11 U.S.C. § 523

Section 523(a)(4) makes a debt arising from a trustee’s misappropriation of trust funds nondischargeable as defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity.

Cervac v. Littman (In re Littman) · filed 2016-12-21(a)(4)

For a plaintiff to prevail under section 523(a)(4), it must prove that the debtor committed: (1) fraud or defalcation while acting as a fiduciary; (2) embezzlement; or (3) larceny. ... As a result, the Plaintiff has established that she is entitled to summary judgment on Count II of the Complaint as to all issues but the value of the nondischargeable claim.

Section 523(a)(4) requires a fiduciary relationship to exist when the alleged fraud occurs.

Borges v. Placeres (In re Placeres) · filed 2016-12-29(a)(4)

Assuming without deciding that Placeres’ statements and submissions met the requirements for fraud, Borges’ § 523(a)(4) claim must fail because Placeres did not commit the offending conduct while acting in a fiduciary capacity.

Section 523(a)(4) excepts a debt from discharge when a partner’s willful failure to disclose business information constitutes defalcation in a fiduciary capacity.

Lopez v. Hernandez (In re Hernandez) · filed 2017-01-20(a)(4)

Thus, the Court concludes that Jorge violated his duty of disclosure to Magdalena and his actions amounted to “defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity.” When Magdalena requested the financial information related to the business, and Jorge did not produce the documents or disclose the information within a reasonable time, he violated this duty. Consequently, the Court concludes that the money Magdalena lent or contributed to the business starting on October 2, 2012, totaling $271,270, is a nondischargeable debt under § 523(a)(4).

Section 523(a)(4) excepts a debt from discharge when a fiduciary knowingly diverts employee wages withheld for health premiums to other expenses.

U.S. Department of Labor v. Harris · filed 2017-01-06(a)(4)

Finally, we hold that the undisputed facts support the conclusion that the Debtor committed defalcation while acting in that fiduciary capacity under § 523(a)(4).

Section 523(a)(4) excepts debts from discharge when a trustee’s imprudent investment of trust funds breaches a fiduciary duty with the required intent or scienter.

Whittaker v. Whittaker (In re Whittaker) · filed 2017-01-17(a)(4)

For all these reasons, and each of them separately, I conclude that the Debtor acted with the requisite scienter and intent and that his breaches of fiduciary duty were defalcations within the meaning of § 523(a)(4).

Section 523(a)(4) excepts a debt for fiduciary defalcation from discharge when the debtor held property in an express or technical trust and committed defalcation while acting as a fiduciary.

Board of Trustees v. Kern (In re Kern) · filed 2017-04-09(a)(4)

The Court has determined on summary judgment that certain but not all of the monies deducted from the employee paychecks give rise to non-dischargeable debts pursuant to § 523(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code; specifically, monies deducted for a vacation fund is non-dischargeable because those funds were subject to a statutory trust, Debtor acted as a fiduciary, and Debtor committed a defalcation when he did not remit such deducted monies to the benefit funds; however, monies deducted for union assessments and political action league funds are dischargeable because a statutory trust did not exist as to such monies.

Section 523(a)(4) makes a debt nondischargeable when a preponderance of the evidence establishes that a fiduciary's intentional misconduct amounted to defalcation.

Pemstein v. Pemstein · filed 2017-07-03(a)(4)

The bankruptcy court properly held that the debt based on the 2010 state court judgment was nondischargeable under § 523(a)(4) because a preponderance of the evidence established that Martin’s misconduct was intentional and amounted to defalcation.

Section 523(a)(4) excepts a debt from discharge when a partner, acting in a fiduciary capacity, fails to account for and takes the other partner’s share of partnership profits.

Reed v. Zak (In re Zak) · filed 2017-07-12(a)(4)

Because this Court concludes that Zak was the alter ego of LMG and responsible for his own torts and that LMG was a mere instrumentality of a de facto partnership between Zak and Reed, the Court concludes he is personally liable to Reed for that amount and that amount is nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(4).

Section 523(a)(4) treats a PACA trust as a fiduciary relationship and excepts from discharge a debt arising when the debtor intentionally or recklessly breaches that duty.

Alliance Shippers, Inc. v. Guarracino (In re Guarracino) · filed 2017-10-16(a)(4)

While Defendant never asserted a position regarding whether a PACA trust qualifies under Section 523(a)(4), this Court concurs with the majority of cases previously discussed, which hold that a PACA trust satisfies the fiduciary requirement in Section 523(a)(4). ... Based upon these facts, the Court finds that Debtor committed a defalcation by intentionally or recklessly disregarding his fiduciary duties as required by PACA and defined in Bullock. ... That amount is and shall be deemed non-dischargeable pursuant to Section 523(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 523(a)(4) excepts a debt from discharge when a fiduciary’s intentional misappropriation constitutes defalcation.

Jalbert v. Mulligan (In re Mulligan) · filed 2017-10-27(a)(4)

The State Court’s finding that Mulligan committed statutory theft therefore controls this court’s determination that he also committed defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity. As a consequence, those damages that result from the statutory theft count are non-dischargeable in bankruptcy pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) and the plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on Count II.

Section 523(a)(4) makes debts arising from a fiduciary’s defalcation, including associated attorney’s fees, nondischargeable.

Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Ward (In re Ward) · filed 2017-11-29(a)(4)

Accordingly, the Court finds that Liberty has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the Debtor committed defalcation, as defined in § 523(a)(4) and interpreted in the Supreme Court’s Bullock decision. Because the underlying debts are nondischargeable, so are the associated attorney’s fees.

Section 523(a)(4) excepts debts for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity from discharge.

A.Y. McDonald Indus., Inc. v. McDonald (In re McDonald) · filed 2018-04-20(a)(4)

Debtor's debt to AY was "for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny" and is therefore not dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4).

Section 523(a)(4) excepts from discharge a debt arising from a debtor’s fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity.

Bobbie Chance Robinson & Commercial Grain Mktg., LLC v. Smith (In re Smith) · filed 2018-04-23(a)(4)

Accordingly, the $115,676.26 the Debtor owes to CGM for the freight and rent overpayments are debts resulting from the Debtor's fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity to CGM and are thus excepted from the Debtor's discharge under that prong of § 523(a)(4).

For fraud or defalcation in a fiduciary capacity, section 523(a)(4) requires proof of a traditional fiduciary relationship and fraud or defalcation while the debtor acted in that capacity.

Durant v. Durant (In re Durant) · filed 2018-06-19(a)(4)

Courts evaluating claims under section 523(a)(4) of the Code generally require proof of a traditional fiduciary relationship and evidence of fraud or defalcation by the debtor while acting a fiduciary capacity.

Section 523(a)(4) excludes a debt from discharge when the debtor knowingly diverts funds while acting in a fiduciary capacity.

Pendergraft v. Network of Neighbors · filed 2018-08-08(a)(4)

First, the bankruptcy court applied the proper standard to determine the mental culpability of the Pendergrafts. The bankruptcy court applied the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A. 7 and found that the Pendergrafts knowingly defalcated monies from NON by diverting funds to themselves through Holiday without first seeking majority approval from NON’s disinterested directors, which flouted NON’s bylaws.

Section 523(a)(4) makes a debt for defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity nondischargeable when the debtor has the requisite culpable state of mind.

Peterson v. Lusk (In re Lusk) · filed 2018-07-05(a)(4)

The foregoing reasons all support the court's finding that in addition to committing a defalcation, Michael had the requisite culpable state of mind making the Ventura County Superior Court's award on December 12, 2016 in the amount of $146,877.00 nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4).

Section 523(a)(4) excepts a debt from discharge when a debtor who already had fiduciary duties over withheld employee contributions diverts those funds to personal and corporate expenses.

U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Harris (In Re Harris) · filed 2018-08-03(a)(4)

The stipulated facts, as well as the unchallenged facts found by the district court, show that Harris exercised control over Plan assets before he diverted any employee contributions; therefore, the fiduciary relationship preexisted the debt. ... In summary, these undisputed facts and unchallenged factual findings support the conclusion that Harris committed defalcation in late March 2009 when he chose to use plan assets to pay himself and other corporate expenses instead of remitting those assets to HealthPartners.

Section 523(a)(4) makes a debt nondischargeable when a debtor fraudulently obtains funds while acting in a fiduciary capacity.

Kontos v. Manevska (In re Manevska) · filed 2018-08-08(a)(4)

As a result, the court concludes that the checks to the Defendant in excess of her salary were fraudulently obtained by the Defendant at a time when she acted in a fiduciary capacity to the Decedent. The Plaintiff has carried his ultimate burden under section 523(a)(4) and Defendant's debt to Plaintiff arising from these transactions is nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(4) excepts a debt from discharge when it arises from defalcation while the debtor was acting in a fiduciary capacity.

Lefevre v. Fritzson (In re Fritzson) · filed 2018-08-10(a)(4)

For the reasons stated above, the Plaintiff has met his burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Defendant committed a defalcation while in a fiduciary capacity. Accordingly, a debt of $98,702.36 is nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4), and judgment shall enter in favor of the Plaintiff on Count Five of the Complaint.

Section 523(a)(4) requires a fiduciary defalcation claim to involve an express or technical trust, a debtor acting in a fiduciary capacity, and a defalcation.

Alliance Shippers, Inc. v. Choez (In re Choez) · filed 2018-10-26(a)(4)

First, the debt must result from a fiduciary's defalcation under an "express or technical trust" involving the entrusting of money or other property to a fiduciary for the benefit of another. Second, the debtor must have acted in a fiduciary capacity with respect to the trust. Third, the transaction in question must be a "defalcation" within the meaning of bankruptcy law.

Section 523(a)(4) excepts a debt for defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity when the breach of duty involves a culpable state of mind.

Integrated Pharm., Inc. v. Chatterjee (In re Chatterjee) · filed 2018-11-28(a)(4)

Accordingly, the Court may and does infer from the stipulated facts that the Chatterjees appreciated the wrongfulness of the conduct on which their judgment debts are predicated. I conclude that the judgment debts of the Chatterjees to the Integrated are, in their entirety, debts for defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity.

Section 523(a)(4) excepts a debt from discharge when it arises from defalcation committed with knowledge of, or gross recklessness about, the improper nature of fiduciary conduct.

Swait v. Newman · filed 2019-02-26(a)(4)

As a result of the Defendant’s actual knowledge of the improper nature of her conduct toward the Plaintiffs, the damages evidenced by the Consent Judgment are rendered nondischargeable under §523(a)(4) as arising from defalcations committed by the Defendant while acting in a fiduciary capacity.

Section 523(a)(4) requires a creditor alleging fiduciary defalcation to prove that the debtor knew the conduct was improper or was grossly reckless about it.

Campbell v. Spencer · filed 2019-02-12(a)(4)

To prove defalcation, a creditor must establish a “culpable state of mind . . . involving knowledge of, or gross recklessness in respect to, the improper nature of the relevant fiduciary behavior.”

Section 523(a)(4) excepts a debt for fiduciary defalcation from discharge when the fiduciary knew, or was grossly reckless about, the improper nature of the conduct.

In Re: Lawrence R. Mulligan · filed 2019-03-05(a)(4)

Thus, the bankruptcy court did not err in deciding that the state court’s findings also established that Mulligan possessed the required mental state for defalcation—that is, that he knew, or was grossly reckless with respect to, “the improper nature of [his] fiduciary behavior.”

Section 523(a)(4) excepts a debt for fiduciary defalcation from discharge when the debtor consciously disregarded or was willfully blind to a substantial and unjustifiable risk of breaching a fiduciary duty.

Chavis v. Mangrum (In re Mangrum) · filed 2019-05-14(a)(4)

Section 523(a)(4) excepts debts from discharge for defalcation arising from reckless conduct if a plaintiff establishes that a debtor either consciously disregarded or was willfully blind to a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his conduct would violate a fiduciary duty.

Defalcation under § 523(a)(4) requires intentional wrongdoing or criminal recklessness; consciously abandoning a continuing fiduciary duty may satisfy that standard.

Bryan Scott Owens, Ga. Lottery Corp. v. Owens · filed 2019-04-15(a)(4)

Specifically, whether the required mens rea is present to support a finding of defalcation under § 523(a)(4). ... Rather, Bullock dictates that defalcation can be established by showing that either the Defendant intentionally acted wrongfully or that he acted with criminal recklessness. ... Ultimately, the Court finds that the Defendant's conscious decision to withdraw from the business, despite his continuing fiduciary duty, constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct expected in his fiduciary role.

Section 523(a)(4) excepts from discharge a debt arising from a fiduciary’s defalcation involving entrusted funds.

Bade v. Mason · filed 2019-08-15(a)(4)

For the aforementioned reasons, the debt arising from the unauthorized release of the $690,000 entrusted to the Defendant is not dischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(4).

Section 523(a)(4) requires a finding about the debtor’s state of mind; violating Wisconsin’s theft by contractor statute alone does not make a debt nondischargeable.

Sonnentag v. Swinehart · filed 2019-10-15(a)(4)

After the Supreme Court’s decision in Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 569 U.S. 267 (2013), a finding that a debtor has violated Wisconsin’s theft by contractor statute does not per se lead to a determination that debt is non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(4).

Section 523(a)(4) requires courts to assess defalcation separately for distinct, divisible debts.

In re: Stuart Scott Snyder · filed 2019-09-12(a)(4)

The proper inquiry here required the court to examine whether the Snyders committed defalcation with regard to the monies involved in the New Jersey and Connecticut Projects separately, not with regard to the debt as a whole.

Section 523(a)(4) excepts a debt from discharge when a debtor commits defalcation while acting as a fiduciary of an express trust.

William M. Bryan, Inc. v. Brody · filed 2019-09-30(a)(4)

For all of the reasons stated above, WMB prevails on its claim that the debt owed to it is nondischargeable under Section 523(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 523(a)(4) excepts from discharge a debt arising from a debtor’s knowing diversion of construction trust funds while acting in a fiduciary capacity.

Vrana v. Thornhill, Jr. · filed 2019-09-30(a)(4)

Accordingly, as a result of the state court’s determination that the Defendant had knowingly engaged in his improper conduct toward the Plaintiffs, the entry of judgment as a matter of law on the Plaintiffs’ claim under § 523(a)(4) is appropriate and the indebtedness evidenced by the State Court Judgment is rendered nondischargeable under § 523(a)(4) as arising from a defalcation committed by the Defendant while acting in a fiduciary capacity.

Section 523(a)(4) requires a finding about the debtor’s state of mind for fiduciary defalcation; violating a state theft by contractor statute alone does not make a debt nondischargeable.

Brisk v. Swinehart · filed 2019-10-15(a)(4)

After the Supreme Court’s decision in Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 569 U.S. 267 (2013), a finding that a debtor has violated Wisconsin’s theft by contractor statute does not per se lead to a determination that debt is non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(4).

Section 523(a)(4) requires a knowing or grossly reckless breach of fiduciary duty for a debt to be nondischargeable as defalcation.

Andrade v. Hill · filed 2019-11-22(a)(4)

However, on this record, the Court does not find that Ms. Hill’s failure to remit half of the partnership profits to Mr. Andrade rose to the level of gross recklessness as explained by the Supreme Court in Bullock.

Section 523(a)(4) requires an express or technical trust relationship for a debt to be nondischargeable as defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity.

Carouthers Management and Consulting LLC v. Ashby · filed 2019-10-18(a)(4)

Nor does the breach of fiduciary duty owed to an employer establish “defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity” under the test established by the Sixth Circuit, which requires an express or technical trust relationship.

Section 523(a)(4) requires knowledge of or gross recklessness about improper fiduciary conduct for a debt arising from defalcation to be excepted from discharge.

ANDRADE v. HILL · filed 2020-03-12(a)(4)

For a debt to be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(4), the debtor must violate the fiduciary duty “with ‘knowledge of, or gross recklessness in respect to, the improper nature of the relevant fiduciary behavior.’” Id. at 161 (citing Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 569 U.S. 267, 269 (2013)).

Section 523(a)(4) excepts debts arising from fiduciary defalcation, embezzlement, or larceny from discharge; prior state court findings can establish those grounds.

Village Mortgage Company v. Veneziano · filed 2020-03-27(a)(4)

The Plaintiff is therefore entitled to a determination as a matter of law that the debt owed to it by the Defendant is non-dischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4).

Section 523(a)(4) requires knowledge of, or gross recklessness about, the improper nature of a fiduciary breach for the resulting debt to be nondischargeable.

ANDRADE v. HILL · filed 2020-04-02(a)(4)

Therefore, because the Bankruptcy Court assumed a fiduciary relationship existed for purposes of its opinion, and correctly decided that Ms. Hill did not violate any fiduciary duty with gross recklessness, I find Mr. Andrade’s first allegation of error to be moot and unsupported by the law.

Section 523(a)(4) does not except unpaid employer contributions from discharge when the failure to pay them does not amount to defalcation.

Board of Trustees of the Sheet Metal Workers International Association Local Union No. 28 Trust Funds v. Kern · filed 2020-06-24(a)(4)

The Bankruptcy Code, however, made that debt dischargeable unless it was the result of “defalcation.” The bankruptcy court did not err in holding that Local 28 failed to establish defalcation under the Supreme Court’s definition in Bullock.

Section 523(a)(4) requires proof of knowledge or gross recklessness for a fiduciary’s defalcation to make a debt nondischargeable.

Flora v. Tagliaferri · filed 2020-07-02(a)(4)

Specifically, there is no evidentiary basis before this court to conclude that the New Jersey Court found that Ms. Tagliaferri acted with the requisite state of mind to commit an act of defalcation under § 523(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 523(a)(4) requires proof of a fiduciary relationship and the required mental state to except a debt for fiduciary defalcation.

NextGear Capital Inc. v. Ferati · filed 2020-07-27(a)(4)

The Court finds the Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the section 523(a)(4) claim. The record does not establish as a matter of law all of the elements of a fiduciary defalcation cause of action, including the creation of an express trust and corresponding fiduciary relationship, and whether the Defendant’s actions were taken with the mental state required for a showing of defalcation.

Section 523(a)(4) excepts a personally guaranteed debt from discharge when the debtor’s own fiduciary conduct caused the company’s defalcation.

James River Petroleum, Inc. v. Dickson · filed 2020-09-29(a)(4)

Taking the four Airlines Reporting factors together, the Court concludes that Mrs. Dickson is liable for Dickson Convenience’s fiduciary defalcation by reason of the Guaranty Agreement because she was acting in a fiduciary capacity to Dickson Convenience. Accordingly, the Court concludes as a matter of law that the debt owed to James River should be determined nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) in Mrs. Dickson’s bankruptcy case.

Section 523(a)(4) makes a landlord’s debt for misuse of a tenant’s security deposit nondischargeable when the misuse is a defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity.

Brown v. Outlaw · filed 2020-09-15(a)(4)

Accordingly, a landlord's misuse of a tenant's security deposit under the RLTO by failing to properly hold the deposit, failing to pay interest on it, or failing to return it or provide a proper accounting of it is a “defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity” and is therefore a nondischargeable debt under § 523(a)(4).

Section 523(a)(4) excepts a fiduciary debt from discharge when the fiduciary knowingly misuses entrusted funds, an intentional wrong that constitutes defalcation.

Donovan-Clemens v. Tebbenhoff · filed 2020-12-21(a)(4)

However, based on those findings, it is clear that Tebbenhoff committed an intentional wrong rising to the level of defalcation under Section 523(a)(4) when he knowingly misused Donovan-Clemens’ funds.

Section 523(a)(4) requires a qualifying fiduciary relationship for defalcation; agreements about reimbursements do not by themselves establish one.

Rob's Automotive, LLC v. Lazarz · filed 2021-01-13(a)(4)

There may have been a breach of contractual agreements about reimbursements, the overpayment, or the failure of Defendant to reimburse Plaintiff, but those agreements do not rise to the level of a fiduciary relationship. Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to establish the required elements, and the claim under section 523(a)(4) that Defendant committed defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity fails.

Section 523(a)(4) requires proof that a fiduciary committed defalcation intentionally or consciously disregarded an unjustifiable risk of harm.

Credit Associates, Inc. v. Blevins · filed 2021-02-01(a)(4)

Credit Associates needed to show that Blevins either knew that her actions would result in the harm that occurred or that she consciously disregarded an unjustifiable risk of harm. Because I’ve found that she believed her statements were true—however poor her understanding of those statements—I can’t conclude that she acted intentionally or recklessly.

Section 523(a)(4) permits a nondischargeability claim for breach of a PACA trust; the trust assets need not be segregated.

Melon Acres, Inc. v. Villa · filed 2021-01-28(a)(4)

After careful consideration of the parties’ legal arguments, and the majority and minority views, including decisions of sister bankruptcy courts in Florida in light of the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Quaif v. Johnson, the Court holds in the affirmative: a party can state an actionable cause of action for breach of a PACA trust under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4).

Section 523(a)(4) excepts a fiduciary’s defalcation debt from discharge when the fiduciary acts knowingly or with gross recklessness concerning the misconduct.

Wizenberg v. Wizenberg · filed 2021-03-01(a)(4)

Count Two sought to prevent some of Peter’s debts from being discharged because they were “for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity.” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4). Defalcation is the misappropriation or misuse of property or funds entrusted to a fiduciary. ... It requires a culpable state of mind, involving either knowledge of, or gross recklessness with respect to, the fiduciary’s misconduct. ... This evidence therefore supports the bankruptcy court’s ruling on Count Two.

Section 523(a)(4) excepts a debt for defalcation from discharge only when the debtor acted under an express or technical trust.

Cutting Edge Decorative Concrete v. Struhar, Sr. · filed 2021-03-22(a)(4)

There is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether an express or technical trust was created between the debtor personally and Cutting Edge, and therefore the debtor’s motion for summary judgment as to § 523(a)(4) is granted.

Section 523(a)(4) requires an express or technical trust for a debt to be nondischargeable as defalcation; an auction consignment agreement alone does not create one.

Pearl of the Orient III, Inc. v. Struhar, Sr. · filed 2021-03-24(a)(4)

In this case, there is nothing in the one page “Auction Consignment Agreement” that created a technical trust meeting the requirements of § 523(a)(4).

Section 523(a)(4) excepts a debt from discharge when a debtor recklessly violates a preexisting fiduciary duty and causes the creditor economic loss.

MASON v. BADE · filed 2021-03-31(a)(4)

The Court does, however, find an express trust between the parties that gives rise to a fiduciary relationship under § 523(a)(4).

Section 523(a)(4) requires proof of the requisite state of mind for defalcation or embezzlement; a prior judgment establishing a trust and nonpayment alone does not establish nondischargeability.

Nicewander v. Nicewander · filed 2021-09-30(a)(4)

Because the state court order at issue did not make factual findings to support the requisite state-of-mind elements required to prove defalcation and embezzlement under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4), Plaintiff is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on these counts of her complaint.

Section 523(a)(4) excepts a debt from discharge when a fiduciary commits defalcation through knowingly improper or grossly reckless conduct.

Rennaker v. Davis · filed 2021-11-09(a)(4)

Consequently, based on the foregoing, Ms. Rennaker satisfied her burden to establish that Ms. Davis engaged in grossly reckless conduct sufficient to establish defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity under § 523(a)(4).

Section 523(a)(4) excepts from discharge a debt caused by a contractor’s defalcation of construction trust funds while acting as a fiduciary.

Miller v. Safford · filed 2021-11-23(a)(4)

The requisite fiduciary relationship exists because, under Patel, there is no dispute that Defendant and his company, Integrity, were a “contractor” for purposes of the Act and thus a fiduciary to Plaintiffs. ... Accordingly, Defendant has not adequately accounted for the funds and this failure satisfies the intent element. ... Pursuant to Section 523(a)(4), this warrants a finding of nondischargeability.

Section 523(a)(4) makes a debt nondischargeable when a fiduciary recklessly fails to account for entrusted funds.

Scroggins v. Jones · filed 2022-01-20(a)(4)

As stated earlier, a debt arising from a fiduciary’s reckless conduct that results in a failure to account for the beneficiary’s assets is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(4).

Section 523(a)(4) excepts from discharge a debt arising from defalcation committed while the debtor acts in a fiduciary capacity.

Goodstein v. Kamhi · filed 2021-12-16(a)(4)

The Court finds that the Defendant’s conduct amounted to defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity with respect to the Plaintiffs.

Section 523(a)(4) excepts a fiduciary’s debt from discharge when the debt arises from defalcation, which can be established by reckless disregard of fiduciary duties.

Lee v. Line · filed 2022-01-20(a)(4)

Without question, the Debtor’s debt owed to the Plaintiffs in the amount of $190,000 plus prejudgment interest and costs arose from her defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity.

Section 523(a)(4) requires knowledge of, or gross recklessness about, improper fiduciary conduct for a debt to be nondischargeable as defalcation.

In re: Andrew B. Platt and Ruth Ann Platt · filed 2022-04-22(a)(4)

For a debt to be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(4) as a defalcation, the debtor must possess “a culpable state of mind,” which the Supreme Court described as “one involving knowledge of, or gross recklessness in respect to, the improper nature of the relevant fiduciary behavior.”

Section 523(a)(4) excepts a Wisconsin contractor-theft debt from discharge when the state judgment established the elements of fiduciary defalcation.

Jackson v. Meyers · filed 2022-04-29(a)(4)

Thus for the purpose of issue preclusion, the elements of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) were actually litigated and determined in Jackson’s state court suit against Meyers for a violation of Wis. Stat. § 779.02(5).

Section 523(a)(4) makes a debt arising from a fiduciary’s defalcation nondischargeable when the fiduciary knew of or was grossly reckless about the improper conduct.

Conn v. Roach · filed 2022-08-17(a)(4)

However, not every act of defalcation by a fiduciary satisfies § 523(a)(4). ... More fundamentally, even if the Court assumes the Land Trust owed the Defendant a debt, her decision to unilaterally transfer the Timeshare to herself in direct contravention of the terms of the Land Trust Agreement was subjectively grossly reckless. ... The debt owed to the Plaintiffs as provided for by Claim 8-1 is hereby declared NONDISCHARGEABLE.

Section 523(a)(4) excepts a fiduciary’s debt for defalcation from discharge when the breach involves bad faith, intentional wrongdoing, or comparably reckless conduct.

Nickerson v. Birchfield · filed 2022-08-11(a)(4)

But to constitute defalcation under 523(a)(4), a fiduciary-duty breach must “involve bad faith, moral turpitude, or other immoral conduct” or else intentional wrongdoing or “reckless conduct of the kind that the criminal law often treats as the equivalent.”

Section 523(a)(4) excepted $47,500 in sale proceeds from discharge as defalcation and embezzlement, but did not reach proceeds used to satisfy tax liens.

Nicewander v. Nicewander · filed 2022-10-03(a)(4)

The evidentiary record before the Court demonstrates that Defendant’s actions constitute both defalcation and embezzlement under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) with respect to the $47,500 in net sales proceeds that Defendant failed to pay to Plaintiff, but not with respect to the $16,020.24 in sales proceeds used to satisfy Defendant’s tax liens at closing.

Section 523(a)(4) excepts a judgment debt arising from the debtor’s defalcation while acting as trustee.

Smith v. Smith · filed 2023-04-24(a)(4)

For the reasons set forth below, the court grants plaintiff’s motion to except the judgment debt defendant owes to plaintiff from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4).

A state court judgment arising from fiduciary defalcation and embezzlement may be excepted in its entirety from discharge under § 523(a)(4).

Brabson v. Janosik · filed 2023-06-08(a)(4)

This Court holds that the State Court Judgment, in its entirety, is nondischargeable pursuant to section 523(a)(4).

Section 523(a)(4) excepts a debt for fiduciary defalcation from discharge when the debtor has the required culpable state of mind; a prior judgment conclusively establishing that state of mind prevents relitigation through advice of counsel allegations.

In re: Wallace Steffen · filed 2023-07-18(a)(4)

Here, the Probate Court’s state of mind findings were actually and directly litigated, and were necessary to the imposition of liability on Mr. Steffens. The court’s findings precisely mirror those required for nondischargeability under § 523(a)(4).

Section 523(a)(4) excepts a debt for defalcation by a fiduciary from discharge when the fiduciary recklessly disregards a substantial risk of violating fiduciary duties.

Ruck v. McGill · filed 2023-09-11(a)(4)

McGill’s understanding of the requirement to act as a fiduciary combined with the way he maintained the funds and kept only casual accounting records shows a reckless indifference to his fiduciary duties that amounts to defalcation. ... As a result, Ruck has shown that the $7,458.02 debt McGill owes her is one for defalcation while acting as a fiduciary within the meaning of §523(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code.

A construction contract debt may be nondischargeable under both § 523(a)(2)(A) and § 523(a)(4).

Hann v. Kahkeshani · filed 2023-10-16(a)(2)(A), (a)(4)

Thus, we AFFIRM the district court’s determination that Hann’s debt to Kahkeshani is rendered nondischargeable by 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(4).

Knowingly selling trust property in violation of a court order and keeping the proceeds can constitute fiduciary defalcation under § 523(a)(4).

Hu v. Liu · filed 2024-02-12(a)(4)

Giving collateral estoppel effect to the determinations actually and necessarily decided in the State Court’s Warrant of Arrest for Contempt and the State Court Judgment, there can be no genuine dispute that the Defendant engaged in knowingly improper and reckless behavior by selling Lowbet’s Property in violation of the State Court’s TRO, and by keeping the net sale proceeds for herself to the detriment of Plaintiff. These actions clearly constitute defalcation in a fiduciary capacity under § 523(a)(4).

Section 523(a)(4) requires a culpable state of mind for defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity.

Fuller v. Clasby · filed 2024-11-26(a)(4)

Instead, Bullock held defalcation requires a culpable state of mind (i.e. moral turpitude or intentional wrong). The Court finds that the Plaintiffs failed to satisfy the state of mind requirement under Section 523(a)(4).

Section 523(a)(4) excepts a debt from discharge when a fiduciary’s grossly reckless conduct constitutes defalcation.

Fritscher v. Fritscher, II · filed 2025-02-13(a)(4)

Stated another way, the Smiths proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Patrick was a fiduciary and was grossly reckless in managing the Company. Therefore, the $93,040 judgment, which mirrors their allowed proof of claim, is nondischargeable pursuant to section 523(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 523(a)(4) excepts from discharge a debt for defalcation by an LLC manager who breaches a fiduciary duty to a minority member by misappropriating company funds.

Wilkerson v. Williams · filed 2025-03-05(a)(4)

The State Court specifically found that Williams in her capacity as manager and a member of the LLC, breached her fiduciary duties to Wilkerson, the minority member, by misappropriating corporate funds. These findings satisfy the requirements of § 523(a)(4).

Section 523(a)(4) excepts a fiduciary debt from discharge when the debtor’s defalcation involves at least reckless conduct.

King v. King · filed 2025-05-27(a)(4)

The Bankruptcy Court did not err in concluding that the state court found King personally liable for (at least) reckless conduct and, therefore, that defalcation applied.

Section 523(a)(4) excepts a fiduciary debt from discharge for defalcation when the underlying judgment establishes at least reckless indifference to the beneficiary.

King v. WNB Financial National Association · filed 2025-05-27(a)(4)

Because Nevada’s breach of trust requires, at the very least, a finding of reckless indifference, the conclusions from the state court were sufficient for the Bankruptcy Court to correctly find defalcation.

Section 523(a)(4) excepts from discharge a debt for defalcation committed while the debtor acted in a fiduciary capacity.

Yonkers Islamic Center, Inc. v. Coleman · filed 2025-06-11(a)(4)

For the reasons stated, the YIC Claim is excepted from the bankruptcy discharge because the debt is for defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4).

Section 523(a)(4) excepts a fiduciary debt from discharge for defalcation when the debtor knew the conduct was improper or acted with gross recklessness toward that risk.

Thrower · filed 2025-10-14(a)(4)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds and concludes that, with respect to the $106,387.58 payment owed to the Plaintiffs’ benefit funds, Godwin did not commit defalcation because there is insufficient proof he had the culpable state of mind required by Bullock. Thus, the $106,387.58 debt is not excepted from his discharge under § 523(a)(4).

Section 523(a)(4) excepts from discharge a debt caused by a debtor’s defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, including willful neglect of duties under an express trust.

NextGear v. Lorca · filed 2025-10-20(a)(4)

Based upon the foregoing, because Lorca’s breach or willful disregard of his fiduciary duty to NextGear (i.e., defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity) in relation to the $829,739.36 in Misapplied Sales Proceeds deprived NextGear of such proceeds, and the Judgment Debt owed by Lorca to NextGear necessarily includes such amount, the Court finds that $829,739.36 of the Judgment Debt is nondischargeable pursuant to the defalcation provisions of § 523(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 523(a)(4) permits a defalcation claim when a debtor knowingly uses funds held in a fiduciary capacity for unauthorized personal expenses.

Moodie · filed 2026-01-15(a)(4)

These allegations state a plausible §523(a)(4) defalcation claim: They allege (1) Olson operated as a Wisconsin home contractor and knew that Wisconsin law imposed a trust on all funds received from Moodie “to be solely used for the home construction work”; (2) Olson knew he owed Moodie this fiduciary duty; (3) Olson breached his fiduciary duty as trustee of those funds by using them to pay personal expenses; and (4) Olson acted with “an intent to convert the funds to his own use and for his own purposes”, thus implying that he knowingly violated the fiduciary duty imposed by Wisconsin law.

A claim of fiduciary defalcation under § 523(a)(4) is subject to Rule 8(a)(2)’s pleading standard.

Cruz · filed 2026-03-12(a)(4)

For that reason, the Court finds that a § 523(a)(4) defalcation claim need not meet the heightened standard of Federal Rule 9(b).

Section 523(a)(4) makes an attorney’s debt nondischargeable when the attorney misappropriates client funds held under a preexisting duty to keep them in trust.

Prasla · filed 2026-03-30(a)(4)

An attorney-client relationship satisfies the fiduciary requirement under § 523(a)(4) where the attorney holds client funds subject to a pre-existing obligation to maintain them in trust.

Section 523(a)(4) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor commits defalcation while acting under a preexisting express or technical trust.

Fuller · filed 2026-04-09(a)(4)

Plaintiffs have established under Section 523(a)(4) that Defendant committed defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity.

Section 523(a)(4) makes a debt for defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity nondischargeable, and a state court judgment can establish that basis through collateral estoppel.

In Re Douglas SPEIGHT, Debtor. Joe LAUGHTER, Appellee, v. C. Douglas SPEIGHT, Appellant · filed 1994-02-09(a)(4)

Under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4), a debt for “fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity ...” is not dischargeable. ... We agree, too, with the district court’s conclusion that the fifteen-page judgment of the state court contained all that was necessary to establish, under well-known principles of collateral estoppel, that the judgment debt was not dischargeable.

Section 523(a)(4) excepts from discharge a debt arising from a fiduciary’s failure to remit funds expressly held in trust.

Navistar Financial Corp. v. Stelluti (In Re Stelluti) · filed 1994-02-03(a)(4)

Mr. Stelluti’s failure to remit floor plan funds expressly held in trust on behalf of Navistar constitutes fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4).

Section 523(a)(4) makes a debt for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity nondischargeable.

Hoop v. Hoop · filed 2008-09-29(a)(4)

The district court properly concluded that the bankruptcy court did not err when it determined that the Pennsylvania court’s judgment against Hoop is nondischargeable. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (setting forth nondischargeability of debt for “fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity”); see also Lewis v. Scott (In re Lewis), 97 F.3d 1182, 1185-87 (9th Cir.1996) (defining “fiduciary” and “defalcation” for purposes of section 523(a)(4)).

Section 523(a)(4) requires some degree of culpability for a debt to be nondischargeable as a fiduciary defalcation.

Salem Services, Inc. v. Hussain (In Re Hussain) · filed 2004-04-06(a)(4)

Hence, some degree of culpability is required to make a debt non-dischargeable as a defalcation under § 523(a)(4).

Section 523(a)(4) requires a particular state of mind for defalcation to make a debt nondischargeable.

Perez v. Richard Schoenfeld. · filed 2015-03-02(a)(4)

Bullock clarified the requisite intent for defalcation under § 523(a)(4) and effectively abrogated Ninth Circuit law, which formerly did not require a particular state of mind.

Section 523(a)(6) can except sanctions for a debtor’s bad-faith litigation from discharge.

TIMOTHY R GEIGER · filed 2023-07-21(a)(6)

Debtor shall be required to pay all reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by Access from the date Debtor’s Motion to Reopen was filed through the filing of its fee requests. The foregoing sanctions against Debtor are nondischargeable in Debtor’s bankruptcies.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor was substantially certain that his conduct would cause significant injury, even if he did not foresee the precise injury.

In re Granoff · filed 2007-10-09(a)(6)

Moreover, the fact that Granoff might not have been substantially certain that Bibus’s left tympanic membrane would be perforated does not alter the determination that Bibus established by a preponderance of the evidence that Granoff was substantially certain that his striking her would produce some significant injury.

Section 523(a)(6) permits a court to consider a debtor’s violation of a relevant statute, along with other evidence, when deciding whether the debtor acted maliciously.

Johnson v. Fors (In Re Fors) · filed 2001-02-22(a)(6)

The bankruptcy court properly considered Fors’ violation of the Minnesota statutory prohibition against a chiropractor engaging in sexual conduct with a patient as circumstantial evidence of his malicious intent. Such evidence, along with the additional evidence admitted at trial regarding this issue, adequately supports the bankruptcy court’s finding that Fors acted with malicious intent.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a contract debt from discharge when the breach is accompanied by tortious conduct that causes willful and malicious injury.

In Re: George Jercich, Debtor. James A. Petralia v. Jercich · filed 2001-01-23(a)(6)

We therefore hold that to be excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6), a breach of contract must be accompanied by some form of “tortious conduct” that gives rise to “willful and malicious injury.” In so holding, we reject BAP’s imposition of a requirement that the conduct at issue be tortious even if a contract between the parties did not exist.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a debtor’s willful and malicious conversion of collateral injures a secured creditor.

First National Bank of McClusky v. Zinke (In Re Zinke) · filed 1994-08-15(a)(6)

In the case at bar, this court has absolutely no trouble in concluding that Zinke’s repeated and unauthorized dispositions of collateral in contravention of the express dictates of the security agreements, resulted in an “injury by the debtor ... to the property of another entity” and were both “willful” and “malicious” within the meaning of § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not make a debt from selling secured collateral nondischargeable merely because the debtor knew the sale breached the security agreement; the creditor must prove malice.

John Deere Credit Service v. McLaughlin (In Re McLaughlin) · filed 1989-12-14(a)(6)

The plaintiff has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the debtor “maliciously” converted the collateral. The debtor knew he was breaching the security agreement, but this fact is not enough under § 523(a)(6). Not every breach of a contractual obligation is a willful and malicious act.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a malicious prosecution judgment from discharge when the debtor’s injury was willful and malicious; the judgment can include attorneys’ fees supported by an independent statutory basis.

Ziegler v. Ziegler (In Re Charles W. Ziegler) · filed 1989-11-08(a)(6)

Accordingly, this court concludes that a judgment obtained against a debtor in a malicious prosecution case is non-dis-chargeable under § 523(a)(6) as a debt resulting from a willful and malicious injury by the debtor to the person and property of another. ... Accordingly, this statute applies the necessary basis for allowing Lupin’s judgment to include his attorneys’ fees and make them non-dis-chargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires a creditor seeking to except a debt arising from the sale of collateral to identify with some specificity the collateral sold that was subject to its valid lien.

Farmers & Merchants Bank of Eatonton v. Alexander · filed 1987-02-20(a)(6)

The creditor bank must be able to demonstrate with some specificity the amount of collateral sold that was subject to a valid lien before it can take advantage of section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt nondischargeable when a debtor actively participates in the willful and malicious conversion of another party’s secured property.

Bankr. L. Rep. P 71,593 Ford Motor Credit Company, a Delaware Corporation v. Owens · filed 1987-01-20(a)(6)

Therefore, Owens is personally liable to FMCC for the conversion of the property in question and the debt is nondischargeable pursuant to section 523(a)(6) in Owens personal bankruptcy.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for conversion from discharge only when the conversion is willful and malicious; malice is assessed from the totality of the circumstances.

Coffing v. Burdick (In Re Burdick) · filed 1986-09-02(a)(6)

The inherent unfairness of the competing views on what is necessary to establish a malicious conversion under § 523(a)(6) leads this court to reject the strict application of either view. Instead, this court chooses to make the determination of malice by looking at the totality of the circumstances.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for intentional injury without legal justification from discharge; a prior verdict can establish that the injury was malicious.

Smith v. Pitner (In Re Pitner) · filed 1980-07-23(a)(6)

Thus, defining the word “malicious” in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) as the absence of any legal justification for the act done, and construing this as an essential element of assault and battery, it is clear that the verdict against defendant collaterally es-tops him from denying his action was “malicious.”

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for injury from discharge when the debtor intended harm or harm was substantially certain to result.

Alexander v. Donnelly (In Re Donnelly) · filed 1980-07-25(a)(6)

The term wilful and malicious is intended to apply to those acts in which it can be said that the actor intended to cause harm or to those acts wherein the likelihood of causing harm is so great that the actor will not be heard to say that he did not intend to cause the resultant harm.

Section 523(a)(6) requires both a willful injury and malicious intent to harm before a debt is excepted from discharge.

Grand Piano & Furniture Co. v. Hodges (In Re Hodges) · filed 1980-07-25(a)(6)

Code Section 523(a)(6) reads in the conjunctive, not the disjunctive: “willful and malicious.” While he may well have willfully sold the secured property, he did not appear to do so maliciously. Testimony from the Debtor indicated that he did not intend to hurt or harm Grand Piano by selling the goods; he only meant to raise money to make his monthly mortgage payment.

Section 523(a)(6) requires maliciousness in addition to willfulness to except a debt from discharge; reckless disregard alone is insufficient.

Liberty National Bank & Trust Co. v. Hawkins (In Re Hawkins) · filed 1980-08-28(a)(6)

Now that the “reckless” or “knowing disregard” standard has been obviated by Congressional intent, there remains the requirement of showing “maliciousness” in addition to “willfulness” in order to come within the § 523(a)(6) exception.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof of willfulness and malice to except a debt from discharge.

Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi (In Re Eskenazi) · filed 1980-10-16(a)(6)

And, since no one questions the need for proof of willfulness and malice under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), the Panel must affirm the conclusion reached by Judge Russell that this debt should be discharged in the Defendant-Appellee’s bankruptcy case.

Section 523(a)(6) requires the creditor to prove a wilful and malicious injury; a jury’s refusal to award exemplary damages weighs heavily in the debtor’s favor.

Gregor v. Ertz (In Re Ertz) · filed 1980-10-20(a)(6)

This Bankruptcy Court holds that Congress intended a stricter application of the “wilful and malicious” test. Where a state court jury has refused to award exemplary damages, that factor should be weighed heavily in favor of the Debtor. Plaintiff, who has the burden of proof to show that the action was “wilful and malicious”, must justify the Court’s ignoring the jury’s verdict and finding that the debt is excepted from discharge.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof of the debtor’s knowledge and intent to except a debt for willful and malicious injury from discharge.

Eck v. Schuck (In Re Schuck) · filed 1980-11-04(a)(6)

In the present case, in order to secure a finding of nondischargeability under Section 523(a)(6) for willful and malicious injuries to the person or property of another, the requisite knowledge and intent must be proven.

Section 523(a)(6) requires deliberate or intentional conduct for an injury to be willful and malicious.

Heritage Mutual Insurance v. Naser (In Re Naser) · filed 1980-11-17(a)(6)

20. That there is no evidence in the record herein that defendant-debtor intended to injure anyone. His conduct cannot be described as “willful and malicious” under § 523(a)(6) in that said section requires deliberate or intentional conduct.

Section 523(a)(6)'s exception for willful and malicious injury covers debts arising from willful and malicious conversion of property.

In Re Meyer · filed 1981-01-12(a)(6)

This court holds that the phrase “willful and malicious injury” used in § 523(aX6) was intended to encompass “willful and malicious conversion.”

Section 523(a)(6) covers conversion of property when the debtor’s conduct is willful and malicious.

Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Simmons (In Re Simmons) · filed 1981-01-26(a)(6)

Although § 523(a)(6) omits the term “conversion”, it is clear from the legislative history that “injury” includes conversion.

Section 523(a)(6) does not bar discharge when a debtor had the right to dispose of property but failed to follow state procedures for doing so.

Noble v. Reynolds (In re Reynolds) · filed 1981-02-02(a)(6)

The debtor in this instance exercised his proper right in disposing of the merchandise but misused the Ohio procedural method in doing so. Such is not “willful and malicious injury”.

Section 523(a)(6) requires deliberate or intentional injury; reckless disregard alone does not make a debt nondischargeable.

Hartwig v. Ankowiak (In Re Ankowiak) · filed 1981-03-04(a)(6)

For the instant debt to be non-disehargea-ble, this court must find that debtor’s actions were deliberate or intentional. Debt- or was speeding and he ran a stop sign. His conduct evidenced “reckless disregard” for the safety of others, but the evidence fails to show that he intended to injure anyone or that he deliberately crashed his car into Mr. Hartwig’s.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt arising when a debtor sells property subject to a security interest without paying the secured debt, causing a willful and malicious injury.

Crebithrift of America v. Auvenshine (In Re Auvenshine) · filed 1981-03-10(a)(6)

The sale of property subject to a security interest by a debtor without payment of the debt so secured is a willful and malicious conversion. ... Therefore, I find that the debtors’ debt to Credithrift in the sum of $250.00 is not dischargeable and a judgment in this amount may be entered with costs .to be taxed.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt arising from a debtor’s willful and malicious injury to another entity’s property, including a subrogated insurer’s claim.

Northland Insurance v. Dillman (In re Dillman) · filed 1981-03-11(a)(6)

Any conversion will not constitute a “willful and malicious injury” to another entity or the property of another entity; although, it must be concluded that most any conversion of property would be injurious to the owner. The circumstances of this case also show that the injury was willful and malicious in that the debtor admitted that he knew that the vehicle was stolen when he took it from Louisiana to Alabama, where he disposed of it.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor willfully and maliciously converts another’s property without justification or excuse.

Vagley v. Lavitsky (In Re Lavitsky) · filed 1981-03-30(a)(6)

Maliciousness, willfulness and intent to do harm are the elements needed in order for the § 523(a)(6) exception to apply.

Section 523(a)(6) requires malice and deliberation to except a debt for injury to property from discharge.

Ohio Grain Co. v. Gentis (In Re Gentis) · filed 1981-04-01(a)(6)

We hold that malice and deliberation together are the prerequisites to a cause of action under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt arising from a technical conversion from discharge when the debtor lacks conscious intent to violate another’s rights and acts under mistake or misapprehension.

West Springfield M. E. Credit Union v. Finnie (In Re Finnie) · filed 1981-04-10(a)(6)

A claim founded on a mere technical conversion without conscious intent to violate the rights of another, and under mistake or misapprehension, is dischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt arising from conversion from discharge when the conversion is both willful and malicious.

Thorp Credit & Thrift Co. v. Pommerer (In Re Pommerer) · filed 1981-05-07(a)(6)

To establish that an obligation arising from a conversion is non-dischargea-ble under this subsection, the plaintiff must prove a conversion which was both willful and malicious. A willful conversion is one which is deliberate and intentional.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a debtor knowingly converts another's property and permanently deprives the owner of it.

First National Exchange Bank v. Cummins (In Re Cummins) · filed 1981-05-07(a)(6)

The phrase “willful and malicious injury” covers a willful and malicious conversion. ... When the debtor withdrew the $5,000.00 erroneously deposited to his account, he knew those funds did not belong to him. By intentionally disposing of those funds, he forever deprived the Bank of its property. ... The debt is non-dischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that the debtor acted deliberately and intentionally with the intent to cause harm before a debt is nondischargeable.

First National Bank of Central Jersey v. Maiolo (In Re Maiolo) · filed 1981-06-25(a)(6)

It is generally held that under Section 523(a)(6) it must be shown that the debtor acted deliberately and intentionally with the intent to do harm before a debt will be held nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(2) and (6) except a debt from discharge when the debtor fraudulently induces a sale and willfully and maliciously converts the property.

McDonald v. McCay (In Re McCay) · filed 1981-07-14(a)(2), (a)(6)

The Court finds that defendant, at the time of the agreement of sale, fraudulently induced plaintiff to part with the horse having the intention of not paying the balance of the purchase price unless forced to do so, having in mind a scheme to conceal her whereabouts and the horse so as to frustrate and collection of the debt. In addition, the transfer of registration was a deliberate and intentional conversion of the property to herself and her daughter when she knew that registration would be transferred only on payment in full. This was willful and malicious. Under both 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) and (6) the debt is excepted from discharge.

Section 523(a)(6) requires intentional disregard of another’s rights for an injury to be malicious.

United States v. Langer (In Re Langer) · filed 1981-07-17(a)(6)

In light of Davis, and the legislative history behind the new Code, this court agrees with the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that for malice to exist there must be some intentional disregard for the rights of another.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for willful and malicious conversion of another’s property from discharge.

Citibank N. A. v. Friedenberg (In Re Friedenberg) · filed 1981-07-29(a)(6)

The opinion of the state court, coupled with the testimony of the debtor himself, offer sufficiently convincing proof that the debt in question involves willful and malicious conversion of the bank’s property and is therefore nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that the debtor acted in knowing disregard of another’s rights to except a conversion debt from discharge.

Maine Bonding & Casualty Co. v. Crook (In Re Crook) · filed 1981-08-28(a)(6)

Since Maine Bonding failed to clearly and convincingly show that the Debtor acted in knowing disregard of the rights of Maine Savings or Maine Bonding, his debt in approximately that amount cannot be held nondischargeable based on Section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge when the injury resulted from negligence, even gross negligence, rather than willful and malicious conduct.

Laatsch v. Stanfield (In Re Stanfield) · filed 1981-09-22(a)(6)

Therefore, although the Defendant’s actions have been substantially negligent, they are not sufficient to find that the injury inflicted upon deceased was “willful and malicious” rendering the debt nondis-chargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt for an intentional, unjustified conversion of another’s property without the owner’s knowledge or consent that injures the owner.

Meneley Motors, Inc. v. Giantvalley (In Re Giantvalley) · filed 1981-10-05(a)(6)

The conversion of another’s property without his knowledge or consent, done intentionally and without justification and excuse, to the other’s injury, is a willful and malicious injury within the meaning of § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a debtor’s intentional conduct causes willful and malicious injury to another’s property rights.

Gerst v. Fry (In re Fry) · filed 1981-10-06(a)(6)

In summary, the court finds and concludes that the debtors’ acts fall within the definition of “willful and malicious injury” as applied in section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the creditor proves willful and malicious injury by the debtor.

First National Bank of Gainesville v. Grainger (In Re Grainger) · filed 1981-10-27(a)(6)

After weighing the evidence in light of the “fresh start” philosophy of the Bankruptcy Code, and being mindful of the burden of proof and the standard of proof in cases of this sort, it is the finding of the court that the plaintiff has not proven by clear, cogent and convincing evidence that the defendant either willfully or maliciously injured the property of the plaintiff within the provisions of § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires intentional conduct; reckless disregard or negligence cannot satisfy its willfulness requirement.

Budres v. Farmer (In Re Farmer) · filed 1981-12-18(a)(6)

Thus, under the Bankruptcy Code, “reckless disregard” or other degree of negligence may not substitute to supply the intent demanded by “willful” as used in § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt arising from a debtor’s willful and malicious conversion of another’s property.

Hines v. Tanner (In Re Tanner) · filed 1982-01-18(a)(6)

Applying the decisional law to the evidentiary facts of record, it is apparent that the debtor’s act of cutting and removing twenty-five trees from the plaintiff’s property without authority was both “willful” and “malicious” within the meaning of § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires both willful and malicious conduct to except a debt for converted collateral from discharge.

Peoples Security Finance, Inc. v. Aldrich (In Re Aldrich) · filed 1982-01-27(a)(6)

The debtor’s conduct in disposing of plaintiff’s collateral although “willful” was not malicious as defined by the cases interpreting this subsection.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge for failure to refund a contract down payment when the payer had no property interest in the specific funds.

Langdon v. Alexander (In Re Alexander) · filed 1981-12-09(a)(6)

As a matter of law, the defendant’s failure to make restitution upon the cancellation of a contract under ORS 83.720(1) or upon rescission of the contract for any reason, is not actionable as a conversion of property of another under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not except an alleged conversion debt from discharge when the claim depends on a demand for goods and refusal to return them, but the undisputed evidence shows no demand.

Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Walters (In Re Walters) · filed 1982-02-09(a)(6)

Plaintiff’s second claim for relief seeks a determination of nondischargeability of debt for a willful and malicious injury to property under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). ... Defendants’ uncontroverted affidavit contains dispositive facts as plaintiff’s claim for conversion rests only on an allegation of a demand for the goods and a refusal to relinquish possession. A grant of summary judgment on this claim in favor of defendants is therefore appropriate.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for conversion from discharge when the taking was willful and malicious.

Bunn v. Cooper (In Re Cooper) · filed 1982-02-18(a)(6)

In this case all facts and circumstance demonstrate that the taking was malicious as well as willful. This court, then, finds that the debt of Eleven Thousand Two Hundred Dollars ($11,200.00) based on a judgment for damages stemming from conversion constitutes an exception to discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)6.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for willful and malicious injury from discharge even when the debtor injures a bystander instead of the intended target.

Davis v. White (In Re White) · filed 1982-03-09(a)(6)

White’s actions cannot be excused solely because he missed his intended victim and instead hit someone else. The injury is not required to be directed against the victim, but includes any entity other than the intended victim.

Section 523(a)(6) allows a creditor to seek a determination that a debt arising from willful and malicious injury to another’s property is nondischargeable.

Mileasing Co. v. Allavena (In Re Allavena) · filed 1982-03-17(a)(6)

Even if we were to find that the debtor was correct in his assertion that the plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a cause of action under § 727(a)(2), we conclude that the complaint states a cause of action under § 523(a)(6) for a determination that the debt owed by the debtor to the plaintiff is nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt from the debtor’s willful and malicious conversion of another’s property nondischargeable.

Pioneer Bank & Trust Co. v. Scotella (In Re Scotella) · filed 1982-03-31(a)(6)

This court holds that Scotella’s sale of the boat, without Pioneer’s consent or knowledge, constitutes a “willful and malicious injury to property” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for conversion from discharge when the debtor knows the conduct will cause injury and acts anyway; personal hatred is unnecessary.

Danekas v. Donny (In Re Donny) · filed 1982-04-08(a)(6)

Willful and malicious in this context does not require that the debtor be motivated by personal hatred, spite or ill will in harming the victim. It is sufficient that the debtor know that an injury will be caused and proceed in the face of this knowledge to carry out the actions which will cause the injury.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt for injury caused by a deliberate, wrongful act committed without just cause and from personal ill will.

Fireman's Fund Insurance v. Dynda (In Re Dynda) · filed 1982-04-22(a)(6)

2. Defendant, Susan Marie DYNDA, set the above-referenced fire willfully and maliciously as those terms are used in § 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for willful and malicious injury to property nondischargeable when the debtor intentionally converts another’s property in knowing disregard of the owner’s rights.

Callahan v. Norton (In Re Norton) · filed 1982-05-04(a)(6)

If the “subjective” and “intent to harm” standards are to be applied, however, this court believes that, despite the defendant’s express denial of any intention to harm the plaintiff, that the surrounding facts and circumstances demonstrate the contrary. The relatively long period through which successive withdrawals were made from the plaintiff’s account by means of careful and repeated imitations of the plaintiff’s signature betoken a state of mind other than one which could be characterized as “good faith” or “unintentional.” This egregious factual situation cannot conscionably rate a discharge in bankruptcy.

Section 523(a)(6) requires willful and malicious injury; a fee judgment for a frivolous, bad faith lawsuit does not by itself establish those elements.

Savitsky v. Katz (In Re Katz) · filed 1982-05-17(a)(6)

The standards used in the prior state court action did not require the measure of culpability that is necessary to support a finding of willful and malicious injury in a dischargeability action. Thus, Plaintiffs’ assertion that a judgment based upon § 6F constitutes, as a matter of law, a nondischargeable debt under § 523(a)(6) is without merit.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt from willful and malicious conversion nondischargeable when prior findings establish that the debtor intended to harm the creditor or its property.

United States v. Cole (In re Cole) · filed 1982-05-24(a)(6)

This Court is of the opinion that such findings are the practical equivalent of a finding that the debtor actually intended to harm the Plaintiff or his property. ... Therefore, it is the conclusion of this Court that the debt owed by debtor, Calvin Cole, to Plaintiff, United States of America, in the sum of $141,788.16, plus interest, is nondischargeable in bankruptcy pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts an entire judgment from discharge when its contract and tort claims arise from willful and malicious injury, including costs and attorneys’ fees.

Dutton v. Schwartz · filed 1982-05-28(a)(6)

Because this court has previously held that the entire state court judgment, including costs and attorneys’ fees, arose from the willful and malicious injury to the debtor, the § 523(a)(6) exception to dis-chargeability will apply.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge only when the injury was willful and malicious; malicious injury requires intent to do harm.

Winkleman v. Fiedler (In Re Fiedler) · filed 1982-06-29(a)(6)

The evidence falls far short of establishing the requisite element of “malicious injury” in order to secure a finding of non-dischargeability under § 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. The debt in question must be considered dischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt from an intentional assault nondischargeable when the debtor intended to strike and harm the victim.

Bonenfant v. Greig (In Re Greig) · filed 1982-07-07(a)(6)

Title 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) provides that a debt for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity is nondischargeable. ... The court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury to Bonenfant was willful and malicious. The debtor admitted that he formed the intent to strike Bonenfant immediately before doing so; thus, the action was willful. ... This evidence amply demonstrates that at the time he threw the punch, the debtor, in fact, intended to harm Bonenfant; thus, his action was malicious.

Section 523(a)(6)’s exception for willful and malicious injury extends to intangible personal property and property rights.

Craycraft v. Adams (In Re Adams) · filed 1982-06-29(a)(6)

This section encompasses injury to intangible personal property or property rights as well as physical damage or destruction.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt arising from an intoxicated driver’s collision from discharge without evidence of deliberate injury.

Whitaker v. Bratcher (In Re Bratcher) · filed 1982-07-25(a)(6)

In the instant case, no evidence has been presented to show that Bratcher deliberately drove his truck into the plaintiffs’ car. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that any debt which Bratcher has incurred to the plaintiffs as a result of the collision does not fall within the dischargeability exception of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) and will be discharged.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge merely because the injury resulted from gross negligence; the injury must be deliberate or intentional.

Castiglia v. Morgan (In Re Morgan) · filed 1982-07-28(a)(6)

An increase in the degree of gross negligence only increases the probability of a resulting injury. It does not make the injury a “willful injury” and a “malicious injury”.

Section 523(a)(6) requires the creditor to establish willful and malicious injury; a default judgment and complaint that do not establish that injury are insufficient.

Kramer v. Joseph (In Re Joseph) · filed 1982-08-04(a)(6)

For a debt to be dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), the party opposing discharge must establish the existence of “willful and malicious injury.” Neither the second, nor third, causes of action in the state court pleaded malicious injury.