11 U.S.C. § 523

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge when the debtor’s failure to insure collateral and accidental damage to it do not amount to willful and malicious injury.

National Bank of Commerce v. Barriger (In Re Barriger) · filed 1986-05-30(a)(6)

Moreover, the failure to maintain insurance on collateral while amounting to a “breach of contract and negligence” on the part of the Debtor, has not been held to constitute “willful and malicious injury.” ... From these facts, the Court cannot find that she willfully and maliciously caused injury to the automobile within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge merely because the debtor sold and repurchased property subject to a notice of lis pendens; the creditor must prove willful and malicious injury.

City of Colton v. Johnson (In Re Johnson) · filed 1986-06-04(a)(6)

Based on this, the Court finds that the City has failed to clearly prove that it was “willfully and maliciously” injured by the debtor’s sale and repurchase of certain real property and, therefore, holds that the debtor is not precluded discharge under Bankruptcy Code Section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) bars discharge for intentionally inflicted injuries; reckless disregard alone does not suffice.

Cassidy v. Minihan · filed 1986-06-20(a)(6)

We conclude that by section 523(a)(6) of the Code, the 95th Congress intended to bar the discharge of intentionally inflicted injuries. We agree with the district court’s assessment that there is no evidence that Minihan intended to cause injury to anyone. Minihan’s conduct reflected, at most, reckless disregard for the risks involved. We therefore conclude that Minihan’s debt is dischargeable under section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires more than reckless conduct to except a debt for willful and malicious injury from discharge; filing a frivolous lawsuit alone does not meet that standard.

In Re Peter J. Wrenn, Debtor. American Cast Iron Pipe Company v. Wrenn · filed 1986-06-25(a)(6)

The legislative history makes clear that an act in reckless disregard of the rights of others is insufficient to constitute “willful and malicious” conduct for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that an intentional conversion was maliciously targeted at the creditor to make the debt nondischargeable.

National Bank of Commerce of Pine Bluff v. Hoffman (In Re Hoffman) · filed 1986-09-16(a)(6)

Consistent with In re Long, there is insufficient evidence of malice targeted at NBC to warrant a denial of discharge of the NBC debt.

Section 523(a)(6) does not make a debt nondischargeable merely because the debtor breached a mortgage condition; the conduct must be willful and malicious.

United States, Farmers Home Administration v. Buckley (In re Buckley) · filed 1986-09-30(a)(6)

The question then becomes whether the debtor, by failing to inform FmHA of his intention to rent the property as required by the mortgage, interfered with or, in effect, prevented FmHA from perfecting its interest in rents and whether this conduct was willful and malicious, amounting to a conversion nondischargeable under the Code. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). This Court must conclude that, although the debtor’s conduct constituted a breach of the conditions of the mortgage, such a breach is not in and of itself sufficient to declare the debtor’s conduct to be willful and malicious.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except an ordinary breach of contract debt from discharge merely because the breach foreseeably harms the creditor.

Communications Workers of America, Local 11500 v. Allen (In Re Allen) · filed 1987-01-08(a)(6)

In summary, while Debtor’s conduct here constituted a breach of her contractual obligations to her Union, it did not cause “willful and malicious injury” within the meaning of Section 523(a)(6). Neither the legislative history nor case precedent justify expanding this exception to include garden variety breaches of contract, even if the particular contract, as here, is favored as a matter of public policy.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a debtor intentionally converts a creditor’s property knowing the creditor will be harmed.

State National Bank of Platteville v. Cullen (In Re Cullen) · filed 1987-02-09(a)(6)

Paul’s actions constituted a willful and malicious injury to the property of another entity within the purview of section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires a creditor to prove injury caused by the debtor’s willful and malicious conduct.

Homemakers, Inc. v. Salamone (In Re Salamone) · filed 1987-02-11(a)(6)

Thus, while Salamone may have acted improperly in attempting to make personal sales from Homemakers’ leads, Homemakers was not injured by Salamone’s actions if it would not have received these sales in any event.

Section 523(a)(6) makes fees and costs arising from a debtor’s willful and malicious injury nondischargeable.

Audio Visual Systems, Inc. v. Hopper (In Re Hopper) · filed 1987-02-11(a)(6)

... we also find that the debtor’s conduct was intentional, ... and caused willful and malicious injury to the plaintiff through the use of a fraudulent document in prior state court proceedings. ... Accordingly, and on both grounds mentioned above, the attorneys’ fees and costs awarded in favor of the plaintiff against the debtor are determined to be nondischargeable. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge for technical conversion unless willful and malicious injury is proved.

GMA, Inc. v. Boerner (In re Boerner) · filed 1987-02-12(a)(6)

The conclusion derived from the aboye is that, even if debtor’s conduct constituted a technical conversion of the creditor’s property, the required elements of Section 523(a)(6) were not proven.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when conversion of another’s property constitutes a willful and malicious injury.

Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Miller (In Re Miller) · filed 1987-02-17(a)(6)

In these circumstances, we are required to make a determination of whether plaintiff has succeeded in establishing its claim that defendant converted plaintiff’s collateral, and that therefore the debt represented thereby should be held nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). We hold that plaintiff is entitled to succeed on that claim.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge for willful and malicious injury when the underlying verdict may have rested on reckless disregard alone.

Daniel v. Jenkins (In Re Jenkins) · filed 1987-02-20(a)(6)

Although reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of a statement may support a libel verdict, it is not a willful and malicious injury for purposes of § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor willfully and maliciously injures another person’s property, including through conversion.

Bacon v. Hyers (In Re Hyers) · filed 1987-02-23(a)(6)

To sustain a claim under § 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code the Plaintiff must establish with the requisite degree of proof that the Debtor did, in fact, willfuly and maliciously injure property of another, and of course, that would include a conversion of the property of another would be tantamount of a willful, malicious injury to property. ... Thus, it is clear that he did, in fact, willfully and maliciously injure the property of Bacon at least to the extent of an unauthorized spending of the $20,000.00.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt arising from a debtor’s willful and malicious conversion of another’s property from discharge.

First Colony Life Insurance Co. v. Coover (In Re Coover) · filed 1987-03-03(a)(6)

The Debtor’s conduct constitutes conversion, the direct result of which was injury to FIRST COLONY. Conversion of property is clearly among the wrongs prohibited by Section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when it arises from an intentional injury caused without just cause or excuse; a prior finding that the conduct was unexcused can establish malice.

Condict v. Condict (In Re Condict) · filed 1987-03-12(a)(6)

A determination that Vernon’s conduct was unexcused was the equivalent of finding that his conduct was malicious as contemplated by section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not make a debt nondischargeable merely because the debtor violated a traffic law and caused an injury.

Oregon Ford, Inc. v. Claburn · filed 1987-04-15(a)(6)

To carry Judge Speer’s analysis to its logical conclusion, any violation of the law resulting in civil liability would not be dis-chargeable under § 523(a)(6). The Court finds this conclusion to be unsupported by case law or the historical development of § 523(a)(6) as previously discussed.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for willful and malicious injury from discharge when the debtor acted deliberately and without just cause or excuse.

Raybourn v. Buroker (In Re Buroker) · filed 1987-05-07(a)(6)

As used in Section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code “willful” means deliberate or intentional. ... The deliberate shooting into a structure occupied by others is clearly a malicious act.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for conversion from discharge only if the conversion was willful and malicious.

Krohn v. Tracton (In Re Tracton) · filed 1987-05-22(a)(6)

A mere technical conversion is not sufficient to except a debt from discharge, it must be a willful and malicious conversion.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a prior judgment necessarily establishes willful and malicious injury.

In Re Kenneth Earl Latch, Helen Doris Latch, Debtors. Sunco Sales, Inc. v. Kenneth Earl Latch, Helen Doris Latch · filed 1987-07-02(a)(6)

In this case, the prior court’s decision unambiguously established the fact that the Latches’ actions were willful and malicious. Thus, the bankruptcy judge was bound to give collateral estoppel effect to that fact finding.

Section 523(a)(6) can except a drunk-driving injury debt from discharge when the debtor’s conduct is willful and malicious.

Estate of Burnham v. Haugsrud (In Re Haugsrud) · filed 1987-08-27(a)(6)

Based upon all of the foregoing circumstances I conclude that the debtor-defendant’s liabilities to the Estate of Muriel Burnham raised in this adversary proceeding are nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a creditor alleging willful and malicious injury to show that the debtor had no just cause or excuse for the intentional act.

Davenport v. Schulcz (In Re Schulcz) · filed 1987-10-28(a)(6)

Perkins does not speak in terms of probable cause, but incorporates as part of the test for a holding of nondis-chargeability that there not have been just cause or excuse for defendant’s act.

Section 523(a)(6) does not automatically except a debt from discharge when a debtor transfers secured collateral without authorization; the circumstances may show just cause or excuse.

Sears v. Gault (In Re Gault) · filed 1988-02-08(a)(6)

In order to grant summary judgment to Sears on the basis of the bare facts outlined above, this court would be required to hold that any unauthorized transfer of an item subject to a security agreement is per se non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). Although this court’s circuit court of appeals has indicated that willful and malicious injury does not require an act with intent to cause injury, but merely an intentional act that results in injury, Perkins v. Scharffe, 817 F.2d 392 (6th Cir.1987), this court does not believe that Perkins requires application of a per se rule in the instant matter.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another’s property.

Richter v. Gordon (In Re Gordon) · filed 1988-02-26(a)(6)

However, the Court finds the state court judgment should be excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) as requested in Count VI of Richter’s complaint. This section excepts a debt from discharge for the willful and malicious injury by the debtor to the property of another entity. The injury in this case was the theft or loss of the ring.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a debtor deliberately converts a creditor’s funds in knowing disregard of the creditor’s rights.

NERCO Coal Corp. v. Ball (In Re Ball) · filed 1988-03-03(a)(6)

After applying the “clear and convincing” evidentiary standard, the court finds that the debtor willfully and maliciously injured the plaintiff, NERCO, by converting funds in excess of $1,750,000 which should have been made available to NER-CO. ... Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the debtor’s debt to NERCO as set forth in the judgment dated December 12, 1986, is nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) and that the debtor’s discharge should be denied pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(a)(4)(A) and 727(a)(5).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor deliberately acts with knowledge that the act will harm another and without just cause or excuse.

Couch v. Rubitschung (In Re Rubitschung) · filed 1988-03-07(a)(6)

While there is no universally accepted definition of the term “willful and malicious,” this Court concludes that willful and malicious conduct is the deliberate or intentional act of a debtor with knowledge that the act will harm another.

Section 523(a)(6) requires malice as well as willful conduct to except a debt from discharge.

AVCO Financial Services of Ohio, Inc. v. Hurst (In Re Hurst) · filed 1988-03-28(a)(6)

In view of our determination that malice is an essential element in a Sec. 523(a)(6) action, AVCO cannot succeed on the merits. Therefore, Mr. Hurst’s obligation to AVCO is deemed to be dischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt from the intentional appropriation of another’s trade secrets nondischargeable when the appropriation causes willful and malicious injury.

World Wide Bearing & Automotive Parts, Inc. v. Springer (In Re Springer) · filed 1988-03-31(a)(6)

Thus, it is clear that the act of trade appropriation/civil theft by SPRINGER arose on account of a willful and/or malicious injury to the person and/or property of WORLD WIDE. SPRINGER’S subsequent filing in Bankruptcy will have no effect on the Final Judgment against her in the amount of Six Thousand ($6,000.00) Dollars, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 523(a)(6), as the debt is non-dischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a willful and malicious injury; willfulness requires deliberate or intentional conduct, beyond negligence or reckless disregard.

Anthony v. Baker (In Re Baker) · filed 1988-04-27(a)(6)

A showing of willfulness requires more than proof of inadvertence or negligence, and no longer may be satisfied by merely proving “reckless disregard.”

Section 523(a)(6) bars discharge for an intentional injury when a reasonable person in the debtor’s position would recognize that harm was substantially certain to result.

Hartley v. Jones (In Re Hartley) · filed 1988-04-28(a)(6)

Thus, while intentional harm remains the standard for malicious injury under § 523(a)(6) in this circuit, courts are not bound to the nearly impossible task of determining the subjective intent of the debt- or at the time of his actions which gave rise to the debt.

Section 523(a)(6) covers tortious injury, not a mere breach of contract.

Columbus Municipal Employees Federal Credit Union v. Moore (In Re Moore) · filed 1988-03-09(a)(6)

Section 523(a)(6) relates to torts not to contracts.

Section 523(a)(6) requires the creditor to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the debtor acted deliberately and intended to injure the creditor.

Blackman v. Gaebler (In Re Gaebler) · filed 1988-03-25(a)(6)

The Plaintiff was obliged to prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that (1) The shooting was an intentional or deliberate act; and (2) The Debtor intended to injure the Plaintiff, to prevail in a complaint challenging dischargeability on the basis of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires separate findings of willfulness and malice before a debt can be excepted from discharge.

American Bank of Raytown v. McCune (In Re McCune) · filed 1988-05-04(a)(6)

Long specifies, however, that the elements of willfulness and maliciousness are analyzed separately, and that both must be found in order to justify denial of dis-chargeability.

Section 523(a)(6) permits a claim to proceed when an employer intentionally fails to carry required workers’ compensation insurance, knowing the failure will harm an employee’s interests.

Zielinski v. Strauss (In Re Strauss) · filed 1988-05-23(a)(6)

To fail to carry adequate insurance or be in a position to self-insure is an intentional act done with knowledge that the act will harm his employee’s interests.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt secured by wrongfully disposed collateral from discharge when the creditor proves intentional conduct and malice, which may be inferred from the circumstances.

ITT Consumer Discount Co. v. Horldt (In Re Horldt) · filed 1988-05-24(a)(6)

Accordingly, I hold that in the context of a debtor who wrongfully disposes of collateral, the debt secured by the collateral will be found nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6) if the creditor proves that the debtor acted (1) deliberately or intentionally (i.e. “willfully”) and (2) with malice, recognizing that malice can be implied from the facts and circumstances of the case.

Under § 523(a)(6), a willful injury requires a deliberate and intentional act that necessarily leads to injury; reckless disregard alone is insufficient.

Stewart v. Gargac (In Re Gargac) · filed 1988-05-26(a)(6)

In that case, the Court of Appeals held that “willful” means the deliberate and intentional doing of an act that necessarily leads to injury. ... Accordingly, this Court will apply the standard set forth in Perkins.

Section 523(a)(6) requires specific intent to injure the creditor; reckless disregard alone does not except a debt from discharge.

Ledbetter v. Zaidan (In Re Zaidan) · filed 1988-06-02(a)(6)

Reckless disregard for others is not sufficient to except a debt from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for criminal conversation and alienation of affections nondischargeable when the debtor’s conduct was intentional, wrongful, and without just cause or excuse.

Perrin v. Meyer (In Re Meyer) · filed 1988-06-06(a)(6)

The plaintiff has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant willfully and maliciously injured the plaintiff so as to preclude, pursuant to § 523(a)(6), the discharge of the defendant’s $155,000. indebtedness to the plaintiff.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a debtor’s conversion of property to constitute a willful and malicious injury before the resulting debt is nondischargeable.

In Re Keffer · filed 1988-06-09(a)(6)

In order to support a finding of nondischargeability under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), the Court must be convinced that a debtor’s conversion of property constituted a willful and malicious injury.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a malicious prosecution judgment nondischargeable when the prior judgment resolved whether the debtor acted willfully and maliciously.

Laganella v. Braen (In Re Braen) · filed 1988-06-21(a)(6)

Said exhaustive legal battle centered on the question as to whether the debtor had acted willfully and maliciously toward the plaintiff herein. Said issue having been resolved, the debtor cannot not now obtain a second trial within the context of this bankruptcy proceeding. Summary judgment is granted in favor of the plaintiff; the judgment entered in favor of Nicholas Laganella and P.T. & L. Construction Co., Inc. in the Superior Court of the State of New Jersey is nondischargeable pursuant to Bankruptcy Code Section 523(a)(6).

A judgment that a debt is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6) does not require a finding that the debtor’s conduct warranted punitive damages.

Pinshaw v. Metropolitan District Commission · filed 1988-06-30(a)(6)

A judgment of nondischargeability does not require a determination that punitive damages would be warranted.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt arising from a debtor’s knowing, wrongful conversion of collateral nondischargeable to the extent of the collateral’s value, less amounts applied to the debt.

Bank of Findlay v. Sain (In Re Sain) · filed 1988-05-11(a)(6)

While the Bank was perhaps ill-advised in allowing the Debtor the latitude to sell the truck himself, rather than collecting it from him for sale, under Sec. 523(a)(6) the Court is concerned only with the conduct and intent of the Debtor. The Debtor’s misconduct lies in his misappropriation of the proceeds. The Debtor has failed to establish just cause or excuse for his knowingly wrongful intentional conversion of the Bank’s collateral. Hence, the debt owed the Bank is nondischargeable, to the extent of the value of the collateral less the amount applied to the Bank’s note.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt arising from breach of contract from discharge because it applies to tortious liabilities.

Posey v. Hiner (In Re Hiner) · filed 1988-06-14(a)(6)

The Plaintiff cannot meet the first element because Sec. 523(a)(6) relates solely to tortious liabilities and not to debts stemming from breach of contract.

Section 523(a)(6) does not make a contract debt nondischargeable merely because the debtor breached the contract; the creditor must show a willful and malicious injury.

Local 11500, Communications Workers v. Akridge (In Re Akridge) · filed 1988-07-19(a)(6)

There is no evidence on the record before this Panel that the debtor’s conduct amounted to a malicious or willful injury. To adopt the Union’s arguments would essentially make every breach of contract claim nondischargeable as a “willful and malicious injury.”

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that the debtor’s act was malicious to except a resulting debt from discharge.

Baker v. Tadych (In Re Tadych) · filed 1988-07-19(a)(6)

Under any tort or contract theory, the Bakers failed to present evidence that Norbert Tadych’s act was malicious, as is required to find nondischargeability under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). While the act was unquestionably willful, there was no proof that Mr. Tadych intended any harm to come to the Bakers or that he knew that harm would result from the revocation.

Section 523(a)(6) does not make a debt from negligent driving nondischargeable merely because the debtor lacked liability insurance.

Austin Mutual Insurance v. Schultz (In Re Schultz) · filed 1988-08-02(a)(6)

Putting negligence together with failure to carry liability insurance still does not make driving an intentional act which the debtor realized would harm a creditor’s interest and which she nevertheless proceeded to do.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts compensatory and punitive damages arising from willful and malicious injury from discharge.

Zervas v. Nix (In Re Nix) · filed 1988-08-26(a)(6)

§ 523(a)(6) does not contain the limiting language present in § 523(a)(2)(A) which restricts the debt excepted from discharge to “the extent obtained” by fraud. Where willfulness and malice exist, then compensatory and punitive damages flowing therefrom are non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt nondischargeable when a debtor intentionally fails to provide required workers’ compensation coverage and thereby injures a worker’s right to that coverage.

Vig v. Erickson (In Re Erickson) · filed 1988-07-22(a)(6)

The defendants admitted their failure to provide workmen’s compensation for Vig. They were under a duty to do so. They intentionally failed to perform this duty. This intentional failure directly led to Vig’s predicament of being without workmen’s compensation coverage. This intentional failure is a violation of § 523(a)(6) and therefore results in a finding of nondis-chargeability of the debt owed Vig in the amount of $26,600.79.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt for an injury the debtor caused willfully and maliciously.

Rymer v. Stillwell (In Re Stillwell) · filed 1988-09-12(a)(6)

Accordingly, we hold that the defendant’s actions were willful and malicious within the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) and as such are nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge solely because the debtor violated state law while operating a motor vehicle.

Ward v. Roberson (In Re Roberson) · filed 1988-09-12(a)(6)

The Court also finds that a violation of state law in the operation of a motor vehicle does not, without more, establish the willfulness and/or maliciousness of an action within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof of both willfulness and malice to except an injury debt from discharge.

Perino v. Cohen (In Re Cohen) · filed 1988-09-30(a)(6)

Nevertheless, Code Section 523(a)(6) requires proof not only of the debtor’s willfulness, but of malice as well.

Section 523(a)(6) requires willful and malicious injury; a state verdict that could rest on reckless or wanton conduct does not establish that requirement.

Brooks v. Smith (In re Smith) · filed 1988-10-12(a)(6)

While the first two standards (willful or malicious) are identical to the bankruptcy standard, the last two standards (reckless or wanton disregard for the rights of others, etc.) clearly represent a less stringent standard than the bankruptcy standard since no finding of intent is required. Since the jury could have awarded punitive damages to the Plaintiff based on a finding that the Defendant acted with reckless or wanton disregard for the rights of others, we can not find that the issue of ‘willful and malicious injury’ was actually litigated in the state court proceeding.

Section 523 excepts personal injury debts from discharge when the debtor caused the injury willfully and maliciously or through drunk driving.

Boscia v. Donnelly (In Re Donnelly) · filed 1988-10-17(a)(6), (a)(9)

11 U.S.C. § 523 sets forth the exceptions to discharge. Personal injury claims are exempted from discharge only where (1) the debtor acted willfully and maliciously in causing the injury, § 523(a)(6) or (2) the injury was a result of the debtor’s drunk driving, § 523(a)(9).

Section 523(a)(6) requires both willful and malicious injury; an unauthorized sale of collateral alone does not make the resulting debt nondischargeable.

First National Bank & Trust Co. of Beatrice Nebraska v. Claassen (In re Claassen) · filed 1988-11-22(a)(6)

On the facts of this case, there has been no showing that debtor’s conduct in selling the collateral was targeted at the creditor or was certain or almost certain to cause financial harm. ... Debtor’s obligation to the Bank is not barred from discharge under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) makes the nature of a willful and malicious act, rather than the amount of resulting damages, decisive for nondischargeability.

Raitano v. Nunez (In Re Nunez) · filed 1988-11-28(a)(6)

Under section 523(a)(6) the nature of the act gives rise to nondischargeability, not the amount of damages resulting from the act.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a corporate officer’s conversion debt from discharge when the officer actively participates in conduct that willfully and maliciously injures a secured creditor, even if the proceeds go to the corporation.

Mercury Marine Acceptance Corp. v. Wheeler (In Re Wheeler) · filed 1988-12-06(a)(6)

Having reviewed the transcripts, the decision of the bankruptcy judge and the parties’ briefs, the court concludes that the bankruptcy judge did not err in finding that Wheeler converted the boat, causing willful and malicious injury to MMAC. As a result, the debt is nondischargeable in bankruptcy.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for willful and malicious injury nondischargeable when a debtor intentionally keeps another person’s property, knowing that doing so will cause harm.

Wood v. Coffer (In Re Wood) · filed 1988-12-16(a)(6)

Such facts clearly indicate that the debtor intended to keep the money for himself, knowing that such would injure and harm his former wife. Therefore, under either test, the bankruptcy court was correct in finding the debtor’s conduct to be “willful and malicious” and in finding this debt nondischargeable under section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt arising from arson from discharge when the fire willfully and maliciously injures another entity’s property.

State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Dunn (In Re Dunn) · filed 1988-12-20(a)(6)

The Court finds that the debt owed to State Farm is the product of the debtor’s willful and malicious injury to the property of another entity, and is, therefore, nondis-chargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) permits a court to infer willfulness and malice from direct evidence of intent and the surrounding circumstances.

St. Mary's Medical Center v. Nelson (In Re Nelson) · filed 1988-11-17(a)(6)

Under established Eighth Circuit authority construing the “willfulness” and “malice” elements of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), this Court may consider both direct evidence of Defendants’ subjective state of mind and evidence of the surrounding objective circumstances, and then may make appropriate inferences as to whether Defendants harbored the proscribed intent.

Section 523(a)(6) requires an intentional injury by the debtor; a minor child’s intent cannot be imputed to a parent to make the parent’s debt nondischargeable.

Jones v. Whitacre (In Re Whitacre) · filed 1988-11-22(a)(6)

The legislative history accompanying the enactment of Section 523(a)(6) indicates Congress’s specific intent that a debt is nondischargeable only where injury has resulted from some deliberate or intentional act of the Debtor.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a negligence debt from discharge merely because the debtor knowingly drove without insurance or the ability to pay for an injury.

Pechar v. Moore · filed 1988-12-29(a)(6)

Thus, the $6,000 debt is a debt for “negligent” injury. It is not a debt for “willful” or “malicious” injury. Only the latter type of debt may be found nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for intentional injury from discharge only when the injury is also malicious, meaning without just cause or excuse.

Berry v. McLemore (In Re McLemore) · filed 1988-12-30(a)(6)

Therefore, the debtor’s conduct was “willful” under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), but was not “malicious.”

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge based on reckless conduct alone.

Hoskins v. Yanks (In Re Yanks) · filed 1989-01-12(a)(6)

Reckless acts are insufficient to satisfy the test under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that the debtor specifically intended to cause injury.

Milam v. Vorek (In Re Vorek) · filed 1989-01-13(a)(6)

While this Court may conclude that the defendant did willfully cause the truck to move forward and that this act was indeed the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury, the Court cannot conclude that the defendant caused the truck to move forward with the specific intent of causing injury to this plaintiff.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) excepts debts arising from actual fraud from discharge, and § 523(a)(6) excepts debts arising from willful and malicious injury.

Bear, Stearns & Co. v. Powell (In Re Powell) · filed 1989-01-17(a)(2)(A), (a)(6)

Having reviewed all the evidence, the Court independently finds that the debtor’s actions clearly and convincingly constitute actual fraud under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A), and were done willfully and maliciously pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) as those terms have been defined by the courts.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt arising from a debtor’s willful and malicious appropriation of another person’s funds.

McNierney v. McNierney (In Re McNierney) · filed 1989-02-03(a)(6)

The evidence is clear and convincing that there was an unlawful appropriation of the ex-wife’s portion of the funds. I find that the taking of the funds by the debtor was willful and malicious. I find that the “ar-rearage” amount of $10,064 which the Florida court concluded was received by the debtor and not turned over to the defendant ex-wife in accordance with the Settlement Agreement (¶ 18) is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a debtor willfully and maliciously injures a creditor’s collateral by allowing it to be stripped for parts.

Farmers National Bank of Canfield v. Kolbfleisch (In Re Kolbfleisch) · filed 1989-02-08(a)(6)

Thus, her action or acquiescense is sufficient to make the injury willful. Finally, the injury also must be malicious. The Wheeler court held that “malicious” means “in conscious disregard of one’s duties or without just cause or excuse.” The Debtor had a duty not to destroy Farmers’s collateral. The piecemeal sale of parts off of the Citation was comparable to common law conversion. Hence, the Court finds the Debtor’s actions to also be malicious. Plaintiff’s request to deem the Farmers obligation nondischargeable is sustained as to Count Three of the Complaint.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for willful and malicious conversion of a secured creditor’s collateral nondischargeable when the debtor knowingly sells the collateral without remitting the proceeds or providing replacement collateral.

Standard Bank & Trust Co. v. Iaquinta (In Re Iaquinta) · filed 1989-01-12(a)(6)

The Court hereby denies Iaquin-ta’s motion in part as to the relief sought by the Bank under section 523(a)(6). Ia-quinta’s debt to the Bank in the amount of $14,500.00 plus statutory interest and costs on the two Mercedes motor vehicles is non-dischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge when a debtor’s sale of collateral is only a technical conversion, without malicious disregard of the creditor’s rights.

In Re Gregory Alyan Posta and Mary Jones Posta, C.I.T. Financial Services, Inc. v. Gregory Alyan Posta, Mary Jones Posta · filed 1989-01-26(a)(6)

We agree with the bankruptcy court that, in light of these facts, at most, all that occurred was a “technical conversion.” Technical conversions do not fall within the § 523(a)(6) exception to discharge.

Section 523(a)(6) requires willful and malicious injury; negligent driving and failure to maintain required insurance do not automatically make collision damages nondischargeable.

Conroy v. Kimsey (In Re Kimsey) · filed 1989-02-21(a)(6)

For the reasons set forth herein, the plaintiff has not demonstrated that the damage to his vehicles was caused by a willful and malicious act of the defendant. Neither the defendant’s act of negligent driving, nor the defendant’s act or omission in failing to comply with the Nebraska Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act was willful and malicious under § 523(a)(6). Therefore, I conclude that the $2,197.65 debt is dischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) requires an injury to be both willful and malicious for the resulting debt to be excepted from discharge.

Cinc v. Williams (In re Williams) · filed 1989-02-21(a)(6)

In order to find a debt non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), we must find that the injury was not only “willful,” it must be “malicious.”

Section 523(a)(6) requires deliberate and intentional conduct; reckless disregard does not satisfy its willfulness requirement.

Richter v. Thibodaux (In re Thibodaux) · filed 1989-02-28(a)(6)

Under this section, willful means deliberate and intentional. “Reckless disregard” does not establish sufficient intent to satisfy the willful requirement under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt arising from a debtor’s deliberate, wrongful injury to another’s property without just cause or excuse.

United States v. Nielson (In Re Nielson) · filed 1989-03-02(a)(6)

From the evidence presented the court is clearly convinced that the debtors’ payment of the $5,700 to secured creditors First Union National Bank and First Federal Savings & Loan was a wrongful act done deliberately and intentionally, in willful disregard of the court’s February 1, 1988 Order, as well as in willful disregard of FmHA’s security interest.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor deliberately causes injury through wrongful conduct without just cause.

Gunter v. Morton (In Re Morton) · filed 1989-03-15(a)(6)

Defendant intentionally pulled the trigger when he shot the plaintiff on June 3, 1984, so the shooting was willful. Defendant knew that an injury would be caused by discharging the gun pointed at the plaintiff, and yet proceeded to shoot the gun despite such knowledge. This is sufficient to establish malice within the meaning of § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts damages for intentional interference with contractual relations from discharge when the debtor knew of the creditor’s contract rights and intentionally damaged them.

Chicago Title Insurance v. Hartman (In Re Hartman) · filed 1989-04-03(a)(6)

Applying the Compos standard to the present case, the bankruptcy court correctly determined that only that portion of the Foulston judgment representing damages for tortious interference with contractual relations was not dischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) treats a debtor's failure to remit proceeds from sold collateral and to substitute titles as conversion for purposes of dischargeability.

Standard Bank & Trust Co. v. Iaquinta (In Re Iaquinta) · filed 1989-03-29(a)(6)

Iaquinta admitted that he failed to remit proceeds from the sale of the secured vehicles and failed to substitute titles to the Bank. These admissions constitute conversion for purposes of section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge merely because the debtor drove negligently without insurance; the creditor must show intentional injury.

Pichardo Ex Rel. Pichardo v. Granda (In Re Granda) · filed 1989-04-11(a)(6)

Therefore, this Court concludes that none of the debtor’s acts individually, or viewed collectively, rise to the level of willful and malicious behavior as required by 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). Furthermore, the debtor’s act of driving without insurance is not equivalent to willful and malicious injury.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for intentional, unjustified injury from discharge even if the debtor did not intend to injure the particular victims or cause the resulting harm.

Rolland v. Johnson (In Re Johnson) · filed 1989-04-14(a)(6)

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Defendant intentionally shot both Plaintiffs without just cause or excuse and that he possessed the requisite constructive malice as required by § 523(a)(6) in that he intended to fire the revolver and strike whomever he believed was in the room. The fact that he did not intend to shoot the Plaintiffs or cause the resultant harm is not a defense.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts compensatory and punitive damages from discharge when they arise from willful and malicious conversion.

Associated Growers, Inc. v. Horowitz (In Re Horowitz) · filed 1989-04-19(a)(6)

Accordingly, the Court finds the compensatory and punitive awards, in the sums of $20,000.00 and $50,-000.00 respectively, to be debts for the willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity which are therefore non-dischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) measures damages for converted collateral by its fair market value.

First State Bank of Alsip v. Iaquinta (In Re Iaquinta) · filed 1989-04-28(a)(6)

The fair market value of the converted collateral under section 523(a)(6) is the appropriate measure of damages for conversion.

Section 523(a)(6) requires an injury to be both willful and malicious; reckless driving and knowingly driving without insurance do not make the resulting injury willful.

Madden v. Fate (In Re Fate) · filed 1989-06-02(a)(6)

I rule that by driving recklessly and without insurance, the defendant acted with malice, but not with the willfulness required by Sec. 523(a)(6), therefore, I conclude that judgment should enter for the defendant.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt arising from failure to provide workers’ compensation insurance when that failure does not necessarily cause injury.

Workers' Compensation Trust Fund v. Collins (In Re Collins) · filed 1989-06-02(a)(6)

I conclude that this exception does not apply because the injuries—the uncompensated medical and legal expenses—suffered by Hall and by the Trust Fund were not “willful” as that term is used in Sec. 523(a)(6). “Willful” requires a deliberate or intentional act that necessarily leads to the injury complained of. ... But the failure to provide Workers’ Compensation Insurance does not inevitably or necessarily cause harm and so cannot give rise to willful injury.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for willful and malicious injury nondischargeable; a state court assault and battery judgment entered after an evidentiary hearing can establish the injury through collateral estoppel even if the defendant defaulted.

Walker v. Seals (In Re Seals) · filed 1989-06-30(a)(6)

Thus, this court holds that the doctrine of collateral estoppel does apply, and that since the state court judge necessarily held that the actions were willful and wanton, this court holds that the debt in question was not dischargeable under the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires malicious conduct to make an injury debt nondischargeable; the psychiatrist’s conduct did not meet that requirement.

Romano v. Strybel (In Re Strybel) · filed 1989-07-27(a)(6)

It was ill-advised for Dr Strybel to have a sexual relationship with Mrs Romano, but his conduct cannot be construed as “malicious” as that term is defined in § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a libel judgment from discharge when the debtor’s knowing publication of a false statement caused willful and malicious injury.

Worrell v. Grim (In Re Grim) · filed 1989-07-28(a)(6)

Plaintiff has, therefore, carried its burden of demonstrating that its judgment claim for libel is excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt nondischargeable when a debtor intentionally disposes of pledged collateral in conscious disregard of the creditor’s security interest, injuring the creditor.

First Seneca Bank v. Galizia (In Re Galizia) · filed 1989-09-15(a)(6)

The evidence also establishes that this injury to Seneca by Galizia was malicious in that Galizia acted in conscious disregard of the fact that these items had been pledged as security for the loan. He acknowledged an understanding of the security interest concept and knew that he had granted Seneca a security interest in these items. His actions, in conscious disregard of his duties with regard to those pledged items, are classic examples of a debtor willfully and maliciously causing injury to another entity. Accordingly, this debt is not dischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) requires willful and malicious injury; recklessness alone does not establish willfulness, so a judgment for wantonness does not necessarily establish that a debt is excepted from discharge.

In Re Clinton Melvin Ikner, Jr., Debtor. Linda L. Lee, F/k/a Linda Miller and Robert Peters v. Clinton Melvin Ikner, Jr. · filed 1989-09-15(a)(6)

Thus, although wantonness involves a conscious act and knowledge that injury is a likely consequence, the standard for wantonness under Alabama law seems to encompass an element of recklessness. By contrast, under the Bankruptcy Code, the willfulness prong of the “willful and malicious injury” exception to dischargeability can not be established by a mere showing of a reckless disregard of duty.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge when another person uses the debtor’s innocent or negligent conduct in a willful and malicious scheme without the debtor’s knowledge.

California State Bank v. Lauricella (In Re Lauricella) · filed 1989-09-22(a)(6)

However, the fact that the debtor’s conduct in this regard, whether negligent or innocent, was used by another person, without debtor’s knowledge, as part of a willful and malicious scheme does not make the conduct wrongful for purposes of section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt nondischargeable when a debtor willfully and maliciously injures a creditor by diverting proceeds from its collateral.

Bancfirst v. Padgett (In Re Padgett) · filed 1989-09-25(a)(6)

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the obligation owed by the Defendant to the Plaintiff is rendered nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) for the reasons set forth hereinabove.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a debtor’s unexplained failure to segregate and remit secured sale proceeds is wrongful, intentional, and causes harm.

Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Sharp (In Re Sharp) · filed 1989-08-11(a)(6)

Mr. Sharp’s unexplained failure to retain the proceeds into the trust account and then remit those funds to BWAC support a conclusion that Mr. Sharp knew or reasonably should have known, that his actions would “necessarily produce harm.” ... We, therefore, conclude that the bankruptcy court did not err in holding the instant debt nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge when the debtor's handling of another's funds was neither malicious nor intended to cause injury.

Travelers Express Co. v. Washington (In Re Washington) · filed 1989-10-05(a)(6)

Furthermore, because this court is unconvinced that WASHINGTON, on behalf of INSTA CHECK, harbored any “intent to injure” TRAVELERS by commingling the latter’s funds in the former’s general account, TRAVELERS’ will be denied any relief under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not bar discharge for a debtor’s use of collateral proceeds when the creditor waived segregation of the proceeds and the debtor’s conduct was not malicious.

Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Littleton (In Re Littleton) · filed 1989-10-26(a)(6)

We, therefore, adopt the reasoning in Shah and hold that the disposition of Transamerica’s cash proceeds collateral was not malicious under § 523(a)(6), and that even if the conduct were malicious the alleged conversion was excused by Trans-america’s waiver of its contracted for protection in the form of a segregated account.

Section 523(a)(6) can except a lawyer’s debt from discharge when intentional, unjustified concealment of professional negligence materially causes the client’s injury.

Johnson v. Keller (In Re Keller) · filed 1989-10-30(a)(6)

The record as a whole supports, contrary to the findings made, the inference that he acted intentionally and without just cause or excuse when deciding which grounds to assert in support of Johnson’s motions for relief. ... Keller’s conduct was actionable under section 523 if reasonably and materially related to the harmful result.

Section 523(a)(6) does not treat an employee’s statutory right to workers’ compensation insurance as property.

Denehy v. Zalowski (In Re Zalowski) · filed 1989-11-17(a)(6)

There is another reason that this claim falls outside § 523(a)(6). The Employee’s statutory right to insurance coverage is not “property” within the meaning of the statute.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for copyright infringement nondischargeable when the debtor knowingly violates copyright requirements and thereby injures the rights holder.

Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Elms (In Re Elms) · filed 1990-01-19(a)(6)

For these reasons, the Court will grant BMPs motion for summary judgment finding the debt, represented by the judgment entered April 17, 1989, in the amount of $308,000 and the award of costs and fees in the amount of $54,311.05, is nondischargea-ble pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for willful and malicious injury when the debtor intentionally acts without just cause or excuse, knowing harm is substantially certain to result.

Mathes v. Woolner (In Re Woolner) · filed 1990-01-23(a)(6)

This Court is of the opinion that willful and malicious conduct is best defined as an act, done intentionally and without just cause or excuse, which the actor knows is substantially certain to re-suit in harm to another.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge only if the creditor proves that it arose from willful and malicious injury.

Lopez v. Martinez (In Re Martinez) · filed 1990-01-26(a)(6)

Therefore, I conclude that the plaintiff, Barbara Lopez, has failed to carry her burden of proving that the Debtor/defendant, Angelita Martinez, willfully and maliciously injured her. Accordingly, the obligation deriving from the state court judgment is not a debt excepted from discharge by § 523(a)(6) and is subject to discharge under § 727(a).

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt arising from an intentional, malicious assault nondischargeable when the debtor has no just cause or excuse.

Roberts v. Tuma (In re Tuma) · filed 1990-02-28(a)(6)

In this present case, the act of striking the plaintiff was clearly intentional, and the defendant does not argue otherwise. I further conclude from the evidence that the act was malicious, since the defendant had a pre-disposition to harm the plaintiff, based on his verbal statement that he intended to “blast” plaintiff in the face. No just cause or excuse has been shown to justify such conduct. Accordingly, the debt of $23,526.00 owing to the plaintiff by the Debtor is non-dischargeable under Section 523(a)(6) of the Code.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a civil judgment for willful and malicious injury nondischargeable under Chapter 7.

James E. Hardin, James C. Hardin, and Ralph Majors v. Caldwell · filed 1990-03-06(a)(6)

In the Chapter 7 context, a civil judgment is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 523(a)(6) if it is the result of a "willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity."

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge for malicious injury when the debtor’s wrongful conduct created a risk of loss but the loss was not sufficiently certain or automatic.

Goldberg Securities, Inc. v. Scarlata (In Re Scarlata) · filed 1990-03-30(a)(6)

Although the Debtor here wrongfully started to trade knowing that he was risking Goldberg’s assets without its knowing consent, the prospect of loss was not sufficiently certain or automatic so as to make his conduct “malicious.”

Section 523(a)(6) requires a creditor to prove willful and malicious injury by a preponderance of the evidence.

Laganella v. Braen (In re Braen) · filed 1990-03-30(a)(6)

We therefore hold that creditors claiming a nondischargeable debt under § 523(a)(6) must prove a malicious and willful injury inflicted by the debtor by a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 523(a)(6) covers a debt arising from the debtor’s conversion of another person’s property.

McManus v. McManus (In Re McManus) · filed 1990-04-04(a)(6)

Clearly, the debtor converted the property of the plaintiff by selling the refrigerator in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6); however, the Court finds that the refrigerator was not the property of the debtor at the time of the sale and, therefore, not technically under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2) or § 727(a)(4).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge only when the debt stems from a willful and malicious injury; disposing of assets to frustrate collection does not make an earlier, unrelated debt nondischargeable.

Fox v. Shervin (In Re Shervin) · filed 1990-04-13(a)(6)

I cannot conclude that this dissipation of assets, in the current factual setting, results in the nondischargeability of the debt under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not make a debt from unremitted proceeds of secured property nondischargeable merely because the debtor failed to pay them over.

American Honda Finance Corp. v. Cilek (In Re Cilek) · filed 1990-04-13(a)(6)

Mere failure to pay over money received from sale of secured property does not show willfulness or maliciousness.

Section 523(a)(6) requires deliberate or intentional injury; reckless disregard does not make a debt nondischargeable.

In Re C.A. Thurman, Debtor. McOrp Management Solutions, Inc. v. C.A. Thurman · filed 1990-04-16(a)(6)

With this analysis, it becomes clear the test of dischargeability in this circuit under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) is established in Compos. ... Those findings support the conclusion that Mr. Thurman did not act deliberately and intentionally to injure the security interest held by MBank.

Section 523(a)(6) requires malice under federal bankruptcy law; a breach of state contract law alone does not establish it, and the debtor must at least have acted in knowing disregard of the creditor’s rights.

Wagner v. Groshans (In re Groshans) · filed 1990-05-09(a)(6)

The above language in In re Posta makes clear that federal bankruptcy law, not state law, gives meaning to the phrase “willful and malicious.” Thus, following the Wagners’ argument, even if they could establish a breach of state contract law or a violation of the state’s U.C.C., this does not meet their burden of showing malice under § 523(a)(6). At a minimum, the Groshans must have acted in knowing disregard of their creditors’ rights.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for intentional, wrongful injury to another’s property nondischargeable when the debtor lacks just cause or excuse.

Itule v. Metlease, Inc. (In Re Itule) · filed 1990-05-31(a)(6)

In sum, the record is abundantly clear that Itule willfully and maliciously injured Metlease’s vehicles and that there was no just cause for his conduct. Therefore, we affirm the bankruptcy court’s determination that the debt owed to Metlease is nondischargeable pursuant to Section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a property-damage debt from discharge when the injury results from intentional, wrongful conduct without just cause or excuse.

Realty Investments v. Gresso (In Re Gresso) · filed 1990-06-04(a)(6)

Reviewing the totality of circumstances in this case, the court believes that the damages which the debtors caused to Realty’s property meet the standard of “willful and malicious injury to property” set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) and that the debt therefrom should be excepted from their discharge.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts liability for an intentional and malicious shooting injury from discharge.

York v. Camden (In re Camden) · filed 1990-06-08(a)(6)

The debtor’s conduct in shooting York was intended to injure him and was malicious under either standard. ... IT IS ORDERED that the liability to Ivan York, Jr. is nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(2)(A) excepts debts obtained through fraud from discharge, and § 523(a)(6) excepts debts arising from willful and malicious injury.

Crawford v. Dine (In Re Dine) · filed 1990-06-29(a)(2)(A), (a)(6)

Accordingly, the court finds the entire debt of eighty-two thousand dollars ($82,-000.00) to be nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(2)(A) and § 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts from discharge when a debtor’s willful and malicious sale of secured collateral injures the creditor.

Central Fidelity Bank v. Higginbotham (In Re Higginbotham) · filed 1990-07-09(a)(6)

Nevertheless the court concludes in this proceeding that the debtor’s conduct resulting in his failure to pay the plaintiffs’ secured loans was willful and malicious, and therefore the loans will be excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for deliberate conversion that injures the property owner from discharge.

Miller v. Harper (In Re Harper) · filed 1990-07-18(a)(6)

The court finds that the judgment of $11,250.00 resulting from Debtor’s conversion of goods should be excepted from discharge.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a debtor’s sale of collateral without turning over the proceeds causes willful and malicious injury to the creditor.

Barnett Bank of Columbia County v. Ogden (In Re Ogden) · filed 1990-07-27(a)(6)

The Court concludes that the plaintiff has clearly and convincingly proven that the defendant’s act of selling the cattle without turning over the proceeds to the bank was a willful and malicious injury. The damage judgment of the state court is an exception to discharge in the amount of $204,615.71.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt nondischargeable when a debtor intentionally converts collateral knowing that the conversion will harm the secured creditor.

Randall Bank v. Melhus · filed 1990-08-01(a)(6)

Here, the debtor intentionally converted collateral knowing that harm to the Bank would result. Such conduct is willful and malicious and requires the .sanction of .non-dischargeability under § 523(a)(6).