11 U.S.C. § 522

Section 522(b)(3)(A) assigns the applicable exemption law by the debtor’s domicile during the 730 days before filing, or, if the debtor moved among states, during the longer portion of the preceding 180 days.

Steven C. Wallwork · filed 2020-02-20(b)(3)(A)

Put another way, to determine which exemption scheme applies, the parties and Court must first identify a debtor's domicile during the 730 days preceding the filing of the petition. If the debtor has been domiciled in the same State for those 730 days, then that State's exemption laws apply. On the other hand, if the debtor was domiciled in more than one State during the 730-day period, then the Court must identify where the debtor was domiciled during the 180 days preceding the 730-day period, or the longer portion of that 180 days, and apply the exemption laws of that State in debtor's bankruptcy case.

Section 522(b)(3)'s safety net permits a debtor denied a particular exemption category by the domiciliary rule and a state's residency requirement to claim the same category under § 522(d), subject to the applicable state's conditions, qualifications, or restrictions.

Leaza Danell Abel · filed 2020-08-14(b)(3)

The Court also adopts the flexible interpretation of “any exemption” in § 522(b)(3), meaning that if the Domiciliary Provision coupled with a state’s residency requirement denies a debtor a particular category of exemption, such debtor can claim the same category of exemption under § 522(d) (e.g., a vehicle), subject to “whatever conditions, qualifications, or restrictions [the applicable state law] imposes on a claim of exemption.”

Section 522(b)(3)(A) selects the state exemption law based on the debtor’s domicile during the 730-day lookback, with a 180-day fallback when the debtor was not domiciled in one state for the full period.

Brandy Marie Stephens · filed 2025-02-07(b)(3)(A)

Section 522(b)(3)(A)5 allows a debtor to claim certain property as exempt, and therefore not included as property of the bankruptcy estate, in accordance with the state exemption laws of the state where the debtor was domiciled for 730 days prior to filing a bankruptcy petition. If the debtor’s domicile has not been located in a single state for the 730-day period, then the controlling state law is that of the state in which the debtor was domiciled for the 180 days immediately preceding the 730-day period or for a longer portion of such 180-day period than in any other place.

Section 522(b)(3)(A) determines which state’s exemption law applies based on the debtor’s domicile before filing.

Laurie A. Todd · filed 2019-12-23(b)(3)(A)

For all of the foregoing reasons, the objection to the Debtor’s amended exemption is sustained and the applicable state law pursuant to Section 522(b)(3)(A) is New York law.

Section 522(b)(3)(A) selects the applicable state exemption law based on the debtor’s domicile history but does not change the debtor’s actual domicile or override that state’s limits on exemptions.

In re: Leonard A. Mancuso, II · filed 2018-03-12(b)(3)(A)

11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A) operates, in the default situation, to require the application of the law of a debtor’s domicile as of the petition date, to the factual situation of a debtor as of the petition date. ... But while the BAPCPA amendment temporally changes the applicable law, it does not contain any language that would produce the same effect on a debtor’s factual situation (i.e. the language of the statute does not change the state of a debtor’s domicile).

Section 522(l) requires a debtor to list property claimed as exempt; the property becomes exempt unless a party in interest objects, and it must first be part of the bankruptcy estate.

Rafia Khan v. Regions Bank · filed 2013-11-01(l)

Under § 522(l), the debtor is required to file a list of property claimed as exempt. “Unless a party in interest objects, the property claimed as exempt on such list is exempt.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(l). The Supreme Court, in Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305 (1991), recognized this process for claiming exemptions, and remarked that no property can be exempted “unless it first falls within the bankruptcy estate.” Owen, 500 U.S. at 308 (emphasis added). Ms. Khan cannot claim an interest in the “homestead exemption” separate from the bankruptcy estate and expect that property to retain exemption status. Without its inclusion in the bankruptcy estate there is no plausible way it qualifies for exemption status.

Section 522(a)(2) measures the value of exempt property by its fair market value on the bankruptcy petition date, with a legal claim valued by accounting for the probability that its potential value will be realized.

In re Presswood · filed 2016-09-15(a)(2)

The Debtor’s value takes into account the probability that he will prevail on his claim ... and the likelihood that he will recover certain damages.

Section 522(l) requires a debtor to claim property as exempt, and property claimed as exempt becomes exempt if no party in interest objects.

Rahien NaySaun Little · filed 2024-12-19(l)

The Bankruptcy Code further provides: “Debtor shall file a list of property that the debtor claims as exempt under subsection (b) of this section. . . Unless a party in interest objects, the property claimed as exempt on such list is exempt.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(l). “Unless the debtor takes affirmative steps to claim property as exempt, the property will remain in the estate.” ... Neither party has prevailed upon this Court to find whether the Vehicle constitutes property of the estate. However, Debtor has not sought to exempt the Vehicle from the property of the estate, and, therefore, the Court finds that the Vehicle remains in the estate.

Section 522(l) requires a debtor to list property claimed as exempt so the trustee or creditors can object.

United States of America v. Shadduck · filed 1997-04-24(l)

The present contention assumes, contrary to our caselaw, that property of the debtor neither claimed nor set apart as exempt would not have been subject to administration. See Petit v. Fessenden, 80 F.3d 29, 33 (1st Cir.1996); Mercer v. Monzack, 53 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1103, 116 S.Ct. 1317, 134 L.Ed.2d 471 (1996); see also 11 U.S.C. § 522(l) (requiring debtor to list property claimed exempt); Fed. R. Bankr.P. 4003(b).

Section 522(l) makes property claimed as exempt exempt when no party in interest objects.

Kurchack v. Life Insurance Co. of North America · filed 2010-07-26(l)

Nonetheless, 11 U.S.C. § 522(Z) provides, “Unless a party in interest objects, the property claimed as exempt on [the list of the debtor’s property] is exempt.”

Section 522(a) permits a debtor in bankruptcy to claim eligible property as exempt.

Christy v. Heights Finance Corp. · filed 1987-05-18(a)

Thus, by virtue of the passage of time and the operation of this rule, the Truth-In-Lending Act claim became exempt property and is no longer part of the bankruptcy estate.

Section 522(l) makes property listed as exempt exempt unless a party in interest objects, provided the claim has a statutory basis.

In Re Kingsbury · filed 1991-02-22(l)

Section 522(Z) provides that unless a party-in-interest objects, the property claimed as exempt on debtors’ list is exempt. ... The debtors' exemption claim will be sustained if there is a “good-faith” statutory basis for it. If the claim is merely uncertain under existing law, it will be upheld in the face of the failure of a trustee or other party-in-interest to file a timely objection as required by the Rule 4003(b).

Section 522(l) does not exempt a claim that the debtor neither lists as an asset nor claims as exempt.

Flores v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company · filed 2014-08-21(l)

The claim that the liens violated the constitution and were therefore invalid was not exempt because he did not include it on his list of assets and did not claim it as exempt.

Section 522(d)(5) exempts only the claimed dollar amount of a debtor’s interest in an asset, even if the asset is worth more.

In Re Saunders · filed 2006-09-07(d)(5)

For all of these reasons, I sustain the Chapter 7 Trustee’s Objections to Exemptions to the extent that Debtors are attempting to exempt more than $200 in the stock of each of the three corporations.

Section 522(l) requires a debtor to list property claimed as exempt; until the exemption is properly claimed and interested parties have an opportunity to object, the property remains in the estate.

In Re Varney · filed 2011-04-25(l)

Until exemptions are properly claimed, and the trustee and creditor are given an opportunity to object to allowance, assets remain property of the estate subject to the trustee’s control.

Section 522(l) requires a debtor to list property claimed as exempt; property the debtor does not claim remains in the bankruptcy estate.

Owen v. Garrett Auto Sales, LLC (In re Owen) · filed 2014-09-08(l)

Those are: (1)the debtor must claim it as exempt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(b)(1) & (l); or (2) the trustee must abandon it pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 554. ... It is, therefore, without question that Mr. Owen did not claim the Mustang as exempt and never intended to do so. Therefore this exception does not apply.

Section 522(b)(3)(C) exempts a debtor’s retirement funds in qualifying tax-exempt accounts, but a non-spousal inherited IRA generally is not “retirement funds” for this exemption.

Tracy Lynn Ponte · filed 2024-02-01(b)(3)(C)

“Retirement funds” under Section 522(b)(3)(C) therefore means “sums of money set aside for the day an individual stop working.” (Id.) ... Inherited IRAs—to the extent that the account is not inherited from a spouse—are therefore not retirement funds and not qualified for exemption under § 522(b)(3)(C).

Section 522(b)(3)(C) exempts retirement funds in qualifying tax-exempt accounts, but a non-spousal inherited IRA is not retirement funds for purposes of that exemption.

Tracy Lynn Ponte · filed 2024-02-08(b)(3)(C)

Under § 522(b)(3)(C), a debtor can exempt “retirement funds to the extent those funds are in a fund or account that is exempt from taxation under section 401, 403, 408, 408A, 414, 457, or 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code.” ... “Retirement funds” under Section 522(b)(3)(C) therefore means “sums of money set aside for the day an individual stop working.” ... Inherited IRAs—to the extent that the account is not inherited from a spouse—are therefore not retirement funds and not qualified for exemption under § 522(b)(3)(C). ... Accordingly, on a purely federal law analysis, the Court finds that Debtor is not entitled to exempt the Inherited IRA under § 522(b)(3)(C).

Section 522(b)(3)(C) does not exempt an inherited IRA when, after the original owner’s death, the funds are no longer held for anyone’s retirement.

In Re Clark · filed 2011-05-10(b)(3)(C)

The debtors’ Inherited IRA does not contain “retirement funds” within the common meaning of § 522(b)(3)(C).

Section 522(b)(3)(C) does not exempt inherited IRAs because they are not “retirement funds” within the statute.

In re Everett · filed 2014-09-29(b)(3)(C)

The Supreme Court held that inherited IRAs are not “retirement funds,” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(C). ... Accordingly, the inherited IRA cannot be claimed as exempt from a bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(C).

Under § 522(b)(4)(B)(ii)(I), retirement funds are not exempt when the plan is not in substantial compliance with the applicable Internal Revenue Code requirements as of the petition date; the mere possibility of future corrective action does not change that result.

In re: Xiao · filed 2019-09-30(b)(4)(B)(ii)(I)

I need not resolve these disputes, as I find that the mere possibility of future corrective action simply does not preclude an otherwise proper finding that a plan was not substantially compliant with the IRC under 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(4)(B)(ii)(I) as of the petition date.

Section 522(b)(4) protects retirement funds without a favorable determination only when the fund meets the statute's requirements, including substantial compliance with the Internal Revenue Code or the debtor's lack of material responsibility for noncompliance.

Agin v. Daniels (In Re Daniels) · filed 2011-06-16(b)(4)(A), (b)(4)(B)

Therefore, this letter is insufficient to establish that the funds in the Profit Sharing Plan are presumed exempt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(4)(A). ... Therefore, I find that the February 19, 2009 IRS letter is not a favorable determination letter under section 7803 of the Internal Revenue Code. ... Furthermore, having actively managed the affairs of the plan as employer, manager, and trustee of the Profit Sharing Plan, the Debtor was materially responsible for the failure of the plan to be in substantial compliance with applicable tax law. The Debtor has abused the profit sharing plan form and the consequence is that the funds held therein may not be exempted from the bankruptcy estate.

Section 522(b)(4)(B)(ii)(II) can preserve an exemption for a retirement fund that fails substantial compliance with the Internal Revenue Code only if the debtor is not materially responsible for that failure.

In re Sharkey · filed 2017-02-16(b)(4)(B)(ii)(II)

Given that neither annuity is “in substantial compliance with the applicable requirements of the Internal Revenue Code,” Debtor must demonstrate that he “is not materially responsible for that failure.”

Section 522(b)(3) permits a debtor to use the exemption scheme of the state where the debtor was domiciled for the preceding 730 days, while § 522(o) reduces a homestead exemption to the extent its value came from property disposed of within ten years with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor.

In Re Stanton · filed 2011-07-19(b)(3), (o)

Either of these findings subsume more than enough time to allow Stanton to select Nevada exemptions under Section 522(b)(3). ... Section 522(o) has four essential components. To prevail, a creditor or trustee must show: (a) an increase in the value of the debtor’s homestead; (b) that the increase was “attributable” to the disposition of nonexempt assets; (c) that the disposition of the nonexempt assets was made with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor; and (d) that the disposition occurred during the ten-year period ending on the date the debtor’s bankruptcy petition was filed. ... As such, Section 522(o) applies, and the value of Stanton’s interest in her Nevada residence will be reduced by the amount of the pay off.

Section 522(o) reduces the value of a claimed homestead exemption to the extent attributable to property disposed of within 10 years with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor that would not have been exempt under § 522(b).

In re Thaw · filed 2013-03-20(o)

The Court, therefore, concludes the requirements of § 522(o) are met and Debtor's homestead exemption should be reduced to $0.

Section 522(o) reduces the value of a claimed homestead by the value attributable to nonexempt property disposed of within 10 years with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor; the objector bears the burden of proving the statutory elements by a preponderance of the evidence.

In re Savino · filed 2016-09-14(o)

The phrase “intent to hinder, delay or defraud a creditor” is similar to the language employed by Congress in 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A) and 727(a)(2)- and requires actual, as opposed to constructive, fraud. ... “[T]he phrase ‘the value of an interest in ... real [ ] property ... shall be reduced’ in 11 U.S.C. § 522(o) means that the equity in a debtor’s home that was obtained through fraudulent transfer of non-exempt assets into exempt assets is to be reduced. If there is no equity, there is no value subject to reduction.” ... The party objecting to a debtor’s claimed homestead and seeking a reduction in amount pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(o) has the burden of proof using a preponderance of the evidence standard. ... Additionally, the Court concludes that the determination of whether the debtor could exempt “any property ... disposed of’ is determined on the petition date by virtue of the language of the statute.

Section 522(o) reduces a state homestead exemption to the extent its value is attributable to nonexempt property converted into the homestead within 10 years with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor.

McDermott v. Crabtree (In re Crabtree) · filed 2016-08-08(o)

In summary, the Trustee has met his burden of proof in establishing all the requisite elements of § 522(o); the Debtors’ homestead exemption is hereby reduced by $74,294.68.

Section 522(o) reduces a claimed homestead exemption only to the extent that fraudulently converted nonexempt property increased the value of the debtor’s homestead interest.

McDermott v. Crabtree (In re Crabtree) · filed 2017-01-24(o)

Section 522(o) requires the bankruptcy court to determine the extent to which the improvements Debtors made to their homestead increased the value of Debtors’ interest in their homestead.

Section 522(o) reduces the value of a homestead exemption to the extent attributable to nonexempt property transferred within ten years before bankruptcy with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor.

Wendy L. Shaw · filed 2020-11-12(o)

A party objecting to an exemption pursuant to § 522(o) must establish four elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) the debtor disposed of the property during the ten (10) years preceding the petition date; (2) the property was not exempt; (3) some of the proceeds from the sale of the property were used to buy a new homestead, improve an existing homestead, or reduce the debt associated with an existing homestead; and (4) the debtor disposed of the property with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor.

Section 522(b)(3)(A) determines the applicable exemption law by the debtor's domicile during the 730 days before filing, or the alternative 180-day period if the debtor lacked a single domicile for 730 days.

In Re Porvaznik · filed 2011-08-10(b)(3)(A)

This implicates the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A), which reads, as follows: ... In summary, I find that the Debtor did not change her domicile in the 730 days prior to her filing the bankruptcy petition and that domicile was in Pennsylvania.

Section 522(b)(4)(A) presumes retirement funds exempt when they are held in a qualified retirement fund with a favorable IRS determination, unless the presumption is rebutted.

In re Drumheller · filed 2017-10-04(b)(4)(A)

Generally, it is the debtor’s burden to establish that the retirement account claimed as exempt is a qualified retirement account under the Internal Revenue Code. If it is, then by operation of § 522(b)(4)(A), those funds are presumed to be exempt from the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(4)(A) (“If the retirement funds are in a retirement fund that has received a favorable determination - under section 7805 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, and that determination is in effect as of the date of the filing of the petition in a case under this title, those funds shall be presumed to be exempt from the estate.”). ... The Trustee has failed to meet his burden of rebutting the presumption in favor of exemption as to the Annuity Policy.

Section 522(b)(4)(A) makes a favorable § 7805 determination presumptive evidence that retirement funds are exempt, but the presumption can be rebutted; § 522(b)(4)(B) applies only when no favorable determination exists.

In Re Daley · filed 2011-10-11(b)(3)(C), (b)(4)(A), (b)(4)(B)

Under § 522(b)(4)(A), the determination letter being in place creates the presumption that the funds in the Merrill Lynch IRA are exempt. This presumption is, however, rebuttable, and it is appropriate for the Trustee to present evidence “to establish that the IRA was improperly operated under applicable IRC provisions, thereby disqualifying the IRA funds from exempt status under § 522(b)(3)(C).” ... While it is undisputed that a favorable determination letter from the IRS was in place when the Debtor filed his bankruptcy case on August 25, 2010, stating that the Merrill Lynch IRA meets the requirements of an IRA under 26 U.S.C. § 408(a), the Trustee has offered proof sufficient to rebut the presumption set forth in § 522(b)(4)(A) afforded by the favorable determination. Through no fault of his own and notwithstanding the fact that between its creation and the filing date, the Debtor conducted no borrowing transactions against the Merrill Lynch IRA, the Debtor indirectly engaged in a prohibited transaction under 26 U.S.C. § 4975 simply by signing the Client Relationship Agreements granting Merrill Lynch a lien on all of his accounts. Accordingly, the Debtor is not entitled to an exemption in the Merrill Lynch IRA holding $61,646.00 from a rollover which occurred on May 16, 2008. ... Finally, the Debtor argues that the Merrill Lynch IRA is protected by § 522(b)(4)(B), which provides that “[i]f the retirement funds are in a retirement fund that has not received a favorable determination under such section 7805, ... those funds are exempt from the estate if the debtor demonstrates that ... (ii) ... (II) the retirement fund fails to be in substantial compliance with the applicable requirements of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and the debtor is not materially responsible for that failure.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(4). This section cannot benefit the Debtor because it applies only to a retirement fund that has not received a favorable determination under § 7805. Here, it is undisputed that the Merrill Lynch IRA is the product of a favorable determination letter issued pursuant to § 7805 of the Internal Revenue Code.

Section 522(b)(4)(A) presumes retirement funds exempt under § 522(b)(3)(C) only when they are held in a retirement fund with an effective favorable determination under Internal Revenue Code § 7805.

Daniels v. Agin · filed 2012-09-30(b)(4)(A)

Under 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(4)(A), retirement funds are presumed exempt under subsection (b)(3)(C) if they are held “in a retirement fund that has received a favorable determination under section 7805 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, and that determination is in effect as of the date of the filing of the petition.”

Section 522(b)(4)(A) presumes retirement funds exempt when the account has an effective favorable IRS determination.

In re James · filed 2013-02-22(b)(4)(A)

11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(4)(A)-(B). The parties did not stipulate whether these IRAs are retirement funds that have received a favorable determination. ... The court will presume that there was a favorable determination and that the Trustee has waived any objection based upon lack of a favorable ruling by the Internal Revenue Service.

Section 522(l) makes property claimed as exempt exempt when no timely objection is filed, supporting the finality of unchanged exemption claims.

In re Walker · filed 2014-02-06(l)

If there is no objection, the property is exempt.

Under § 522(l), property claimed as exempt becomes exempt when no timely objection is filed, and the exemption is final after the objection deadline passes.

In re Reeves · filed 2014-11-26(l)

Absent objection, “the property claimed as exempt on such list is exempt.”

Section 522(l) makes property claimed as exempt exempt when no timely objection is filed, but that rule does not prevent amendment of the exemption schedule before the bankruptcy case closes.

Li v. Multicultural Radio Broadcasting, Inc. · filed 2023-03-21(l)

If no exemptions are timely filed, “the property claimed as exempt on such list is exempt” and the trustee may no longer raise objections to the filings. 11 U.S.C. § 522(l). ... This argument, however, is without merit, as F.R.B.P. 1009(a) permits a debtor to amend a schedule as a matter of course while the case is open, even if the trustee did not raise timely objections to the schedule. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1009(a); see also In re Cash, 319 F.App’x. 4, 5 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that the right to amend schedules may be exercised at any time but prejudicial reliance by interested parties on the previous motion is considered in determining the allowance of the amendment). Thus, the absence of any objections to the First Amended Schedules does not, as MRBI contends, render them “final[.]”

Section 522(b)(3)(C) permits a debtor to exempt qualifying retirement funds, including the TSP account at issue, if the funds must be claimed as exempt.

In Re O'Neal · filed 2011-12-16(b)(3)(C)

Based upon the authority referenced above, the Court finds that any sums in the Debtor’s TSP Account at the commencement of her case are not property of her bankruptcy estate. Even were the Court to conclude that the Debtor was required to claim those funds as exempt, she could amend her exemptions to claim the TSP Account as exempt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(C).

Section 522(b)(3)(C) allows a debtor to exempt retirement funds in full when they are held in a fund or account exempt from taxation under the specified Internal Revenue Code provisions.

Cardiello v. Arbogast (In re Arbogast) · filed 2012-02-07(b)(3)(C)

Paragraph (C) of § 522(b)(3) allows a debtor to exempt, in full, “retirement funds to the extent that those funds are in a fund or account that is exempt from taxation under section 401, 403, 408, 408A, 414, 457, or 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.” 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(b)(3)(C) (West 2012). An examination of the Debtor’s Schedule C reveals that the Debtor has exempted the entire balances in the Retirement Accounts, in particular, pursuant to § 522(b)(3)(C). Such exemption, the Court concludes, is entirely appropriate.

Section 522(b)(3)(C) permits a debtor to exempt retirement funds in full when they are held in a fund or account exempt from taxation under the listed Internal Revenue Code provisions; the objecting parties bear the burden of showing the account does not qualify.

Bohm v. Titus (In Re Titus) · filed 2012-02-29(b)(3)(C)

The Trustee and TRZ, as the objecting parties, bear the burden of proving that the Debtor’s exemptions, including that of his retirement account, are inappropriate. ... The Trustee and TRZ have failed—and, in fact, have not even attempted—to prove that the Debtor’s retirement account is not just that, or that the same is not exempt from taxation under 26 U.S.C. (IRC) §§ 401, 403, 408, 408A, 414, 457, or 501(a). Therefore, the Court concludes that the Debtor’s retirement account may be exempted in full pursuant to § 522(b)(3)(C).

Section 522(b)(3)(C) permits a debtor using state and other nonbankruptcy exemptions to exempt retirement funds only to the extent they are held in a fund or account exempt from taxation under the specified Internal Revenue Code sections.

In re Rivera · filed 2013-06-10(b)(3)(C)

Notwithstanding, even when a debtor chooses state and other nonbank-ruptcy exemptions, he/she may still claim nontaxable retirement funds under Section 522(b)(3)(C) of the Bankruptcy Code “to the extent that those funds are in a fund or account that is exempt from taxation under Section 401, 403, 408, 408A, 414, 414, 457 or 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.” ... In the instant case, there is no evidence of compliance with Section 522(b)(3)(C) of the Bankruptcy Code nor have Debtors demonstrated that the fund or account where they keep the $1 claimed exemption is tax-exempted under the pertinent sections of the Internal Revenue Code, as mandated by 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(C). Consequently, an evidentiary hearing is warranted for Debtors’ claimed exemption for their Interest in Undefined Benefit from Marriott San Juan Retirement Plan under 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(C).

Section 522(b)(3)(C) allows a debtor to exempt retirement funds held in a tax-exempt account even when the debtor’s state has opted out of the federal exemption scheme.

Karla K Kelly · filed 2023-04-11(b)(3)(C)

Here, the federal exemption in section 522(b)(3)(C) applies because the Iowa exemption statute is more restrictive than section 522(b)(3)(C). ... The issue, then, is whether the funds in Debtor’s IRAs qualify as “retirement funds” for purposes of section 522(b)(3)(C). They do. ... Here, Debtor rolled over the funds from her late husband’s IRA into the IRAs for which she has claimed exemption. ... Unlike an inherited IRA, Debtor’s IRAs are retirement accounts in her hands. The funds in those accounts are subject to the same tax and bankruptcy rules as would apply to funds that Debtor had contributed herself. Debtor therefore properly claimed exemption of the funds in her IRAs.

Section 522(b)(3)(C) exempts only retirement funds held in qualifying tax-exempt accounts, and funds in inherited IRAs do not qualify because those accounts are available for current consumption rather than set aside for retirement.

Clark v. Rameker · filed 2014-06-12(b)(3)(C)

The text and purpose of the Bankruptcy Code make clear that funds held in inherited IRAs are not “retirement funds” within the meaning of §522(b)(3)(C)’s bankruptcy exemption. ... Section 522(b)(3)(C)’s reference to “retirement funds” is therefore properly understood to mean sums of money set aside for the day an individual stops working.

Section 522(b)(3)(C) exempts retirement funds only if the fund or account is tax-exempt under a listed Internal Revenue Code provision.

In Re: Ernest W. Willis · filed 2011-04-21(b)(3)(C)

The Bankruptcy Code provides an exemption for “retirement funds to the extent that those funds are in a fund or account that is exempt from taxation under section 401, 403, 408, 408A, 414, 457, or 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(C). The bankruptcy court and the district court determined that Willis engaged in several prohibited transactions under section 408 of the Internal Revenue Code and caused the assets to lose their tax-exempt status. 26 U.S.C. §§ 408(e)(2), 4975(c)(1). All of Willis’s arguments on appeal lack merit, and he has failed to establish that the bankruptcy court committed any reversible error. We affirm based on the well-reasoned opinion of the district court.

Section 522(b)(3)(C) exempts retirement funds held in a qualifying individual retirement annuity, including funds transferred from a qualifying individual retirement account.

Terri Running v. Miller · filed 2015-02-13(b)(3)(C)

Thus, if retirement funds are held in either of these qualified retirement plans, then the funds can be exempted from creditors’ claims in bankruptcy. This exemption generally applies even if the debtor transferred the retirement funds to the qualified retirement plan from another qualified retirement plan.

Section 522(d)(1) permits only a debtor’s aggregate interest in real property up to a specified dollar amount, so a claim of “100% of FMV” or “100% of Equity” does not adequately state the exemption.

In re Luckham · filed 2012-01-13(d)(1)

Because the language of § 522(d)(1) clearly limits the Debtors’ claimed exemption in the Property to a specific dollar amount, the Court agrees with the Trustee that neither the language “100% of FMV” nor “100% of Equity” adequately circumscribes the exemption consistent with the requirements of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 522(d)’s limited-value exemptions require the debtor to state a specific dollar amount; a claim of “100% of FMV” is facially invalid.

Massey v. Pappalardo (Massey) · filed 2012-02-27(d)

Thus, the bankruptcy court did not err when it sustained the Trustee’s objection to the Masseys’ facially invalid exemptions of “100% of FMV” in the residence and the car.

Section 522(b)(3)(A) selects the applicable state exemption law based on the debtor’s domicile during the prescribed 730-day and, if necessary, preceding 180-day periods, while the hanging paragraph permits § 522(d) exemptions when that requirement leaves the debtor ineligible for any exemption, and § 522(m) applies the exemption provisions separately to each joint debtor.

In re Kelsey · filed 2012-02-15(b)(3)(A), (b)(3) hanging paragraph, (m)

Section 522(b)(3)(A) allows a debtor to exempt, subject to § 522(o) and (p), any property' that is exempt under the state law that is applicable on the petition date at the place in which the debtor’s domicile was located for the 730 days immediately preceding the petition date. If the debt- or’s domicile has not been located in a single state for such 730-day period (as is the case for the Debtors in this case), then the state law that is applicable is that of the place in which the debtor’s domicile was located for 180 days immediately preceding the 730-day period. ... Application of § 522(b)(3)(A) to the facts in this case results in Colorado’s law being the applicable law. ... Thus, under § 522(b)(3)(A), the Colorado exemption laws that were in effect on the petition date are the laws that must be analyzed to determine whether the Debtors have properly claimed their exemptions. ... This scenario triggers the hanging paragraph of § 522(b)(3), which states that “[i]f the effect of the domiciliary requirement under subparagraph (A) [of section 522(b)(3) ] is to render the debtor ineligible for any exemption, the debtor may elect to exempt property that is specified under subsection (d) [of section 522].” ... Thus, pursuant to the hanging paragraph/savings clause of § 522(b)(3) and the corresponding resort to § 522(d)(1), the Debtors may each exempt $21,625.00 in value of the Real Property (as their residence), for a total exempt amount of $43,250.00.

Section 522(b)(3)’s hanging-paragraph fallback permits nonresident debtors to use the federal exemptions when an opt-out state’s law makes them ineligible for that state’s exemptions.

In re Rody · filed 2012-02-06(b)(3), (d)

Arizona’s opt-out exemption statute renders the nonresident Debtors ineligible for the state exemptions but does not prohibit them from utilizing the federal exemptions pursuant to § 522(b)(3) and (d). Therefore, Debtors’ federal exemption claims are valid and the Trustee’s objection is overruled. A separate order will be entered.

Section 522(b)(3)(A) generally requires a debtor to have been domiciled in a state for 730 days before filing to use that state’s exemptions.

In Re Jevne · filed 2008-04-02(b)(3)(A)

In this case, the Debtors cannot use Florida’s exemptions because they were not domiciled in Florida for 730 days prior to filing their petition.

Section 522(d)(1) allows a debtor to exempt real or personal property used as a residence, including property incidental to that residence, but not a separate rental dwelling or adjacent undeveloped acreage that the debtor does not use as a residence.

In re Faulring · filed 2017-08-30(d)(1)

For the reasons stated herein, the debtor’s claim of an exemption under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1) does not extend to the separate dwelling that he rents to a third party, or to the 65 acres of undeveloped property that adjoin the lot on which he resides. Accordingly, the motion is denied to the extent that it seeks to avoid the fixing of judgment hens on either of these non-exempt portions of his real estate.

Section 522(d)(1) permits a debtor to exempt an interest in real property only if the debtor or a dependent uses it as a residence, as determined on the bankruptcy petition date.

In re Holland · filed 2012-07-09(d)(1)

The issue presented is whether, as of the'date on which Debtors filed this Chapter 7 case (February 29, 2012), the Debtors used the property located at 8764 Twin Lake Road, Mancelona, Michigan (the “Mancelona Property”) as a residence within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1). ... Because neither of the Debtors was using the Mancelona Property as a residence as of the petition date (February 29, 2012), neither of them may claim an exemption for it under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1).

Section 522(d)(1) does not allow a homestead exemption for a separate adjacent parcel that the debtor does not use as a residence.

In Re Beck · filed 2012-05-24(d)(1)

The record does not support Debtors’ claim to an exemption under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1) for the 22.88 acres.

Section 522(d)(1) allows a debtor to claim a homestead exemption only in property the debtor or a dependent uses as a residence, which requires occupancy as a principal place of dwelling.

In Re Lozada Rivera · filed 2012-05-03(d)(1)

Bankruptcy courts have also interpreted Section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code similarly. The term “residence [provided in Section 522(d)(1) ] at a minimum, denotes occupancy of the premises by the debtor as a principal place of dwelling.” ... Based on Debtor’s own factual allegations, this court finds that her principal residence and place of dwelling is her mother’s house, not her Real Property. Therefore, she cannot claim a homestead exemption on the contiguous property of a property that does not belong to her. Debtor’s principal place of dwelling does not belong to the bankruptcy estate. She cannot claim it as exempt under Section 522 and cannot therefore claim the contiguous lots as homestead either.

Section 522(d)(1) requires the property to be used as a residence; without a valid exemption, a judgment lien cannot impair the exemption and cannot be avoided under § 522(f).

In Re Kaplan · filed 2012-03-26(d)(1), (f)

Because the Debtor did not use the Simpsonville Property “as a residence” under § 522(d)(1), Puckett’s Objection to Exemption is due to be sustained. Moreover, since the Debtor cannot properly claim an exemption in this property, his Motion to Avoid Lien must be denied. Without a proper exemption, there cannot be an impairment to that exemption.

Section 522(d)(1) permits an exemption for an interest in property used as a residence, and residence requires more than occasional or temporary occupancy under state-law homestead principles.

In re Stoner · filed 2013-03-06(d)(1)

Thus, § 522(d)(1) is rooted in state law and is based upon the underlying premise that a debtor be afforded an exemption in his home. It is therefore consistent with the legislative history of § 522(d)(1) that this Court likens the term “residence” in § 522(d)(1) to a “home” or “homestead” and interprets the definition of the term “residence” within § 522(d)(1) as requiring more than mere occasional or temporary occupancy. It is likewise consistent with the legislative history of § 522(d)(1) that this Court looks to state law interpretations of the term “homestead” to determine the meaning of “residence” within § 522(d)(1).

Section 522(d)(1) permits a debtor to claim a homestead exemption in property intended for use as a residence when the totality of the circumstances, including concrete steps toward relocation, shows residential use even without physical occupancy on the petition date.

Sikirica v. Yanovich (In re Yanovich) · filed 2016-02-01(d)(1)

Given the fact that it is undeniable that the Debtor intended to reside at the Braddock Property, and that it is beyond dispute that the Debtor was taking overt and good faith steps to relocate to the residence as of the petition date, the Court is comfortable with concluding that the Debt- or should be deemed to have been “using” the Braddock Property as a “residence” for purposes of allowing a homestead exemption pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1).

Section 522(d)(1) permits a debtor to exempt a limited interest in real or personal property that the debtor or a dependent uses as a residence.

Joseph W. Prestia · filed 2024-01-12(d)(1)

This Court agrees with and echoes the reasoning set forth in Yanovich, but based upon the facts on this case, comes to the opposite conclusion as to the propriety of the exemption claim. ... The Debtor has not presented any evidence that it was his intent to return to and reside in The Property as his residence on the date that he filed his Petition. ... The Debtor’s hollow statement in his Response, filed several months post-petition, that he may have intended to live at The Property at some undefined point in the future is insufficient for the Debtor to be considered to have constructive occupancy of The Property. ... There are no corroborating factors that show the Debtor actually intended to, and/or had the means to, reside in the premises, and those factors and intent must have existed on the date the Petition was filed.

Section 522 permits a debtor to claim a homestead exemption only if the debtor has an interest in the property on the petition date.

Sanchez · filed 2026-03-11(d)(1)

Therefore, under 11 U.S.C. § 522(l), the homestead exemption is inapplicable because even if Defendant lived in the Property on the petition date, Defendant did not have an interest in the Property.

Section 522(c) protects the value of an allowed exemption from liability for most creditors' claims, while the exempted property remains property of the estate and may be administered for value exceeding the exemption.

In re Witt · filed 2012-05-10(c)

To the extent of the claimed exemption, the value of the exempted property is available only to the debtor and is not liable for the claims of most creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 522(c). Yet, the property in which the exemption was claimed remains property of the estate and, if it has value in excess of the claimed exemption, it may be sold by the trustee so that its excess value can be made available for creditors.

Section 522(c) leaves exempt property in the estate while insulating it from creditor claims for as long as it remains exempt under state law; when that status ends, the property becomes vulnerable to claims.

In re Garcia · filed 2013-09-27(c)

First, one must conclude that exempt property is not withdrawn from the estate, but remains property of the estate insulated from the claims of creditors for as long as the asset enjoys exempt status under state law.

Section 522 allows a debtor to claim property as exempt without a hearing, but a claimed exemption does not retroactively restore the debtor’s standing to pursue a claim belonging to the bankruptcy estate.

In Re: Stephen Thomas Yelverton · filed 2014-10-07

While abandonment of a claim by a trustee may retroactively provide a debtor with standing, claiming an exemption does not have an equivalent effect, as several courts have found. ... On the other hand, the debtor can list property as exempt from the start of a bankruptcy filing, and there is no hearing requirement before the exemption is effective. See 11 U.S.C. § 522.

Section 522 allows exempt property to leave the bankruptcy estate and revest in the debtor.

Todeschi v. Juarez · filed 2020-12-17

Rather, “[i]t is widely accepted that property deemed exempt from a debtor’s bankruptcy estate revests in the debtor” under 11 U.S.C. § 522.

Section 522(o)(4) reduces the homestead exemption’s value to the extent it reflects equity obtained by fraudulently converting nonexempt assets into the home.

Soulé v. Willcut (In re Willcut) · filed 2012-05-29(o)(4)

We conclude that the phrase “the value of an interest in ... real [ ] property ... shall be reduced” in 11 U.S.C. § 522(o) means that the equity in a debtor’s home that was obtained through fraudulent transfer of non-exempt assets into exempt assets is to be reduced.

Section 522(d)(10)(E) exempts a debtor’s right to receive payments from a similar plan that substitutes for wages and pays because of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service, to the extent reasonably necessary for support.

In re Butler · filed 2012-05-29(d)(10)(E)

According to the United States Supreme Court, the debtor’s right to receive payment under the CSI Plan must meet three requirements to be exempted under this provision: “(1) [t]he right to receive payment must be from ‘a stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, annuity, or similar plan or contract’; (2) the right to receive payment must be ‘on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service’; and (3) even then, the right to receive payment may be exempted only ‘to the extent’ that it is ‘reasonably necessary [to] support’ the accountholder or his dependents.” ... In order to be a “similar plan or contract” under § 522(d)(10)(E), the CSI Plan must provide income that substitutes for wages earned as salary or hourly compensation. ... The terms of the agreement and the general policy of the partnership indicate that the debtor’s right to redeem her CSI units functions as a substitute for wages. ... The CSI Plan payments also meet the second element of the statute, as redemption of units can occur “on account of’ disability, death, or illness. ... The trustee has not proved that the payments under the CSI Plan are not reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor. ... For these reasons, the trustee’s objection is overruled, and the exemption is allowed.

Section 522(d)(10)(E) exempts payments from a stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, annuity, or similar plan or contract when payment is on account of age or another listed event, to the extent reasonably necessary for support.

In re Rove · filed 2013-10-10(d)(10)(E)

In sum, the Debtor’s right to receive payments from the account is on account of her age.

Section 522(f)(1) permits a debtor to avoid a lien unless the lien arose before or at the same time as the debtor acquired the relevant property interest, and it does not contain an unjust-enrichment exception.

Van Dusen v. Keys · filed 2012-06-26(f)(1)

A debtor may avoid a lien under section 522(f)(1) unless it arose before or at the same time as the debtor acquired the property interest at issue. ... Van Deusen offers no authority that establishes an unjust enrichment exception to section 522(f)(1).

Section 522(c) protects exempt property from liability for prepetition debts, but fraudulent concealment of non-exempt assets may justify a surcharge against otherwise exempt property so the debtor does not retain more than the Code permits.

Malley v. Agin · filed 2012-08-15(c)

When the concealed assets have disappeared, as the $25,000 seems to have done, surcharge is an appropriate and necessary way to vindicate § 521, requiring honest disclosure of non-exempt assets, and § 522, regulating the determination of legitimate exemptions for the debtor’s benefit.

A debtor who fraudulently conceals an asset may be denied an exemption in that asset when the concealment prejudices creditors.

In Re Terry · filed 2002-06-06(d)(5)

The debtor’s fraudulent concealment in this instance has a prejudicial effect on his creditors in that they would have received $6375.00 more through the debtor’s chapter 13 plan if the asset had been disclosed. The Court will sustain the bank’s and the chapter 7 trustee’s objection as to the debtor’s claim of exemption in his 1/5 interest in 80 acres of land as set forth on his amended petition.

Sections 522(d)(2) and 522(d)(5) allow a debtor to claim an exemption in property only when the debtor has an ownership or other cognizable legal or equitable interest in it.

Andrew Lancos, Jr. and Carol Ann Lancos · filed 2022-06-23(d)(2), (d)(5)

As previously noted, however, a mere right to use property is insufficient to establish an exemptible interest under the federal bankruptcy exemptions. A debtor must have an ownership interest in an asset to claim an exemption.”> Because the Debtors failed to produce “unequivocal evidence” proving that Carol maintains a cognizable interest in the Mercedes beyond a mere right to use, she cannot assert an exemption in the vehicle.

Section 522(b)(1) permits a debtor to exempt property from the bankruptcy estate, but property that never becomes part of the estate cannot be exempted.

In re Coenen · filed 2012-09-10(b)(1)

Section 522 allows a debtor to exempt property from the bankruptcy estate; if property is never part of the bankruptcy estate, it cannot be exempted.

Section 522 allows property entering the bankruptcy estate to be exempted, while the court determines what remains estate property.

Still v. Hopkins (In re Hopkins) · filed 2013-05-17(l)

After the property comes into the estate, then the debtor is permitted to exempt it under 11 U.S.C. § 522 and the court will have permission to determine what property may be exempted and what remains as property of the estate.

Section 522(d) provides federal bankruptcy exemptions, and an exemption must be based on a legislative enactment identifying property protected from creditors; common-law nonattachability is not enough.

Abdul-Rahim v. LaBarge · filed 2012-09-21(d)

“By definition, common law does not meet the Eighth Circuit’s requirement that an exemption be created by the legislative branch. ... However, what the debtors fail to appreciate is that in Benn, the Eighth Circuit was interpreting federal law, specifically what Congress meant when it used the word “exemption” throughout § 522.”

Section 522(d) permits exemptions created by enacted law; a common-law rule that a contingent or unliquidated claim is not attachable is not itself a bankruptcy exemption.

Abdul-Rahim v. LaBarge (In re Abdul-Rahim) · filed 2012-09-21(d)

By definition, common law does not meet the Eighth Circuit’s requirement that an exemption be created by the legislative branch.

Section 522(i) does not let a debtor create an exemption merely by declaring property exempt; the exemption must fall within a statutory category.

In Re Bennett · filed 1984-02-09(i)

Read quite literally, the statute seems to say that unless a party raises an objection, a debtor may claim an exemption in any property that he himself characterizes as exempt — an exemption, as it were, by declaration. That is the reading urged upon us by the debtor. We cannot accept it.

Section 522(p)(1) caps a debtor’s homestead exemption when the debtor acquires an interest in the property within 1,215 days before filing, including through an inter-spousal transfer despite continuous occupancy.

In re Gentile · filed 2012-11-28(p)(1)

The cap established by Bankruptcy Code § 522(p)(l) is triggered when a debtor acquires an interest in property within 1215 days of the filing of a petition in bankruptcy. ... Despite the fact that the debtors occupied the Marlborough property for the entirety of the period in question, a transfer between spouses is sufficient to trigger application of Bankruptcy Code § 522(p)(l). ... Thus both debtors are subject to the § 522(p)(l) cap.

Section 522(d)(11)(D) permits a debtor to exempt one or multiple payments received on account of personal bodily injuries, but caps the exemption at the statutory amount in the aggregate, regardless of the number of injuries, accidents, or payments.

In re Phillips · filed 2012-12-27(d)(11)(D)

Therefore, this Court concludes that § 522(d)(ll)(D), read in light of § 102(7), authorizes Mr. Phillips to exempt the right to receive either a payment or multiple payments received on account of either or both the Accidents, but not to exceed $21,625 in the aggregate.

Section 522(d)(7) exempts the unmatured life insurance contract itself and prevents the trustee from surrendering it; it does not protect other rights under the contract, such as loan value.

Wisdom v. Gugino (In re Wisdom) · filed 2013-04-18(d)(7)

Paragraph (8) does not perform that function.

Section 522(d)(7) provides an elective federal exemption for an unmatured life-insurance contract owned by the debtor, rather than excluding the contract from the bankruptcy estate at the outset.

Gladstone v. US Bancorp · filed 2016-01-08(d)(7)

The structure of the Bankruptcy Code buttresses our conclusion. In dealing with the issue of life insurance, Congress chose not to exclude it from the estate under § 541(b), but to provide an elective exemption under § 522, which provided an exemption for “[a]ny unmatured life insurance contract owned by the debtor, other than a credit life insurance contract.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(7).

Section 522(d) caps the value of property a debtor may exempt, rather than the percentage interest in the asset; a debtor may exempt a 100% interest when that entire interest is within the applicable dollar limit.

Peake v. Ayobami (In Re Ayobami) · filed 2018-01-03(d)

Thus § 522(d) limits the value that may be exempted, not the debtor’s interest that may be exempted. ... But addressing only the certified question before us, we hold that if, when considering any other exemptions claimed, the debtor’s entire interest in an asset is less than or equal to any dollar-value limitation imposed by the applicable § 522(d) subsection, then the debtor may exempt her 100% interest in that asset.

Section 522(b) allows a debtor to exempt an interest in property from the bankruptcy estate, but a claimed dollar-limited exemption does not exempt the entire property.

Derrick Allen Pulliam · filed 2020-04-13(b)

When the Debtor claimed an exemption in the Property on Schedule C-1, he did not exempt the Property in its entirety, and he did not remove the Property from the bankruptcy estate. He exempted his interest in the Property. Local Rule 4002-1(g)(4) governing the sale of “non-exempt” property remains applicable to any future sale of the Property, despite the Debtor’s attempt to circumvent the Rule by including the Nonstandard Provision in Section 8.1 of the Plan. ... The Nonstandard Provision is at odds with 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) and, in turn, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1C-1601(a)(1). The court also finds that the Plan has not been proposed in good faith, because it seeks impermissibly to deem property fully exempt from the Debtor’s bankruptcy estate through the use of the Nonstandard Provision.

Section 522(b)(3)(A) uses the debtor’s domicile history to select the applicable state exemption law, but the debtor’s residency for applying that law is measured as of the petition date.

In re Willis · filed 2013-05-22(b)(3)(A)

The statute additionally confirms that state law will be used as it existed on the petition date. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A) (property may be exempted under “State or local law that is applicable on the date of the filing of the petition”). ... A debtor’s residency for purposes of applying state exemption laws must be analyzed as it existed on the petition date.

Section 522(b)(3)(A) selects the applicable state’s exemption law based on the debtor’s domicile during the statutory look-back period, and the court must give effect to that state law’s residency requirements.

Candace Goldstein · filed 2021-11-19(b)(3)(A)

In light of the foregoing, this Court concludes that the most logical and plain reading of the statute requires courts to give effect to residence requirements in state exemption laws and, therefore, rejects the preemption approach.

Section 522(b)(3)(A) requires exemptions to be determined under the state law applicable to the debtor when the bankruptcy petition was filed.

TROY D. STAFFORD and XOCHITL B. STAFFORD · filed 2022-06-07(b)(3)(A)

The second reason why Debtors’ application of the snapshot rule is misplaced is because it ignores the language in 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A), and reiterated in the cases discussing the snapshot rule, that exemptions are determined in accordance with state law applicable at the time the petition was filed, not simply what state law was in effect at the time the petition was filed. This is an important distinction. The state exemption law “applicable” to Debtors at the time they filed their petition was the law in effect as of December 30, 2021. At that point, Debtors had an exemption in their “interest in real property.” Once they sold the property, their exemption “automatically attached” to the proceeds “not exceeding the value provided in subsection A” of 33-1101, which at the time was $150,000. Stated another way, the sale resulted in the fixing of the exemption as provided in the statute on the day of the sale, not a day later or 18 months later.

Section 522(b)(3)(C) allows a debtor to exempt retirement funds held in a tax-exempt § 408 account, and § 522(b)(4)(A) presumes those funds exempt when they have received a favorable IRS determination.

James Daley, Jr. v. Mostoller · filed 2013-06-17(b)(3)(C), (b)(4)(A)

A debtor may exempt “retirement funds” if they are in an “account that is exempt from taxation under section” 408 of the tax code. Id. § 522(b)(3)(C). ... If a retirement fund “has received a favorable determination” from the IRS, “those funds shall be presumed to be exempt from the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(4)(A).

Section 522(b)(3)(C) exempts retirement funds held in specified tax-exempt accounts, but a debtor must claim that exemption expressly.

Soori-Arachi v. Ferrara · filed 2021-01-14(b)(3)(C)

Here, the Debtor claimed exemptions under § 522(b)(4)(B)(i) and (ii)(II), but did not cite § 522(b)(3)(C), which provides the relevant exemption. Because the Debtor did not state a claim of exemption under § 522(b)(3)(C), he is not entitled to exempt the funds in the Fidelity Account under that statute.

Section 522(d)(11)(D) allows a debtor using the federal exemptions to exempt a payment traceable to compensation for the debtor's personal bodily injury, excluding pain and suffering and actual pecuniary loss, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor or a dependent.

In re Lee · filed 2013-07-08(d)(11)(D)

Using the federal exemptions, a debtor may exempt his right to receive an award traceable to a payment not to exceed $21,625 “on account of personal bodily injury, not including pain and suffering or compensation for actual pecuniary loss, of the debtor” or “a payment in compensation of loss of future earnings of the debtor” to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor or a dependent. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(11)(D),(E).

Section 522(d)(10)(C) covers a debtor’s right to receive disability, illness, or unemployment benefits, while § 522(d)(11)(D) covers certain payments on account of personal bodily injury; these exemptions require a qualifying right or payment and do not cover unrestricted funds already received into an HSA.

Leitch v. Christians · filed 2013-07-16(d)(10)(C) and (11)(D)

The bankruptcy court denied the exemptions because the funds in the HSA could be used for purposes other than “disability, illness, or unemployment” (and in fact, could be used for anything) and also could be used for purposes other than “personal bodily injury.” We agree. In addition, the exemptions under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(C) and (11)(D) apply only to a debtor’s “right to receive” the stated benefits. Here, Mr. Leitch has already received the money from his employer. The employer has paid the money to the HSA, and Mr. Leitch is the account owner/beneficiary with unrestricted access to the funds. Thus, there is no longer a “right to receive” the funds that are already in the account.

Section 522(d)(11)(D) exempts up to $7,500 of bodily injury payments, and section 522(d)(11)(E) exempts future earnings payments reasonably necessary for support.

Matter of Harris · filed 1985-06-10(d)(11)(D) and (d)(11)(E)

Bankruptcy Rule 4003(c) places on the objecting party the burden of proving that exemptions are not properly claimed. Hence, the court must conclude, after a careful review of the record, that the objecting parties failed to meet this burden. ... Thus, the court must conclude that the exemptions the debtor claimed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(d)(ll)(D) and (d)(ll)(E) are proper and must be allowed.

Section 522(d)(11)(D) permits a debtor to exempt a personal injury payment for serious bodily injury within the statutory limit.

Skiba v. Andrzejewski (In Re Andrzejewski) · filed 2006-03-09(d)(11)(D)

The injury warranted a $15,000 damage award. The exemptions claimed in the personal injury award will be allowed under § 522(d)(ll)(D).

Section 522(b)(3)(A) generally fixes a debtor’s bankruptcy exemption rights according to the state law in effect on the petition date.

Olsen v. Reuter (In re Reuter) · filed 2013-09-12(b)(3)(A)

Likewise, in terms of exemptions, a debtor’s rights are generally determined in accordance with the state law applicable on the filing date. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A).

Section 522(f)(1) permits avoidance of only judicial liens and certain nonpossessory, non-purchase-money security interests that impair an exemption.

Goben v. Corydon State Bank (In re Goben) · filed 2013-09-23(f)(1)

We also agree with the bankruptcy court’s statement that “11 U.S.C. [§ ] 522(f) is not available to Debtor to avoid this type of lien.” ... Nothing in the record suggests, even remotely, that the Bank’s interest in the Vehicle qualifies under any category enumerated in § 522(f)(1).

Section 522(f)(1) does not let a debtor avoid a lien created as part of the same transaction that transferred the property interest.

Hart v. Hart (In Re Hart) · filed 1985-07-16(f)(1)

In this ease, the divorce decree ordered the plaintiff to convey his interest in the family home to the defendant. The plaintiff complied with the order and quit-claimed his interest to the defendant. The divorce decree also created an equitable lien in favor of the plaintiff to secure payment of his interest in the equity in the home. The lien was created concurrent with the transfer of plaintiff's interest to the defendant pursuant to the divorce decree and order. The lien here is more in the nature of a purchase money obligation and is not avoidable under § 522(f)(1).

Section 522(d)(10)(C) and (d)(11)(D) protect only a debtor's right to receive specified benefits or payments, not funds already received and held with unrestricted access.

Leitch v. Christians (In re Leitch) · filed 2013-07-16(d)(10)(C), (d)(11)(D)

In addition, the exemptions under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(C) and (11)(D) apply only to a debtor’s right to receive the stated benefits.

Section 522(d)(10) exempts a debtor’s right to receive certain future payments, but not benefits already received.

In Re Pomar · filed 1993-08-23(d)(10)

It should be noted in this connection that § 522(d)(10) exempts the Debt- or’s right to receive future payments, but not benefits already received, unlike § 522(d)(ll), which expressly exempts the Debtor’s right to receive future payments and property already received which is traceable to the specific benefits set forth in this Section.

Section 522(d)(1) permits a debtor to exempt an aggregate interest in a residence up to the statutory amount, and for a tenancy by the entirety the debtor's interest is presumptively valued at half of the homestead's equity.

In re Bradigan · filed 2013-10-29(d)(1)

For purposes of determining the exemptible interest in property held by the entireties, we need not here decide whether a spouse can ever justify an unequal allocation based on actuarial or other considerations. In the present instance, Bra-digan has asserted a 50% interest in his homestead. Acknowledging that each spouse must necessarily possess an interest that is something less than the whole, we accept this allocation as presumptively reasonable. With no evidence to compel a different valuation, the court will recognize an interest as stated in the debtor’s schedules. Because the debtor has duly claimed a proper exemption for an aggregate interest in that amount, the trustee’s objection is overruled.

When entireties property is sold, the debtor spouse may claim the § 522 exemption against the portion of the sale proceeds allocated to the bankruptcy estate.

In re Naples · filed 2014-12-16(f)

And the debtor spouse in bankruptcy may claim his or her exemption against the portion of the proceeds allocated to the § 541 estate.

Section 522(a)(2) values exempt property at fair market value without deducting hypothetical costs of sale.

In Re Sumerell · filed 1996-04-12(a)(2)

This court having determined that value for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 522 means fair market value as that term is generally understood without any deduction for hypothetical costs, the court must determine the fair market value of the property in which the debtors are claiming their exemptions.

Section 522(a)(2) requires a single valuable household item, jewelry, and other liquid assets to be valued at fair market value.

Spencer v. Blanchard (In Re Blanchard) · filed 1996-09-23(a)(2)

We believe that a single valuable piece of household furnishings, as well as jewelry and other liquid assets, in contrast to general household goods, must be valued at fair market value.

Section 522(a)(2) values exempt property when the petition is filed; an asset fully exempt at that time leaves the estate, and its later appreciation belongs to the debtor.

Stoebner v. Wick (In Re Wick) · filed 2001-01-02(a)(2)

As Polis indicates, however, the Bankruptcy Code provides that asset values are determined on the date of fifing. ... Because Wick exempted all of the value of the contingent stock option, the contingent stock option was removed from the estate and revested in Wick.

Section 522(d)(12) allows a debtor to exempt retirement funds only while they remain in a qualifying tax-exempt account, and § 522(l) does not turn nonexistent property into exempt property merely because no one objects.

Feldman v. People First Fed. Credit Union (In re White) · filed 2019-05-07(d)(12), (1)

This does not mean, however, that the withdrawn funds were exempt and not property of the estate.

Section 522(b)(3)(C) exempts retirement funds to the extent they are held in an account that is exempt from taxation under the specified Internal Revenue Code provisions, including § 408.

Terri A. Running v. Miller · filed 2013-11-04(b)(3)(C)

Regardless of whether a debtor’s state opts out of the federal exemption scheme, § 522(b)(3)(C) of the Bankruptcy Code exempts “retirement funds to the extent that those funds are in a fund or account that is exempt from taxation under sections 401, 403, 408, 408A, 414, 457, or 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.”

Section 522(b)(3)(C) exempts qualifying tax-exempt retirement funds, while § 522(b)(4) permits exemption based on a favorable determination or, absent one, no adverse determination plus substantial compliance or lack of material debtor responsibility.

In re Gilbraith · filed 2014-12-24(b)(3)(C), (b)(4)(A), and (b)(4)(B)

Even if the Plan had not received a favorable determination, Debtors would have been entitled to the § 522(b)(3)(C) exemption. ... The Plan is presumed exempt under § 522(b)(4)(A). ... Finally, if the Plan was not in substantial compliance within the meaning of § 522(b)(4)(B)(ii)(I), Ms. Gilbraith was not materially responsible for such noncompliance so she successfully declared her marital community’s exemption in the Plan’s assets.

Section 522(b)(4)(B) permits retirement funds to remain exempt when no contrary determination exists and the fund substantially complies with the Internal Revenue Code, or the debtor is not materially responsible for noncompliance.

In re Ortiz · filed 2016-09-26(b)(4)(B)

Thus the retirement funds belonging to the Debtor held in the Defined Benefits Plan and 401-(k) Plan are exempt pursuant to Section 522(d)(12) as the Debtor has complied with Section 522(b)(4)(B) and the Hands have failed to present any evidence as to the retirement plans alleged non-compliance.

Section 522(b)(3)(C) exempts retirement funds held in a fund or account that is exempt from taxation under specified Internal Revenue Code provisions.

Corzin v. Lawson (In re Lawson) · filed 2017-03-31(b)(3)(C)

In addition, the Debtor’s contingent interest in the Plan account assets that arose by virtue of her divorce filing in Ohio state court was subject to exemption pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(C) and R.C. 2829.66(a)(10).

Section 522(d)(12) exempts retirement funds only to the extent they are held in an account exempt from taxation under the specified Internal Revenue Code provisions; an IRA funded above the annual contribution limit does not qualify.

FARBER · filed 2025-09-04(d)(12)

In view of the language of Section 522(d)(12), providing that retirement funds may be exempted only “to the extent that those funds are in a fund or account that is exempt from taxation . . . under 26 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403, 408, 408A. 414, 457, or 501(a),” and given that the Wells Fargo IRA, if it in fact was an IRA, could not have been opened in an amount in excess of $6,500 in 2018, I agree with Judge Mayer’s ruling that it was not a “qualified” or tax exempt IRA. Thus, even giving the benefit of the doubt to the debtor that she “rolled over” an IRA at Wells Fargo into the Allianz IRA annuity on April 13, 2018, that rollover did nothing to render any of the funds in that annuity validly exempt from taxation or from her bankruptcy estate.

Section 522(b)(3)(C) exempts retirement funds only to the extent they retain their tax-exempt status.

Joseph F Langston, Jr · filed 2023-07-21(b)(3)(C)

Under section 522(b)(3)(C) of the Bankruptcy Code, retirement funds are only exempt from creditors to the extent that they are exempt from taxation.

Section 522 exemptions are not yet established while the period for objecting to the debtor's exemption claims remains open.

In re Wigger · filed 2018-06-04

Therefore, because the time for objecting to exemptions has not passed, none of the Debtor's property is yet exempt.

A claimed exemption becomes effective only after the objection deadline expires without an objection.

In re Miller · filed 2013-11-14(i)

Based on § 522(i) and Rule 4003(b)(1), courts have held that a claimed exemption of property from the bankruptcy estate “becomes effective” when the deadline for objection under Rule 4003(b)(1) has expired and no objections have been filed. ... As a result, the Annuity currently is property of the bankruptcy estate. It follows that the § 362(b) exception to the automatic stay is inapplicable; the stay is in effect with respect to the Annuity.

Section 522 requires a debtor seeking bankruptcy exemptions to file a list of the property claimed as exempt.

Runaj v. Wells Fargo Bank · filed 2009-09-30

Section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code specifies the federal property exemptions available to debtors. However, to qualify for these exemptions, the Code requires that the debtor “shall file a list of property that the debtor claims as exempt.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(2009).

Section 522(b)(3)(C) protects qualifying retirement funds from the bankruptcy estate, while § 522(b)(4) does not treat an IRS audit as a favorable determination for matters the IRS did not examine and requires substantial tax-law compliance unless the debtor was not materially responsible.

Daniels v. Agin · filed 2013-11-25(b)(3)(C), (b)(4)

Even assuming that the results of an audit can serve as a favorable determination under section 522(b)(4) of those matters examined in the audit, we would reject Daniels's contention that an audit closure may be deemed to be a "favorable determination" of facts or issues of which the IRS was not made aware. ... We therefore find that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the Plan did not substantially comply with applicable tax laws. ... Having thus rejected Daniels's sole challenge to the ruling that the Plan was not in substantial compliance with the Tax Code--that the bankruptcy court's conclusion was precluded by the Plan's audit result--we affirm the judgment that the Plan assets were not exempt from the bankruptcy estate.

Section 522(b)(3)(C) exempts qualifying retirement funds; § 522(b)(4) supplies a favorable-determination presumption and, absent one, requires proof of no contrary determination and substantial compliance or lack of material responsibility.

RES-GA Dawson, LLC v. Rogers (In re Rogers) · filed 2015-09-17(b)(3)(C), (b)(4)(A), (b)(4)(B)

Based on the above, in order for Mr. Rogers to obtain summary judgment on his exemption of the Plan under § 522(b)(3)(C), he must demonstrate both that the Plan is in substantial compliance with the tax code (or, if it is not, he is not responsible for its failure) and that no prior unfavorable determination has been made by a court or the IRS.

Section 522(b)(3)(C) exempts retirement funds held in an account exempt from taxation under the listed Internal Revenue Code provisions, including qualifying TSP funds.

Gertz v. Warner (In re Warner) · filed 2017-04-14(b)(3)(C)

In addition, the Debtor’s contingent interest in the TSP account assets that arose by virtue of her divorce filing in Ohio state court was subject to exemption pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(C) and R.C. 2329.66(a)(10) and (17).

Section 522(b)(3)(C) allows an exemption for certain retirement funds only to the extent the debtor actually claims and supports the exemption.

In re Smith · filed 2017-05-12(b)(3)(C)

The parties have addressed no arguments regarding this claim, and the Court has previously held that exemptions will be allowed only to the extent they are claimed. ... Because Debtors offer no arguments to support a § 522(b)(3)(C) exemption, and because, even if exempt, they value the exempt property at $0.00, the Court declines to allow an exemption under this statute.

Section 522(b)(4)(C) and (D) preserve an exemption for certain retirement funds only when distributed funds are deposited into a qualifying tax-exempt account within 60 days.

Michael Scott Campbell · filed 2021-08-11(b)(4)(C) and (D)

First, although the parties do not dispute that the funds Michael used to pay Bettis came from an exempt retirement account, those funds lost their exempt status because they were not subsequently deposited into a qualifying tax-exempt account within sixty days of their removal, as is required by § 522(b)(4).

Section 522(b)(3)(C) does not exempt a divorce-awarded interest in an ex-spouse’s IRA or 401(k) when the interest lacks the legal characteristics of retirement funds.

Lerbakken v. Sieloff and Associates, P.A. · filed 2020-02-07(b)(3)(C)

Because Lerbakken’s interests in his ex-wife’s IRA and 401(k) are not “retirement funds” under 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(C), the bankruptcy court and the BAP correctly disallowed the exemptions from the bankruptcy estate.

Section 522(o)(4) reduces the value of a claimed homestead exemption when it is attributable to property disposed of within ten years before bankruptcy with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor, and the objecting party must prove that intent by a preponderance of the evidence.

In re Cook · filed 2013-12-02(o)(4)

In order to prevail on their § 522(o)(4) objections the Trustee and Centennial must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Cooks’ intent, when they used their tax refund to buy their home, was to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor.

Section 522(o)(4) reduces a homestead exemption by the value of nonexempt property converted into the homestead within ten years before filing with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor.

In re Roberts · filed 2015-03-11(o)(4)

The Debtors’ homestead exemption is reduced, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(o), by $394,875.28, comprised of the amounts the Debtors received from their sales of the four properties and the money from their Regions Bank Money Market Account.

Section 522(o) limits a debtor’s homestead exemption by the value added through a transfer of nonexempt property made with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors during the ten years before bankruptcy.

Bobby L. Pope, Jr. · filed 2023-08-23(o)

Section 522(o) reduces the value of a debtor’s homestead, for purposes of a state homestead exemption, to the extent of any addition to the value of the homestead on account of a disposition of nonexempt property made by the debtor—with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors—during the ten years prior to the bankruptcy filing. ... The Court ultimately finds that the Trustee has failed in his burden as to “a disposition of nonexempt property” finding that the property transferred, i.e., the $125,000.00 payment was exempt homestead proceeds. ... Accordingly, the Court holds that the $125,000.00 payment made to Sprit of Texas Bank on August 2, 2023, by the debtor was from homestead proceeds exempt from execution pursuant to the Texas Property Code from the date of sale of July 9, 2021 for a period of six months. Given the Court’s holding of homestead proceeds the Court need not reach the issue whether the disposition was with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors during the ten years prior to the bankruptcy filing.

Section 522(o) reduces the value of a homestead or residence exemption to the extent it comes from property disposed of within 10 years before filing with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor.

William M. Clark, Jr. v. Wilmoth · filed 2008-12-09(o)

The addition of § 522(o) to the Bankruptcy Code does not establish any new law in the Eighth Circuit.

Section 522(o)(4) requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the debtor intended to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor before a homestead exemption can be reduced.

DANUSSI v. Kaska · filed 2010-02-26(o)(4)

Therefore, Danussi has not come forward with sufficient proof to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Kaska intended to hinder, delay, or defraud her as provided in § 522(o)(4), and the Bankruptcy Court’s decision will be affirmed.

Section 522(o) permits a court to consider circumstances that undermine a creditor’s claim of victimization when the creditor relies on its own lawsuit to establish the debtor’s intent to hinder, delay, or defraud.

In re Wrobel · filed 2014-03-28(o)

When the creditor raising 11 U.S.C. § 522(o) asserts the existence of its own lawsuit against the Debtor as the “something more” that is necessary to establish the “intent to hinder, delay, or defraud,” it is appropriate (in this Court’s view) to consider circumstances that negate that creditor’s claim of outrage and victimization, at least where no other creditor complains of any unfair loss by reason of the Chapter 13 filing and Plan.

Section 522(b)(4)(A) exempts qualifying retirement funds, but an equitable-distribution claim that had not become a pension interest by the petition date falls outside it and is instead eligible for the § 522(d)(5) exemption, subject to its dollar limit.

Walsh ex rel. Bankruptcy Estate of Burgeson v. Burgeson (In re Burgeson) · filed 2014-01-16(b)(4)(A), (d)(5)

Under section 522(b)(4)(A), retirement funds are exempted from the bankruptcy estate if they “received a favorable determination under section 7805 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, and that determination is in effect as of the date of the filing of the petition in a case under this title.” 11 U.S.C. § 522. ... The Court therefore finds that the Debt- or cannot exempt her interest in her right to claim an equitable distribution of the marital assets pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(4)(A). The Court agrees with the Trustee that the equitable distribution claim can be exempted instead under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5). Pursuant to the order entered on January 17, 2011, the Debtor’s exemption under § 522(d)(5) is limited to $10,325.

Section 522(d)(1) does not permit a homestead exemption to attach when secured creditors’ claims consume the sale proceeds and leave no residual equity in the property.

Baldridge v. Ellmann · filed 2014-02-03(d)(1)

The district court correctly held that the $28,000 “carve out” itself, recovered by the Trustee upon closing the sale of debtors’ property, was not part of the estate that could be subject to debtors’ exemptions at the time the bankruptcy case was commenced. ... Hence, inasmuch as the sale proceeds were insufficient to satisfy the prior obligations owed to the secured creditors, there was no residual equity in the property to which debtors’ exemptions could attach.

Section 522(p)(1) imposes a 1,215-day look-back period for a debtor's homestead exemption, and parties cannot contract around that period.

Weisbart v. Shankles · filed 2014-02-12(p)(1)

We further agree with the bankruptcy court that any relevant prior deeds, conveyances, or agreements were rendered null and void ab initio, and that parties cannot contract around the 11 U.S.C. § 522(p)(1) 1,215-day “look-back” period.

Section 522(p)(1) does not limit an exemption for a homestead interest acquired before the 1,215-day period preceding the bankruptcy petition.

Robert Marcus Michelena and Monica Michelena · filed 2020-08-24(p)(1)

Conclusively, this Court finds that § 522(p)(1) is inapplicable to Debtor’s homestead exemption because that interest was acquired no later than 2014, well before the first day of the 1,215-day period preceding the filing of Debtor’s chapter 11 petition.

Section 522(c) does not prevent exempt property from losing its exempt status when a state-law restriction applies or the property changes character.

Viegelahn v. Frost (In Re Frost) · filed 2014-03-05(c)

Adopting Frost’s argument would require rejecting this court’s determination in Zibman that § 522(c) does not prevent exempt property from losing its exempt status. If § 522(c) requires strict enforcement of the “snapshot rule” such that property exempted at the moment of filing can never be liable—regardless of restrictions placed on that exemption by state law or a change in the essential character of the property—then the proceeds from the sale in Zibman would have been exempted indefinitely, despite the six month limitation on that exception. Frost’s reading of the statute is in conflict with Zibman and cannot be accepted.

Section 522(f)(1) allows a debtor to avoid a judicial lien impairing an exemption the debtor would have been entitled to claim even if the debtor did not actually claim that exemption.

In re Schmidtke · filed 2014-03-11(f)(1)

a debtor may utilize § 522(f) to avoid a judicial lien without claiming the related exemption.

Section 522(c) protects exempt property from prepetition debts except for the statute’s specified exceptions, so a state cannot add conflicting debt-based limits to an exemption in bankruptcy.

In re Kyle · filed 2014-05-14(c)

However, subsection (c) and the other subsections of § 522 apply independently to all exemptions, whether of state or federal origin, and built in limitations to state exemptions must yield to these bankruptcy provisions.

Section 522(b) makes bankruptcy exemptions a matter of federal law and permits using either the federal exemption scheme, including § 522(d), or applicable state-law exemptions under § 522(b)(3).

In re Sinclair · filed 2017-02-14(b)

Congress created under the Bankruptcy Code a federal asset exemption scheme for debtors. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b). The exemptions allowed as a matter of federal law arising under the Bankruptcy Code are computed in one of two ways. One method is using the dollar amounts and exemptions provided in 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2), (d) and (n), the federal exemption scheme. The second computational method is using the state law exemption scheme to determine the items and dollar amounts which may be claimed exempt under federal law. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3). ... Whether the federal exemption scheme or the applicable state law exemption scheme identifies the items and amounts to be used in determining the allowable bankruptcy exemptions, this is a federal law grant of exemptions under the Bankruptcy Code as part of the uniform bankruptcy laws to which Congress is given the sole authority to promulgate under Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 of the United States Constitution. Determination of exemptions is a federal law matter arising under the Bankruptcy Code—a core proceeding for which the bankruptcy judge issues the final order.

Section 522(b)(3)(A) may select a state's exemption law without barring a nonresident debtor from electing federal exemptions when that state's opt-out law applies only to residents.

In Re Beckwith · filed 2011-03-31(b)(3)(A)

This Court finds that a debtor who resides in Ohio but who is forced into using a Florida exemption pursuant to § 522(b)(3)(A) may elect federal exemptions listed in § 522(d).

Section 522(b)(3) permits a debtor domiciled in an opt-out state to claim exemptions under § 522(d) when the domiciliary rules in § 522(b)(3)(A) make the debtor ineligible for the domicile's exemptions, even if the debtor can claim an exemption for tenancy-by-the-entirety property under § 522(b)(3)(B).

In re Capelli · filed 2014-09-29(b)(3)

In summary, the court finds that the legislative history and intent behind § 522(b)(3), and particularly the concluding sentence thereof, makes clear that “ineligible for any exemption” means “ineligible for [any single] exemption [under subparagraph (A) ].”

Section 522(p)(1)(A) limits a debtor’s homestead exemption for qualifying interests acquired within 1,215 days before filing, and the cap applies even in states that require debtors to use state-law exemptions.

Kane v. Zions Bancorporation, N.A. · filed 2022-09-29(p)(1)(A)

I agree with the conclusions reached in Virissimo, Kane, and numerous other cases: the statutory cap set forth in section 522(p) applies to opt-out states such as California.

Section 522(p)(1) caps a debtor’s homestead exemption for a homestead acquired within 1,215 days before the petition, but the cap must be enforced through a timely objection.

In re: Jose Ramon Pelucarte and Monica Franco · filed 2025-10-16(p)(1)

Because the Trustee failed to object to the Debtors’ claimed homestead exemption before expiration of the agreed-to deadline, the Trustee waived the right to object under 522(p)(1). Consequently, the Debtors’ homestead exemption is allowed “whether or not [the Debtors] had a colorable statutory basis for claiming it”, even if the value of the equity above the first mortgage exceeds the statutory limit of $189,000.

Section 522(p)(1) caps each debtor’s Texas homestead exemption for an interest in property acquired within 1,215 days before the bankruptcy petition.

Fehmel v. Union State Bank · filed 2010-04-05(p)(1)

In other words, § 522(p)(1) caps Texas’s homestead exemption at $136,875 per debtor for any interest in property acquired 1,215 or fewer days before the petition date (the “lookback period”).

Section 522(d)(10)(E) does not permit exemption of pension proceeds when the debtor lacks a direct right to payment under the pension plan.

In re Byrne · filed 2015-11-13(d)(10)(E)

Simply put, the Debtor does not have a ... right to payment ... under the pension plan.

Section 522(q)(1)(B)(i) caps a debtor’s homestead exemption at the statutory amount when the debtor owes a debt arising from a violation of federal or state securities laws.

Steven Gerald Papermaster · filed 2026-03-02(q)(1)(B)(i)

The agreed judgment establishes a debt based on Texas Securities Act violations, which is sufficient to trigger application of § 522(q)(1)(B)(i), even if some of the other claims asserted against him and decided in the agreed judgment might not have triggered § 522(q). ... In sum, Race and Leap successfully met their burden and proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Papermaster owes a debt arising from a violation of state securities laws. Under § 522(q)(1)(B)(i), then, his homestead exemption is limited to the statutory cap of $214,000.

Section 522(q)(1)(B)(i) caps a debtor’s state-law homestead exemption when the debtor owes a debt arising from a state securities-law violation.

In re Bounds · filed 2013-04-24(q)(1)(B)(i)

As such, the Trustee and Fernea have shown that Bounds committed a securities violation under state security law, thereby satisfying the requirements of section 522(q)(l)(B)(i).

Section 522 does not authorize a bankruptcy court to deny a debtor’s exemption claim on a ground not specified in the Bankruptcy Code.

Rucker v. Belew · filed 2018-09-06

Having reviewed the matter de novo, we agree with the bankruptcy court: A bankruptcy court has no authority under federal law to deny a debtor's claim of exemptions on a ground that is not specified in the bankruptcy code.

Section 522 does not permit a bankruptcy court to disallow an exemption for bad faith, fraudulent concealment, or a fraudulent transfer through equitable powers alone; disallowance requires a statutory basis.

In re Hurt · filed 2015-12-31

the court may not refuse to honor that exemption without a statutory basis for doing so.

Section 522 does not let a bankruptcy court deny an otherwise valid exemption based solely on a debtor’s bad faith or fraud; a denial requires a valid statutory or applicable state-law basis.

In re Castellano · filed 2016-04-25(b)(1)

A debtor need not invoke an exemption to which the statute entitles him; but if he does, the court may not refuse to honor the exemption absent a valid statutory basis for doing so.

Section 522 does not permit a bankruptcy court to deny an exemption amendment solely because the debtor acted in bad faith when no statutory exception authorizes that denial.

Rucker v. Belew · filed 2019-11-26

We conclude that Law abrogates Kaelin and precludes the denial of an amendment to a schedule of claimed exemptions based on a debtor’s bad faith.

Section 522(b) prescribes exemptions that a bankruptcy court may not deny merely because it considers the property unnecessary.

In Re Higginbotham · filed 1990-03-13(b)

The Court may not deny exemptions prescribed by the Legislature, 11 U.S.C. § 522(b), 31 O.S.A. § 1(B), merely because the Court considers them to be unnecessary; but the Court may consider debtors’ disposition of any and all of their property, exempt or otherwise, as part of the pattern of legal and economic behavior that goes to make a substantial abuse of the provisions of 11 U.S.C. Chapter 7.

An order allowing or denying judicial-lien avoidance under § 522(f) remains final and enforceable after conversion to another chapter unless the bankruptcy case is dismissed, so the same lien cannot be relitigated in the same case.

In re Phillips · filed 2016-07-08(f)(1)

An order either allowing or denying avoidance of judicial lien under § 522(f) is a final order and shall remain valid and enforceable unless the case in which the order was entered is dismissed.

Section 522(q)(1)(B)(iv) includes sexual assault of a minor as a criminal act causing serious physical injury, even without an allegation of actual physical injury.

In re Sinclair · filed 2016-09-07(q)(1)(B)(iv)

And, this Court finds that as a matter of law, a crime of violence is equivalent to § 522(q)(l)(B)(iv)’s “criminal act ... [causing] serious physical injury.” Thus, this Court finds that Mr. Sinclair’s conduct falls within the conduct described in § 522(q)(l)(B)(iv).

Section 522 permits a debtor to exempt assets from the bankruptcy estate, but a claimed exemption for a cause of action must be described with enough detail to alert the trustee to the claim.

Ricketts v. Strange · filed 2017-02-16

Nevertheless, 11 U.S.C. § 522 allows a debtor to exempt assets from the bankruptcy estate and hold this property free from claims of the trustee and creditors. ... Section 522(d) of Title 11 of the United States Code sets out the federal exemption schedule, but Virginia elected to “opt-out” of these federal exemptions pursuant to § 522(b)(2). ... Ricketts’s overly general and misplaced exemption language did not exempt her cause of action from the bankruptcy estate. While there are no “bright-line rules” a debtor must follow to exempt a cause of action, the schedules must contain sufficient detail to lead the trustee to the claim ultimately asserted. Ricketts’s schedules do not.

Section 522(d) permits an exemption based on state-law redemption rights only when there is residual equity in the property after satisfaction of secured claims.

Brown v. Ellmann · filed 2017-03-20(d)

Since Brown points to no authority contrary to our holding in Baldridge, we adhere to the rule articulated in that case: Section 522 will not support an exemption on the basis of state-law redemption rights in a piece of property if the proceeds from the sale of that property are “insufficient to satisfy the prior obligations owed to the secured creditors.” Baldridge, 553 F. App’x at 599. It is undisputed that the $160,000 in proceeds from the sale of the Ypsilanti property were insufficient to satisfy the $219,000 in secured claims held by the two mortgage creditors. Consequently, we affirm the bankruptcy court’s denial of Brown’s request for exemptions under § 522 on the basis of her redemption rights under Michigan law because there was no “residual equity” in the Ypsilanti property to which Brown’s claimed exemptions could attach.