11 U.S.C. § 522

Section 522(o) sets a ten-year look-back period for reducing a homestead exemption when a debtor disposes of nonexempt property with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor; it does not create a new evidentiary standard in the Eighth Circuit.

Clark v. Wilmoth (In Re Wilmoth) · filed 2008-12-09(o)

Rather than establishing a new evidentiary standard for pre-bankruptcy homestead exemption planning, the addition of § 522(o) marks out a look-back period of ten years.

Section 522(o) permits reducing a homestead exemption when circumstantial evidence shows that the debtor disposed of nonexempt property with actual intent to defraud creditors.

Cipolla v. Roberts · filed 2013-10-14(o)

... evidence supports the findings that four TUFTA badges of fraud apply, and that there is sufficient circumstantial evidence supporting the bankruptcy court’s ultimate finding that Cipolla acted with intent to defraud under § 522(o).

Section 522 bars a debtor from claiming a homestead exemption for an interest he concealed and failed to disclose.

United General Title Insurance Co. v. Karanasos · filed 2016-12-27(o)(4)

Second, the homestead exemption would not have been available to the Debt- or because he sought to conceal his interest in the Rockville Centre Property. A debtor cannot claim an exemption on something that he concealed.

Section 522(o) does not apply to a motor vehicle that is not used as a residence, burial plot, or homestead.

Labbadia, III v. Martin · filed 2019-08-02(o)

Turning first to Labbadia’s objection regarding Martin’s motor vehicles, I conclude as a matter of law that a motor vehicle is not subject to the provisions of § 522(o) when it is not used as a residence, burial plot, or claimed as a homestead.

Section 522(c) protects proceeds from the post-petition sale of exempt property from pre-petition debts, including nondischargeable debts not listed among its exceptions.

Pasquina v. Cunningham · filed 2008-01-22(c)

Pasquina's claim that the post-petition voluntary sale of the exempt property makes the proceeds of the sale available to satisfy a nondischargeable pre-petition debt is at odds with the immunizing effect of § 522(c).

Section 522(c) protects property properly exempted under § 522 from pre-petition debts, and a post-petition sale converting it into proceeds does not remove that protection.

William J. Pasquina, P.C. v. Cunningham (In Re Cunningham) · filed 2006-11-28(c)

The Court concludes that post-petition conduct — -including the voluntary sale of homesteaded property and the consequent conversion into proceeds that may not be exempt under state law — cannot remove previously exempted property from the protections of § 522(c).

Section 522(b)(3)'s 730-day domicile rule, which can require a debtor to use another state's exemption law, does not violate the Constitution's bankruptcy uniformity requirement.

In Re Urban · filed 2007-01-31(b)(3)

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3), as amended by the Bankruptcy Abuse and Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub.L. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005), does not violate the uniformity requirement found in the United States Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 4.

Section 522(b)(3)(A)’s domicile-based exemption rules do not violate the Constitution’s Uniformity Clause and may require a relocated debtor to use the former state’s exemptions.

In Re Chandler · filed 2007-03-01(b)(3)(A)

This court does not believe that creating a separate class of debtors for purposes of claiming exemptions based on the length of time such debtors have lived in a particular state violates the Uniformity Clause of the United States Constitution because: (1) the law is uniformly applicable to any debtor that relocates from one state to another; (2) the class of debtors ensnared by § 522(b)(3)(A) is well defined; (3) it is not a private bankruptcy bill; and (4) the classification is not arbitrary inasmuch as the classification is a Congressional attempt to prohibit debtors from moving to a new state for the purpose of filing bankruptcy.

Section 522(d)(11)(E) permits a debtor to exempt a bank account consisting solely of a workers’ compensation award when the award compensates for lost future earnings and is reasonably necessary for support; the provision covers property traceable to the award.

In Re Holstine · filed 2011-10-11(d)(11)(E)

property that is traceable to a payment in compensation of loss of his future earnings.

Section 522(d)(11)(E) permits qualifying property traceable to a prepetition lump-sum workers’ compensation settlement to be claimed exempt when reasonably necessary for support.

Carr v. Arellano (In re Arellano) · filed 2015-01-06(d)(11)(E)

Accordingly, I conclude that § 522(d)(11)(E) provides a basis upon which property traceable to a pre-petition lump sum workers’ compensation settlement awarded for the loss of future earnings to the extent that the lump sum is reasonably necessary for the support of a debtor and the dependents of a debtor may be claimed as exempt.

Section 522(d)(10)(C) fully exempts a debtor’s right to receive disability benefits, including workers’ compensation benefits akin to future earnings, and the exemption applies to a postpetition settlement payment derived from that right.

Lynn E. Feldman, Chapter 7 Trustee v. Buffenmeyer · filed 2021-07-07(d)(10)(C)

Section 522(d)(10)(C) allows exemption of “the debtor’s right to receive a disability, illness, or unemployment benefit.” This provision allows a Debtor to exempt benefits that are “akin to future earnings,” including a disability benefit. 4 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶522.09 (16th Ed). The entire amount of these benefits is exempt. Id. At the time of the petition, the Debtor had a claim for worker’s compensation related to future earnings which had not yet been monetized. Section 522(d)(10)(C) is therefore the appropriate exemption. Moreover, that exemption applies equally to the Compensation Payment made postpetition.

Section 522(d)(10)(C) exempts a debtor’s right to receive a disability benefit, and § 522(d)(11)(E) exempts compensation for loss of future earnings to the extent reasonably necessary for support.

In Re Lambert · filed 1981-03-12(d)(10)(C), (d)(11)(E)

Keeping in mind that exemption laws are to be liberally construed in favor of the debtor, I would find that the worker’s benefit granted debtor would be covered by both 11 U.S.C. Sec. 522(d)(10)(C) and 11 U.S.C. Sec. 522(d)(ll)(E). Although the order granting the redemption award was signed prior to the filing of the voluntary petition, it was not final until after the petition was filed and there was no payment until after the filing. That part of the redemption award pertaining to accrued disability would be “a disability * * * benefit” which the debtor had a right to receive as of the date of the filing of the petition. An exemption is in “property of the estate” 11 U.S.C. Sec. 522(b). The estate is created at “the commencement of a case.” 11 U.S.C. Sec. 541(a). A voluntary case is commenced “by the filing of a petition.” 11 U.S.C. Sec. 301. Thus, the accrued part of the award is totally exempt. The balance of the award would be a payment in “compensation of loss of future earnings” and would be exempt “to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor.” Debtor is a divorced woman who receives no alimony or support monies, her ex-husband being in a correctional institution. She has two children dependent upon her, ages nine and six. The redemption agreement and order were based on $115.00 a week. Although there was ample testimony establishing that debtor’s expenses exceeded this amount, the Court would take judicial notice that $115.00 a week would be less than a reasonably necessary amount to support any mother and two children today. Thus, I would find that that part of the award pertaining to the loss of future earnings is exempt under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 522(d)(ll)(E).

Section 522(d)(11)(D) does not exempt workers’ compensation awards or property purchased with their proceeds.

In Re Williams · filed 1995-05-05(d)(11)(D)

The Debtors may not exempt the cash in their bank accounts, their 1991 Ford Explorer, or a portion of their sporting equipment under § 522(d)(ll)(D). This property was purchased with debtor James Williams’ workers’ compensation award. Such awards may only be exempted under § 522(d)(10)(C).

Section 522(d)(11)(E) permits an exemption for a prepetition workers’ compensation settlement for lost future earnings and property traceable to it, limited to the amount reasonably necessary for support.

In Re Sanchez · filed 2007-01-31(d)(11)(E)

Nonetheless, Section 522(d)(ll)(E) still offers her some relief, for that subsection clearly provides that a right to receive payment, or property that is traceable to that right, may be exempted: (a) if the payment is “in compensation of loss of future earnings of the debtor or an individual of whom the debtor is or was a dependant;” but (b) only “to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependant of the debtor.”

Section 522(c) protects only the portion of property authorized as exempt by state law; an unauthorized exemption that was allowed by default does not shield the asset from a nondischargeable prepetition creditor after bankruptcy.

Pearson v. Kancilia · filed 2007-06-26(c), (c)(2)

We hold that an exemption, lacking a statutory basis, but which is claimed and allowed in bankruptey, does not protect the exempted asset from garnishment following the close of the bankruptcy proceeding by creditors whose prepetition claims have been excepted from discharge.

Section 522(b)(3)(B) recognizes an entireties exemption only to the extent applicable nonbankruptcy law protects it, while §§ 522(c) and (k) prevent exempt property from being used for most prepetition claims or administrative expenses.

Moyer v. Rosich (In re Rosich) · filed 2017-07-01(b)(3)(B), (c), (k)

The bankruptcy exemption scheme recognizes this nature of entireties property, and authorizes a debtor to claim such property as exempt, as the Debtor did, but only to the extent the interest would be exempt from process under applicable non-bankruptcy law. ... In other words, because § 522(c) and (k) together establish that the Property is not “liable” for most prepetition claims or costs of administration, the Property cannot benefit the estate.

Section 522(c) does not make exempt property permanently immune from liability when state-law conditions of the exemption later cease to be satisfied.

Hawk v. Engelhart · filed 2017-07-19(c)

Adopting Frost’s argument would require rejecting this court’s determination in Zibman that § 522(c) does not prevent exempt property from losing its exempt status. If § 522(c) requires strict enforcement of the “snapshot rule” such that property exempted at the moment of filing can never be liable—regardless of restrictions placed on that exemption by state law or a change in the essential character of the property—then the proceeds from the sale in Zibman would have been exempted indefinitely, despite the six month limitation on that exception.

Section 522 permits a debtor to claim property as exempt at the start of a bankruptcy case without a hearing, but the exemption does not retroactively give the debtor standing to pursue a claim.

Yelverton v. District of Columbia · filed 2014-10-07

On the other hand, the debtor can list property as exempt from the start of a bankruptcy filing, and there is no hearing requirement before the exemption is effective. See 11 U.S.C. § 522.

Section 522(q)(1) limits exemptions for debtors who elect state or local exemptions and meet specified felony or misconduct conditions; a debtor who elects federal exemptions under § 522(b)(2) is outside that limit.

Madhu Grover · filed 2025-11-18(q)(1), (b)(2)

Accordingly, section 522(q)(1) is inapplicable as the Debtor has not elected to exempt property under state or local law pursuant to section 522(b)(3)(A). 11 U.S.C. § 522(q)(1).

Section 522(b)(3)(B) allows a debtor to exempt property that is exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law.

In re: Nathaniel Spencer Lyne and Hallee Nicole Lyne · filed 2026-02-04(b)(3)(B)

Congress created § 522(b)(3)(B) as the mechanism available to debtors to protect their state-law TBE interests in bankruptcy. Thus, the Lynes must claim the TBE exemption under § 522(b)(3)(B) to protect the Sienna, or its value, from administration for the benefit of their creditors.

Section 522(b)(3)(B) allows a debtor to exempt an interest held as a tenant by the entirety or joint tenant to the extent it is exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law, which is not necessarily the law of the debtor’s domicile.

Holland v. Safanda (In Re Holland) · filed 2007-03-30(b)(3)(B)

Thus, the Court holds that “applicable nonbankrupt-cy law” as it is used in section 522(b)(3)(B) does not mean exemption law of the debt- or’s domicile.

Section 522(b)(3)(B) protects a debtor’s joint-tenancy or tenancy-by-the-entirety interest only to the extent applicable nonbankruptcy law makes that interest exempt from process; joint ownership alone is insufficient.

In Re Antonie · filed 2010-04-30(b)(3)(B)

But is Debtor’s exemption claim under § 522(b)(3)(B) proper? In support of her position, Debtor focuses only on the fact that she held a joint tenant interest in the mobile home. Trustee argues that owning a joint interest in property is insufficient to bestow any exemption under § 522(b)(3)(B) because, while that statute protects property held jointly, it also limits any exemption “to the extent that such interest ... is exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law[.]” 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(B). In other words, Trustee contends that in addition to demonstrating that Debtor owns an interest in the mobile home as a joint tenant, she must also show that her interest is beyond the reach of her creditors under Idaho law. Trustee is correct.

Section 522(b)(3)(B) allows a debtor to exempt an interest in entireties or joint-tenancy property to the extent applicable nonbankruptcy law exempts that interest from process.

In re Adams · filed 2014-03-05(b)(3)(B)

The Adamses correctly point out that 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(B) also applies, and permits the debtor, “[notwithstanding § 541 of this title,” to exempt “any interest in property in which the debtor had, immediately before the commencement of the case, an interest as tenant by the entirety or joint tenant to the extent that such interest as a tenant by the entirety or joint tenant is exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law.” ... The court concludes that under North Carolina state law, absent the existence of an exception not applicable here, rents derived from real property owned as tenants by the entireties are not considered entire-ties property.

Section 522(b)(3)(B) does not exempt a debtor’s interest in tenancy-by-the-entirety property from process when applicable nonbankruptcy law permits a federal restitution lien to reach that interest.

Conrad v. Schlossberg · filed 2016-08-10(b)(3)(B)

In other words, under “applicable nonbankruptcy law,” 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(B), the Debtor’s interest as a tenant by the entirety is not exempt from process, and the Bankruptcy Court properly sustained the Trustee’s objection to the Debtor’s claimed exemption.

Section 522(b)(2)(B) lets a debtor choosing state exemptions exempt an interest in tenancy by the entirety or joint tenancy property to the extent that applicable nonbankruptcy law makes the interest immune from process.

Ray v. Dawson (In Re Dawson) · filed 1981-04-17(b)(2)(B)

Congress for some reason said “exempt from process” rather than “immune from process”. “Exempt” suggests statutory exemptions, but Congress apparently meant common law immunity. That should be obvious since state statutory exemptions are covered in the sub-paragraph (A) of the same subsection.

For judicial lien avoidance under section 522(f)(1), a New York debtor’s tenancy-by-the-entirety interest is valued at the full property value without an actuarial discount.

Levinson v. R & E PROPERTY CORP. · filed 2008-08-27(f)(1)

The present case involves section 522(f) and avoiding a lien because it impairs an exemption; it does not involve a sale of a tenancy by the entirety. As such, as in Snyder, this Court finds that an actuarial analysis is not appropriate to determine the Debtor’s interest in the Property.

Section 522(d) identifies property a debtor may claim as exempt, and § 522(1) makes a claimed exemption effective when no party in interest timely objects.

In Re O'Brien · filed 2007-04-17(d), (1)

The Debtor timely filed the Exemption Claim and no party in interest objected thereto. Accordingly, the Retirement Accounts are exempt property and thus not property of the Debtor’s bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) and 11 U.S.C. § 522(1).

Section 522(1) makes property claimed as exempt exempt when the objection period expires without objection or a timely objection is overruled.

Bucchino v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In Re Bucchino) · filed 2010-09-29(1)

Property of the estate is not exempt unless and until the time to object to the claim of exemption expires or a timely objection is overruled.

An unobjected claim of exemption removes the exempt property from the bankruptcy estate.

Hennessy v. Muirfield Ass'n (In re Hennessy) · filed 2015-09-28

Moreover, this action does not involve property of the bankruptcy estate: Although the Property was initially property of the bankruptcy estate, 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1), Debtors have claimed their interest in the Property exempt and their exemption covers the entire equity in the Property over and above the encumbrances. Inasmuch as there were no objections to their claim of exemption, the Property is effectively no longer property of the bankruptcy estate.

Section 522(b)(3)(A) directs a debtor who has not maintained a 730-day domicile in one state to use the exemption law of the state where the debtor was domiciled for the longer portion of the preceding 180 days, as part of a federal bankruptcy choice-of-law rule.

In Re Williams · filed 2007-05-22(b)(3)(A)

Pursuant to § 522(b)(3)(A), the debtors are required to use Iowa exemptions, if the exemptions are available. ... Section 522(b)(3)(A) encompasses a federal choice of law, the result of which may be contrary to a state court decision interpreting the statute. ... Because the homestead exemption statute is not territorial on its face, and permitting the exemption is consistent with Iowa’s liberal construction of its homestead laws, the Court finds that Iowa’s homestead exemption is available to the debtors in this case as a matter of federal bankruptcy law and overrules the trustee’s objection.

For § 522, the value of property that becomes property of the estate after the filing date is its fair market value as of the date it becomes property of the estate.

In re Walz · filed 2016-03-15(a)(2)

Further, in section 522, “value” with respect to property that becomes property of the estate after the filing date means fair market value as of the date such property becomes property of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 522(a)(2). There would be no. need for § 522 to have a rule for determining value in after-acquired property unless such property could be claimed as exempt.

Section 522(b)(1) permits a debtor to exempt eligible estate property acquired after the bankruptcy petition is filed.

In Re Cutignola · filed 2011-05-18(b)(1)

Section 522(b)(1) does not limit itself to subsection (a)(1) of § 541, which would support the trustee’s argument that the exemptions may only be taken in property owned at the time of filing; rather, § 522(b)(1) allows a debtor to exempt property despite “section 541.”

Section 522(b)(3)(B)’s prepetition ownership language applies to jointly held property and tenancy by the entirety interests, but does not bar exemptions in other property acquired after filing.

In re Walley · filed 2015-02-11(b)(3)(B)

Section 522(b)(3)(B) is not a blanket prohibition that prevents an individual debtor from claiming an exemption in any property other than property the debtor had at the commencement of his case.

Under § 522(f)(2)(A), a prepayment penalty secured by an unavoidable mortgage is included among the other liens on the property when calculating whether a judicial lien impairs a debtor’s exemption.

In Re Barrett · filed 2007-05-29(f)(2)(A)

The lienor’s objection presents a novel issue: whether a prepayment penalty secured by a mortgage on the Debtors’ homestead should be considered when determining the amount of “all other liens on the property” for the purposes of § 522(f)(2)(A)(ii). Because I conclude that the prepayment penalty is a cognizable component of the claim secured by an unavoidable mortgage, the judicial lien impairs the Debtor’s homestead exemption and will be avoided.

Section 522(f)(2)(A) determines impairment by applying its mathematical formula to the judicial lien, all other liens, the exemption amount, and the property value, without regard to state-law lien priority.

In Re Bowshier · filed 2008-05-30(f)(2)(A)

Under the clear language of the statute, once these basic facts are clear, impairment is determined in accordance with the simple mathematical formula outlined in § 522(f)(2)(A).

Section 522(f)(2)(A) requires the court to use the correct property valuation in the impairment calculation; when the higher valuation leaves equity above the liens and exemptions, the judicial lien is not avoidable.

In Re Willett · filed 2008-09-12(f)(1), (f)(2)(A)

However, if the property valuation is set at $95,000, the value exceeds the liens plus the Willetts’ exemptions by $13,953.08. ... Therefore, if the higher valuation is used, NCM’s lien does not impair the Willetts’ exemption, and they may not avoid it under § 522.

Section 522(f)(2)(A) measures impairment by adding the lien, other liens, and the exemption and comparing that sum with the property value; § 522(f)(2)(B) excludes an avoided lien from calculations for other liens.

In Re Brown · filed 2010-09-14(f)(2)(A), (f)(2)(B)

Thus, the amount of the impairment caused by the March Lien is $16,443.43.

Section 522(f)(2)(A) treats a judicial lien as impairing an exemption when the lien, all other liens, and the available exemption exceed the property’s value without liens.

Taitt v. Filomena White Realty, Inc. (In Re Taitt) · filed 2011-07-18(f)(2)(A)

The sum total of (i), (ii), and (iii) is $606,543.10 and exceeds the value of the property of $380,000 by $226,543.10.

Section 522(f) requires the lien-impairment calculation to use the exemption the debtor would have been entitled to claim under § 522(b), not merely the amount actually claimed on Schedule C.

In Re Scannell · filed 2011-07-27(f)(1) and (f)(2)(A)(iii)

the debtor is entitled to use an exemption in the amount corresponding to the amount to which the debtor would have been entitled under § 522(b) for purposes of the calculation.

Section 522(f)(2)(A) permits full avoidance of a judicial lien when the statutory impairment calculation exceeds the property value.

In re Andris · filed 2012-04-10(f)(2)(A)

Based upon these calculations, which I note that Kilwien has not contested, both the attachment and the execution are fully avoidable.

Section 522(f)(2)(A) measures lien impairment against the entire parcel, including improvements, when the parcel contains the debtor’s principal residence.

In re Young · filed 2012-05-15(f)(2)(A)

Accordingly, the Debtors are entitled to claim their $50,000.00 homestead exemption in the Tampico Church Road Property as a whole, inclusive of the Real Property, the Residence, and the Farmhouse.

Section 522(f)(1) permits avoidance of a judicial lien only to the extent it impairs an exemption, and § 522(f)(2)(A) supplies the impairment formula.

In re Kology · filed 2013-09-24(f)(1), (f)(2)(A)

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f), a debtor may avoid the fixing of a judicial lien ... Thus, the Debtors’ motions to avoid those liens must be denied.

Section 522(f)(2)(A) measures exemption impairment by adding the lien, all other liens, and the exemption the debtor could claim without liens, while § 522(f)(2)(B) requires avoided liens to be omitted from later calculations, so each judicial lien requires a separate calculation.

In re Derocha · filed 2014-01-14(f)(2)(A), (f)(2)(B)

Thus, a debtor must perform a separate calculation under § 522(f)(2)(A) for each judicial lien that a debtor seeks to avoid.

Section 522(f)(1) permits a debtor to avoid a judicial lien that impairs an exemption, and § 522(f)(2)(A) defines impairment by comparing the lien, other liens, and exemption amount with the property's unencumbered value.

In re Ramos · filed 2014-05-01(f)(1), (f)(2)(A)

exceeds the value that the debtor’s interest in the property would have in the absence of any liens.

Section 522(f)(2)(A)’s lien-impairment formula should be adjusted in jointly owned property so the debtor’s full homestead exemption is protected while the lien remains attached to nonexempt equity.

In re Steinke · filed 2014-12-23(f)(2)(A)

It will make adjustment to the § 522(f)(2)(A) formula to insure that the full amount of the Debtor’s homestead exemption is protected and that the Kilgore lien continues to attach to non-exempt equity as intended by the statute.

Section 522(f)(1) permits a debtor to avoid a judicial lien that impairs an exemption, with impairment determined under the formula in § 522(f)(2)(A).

In re Obedian · filed 2016-03-01(f)(1), (f)(2)(A)

Therefore, the court determines that based on. this evidence, the DHCS judgment lien impairs Debtor’s homestead exemption under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(A) and may be avoided under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1).

Section 522(f)(2)(A) uses the statutory arithmetic formula to determine whether a judicial lien impairs a debtor’s exemption in property.

Fatima De'Shawn Bordner · filed 2019-08-30(f)(2)(A)

After application of the arithmetical formula required by 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(A), there is no equity to support the judicial lien. Therefore, the fixing of the judicial lien impairs Debtor’s exemption of the real property, and its fixing is avoided subject to 11 U.S.C. § 349(b)(1)(B).

Section 522(f)(1) permits a debtor to avoid a judicial lien that impairs an exemption, while § 522(f)(2)(A)’s formula must be applied so the debtor receives only the state-law exemption and no windfall, including in partial-avoidance cases.

Hines v. Scottsboro Investment Group LLC · filed 2020-01-27(f)(1), (f)(2)(A)

But Lehman is not restricted to situations where the entire lien would be avoided. We explained that the statutory formula should work so that Section 522(f) would “only [entitle] the debtor to the” state law exemption in a scenario such as this. Id. at 1257. To hold otherwise would entitle Hines to just the kind of “windfall” Lehman sought to eliminate, because he would be turning a $5,000 state law exemption into a $43,693.74 exemption. 4 See id. And nowhere does Lehman suggest that two Section 522(f) statutory formulas exist — one for situations where the entire lien is avoided and one for partial avoidance scenarios.

Section 522(c) does not protect proceeds of a properly exempted but terminated homestead from postpetition claims into perpetuity.

In Re Hermosilla · filed 2007-08-06(c)

To the extent the Debtor is suggesting that 11 U.S.C. § 522(c) protects the proceeds of a properly exempted but terminated homestead from postpetition claims into perpetuity, I reject his argument.

Section 522(c) preserves only the specific monetary exemption actually claimed; a capped exemption does not grow into the debtor’s entire interest in the property.

In Re Raffone · filed 2008-01-16(c), (d)(5)

That property is precisely the exemption that was ... claimed ... by the debtor; nothing more, nothing less.

Section 522(c) prevents a creditor from setting off debts against tax refunds after the debtor has claimed the refunds exempt without opposition, because the refunds are no longer property of the estate.

In Re Gould · filed 2008-06-12(c)

The tax refunds in dispute ceased being property of the estate when Debtor exempted them, without opposition by the IRS. ... At that point, the exempt tax refunds were no longer subject to any possible setoff against debts owed by the estate.

Section 522(c) protects properly exempted property from direct collection by unsecured creditors unless a statutory exception applies.

In Re Smith · filed 2008-11-25(c)

Therefore, an unsecured creditor may not proceed directly against exempt property.

Section 522(g) does not bar an exemption merely because a debtor receives and transfers the property after filing when the right to the exemption existed on the petition date.

In re Hill · filed 2018-11-15(g)

Finally, § 522(g) of the Bankruptcy Code does not preclude Debtor from claiming the Insurance Proceeds as exempt simply because she received and transferred these proceeds after the Petition Date. Debtor's right to the exemption existed at the Petition Date.

Section 522 preserves an exemption even when the property remains liable for particular creditors’ claims; the trustee cannot administer the exempt property on that basis.

Nancy Money Turnage · filed 2022-08-26

Since the property in question is still exempt (except as to certain claims/creditors), the Trustee cannot administer it.

Section 522(b)(3)(A) constitutionally requires debtors who have not been domiciled in the forum state for at least two years before bankruptcy to use the applicable prior-state exemption law, even when that produces different results from forum-state law.

Drummond v. Urban (In Re Urban) · filed 2007-08-29(b)(3)(A)

Section 522(b)(3)(A) is such a classification statute. ... It creates special exemption rules for a specific class of debtors who have relocated from one state to another within a defined period of time. ... The law is uniform because it applies to all debtors who have not been domiciled in the forum state for at least two years preceding bankruptcy, regardless of where a bankruptcy petition is filed.

Section 522(b)(1) permits a debtor to select exempt property only from property of the bankruptcy estate.

In Re Brown · filed 2007-09-05(b)(1)

Moreover, the debtor in this hypothetical would not be able to unilaterally correct his error in the subsequent Chapter 7 proceeding by then claiming one or the other vehicle as exempt because Section 522(b)(1) is also quite clear: exempt property may be selected from only property of the bankruptcy estate.

Section 522(d)(1) permits a debtor to exempt the full equity in indivisible marital property, up to the statutory dollar limit for one debtor, even when half is owned by a non-filing spouse.

In Re Griffith · filed 2011-04-15(d)(1)

the debtor’s interest in the entire property justifies her ability to claim an exemption in the entire equity, up to the dollar limit of the exemption.

Section 522(b) treats property as exempt only when applicable law lets the debtor permanently shield it from creditors; a temporary state-law limit on wage collection does not create a bankruptcy exemption.

In Re Radzilowsky · filed 2011-05-06(b)

The Act does not “forever sequester” the debtor’s wages, or even his unpaid wages.

Section 522(b)(1) permits only an individual debtor, not a corporation, to claim bankruptcy exemptions.

In re BWP Transport, Inc. · filed 2011-12-23(b)(1)

Only an “individual” debtor may claim exemptions under § 522.

Section 522(b) permits a debtor to exempt certain property from the bankruptcy estate; an interest not held by the estate cannot be exempted.

Studensky v. Morgan (In Re Morgan) · filed 2012-07-17(b)

Thus, when Ronald subsequently amended his exemption schedule in February 2011, it was against those proceeds that Ronald had to make his exemption claim. See Owen, 500 U.S. at 308 (“Section 522(b) provides that the debtor may exempt certain property ‘from property of the estate’; obviously, then, an interest that is not possessed by the estate cannot be exempted.”)

Section 522(b)(3) permits a debtor to claim applicable state-law exemptions only for property the debtor owns or has an interest in, and § 522(l) permits a dependent to file a list of exemptions only when the debtor has filed no Schedule C.

Jeffrey Kane Reich · filed 2025-11-25(b)(3), (l)

A debtor may not claim an § 522 exemption on assets which he does not own and which are not property of the estate. ... In any event, while precedent interpreting § 522(l)’s language regarding the right of a dependent to file a Schedule C on behalf of a debtor is quite sparse, the court is persuaded that a dependent can only do so when the debtor has filed no Schedule C at all rather than simply one with which the dependent disagrees.

Section 522(b) permits a debtor to exempt only the debtor’s own interest in property of the estate, so a state exemption cannot allow the debtor to exempt a codebtor’s or dependent’s interest.

In Re Vinson · filed 2006-01-27(b)

Under § 522(b), a debtor may exempt only certain specified property from “property of the estate.” ... From these basic Bankruptcy Code provisions, it follows that a bankruptcy debtor may not exempt from property of the estate a property interest of any person other than the bankruptcy debtor.

Section 522 does not permit a debtor to claim an exemption in property that has left the bankruptcy estate after the automatic stay terminates under § 362(h).

Anderson · filed 2025-12-11

Thus, Appellant could no longer claim its exemption or seek its abandonment under §§ 522 or 554 at the time of the August 25, 2025 hearing.

Section 522(p)'s homestead-exemption limitation is not subject to equitable tolling.

Alwin Gerald Morgan · filed 2019-10-09(p)

Additionally, however, equitably tolling does not apply to 11 U.S.C. § 522(p).

Section 522(p)(1) limits only vested economic interests in homestead property acquired during the 1,215-day period, so it does not cap the debtor’s full Texas homestead exemption merely because the homestead was established during that period.

Wallace v. Rogers · filed 2008-01-04(p)(1)

We do not believe that Congress was concerned with the timing of the establishment of the homestead when it enacted § 522(p)(1). The statutory text and legislative history indicate that the term “interest” refers to vested economic interests in the property that were acquired by the debtor within the 1,215-day period preceding the filing of the petition. ... We hold that Rogers is entitled to her full homestead exemption under Texas state law.

Section 522(p)(1)'s monetary cap is based on when the debtor acquired ownership of the real property, not when the debtor recorded a homestead claim or began residing there; property acquired more than 1215 days before the petition is not subject to the cap.

Greene v. Savage · filed 2009-10-02(p)(1)

We hold that “any amount of interest that was acquired,” as used in Section 522(p)(l), means the acquisition of ownership of real property and that the monetary cap in Section 522(p) does not apply to property to which a debtor acquired title more than 1215 days before she or he filed a bankruptcy petition. That language does not include a homestead claim for the underlying property interest, which claim was recorded within the 1215-day period. ... We further hold that, as the facts here are undisputed with regard to when Greene purchased his Property, Greene’s homestead is not subject to the $125,000 cap contained in Section 522(p), because he purchased the underlying property interest more than 1215 days before the bankruptcy filing.

Section 522(p) limits the amount of a debtor’s homestead exemption but does not convert an otherwise unenforceable state-law lien into an enforceable lien.

Smith v. H.D. Smith Wholesale Drug Co. · filed 2011-10-04(p)

Section 522(p) is a federal provision that operates to limit the debtor’s exemptible interest in the property; it does not speak to H.D. Smith’s interest.

Section 522(p) does not cap a homestead when the debtor receives legal title to an equitable interest already held before the 1,215-day period, because no additional equity was acquired.

In re Peake · filed 2012-10-15(p)

The trustee failed to demonstrate that Peake acquired any “amount of interest” in the homestead by virtue of the Trust’s deed during the 1,215-day period preceding his bankruptcy filing, or, if an “amount of interest” in the homestead was in fact acquired, that it exceeded the statutory cap of § 522(p).

Section 522(o) limits exemptions claimed under § 522(b)(3)(A), but does not limit property exempted under § 522(b)(3)(B), including tenancy-by-the-entireties property.

Hinton v. Hinton (In Re Hinton) · filed 2007-10-01(o)

Section 522(o), however, only applies to subsection (A) of Section 522(b)(3), and not to subsection (B).

Section 522(b)(3)(B) makes a tenancy-by-the-entireties exemption depend on whether the applicable state law exempts the interest from process; New York law does not exempt that interest from execution by an individual judgment creditor.

In re Prosser · filed 2008-07-01(b)(3)(B)

Because New York law applies to the Lake Placid Property and because New York law provides that real property held in tenancy by the entirety is not exempt from process, the objecting parties met their burden of demonstrating that Prosser was not entitled to an exemption for the Lake Placid Property.

Section 522(o) does not affect a debtor's ability to claim an exemption for property held as a tenancy by the entireties.

In Re Davis · filed 2009-04-22(o)

First, it is clear that even if § 522(o) applies to the Debtor in this case, § 522(o) does not affect the ability of the Debtor to exempt the Brightwaters Home as a tenancy by the entireties property.

Section 522(b)(3)(B) exempts a debtor’s interest in property held as a tenancy by the entirety or joint tenancy only to the extent that applicable nonbankruptcy law exempts that interest from process.

In RE McKAIN · filed 2011-07-22(b)(3)(B)

Consequently, a debtor’s interest as a joint tenant is not exempt from his bankruptcy estate.

Section 522(b)(3)(B) exempts from the bankruptcy estate a debtor’s interest held as a tenant by the entirety when it is exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law.

Stevenson v. Uttermohlen (In re Uttermohlen) · filed 2012-12-17(b)(3)(B)

Exempt from the bankruptcy estate is “any interest in which the debtor had, immediately before the commencement of the case, an interest as tenant by the entirety” if that property would be “exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(B). ... The Court finds that the Utter-mohlens had an interest in the prospective refund at the time of filing and the law presumes that they intended to possess that interest as TBE.

Section 522(b)(3)(B) exempts a debtor’s interest in tenancy-by-the-entirety or joint-tenancy property to the extent that applicable nonbankruptcy law exempts it from process.

Don Scioli v. · filed 2014-05-22(b)(3)(B)

Currently before the court is one issue for our consideration: whether sufficient evidence was presented to rebut the presumed validity of the Exemptions claimed by Appellant pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(B). ... Once Appellee provided the three Titles showing that the vehicles were in Appellant’s name only,10 the burden shifted to Appellant to provide “unequivocal evidence” that the vehicles were in fact held by he and his wife as tenants by the entireties. Appellant failed to do so.

Sections 522(b)(3)(A) and (b)(3)(B) measure exemption eligibility by the debtor’s ownership and applicable exemptions at or immediately before the bankruptcy filing, so prepetition planning to increase an exemption is permissible absent fraud.

In Re Martiny · filed 2007-10-31(b)(3)(A), (b)(3)(B)

Rather, for instances where the state has preempted the federal list of exemptions, 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A) looks to state exemptions applicable “on the date of the filing of the petition.” Similarly, 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(B) recognizes exemptions for interests that the debtor has in property “■immediately before the commencement of the case.” Thus, the statutes focus on the status of ownership as of the moment of bankruptcy filing, and not as of the date of any pre-petition event. Absent evidence of fraud, the court will allow any recognized exemption for assets that debtors own at the commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding, even when the debtors may have enhanced the value of that exemption by reason of careful planning with the advice of counsel.

Section 522(b)(3)(A) applies the state exemption law in effect on the petition date, so a debtor filing after a state amendment's effective date may invoke the increased homestead exemption against pre-existing debts.

CFCU Community Credit Union v. Hayward · filed 2009-01-09(b)(3)(A)

Accordingly, New York debtors who file a bankruptcy petition after the Amendment’s effective date are entitled to invoke the greater homestead exemption amount of $50,000.

Section 522(b)(3) makes the homestead exemption in effect on the bankruptcy filing date relevant to a later sale and distribution, rather than an exemption increased during the case.

Desiderio v. Parikh (In re Parikh) · filed 2014-04-17(b)(3)

Desiderio’s request for damages due to the change in the New York homestead exemption during the pendency of this case is denied.

Section 522(d)(5) permits a debtor to exempt an interest in property only up to the statute’s maximum specified value; it does not create an in-kind exemption for the entire property based on its scheduled value.

In Re Cormier · filed 2008-02-14(d)(5)

This court believes that § 522(d)(5) is direct and unambiguous. An individual debtor may exempt his or her interest in any property not to exceed a value of a maximum specific amount. Interpreting the statute as an “in-kind” exemption does not give enough weight to the language “not to exceed in value.”

Section 522(d)(5) limits the debtor’s interest in a lawsuit by value, so the court must value an uncertain claim rather than cap the eventual recovery at the exemption amount.

In Re Solly · filed 2008-08-07(d)(5)

The key term in § 522(d)(5) is “value,” which implies an amount capable of fluctuation, rather than a fixed dollar amount.

Section 522(g) lets a debtor exempt property recovered by a trustee only under listed Code provisions and subject to the statute’s conditions, while § 522(p)’s $125,000 homestead cap applies only to cases commenced on or after its effective date.

Stornawaye Financial Corp. v. Hill (Hill) · filed 2008-05-07(g), (p)

The term “creditor” is not used interchangeably with the term “trustee” in the Bankruptcy Code. ... In view of the above, the Panel finds that the bankruptcy court erred in sustaining the objection to the claimed exemption pursuant to § 522(g) in favor of Storna-waye because the transfer was caused pre-petition by a creditor acting for its own benefit, and not by the trustee’s action under §§ 510(c)(2), 542, 543, 550, 551, or 553 of the Bankruptcy Code. ... The bankruptcy petition in this case was filed on April 4, 2005, approximately two weeks before § 522(p) became effective; thus, the $125,000 cap contemplated in § 522(p) is not applicable in this case.

Section 522(d)(10)(E) does not exempt a nonqualified account; § 522(d)(12), as limited by the 60-day rollover rule in § 522(b)(4)(D), does not exempt retirement funds rolled into a nonqualified account after the period expires, while § 522(c) leaves otherwise exempt retirement accounts liable for domestic support obligations. A debtor electing the federal exemptions under § 522(b)(1) may not also claim the alternative state-law exemptions.

In Re Crum · filed 2009-02-20(b)(1), (d)(10)(E), (d)(12), (b)(4)(D), and (c)

By electing the section 522(d) federal exemptions, Crum may not also claim the accounts as exempt under state law pursuant to section 522(b)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code. ... Section 522(d)(10)(E) states that a debtor may-exempt a right to receive a “payment under a qualified stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing, annuity, or similar plan or contract....” 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E). This provision is not applicable to the Group SAMA account because such account is not, as stipulated, a qualified stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, annuity, or similar plan or contract. ... Section 522(d)(12) provides an exemption for “retirement funds” that are in a fund or account that is exempt from taxation under the applicable provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(12). ... paragraph (4)(D) provides that funds distributed from a qualified account and subsequently “rolled over” into another qualified account must have been deposited into the second account not later than sixty days after the distribution from the former account. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(4)(D). ... Crum clearly failed to satisfy the requirements of the exemption. ... The sixty-day reinvestment requirement must be observed. ... The Fidelity IRA and Wachovia IRA accounts are generally exempt from the claims of Crum’s pre-petition creditors, but are not exempt from the claims of Randi Crum.

Section 522(f)(2)(A) measures exemption impairment by adding the lien, all other liens on the property, and the debtor’s exemption; “all other liens” includes junior consensual liens.

In Re Gilmer · filed 2009-04-03(f)(2)(A)

The question, then, is whether junior consensual liens are correctly included as “all other liens” pursuant to section 522(f)(2)(A)(ii). Nothing in the language of section 522(f) excludes junior consensual liens from “all other liens.” ... Therefore, the Court concludes that junior consensual liens are correctly included in “all other liens,” and that the deeds of trust in favor of First Franklin should be included in the calculation used to determine whether the Debtor’s exemption is impaired by the Claimant’s judicial lien.

Section 522(d)(11) provides mutually exclusive exemption options, so a debtor must choose one option rather than claim both.

Frank v. Herb · filed 2009-06-18(d)(11)

Because § 522(d)(ll) provides for mutually exclusive options, the Debtors are left with no choice but to choose between them.

Section 522(c) does not make exempt property immune from a creditor’s otherwise valid prepetition right of setoff under § 553.

Miller v. United States (In Re Miller) · filed 2009-07-08(c)

In this Court’s view, the “majority” approach seems to suggest that § 522(c) places a limitation upon a creditor’s setoff rights. ... This Court can find no basis for interpreting § 553 in any other manner than is clear from the face of the statute: namely, that a creditor’s right to offset a mutual debt is not affected by other provisions of the bankruptcy code, except in certain rare instances which do not apply to this case. Accordingly, the defendant is entitled to exercise whatever setoff rights it possessed prior to the bankruptcy notwithstanding the fact that the debtor claimed the property otherwise subject to setoff as exempt.

Section 522(l) makes properly listed property exempt absent a timely objection, while § 522(b)(3) limits a debtor to exemptions available in the state of domicile during the preceding 730 days.

In Re Quillen · filed 2009-07-09(l), (b)(3)

Section 522(() provides in pertinent part that, “Unless a party in interest objects, the property claimed as exempt on such list [the debtor’s list of exemptions] is exempt.” ... As used in the Statute, the word ‘objects’ must mean a timely objection filed in accordance with Rule 4003(b)(1). ... Pursuant to Section 522(b)(3), (another BAPCPA addition to the Code) a debtor may only claim exemptions available in the state in which the Debtor has been domiciled for the 730 days immediately prior to the date of the filing of the petition. ... Accordingly, the Debtor is limited to the exemptions available in Maryland.

Section 522(p) treats the relevant “amount of interest” as quantifiable equity, including equity acquired by paying down a mortgage, and § 522(p)(2)(B) excludes equity transferred from a prior same-state principal residence from the § 522(p)(1) cap without requiring that the transfer fund acquisition of the debtor’s current title.

In re Meguerditchian · filed 2017-03-28(p)(1) and (p)(2)(B)

For these reasons, I conclude that interest in § 522(p) means equity, including such as is acquired by payment of a mortgage encumbering the homestead. ... Notably, this subsection requires only a transfer “into the debtor’s current principal residence”; it does not require that the transfer have funded the acquisition of the current form of title of the current principle residence. ... I hold that, on these facts, the later conveyance would not disqualify the Debtor from relief under subsection (p)(2)(B), and therefore that the Debtor has pled a plausible basis for relief under that subsection.

Section 522(h) permits an individual debtor in a Chapter 7 or 13 case to exercise trustee avoidance powers to preserve exemptions only against liens the debtor did not voluntarily grant.

Litton Loan Servicing, L.L.P. v. Eads (In Re Eads) · filed 2009-09-18(h)

In a Chapter 7 or 13 case, in contrast, a debtor may only assert the trustee’s avoiding powers, including § 544(a)(1), in order to preserve exemptions, and the debtor’s avoiding capacity is limited to liens that were not voluntarily granted by the debtor.

Section 522(d)(12) exempts only retirement funds held in accounts exempt from taxation under the enumerated Internal Revenue Code provisions, and an inherited IRA is not exempt because its funds are not retirement funds.

In Re Chilton · filed 2010-03-05(d)(12)

The Court concludes that, viewing the words “retirement funds” in their entire context, they cannot reasonably be understood to authorize an exemption of an inherited IRA. The funds contained in an inherited IRA are not funds intended for retirement purposes but, instead, are distributed to the beneficiary of the account without regard to age or retirement status.

Section 522 allows a debtor to claim specified property interests as exempt, but a claim valued below the applicable limit is not thereby removed from the estate when the trustee later learns it may be worth more than the allowed exemption.

Hobson v. Holloway · filed 2010-03-17(b)(2), (d)(11)(D), (d)(11)(E), (l)

We agree with Holloway. When Hob-son valued her claim at less than the amount allowed to be exempted under the statute, the trustee had no reason to object to the exemption. This is in contrast with the trustee in Taylor, who had a legitimate reason to challenge the exemption but did not do so. The trustee here did not have a legitimate reason to object to the exemption until he learned that Hobson’s claim might have been worth more than the bankruptcy code allowed to be exempted. And he petitioned for the estate to be reopened to specifically address the claim. Because the trustee could still pursue a claim for the proceeds, Hobson’s claim was not removed from the bankruptcy estate at the time she filed her complaint.

Section 522(h) allows a debtor to use the trustee’s avoidance powers, subject to § 522(g)(1), only to recover property or value to the extent of valid exemptions.

Nealy v. Ivy Holdings, LLC · filed 2021-01-07(h)

This Court does not interpret the line of cases requiring a benefit to creditors to mean that a debtor can never bring an avoidance action where a trustee has opted not to do so for the benefit of creditors. Indeed, the ability of a debtor to avoid a transfer reflects the entire purpose of the rights provided to a debtor under 11 U.S.C. § 522(h). A debtor must, however, tailor the relief sought in an action brought under 11 U.S.C. § 522(h) to comport with the limitations prescribed by statute—meaning that a Debtor can only recover to the extent of any valid exemptions. That is not the relief requested in the summary judgment motion presently before the Court, so it must be denied.

Section 522(b)(1) distinguishes elections between federal and state exemption schemes from exemptions required by state law or arising by operation of statute.

In Re Connor · filed 2009-11-19(b)(1)

Section 522(b)(1) does not speak to joint debtors’ ability to claim federal and state exemptions where the result arises not from an election, but by operation of statute.

Section 522(b)(1) requires joint debtors to claim exemptions under the same provision; if one spouse is limited to § 522(b)(3), the deemed-election rule does not permit the other spouse to choose § 522(b)(2).

In Re Hassen · filed 2010-07-13(b)(1)

The statute is clear that both spouses must claim exemptions under the same provision, either § 522(b)(2) or § 522(b)(3), when the alternative of electing under either provision is available to both spouses. The deemed-to-elect provision does not alter that requirement. The statute is equally clear that if one spouse is limited to § 522(b)(3) exemptions, the other spouse may not elect § 522(b)(2) exemptions, and thus the deemed-to-elect provision of the last sentence does not come into play.

Section 522(d)(1) permits exemption of a debtor’s interest in real property, while §§ 522(f) and 522(m) require separate, debtor-specific calculations to determine whether a judicial lien impairs that exemption in a joint case.

Gilchrist v. United Bank & Trust Co. (In re Gilchrist) · filed 2011-01-24(d)(1), (f), (m)

Therefore, the calculations as between the co-debtors should be applied separately based on their interest in the property.

Section 522(f)(1) measures the exempt nature of property for judicial-lien avoidance as of the bankruptcy petition date, not the date of the lien-avoidance motion.

In Re Mayhugh · filed 2010-04-09(f)(1)

The language in § 522(f)(1) indicates that the exempt nature of the property is determined as of the petition date, not when the motion to avoid lien is filed.

Section 522(b)(3)(A) makes federal law control the date on which a state-law exemption becomes effective, while state law supplies the exemption itself.

Nisselson v. Fasarakis (In Re Fasarakis) · filed 2010-02-03(b)(3)(A)

While New York state law provides the allowable exemptions, federal law governs the date of effectiveness.

Section 522(b)(1) permits a debtor to claim either the federal exemptions in § 522(d) or applicable state-law exemptions under § 522(b)(3), and § 522(b)(3) includes all property exempt under applicable state law after an opt-out.

In Re Fullwood · filed 2010-03-17(b)(1), (b)(3), (d)

That language is broad enough to cover “any property” once the state shows its intent to opt out.

Sections 522(b)(2) and (b)(3) permit states to opt out of federal exemptions or recognize generally applicable state exemptions, but do not authorize bankruptcy-only state exemption laws.

Richardson v. Schafer (In Re Schafer) · filed 2011-02-24(b)(2) and (b)(3)

Section 522(b)(3) does not delegate to the states the power to legislate exemptions which apply only to debtors in bankruptcy.

Section 522(b) permits a state to opt out of the federal exemption scheme, in which case debtors in that state must claim exemptions under state law.

Jody May Walters v. Bank of the West · filed 2011-06-02(b)

of the federal exemption scheme, debtors in Iowa must claim exemptions under Iowa state law.

Section 522(b)(2) permits a debtor to exempt property from the bankruptcy estate to the extent the applicable state law permits the exemption.

In Re Stanley · filed 2011-06-20(b)(2)

Section 522(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor to exempt certain ... property from the bankruptcy estate to the extent permitted by state law.

Section 522(b)(2) allows a state to opt out of the federal exemptions, so a debtor domiciled in an opting-out state must claim exemptions under the exemptions available under that state’s law.

In Re Wood · filed 2011-09-27(b)(2)

the exemptions available to a debtor domiciled in Ohio are based on Ohio law.

Section 522(b)(2)(A) directs the bankruptcy court to apply the exemption law applicable at the debtor’s domicile during the specified 180-day period.

In re Fratzke · filed 2015-08-10(b)(2)(A)

The provision of § 522(b)(2)(A) in effect in this case applies state or local exemption law “that is applicable on the date of the filing of the petition at the place in which the debtor’s domicile has been located for the 180 days immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition.”

Section 522(b)(2) permits a state to opt out of the federal exemptions in § 522(d), leaving a debtor domiciled there to use applicable non-§ 522(d) federal exemptions and state and local exemptions.

Scott Ryan Longnecker and Heather Renee Longnecker · filed 2019-06-26(b)(2)

Under § 522(b), a state may opt out of using the federal exemptions listed in § 522(d). “A debtor whose domicile is in a state that has opted out of the federal Bankruptcy Code exemptions is limited to the exemptions applicable under federal law other than § 522(d)} and the laws of such state and locality. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2) and (3).”

Section 522(d)(2) exempts only one motor vehicle, while § 522(d)(5) provides a wildcard exemption whose availability does not depend on property being held for business purposes.

Watson v. Andrews (In Re Andrews) · filed 2010-05-06(d)(2), (d)(5)

In their original Petition, the Debtors cited 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(2) as the basis for the exemption of the RV and a 2000 Pontiac Grand Prix. As this section clearly states that it is applicable to only one motor vehicle, this exemption is without any basis. Debtors’ Second Amended Petition lists the RV as exempt under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5) (the “wildcard” exemption), which could be an applicable exemption. However, Debtors persist in stating that the RV was held for business purposes. Why they do so is difficult to understand because whether it was held for business purposes is irrelevant to the availability of the § 522(d)(5) exemption, and not supported by the facts.

Section 522 permits a debtor to claim an exemption in a vehicle that became estate property when the petition was filed, even if the debtor did not possess it then.

Rockstone Capital, LLC v. Bub (In re Bub) · filed 2013-11-13

Once property becomes part of the bankruptcy estate, the debtor may claim that certain interests in property are exempt from the debtor’s estate. ... Because the Debt- or was entitled to claim an exemption to the 1996 Viper pursuant to Bankruptcy Code § 522, his conduct was neither false nor fraudulent.

Section 522(f)(2)(C) does not exclude a judicial lien based on a mortgage deficiency judgment from avoidance merely because the deficiency judgment is connected to a mortgage foreclosure.

In Re Burns · filed 2010-06-16(f)(2)(C)

The court agrees that this distinction removes a deficiency judgment lien from the purview of § 522(f)(2)(C) as it is a complimentary remedy that arises out of the underlying obligation, not out of a mortgage foreclosure.

Section 522(f)(2)(C) protects a judgment foreclosing a mortgage on the debtor’s exempt homestead from avoidance, but it does not protect a deficiency judgment arising from foreclosure of other property.

In Re McMorris · filed 2010-09-16(f)(2)(C)

In summary, Bankruptcy Code section 522(f) prohibits debtors from avoiding judgments foreclosing on mortgages on their exempt homesteads, but not all judgments related to mortgage debt that may encumber the homestead. The statute specifically does not prevent avoidance of deficiency judgments arising out of foreclosures on property other than the exempt homestead.

Section 522(d)(12) exempts retirement funds held in an account exempt from taxation under designated Internal Revenue Code provisions, and it does not require that the funds be the debtor’s own retirement funds.

In Re Johnson · filed 2011-05-04(d)(12)

By its plain terms, all that the Bankruptcy Code requires is that the funds at issue be retirement funds.

Section 522(b)(3)(A) requires a debtor using the state-exemption option to claim property exempt under the state law identified by the domiciliary look-back test as that law applies on the petition date; it does not authorize an artificial extraterritorial application of that state’s exemptions.

In Re Fernandez · filed 2011-01-26(b)(3)(A)

The actual language of the current statute, however, signals no such approach, nor does it express any intent to artificially apply one state’s laws to property in another state.

Section 522(b)(3)(A) preempts conflicting state residency and domiciliary restrictions when selecting state exemptions, while § 522(b)(3)(B) applies the law of the property’s situs to tenancy-by-the-entirety exemptions.

In Re Garrett · filed 2010-08-18(b)(3)(A), (b)(3)(B)

The Court concludes that § 522(b)(3)(A) preempts state domiciliary and residency exemption restrictions. Accordingly, the Debtors in this case are entitled to claim North Carolina’s exemptions. ... Instead, the Court holds that the applicable nonbankruptcy law is determined by “the situs of the asset that is held by the debtor in bankruptcy as a tenant by the entireties....” ... The Debtors’ real property at issue is located in Texas, not North Carolina. Therefore, the Court finds that Texas law governs the Debtors’ exemption eligibility under § 522(b)(3)(B).

Section 522(b)(3)(A) requires exemptions to be determined under the state or local law applicable on the petition date.

In Re Howlett · filed 2010-10-26(b)(3)(A)

Exemptions are determined as of the date of filing.

Section 522(b)(3)(A) makes the exemption law applicable to a debtor depend on the place of the debtor’s domicile, so a debtor domiciled outside a tribe’s reservation cannot use the tribe’s exemption law as local law with extraterritorial effect.

In Re Howley · filed 2010-10-26(b)(3)(A)

Further, the Bankruptcy Code clearly provides that the applicable exemption law is determined by the domicile of the debtor ... the exemption would not apply to the estate’s interest in Debtor’s Per Capita Payments.

Section 522(b)(3)(A) permits a debtor to claim an applicable state-law exemption based on domicile, including an Iowa homestead exemption for property outside Iowa when the state statute has no territorial limit.

In Re Roberts · filed 2010-12-29(b)(3)(A)

The plain language of the statute provides no territorial limit.

Section 522(b)(3)(A) permits a debtor to claim applicable state-law exemptions based on the debtor’s domicile, and the court held that this federal scheme allowed Iowa’s homestead exemption to apply to the debtor’s California property.

Hanrahan v. Roberts (In Re Roberts) · filed 2011-05-05(b)(3)(A)

As a matter of federal bankruptcy law, Debtor is entitled to the Iowa exemptions and the court concludes that Iowa’s homestead exemption can be applied to Debtor’s California property.

Section 522(b)(3)(A) does not make a tribal exemption available as local law when the debtor’s domicile was elsewhere during the statutory look-back period.

In re McDonald · filed 2014-10-27(b)(3)(A)

As a result, § 522(b)(3)(A)’s exemption based on “local law” is not applicable.

Section 522(b)(3)(A) determines which state's exemptions apply by the debtor's domicile during the specified 730-day period or fallback 180-day period, while exemption eligibility is fixed by the facts and law existing on the petition date.

Brown v. Sommers · filed 2015-11-24(b)(3)(A)

To determine which State’s exemptions are potentially available to a debtor under § 522, we first determine whether the debtor was domiciled in a single State for the two years preceding his bankruptcy filing. If he was, then that State’s exemption laws govern. If he was not, we instead inquire where the debtor was domiciled during the period starting on the date 910 days prior to filing and ending on the date 730 days prior to filing. We then apply the exemptions of the State in which the debtor was domiciled for the longest portion of that 180-day period. ... A debtor’s eligibility for a state law exemption under § 522 is determined by the facts and law in existence on the date that the debtor filed his bankruptcy petition. ... Thus, under the Snapshot Rule, Lenox cannot claim that exemption on Debtor’s behalf under Bankruptcy Code § 522.

Section 522(b)(2) applies the state or local exemption law applicable to the debtor under paragraph (3)(A), and a state’s opt-out makes that state-law scheme govern instead of the federal exemptions.

In re Sann · filed 2016-04-06(b)(2)

The provision of § 522(b)(2) in effect in this case applies state or local exemption law that is applicable to the debtor under paragraph (3)(A). ... Pursuant to § 522(b)(2), Montana has opted out of the federal exemption scheme by means of MCA § 31-2-106. ... This Court thus looks to Montana state law rather than federal law, or Nevada law, to determine the allowance of the Debtor’s claimed exemptions in a homestead, bank accounts, stock and Sann, LLC.

Section 522(b)(3)(A) uses a debtor’s domicile, rather than residence, to determine which state’s exemption laws apply.

Tiffany Panitzke · filed 2025-09-29(b)(3)(A)

Under 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A),1 a debtor’s domicile, not residence, is what determines which exemptions may be claimed.

Section 522(b)(3)(A)'s domicile requirement does not trigger the hanging paragraph's federal-exemption fallback when the debtor remains eligible for any state exemption.

In Re Capps · filed 2010-10-18(b)(3)(A)

First, BAPCPA altered the § 522(b) choice-of-law provision, affecting which state’s laws a debtor may invoke in claiming her exemptions. ... As a result, because § 522(b)(3)(A)’s domicile requirements did not render Debtor ineligible for all state exemptions, § 522(b)’s hanging paragraph has no significance in this case.

Section 522(d) allows a debtor who is subject to a former state’s exemption law but is no longer that state’s resident to claim the federal exemptions when the state’s opt-out provision applies only to residents.

In Re George · filed 2010-12-17(d)

Application of the entire Illinois exemption scheme confirms that the Debtor is eligible to claim the federal exemptions.

Section 522(b)'s domiciliary provision selects the applicable state exemption law, while its safety net permits bankruptcy exemptions when the domiciliary rule and state-law restrictions together eliminate an otherwise available non-bankruptcy exemption.

In re Withington · filed 2018-09-18(b)

This Court adopts the State-specific Interpretation as well as the flexible reading of "any exemption." These two interpretations best give effect to all the provisions of § 522(b) and the purpose behind the amendments. ... It is only applicable when state law and the Domiciliary Provision combined have caused him to lose an otherwise available non-bankruptcy exemption.

Section 522(b)(3)'s savings clause permits a debtor rendered ineligible for any exemption by the domiciliary requirement to elect property exemptions under § 522(d), including the § 522(d)(5) exemption.

Zebley v. Karavias (In Re Karavias) · filed 2010-10-19(b)(3), (b)(3)(A), (d)(5)

Furthermore, the Court holds that the § 522(b)(3) Savings Clause applies to such a debtor so that such debtor is free to then take the federal exemptions specified under § 522(d).

Section 522(d)(7) exempts the life insurance policy itself, while § 522(d)(8) exempts accrued dividends or interests under the policy, including cash surrender value.

In Re Steiner · filed 2010-11-10(d)(7) and (d)(8)

In other words, all that is exempted by § 522(d)(7), and its state-law counterpart Idaho Code § 11-605(9), is the life insurance policy itself, and not a debtor’s rights under the policy. H.R.Rep. No. 95-595, at 361. If a debtor wishes to protect dividends or interests that have accrued under a policy, such as a policy’s cash surrender value, he or she must claim exemption in that interest under § 522(d)(8) or Idaho Code § 11-605(10).

Section 522(d)(7) permits a debtor to exempt the life-insurance policy itself, but the exemption does not encompass cash surrender value that the debtor has not claimed under that provision.

O'Neil, Jr. v. Roncari · filed 2020-06-24(d)(7)

The Debtor’s exemption in the Policy itself under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(7) is proper, as the Debtor has made no claim of exemption in the cash surrender value of the Policy pursuant to section 522(d)(7).

Section 522(d)(7) permits a debtor to exempt the debtor’s interest in an unmatured life insurance contract, and the exemption of the policy itself is proper when the debtor does not claim the policy’s cash surrender value under that subsection.

David Roncari · filed 2020-06-24(d)(7)

The Debtor’s exemption in the Policy itself under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(7) is proper, as the Debtor has made no claim of exemption in the cash surrender value of the Policy pursuant to section 522(d)(7).

Section 522(c) protects bankruptcy exemptions from creditor-specific claims except for the exceptions specified in the statute.

Crowell v. Porayko (In Re Porayko) · filed 2010-12-07(c)

The Bankruptcy Code already provides for creditor-specific exceptions to state exemptions in 11 U.S.C. § 522(c). Since Crowell’s debt does not fall within any of those provisions, this contention is rejected.

Section 522(b)(3)(A) applies the exemption law in effect on the petition date, and the Code contains no repeat-filer limitation preventing a debtor from claiming the available exemption in a later, separate bankruptcy case.

In Re Magee · filed 2011-02-03(b)(3)(A)

The Court holds that Daniel Magee may claim the homestead exemption in the present, chapter 13 case in the amount of $50,000. ... The Court notes that the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that concern exemptions make no qualifications for repeat filers, and if the drafters of the statute had intended such a limitation, then it was well within their capabilities to provide it.

Section 522(b)(3)(A) generally determines a debtor’s exemption eligibility under the state or local law applicable, and based on the facts, as of the petition date; conversion from chapter 13 to chapter 7 does not shift that determination to the conversion date.

In re Kuceris · filed 2016-09-02(b)(3)(A)

With the above history in mind and after conducting a review of the interplay between the Code provisions in question, the Court is' persuaded that when determining a debtor’s eligibility for exemptions under § 522(b)(3)(A) in a case converted from chapter 13 to chapter 7, the controlling date for both facts and law is the date of the filing of the chapter 13 petition.

Section 522(b)(3)(B) exempts a debtor’s interest as a tenant by the entirety or joint tenant only to the extent that applicable nonbankruptcy law makes that interest exempt from process.

In Re Antonie · filed 2011-03-31(b)(3)(B)

As the Bankruptcy Court recognized, the applicability of § 522(b)(3)(B) depends upon the treatment of joint tenancy interests under Idaho law. ... The Court therefore concludes that An-tonie cannot use her mother’s homestead exemption to shield her interest in the mobile home.

Section 522(b)(2)(B) allows a debtor to exempt an interest held as a tenant by the entirety or joint tenant to the extent that interest is exempt from process under applicable non-bankruptcy law.

Lake Erie Leasing, Inc. v. Bundy (In Re Bundy) · filed 1985-08-30(b)(2)(B)

It should be noted that insofar as possible the federal bankruptcy Code permits exemptions to be taken in comformity to the provisions of state law exempting assets from attachment, even when the debtors desire to elect federal exemptions, and that state law restrictions apply to interests of a tenant by the entirety which can be claimed only “to the extent that such interest as a tenant by the entirety or joint tenant is exempt from process under applicable non-bankruptcy law.” (From 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B), supra).

Section 522(b)(3)(A) determines which state’s exemption law applies by looking to the debtor’s domicile for the preceding 730 days, or, if no single state qualifies, the state of domicile during the preceding 180 days.

In Re Welton · filed 2011-03-31(b)(3)(A)

The fall of 2008 lies within the 730-day period immediately preceding the filing of the Debtors’ bankruptcy petition. Even if the Debtors’ own statement of their relocation date is accepted, therefore, the Debtors’ change of domicile occurred within the two-year period prior to the bankruptcy petition. If a debtor moves within the two-year period, § 522(b)(3)(A) requires the Court to look to the 180 days immediately prior to the two-year period to determine which state’s exemption laws apply. ... Under these circumstances, the Court finds that the Debtors’ domicile was not located in Florida during the period between 730 days and 910 days preceding their bankruptcy petition. Pursuant to § 522(b)(3)(A), Florida’s exemption laws are not available to the Debtors in this case.

Section 522(b)(3)(A) requires exemptions in an opt-out state to be determined under the state exemption laws in effect on the bankruptcy petition date.

In Re Stewart · filed 2011-05-12(b)(3)(A)

The policy expressed in the Bankruptcy Code is that property exemptions for opt-out states are determined by the laws of the state in effect on the petition date, no more and no less. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A). This provision is a clear Congressional acknowledgment and concession that there is no competing “federal interest” that might alter or contradict the state exemption laws.

Section 522(b)(3)(A) lets a debtor choose applicable state-law exemptions when the state has not opted out, making state law govern the validity of the claimed exemption.

In re Navarro · filed 2014-01-28(b)(3)(A)

Section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code governs the claims for exemptions. ... Hence, Puerto Rico law is dispositive.

Section 522(b)(3)(A) permits a debtor to claim exemptions under the law of the state where the debtor was domiciled for the specified 180-day period when the debtor was not domiciled in one state for the preceding 730 days.

In re Anderson · filed 2014-08-05(b)(3)(A)

Accordingly, the Minnesota homestead exemptions are available to the Debtor under the Code.

Section 522(b)(3)(A) requires a debtor electing state exemptions to use the exemption law applicable in the state where the debtor’s domicile was located during the statutory lookback period, while state law determines how that exemption applies.

In re James · filed 2016-10-21(b)(3)(A)

Thus, the Debtor is required to apply the Massachusetts'exemptions if he selects the state exemptions, as he has done here.

Section 522(b)(3)(A) selects the applicable state exemption law based on the debtor’s domicile during the 730 days before filing, or, if the debtor lived in more than one state, the longer portion of the preceding 180-day period.

In re Migell · filed 2017-07-31(b)(3)(A)

Section 522(b)(3)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code does not require the Debtor to use Massachusetts homestead provisions. Florida homestead exemption law applies.