11 U.S.C. § 523

Section 523(a)(6) excepts the entire debt, including punitive damages, from discharge when it results from a debtor’s willful and malicious injury.

Brill v. Dvorak (In Re Dvorak) · filed 1990-09-07(a)(6)

Clear and convincing evidence established that Debtor’s failure to timely file and then his failure to pursue his motion to vacate the default judgment against Brill was “willful and malicious.” His resulting debt to Brill is excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). ... Therefore the entire total of the state court judgments amounting to $116,686.40 is nondischargeable.

Under § 523(a)(6), good faith reliance on counsel’s advice can negate willfulness when a debtor converts a creditor’s property.

Vaughan v. Murray (In Re Murray) · filed 1990-07-16(a)(6)

Therefore, the Court concludes that, having acted as they did, the debtors conduct would not be “willful” as construed in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires both willful and malicious conduct to except a debt from discharge; failure to maintain automobile insurance does not necessarily cause accident injuries.

Basham v. Druen (In Re Druen) · filed 1990-11-05(a)(6)

Because section 523(a)(6) is in the conjunctive, a debt must be the product of both willful and malicious conduct to be excepted from discharge. Since the defendant’s conduct was only malicious and not willful, the section 523(a)(6) exception does not apply.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts compensatory damages for this conversion from discharge, but not the punitive damages awarded.

Jameson v. Reynolds (In Re Reynolds) · filed 1990-11-19(a)(6)

At trial, this Court ruled that the compensatory damages but not the punitive damages were excepted from discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a debtor’s unauthorized transfer of collateral willfully and maliciously injures the secured creditor.

Mercury Marine Acceptance Corp. v. Rooney (In re Rooney) · filed 1990-11-28(a)(6)

Clearly, removing the collateral from the reach of the secured party in such a complete fashion as did this Debtor constitutes a willful and malicious injury.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for intentionally burning a home nondischargeable when the fire injures the creditor’s security interest in the home.

Cheripka v. Republic Insurance (In Re Cheripka) · filed 1990-12-20(a)(6)

In that event, the Cheripkas would have caused a willful and malicious injury to property in which Republic, as assignee and/or subrogee of the original mortgagee, had a security interest. The Cheripka house was the collateral for the mortgage, and thus, for purposes of § 523(a)(6), was “property of another” which was injured when the house was destroyed by fire.

Section 523(a)(6) requires both willful and malicious conduct; a creditor’s acquiescence in delayed payment can provide just cause or excuse that defeats malice.

American Honda Finance Corp. v. Grier (In Re Grier) · filed 1991-01-04(a)(6)

In light of the foregoing, the court finds that, though Grier’s conduct was willful, it was not malicious for purposes of Section 523(a)(6). As such, the obligations owed to plaintiff AHFC by the defendant Grier, in the amount of $15,070.19, shall be discharged.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof of a malicious injury; a manslaughter guilty plea alone does not establish malice.

Arizmendi v. Debtor & Trustee (In re McEldowney) · filed 1991-01-09(a)(6)

We cannot determine from the stipulated facts and Exhibits “A” and “B”, whether Debtor’s act of killing his wife was malicious within the purview of Section 523(a)(6). Malice is not an element of the crime of manslaughter as per 33 Laws of P.R.Ann. Section 4004. This means the guilty plea entered is of no help.

Section 523(a)(6) requires an intentional or deliberate injury; an intentional act that causes harm is insufficient.

Dorr & Associates v. Pasek (In Re Pasek) · filed 1991-02-21(a)(6)

Accordingly, under § 523(a)(6), it is no longer sufficient to establish only a wrongful act, done intentionally, which necessarily produces harm and is without just cause or excuse. That only establishes malice. To find willful, the court must additionally find an intentional or deliberate injury.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a fact finder to assess whether a debtor’s conduct was malicious; intentional conversion of collateral proceeds alone does not establish malice.

Merchants National Bank v. Brouillet (In Re Brouillet) · filed 1991-02-22(a)(6)

In sum, the word “malicious” in § 523(a)(6) requires some judgment on the part of the fact finder concerning the degree of immorality of a debtor’s conduct.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt arising from the unauthorized sale of collateral covered by a valid security agreement, even if the security interest was unperfected.

Mercury Finance Co. of Georgia v. Muto (In Re Muto) · filed 1991-03-04(a)(6)

The law is well settled that the sale of collateral without the consent of the lienholder constitutes willful and malicious injury giving rise to an exception to discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). ... The statutory scheme provides that, as between the parties, the security agreement is valid and enforceable. ... The debt of defendants to plaintiff will be held non-dischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury from discharge.

Bartlett Futures, Inc. v. Davis (In Re Davis) · filed 1991-03-19(a)(6)

IT IS FURTHER, BY THE COURT, ORDERED That under § 523(a)(6), judgment be for the plaintiff and against the defendant, and the debt of $409,586.04 shall be and the same hereby is NOT DISCHARGED.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt arising from the willful and malicious conversion of marital funds from discharge.

Berman v. Berman (In Re Berman) · filed 1991-03-25(a)(6)

Therefore, the Court’s prior ruling that the Debtor’s conversion of the marital funds constitutes a “willful and malicious injury” to the Plaintiff within the meaning of § 523(a)(6) remains unchanged and the Debtor’s obligation to pay Plaintiff the sum of $31,250.00 is non-dischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury from discharge; malice may be inferred from the circumstances.

In Re Jean Mona, Debtor, Jean Mona v. Hersh · filed 1991-05-06(a)(6)

An act is willful and malicious under Sec. 523(a)(6) if it is done deliberately and intentionally; malice can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. ... Mona's conduct was deliberate and intentional, and she knew that she did not have authorization to type the note over Hersh's signature. Therefore, the debt was nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt for alleged conversion from discharge when the creditor cannot identify property the debtor converted.

Humphreys v. Watley (In re Watley) · filed 1991-05-29(a)(6)

In this adversary proceeding there is no property claimed by the plaintiff which has been identified as property converted or taken by the defendant to the BMW Club or otherwise, so as to create a debt excepted from the defendant’s discharge in bankruptcy by 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a debtor’s intentional, wrongful act causes willful and malicious injury to an entity, including a state injured by environmental damage.

Kentucky, Natural Resources Cabinet v. Daniels (In Re Daniels) · filed 1991-06-07(a)(6)

The Court has found that the Commonwealth was an “entity” for the purposes of Section 523(a)(6) and that the actions of Daniels constituted a “willful and malicious injury.” Thus, the requirements for an exception to discharge under Section 523(a)(6) are met and so the Court concludes that the decision of the Bankruptcy Court must be reversed on this issue in favor of the appellants.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury from discharge; necessary findings in a prior criminal case can preclude relitigation of those elements.

Edgman v. Farfalla (In Re Farfalla) · filed 1991-06-25(a)(6)

I conclude that either of the jury findings pursuant to said parts 3(a) or (b) of jury instruction 5 are sufficient to preclude the debtor from relitigat-ing willfulness and malice under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires both willful and malicious injury; a punitive damages award that could rest on reckless disregard does not alone establish nondischargeability.

Sylvester v. Martin (In Re Martin) · filed 1991-07-05(a)(6)

Thus, the jury instructions allowed the jury to award punitive damages even in the absence of a finding of malice or willfulness on the part of Debtor. Both findings are necessary in order for a debt to be deemed nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor deliberately causes injury and the circumstances establish malice, including an unjustified shooting.

McGee v. McCown (In Re McCown) · filed 1991-07-11(a)(6)

This court concludes that the Police Board’s findings of fact establish that the Debtor willfully and maliciously injured plaintiff Ja-Wan McGee, so that the debt obligation arising from the consent judgments is barred from discharge under Section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts punitive damages from discharge when a bad-faith involuntary bankruptcy filing constitutes a willful and malicious injury.

Sjostedt v. Salmon (In Re Salmon) · filed 1991-06-12(a)(6)

As stated before, if the Court finds a creditor filed an involuntary petition in bad faith, the Court may grant judgment against the creditor for punitive damages. Title 11 U.S.C. § 303(i)(2)(B). These punitive damages are determined to be nondischargeable pursuant to Title 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) permits punitive damages arising from a debtor’s willful and malicious injury to be held nondischargeable.

Placer U.S., Inc. v. Dahlstrom (In Re Dahlstrom) · filed 1991-07-03(a)(6)

Having done so, it now joins the majority rule finding that punitive damages may be held to be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not make a debt for conversion of collateral nondischargeable without proof of malicious intent to cause injury.

Sears Consumer Financial Corp. v. Gibson (In re Gibson) · filed 1991-08-02(a)(6)

The Eighth Circuit held that the mere conversion did not constitute willful and malicious injury to the secured party. The same reasoning would apply in this case. There was no showing that debtor possessed a malicious intent to cause injury to Sears.

Section 523(a)(6) does not bar discharge when a debtor's intentional use of collateral proceeds does not necessarily harm the creditor.

In Re Littleton · filed 1991-08-12(a)(6)

Considering these facts, it was not clearly erroneous for the bankruptcy court or the BAP to conclude that the debtors' acts would not have necessarily produced harm. Consequently, the debtors' conduct was not malicious, as that term is used in § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not automatically except a workers’ compensation debt from discharge because the debtor failed to obtain insurance; the creditor must prove a willful and malicious injury.

Wood Peek v. Mazander (In Re Mazander) · filed 1991-08-22(a)(6)

Therefore, the mere failure to provide such insurance is not, by operation of statutory law, a willful and malicious injury by a debtor which is not dischargeable in a Bankruptcy case.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for willful and malicious injury from discharge when a prior judgment establishes that injury through collateral estoppel.

Florida Farm Bureau Insurance v. Nicks (In re Nicks) · filed 1991-09-06(a)(6)

Accordingly, all the Halpem factors are satisfied and collateral estoppel is properly applied in this proceeding. Thus, Defendant’s obligation to pay and satisfy the Final Judgment in the amount of $68,-582.38 is excepted from his discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires a creditor to prove that the debtor’s conduct was both willful and malicious to except the resulting debt from discharge.

Alverio v. Muhammad (In Re Muhammad) · filed 1991-09-25(a)(6)

For Defendant’s judgment obligation to Alverio to be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6), Alverio must prove that Defendant’s conduct was both wilful and malicious.

Section 523(a)(6) applies to intentional torts such as conversion, not to claims based on contractual duties.

Huntington National Bank v. Parton (In Re Parton) · filed 1991-12-02(a)(6)

Section 523(a)(6) relates to intentional torts such as conversion and not to contract actions.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof of malice to except a debt for injury from discharge; reckless disregard of the creditor’s rights is insufficient.

Bybee v. Geer (In Re Geer) · filed 1991-12-17(a)(6)

The court does not find that debtor’s actions were done maliciously as required by § 523(a)(6). Plaintiff failed to satisfy his burden of proof as to the existence of malice.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury from discharge, and an actually litigated Florida civil theft judgment can establish those elements through collateral estoppel.

Johnson v. Keene (In Re Keene) · filed 1991-12-20(a)(6)

The state court lawsuit was actually litigated, and the issues tried in the state court conclusively established each of the elements under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a debtor deliberately uses a secured creditor’s collateral to pay personal and unsecured debts, causing willful and malicious injury to the creditor.

Sun Bank/Treasure Coast, N.A. v. Moore (In Re Moore) · filed 1991-12-23(a)(6)

Accordingly, under § 523(a)(6), the subject debt is nondischargeable for the aforementioned reasons. The Plaintiff, Sun Bank, has sufficiently met its burden by a preponderance of the evidence to show that the Debtors’ conduct towards its collateral caused it to sustain willful and malicious injury.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts damages from a breach of contract from discharge only when the breach is an independent, willful tort.

Palazzolo v. Colclazier (In Re Colclazier) · filed 1991-11-14(a)(6)

Because we find that § 523(a)(6) applies to injuries from tortious conduct and an intentional bad faith breach of contract is not an independent tort under Oklahoma law, the judgment awarded for damages of $40,-510.86 arising from a bad faith breach of contract is not covered by the exception to discharge in § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for deliberately converted secured proceeds nondischargeable when the debtor knowingly disregards the creditor’s rights, regardless of the debtor’s motive.

Merchants National Bank v. Brouillet (In Re Brouillet) · filed 1992-01-23(a)(6)

The debtors are not entitled to reorder the priorities of debt upon insolvency, no matter what their motives. In my opinion the obligation to repay the converted proceeds is nondis-chargeable under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts compensatory and punitive damages from discharge when both arise from willful and malicious injury to another’s property.

Fairway Golfview Homes, Inc. v. Kecskes (In Re Kecskes) · filed 1992-02-10(a)(6)

As the issues and parties have also been found to be identical, this Court must give full preclusive effect to the state court judgment and thus finds the debt of $1,768,220.50 owed by the Debtor, William M. Kecskes, to be nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not make a debt nondischargeable merely because the debtor committed a battery; the injury must be willful and malicious.

Holmes v. Robinson (In Re Robinson) · filed 1992-03-30(a)(6)

This Court disagrees with the position taken by the Plaintiff and finds that it is possible to find that there was a battery under Illinois law without finding the intent necessary for a finding of malice so as to establish the debt in question is non-dischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a debtor deliberately disposes of collateral knowing the act will harm the secured creditor’s interest.

Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Lau (In re Lau) · filed 1992-03-11(a)(6)

Although defendant asserts that he has attempted to regain possession of these items, the court finds that defendant’s actions were deliberate and intentional, in knowing disregard of plaintiff’s rights. Plaintiff has, then, established that defendant acted willfully and maliciously, causing economic injury to plaintiff.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for intentional conversion of another's property without just cause or excuse nondischargeable.

Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Dibben (In Re Dibben) · filed 1992-04-06(a)(6)

Under this evidence and explanation, the finding is made the defendant intentionally converted the property without just cause or excuse and the conversion obviously produced harm to the plaintiff Sears. ... Accordingly, the conclusion is made the debt is nondischargeable under the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge when a debtor negligently fails to maintain insurance and does not actually know or reasonably foresee that the failure will cause injury.

Holt v. France (In Re France) · filed 1992-04-09(a)(6)

Nevertheless, assuming that the “willfulness” requirement is established, France’s acts were not “malicious.” Since France had no actual knowledge that Ms. Holt (and thereafter, Mr. Holt) would be harmed by his failure to maintain coverage, the focus is whether it was reasonably foreseeable that harm would result. ... Accordingly, the bankruptcy court did not err in holding that France’s debt to Holt was not exempt from discharge under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires willful and malicious injury; a negligence claim does not qualify.

McFee v. Kelly (In Re Kelly) · filed 1992-05-01(a)(6)

A negligence claim cannot be declared nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), which requires willful and malicious injury.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt arising from willful and malicious conduct nondischargeable.

Hardesty v. Goseland (In re Goseland) · filed 1992-06-01(a)(6)

The events which gave rise to the dispute suggest willful and malicious conduct at the hands of defendant Goseland, and his debt owing to the plaintiff should be and is hereby found to be nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for intentional battery from discharge even when the victim’s ethnic slurs provoked the debtor.

Taradash v. Pokorny (In Re Pokorny) · filed 1992-06-30(a)(6)

There is no dispute that Debtor intentionally struck Ms. Taradash, and Debtor has not offered, any legal authority to support his position that ethnic slurs might mitigate against the “willful and malicious” nature of the conduct under § 523(a)(6). Therefore, verbal abuse, even an ugly assault on one’s ethnic heritage, is not legal justification to pummel someone.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor knowingly participates in converting proceeds owed to a creditor.

Transamerica Commercial Finance Corp. v. James · filed 1992-05-21(a)(6)

The Court finds that Anne James was sufficiently involved in the business affairs of Mid-Florida Marine to support the conclusion of law that she converted the proceeds from the sale of the boats sold “out of trust.” Therefore, the Court will affirm the Bankruptcy Court’s determination that the debt owed to appellee is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt nondischargeable when the debtor deliberately converts property owed to another without just cause or excuse.

Patrick v. Patrick (In Re Patrick) · filed 1992-07-16(a)(6)

His actions in disposing of the sale proceeds and not remitting any of same to Cheryl constituted conversion and certainly resulted in injury to her. ... For the foregoing reason, the Court hereby finds that the subject debt owed by Daniel to Cheryl is nondischargeable pursuant to section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6)’s willful injury requirement is not met by a parent’s failure to maintain required auto insurance when the parent did not intend or expect the child’s collision.

Beyersdoerfer v. Bex (In Re Bex) · filed 1992-07-30(a)(6)

This Court concludes that, while the conduct of the Bexes was at least arguably malicious, the willful requirement of ... § 523(a)(6) has not been met and that the defendants are entitled to a summary judgment on that issue.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury from discharge; findings actually litigated in an earlier action can establish that exception.

Alvarado v. Kallmeyer (In Re Kallmeyer) · filed 1992-07-31(a)(6)

This Court finds that, with regard to the violations actually litigated, the issue of whether the debt was the result of a “willful and malicious injury” has already been determined by the District Court Action and that court’s determination of the issue was necessary to the resulting final and valid judgment. Therefore, the Court grants plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment as it relates to debtor’s violations of 29 U.S.C. §§ 1821(a), 1821(b), 1821(c), 1823(b)(1), 1841 and 1842 and finds that the debt’s resulting from these violations are nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires both willful and malicious conduct; intentional conduct alone does not make a debt nondischargeable.

Taubert v. Walsh (In Re Walsh) · filed 1992-08-10(a)(6)

He neither intended nor foresaw harm to the Tau-berts, and his conduct was not “without just cause or excuse” and, therefore, was not malicious within the meaning of Section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge when a shooting was negligent or reckless and the debtor did not intentionally or deliberately shoot the victim.

Yelverton v. Britt (In Re Britt) · filed 1992-08-12(a)(6)

The evidence presented in the case currently before the Court indicates that the shooting of Horace Edward Yelverton was an act of negligence or reckless disregard, that tragically resulted in Yelver-ton’s death. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the debtor intentionally or deliberately shot Yelverton. Therefore, the element of “willfulness” for purposes of Section 523(a)(6) has not been established and the relief requested in the Complaint cannot be granted.

Section 523(a)(6) requires both willful conduct and malice; a course of dealing that gives a debtor a legitimate belief that the creditor consented to the conduct prevents a finding of implied malice.

Night Kitchen Music v. Pineau (In Re Pineau) · filed 1992-07-08(a)(6)

In assessing the character of the debtor’s conduct, a course of dealing that provides the debtor with a legitimate expectation or belief that his conduct will be forgiven or excused, or that he acted with the creditor’s consent, must be considered. If such a course of dealing existed, the debtor’s actions will not support a finding of implied malice.

Section 523(a)(6) requires deliberate or intentional injury; reckless disregard is insufficient to establish willful and malicious conduct.

MRB, Inc. v. Marshall (In Re Marshall) · filed 1992-09-11(a)(6)

It is impossible to ascertain from this record whether the jury found that the Debtor’s conduct was deliberately intended to injure, or merely that it was in reckless disregard of MRB’s rights. Because “reckless disregard” is insufficient to prove willful and malicious conduct for purposes of § 523(a)(6), it would be inappropriate for this Court to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel to resolve Count I.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge for an intentional transfer of collateral when the transfer was not malicious.

Middlefield Banking Co. v. Kassoff (In Re Kassoff) · filed 1992-10-22(a)(6)

The sale and transfer of equipment in which the Bank had a security interest were not malicious within the meaning of Section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) makes statutory damages and legal fees nondischargeable when they flow from a debtor’s willful and malicious conduct.

Stokes v. Ferris · filed 1992-11-23(a)(6)

Therefore, all debts, including statutory damages and legal fees, which flow from the debtor’s willful and malicious conduct are nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) requires the creditor to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the debtor caused an injury both willfully and maliciously.

In Re LFS · filed 1992-11-23(a)(6)

In order to establish nondischargeability pursuant to § 523(a)(6) in the Eighth Circuit, plaintiff must prove defendant's conduct was both willful and malicious, which are construed as two separate elements. ... In the present case, plaintiff cannot even establish negligence or recklessness, because she did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant infected her with genital herpes.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a creditor to prove that the debtor caused an injury and that the debtor’s conduct was both willful and malicious.

L.D.J. v. L.F.S. (In re L.F.S.) · filed 1992-11-23(a)(6)

In order to establish nondischargeability pursuant to § 523(a)(6) in the Eighth Circuit, plaintiff must prove defendant's conduct was both willful and malicious, which are construed as two separate elements.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a reclamation debt from discharge when the debtor’s knowing illegal mining and refusal to reclaim cause willful and malicious injury.

Phipps v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet · filed 1992-12-03(a)(6)

Therefore, section 523(a)(6) excepted Phipps's reclamation obligation from dischargeability and, in effect, rendered Whizco inapplicable.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from an intentional breach of contract from discharge only when malicious and willful tortious conduct accompanies the breach.

In Re Mark Riso Shelly Riso, Debtors. Gary L. Snoke v. Mark Riso Shelly Riso · filed 1992-11-04(a)(6)

An intentional breach of contract is excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6) only when it is accompanied by malicious and willful tortious conduct.

Section 523(a)(6) makes compensatory and punitive damages arising from a willful and malicious injury nondischargeable.

McKenna v. Jordan (In Re Jordan) · filed 1992-12-22(a)(6)

Ample authority can be found for the proposition that where willfulness and malice exist compensatory and punitive damages flowing therefrom are nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) treats a debt arising from fraud as a debt for willful and malicious injury.

Mosley v. Sims (In Re Sims) · filed 1992-12-22(a)(6)

Fraud constitutes a willful and malicious injury within the meaning of section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) can except a debt from discharge when an intentional breach of a valid covenant not to compete causes willful and malicious injury.

Traditional Industries, Inc. v. Ketaner (In Re Ketaner) · filed 1992-12-30(a)(6)

Intentional breach of a valid covenant not to compete in an employment agreement can constitute “willful and malicious” injury under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) makes a judgment for conversion of marital property nondischargeable to the extent of the injured spouse’s share of that property.

Reid v. Reid · filed 1992-12-31(a)(6)

Likewise, this Court finds that plaintiff’s judgment should be declared nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(6), but only to the extent of the value of her share of the property disposed of by debtor.

Section 523(a)(6) treats a wrongful act done without just cause or excuse as malicious if the debtor intended harm or harm was substantially certain to follow.

Morton Ex Rel. Morton v. Kemmerer (In Re Kemmerer) · filed 1993-01-08(a)(6)

The Court concludes that under 11 U.S.C. section 523(a)(6), an act is “malicious” only if it is a wrongful act done without just cause or excuse, which (1) the debtor commits with the specific intent to harm another or another’s property, or (2) which is substantially certain to cause harm to another or another’s property.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor acts without justification or excuse, knowing the conduct will cause a particular injury.

In Re: Gregory James PASEK, Debtor. DORR, BENTLEY & PECHA, CPA’S, P.C., Appellant, v. Gregory James PASEK, Appellee · filed 1993-01-20(a)(6)

Rather, we believe the rule fully supported by our cases is that “willful and malicious injury” occurs when the debtor, without justification or excuse, and with full knowledge of the specific consequences of his conduct, acts notwithstanding, knowing full well that his conduct will cause particularized injury.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that the debtor intended to injure before a debt can be excepted from discharge as a willful and malicious injury.

In Re Paul ROBINSON, Debtor. Paul ROBINSON, Appellant, v. Mary Elaine TENANTRY, Appellee · filed 1993-02-23(a)(6)

A willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6) “requires proof of an intent to injure.”

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for damages from an intentional, wrongful deprivation of property without just cause nondischargeable as a willful and malicious injury.

Kaufhold v. Cauthen (In Re Cauthen) · filed 1993-03-18(a)(6)

The Court concludes that debtor’s acts, done with specific intent to harm plaintiffs and to knowingly and wrongfully deprive them of possession of their property without just cause which gave rise to damages, create a debt which is non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) as a willful and malicious injury caused by the debtor.

Section 523(a)(6) makes punitive damages nondischargeable when they arise from a debtor’s willful and malicious injury.

McBee v. Brady (In Re Brady) · filed 1993-03-19(a)(6)

For the above reasons, I find that Plaintiff has carried her burden of proving defendant’s conduct was both willful and malicious within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) and that, therefore, the judgment for punitive damages is nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) requires intentional or deliberate injury; recklessness or negligence does not establish a willful and malicious injury.

McDermott v. Keppler (In Re Keppler) · filed 1993-03-23(a)(6)

The statute requires not only intentional conduct on the part of the debtor, but also intentional or deliberate injury. ... A “willful and malicious injury,” for nondischargeability purposes, cannot be established by showing recklessness or negligence.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge merely because an employer failed to maintain workers’ compensation insurance when that failure did not necessarily cause injury.

Silva v. Frias (In Re Frias) · filed 1993-04-05(a)(6)

Failing to maintain insurance certainly created a risk that the employer might incur a personal financial liability, but that result was not so predestined that the Debtors’ conduct may be deemed willful or malicious, as a matter of law. The fact that Silva was in fact injured on the job was not so inevitable that the failure to have insurance constituted a willful or malicious act.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt nondischargeable when a debtor deliberately deprives a creditor of its lien priority knowing that financial injury will result.

Lampi v. Hundman Lumber Mart Co. (In Re Lampi) · filed 1993-04-05(a)(6)

Accordingly, the Court finds that pursuant to § 523(a)(6), the debt to Hundman is not dischargeable and that Mrs. Lampi is jointly liable since the record indicates that she knew that Hundman’s lien waiver was being tendered without having sufficient funds to pay the check issued to it.

Section 523(a)(6) can except an assault debt from discharge when the debtor acted willfully and maliciously, even if the debtor was intoxicated.

Thorp v. Thirtyacre (In Re Thirtyacre) · filed 1993-05-19(a)(6)

The obvious is that Congress singled out injuries arising out of drunken driving for special treatment and left other injuries from other forms of intoxication to be decided under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor injures the creditor through willful and malicious acts.

Corsi v. Berman (In Re Berman) · filed 1993-06-01(a)(6)

The court further concludes that the debtor’s obligation to the plaintiffs is excepted from his discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). A plaintiff who relies on § 523(a)(6) must show that the debtor injured the plaintiff and that the debtor’s actions were both willful and malicious.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge when the debtor’s liability rests solely on an agent’s willful and malicious conduct.

Piccicuto v. Rex (In Re Rex) · filed 1993-04-20(a)(6)

Because the judgment was rendered against the Debtors on a theory of vicarious liability based upon acts of their agent, I hold it does not come within the exception for discharge under the statute.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof of a debtor’s own malicious conduct; a partner’s misconduct cannot be imputed solely because the debtors are jointly liable.

Peabey Associates v. Haisfield (In Re Haisfield Enterprises) · filed 1993-05-24(a)(6)

Although the court’s judgment does find Richard, Randy and Marc Haisfield jointly and .severally liable, this Court will not find the debt to be nondischargeable under 523(a)(6) in the absence of direct proof of malicious conduct.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts an obligation from discharge when a debtor intentionally withholds a former spouse’s share of retirement benefits without just cause or excuse.

Rose v. Rose (In Re Rose) · filed 1993-06-16(a)(6)

This case is virtually identical to the case of Russell v. Russell, 141 B.R. 107 (Bkrtcy.W.D.La.1992) in which this Court concluded that pre-petition arrearages under a former wife’s judicially established sole and separate property award were non-dischargea-ble under both 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) and (6). This Court reaches the same result on these facts regarding the property issue and need not address the plaintiff’s additional contentions (some of which are addressed in Russell).

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge merely because the debtor intentionally sold secured property; the creditor must also prove malice.

Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Parker (In Re Parker) · filed 1993-06-22(a)(6)

This voluntary behavior satisfies the willful element of § 523(a)(6). However, the stipulated facts are totally lacking in any showing of the Defendant’s actual intent to maliciously injure the Plaintiff or the Plaintiff’s property. While the malice element may constructively or impliedly be found in the nature of the act itself, the Defendant’s sale of the items, by itself, is not an act which implies a sufficient degree of malice.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a creditor seeking to except an attorney fee award from discharge to prove that the award compensates for a willful and malicious injury.

Adams v. Zentz (In Re Zentz) · filed 1993-06-28(a)(6)

Plaintiff had the burden of proving that the judgment for attorney fees entered in his child custody proceedings was intended to compensate him for the willful and malicious injury done to him by Debtor.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a judgment for willfully and maliciously alienating a spouse's affections.

In Re: Joe Allen Blevins, Debtor. Joe Allen Blevins v. Coe · filed 1993-07-06(a)(6)

Joe Blevins appeals the decision of the district court, holding that a prior state court judgment against Blevins was not dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. The prior state court judgment determined that Blevins acted willfully and maliciously in alienating the affections of Harold Coe's wife. ... Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court for the reasons stated in that court's order.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt for injuries caused by deliberate drag racing on a busy street because the injury is willful and malicious.

Konefal v. Kaperonis (In Re Kaperonis) · filed 1993-07-22(a)(6)

The plaintiff has also established that the debtor’s participation in drag racing was malicious. Drag racing is wrongful activity which is prohibited by law. Manifestly, drag racing on a busy street like Central Park Avenue necessarily produces harm. Accordingly, because the plaintiff has proven that the debtor’s obligation to him was incurred as the result of the debtor’s willful and malicious injury, his claim against the debtor is excepted from discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for unwanted sexual contact nondischargeable when the debtor knows the contact is substantially certain to cause injury.

Dorer v. Moberg (In Re Moberg) · filed 1993-07-26(a)(6)

Moberg acted willfully because he proceeded to have sex with Dorer knowing that she did not wish to have sex with him, and he acted maliciously because the nonreciprocal sexual act was substantially certain to cause harm to Dorer.

Section 523(a)(6) requires more than recklessness to establish malice for the willful and malicious injury exception to discharge.

Haas v. Huddleston (In re Huddleston) · filed 1993-07-30(a)(6)

Huddleston’s proposition of law is correct as far as' it goes: under current law, recklessness is not “malice” for purposes of § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge only when the evidence establishes a willful and malicious injury by the debtor.

Johnson v. Johns (In Re Johns) · filed 1993-08-12(a)(6)

Absent the evidence of Defendant’s plea and subsequent conviction, this Court finds no evidence that Defendant’s conduct was willful and malicious within the context of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor’s willful conduct targets the creditor for financial harm.

Carter v. Verhelst (In Re Verhelst) · filed 1993-08-23(a)(6)

Carter has successfully carried his burden of proof that Verhelst’s debt to Carter is nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts an entire judgment, including treble damages, from discharge when the damages arise from the same willful and malicious injury.

Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy (In Re Fugazy) · filed 1993-09-09(a)(6)

The debtor’s acts constitute willful and malicious injury and therefore his obligation to Metromedia is nondis-chargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). This court moreover rejects the debtor’s argument that the portion of Metromedia’s claim which represents treble damages should not be excepted from the debtor’s discharge. The entire judgment is nondis-chargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) because treble damages and the compensatory damages flow from the same course of conduct.

Section 523(a)(6) makes punitive damages awarded for willful and malicious acts nondischargeable.

In Re John R. Lobherr, Debtor. John R. Lobherr v. Robert W. Mobarry, Elaine L. Mobarry, Robert G. Mobarry and Mary D. Mo · filed 1993-09-22(a)(6)

Finally, the punitive damages were also nondischargeable under Sec. 523(a)(6), as they were awarded for willful and malicious acts.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor deliberately acts knowing the conduct is certain or substantially certain to injure the creditor.

ITT Life Insurance Corp. v. Haakenson (In Re Haakenson) · filed 1993-09-23(a)(6)

The court believes by a fair preponderance of the evidence that after that date, Haakenson knew that the continued sale of Beneficial Standard policies under the special marketing program was certain or substantially certain to injure United Fidelity.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor deliberately converts another’s property knowing the conduct will harm the creditor.

Dahlgren & Co. v. Lacina (In Re Lacina) · filed 1993-10-14(a)(6)

This court is satisfied from the totality of the evidence that the element of malice has been established in accordance with the requisite degree of proof and, when coupled with the element of willfulness, meets the requirements of nondischargeability under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a debtor knowingly and wrongfully converts collateral, destroying a creditor’s property interest.

Universal Pontiac-Buick-GMC Truck Inc. v. Routson (In Re Routson) · filed 1993-10-25(a)(6)

Loss to the creditor of the interest in the property converted, is, ordinarily, sufficient financial harm to make a willful conversion malicious.

Section 523(a)(6) does not require proof of an independent tort when the debtor’s willful and malicious conduct causes injury.

Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Smith (In Re Smith) · filed 1993-10-25(a)(6)

The court agrees with the FDIC-Receiver. Several courts have held debts to be nondis-chargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(6) without doing so on the basis of an independent tort. In each case the dispositive question was whether the debtor’s actions constituted willful and malicious conduct.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a copyright infringement debt from discharge when the debtor’s conduct establishes willful and malicious injury to the copyright holder’s property.

Sophos v. Hibbs (In re Hibbs) · filed 1993-10-26(a)(6)

Since all elements necessary for judgment under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) have been established by plaintiff Sophos, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of Sophos and against Mr. Hibbs, holding $260,706.84 non-dischargeable pursuant to Section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(4) and (a)(6) except a debt from discharge when state court findings establish both fiduciary defalcation and willful and malicious injury.

Minuteman Inc. v. Alexander (In Re Alexander) · filed 1993-10-29(a)(4), (a)(6)

Because the state court findings establish willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6), no genuine issues of material fact exist, and Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law that the judgment debt is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6). ... This Court holds that the Wisconsin court’s finding that the Debtor, while an officer of the Plaintiff, misappropriated the Plaintiffs secret customer lists through “theft and breach of duty to maintain secrecy” establishes by collateral estoppel that the Debtor committed defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity under § 523(a)(4). Therefore, the judgment debt is also nondischargeable under § 523(a)(4).

Section 523(a)(6) does not automatically excuse an intentional injury because the debtor was affected by alcohol or drugs; whether the debtor formed the required intent depends on the facts.

Thorp v. Thirtyacre · filed 1993-11-16(a)(6)

This Court refuses to adopt a general rule providing that a drunk or drugged debtor would never be liable for his/her actions under § 523(a)(6). This Court also declines to conclude that alcohol or drug influence would never be a valid defense to a dischargeability action. Instead, this Court has examined the specific facts of this case and, based on those facts, rejects Thirty-acre’s argument that he failed to form the requisite intent because of his depression and use of alcohol while taking the prescription drug Pamelor.

Section 523(a)(4) and (a)(6) except debts for larceny and willful and malicious injury from discharge when a prior judgment establishes those grounds.

Davidcraft Corp. v. Baer (In Re Baer) · filed 1993-11-23(a)(4), (a)(6)

Therefore, based upon this Court’s reading of the prior action and the appropriate statutory and case law, this Court grants the Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and finds that the Plaintiff has established a cause of action under §§ 523(a)(4) and 523(a)(6) of the Code.

Section 523(a)(6) can except a fraud-based debt from discharge when the debtor’s conduct causes willful and malicious injury.

Casey v. Transport Life Insurance (In Re Dorsey) · filed 1993-12-09(a)(6)

The Court finds that there is nothing in the text of section 523(a)(6) which precludes its proper invocation by an aggrieved party whose claim for willful and malicious injury sounds in fraud.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt for sanctions arising from a debtor’s willful and malicious injury.

E'Chavarrie v. West (In Re West) · filed 1993-12-13(a)(6)

The Debtor’s debt for $175,000.00, plus post-judgment interest from January 17, 1989, is nondisehargeable under both § 523(a)(2)(A) and § 523(a)(6); and the sanctions granted in the Modification Order, in the amount of $51,849.40, plus post-judgment interest from March 12, 1990, is nondis-chargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a debtor intentionally acts without just cause or excuse and injures another person or their property.

Blackwood v. Rushing (In Re Rushing) · filed 1993-12-17(a)(6)

Debtor’s purposeful failure to effect the terms of the divorce decree and to make the payments on the mortgage constituted willful and malicious injury within the meaning of section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts the full amount of a debt arising from willful and malicious injury from discharge, including compensatory and punitive damages.

Daghighfekr v. Mekhail (In Re Daghighfekr) · filed 1993-12-22(a)(6)

Section 523(a)(6) bars from discharge liability on a claim for willful and malicious injury. The debtor does not dispute that the judgment he wishes to discharge arises from a willful and malicious injury. The court did not err by determining the entire judgment nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) requires intent to injure; an employer’s failure to carry workers’ compensation insurance alone does not make the resulting debt nondischargeable.

Tiberi v. Annan (In Re Annan) · filed 1993-12-23(a)(6)

In order for § 523(a)(6) to apply, petitioner must establish an intent to injure.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts both punitive and compensatory damages arising from willful and malicious injury from discharge.

Reynolds-Marshall v. Hallum · filed 1993-12-29(a)(6)

Given the persuasive arguments of statutory construction and policy considerations, along with the overwhelming weight of authority in support of holding punitive damages nondischargeable, this Court is compelled to hold that section 523(a)(6) encompasses, as a matter of law, punitive as well as compensatory damages which arise from conduct adjudged to be willful and malicious.

Whether a debtor willfully and maliciously converted funds under § 523(a)(6) is a factual determination reviewed for clear error.

Robert Brown Patterson, and Maureeen Down Patterson v. The Riggs National Bank of Washington, D.C., Defendant-Appelle · filed 1993-12-20(a)(6)

The issue is whether Patterson willfully and maliciously converted funds from an inactive home equity line of credit within the meaning of Sec. 523(a)(6). The bankruptcy court's determination on this issue is one of fact, reviewed for clear error.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt arising from Indiana criminal conversion from discharge because knowing or intentional unauthorized control of another’s property satisfies its willful and malicious injury requirement.

Lehman's Inc. of Anderson v. Hittle (In Re Hittle) · filed 1994-01-25(a)(6)

The fact that criminal conversion requires a mens rea of knowing or intentional means that the “willful” prong of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) is satisfied. ... That the control was knowingly or intentionally unauthorized leaves no question that it was malicious within the meaning of § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires a willful and malicious injury; a payment practice accepted by the creditor can provide just cause or excuse for the debtor’s conduct.

Wickes Lumber Co. v. Magee (In Re Magee) · filed 1994-02-14(a)(6)

It is this Court’s opinion that the acceptability to Wickes of the parties’ past course of conduct on Magee’s four previous projects, coupled with the parties’ intention to operate in accordance with their ordinary course of conduct on the final project is sufficient to constitute “just cause or excuse” as contemplated by § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not treat constructive knowledge of a workers’ compensation insurance requirement as willfulness.

Szewczyk v. Wojtaszek · filed 1994-02-08(a)(6)

A holding that constructive knowledge suffices to establish willfulness under section 523 would reverse this rule of construction in favor of the creditor.

Under § 523(a)(6), a default establishes a willful and malicious injury when the adversary complaint alleges that injury and a resulting debt.

In Re Leonard Appell, Debtor. Leonard Appell v. Lessary · filed 1994-02-25(a)(6)

Lessary's adversary complaint alleged that Appell engaged in "willful and malicious conduct" to Lessary, as set forth in the state court complaint, and that Appell owed Lessary a debt for such conduct. Because Appell's answer was stricken and default entered against him, these facts were conclusively established.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor deliberately commits a wrongful act knowing it will injure another person or that person’s property.

Lane v. Jenkins (In Re Jenkins) · filed 1994-03-02(a)(6)

To prevail under § 523(a)(6), a plaintiff must prove that the debtor committed a willful and malicious act which caused injury to the property of an entity or to an entity.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a malicious injury; a prior finding of intentional injury alone does not establish that requirement.

DeBellis v. Maula (In Re Maula) · filed 1994-03-22(a)(6)

The Court has reviewed the Opinion of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Bronx, and has determined that at best the Court can find that the injury sustained by the Plaintiff’s decedent and as caused by the Defendant was an intentional infliction of an injury. The Court simply cannot find that the injury was “malicious” as required under the dictates of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires an intended injury or knowledge that injury was certain to occur; awareness that harm might result is insufficient.

Walters v. Betts (In Re Betts) · filed 1994-04-06(a)(6)

Merely knowing that such financial harm might result is not the degree of culpability which supports a determination of nondischargeability under Section 523(a)(6). It must be shown that such a result was intended or that Defendants were certain that it would occur and this will require an examination of the basis of their understanding as to their state law duties.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge merely because a debtor failed to insure collateral when that failure did not necessarily cause injury and the debtor had just cause for it.

LSI Financial Group v. Perry (In Re Perry) · filed 1994-04-08(a)(6)

Upon consideration of all the facts and circumstances in this case, the Court concludes that the debtor’s actions, although in violation of applicable Local Rules, do not rise to the level of “willful and malicious” conduct so as to except LSI’s debt from discharge.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge fees and costs incurred defending a lawsuit the debtor intentionally brought in bad faith.

Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Lentine (In Re Lentine) · filed 1994-04-11(a)(6)

Further, it is beyond debate that a finding that the Debtor brought the District Court Action in bad faith is analogous to bringing an action without just cause. Consequently, the Court finds that all the elements of collateral estop-pel are present in this action. ... Likewise, the attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by Aetna in the District Court Action should be nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) bars discharge of a debt for willful and malicious injury when a binding state-court judgment establishes the debtor's specific intent to injure.

In Re Ronald L. Ward, Debtor. Richard Hovdestad v. Ward · filed 1994-04-14(a)(6)

The state-court declaratory judgment determined that Ward had a "specific intent to injure" Hovdestad. Under Arizona rules of collateral estoppel, that judgment is binding on the federal bankruptcy proceedings. Accordingly, the slander judgment is a "willful and malicious injury" within the meaning of Section 523(a)(6), and it is not dischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge sanctions for a lawsuit the debtor knowingly fabricated to extract money from others, because the resulting injury was willful and malicious.

Foran v. Lutz (In Re Lutz) · filed 1994-05-27(a)(6)

Plaintiffs have, therefore, established each of the three elements necessary to show a willful and malicious injury under section 523(a)(6) of the Code.

Section 523(a)(6) can except a debt from discharge when a debtor willfully and maliciously disposes of a creditor’s collateral.

American Family Financial Services, Inc. v. Johnson (In Re Johnson) · filed 1994-04-22(a)(6)

Wrongful disposition of collateral can be non-dischargeable conduct under the statute. ... The conversion here was both willful and malicious. The debt is nondisehargeable and should be excepted from Mr. Johnson’s general 11 U.S.C. § 727 discharge.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a claim for willful and malicious injury nondischargeable.

Edwin H. Harvey Sandy v. Lee v. Nelson J. Kline · filed 1994-06-15(a)(6)

The bankruptcy court's finding that appellants acted willfully and maliciously within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. Sec. 523(a)(6) is not clearly erroneous.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury from discharge, and a theft conviction can establish those elements when its intent requirement encompasses them.

Erickson v. Roehrich (In Re Roehrich) · filed 1994-06-20(a)(6)

Based upon an analysis of the intent requirement necessary to sustain a conviction for theft of property under § 12.1-23-01 of the North Dakota Century Code, there can be no doubt that the definition of “willful” and “malicious” under the Bankruptcy Code is encompassed by the requirement of criminal intent under the state theft statute. Accordingly, the elements of a § 523(a)(6) claim were unambiguously and conclusively established when the debtor pled guilty to, and was convicted of, theft of property under the aforementioned section.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that the debtor intended the injury or knew it was certain to occur; merely knowing that financial harm might result is insufficient.

Myrick v. Ballard (In Re Ballard) · filed 1994-06-24(a)(6)

Merely knowing that such financial harm might result is not the degree of culpability which supports a determination of nondischargeability under Section 523(a)(6). It must be shown that such a result was intended or that Defendant was certain that it would occur.

Section 523(a)(6) permits a creditor to seek nondischargeability of a conversion debt when a promissory note evidences the debt but does not release or extinguish it.

United States v. Walters (In Re Walters) · filed 1994-06-27(a)(6)

The facts in this case are clearly distinguishable from West, and thus the Court concludes that Dr. Walters may proceed under § 523(a)(6) as there was no intent that the conversion debt be released or extinguished by the note.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts an attorney’s fee judgment from discharge when the debtor’s willful and malicious litigation injured the creditor.

Ammann v. Ihringer (In re Ihringer) · filed 1994-07-11(a)(6)

Plaintiff is entitled to be reimbursed for the cost of attorney’s fees expended to defend a malicious and willful prosecution.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof of both willfulness and malice in the particular circumstances before an uninsured employer’s workers’ compensation debt is excepted from discharge.

Collora v. Leahy (In Re Leahy) · filed 1994-07-19(a)(6)

Unlike some other exceptions to discharge, § 523(a)(6)’s application is circumstance specific, not categorical. ... Only if each element is proved is the exception applicable.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts both compensatory and punitive damages from discharge when they result from a willful and malicious injury.

Forrester v. Staggs (In Re Staggs) · filed 1994-06-06(a)(6)

This court agrees with the decisions that have concluded § 523(a)(6) excepts from the scope of any discharge not only compensatory damages but also any punitive damages awarded as a result of a willful and malicious injury.

Section 523(a)(6) does not make a punitive damages award nondischargeable when the award could rest on conduct that does not satisfy its willful and malicious injury requirement.

Norrell Health Care, Inc. v. Clayton (In Re Clayton) · filed 1994-06-26(a)(6)

With this potential conflict in Georgia law in mind, and reading all factual questions in favor of the non-moving party, the Court cannot hold as a matter of law that the award of $150,000 in punitive damages was based solely upon factual findings that would also satisfy the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts sanctions debts from discharge when the debtor’s conduct caused a wilful and malicious injury, and fully adjudicated sanctions findings can establish that injury without a new trial.

Marine Midland Bank v. Huber (In Re Huber) · filed 1994-07-01(a)(6)

This Court finds that (1) the sanctions awards were awards for “wilful and malicious” injuries by the Debtor, (2) they were previously fully and fairly adjudicated in the Courts that rendered the awards, and (3) were properly before those courts and were necessarily adjudicated by those Courts according to standards and a burden of proof consistent with 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires separate findings that an injury was willful and malicious; a lease violation despite oral consent does not necessarily meet that standard.

Eberhardt v. Comerica Bank · filed 1994-07-28(a)(6)

Moreover, even if the transfer of the equipment was found to be in violation of the lease agreement, such a transfer, in the presence of oral consent, does not necessarily constitute a willful and malicious conversion under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). In order to establish non-dischargeability of debt based on ■willful and malicious injury, a court must make separate findings that the resulting injury was both “willful” and “malicious.”

Section 523(a)(6) requires more than reckless conduct to establish malice and except a debt from discharge.

Vaughn v. Quinn (In Re Quinn) · filed 1994-08-09(a)(6)

The Debtor’s actions were willful and of such a reckless nature that the state court imposed punitive damages. However, the Debtor’s actions here do not rise to the level of malice that is required to sustain a determination that the debt is not dischargeable in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding pursuant to Section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the creditor proves by a preponderance of the evidence that it resulted from a willful and malicious injury.

Burgess v. Martin (In Re Martin) · filed 1994-08-09(a)(6)

This section of the Bankruptcy Code exempts from discharge any debt which results from “willful and malicious” injury by the- debtor to another entity or the property of another entity. ... Willful and malicious injury must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a creditor to establish that the debtor’s act was both willful and malicious to except the resulting debt from discharge.

Frantz v. Schuster (In Re Schuster) · filed 1994-08-16(a)(6)

The code does not provide a definition for willful and malicious, however, it is agreed that in order to have a debt excepted from discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) the creditor must establish that the debtor’s act was both willful and malicious.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt nondischargeable when a debtor intentionally breaches an agreement knowing the breach will harm the creditor.

Carter v. Trammell (In Re Trammell) · filed 1994-08-18(a)(6)

Thus, to fall within the purview of section 523(a)(6), it is sufficient that (1) Trammell intentionally disregarded the provisions of the agreements, and (2) knowing that the breach would harm Carter, proceeded to act in contravention of the agreements and the obligations they imposed.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt for willful and malicious injury; a conversion judgment enhanced by punitive damages can satisfy that requirement.

Kinstle v. Kinstle (In Re Kinstle) · filed 1994-08-23(a)(6)

According to the case law, the state court judgment for conversion, enhanced by an award of punitive damages, is sufficient to satisfy the “willful and malicious” requirement of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not bar discharge when a debtor’s sale of merchandise is authorized by the security agreement and causes no willful and malicious injury to the creditor.

Bonfiglio v. Harkema Associates, Inc. · filed 1994-08-24(a)(6)

In the instant case, St. Anne’s sale of some of its merchandise was consistent with its rights in the property, as those rights are defined by the Security Agreement. ... For the foregoing reasons, this court finds that Debtor did not commit a willful and malicious injury to the interests of Seller. Accordingly, Debtor’s debt to Plaintiff shall be discharged.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a workers’ compensation debt from discharge merely because an employer intentionally failed to maintain insurance; the failure must cause a willful and malicious injury.

Bailey v. Chatham (In Re Bailey) · filed 1994-08-29(a)(6)

In view of the uneontested facts of this case, the Court concludes that the Plaintiffs failure to maintain workers’ compensation insurance did not give rise to a willful and malicious injury within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for willful and malicious injury from discharge when the debtor intended the injury or acted with substantial certainty that it would occur.

In Re Dominick P. CONTE, Debtor, Dominick P. CONTE, Appellant v. Urmila GAUTAM; Narinder Gautam; U.S. Trustee, Trustee · filed 1994-08-30(a)(6)

We hold that actions are willful and malicious within the meaning of § 523(a)(6) if they either have a purpose of producing injury or have a substantial certainty of producing injury.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt for injury caused by a debtor’s willful and malicious concealment of a known sexually transmitted disease from a sexual partner.

Fischer v. Hanson (In Re Hanson) · filed 1994-09-09(a)(6)

The Eighth Circuit has cautioned that § 523(a)(6) has two parts and that it is the plaintiffs burden to show that an injury is both willful and malicious. ... Since Fischer’s damages from Hanson’s transmission to her of the Human Papilloma Virus is the result of a willful and malicious injury, her claims for that injury are nondis-ehargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor’s deliberate, wrongful act causes willful and malicious injury.

Community Mutual Savings Bank v. Landrin (In Re Landrin) · filed 1994-09-15(a)(6)

Thus, the record establishes that the harm which resulted from Landrin’s activities constitutes willful and malicious injury within the meaning of section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt arising from a debtor’s intentional forgery and recording of a certificate that releases a creditor’s security interest.

Bank v. Green (In re Green) · filed 1994-09-26(a)(6)

Debtor’s intentional act of forging and recording the certificate of satisfaction constituted willful and malicious injury to Greene’s property rights.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the creditor proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the debtor caused a willful and malicious injury.

Bethesda Hospital v. Kessnick (In Re Kessnick) · filed 1994-09-27(a)(6)

This court, upon review de novo, also finds that the bankruptcy court did not err when it reasoned that plaintiff failed to meet its burden of proof, by the preponderance of the evidence, that defendant’s actions and intentions were malicious, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt nondischargeable to the extent a debtor’s willful and malicious disposal of collateral reduces the secured creditor’s recovery.

Moog Employees Federal Credit Union v. Kibler (In Re Kibler) · filed 1994-09-30(a)(6)

Rather, a nondisehargeable status attaches only to that portion of the total claim which may be attributed to the debtor’s willful and malicious conduct. Nor can the debtor confine nondischargeability to the limits of his unjust enrichment. The defining factor is the extent to which the debtor’s wrongful activity causes a reduction in the Credit Union’s recovery from its collateral.