11 U.S.C. § 523

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor intentionally injures another without just cause or excuse.

Davis v. Williams (In Re Williams) · filed 1994-10-06(a)(6)

Thus, in this case, to carry her burden of proof of wilfulness and malice for purposes of section 523(a)(6), the plaintiff must demonstrate that the debtor intentionally struck her without just cause or excuse.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a debtor willfully injures a creditor’s property without just cause or excuse.

Williams v. Petersen Construction (In Re Petersen) · filed 1994-11-08(a)(6)

According to the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) the required injury by the debtor to the property of another entity must be “willful and malicious”. ... It is thus found the tools were pawned without just cause or excuse. This amounts to malicious destruction to the plaintiffs property.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a judgment debt nondischargeable when binding state court findings establish that the debtors themselves caused willful and malicious injury.

Richard Piccicuto D/B/A Sheehan's Cafe v. Ralph E. Dwyer, Richard Piccicuto v. Linda L. Rex · filed 1994-11-09(a)(6)

In our view, this ends the matter; the superior court’s unambiguous and factually supported findings must be given effect in this action. Piccicuto therefore should have been awarded summary judgment on his claim that the $742,000 judgment debt is not dis-chargeable in bankruptcy.

Section 523(a)(6) requires intentional injury; reckless disregard may show malice but does not establish willfulness.

Sims v. Morris (In Re Morris) · filed 1994-12-14(a)(6)

Although such a showing may prove maliciousness, it does not demonstrate the intent required under Section 523(a)(6) as it must be established that Defendant acted intentionally with regard to the consequences of his conduct.

Section 523(a)(6) treats an injury as willful when the debtor intended it or knew it was substantially certain to result from the debtor’s acts.

Mills v. Ellerbee (In Re Ellerbee) · filed 1995-01-06(a)(6)

Hence, a willful injury for purposes of section 523(a)(6) is an injury that the debtor intended to cause or that the debtor knew was substantially certain to be the consequence of his acts.

An Indiana battery judgment that establishes intentional conduct can preclude relitigation of willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6).

Staggs v. Forrester (In Re Staggs) · filed 1995-01-19(a)(6)

Thus, the state court’s ultimate finding concerning whether a battery occurred necessarily encompassed both the issue of willfulness (an intentional act, as battery is an intentional tort) and the issue of maliciousness (a wrongful act, an act done in conscious disregard of one’s duties) as those terms are defined by federal law under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that the challenged conduct was legally wrongful.

McCarthy v. McCarthy (In Re McCarthy) · filed 1995-01-26(a)(6)

The language of section 523(a)(6) also requires by implication that the Plaintiff also prove that her actions were “wrongful” in a legal sense.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that the debtor intended the injury or knew it was substantially certain to result from the debtor’s conduct.

Smith v. Assevero (In Re Assevero) · filed 1995-03-02(a)(6)

Hence, even if Debtor willfully and wrongfully failed to perform his duties in compliance with the proper standard of care, it still must be established that he either intended the consequences or knew that injury was substantially certain to result from his conduct.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts damages for sexual harassment from discharge when the debtor’s deliberate, wrongful conduct causes injury without justification or excuse.

Avery v. Sotelo (In Re Sotelo) · filed 1995-03-08(a)(6)

In order for the debt to be nondis-chargeable under § 523(a)(6), Avery must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Sotelo’s actions were “willful and malicious.” ... This court finds that Sotelo’s actions were deliberate and intentional, thereby meeting the “willful” requirement. ... Sotelo’s statements and acts were wrongful. ... Sotelo offered no evidence to justify or excuse his conduct, thus this element is also established. ... Thus, Avery successfully established each of the elements outlined by the BAP in Gee. The remaining question is the amount of Avery’s non-dischargeable claim.

Section 523(a)(6) may except a debt arising from failure to maintain workers’ compensation coverage from discharge when the creditor proves willful and malicious injury.

Nicholson v. Adkins (In re Adkins) · filed 1995-03-08(a)(6)

This court believes that in an appropriate case involving egregious conduct on the part of the debtor, a debt resulting from an intentional failure to comply with a statute requiring the debtor to maintain workers’ compensation coverage may be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6). Whether such a claim, in fact, is nondisehargeable under this rule depends upon the particular facts of each case. Having carefully considered the facts of the present case, the court has concluded that the facts are insufficient to warrant a finding in this case that the plaintiffs claim is nondisehargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a debtor knowingly cancels contractually required insurance and the resulting uninsured damage injures a creditor’s interest in the property.

Barnett Bank of Southeast Georgia, N.A. v. Ussery (In Re Ussery) · filed 1995-03-15(a)(6)

Accordingly, the cost to repair the vehicle, $6,203.61, shall be excepted from Debtor’s discharge as a debt arising from a willful and malicious injury under section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when it results from a debtor’s deliberate act intended to harm the creditor.

North Tel, Inc. v. Brandl (In Re Brandl) · filed 1995-03-24(a)(6)

As a simple comparison between the Eighth Circuit precedent and the fact averments in the Plaintiffs complaint will show, the core fact issues going to “willfulness” and “malice” within the meaning of § 523(a)(6) are identical to those actually raised and decided in the state-court litigation.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for injury from discharge when the debtor intended the injury or committed an intentional act substantially certain to cause it.

In Re Keith WALKER, Debtor. Frank B. HOPE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Keith WALKER, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1995-03-30(a)(6)

Because Congress reenacted section 523(a)(6) in the context of the common law, we conclude that a debtor is responsible for a “willful” injury when hé or she commits an intentional act the purpose of which is to cause injury or which is substantially certain to cause injury.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt nondischargeable when a debtor knowingly disposes of secured property in a way certain to cause the creditor financial harm.

United States v. Recker (In Re Recker) · filed 1995-03-31(a)(6)

These facts establish that Ronald acted “headstrong and knowing” and acted in a way that was certain to cause financial harm to FmHA’s interests in the crop. Appellant acted willfully and maliciously under § 523(a)(6), as the Bankruptcy Court concluded.

Section 523(a)(6) allows a claim for willful and malicious injury based on misrepresentations without requiring proof of every element of actual fraud.

Romesh Japra, M.D., F.A.C.C., Inc. v. Apte (In Re Apte) · filed 1995-04-13(a)(6)

We hold that the bankruptcy court erred in ruling that Dr. Japra could not maintain an action under § 523(a)(6) without proving all the elements of actual fraud.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except damages arising solely from a breach of contract from discharge.

Vaughn v. Quinn (In re Quinn) · filed 1995-04-17(a)(6)

Debts for damages arising solely from a breach of contract are not excepted from discharge under Section 523(a)(6). Thus, the portion of the state court judgment based solely on the breach of contract claim is not excepted from discharge in this case.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts fraud-related punitive damages from discharge when the debtor’s underlying conduct willfully and maliciously injured another.

Klause v. Thompson (In Re Klause) · filed 1995-04-24(a)(6)

The ultimate issue here is whether the fraudulent conduct that was the basis for the instant award of punitive damages was willful and malicious. If it was, then the punitive damages are nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6). If it was not, then they are dischargeable. The court has previously found that the fraudulent conduct was willful and malicious. Therefore the punitive damages in this case are not dischargeable in this bankruptcy.

Section 523 excepts loans obtained by actual fraud and debts arising from willful and malicious conversion of collateral from discharge.

In Re: John F. Foust, Debtor, John F. Foust v. United States · filed 1995-04-20(a)(2)(A), (a)(6)

The bankruptcy court determined Foust had obtained the loans from the SBA and the FmHA by actual fraud, see 11 U.S.C. Sec. 523(a)(2)(A) (1988), and had willfully and maliciously converted the FmHA's security interest in Foust's crops and crop proceeds, see 11 U.S.C. Sec. 523(a)(6) (1988). ... Our review of the record, however, convinces us the bankruptcy court committed no reversible error, and we affirm.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts punitive damages arising from willful and malicious injury from discharge, just as it excepts compensatory damages arising from that conduct.

Brown v. Benson (In Re Benson) · filed 1995-04-27(a)(6)

A debt for punitive damages arising out of willful and malicious conduct that injures another entity of their property is excepted from discharge no less than is a debt for compensatory damages awarded in such instances.

Section 523(a)(6) makes an attorney’s fee award nondischargeable when it is ancillary to a judgment arising from willful and malicious conduct.

Sielschott v. Reimer (In Re Reimer) · filed 1995-05-31(a)(6)

In order to find an award of attorney’s fees nondischargeable under section 523(a)(6), the Court must find that the award is ancillary to a judgment where the conduct of the Debtor was willful and malicious under federal bankruptcy law.

Section 523(a)(6) requires the debtor to intend the resulting injury or know that the conduct is substantially certain to cause it.

Herndon v. Brock (In Re Brock) · filed 1995-06-08(a)(6)

In other words, a showing that the act which caused injury was deliberate or voluntary is insufficient under Section 523(a)(6). It must be established that the defendant intended through his action or omission to cause the resulting injury to plaintiff or that he intentionally engaged in conduct with knowledge that such action or omission was substantially certain to cause such injury.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge only when the debt results from a willful and malicious injury by the debtor.

Sacks v. Reader (In Re Reader) · filed 1995-06-16(a)(6)

In the present case the debt owed to Plaintiff did not result from a willful and malicious tort by the Defendants. The debt arose from a loan or loans.

Section 523(a)(6) bars discharge for a knowing conversion of collateral when the debtor knew the conversion would almost certainly harm the creditor.

In Re James D. FOUST, Debtor. UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. James D. FOUST, Appellee · filed 1995-06-23(a)(6)

Thus, the evidence also supports the bankruptcy court’s finding that James Foust knowingly converted the FmHA’s security interest and knew the conversion would almost certainly harm the FmHA, as required for a willful and malicious conversion under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires both willful conduct and malice; an intentional breach of a financing agreement alone does not establish malice.

Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Rose · filed 1995-06-27(a)(6)

Thus, to prove malice, the creditor must show more than that the debtor intentionally violated the financing agreement, the creditor must show that, in light of the surrounding circumstances, the debtor knew or should have known that his acts would cause financial harm to the creditor.

Section 523 does not except a debt arising from an employer’s failure to maintain workers’ compensation insurance under (a)(4) when the employer is not the employee’s fiduciary, or under (a)(6) when injury is only a possibility.

Parker v. Grzywacz (In Re Grzywacz) · filed 1995-06-06(a)(4), (a)(6)

A breach of a duty does not constitute a defalcation. Moreover, eases have consistently held that an employer with an obligation to obtain workers’ compensation insurance does not serve as a fiduciary for the employee. ... A mere possibility of economic injury in the event of a work-related injury does not satisfy the test for “willful.”

Section 523(a)(6) makes liabilities resulting from willful and malicious conduct nondischargeable, including statutory double and treble damages.

Masters v. Hamama (In re Hamama) · filed 1995-06-14(a)(6)

The Court previously found that the liability of Hamama to Masters for the wage claim and conversion is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6). Generally, all liabilities resulting from the willful and malicious act are non-dischargeable. ... Accordingly, the double damages awarded on the wage claim and the treble damages awarded on the conversion claim are nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) excludes intentional conduct undertaken without just cause or excuse from discharge; a state court malice finding can establish that element through collateral estoppel.

Matter of Garner · filed 1995-06-29(a)(6)

We agree with the district court that the Texas definition of malicious conduct encompasses the intentional conduct undertaken "without just cause or excuse" that we have defined as precluding discharge under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury from discharge.

Montgomery v. Herring (In Re Herring) · filed 1995-06-30(a)(6)

This Court finds that, according to the reliable evidence admitted in this ease, Mr. Herring -willfully and maliciously injured Mr. Montgomery. The debt owed to Mr. Montgomery as a result of that injury is, therefore, not dischargeable in bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) treats a shipowner’s knowing refusal to pay maintenance and cure to an injured seaman as a willful and malicious injury.

Eborn v. Sawyer (In re Sawyer) · filed 1995-07-12(a)(6)

After a careful consideration of the policies protected by § 523(a)(6), this court concludes that a shipowner’s knowing refusal to pay maintenance and cure to an injured seaman is the sort of willful and malicious injury contemplated by the statute.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for injury from discharge when the debtor deliberately commits a wrongful act without just cause that necessarily leads to the injury.

Corley v. Delaney (In re Delaney) · filed 1995-07-28(a)(6)

It is beyond peradventure that loading a twelve gauge, double barreled, sawed-off shotgun and pointing it toward the face of another unarmed person or against a windshield just beyond the face is wrongful and without just cause. The facts also support a finding that the acts were deliberate, intentional and led to the plaintiffs injuries.

Section 523(a)(6) requires the injury-causing act to be willful and malicious; intentional acts preceding an accidental injury do not alone satisfy that requirement.

Delaney v. Corley · filed 1995-08-01(a)(6)

Thus, we are left with the inescapable conclusion that there is no finding of fact to support the decision that the damage causing act of Mr. Delaney was willful and malicious. Hence, the decision of the bankruptcy court is reversed.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts the cost of a home inspection from discharge when the debtor’s representations necessarily caused the buyer to incur that expense.

Starr v. Reynolds (In re Reynolds) · filed 1995-08-18(a)(6)

The evidence has established, however, that the Debtor’s representations did necessarily lead to the Plaintiffs incurring the expense of a home inspection. Therefore, the court finds that pursuant to section 523(a)(6) the cost of the home inspection, in the amount of $250, is non-dischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt from conversion of secured property nondischargeable only when the conversion is both willful and malicious; recklessness is insufficient.

Shelton v. Steering Federal Credit Union · filed 1995-08-29(a)(6)

In summary, the bankruptcy court misconstrued the requirement of section 523(a)(6) that a conversion of secured property be both willful and malicious before it would result in nondischargeability. It essentially applied a “should have known” or a reckless standard. This is what the statute and the courts say cannot be done.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury from discharge; a prior judgment may establish those elements through collateral estoppel.

Newsom v. Moore (In Re Moore) · filed 1995-09-07(a)(6)

In summary, collateral estoppel applies to preclude Defendant from re-litigating the issue of whether her conduct was willful and malicious (Complaint, First, Third and Fourth Causes of Action) for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) in this nondischargeability action.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor intentionally acts without just cause or excuse, consciously disregards a duty, and necessarily causes injury.

Brzys v. Lubanski (In Re Lubanski) · filed 1995-09-08(a)(6)

For the policy considerations stated in McGujfey, this Court finds the standard of constructive or implied malice to be the appropriate standard for defining the term “malicious” under § 523(a)(6) and will follow the majority view in this District that the term “willful and malicious” in § 523(a)(6) means an act intentionally committed, without just cause or excuse, in conscious disregard of one’s duty and that necessarily produces an injury.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt arising from a debtor’s willful and malicious conversion of a creditor’s property and its sale proceeds.

Rentrak Corp. v. Forbes (In Re Forbes) · filed 1995-09-12(a)(6)

Taking into account the totality of the Corporations’ and Debtors’ actions toward Rent-rak, this Court concludes that the Debtors’ conversion of the Rentrak Tapes and the proceeds from the unauthorized sale or disposition of the Rentrak Tapes was both willful and malicious for purposes of §' 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code, as those terms have been defined by. the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Therefore, the Debtors’ obligations to Rentrak are nondisehargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts sanctions for an intentionally filed frivolous appeal from discharge when the conduct necessarily causes harm and lacks just cause or excuse.

Papadakis v. Zelis (In re Zelis) · filed 1995-09-15(a)(6)

The California Court of Appeal found that Zelis had acted intentionally in filing his frivolous appeal of the stipulated judgment. The court ordered sanctions because filing a frivolous appeal necessarily causes harm to the opposing parties by requiring them to incur unnecessary litigation costs and attorneys’ fees, and by delaying final resolution of the dispute. Likewise, a court generally orders sanctions only when the party’s conduct has been particularly abusive and there is no justification or excuse for the behavior. Thus, the BAP’s conclusion that the California Court of Appeal found Zelis’ conduct to be willful and malicious is fully supported. The BAP correctly concluded that the sanction is nondischargeable under section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor deliberately acts to injure a creditor and the conduct is certain or almost certain to cause financial harm.

Eldridge v. Waugh · filed 1995-10-10(a)(6)

If there is a debt against Waugh individually in connection with the $3 million consent judgment against RFTC stemming from the accident, the Court finds that it has not been discharged in bankruptcy because it falls within the willful and malicious exception to dischargeability.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor willfully and maliciously injures a creditor by knowingly concealing an account error and borrowing against stock the account does not own.

Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Printy (In Re Printy) · filed 1995-10-13(a)(6)

The Court has sufficient evidence from which to find that the Debtor willfully and maliciously injured Dean Witter by withholding from it information that he had a duty to disclose and by both borrowing and withdrawing funds from the margin account based upon a loan availability derived from Coastal Health Care stock, which he knew the Trust did not own.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof of both willful and malicious injury; an intentional sale of collateral alone does not make the debt nondischargeable.

American General Finance v. Taylor (In Re Taylor) · filed 1995-10-19(a)(6)

There is no dispute that the act of selling the dinette chair was deliberate and intentional, but the plaintiff has not demonstrated to this Court that the act was malicious. Thus, the plaintiff has in this matter satisfied the first prong of § 523(a)(6), but has failed to carry his burden as pertaining to the second prong.

Section 523(a)(6) requires an intentional and deliberate act resulting in injury; negligence does not establish willful and malicious injury.

Wells v. Jennings (In Re Jennings) · filed 1995-10-24(a)(6)

Minimally, the standard of willful and malicious injury under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) requires that a plaintiff allege and prove an intentional and deliberate act resulting in injury to person or property. The amended complaint alleges no affirmative act; it alleges no intention to injure property of Plaintiff. The amended complaint alleges, albeit in stark terms, that Defendant was negligent in the care and maintenance of her property.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge only if the debtor’s act causing injury was both willful and malicious.

P & S X-Ray Co. v. Dawes (In Re Dawes) · filed 1995-11-30(a)(6)

The Court holds that the Debtor’s actions, though willful because intentional, were not malicious or without just cause or excuse for purposes of § 523(a)(6), and thus, PSX has failed to prove that the Debtor converted its property.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof of a willful and malicious injury by the debtor; a discrimination judgment and punitive damages against another person do not alone establish nondischargeability.

Jones v. Graham (In Re Graham) · filed 1995-12-05(a)(6)

Thus, the verdict as to punitive damages does not meet plaintiff’s burden of proving that this is a debt for willful and malicious injury by the debtor.

Section 523(a)(6) requires the debtor to intend the injury or know that the injury is substantially certain to result from the debtor’s act.

Taneff v. Hoehn (In Re Taneff) · filed 1996-01-03(a)(6)

A willful injury under § 523(a)(6) requires an action that the debtor intended for the purpose of causing injury or that the debtor knew was substantially certain to result in injury.

Section 523(a)(6) requires willful and malicious conduct; failure to perform a commercial contract alone does not satisfy that requirement.

Grand Promenade v. Twersky (In Re Twersky) · filed 1996-01-05(a)(6)

As to plaintiffs claim based on section 523(a)(6), there is no evidence of wilful and malicious conduct on Dr. Twersky’s part. ... Dr. Twersky’s conduct falls into the category of a garden variety breach of contract in a transaction between two parties acting at arms’ length in a commercial setting, not wilful and malicious behavior.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a separate showing of malice; a finding that the debtor acted intentionally and without justification does not establish it.

Princess House, Inc. v. Kraft (In re Kraft) · filed 1996-01-30(a)(6)

Such finding — without more — does not translate into a holding that debtor acted both willfully and maliciously. Therefore, I cannot find that the issue of debtor’s malicious conduct was actually litigated in the District Court case.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a sanctions debt nondischargeable when a debtor deliberately and wrongfully prosecutes a baseless lawsuit that causes the opposing party to incur defense costs.

Haeske v. Arlington (In Re Arlington) · filed 1996-02-06(a)(6)

Mary’s actions in filing and prosecuting the personal injury action against Richard were willful because they were deliberate and intentional. Her actions were also malicious for purposes of § 523(a)(6) because they were wrongful and found to be without just cause, which resulted in entry of the Sanctions Order against her.

Section 523(a)(6) makes all damages arising from a willful and malicious injury nondischargeable, including compensatory and punitive damages.

Corn v. Marks (In Re Marks) · filed 1996-02-12(a)(6)

The compensation for Corn’s rights in the Corporation related to Marks’ willful and malicious conduct: all damages, compensatory and punitive, arising from this conduct are nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge for willful and malicious injury only when the debtor’s intentional act necessarily causes the injury.

Labonte v. Hall (In Re Hall) · filed 1996-02-15(a)(6)

That is, the willful and malicious act must necessarily cause the injury. There is no claim here that the debtor willfully caused the personal injury, and the debtor’s willful failure to buy worker’s compensation insurance did not “necessarily” cause injury to appellant.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts punitive damages from discharge when they flow from a debtor’s willful and malicious injury.

Rossi, McCreery & Assoc., Inc. v. Abbo (In Re Abbo) · filed 1996-03-01(a)(6)

The punitive damages awarded to Rossi are also nondischargeable because they flow from the Debtor’s willful and malicious actions.

Section 523(a)(6) does not prevent discharge based on a debtor's transfer of property to which the creditor had no legal claim.

Bayshore v. Evans · filed 1996-02-15(a)(6)

Additionally, the bankruptcy court determined that Bayshore had no cause of action under § 523(a)(6) because Bayshore had no legal claim to the cashier's checks at the time that D. Evans transferred them to TCB. We agree with the lower courts that, on the facts presented, the transfer of the two cashier's checks to TCB did not justify denial of discharge under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires facts supporting wrongful conversion to except a debt arising from disposal of secured goods from discharge.

Sears v. Goycochea (In Re Goycochea) · filed 1996-03-04(a)(6)

While Sears’ complaint has numerous conelusory statements to the effect that the defendant willfully, deliberately and maliciously converted property in which Sears asserts an interest, the facts set forth do not support a finding of non-dischargeability pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt from a debtor’s unauthorized sale of secured collateral nondischargeable when the sale is willful and malicious.

Allied Credit Corp. v. Giffen (In Re Giffen) · filed 1996-03-06(a)(6)

The Court finds that defendants’ sale of the collateral was willful and malicious and that the outstanding debt ($1,480.18) should be nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not prevent discharge when a debtor's conduct is consistent with a reasonable interpretation of rights under a security agreement.

In Re Joseph M. Bonfiglio, Jr., Debtor. Harkema Associates, Inc. v. Joseph M. Bonfiglio, Jr. · filed 1996-04-03(a)(6)

After reviewing the record and briefs, we are fully satisfied that Bonfiglio's conduct was consistent with a reasonable interpretation of his reserved rights under the security agreement, particularly paragraphs 3 and 7 thereof. That conduct, in our view and that of the district court, falls far short of the rigorous standards for withholding discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge when the debtor's conduct was not willful and malicious.

Adams v. Zentz · filed 1996-04-04(a)(6)

The Bankruptcy Court specifically found that Zentz's attorney fee debt to Adams was not ... a result of "willful and malicious" conduct by Zentz so as to be non- dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), and the District Court affirmed this finding. ... Having carefully considered the record, we conclude that no error of law or fact appears, and we affirm the judgment of the District Court for the reasons set forth in its well-reasoned opinion.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge debts arising from an intentional conversion that causes willful and malicious injury.

Burmeister v. Wilcox (In Re Wilcox) · filed 1996-04-09(a)(6)

Intentional conversion of property can be an injury under § 523(a)(6). Wilcox’s conversion of the co-owners’ share of proceeds constitutes willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires an unjustified act taken with knowledge that it will cause particularized injury.

Albert v. Albert (In Re Albert) · filed 1996-04-09(a)(6)

A willful or malicious injury occurs in the context of § 523(a)(6) when the debtor, without justification or excuse, and with knowledge that his acts will cause particularized injury, nonetheless acts and causes such injury.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a prior judgment establishes that the debtor willfully and maliciously injured another’s property.

Charles E. Smith, J r . v. Maynes · filed 1996-05-15(a)(6)

Because the findings of the state court constitute a finding that appellant acted willfully and maliciously within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), and because those findings must be given preclusive effect in appellant's bankruptcy proceeding, the $5000 debt owed by appellant to appellee is not dischargeable as a matter of law.

Section 523(a)(6) requires the debtor to have caused the willful and malicious injury; a child’s conduct cannot be imputed to the debtor.

Deroche v. Miller (In Re Miller) · filed 1996-06-04(a)(6)

In Section 523(a)(6), the phrase “by the debtor” follows the phrase “for willful and malicious injury”. Thus, the plain meaning test requires that the debtor must have been the one who caused the willful and malicious injury. Imputed liability is insufficient.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for willful and malicious injury from discharge, and a prior judgment can establish those elements when they were actually litigated and determined.

Hayduk v. Page (In Re Page) · filed 1996-06-13(a)(6)

Having found that both willfulness and maliciousness were actually litigated and determined in the underlying action, the parties are barred from relitigating those issues here. Collateral estoppel mandates a finding that both those elements exist. As such, the judgment held by the Plaintiff against Defendant is nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires both willful and malicious injury to except a debt from discharge; malice requires conduct targeted at the creditor.

Princess House, Inc. v. Kraft (In Re Kraft) · filed 1996-06-27(a)(6)

As announced at the hearing, Princess House failed to prove that debtor was motivated by a desire to cause economic harm or that her actions were targeted at Princess House. ... I find that plaintiff has not met its burden of showing that debtor acted with malice.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a creditor to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the debtor acted willfully and maliciously.

AVCO Financial Services of Southern California, Inc. v. Cruz (In Re Cruz) · filed 1996-07-10(a)(6)

To prevail under this section, a creditor has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the debtors acted both willfully and maliciously.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a creditor to prove both willful and malicious injury to except a debt from discharge.

Huntington Center Partners, Ltd. v. Dupree (In Re Dupree) · filed 1996-07-11(a)(6)

It must first be noted that the use of the conjunctive in the phrase “willful and malicious” places a burden upon Huntington to establish both prongs of the test in order for the Court to determine that the debt is nondischargeable pursuant to section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge when the debtor had no personal involvement in the injury and acted, at worst, negligently.

Brown v. Sanford · filed 1996-07-11(a)(6)

We conclude that the court's factual finding that Sanford did not personally sell any drinks to Reasoner is not clearly erroneous, and agree with its holding that Sanford's actions, because he had no personal involvement, were not willful, but rather, at worst, negligent.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a deliberate trespass has aggravating features, including continued injury after the debtor’s workcrew learns of the trespass.

Bairstow v. Sullivan (In Re Sullivan) · filed 1996-07-23(a)(6)

The conduct also contained aggravating features making it malicious. The trespass and injurious activities continued for several months after it was brought to the attention of the Debtor’s workcrew a trespass existed. I therefore conclude the conduct was willful and malicious within the meaning of section 523(a)(6), and hence nondisehargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts damages for willful and malicious injury from discharge, but punitive damages remain dischargeable when the jury may have based them on recklessness.

Ratcliff v. Ratcliff (In re Ratcliff) · filed 1996-08-19(a)(6)

There is no question that the jury award of actual damages in the amount of $100,000 for the debtor’s shooting of Jane is nondisehargeable as a willful and malicious injury under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). ... Here, because the punitive damages portion of the award may have been premised on recklessness rather than willful and malicious conduct, the award of punitive damages must be considered a dischargeable debt.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt nondischargeable when a debtor deliberately diverts funds and the circumstances show malice, even if the debtor does not know the funds belong to the creditor.

In Re Michael Anthony Stelluti and Joanne Stelluti, Debtors. Navistar Financial Corporation v. Michael Anthony Stelluti, · filed 1996-08-28(a)(6)

Accordingly, Ms. Stelluti’s conduct in transferring $480,000 of the proceeds to new accounts in Connecticut was willful and malicious within the meaning of § 523(a)(6). Her actions in diverting these funds injured Nav-istar Financial, since Navistar Financial was hindered from receiving any of these funds, which subsequently were used by the Stellu-tis for their own benefit. Thus, the district court properly affirmed the order of the bankruptcy court that found that Ms. Stellu-ti’s debt to Navistar Financial in the amount of $480,000 was nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge merely because secured collateral is missing; the creditor must prove willful and malicious injury.

Orix Credit Alliance, Inc. v. Cole (In Re Cole) · filed 1996-08-30(a)(6)

The evidence in this record simply confirms that the collateral is missing. Taken in the most charitable light, the record lacks sufficient strength to establish a claim under § 523(a)(6), and the evidence presented is equally balanced.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a contingent debt from discharge when the debtor knowingly acts in a way certain to harm the creditor.

Waugh v. Eldridge · filed 1996-09-12(a)(6)

Section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a debt may not be discharged when the debtor has willfully and maliciously injured another entity or the property of another entity. ... We hold that the bankruptcy court's finding that Waugh did not act willfully and maliciously with respect to the Eldridges was clearly erroneous, and we affirm the district court's judgment holding that Waugh's contingent debt to the Eldridges was not discharged in bankruptcy.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof of an intent to injure; selling secured property without recalling the creditor’s security interest does not satisfy that requirement.

Spencer v. Blanchard (In Re Blanchard) · filed 1996-09-23(a)(6)

We therefore conclude, with little hesitancy, that the facts of this case do not rise to the level necessary to prevent the discharge-ability of the Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to § 523(a)(6). Neither the direct evidence presented nor the circumstantial evidence in this case has proven that the Debtors acted with an intent to injure the Plaintiffs.

Section 523(a)(6) covers willful and malicious economic injury, and a factual dispute about the debtor’s intent can preclude summary judgment on dischargeability.

Marine Midland Bank v. Portnoy (In Re Portnoy) · filed 1996-10-07(a)(6)

Section 523(a)(6) includes willful and malicious economic injury to an entity. ... Here, the issue of the debtor’s true intent is disputed, and Marine has come forward with reasonable evidence sufficient to raise an inference that the debt- or maliciously intended to injure Marine. Therefore, an issue of material fact exists and summary judgment in the debtor’s favor is not warranted.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt arising from a debtor’s intentional, unjustified conversion of another’s property, up to the property’s value at conversion.

Avco Financial Services of Alabama, Inc. v. Alexander (In Re Alexander) · filed 1996-10-10(a)(6)

Thus, conversion of another’s property, without his knowledge or consent, done intentionally and without justification or excuse, is a willful and malicious injury within the meaning of section 523(a)(6). ... Accordingly, the debtors’ willful and malicious conversion of Avco’s collateral is due to be excepted from discharge to the extent of $3,000.00.

Section 523(a)(6) prevents discharge of a debt arising from a debtor’s willful and malicious injury to another person or that person’s property.

Waugh v. Eldridge · filed 1996-10-11(a)(6)

Section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a debt may not be discharged when the debtor has willfully and maliciously injured another entity or the property of another entity. ... We hold that the bankruptcy court's finding that Waugh did not act willfully and maliciously with respect to the Eldridges was clearly erroneous, and we affirm the district court's judgment holding that Waugh's contingent debt to the Eldridges was not discharged in bankruptcy.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except from discharge purely financial loss from a breach of contract induced by oral misrepresentations about the debtor’s financial condition.

McCrary v. Barrack (In Re Barrack) · filed 1996-10-15(a)(6)

Allowing a debt that fails under Section 523(a)(2)(B) for lack of writing to escape discharge under Section 523(a)(6) would ignore the obvious attempt by Congress to require a writing to except a debt of this nature from discharge. In this case the legislative intent can be respected without doing damage to the language of the statute. Injury to the entity or property of the entity will not be interpreted to include the purely financial loss which flows from a breach of contract.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except an uninsured vehicle owner’s accident liability from discharge when the owner neither intended injury nor acted with substantial certainty of causing it.

Choi v. Brown (In Re Brown) · filed 1996-10-17(a)(6)

We find that Vogan’s conduct, including her failure to maintain insurance, does not qualify as a willful and mahcious act under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not bar discharge of a malpractice debt when the debtor acted recklessly but did not intend to injure the patient.

In Re Paul W. Geiger, Debtor. Paul W. Geiger v. Margaret Kawaauhau and Solomon Kawaauhau · filed 1996-10-18(a)(6)

The evidence showed only that Dr. Geiger failed to save Mrs. Kawaauhau’s leg from the ravages of an infection, not that he intended to harm her. In other words, his efforts to treat Mrs. Kawaauhau were not calculated to result in the loss of her leg, and were therefore not malicious. The judgment debt is therefore properly dischargeable in bankruptcy.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts an injury debt from discharge when the debtor intended the injury or intentionally acted with substantial certainty of causing it.

Corley v. Delaney · filed 1996-10-21(a)(6)

It represents the first occasion for us to address the dischargeability, under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), of a judgment debt arising from a debtor's accidental firing of a firearm—albeit one which he intentionally loads and carries to a confrontation—that causes unintended bodily injury to his eventual judgment creditor. Agreeing with the district court to which both the initial and post-remand rulings of the bankruptcy court were appealed, as well as with the majority of circuit courts that have directly addressed this issue, we hold that such debts are dischargeable, and therefore affirm the post-remand ruling of the bankruptcy court to that effect.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge debts arising from deliberate conduct intended to cause injury or substantially certain to cause injury.

Liccio v. Topakas (In Re Topakas) · filed 1996-11-20(a)(6)

Thus, we conclude that the facts of this case do rise to the level necessary to prevent the dischargeability of the claims under § 523(a)(6). Both the direct evidence presented and the circumstantial evidence in this ease sufficiently prove that the Debtor acted with an intent to injure the Plaintiff. Consequently, the Plaintiff has satisfied her burden of proving that the Debtor acted willfully and maliciously.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge only if it results from the debtor’s own willful and malicious injury.

Consolidated Bank & Trust Co. v. Kaestner (In Re Kaestner) · filed 1996-11-22(a)(6)

To be excepted from discharge, a debt must result from the debtor’s willful and malicious action. The debt sought by plaintiff did not result from any conduct of debtor and cannot be asserted against debtor as a willful and malicious injury.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge based solely on imputing another person’s willful and malicious acts to the debtor.

Columbia Farms Distribution, Inc. v. Maltais (In Re Maltais) · filed 1996-12-02(a)(6)

This Court agrees with the majority who have ruled that non-dischargeability of a debt under § 523(a)(6) cannot be grounded on the imputation to the debtor of the acts of another.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor intended the injury or intentionally acted in a way substantially certain to cause it.

Corley v. Delaney (In re Delaney) · filed 1996-12-09(a)(6)

Accordingly, today we reaffirm our place in the circuit majority identified in In re Walker by holding that, for willfulness and malice to prevent discharge under § 523(a)(6), the debtor must have intended the actual injury that resulted.

Section 523(a)(6) requires both willful conduct and malicious injury; violating a security agreement alone does not make a debt nondischargeable.

Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Crisafi (In re Crisafi) · filed 1996-12-11(a)(6)

Accordingly, although the sale of the collateral may have been a violation of the security agreement, the violation alone is not sufficient to make the Debtor’s obligation to Plaintiff nondischargeable pursuant to Section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a negligence judgment from discharge merely because the debtor intentionally drove without required liability insurance; the debtor must have intended the injury or acted with substantial certainty of causing it.

Broussard v. Fields (In Re Fields) · filed 1996-12-13(a)(6)

Accordingly, the Court finds that the Judgment Debt is not excepted from discharge under section 523(a)(6), because by operating his motor vehicle without liability insurance, Defendant did not intend the actual bodily injuries and property damage suffered by Plaintiff, and because such operation was not substantially certain to cause Plaintiff’s injuries.

A punitive damages verdict can establish malice under § 523(a)(6) when the jury necessarily found conduct substantially equivalent to the section’s malice standard.

Easley v. Dulek (In Re Warren) · filed 1996-12-31(a)(6)

There is no substantial difference between the 10th Circuit’s formula and the jury instruction. “Willfull disregard” (10th Circ.) is equivalent to “aware, or did not care” (jury); “reasonably foreseeable that conduct will result in injury” (10th Circ.) is equivalent to “high probability that conduct would cause serious harm” (jury). To award $10,000 in punitive damages against Warren, the jury must have found the substantial equivalent of “malice” for purposes of § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) allows a creditor to pursue a claim that disposing of secured collateral caused willful and malicious injury when the evidence raises a genuine issue for trial.

American General Finance, Inc. v. Burnside (In Re Burnside) · filed 1997-01-21(a)(6)

Plaintiff has shown through the Defendant’s own testimony that collateral was disposed of in violation of the security agreement. Defendant clearly cannot prevail upon summary judgment, as a genuine issue is clearly shown under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt from conversion nondischargeable when the debtor acts with a subjective, conscious intent to harm the creditor.

Centerre Bank of Neosho v. Major (In Re Major) · filed 1984-09-06(a)(6)

Section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code makes liabilities based on wilful and malicious conversion nondischargeable in bankruptcy. ... These decisions require a showing of a “subjective, conscious” intention to harm the plaintiff, an actual evil intention, as opposed to “legal malice” which is demonstrable by evidence of an intentional violation of a known right of the plaintiff.

Section 523(a)(6) does not bar discharge based on a creditor’s fraudulent transfer remedies when the creditor has no property interest in the transferred assets.

In Re Vergil Saylor Roberta Saylor, Debtors. Phillip Quarre, Trustee of the Quarre Marital Trust v. Robert · filed 1997-03-03(a)(6)

Quarre’s claim that he possesses a property interest in the fraudulent transfer remedies provided by state law does not fit within the definitions of either “debt” or “property” for purposes of section 523(a)(6), and runs counter to the long-standing principle that exceptions to dischargeability are to be narrowly construed.

Section 523(a)(6) can make a judgment for sexual battery nondischargeable.

In Re Larry Arnold Wall, Debtor. Larry Arnold Wall v. Wellema · filed 1997-02-20(a)(6)

Wall contends that the district court erred by finding that the state court judgment rendered against him for sexual battery against Wellema was not dischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d), and we affirm for the reasons set forth in the district court's order filed April 28, 1995.

Section 523(a)(6) does not make a judgment for injuries caused by negligent driving nondischargeable merely because the debtor drove without required liability insurance.

Westfall v. Glass (In Re Glass) · filed 1997-03-07(a)(6)

The inescapable conclusion is that for the debt in question to be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6), the Debtor’s negligent driving must have been willful and malicious. ... Consequently, the debt represented by the judgment is dischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof of both willful and malicious injury; a mechanic’s lien filed in good faith has just cause, and a duplicate lien filed by mistake lacks willfulness.

Brown v. Simonis (In re Simonis) · filed 1997-03-19(a)(6)

Thus, Brown failed to demonstrate either that Si-monis filed each individual lien without the just cause of subjectively believing Brown owed him funds, or that Simonis filed the cumulative liens with intent to do so. As a result, the evidence establishes neither maliciousness with regard to the former acts, nor willfulness with regard to the latter. Consequently, Brown’s allegations lodged under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) must fail.

Under § 523(a)(6), a deliberate failure to obtain required insurance is not malicious unless it necessarily leads to or is substantially certain to cause harm.

Pratt v. Pourdas (In Re Pourdas) · filed 1997-03-25(a)(6)

Regretfully, however, the Court must find that debtor’s failure to obtain the required insurance was not malicious within the meaning of § 523(a)(6). In order to find malice, the act in question — here, the failure to insure — must necessarily lead to or be substantially certain to cause harm.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt caused by a debtor’s willful and malicious diversion of proceeds in which a creditor has an enforceable property interest.

In Re McAllister · filed 1997-04-16(a)(6)

This selfserving decision to pay one creditor rather than HOC satisfies both the willful and malicious requirements of section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof of deliberate or intentional injury to property; high mileage without a contractual restriction does not establish it.

First Citizens National Bank v. Bryan (In re Bryan) · filed 1997-04-17(a)(6)

In order to meet its burden, the Bank must establish that any damage to the car caused by the debtor was deliberate or intentional. ... As a result, the Court concludes that the Bank did not prove its case under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires a debtor's claimed good motives to be assessed for objective reasonableness when deciding whether an injury was malicious.

In Re Steven Gregory Bammer, Debtor. James M. Murray v. Bammer · filed 1997-05-06(a)(6)

A debtor is not free to injure others maliciously, however, and escape liability for his actions by pleading that he subjectively held a belief that his actions would lead to good. Instead, the debtor's subjectively held beliefs are examined for their objective reasonableness.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a deliberate or intentional injury; a deliberate act that merely causes injury does not suffice.

Geiger v. Kawaauhau · filed 1997-05-14(a)(6)

Second, the word “willful” in the statute (which Congress has said means “deliberate or intentional”) modifies the word “injury,” so that what is required for nondischargeability is a deliberate or intentional injury, not merely a deliberate or intentional act.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor’s deliberate, wrongful acts are substantially certain to cause injury, even without personal ill will.

Wright v. Bujnowski (In Re Wright) · filed 1997-05-19(a)(6)

Because Wright’s acts were willful and malicious as defined under Section 523(a)(6), the Bankruptcy Court correctly denied Wright’s petition to discharge the debt at issue.

Section 523(a)(6) covers willful and malicious injury even when the injury is not physical.

McComas v. Rosenberger (In Re Rosenberger) · filed 1997-05-15(a)(6)

However, an injury under § 523(a)(6) is not limited to bodily injury or physical abuse.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a debtor willfully and maliciously disposes of collateral securing it.

Raymond v. Raymond (In Re Raymond) · filed 1997-05-30(a)(6)

Although this is a close ease, I find that plaintiff has earned his burden to establish that the debtor acted willfully and maliciously in disposing of the IRA. The sum of $15,000.00 will therefore be excepted from debtor’s discharge.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge when a creditor fails to prove that the debtor sold collateral intending, or knowing the sale was substantially certain, to cause injury.

Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Pugliese (In Re Pugliese) · filed 1997-07-15(a)(6)

The Plaintiff has not established the Debtor sold the merchandise with the purpose of producing harm or the knowledge that he was substantially certain the sale of the merchandise would injure Sears. Furthermore, the Plaintiff has not demonstrated how the disposition of this collateral caused injury to Sears. Without further proof, this Court finds Debtor’s actions did not result in willful and malicious injury to Sears. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs claim fails, § 523(a)(6) does not except the Debtor’s debt from discharge.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a willful and malicious injury; recognizing a strong probability of serious harm does not establish willfulness.

Building Link, Inc. v. Rownd (In Re Rownd) · filed 1997-07-16(a)(6)

For a debt to be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6), the debt must be for an injury that was both willful and malicious. ... A finding that there was a strong probability that the plaintiff would be seriously harmed is close to the reckless disregard standard that the Fourth Circuit recognized as not being “willful” and would not support nondischargeability under 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not make a debt for selling collateral nondischargeable when the debtor did not know of the creditor’s security interest.

Household Retail Services, Inc. v. Wincher (In re Wincher) · filed 1997-06-12(a)(6)

Concededly, defendant sold collateral of plaintiff. That, however, is insufficient to establish a basis for denying discharge on grounds of § 523(a)(6). ... We hold, therefore, that defendant’s act of selling furniture which he had purchased from Art Van does not constitute a willful and malicious act.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that the debtor knew the published statements were false; reckless disregard alone does not make a libel debt nondischargeable.

Langan v. Evers (In Re Evers) · filed 1997-07-01(a)(6)

Reckless disregard may be sufficient to establish libel but it is not sufficient to establish maliciousness under § 523(a)(6). The plaintiff must prove more for nondischargeability purposes. He has to show that the defendant knew the articles were false when they were published.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a judgment for malicious prosecution nondischargeable when the debtor's conduct was willful and malicious.

In Re: Robert Wilson · filed 1997-06-16(a)(6)

To prevail in state court, of necessity, Baldino would have to prove that Wilson acted maliciously. If she is ultimately successful and eventually obtains a judgment, it would be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6) as a debt incurred by the debtor's willful and malicious conduct.

Section 523(a)(6) covers a debt for sexual battery when intentional, offensive touching causes harm, even without HIV infection.

Robinson v. Louie (In Re Louie) · filed 1997-09-02(a)(6)

To the extent Robinson was harmed by this offensive touching, the allegations of sexual battery thus state a basis for nondischarge-ability under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not make property damage caused by drunk driving nondischargeable on that fact alone; the debtor must have intended injury or acted with substantial certainty of causing it.

Ammons v. Edwards (In Re Edwards) · filed 1997-08-29(a)(6)

We agree with Collier’s analysis and hold that it is impossible to find, on this record describing no conduct of Michael except his drunken driving, that Michael can be found to have had a purpose of injuring the Plaintiffs or to have had a “substantial certainty” of producing injury to them.

Section 523(a)(6) does not require subjective ill will to establish malice for a willful injury debt.

Cox v. Bast (In Re Bast) · filed 1997-09-02(a)(6)

Although, Plaintiffs assert that Defendant acted with an actual evil and rancorous motive, nondischargeability under Section 523(a)(6) does not require such a specific finding. A Debtor may be found to have acted with malice for purposes of this section without a finding of subjective ill will towards the creditor.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when it arises from an intentional act that necessarily causes harm and lacks just cause or excuse.

In Re: John William Hibbs Debtors, Demetrios James Sophos v. John William Hibbs Sandra Burris Hibbs · filed 1997-09-05(a)(6)

The Bankruptcy Code bars discharge of debts resulting from "willful and malicious" injury by the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). ... Because there was not just cause or excuse for Hibbs's intentional infringement of Sophos's copyright, and because the infringement necessarily caused harm, the bankruptcy court did not err by that finding that Hibbs's debt was nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except an employer’s debt from discharge solely because the employer failed to carry workers’ compensation insurance.

Roumeliots v. Popa (In Re Popa) · filed 1997-10-03(a)(6)

An employer’s failure to carry workers’ compensation insurance is not be deemed “willful” or “malicious” as a matter of law. Therefore, an employer’s responsibility to pay workers’ compensation award does not come within the exception for discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that a debtor who converts collateral knew and intended that the act would harm the creditor’s interest.

Security Bank v. Wehri (In Re Wehri) · filed 1997-09-09(a)(6)

Whether intent to harm is a measure of willfulness or of malice or of both, it remains an element that must, in conversion cases, be established by proof that a debtor acted with knowledge and intent that the creditor’s interest would be harmed as a consequence of the act.

Section 523(a)(2), (a)(4), and (a)(6) require scienter or mal-intent beyond simple conversion to make a debt nondischargeable.

First American Title Insurance v. Eberhart (In Re Eberhart) · filed 1997-10-14(a)(2), (a)(4), (a)(6)

However, because a requisite level of scienter or mal-intent, in addition to simple conversion, is required to establish a debt as nondischargeable under Subsection 523(a)(2), (a)(4), ... or (a)(6), ... the application of collateral ... estoppel in this ease does not provide a basis for establishing those material issues of scienter.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a willful injury that is also malicious; a lawful withdrawal from a joint account is not malicious merely because it is intentional.

King v. King (In Re King) · filed 1997-10-23(a)(6)

For these reasons the Plaintiffs withdrawal of funds from the Deposit Account was not “malicious” as that term is utilized in Section 523(a)(6). Accordingly, the Defendant does not have a claim against the Plaintiff arising from the nature of his conduct with respect to the Deposit Account, and judgment shall enter in the Plaintiffs favor on the Defendant’s counterclaim.

Section 523(a)(6) does not allow compassion for a family member to excuse a willful, malicious injury to a creditor.

In Re Steven Gregory Bammer, Debtor. James M. Murray v. Bammer · filed 1997-11-20(a)(6)

Accordingly, we hold that the financial injury Bammer inflicted on Murray was malicious, and that Bam-mer’s debt to Murray shall not be discharged in bankruptcy.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when deliberate and unjustified sexual harassment and retaliatory termination cause injury.

Biggers v. Wilson (In Re Wilson) · filed 1997-11-25(a)(6)

The debtor’s conduct was both willful and malicious, and the debtor’s liability to the plaintiff is excepted from the debtor’s discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt arising from negligent legal malpractice from discharge without deliberate, intentional conduct in knowing disregard of the client’s rights.

Ruben v. Harper (In Re Harper) · filed 1997-11-25(a)(6)

However, the negligent misplacement or misunderstanding of client contact information which later results in injury to the client, without additional facts indicating a deliberate, intentional, and knowing disregard of the rights of the client, does not rise to the level of nondischargeability.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for injury to a creditor’s security interest from discharge when the debtor acts deliberately and in knowing disregard of the creditor’s rights.

Wilson v. Key · filed 1997-12-11(a)(6)

To establish that Key's debt to Wilson should be excepted from dis- charge under this section Wilson must prove that Key willfully and maliciously injured Wilson's security interest in the property of SMR. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). Wilson must therefore prove that Key acted deliberately and in knowing disregard of Wilson's rights.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a debtor deliberately withholds settlement proceeds assigned to a creditor, willfully and maliciously injuring the creditor’s property.

Pollock v. Gandara (In Re Gandara) · filed 1997-12-19(a)(6)

Similar to the facts in Raymond, this deliberate conversion of Dr. Pollock’s property constitutes maliciousness within the meaning of § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for willful and malicious conversion of a secured creditor’s collateral nondischargeable.

United Orient Bank v. Green · filed 1997-12-23(a)(6)

“Willful and malicious conversion clearly falls within” Section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(2)(A) excepts debts arising from actual fraud from discharge, and § 523(a)(6) excepts debts arising from willful and malicious injury.

First Centennial Title Co. v. Bailey (In Re Bailey) · filed 1997-12-29(a)(2)(A), (a)(6)

We hold therefore that defendants’ debt to plaintiff in the amount of $22,123.00 is nondisehargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(2)(A), for actual fraud. ... We therefore also hold that the debt owed by defendants to plaintiff in the amount of $22,123.00 to be nondisehargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a defamation debt from discharge when the debtor intentionally publishes a defamatory statement, knows it is substantially certain to cause harm, and has no just cause or excuse.

Mustaine v. Kennedy (In Re Kennedy) · filed 1998-01-15(a)(6)

With that definition in mind, the creditor seeking the § 523(a)(6) nondischargeability determination must demonstrate: (1) the debtor intentionally published a defamatory statement; (2) the debtor knew that the defamatory statement was substantially certain to harm the person about whom the statement concerned; and (3) there was no just cause or excuse for making the statement.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a debtor intentionally withholds proceeds from secured inventory sales, causing willful and malicious injury to the creditor.

John Deere Co. v. Deresinski (In Re Deresinski) · filed 1998-01-05(a)(6)

Defendant knew payment was due to Plaintiff and believed payment had been received from Omni-Quip’s customer, yet he intentionally failed to remit any proceeds to the plaintiff. This constitutes conversion and establishes a willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) permits malice to be imputed from a debtor’s deliberate, repeated violations of court orders that injure another.

Bundy American Corp. v. Blankfort (In Re Blankfort) · filed 1998-01-29(a)(6)

The District Court finding of “blatant and willful” contempt of court orders by the defendants, including the Debtor, which is binding upon this Court under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, constitutes the type of aggravated misconduct which warrants an imputation of malice within the meaning of section 523(a)(6).

For § 523(a)(6), malice can be shown by conscious disregard of duties or action without just cause or excuse.

Lynn v. Cline (In re Cline) · filed 1998-02-20(a)(6)

To prove that the Debtor acted with malice, the Creditor need only prove that the Debtor acted “in conscious disregard of [his] duties”, or “without just cause or excuse”.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for intentional injuries from discharge, but does not cover injuries inflicted recklessly or negligently.

Kawaauhau v. Geiger · filed 1998-03-03(a)(6)

We hold that debts arising from recklessly or negligently inflicted injuries do not fall within the compass of § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for conversion of collateral from discharge only if the debtor desired to injure the creditor or believed injury was substantially certain to result.

AVCO Financial Services of Billings v. Kidd (In Re Kidd) · filed 1998-03-23(a)(6)

Thus, following the aforementioned reasoning and pursuant to the Supreme Court’s holding in Kawaauhau, a creditor, in order to prevail under § 523(a)(6), must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence, that the debtor desired to cause the injury complained of, or that the debtor believed that the consequences were substantially certain to result from the debtors acts.

Section 523(a)(6) requires both an intentional injury and conduct targeted at the creditor for a debt to be excepted from discharge.

Allstate Insurance v. Dziuk (In Re Dziuk) · filed 1998-04-01(a)(6)

As a result, in order for Allstate to prevail on a § 523(a)(6) claim, it must demonstrate that it suffered injury as a result of an intentional tort by Dziuk (i.e., Dziuk’s actions were willful) and that Dziuk’s actions were targeted at Hockema (i.e., Dziuk’s actions were also malicious).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor intentionally and maliciously injures another person.

Ludwig v. Martino (In Re Martino) · filed 1998-04-06(a)(6)

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant intentionally and maliciously caused the plaintiff to be injured. ... Based on the State Court Decision, the Court holds that the debt owed to her by the defendant is not dis-chargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires the debtor to intend the injury, not merely to commit an intentional act that causes injury.

Florida Outdoor Equipment Inc. v. Tomlinson (In Re Tomlinson) · filed 1998-04-21(a)(6)

As a matter of first impression, this Court concludes that Kawaauhau stands for the proposition that a complainant seeking an exception to discharge pursuant to § 523(a)(6) must show that the debtor acted with the intent to cause injury.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt arising from a debtor’s willful and malicious deprivation of a former spouse’s share of marital property.

Shteysel v. Shteysel (In Re Shteysel) · filed 1998-05-18(a)(6)

This court is satisfied that the conduct on the part of Boris was both willful and malicious within the meaning of § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) bars discharge when the debtor intended the injury, including when the debtor knew an intentional act would necessarily cause it.

Texas Ex Rel. Board of Regents of the University of Texas System v. Walker · filed 1998-05-28(a)(6)

For the following reasons, we reverse the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law to Walker on the issue of § 523(a)(6) nondischargeability. An issue of fact exists regarding whether Walker was aware of his obligations to the University under the MSRDP and nonetheless knowingly kept his professional fees with the intent of depriving the University of money owed to it.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor intended the injury itself, including when the debtor acted knowing injury was substantially certain to result.

State of Texas v. Walker · filed 1998-05-28(a)(6)

A "willful and malicious injury" results from an act done with the actual intent to cause injury, not from an act done intentionally that causes injury. ... For the following reasons, we reverse the district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law to Walker on the issue of § 523(a)(6) nondischargeability. An issue of fact exists regarding whether Walker was aware of his obligations to the University under the MSRDP and nonetheless knowingly kept his professional fees with the intent of depriving the University of money owed to it.

Section 523(a)(6) requires willful and malicious injury by the debtor; another person’s conduct cannot be imputed to the debtor.

Hamilton v. Nolan (In Re Nolan) · filed 1998-04-02(a)(6)

This court agrees with the majority who have ruled that nondischargeability of a debt under § 523(a)(6) cannot be grounded on the imputation to the debtor of acts of another.

Section 523(a)(6) permits emotional distress damages for non-physical injuries caused by a debtor's willful and malicious acts.

In Re Juan Perez Dba Pct Development, Debtor. Juan Perez v. James A. Haverkamp M.C. Taylor · filed 1998-04-02(a)(6)

Accordingly, emotional distress damages may be awarded under 523(a)(6) to compensate for non-physical injuries caused by a debtor's willful and malicious acts.

Section 523(a)(6) requires intent to cause injury; a knowing breach of a payment obligation alone does not make the debt nondischargeable.

Salem Bend Condominium Ass'n v. Bullock-Williams (In Re Bullock-Williams) · filed 1998-06-03(a)(6)

Applying Geiger, Salem Bend must demonstrate that the Debtor intended to cause harm by failing to pay association dues. This encompasses more than just the “knowing breach of contract” that was alleged.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt resulting from the debtor’s willful and malicious injury to another person.

Worster v. Howcroft (In Re Howcroft) · filed 1998-07-16(a)(6)

When the entire record is viewed in the light most favorable to the Defendant, this Court finds that the subject debt resulted from the Defendant’s willful and malicious injury to the Plaintiff and is hereby excepted from discharge under section 523(a)(6) as a matter of law.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for willful and malicious injury from discharge.

Wiggins v. Sanders (In Re Sanders) · filed 1998-08-14(a)(6)

Defendant’s action was willful and malicious. The judgment which Plaintiff holds against Defendant is non-disehargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a prior judgment necessarily determined that the debtor caused a willful and malicious injury.

Thompson v. Myers (In Re Myers) · filed 1998-08-27(a)(6)

For the reasons stated within, the willful and malicious nature of Mr. Myers’ acts in obtaining the attachment against Mr. Thompson has already been litigated by the parties in the Massachusetts state court action and was necessarily determined by the jury when it returned its verdict against Mr. Myers on the abuse of process claim. ... ORDERED, that the Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment filed June 29, 1998 is granted and the debt from the Defendant/Debtor David L. Myers to the Plaintiff Robert A. Thompson is excepted from discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires the creditor to prove that the debtor intended to cause injury and intended or fully expected to harm the creditor’s economic interests.

Ehrman v. Feist (In Re Feist) · filed 1998-09-09(a)(6)

Under this standard, Ehrman’s nondischargeability action against Feist must fail, for she has not met her burden of proof under either element of her Section 523(a)(6) action. In particular, Ehrman has not established that Feist’s removal of fixtures from the barn, his failure to remove manure from the farm, or his failure to pay his rent obligations to her — whatever be their exact amount — were deliberate or intentional acts intended to cause her injury, as opposed to deliberate or intentional acts which only led to her injury, or that Feist would have to have believed at the time that she would be substantially certain to suffer harm as a result of his actions. Neither has she established that Feist so acted while intending or fully expecting to harm her economic interests.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor converted collateral with intent to cause injury; negligent or reckless conversion is insufficient.

National City Bank v. Wikel (In Re Wikel) · filed 1998-09-22(a)(6)

It is therefore clear from the foregoing that conversion continues to be a basis for nondischargeability, as long as it was committed with the intent to cause harm, and not merely negligently or recklessly.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a creditor to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the debtor caused an injury and acted willfully and maliciously.

French, Kezelis & Kominiarek, P.C. v. Carlson (In Re Carlson) · filed 1998-09-23(a)(6)

In order to be entitled to a determination of nondischargeability under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), the creditor must prove three elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that the Debtor caused an injury; (2) that the Debtor’s actions were willful; and. (3) that the Debtor’s actions were malicious.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the injury was objectively substantially certain to occur or the debtor had a subjective motive to cause harm.

Miller v. J.D. Abrams Inc. (In Re Miller) · filed 1998-09-24(a)(6)

Because this standard is synonymous to the Kawaauhau standard for “willful injury,” “acts done with the actual intent to cause injury,” id. at 975, we hold that this is the test for “willful and malicious injury” under § 523(a)(6). Thus, we hold that an injury is “willful and malicious” where there is either an objective substantial certainty of harm or a subjective motive to cause harm.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury from discharge; conclusory allegations alone do not establish that a debt qualifies.

Kresmery v. Service America Corp. · filed 1998-09-30(a)(6)

Absent any specific details or incidents of defendant’s conduct which is inferably “malicious or willful,” the plaintiff has failed to show the existence of any triable factual issue on whether his claim qualifies for the § 523(B)(6) exception to dischargeability.