11 U.S.C. § 523

Section 523(a)(6) requires an act to be both willful and malicious for the resulting debt to be nondischargeable.

General Motors Assembly Division—Shreveport Plant v. Whittington (In re Whittington) · filed 1982-08-18(a)(6)

For an act to be nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), it must be both willful and malicious.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a deliberate or intentional injury; reckless disregard does not make a debt nondischargeable under that provision.

Pargas v. Poore (In Re Poore) · filed 1982-08-31(a)(6)

What the comment does say is that “willful” means deliberate or intentional. The “reckless disregard” standard is overruled. Willful does not mean reckless disregard. ... The decision thus arrived at, that the claim here in question is dischargeable because the tort was negligent rather than intentional, is in accord with the cases interpreting the new Bankruptcy Code.

Section 523(a)(6) does not make a debt nondischargeable merely because the debtor failed to carry worker’s compensation insurance.

Hamilton v. Brower (In Re Brower) · filed 1982-09-22(a)(6)

Accordingly, we find the facts in Aldridge, Id., identical for our purposes and agree with the result that the failure to carry worker’s compensation insurance does not rise to the level of nondischargeability under Section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt from repeated, knowing sales of another’s property nondischargeable as willful and malicious conversion.

Spurgeon v. Adams (In Re Adams) · filed 1982-09-28(a)(6)

So the inescapable question squarely before the court is whether the conduct of the defendant was “willful and malicious conversion” within the meaning of § 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. ... It is therefore found that the sale of the 194 breeder gilts and 17 pigs which were given to the custody of the defendant constitutes a “willful and malicious” conversion within the meaning of § 523(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 523(a)(6) requires intent to injure; liability for harm caused by a vicious dog alone does not make the resulting debt nondischargeable.

Ezzo v. Cecko (In Re Cecko) · filed 1982-11-09(a)(6)

While an owner may have to answer for the consequences of the conduct of a pet based upon the fundamental tort concepts of foreseeability and/or strict liability, it does not necessarily follow that a debt arising from such a claim is nondischargeable under present law. The vast majority of decisions which have found an exception to discharge under Section 523(a)(6) have involved intentional torts (such as assault and battery), and it is well-recognized that a deliberate or intentional act is required under that section.

Section 523(a)(6) requires both willful and malicious injury; technical conversion alone does not make a debt nondischargeable.

National Bank of America at Salina v. Clark (In re Clark) · filed 1982-11-12(a)(6)

Consequently, the objecting creditor must show the debtor acted both willfully and maliciously. Not all willful and injurious acts are malicious, and a claim pursuant to § 523(a)(6) founded only on a technical conversion does not make a debt nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a deliberate or intentional injury; reckless disregard for others is insufficient to except a debt from discharge.

Clair v. Oakes (In Re Oakes) · filed 1982-11-22(a)(6)

In enacting 11 U.S.C. Section 523(a)(6), Congress intended that more than reckless disregard for others be required to except a debt from discharge. As it has not been shown that the injuries herein concerned were caused by willful and malicious actions on the part of Debtor, Plaintiffs claim may not be excepted from discharge.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge when the debtor’s conduct in reasonable self-defense was neither willful nor malicious.

Dutka v. Dilley (In Re Dilley) · filed 1982-11-30(a)(6)

Defendant’s actions complained of were neither willful nor malicious as those terms are used in connection with 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for a deliberate and malicious injury from discharge, including a debt owed to an employer subrogated to the injured person’s claim.

County of Chesterfield v. Goyne (In Re Goyne) · filed 1982-12-13(a)(6)

A debt incurred from an action based upon a wilful and malicious injury by the debtor to another person may be nondischargeable in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). The word “wilful” means deliberate or intentional. ... The evidence at bar clearly shows that Goyne intentionally assaulted Willis and that Willis’ injuries resulted from that act. That debt now owed Chesterfield County by virtue of the subrogation provisions of Va. Code Ann. § 65.1-41 is nondischargeable in bankruptcy.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a property-damage debt from discharge when the debtor neither intended the injury nor acted so egregiously as to cause a constructive willful and malicious injury.

Marwell Trucking, Inc. v. Davis (In Re Davis) · filed 1983-01-25(a)(6)

The record is devoid of evidence that the debtor intended to cause any damage to anyone’s property, and neither is there evidence to support a finding that his conduct was so egregious as to constitute constructive “willful and malicious injury.” Accordingly, based on the law as this court is bound to apply it, the debt in question is dischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another person’s property.

Matter of Jones · filed 1983-02-04(a)(6)

The facts establish a nondis-chargeable debt for willful and malicious injury by the Debtor to the property of Joseph W. Storck. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

A jury’s failure to award punitive damages does not necessarily make a debt for willful and malicious injury dischargeable.

In Re: Claude Dennis Pitner, Debtor. Martha Smith v. Pitner · filed 1982-12-27(a)(6)

The failure of a jury to award punitive damages does not necessarily result in the discharge of a judgment debt claimed to be nondisehargeable as arising from a willful and malicious act.

Section 523(a)(6) requires intent for a debt to be excepted from discharge as a willful and malicious injury; an alienation of affections default judgment without an intent finding does not establish that exception.

Bowen v. Bullis (In Re Bullis) · filed 1983-02-23(a)(6)

While alienation of affections judgments were non-dischargeable under the prior Act, the revised standard for examining the conduct of the debtor under the present Code requires that a mental element of intent exist before a debt is determined non-dischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) can except an arson debt from discharge despite the debtor’s alcoholism, memory lapses, or mental instability when the injury was willful and malicious.

Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Purk (In Re Purk) · filed 1983-03-09(a)(6)

Section 523(a)(6) provides that a debt “for willful and malicious injury by the Debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity” shall be excepted from discharge. ... Alcoholism, lapse of memory, or mental instability in the instant case are not a defense to the allegation that the act was a willful and malicious act. The debt of Stephen Purk of $21,341.77 is non-dischargeable and judgment for that amount is awarded.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a debtor deliberately converts another’s property without legal justification, causing willful and malicious injury.

Gargiulo v. Licht (In re Licht) · filed 1983-03-22(a)(6)

This Court, having found and concluded that the Defendant has deliberately and without legal justification converted the property of Plaintiffs and has thereby inflicted a willful and malicious injury upon the property of the Plaintiffs, further finds and concludes that the State Court Judgment, which, including costs and accrued interest now totals $170,233.37, is in accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) excepted from such discharge as the Defendant may obtain in these Chapter 7 proceedings.

Section 523(a)(6) excludes debts for willful and malicious injury from discharge; a negligence claim does not qualify even if the negligence is alleged to be reckless and wanton.

In Re Chase · filed 1983-03-24(a)(6)

The closest exception to the alleged conduct of Mrs. Chase is § 523(a)(6) excluding from discharge a debt “for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity.” It is settled that a claim or judgment based upon negligence does not constitute willful and malicious injury, even if the negligence is alleged to be reckless and wanton.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor willfully and maliciously converts property in which a creditor has an interest.

Webster City Production Credit Ass'n v. Simpson (In Re Simpson) · filed 1983-04-11(a)(6)

Plaintiff proved by clear and convincing evidence that the Defendant willfully and maliciously converted grain, in the amount of $1,200.00, in violation of § 523(a)(6), and that Defendant should not be discharged from that particular debt.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for conversion of collateral nondischargeable when the debtor’s conduct is deliberate and malicious.

Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Talcott (In Re Talcott) · filed 1983-05-03(a)(6)

The Court therefore, finds that Talcott’s conduct was wrongful, excessive, deliberate and intentional, and constituted willful and malicious injury within the meaning of § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for intentional injury from discharge when the injury was inflicted without just cause or excuse.

Seven Elves, Incorporated v. Eskenazi · filed 1983-05-06(a)(6)

We have defined “willful and malicious” under section 523(a)(6) to mean “without just cause or excuse.” Willful means intentional and malicious adds the absence of just cause or excuse.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt nondischargeable when a debtor knowingly mortgages a vessel after transferring away its interest, willfully and maliciously injuring another entity’s property rights.

Wheel Leasing Corp. v. Markowski (In re Markowski) · filed 1983-05-20(a)(6)

The actions by the MARKOWSKIS in representing to Southeast Bank that they were the owners of the vessel and in obtaining a mortgage on the vessel constitutes willful and malicious injury to the property of another entity under § 523(a)(6). Therefore, the debt to Plaintiff is non-dischargea-ble.

Section 523(a)(6) requires willful and intentional damage to property; mere failure to perform a contract is insufficient.

Guttman v. Schaeffer (In Re Schaeffer) · filed 1983-05-24(a)(6)

Even if this were not so, mere failure to perform a contractual obligation does not amount to a violation of § 523(a)(6). That statute requires that there be a willful and intentional damage to property.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor deliberately or intentionally causes an injury that is wrongful and without just cause or excuse.

Lovato v. Irvin (In Re Irvin) · filed 1983-06-06(a)(6)

Thus, if the actions of the debtor were committed deliberately or intentionally, and were wrongful and without just cause or excuse, the elements of “willful and malicious” are established.

Section 523 does not except a debt for alleged conversion from discharge when the debtor lacked actionable intent and any conversion was committed by someone else.

Appliance Buyers Credit Corp. v. Cook (In re Cook) · filed 1983-06-17

It was the “very loose operation,” in more than one sense, that resulted in this small business collapse, not fraud or any other actionable intent on Cook’s part. ... The testimony leads us to believe that if any conversion occurred in this case, it was accomplished at the hands of the former wife, whose whereabouts are unknown. ... Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby ORDERED that the debt of Russell Cook to Appliance Buyers Credit Corporation is dischargeable in bankruptcy.

Section 523(a)(6) does not prevent discharge of a debt secured by crops when the debtor did not convert the crops.

Southern States Madisonville Cooperative, Inc. v. Duncan (In re Duncan) · filed 1983-06-17(a)(6)

Plaintiff alleges that the secured crop was wrongfully converted — an allegation which, if proven, would result in the $41,-615.00 debt surviving this bankruptcy proceeding by virtue of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). ... We therefore find that no conversion occurred, and that the debt of Dennis and Carolyn Duncan to Southern States Madi-sonville Cooperative, Inc., is dischargeable in bankruptcy.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for the intentional, unjustified conversion of another person’s property nondischargeable.

Dey v. Dey (In Re Dey) · filed 1983-07-26(a)(6)

The exception that Collier is referring to is 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) and it refers to a number of cases. ... Therefore, the plaintiff shall have a non-dischargeable judgment against the defendant in the amount of $7,500 which is her share of the property sold according to her own witness.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except liability for conversion from discharge when the debtor lacked a conscious intent to violate another’s property rights.

Miller v. Held (In Re Held) · filed 1983-08-17(a)(6)

Where the conversion occurred without a conscious intent to violate the property rights of another, § 523(a)(6) does not except the liability for conversion from discharge.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the creditor proves that the debtor willfully and maliciously injured another person.

Liekweg v. Bothwell (In Re Bothwell) · filed 1983-08-26(a)(6)

In sum, this Court concludes that Plaintiff has satisfied his burden to prove a willful and malicious injury within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). The Plaintiff’s Complaint seeking a determination that the debt be held nondischargeable is therefore sustained.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof of a deliberate injury and malice to except a debt from discharge; a manslaughter plea and default judgment without a finding of malice do not establish the exception.

Gates v. Garrett (In re Garrett) · filed 1983-09-08(a)(6)

Under the Code, a creditor is required to show that the debtor acted deliberately and with the intent to harm the creditor or his property. ... Having reviewed the pleadings, the Circuit Court records and the testimony before this Court, we cannot find the element of malice that would render this judgment nondischargeable. Therefore the Court finds that said default judgment in Cause No. 11848 in the Circuit Court of Pontotoc County, is hereby discharged.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a judgment debt for criminal conversation from discharge as a willful and malicious injury.

Aguilar v. Aguilar (In Re Aguilar) · filed 1983-07-29(a)(6)

It is evident that a judgment debt arising from an action for criminal conversation is a debt that is encompassed with the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for willful and malicious injury nondischargeable when the injury results from an intentional act; personal ill will is unnecessary.

Waltz v. Rodgers (In re Rodgers) · filed 1983-09-26(a)(6)

Now an intentional act is required although not necessary to find that personal ill will existed. ... The Court finds that the biting off of a portion of Plaintiffs ear was intentional, willful and malicious. ... Suffice it to say the research of all recent cases on this subject requires but one conclusion, to-wit: Judgment must be in favor of the Plaintiff holding the debt non-dis-chargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) requires an injury inflicted intentionally and maliciously for the resulting debt to be nondischargeable.

In re Overmyer · filed 1983-10-11(a)(6)

Code § 523(a)(6) requires that the injury was inflicted not only intentionally, but maliciously.

Section 523(a)(6) requires deliberate or intentional injury; negligence or reckless disregard does not make a debt nondischargeable.

Quezada v. Quezada · filed 1983-10-24(a)(6)

We affirm, however, the holding that the mere harboring of a vicious dog, although it is permitted to escape negligently to cause injury, is not the deliberate and intentional conduct by the debtor required for nondischargeability of a debt for the resulting injury, as causing "willful and malicious injury by the debtor" within the meaning of Section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires deliberate or intentional injury by the debtor; negligently allowing a vicious dog to escape does not make the resulting debt nondischargeable.

Kelt v. Quezada · filed 1983-10-24(a)(6)

We affirm, however, the holding that the mere harboring of a vicious dog, although it is permitted to escape negligently to cause injury, is not the deliberate and intentional conduct by the debtor required for nondischargeability of a debt for the resulting injury, as causing “willful and malicious injury by the debtor” within the meaning of Section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a debtor willfully and maliciously injures a creditor’s property interest by selling secured collateral without consent.

American National Bank of Bristow v. Clark (In Re Clark) · filed 1983-10-25(a)(6)

The debtor-defendant here willfully and intentionally disregarded what he knew his duty to be, wrongfully sold the cows without discharging his obligations to the Bank and thereby caused injury to the Bank. His conduct was therefore willful and malicious in the meaning of § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury from discharge, and a prior jury finding of malice and purposeful conduct can establish that requirement through collateral estoppel.

Asplin v. Mueller (In Re Mueller) · filed 1983-11-07(a)(6)

The end result of this combination of instructions was that it was necessary for the jury to find that the Defendant acted with malice and purposefully in order to assess punitive damages. This finding is identical to the standard of willful and malicious under § 523(a)(6). Therefore, collateral estoppel bars the Defendant from relit-igating whether or not his conduct was willful and malicious so as to prevent the debt from being discharged.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a conversion debt from discharge when the debtors believed they could sell the collateral without accounting for the proceeds because of the parties’ informal dealings.

Lebanon Production Credit Ass'n v. Walker (In Re Walker) · filed 1983-10-31(a)(6)

The conversion of plaintiff’s collateral by defendants in the belief that they had the right to sell that collateral without accounting to plaintiff for the proceeds of the sale, cannot be characterized as a willful and malicious injury to property.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor intentionally injures a creditor’s interest in collateral by collecting insurance proceeds while concealing them from the creditor.

Maryland National Bank v. Mogul (In Re Mogul) · filed 1984-01-05(a)(6)

The Court finds that the debtors’ secret collection of the proceeds of the Chubb insurance policy, coupled with their intentional failure to maintain insurance on the yacht with the Bank as loss payee and their failure to advise the Bank of their purchase of the Chubb policy, constitutes a “willful and malicious injury” to the bank within the meaning of the statute.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury from discharge, and a complaint states a claim when its allegations give the debtor fair notice of that injury.

Hadar Leasing International Co. v. Overmyer (In re Overmyer) · filed 1984-01-27(a)(6)

The language in the “Second Claim For Relief” is consistent with Code § 523(a)(6) which does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt: “(6) for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or the property of another entity.” The “Second Claim For Relief” asserts sufficient facts as to apprise the debtor that he is charged with willful and malicious injury to Hadar and its property.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a creditor to prove both willful and malicious conduct; knowingly transferring secured collateral can make the creditor’s resulting loss nondischargeable.

In Re Thomas · filed 1984-02-13(a)(6)

Accordingly, it is the Court's opinion that plaintiff has successfully met its burden in establishing both willful and malicious conduct as prescribed in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) sufficient to deny discharge of the debt in question. While the balance due on the filing date was $2,991.01, the value received by debtor at the time of the collateral's transfer was $2,800.00, this sum representing the loss to the plaintiff and the benefit derived by the debtor in the amount hereby deemed non-dischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for willful and malicious conversion of secured property nondischargeable when the debtor intentionally violates the creditor’s known right to possession.

Ozark Production Credit Ass'n v. Moore (In Re Moore) · filed 1984-01-17(a)(6)

The facts of this action ... thus clearly answer to the description of wilful and malicious conversion such as is made the basis of a nondischargeable liability by section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt from a debtor’s intentional conversion of property nondischargeable when the debtor acts in knowing disregard of another’s property rights.

Beneficial Finance Co. of New York, Inc. v. Contento (In Re Contento) · filed 1984-03-07(a)(6)

The plaintiff is entitled to an order declaring that the debtor’s conversion of the proceeds of the insurance check in the sum of $3,538.00 constitutes a nondischargeable debt within the meaning of Code § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof of knowledge and intent to except a debt for willful and malicious injury from discharge.

Morin v. Longo (In Re Longo) · filed 1984-03-21(a)(6)

The elements of a Ch. 93A case under Massachusetts law are different from the elements of a Section 523(a)(6) action to determine nondischargeability as the latter requires proof of knowledge and intent. A violation of Ch. 93A may lack characteristics of misconduct necessary to support a finding of nondischargeability for willful and malicious injury.

Section 523(a)(6) requires the debtor to have intended the injury, not merely the act that caused it.

Impulsora Del Territoria Sur, S.A. v. Cecchini (In Re Cecchini) · filed 1984-03-28(a)(6)

We conclude that Congress intended that a debtor must have inflicted an intentional injury on another entity or the property of another entity before the provisions of § 523(a)(6) would apply.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a judgment debt for an injury nondischargeable when the debtor’s conduct demonstrates willful and malicious intent, even if someone else may have jostled the weapon that caused the injury.

Frey v. Beach (In Re Beach) · filed 1984-05-03(a)(6)

A man who goes for his shotgun in the middle of a fistfight, under the circumstances described in the depositions, demonstrates a willful and malicious intent that is beyond all peradventure. ... Even assuming the facts most favorable to Beach — that the weapon was jostled by an adversary during the fracas — the facts remain that it was his shotgun, he went to his car to get it, and it was his hand on the trigger. ... For the above reasons, summary judgment will this day be entered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in the amount of $58,476.04.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts an intentional deprivation of another person’s property from discharge, but not a merely technical conversion.

Dunkinson v. Ricketts (In Re Ricketts) · filed 1984-05-16(a)(6)

Therefore, a mere technical conversion cannot be excepted from discharge, whereas, an intentional deprivation of another person's property is sufficient to satisfy the “maliciousness” requirement.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for injury caused by conduct so likely to cause injury that intent may be implied, even without proof of a specific intent to injure.

Hartford Insurance Group v. Galvan (In Re Galvan) · filed 1984-05-16(a)(6)

Although Galvan may not have subjectively intended to inflict damage to the Paden residence, he embarked upon a course of conduct whereby the possibility of having an injury accident was so great as to be almost a certainty. Therefore the intent to cause the injury may be implied from the conduct.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt from conversion of collateral nondischargeable when the debtor knowingly violates the security agreement.

People's Savings Bank of Brockton v. Cardillo (In Re Cardillo) · filed 1984-05-07(a)(6)

I find that the debtor’s conversion of the Bank’s rights in the collateral when he knew of the consequences constituted willful and malicious conversion sufficient to deny discharge of the debt in question pursuant to Section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge when the debtor honestly and reasonably believes the creditor acquiesced in the conversion of its collateral.

United States v. Johnson (In Re Johnson) · filed 1984-05-18(a)(6)

Hence, they honestly believed that the prior consent of Plaintiff was not mandatory and, thus, their conversion of Plaintiffs security interest was innocent and not “willful and malicious” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires both willful and malicious injury to make a debt for conversion of a creditor’s property nondischargeable.

United States v. Dever (In Re Dever) · filed 1984-06-15(a)(6)

Finally, FmHA notes that under Kentucky law, lack of good faith is not an element of conversion, that motive is irrelevant, and wrongful intent is nonessential to a finding of conversion. Simply stated, this is not the test under § 523(a)(6) which requires the debtors’ actions to be conjunc-tively a “willful” and “malicious” injury in depriving a creditor of its property.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a willful and malicious injury; an innocent or reckless conversion does not suffice to except the debt from discharge.

In Re Jack David Held, Debtor. Ann F. Miller v. Jack David Held, in Re Robert Ray Held, Debtor. Ann F. Miller v. Robert · filed 1984-06-18(a)(6)

A finding of recklessness does not resolve the § 523(a)(6) inquiry. In fact, by adopting the requirement that the conversion be willful and malicious, Congress expressly overruled prior caselaw that had refused dischargeability when the conversion occurred innocently or recklessly.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt arising from a debtor’s active participation in willful and malicious conversion nondischargeable, even when the debtor acted as a corporate officer.

ITT Diversified Credit Corp. v. Nicoll (In Re Nicoll) · filed 1984-06-20(a)(6)

A debtor who actively participates in such a conversion is personally liable and the debt is nondischargeable pursuant to section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for severe, unprovoked assaults that cause willful and malicious injury from discharge.

Roesing v. Moccio (In Re Moccio) · filed 1984-06-27(a)(6)

A severe and unprovoked assault and battery is probably the clearest example of a willful and malicious injury excepted from discharge under section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires intent to cause harm; negligent medical treatment alone does not make a debt nondischargeable.

Perkins v. Scharffe (In Re Scharffe) · filed 1984-08-02(a)(6)

Proof that the debtor injected an unsterile syringe and prescribed ineffective medications is not proof of willful and malicious injury. It is not the intent to inject the syringe or prescribe the medications that satisfies the statute; it is the intent to cause harm that has to be proven. Although this Court may regard the debtor’s treatment of this plaintiff to be absolutely appalling, that conduct did not rise to the level of an intentional tort contemplated in § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a debtor’s deliberate sale of secured vehicles without remitting the proceeds causes willful and malicious injury to the creditor’s property.

Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Emporelli (In Re Emporelli) · filed 1984-08-02(a)(6)

With regard to those vehicles which were sold out of trust by Debtor himself upon his return from Greece, the record amply supports a determination that Debtor’s actions constitute willful and malicious injury within the meaning of § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires a creditor seeking to except a debt for conversion from discharge to make a prima facie case of intentional conversion.

Grimsley v. Owens (In re Owens) · filed 1984-08-16(a)(6)

From the foregoing it is clear that in order to succeed plaintiffs must make out a prima facie case of intentional conversion.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt for ordinary farm-related items from discharge when the debt did not arise from willful and malicious injury.

Hagen v. Alexander (In Re Alexander) · filed 1984-09-13(a)(6)

The Debtors’ disputed debt to the Plaintiff was for items allegedly received by the Debtors during the ordinary course of their stay at the Plaintiff’s farm — not for any willful and malicious injury.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for willful and malicious conversion of another’s property nondischargeable.

Richmond Metropolitan Hospital v. Hazelwood (In Re Hazelwood) · filed 1984-09-17(a)(6)

In summary, this Court holds that Mr. Hazelwood’s debt to Richmond Metropolitan Hospital in the amount of $2,037.50 is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A) for obtaining services by false pretenses, false representation, or actual fraud, and for the reasons stated above, it is likewise nondis-chargeable under § 523(a)(6) as being a debt for willful and malicious injury to another entity or to the property of another entity.

Section 523(a)(6) requires the creditor to prove that the debtor intended to injure the creditor before a conversion debt can be excepted from discharge.

Wilmington Trust Co. v. Behr (In Re Behr) · filed 1984-09-27(a)(6)

Intent to injure the creditor is a necessary element of a case under § 523(a)(6). Before the plaintiff can obtain relief under § 523(a)(6), the plaintiff must show that the debtors acted with the intent to injure the plaintiff.

Section 523(a)(6) requires specific intent to harm; a technical statutory violation supported only by presumed intent does not make a debt nondischargeable.

Cannady v. Vereen (In Re Vereen) · filed 1984-10-15(a)(6)

Exceptions to discharge are to be strictly construed and this Court is satisfied that the presumption of intent utilized to establish liability under the FLCRA does not alone satisfy the requirement of willful and malicious. Absent a showing of specific intent to harm, liability based upon a technical violation of a statute will not be declared non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that the debt is for a deliberate or intentional injury caused without justification or excuse.

Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance v. Wells (In Re Wells) · filed 1984-11-07(a)(6)

The exception requires proof that the debt is for a deliberate or intentional injury caused without justification or excuse.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge only when the injury was both willful and malicious; a punitive damages verdict that could rest on recklessness does not establish both elements.

Roberson v. Schwenn (In Re Schwenn) · filed 1984-11-13(a)(6)

A debt caused by the debtor’s willful and malicious injury to another is excepted from discharge by 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). The conjunctive use of the words willful and malicious requires that both elements be present in order for a debt to be declared nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a libel debt from discharge only if the debtor knew the statements were false; reckless disregard is insufficient.

Materia v. Pereira (In Re Pereira) · filed 1984-11-28(a)(6)

The intentional tort of libel may be considered a willful and malicious injury if it can be demonstrated that the libel was committed with the requisite willfulness and malice. Malice in the bankruptcy sense means that the author knew the statements made were false. ... Reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of a statement does not meet the standard of willful and malicious injury.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge for a reckless breach of contract without proof of willful and malicious injury.

Nicola v. Jacobs (In Re Jacobs) · filed 1985-01-04(a)(6)

Plaintiff has not carried his burden of proving that the Company’s conversion of the plaintiff’s auction proceeds was the willful and malicious act of Jacobs. ... He recklessly breached the Company’s contract with the plaintiff, but that fact is not enough to except the debt from discharge.

A judgment for injuries caused by intoxicated driving satisfies § 523(a)(6) when the jury’s punitive damages award establishes willful and malicious injury.

Johnson v. Horne (In Re Horne) · filed 1985-01-16(a)(6)

Because this Court finds that the jury s award against defendant Stephen Horne is congruent with the test for willful and malicious injury pursuant to Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(6), this Court GRANTS plaintiffs motion for summary judgment against defendant Stephen Horne. Defendant Horne’s debt to the plaintiff is nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a willful and malicious injury by the debtor; vicarious liability under the Family Purpose Doctrine is insufficient.

Johnson v. Horne (In re Horne) · filed 1985-01-16(a)(6)

To prevail on a § 523(a)(6) exception to discharge the plaintiff must show a “willful and malicious injury by the debtor.” In the instant circumstances, despite having a state court judgment against debtor Phillip Horne, the plaintiff is not able to show that he suffered a willful and malicious injury at the hands of the defendant-debtor-father. Under the Bankruptcy Code vicarious liability which is the underlying basis for liability under the Family Purpose Doctrine, is an insufficient basis for “willful and malicious injury” of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt arising from willful and malicious conversion of another person’s property.

Thomas v. Lyles (In Re Thomas) · filed 1984-12-11(a)(6)

Since this claim is created by an act of conversion, then it is excepted from the discharge under Section 523(a)(6) of the Code.

Section 523(a)(6) allows a creditor to prove a deceased debtor’s intent through evidence other than the debtor’s testimony.

Hudson v. Cole (In Re Cole) · filed 1985-01-14(a)(6)

On the facts of the present case, the critical issue of the debtor’s intent will remain unresolved until proof is taken. The debtor’s intent may be proven by evidence other than the direct testimony of the deceased, even though the hand of Providence has denied him a defense. We therefore must overrule the debtor’s motion to dismiss the dischargeability complaint.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except an environmental cleanup debt from discharge solely because state law imposes strict liability.

New Jersey, Department of Environmental Protection v. Carracino (In Re Carracino) · filed 1985-01-25(a)(6)

The Court rejects the third premise of the State’s argument — that any act giving rise to a strict liability environmental law offense constitutes willful and malicious conduct as a matter of law. ... It grants summary judgment to Carracino on the discharge-ability of the $23,672,192.68 debt and the $60,719.16 debt, which the State alleged were nondischargeable under § 523[a][6].

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt arising from willful and malicious injury when the debtor’s assault was deliberate and malicious.

Zuern v. Chapman (In Re Chapman) · filed 1985-01-28(a)(6)

That testimony clearly indicates that the defendant’s brutal kicking of the plaintiff was “willful and malicious”, rendering the debt nondis-chargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt from selling secured property nondischargeable when the debtor knows the sale will harm the secured creditor.

Northern Investment Co. v. Haynes (In Re Haynes) · filed 1985-02-21(a)(6)

A sale of secured property is “willful and malicious” when it is made with the knowledge that the secured creditor will be harmed.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a debtor’s deliberate diversion of secured proceeds and repeated concealment establish willful and malicious injury.

Mammoth Cave Production Credit Ass'n v. Boren (In Re Boren) · filed 1985-03-13(a)(6)

This pattern of conduct, by which the debtor concealed his initial failure to apply all the proceeds of his 1981 crop to MCPCA’s loan clearly demonstrates the required malice for a debt to be nondis-ehargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) treats a sale of secured property contrary to the security agreement as an injury that may make the resulting debt nondischargeable.

Keller Farms v. Ellefson (In Re Ellefson) · filed 1985-02-05(a)(6)

Common law conversion is an “injury” under section 523(a)(6); a sale of secured property which is contrary to the security agreement constitutes a conversion.

A sale of secured property contrary to a security agreement is a conversion that counts as an injury under § 523(a)(6).

Northern Investment Co. v. Nash (In Re Nash) · filed 1985-02-21(a)(6)

Common law conversion is an “injury” under section 523(a)(6); a sale of secured property which is contrary to the security agreement constitutes a conversion.

Section 523(a)(6) covers an alleged libel debt when the debtor intentionally republished statements she knew were false to injure the plaintiff.

Martell v. Voltolini (In Re Voltolini) · filed 1985-04-11(a)(6)

Therefore, construing the allegations of this complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff and taking its allegations as true, I find that a cause of action is stated under § 523(a)(6). Accordingly, the defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury from discharge; an injury is not willful when the debtor did not intend harm and the act did not necessarily lead to injury.

Zeller v. Salai (In Re Salai) · filed 1985-04-22(a)(6)

I find that there was no intent on the debtor’s part to cause any harm or injury to the plaintiff and the maneuver in question neither necessarily nor typically leads to any injury. Therefore, the injury to plaintiff was not willful. It follows that plaintiffs claim arising from this incident is not excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts liability for willful and malicious injury from discharge even when a judgment has not yet fixed the amount owed.

Shelton v. Sturtevant (In Re Sturtevant) · filed 1985-05-17(a)(6)

It is hereby ordered and adjudged that any liability of the debtor, Robert J. Stur-tevant to Lois Shelton, arising from Lois Shelton’s claims against the Debtor as a result of the incidents of June 14, 1984 and July 13, 1984, is excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. Section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt arising from negligent malpractice merely because the debtor may have violated a state statute.

Wiseman v. Weingarten (In Re Weingarten) · filed 1985-05-30(a)(6)

Debts arising from a debtor’s negligent malpractice are not excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires more than gross negligence for an injury debt to be nondischargeable; reckless disregard from drunk driving does not suffice.

Cassidy v. Minihan · filed 1985-06-18(a)(6)

Thus, in order for a debt to be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6), Congress intended to require that the underlying injury was inflicted with something more than gross negligence.

Section 523(a)(6) treats conversion of secured collateral as malicious when the debtor knows the act will harm the creditor’s interest.

Production Credit Ass'n of Grafton v. Clark (In Re Clark) · filed 1985-06-03(a)(6)

In the context of conversion by a debtor of secured collateral, malice is established by proof that the debtor acted with knowledge that the creditor’s interest would be harmed as a consequence of the act.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that a debtor who converted secured collateral knew the disposition would inevitably harm the secured creditor or intended to cause that harm.

Kellerhuis v. Egan (In Re Egan) · filed 1985-06-07(a)(6)

Under this standard, malice is shown by proof that a debtor disposed of security with the specific knowledge that the disposition would invariably and indubitably cause harm to the secured creditor, or by proof that the debtor had the specific intention of causing harm to the secured creditor by the disposition.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge when a debtor’s inability to maintain insurance does not amount to willful and malicious injury.

First of America Bank-Central v. Bafford (In Re Bafford) · filed 1985-06-19(a)(6)

After careful consideration of the testimony, statements of counsel, the case record as a whole, and applicable law, the Court concludes that the “willful and malicious” requirement of 11 USC § 523(a)(6) is not met in this instance.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that the debtor intended the injury before a debt can be excepted from discharge.

In Re Compos · filed 1985-07-18(a)(6)

We hold that Sec. 523(a)(6) requires proof of an intent to injure before a debt can be held to be nondischargeable under that provision of the Code.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt arising from willful and malicious conversion of another’s property from discharge.

Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Branch (In Re Branch) · filed 1985-07-19(a)(6)

Although unlawful conversion is not specifically mentioned in Section 523(a)(6), a debt arising from willful and malicious conversion is included within the scope of a willful and malicious injury to property of another.

Section 523(a)(6) requires injury caused by deliberate or intentional conduct; proof of copyright infringement alone is insufficient.

Continental Map, Inc. v. Massier (In Re Massier) · filed 1985-08-07(a)(6)

But under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), the injury caused must have been as a result of deliberate or intentional behavior. Thus, mere proof of copyright infringement does not suffice under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt arising from an intentional injury that is wrongful, without just cause, or excessive.

Winterland Concessions Co. v. Goldzweig (In Re Goldzweig) · filed 1985-08-07(a)(6)

A debt arising from a wilful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity, if established and prosecuted in timely fashion, is excepted from the discharge afforded debtors in cases under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). A malicious injury, for purposes of section 523(a)(6), is one which is wrongful, done without just cause or is excessive. A wilful injury, for purposes of that section, is one which is deliberately or intentionally inflicted.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt arising from willful and malicious injury nondischargeable, and the creditor bears the burden of proving that conduct.

Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Gabaldon (In Re Gabaldon) · filed 1985-08-15(a)(6)

For this debt to be non-dischargeable, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the debt arose from the willful and malicious conduct of the debtor leading to injury. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). ... This Court finds that the actions of Ga-baldon were willful and malicious causing injury to BMI. The debt of $8,100.00 is therefore non-dischargeable.

Section 523 does not except a debt from discharge merely because the debtor converted another person's property.

Wintrode v. Rubino (In re Rubino) · filed 1985-07-10

The plaintiff had not previously acquired title to the vehicle, but this is immaterial as the conversion of the property of another is no longer a ground for excepting an indebtedness from a discharge under Section 523 of the Revised Bankruptcy Code of 1978 as it was in the amendments to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 beginning about 1971 and construed in In re Vines, 430 F.Supp. 465, aff'd, 560 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir.1977); First National Bank of Burr Oak v. Seamon, 198 N.W.2d 114 (N.D.1972); Excell Finance Camp. Inc. v. Tannerhill, 140 So.2d 202 (La.Ct.App.1962); and In re Brown, 412 F.Supp. 1066, 1072 (W.D.Okla.1975).

Section 523(a)(6) can except a judgment for attorney fees and costs from discharge when previously litigated facts establish willful and malicious injury.

Safeco Insurance v. Orrick (In Re Orrick) · filed 1985-07-12(a)(6)

By its own independent determination and review of the pertinent facts and issues involved in Orrick v. Safeco, this Court finds that all pertinent facts and issues have necessarily been litigated and that any further action by this Court is barred by collateral estoppel. This renders the judgment debt for attorney fees and costs previously awarded to Safeco nondis-chargeable in Orrick’s bankruptcy case number 84-00620, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge merely because the debtor sold collateral in violation of a security agreement; the debtor must have knowingly disregarded the secured creditor’s rights.

Arlington Five Cents Savings v. Santore (In Re Santore) · filed 1985-07-15(a)(6)

In particular, the sale of property, even in violation of the terms of a security agreement, does not preclude discharge unless the secured party’s rights were knowingly disregarded.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a willful and malicious injury by the debtor; another person’s conduct cannot be imputed to the debtor to make a debt nondischargeable.

Yelton v. Eggers (In Re Eggers) · filed 1985-07-26(a)(6)

The addition to the present Code of the phrase “by the debtor” clearly indicates rejection of an imputed liability theory.

Section 523(a)(6) requires evidence of willful and malicious injury; proof of high-speed flight and a crash alone is insufficient.

American Modern Home Insurance v. Leifheit (In Re Leifheit) · filed 1985-09-10(a)(6)

Such facts alone are insufficient to establish a wilfull and malicious injury. Some evidence of the reason why this extraordinary behavior occurred would have to be shown, because there are conceivable explanations that would not lead to liability within a dischargeability case.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt for negligent property damage from discharge because the injury must be deliberate or intentional.

Magee v. Phillipps (In Re Phillipps) · filed 1985-09-18(a)(6)

Therefore, since negligent conduct does not rise to the level of the “willful and malicious injury” contemplated under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), the debt attributable to water damages is dischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt arising from willful and malicious conversion nondischargeable.

Mumm v. Adametz (In Re Adametz) · filed 1985-09-19(a)(6)

Since Adametz’s debt to the Mumms arose from a willful and malicious conversion it is nondischargeable under section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not bar discharge for a deliberate breach of a security agreement unless the debtor intended or fully expected to harm the creditor’s economic interests.

In Re Jesse H. Long, Debtor. Barclays American/business Credit, Inc. v. Long · filed 1985-10-02(a)(6)

Debtors who willfully break security agreements are testing the outer bounds of their right to a fresh start, but unless they act with malice by intending or fully expecting to harm the economic interests of the creditor, such a breach of contract does not, in and of itself, preclude a discharge.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof of willful and malicious conversion of collateral to make the resulting debt nondischargeable.

Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Cline (In Re Cline) · filed 1985-08-21(a)(6)

We therefore hold that Citizens’ has failed to prove that the debtors willfully and maliciously converted its collateral so as to render any portion of their obligation nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge for conversion of collateral when the secured creditor acquiesced in the conduct alleged to be conversion.

Nisswa State Bank v. Eberle (In Re Eberle) · filed 1985-09-09(a)(6)

There is no conversion giving rise to a nondischargeable debt where an owner or interest-holder has acquiesced to the acts allegedly constituting the conversion.

Section 523(a)(6) does not require personal hatred, spite, or ill will to find a willful and malicious injury.

Dearborn Chemical Co. v. Lindsay (In Re Lindsay) · filed 1985-12-03(a)(6)

Personal hatred, spite or ill will are not required in order to find a willful and malicious injury.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a state court judgment for willful and malicious injury nondischargeable when the jury necessarily found that conduct.

York v. Shepherd (In Re Shepherd) · filed 1985-12-17(a)(6)

The court is of the opinion for the foregoing reasons that the state court judgment is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not require proof of specific malice; malice may be inferred from the debtor's conduct and surrounding circumstances.

St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance v. Vaughn · filed 1985-12-26(a)(6)

To reiterate, there is no need to show specific malice under Sec. 523(a)(6) of the Code on the part of the debtor. Something implied is no less true than something expressed. Only the method of proof of the truth is different. Implied malice, which may be shown by the acts and conduct of the debtor in the context of their surrounding circumstances, is sufficient under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires more than intentional conversion of secured collateral: malice requires conduct certain or almost certain to cause the creditor financial harm.

Security State Bank of Houston v. Nelson (In Re Nelson) · filed 1985-11-12(a)(6)

Applying the objective test for malice, the Court concludes that Debtor’s disposition of the beef cows and their proceeds was not certain or almost certain to cause financial harm to Plaintiff during the fall, winter, and spring of 1981-82.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt for negligent injury from discharge, regardless of the degree of negligence.

Ross v. DeVier (In Re DeVier) · filed 1986-02-05(a)(6)

A negligent act, no matter what the degree of negligence, is not a “willful and malicious” act within the meaning of section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires malicious injury; suspicious handling of collateral proceeds alone does not make a debt nondischargeable.

Shelbina Mercantile Bank v. Durbin (In Re Durbin) · filed 1986-02-07(a)(6)

The manner in which the Debtors handled transactions through their bank account creates an air of suspicion as to their motives in their dealings with all their creditors. However, this conduct does not rise to that level of malice required by Section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a libel debt from discharge when the debtor merely recklessly disregarded whether the statement was true.

James P. Wheeler and Sheila N. Wheeler v. Laudani · filed 1986-02-11(a)(6)

Mere reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the statement, which can support a libel verdict, is not a willful and malicious injury for purposes of § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires both willful and malicious injury; using assigned proceeds for necessary business expenses was not malicious on these facts.

Mason Lumber Co. v. Martin (In Re Martin) · filed 1986-02-13(a)(6)

The conclusion is that there was a conversion of the funds assigned to Mason that was not malicious. ... Substantially, all of the contract balance of $17,500 was used to pay materialmen and labor, which was necessary to continue operations in an effort to preserve the business.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt from the debtor’s knowing, unauthorized sale of a creditor’s collateral nondischargeable when the sale willfully and maliciously injures the creditor’s property interest.

Dominion National Bank of Richmond v. Gantt (In Re Gantt) · filed 1985-12-30(a)(6)

The property was sold intentionally and deliberately, without just cause or excuse, and with the knowledge that Dominion would be harmed by the sale of the collateral. Although intent to do harm is not the operative element of “malicious” and § 523(a)(6), the knowledge of the transaction’s import and Gantt’s sale of the property in the face of such knowledge, leads the Court to the conclusion that the debt is not dischargeable in bankruptcy.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt nondischargeable when a debtor sells encumbered property in breach of a security agreement and deprives the creditor of the proceeds without just cause.

Delaware Valley Factors, Inc. v. Smith (In Re Smith) · filed 1986-01-16(a)(6)

More particularly, if a debtor sells encumbered property in derogation of a security agreement and deprives the owner of the proceeds of the sale without just cause, the debt is nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof of both willful and malicious injury to except a debt from discharge.

Creditway of America, Inc. v. Brubaker (In Re Brubaker) · filed 1986-02-27(a)(6)

For a debt to be excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6), both willful and malicious elements must be shown.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the underlying judgment establishes a deliberate, wrongful injury without just cause.

Sunco Sales, Inc. v. Latch · filed 1986-02-28(a)(6)

The Bankruptcy Court had before it a judgment against Kenneth and Helen Latch for violating Florida’s theft statute. The statutory language for theft requires knowledge and intent rather than mere negligence. Thus, the willful element was satisfied. Similarly, there is no dispute that the jury found the appropriation was wrongful and without just cause. Therefore, the court should have found that the debt was nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor deliberately and wrongfully injures another or another’s property.

Davis v. Marler (In Re Marler) · filed 1986-03-12(a)(6)

This Court therefore finds that the state court’s factual findings satisfy the willful and malicious elements of a § 523(a)(6) exception to discharge.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except an injury caused by negligence or gross negligence from discharge when the debtor did not act willfully and maliciously; a punitive damages award alone does not establish the exception.

Carbajo v. Aviles (In re Aviles) · filed 1986-03-20(a)(6)

I find that in this case the injury sustained by the plaintiff was neither willfully nor maliciously caused by the debtor. There is no question in my mind that the injury resulted from negligence and probably gross negligence on the debtor’s part. ... The state court judgment, even though including an award for punitive damages, does not collaterally estop the debtor. The debtor did not willfully and maliciously injure the plaintiff.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor deliberately acts knowing that injury to property is certain or substantially certain to result.

New Hampshire v. Tinkham (In Re Tinkham) · filed 1986-03-31(a)(6)

I therefore conclude that to establish a ground for nondischargeability of a debt under § 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code it must be proven that the debtor engaged in deliberate acts which he knew were certain or substantially certain to result in injury to property.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for intentional infliction of emotional distress from discharge when the debtor’s conduct is willful and malicious.

Ross v. Cunningham (In Re Cunningham) · filed 1986-04-10(a)(6)

Debtor’s intentional infliction of emotional distress upon Plaintiff was both “willful” and “malicious” as those terms have been defined under Section 523(a)(6), and the debt arising from Debtor’s acts is, therefore, nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a judgment for malicious prosecution, false arrest, and imprisonment from discharge when the debtor’s conduct causes willful and malicious injury.

Hardin v. Caldwell (In Re Caldwell) · filed 1986-04-17(a)(6)

Defendant-debtor’s malicious prosecution, false arrest, and imprisonment of plaintiffs, which resulted in the award of a civil judgment to them, clearly qualifies as a “willful and malicious injury” within the meaning of section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof of both willfulness and malice; a guilty plea to willful conversion does not establish malice when malice was not an element of the offense.

United States v. Vandrovec (In Re Vandrovec) · filed 1986-05-23(a)(6)

Although willfulness is an integral element of 15 U.S.C. § 714m(c), maliciousness is not. Thus, one may be guilty of conversion under 15 U.S.C. § 714m(c) on a lesser standard than is required for non-dischargeability of a debt under section 523(a)(6).