Statute Annotations › Federal › 11 U.S.C. § 522

11 U.S.C. § 522

Property exempt from estate: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Federal
Case notes
4,569
Cited in passing
2,652
Citing cases indexed
14,616
Case dates
1979–2026
Screened through
2026-06-24
Checked for later law changes
2026-10-10
Courts' treatment: questioned
At least one reviewed case questions this section’s validity or scope. The reviewed cases disagree about § 522(f)’s retroactive application to pre-enactment security interests, and also disagree about whether ERISA’s anti-alienation provision is “other federal law” under § 522(b)(2)(A). Hoops held retroactive application unconstitutional, while Baker upheld it as applied to pre-effective-date liens.
More on this status

Arcement and Shaker rejected the ERISA exemption, while Vickers upheld a state exemption for reasonably necessary pension benefits. VanMeter held an Indiana pension exemption statute preempted by ERISA, but did not hold § 522 preempted or invalid. Applebaum classified a stipulated-judgment lien as judicial under § 522(f)(1); Balsamo confirmed that an unavoided lien survives discharge; and Schlein rejected ERISA preemption of a state exemption authorized by § 522(b)(2)(A). LaBarge resolved the exemption issue under § 541(c)(2) and Missouri law rather than deciding § 522; Branch discussed the filing-date rule and a state exemption without holding § 522 invalid; Jajuga used § 522 to explain an exemption while the “repealed” statute was a different one; In re Williams concerned § 1322 and Nobelman, not § 522; Bartlett upheld applying the increased homestead exemption under § 522(f)(1); and Foster held an Indiana exemption statute unconstitutional, not § 522. Printy held that ERISA did not preempt a state IRA exemption authorized by § 522; and Pladson rejected a lower-court interpretation that would have denied California debtors the state homestead exemption. Harrell applied § 522(g) and § 522(l) to a concealed transfer and untimely objection, but did not invalidate § 522. None supports a stronger status. Ballirano held that § 522(c) preempts specified state-law homestead exceptions, which supports the existing questioned status but does not establish that § 522 itself is preempted. Yasipour used “invalidates” for an exemption amendment, not for § 522. Ferns used “repeal” and “superseded” for the Bankruptcy Act and § 541, not § 522. No stronger status was confirmed.

This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

7,221 citing cases reviewed of 14,616 in the citation index: 4,569 interpreted the section (annotated below), 2,652 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-06-24 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under 11 U.S.C. § 522?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Later changes in law

Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".

  • 1982-11-30 United States v. Security Industrial Bank held § 522(f)(2) does not reach security interests established before the 1978 Act's enactment; it avoided the constitutional question. Source
  • 1984-07-10 Pub. L. 98-353 barred joint debtors from mixing federal and state exemption schemes and changed § 522(c) and the federal household-goods and wildcard exemptions; the relevant changes generally applied to cases filed from October 8, 1984. Source
  • 1986-10-27 Pub. L. 99-554 corrected two clerical errors in § 522(h)(1) and (i)(2), without changing the exemption rules. Source
  • 1990-11-29 Pub. L. 101-647 added § 522(c)(3), preserving liability of exempt property for specified depository-institution misconduct debts. Source
  • 1991-05-23 Farrey v. Sanderfoot held that § 522(f)(1) cannot avoid a lien that fixed when the debtor acquired the relevant property interest in a divorce decree. Source
  • 1991-05-23 Owen v. Owen held that § 522(f)(1) tests the exemption the debtor would have had without the lien, even when state law denies an exemption because the lien predates it. Source
  • 1992-04-21 Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz held an unobjected exemption effective after the Rule 4003 deadline even when the claim lacked a valid statutory basis. Source
  • 1994-10-22 Pub. L. 103-394 raised federal exemption amounts, added the § 522(f)(2) impairment formula and support-lien exception, and added § 522(f)(3)'s tools-of-trade limit; these changes apply to cases begun on or after this date. Source
  • 1998-04-10 Martin v. Cox reversed the rule requiring a debtor to claim part of the homestead exemption before using the unused amount under § 522(d)(5). Source
  • 2000-11-01 Pub. L. 106-420 added § 522(c)(4), preserving liability of exempt property for specified education-financing fraud debts. Source
  • 2005-04-04 Rousey v. Jacoway held that qualifying IRAs can satisfy § 522(d)(10)(E)'s age-payment requirement despite an early-withdrawal penalty. Source
  • 2005-04-20 Pub. L. 109-8 added retirement-fund exemptions, changed the state-exemption domicile test from 180 to 730 days, defined household goods for lien avoidance, expanded domestic-support protection, and added homestead limits in §§ 522(o)-(q); most provisions took effect October 17, 2005, while §§ 522(o), (p), and (q) apply to cases begun on or after April 20, 2005. Source
  • 2010-06-17 Schwab v. Reilly held that matching scheduled property and exemption dollar values ordinarily claims only the stated interest, leaving excess value in the estate absent a clear claim to the entire asset. Source
  • 2010-12-22 Pub. L. 111-327 made technical wording corrections in § 522(b)(3)(A) and (c)(1), without changing the exemption rules. Source
  • 2014-03-04 Law v. Siegel held that a bankruptcy court cannot use equitable powers to surcharge or deny an exemption on grounds that conflict with § 522; statutory limits and applicable state-law limits still govern. Source
  • 2014-06-12 Clark v. Rameker held that a nonspousal inherited IRA is not “retirement funds” under § 522(b)(3)(C) or (d)(12), despite its tax treatment. Source
  • 2016-11-14 The Eighth Circuit reversed the BAP in CRP Holdings A-1, LLC v. O'Sullivan: § 522(f)(1) can avoid an existing unenforceable lien, but cannot avoid a judgment that created no lien under state law. Source
  • 2025-04-01 The Judicial Conference raised the dollar amounts in § 522(d), (f)(3), (f)(4), (n), (p), and (q) for cases begun on or after this date; earlier § 104 adjustments also changed those caps. Source

Retirement funds under subsection (d)(12)

Section 522(b)(3)(C) protects retirement funds only while they remain in a tax-exempt fund or account, while § 522(b)(4)(D) preserves that status for an eligible rollover completed within 60 days.

Richard N. Berkshire · filed 2026-03-04(b)(3)(C), (b)(4)(D)

When the debtor withdrew the IRA funds, the withdrawn funds were no longer in a fund or account exempt from taxation. ... The exception does not apply. The debtor’s withdrawals were paid to Mr. Bachman. They were not rolled over.
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Section 522(b)(4)(D)(ii) requires an IRA rollover distribution to comply with applicable Internal Revenue Code limits, including the rule allowing only one tax-free rollover in a one-year period, for the distribution to remain exempt from the bankruptcy estate.

In Re Patrick · filed 2008-10-31(b)(4)(D)(ii)

The IRC’s rule that only one tax free rollover can be made in a one-year period applies in determining whether a rolled-over distribution is exempt from the bankruptcy estate under § 522(b)(4)(D)(ii).
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Law changed since Clark v. Rameker (2014) held that nonspousal inherited IRAs are not retirement funds under § 522(b)(3)(C) or (d)(12), despite tax-exempt account status.

Section 522(d)(12) exempts retirement funds in a tax-exempt account even when the funds originated as another person's retirement funds, and a direct trustee-to-trustee transfer does not destroy the exemption.

Doeling v. Nessa (In re Nessa) · filed 2010-04-09§ 522(d)(12), § 522(b)(4)(C)

Accordingly, section 522(d)(12) imposes two requirements before a debtor may claim an exemption under that section: (1) the amount the debtor seeks to exempt must be retirement funds; and (2) the retirement funds must be in an account that is exempt from taxation under one of the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code set forth therein.
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For a debtor using a state exemption under section 522(b)(3)(A), federal law fixes the filing date that controls while state law defines the exemption's nature and scope.

CFCU Community Credit Union v. Hayward · filed 2009-01-09§ 522(b)(3)(A)

Thus, while federal law governs the date on which the exemption comes into play, New York law governs the nature and scope of the exemption.
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Property exempted under section 522 remains liable for a child-support judgment lien that cannot be avoided under subsection (f).

Rupp v. Elmasri (In re Elmasri) · filed 2010-03-16§ 522(c), § 522(f)(1)(A)(i)

the court properly ordered the Trustee to release the funds to Appellees.
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A judicial lien on property that the debtor owned before a divorce and continued to own afterward is avoidable under section 522(f).

Matter of Parrish · filed 1993-11-15§ 522(f)(1)

Since Parrish's interest existed before the divorce and continued unaltered afterwards, we find that the lien attaching to that property was avoidable under section 522.
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Section 522(f) permits avoidance of qualifying nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money liens on exempt property, and a Chapter 13 trustee has standing to seek that avoidance; states define the exempt property but federal law defines the avoidable liens.

Matter of Maddox · filed 1994-03-16§ 522(f), § 522(b)

We answer both questions affirmatively.
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To avoid a lien under section 522(f)(1), the debtor must show a judicial lien fixed against the debtor's property interest that impairs an exemption, and a recorded lien can impair a homestead exemption by clouding title even without attaching to the homestead.

Matter of Henderson · filed 1994-04-20§ 522(f)(1)

a debtor must show: (1) that the lien is a judicial lien; (2) that the lien is fixed against an interest of the debtor in property; and (3) that the lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would otherwise be entitled.
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A debtor may exempt an IRA under § 522(d)(10)(E) to the extent it is reasonably necessary for the debtor's support.

Rawlinson v. Kendall (In Re Rawlinson) · filed 1997-05-30(d)(10)(E)

By the terms of the statute, the debtors may exempt an IRA to the extent that it is reasonably necessary for support.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 522(b)(3)(C) exempts retirement funds held in an account tax-exempt under specified Internal Revenue Code provisions, and an inherited IRA qualifies when it remains in such an account.

In Re Kuchta · filed 2010-04-16(b)(3)(C)

Therefore, the debtor’s inherited IRA is determined to be exempt under the federal exemption.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 522(d)(12) permits a debtor to exempt retirement funds held in a tax-exempt account, and section 522(b)(4)(C) preserves that exemption after a qualifying direct transfer, including into an inherited IRA.

Chilton v. Moser · filed 2011-03-16(d)(12), (b)(4)(C)

As previously noted, the Bankruptcy Court did not have the benefit of considering these five cases in making its decision. ... the court concludes that: (1) the funds in an inherited IRA are “retirement funds” within the meaning of Section 522(d)(12), and (2) the inherited IRA is tax-exempt under 26 U.S.C. § 408(e). Therefore, the inherited IRA can be exempted under Section 522(d)(12).
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Section 522(d)(12) exempts retirement funds only when they are held in a tax-exempt account, and § 522(b)(4)(C) preserves that exemption for direct transfers between qualified accounts.

In Re Rice · filed 2011-08-02(d)(12) and (b)(4)(C)

Accordingly, § 522(d)(12) imposes two requirements before a debtor may claim an exemption under that section: (1) the amount the debtor seeks to exempt must be retirement funds; and (2) the retirement funds must be in an account that is exempt from taxation under one of the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code set forth therein. ... Here, there was simply no direct transfer from one qualified account to another. Therefore, § 522(b)(4)(C) does not apply and the funds are not exempt under § 522(d)(12).
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Section 522(d)(12) requires retirement funds to be in a tax-exempt account; a judgment, traceable funds, or a right to receive funds does not qualify for the exemption.

In re Pellegrini · filed 2012-01-17(d)(12)

Assuming arguendo that a judgment can constitute a “fund,” it is not exempt from taxation. Further, § 522(d)(12) does not permit an exemption on “traceable” funds or the Debtor’s “right to receive” funds.
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Section 522(d)(12) allows a debtor to exempt retirement funds held in an account exempt from taxation under specified Internal Revenue Code provisions, including § 408.

In Re Seeling · filed 2012-05-24(d)(12)

This Court finds itself in agreement with what appears to be a consensus. Individual retirement accounts are tax exempt under 26 U.S.C. § 408 and accordingly are exempt under the Bankruptcy Code, pursuant to § 522(d)(12). The Bankruptcy Code requires no forensic analysis in order to determine from where those funds arose. All that the Bankruptcy Code requires is that the funds sought to be invested have been placed in a particular form of a retirement investment vehicle in order to be exempt from taxation. The subject IRA being among the kinds of investment vehicles referenced in § 522(d)(12), there is no statutory basis for imposing additional conditions for its bankruptcy exemption.
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Section 522(d)(12) exempts retirement funds only when they are in a qualifying tax-exempt account, while § 522(b)(4)(C) preserves the exemption for direct transfers between qualifying retirement accounts and does not cover a transfer to cash.

Rice v. Allard (In re Rice) · filed 2012-09-06(d)(12), (b)(4)(C)

11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(12) permits a debtor to exempt “Retirement funds to the extent that those funds are in a fund or account that is exempt from taxation under section 401, 403, 408, 408A, 414, 457, or 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.” This exemption contains two requirements: (1) that the amount must be retirement funds; and (2) that the retirement funds must be in an account that is exempt from taxation under one of the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code set forth therein. ... 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(4)(C) provides: ... A direct transfer of retirement funds from 1 fund or account that is exempt from taxation under section 401, 403, 408, 408A, 414, 457, or 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, under section 401(a)(31) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or otherwise, shall not cease to qualify for exemption under paragraph (3)(C) or subsection (d)(12) by reason of such direct transfer. ... As noted by the Bankruptcy Court, this section has been applied in situations involving a direct transfer from one qualified account to another qualified account. ... This court agrees with the Bankruptcy Court’s findings that § 522(b)(4)(C) does not apply here and that the funds at issue are not exempt under § 522(d)(12).
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Section 522(b)(3)(C) and (d)(12) exempt retirement funds with tax-deferred status, but a non-spousal inherited IRA does not qualify because it is available for current consumption rather than reserved for the owner’s retirement.

Rameker v. Clark · filed 2013-04-23(b)(3)(C) and (d)(12)

Section 522(b)(3)(C) and (d)(12) provides that the exemption depends on the conjunction of tax deferral and assets’ status as “retirement funds”; that an inherited IRA provides tax benefits is not enough.
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Section 522(d)(12) permits a debtor to exempt retirement funds held in a tax-exempt account; the funds need not be held in an account belonging to the debtor, and a qualified domestic relations order is not required for the funds to qualify.

In re Remia · filed 2013-12-20(d)(12)

Section 522(d)(12) of the Bankruptcy Code requires only that funds be in a fund or account exempt from taxation.
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Section 522(d)(12) permits a debtor to exempt retirement funds only to the extent they are held in a fund or account exempt from taxation under the specified Internal Revenue Code provisions.

In re Kellerman · filed 2015-05-26(d)(12)

Thus, the debtors may not claim any interest in the IRA as exempt under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(12) of the United States Bankruptcy Code.
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Section 522(d)(12) does not exempt funds in divorce-related alternate-payee retirement accounts when the accounts are not objectively set aside for the debtor’s retirement.

In re Kizer · filed 2015-10-02(d)(12)

Thus, the funds at issue in this case cannot be considered “retirement funds” within the meaning of the § 522(d)(12) exemption.
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Section 522(d)(12) exempts retirement funds held in accounts tax-exempt under specified IRC provisions, subject under § 522(b)(4) to a favorable determination or proof of substantial compliance or lack of material responsibility.

Chorches v. Jie Xiao (In re Jie Xiao) · filed 2018-08-22(d)(12), (b)(4)(A), and (b)(4)(B)

Section 522(b)(4)(A) provides that if the retirement fund has received a favorable determination, and that determination is in effect as of the petition date, those funds shall be presumed to be exempt from the bankruptcy estate.
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Section 522(d)(12) exempts retirement funds only when they are both retirement funds and held in an account exempt from taxation under one of the specified Internal Revenue Code provisions.

Lerbakken v. Sieloff and Associates · filed 2018-10-16(d)(12)

§522(d)(12) contains two requirements: (1) that the amount must be retirement funds; and (2) that the retirement funds must be in an account that is exempt from taxation under one of the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code set forth therein.
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Section 522(d)(12) exempts retirement funds only when the funds are held in an account exempt from taxation under a specified Internal Revenue Code provision, and both requirements must be met.

Lerbakken v. Sieloff & Assocs., P.A. (In re Lerbakken) · filed 2018-10-16(d)(12)

(d)(12) contains two requirements: (1) that the amount must be retirement funds; and (2) that the retirement funds must be in an account that is exempt from taxation under one of the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code set forth therein.
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Section 522(d)(12) exempts retirement funds only when they remain in a qualifying tax-exempt fund or account; distributed funds lose the exemption unless timely rolled over into another eligible fund.

Ostrander v. Angilene Brown · filed 2020-05-21(d)(12)

“[A]n exemption claimed under [§] 522(d)(12) must satisfy two requirements: (1) the amount the debtor seeks to exempt must be retirement funds, and (2) those retirement funds must be in an account that is exempt from taxation under section 401, 403, 408, 408A, 414, 457, or 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code.” ... “As of the petition date, the loan proceeds that the Debtor attempts to exempt were no longer “in” one of the tax-exempt funds listed in § 522(d)(12).” ... “Therefore, the $18,000 cannot be exempted from estate property.”
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Section 522(d)(12) permits a debtor to exempt retirement funds only to the extent they are held in an account exempt from taxation under specified Internal Revenue Code sections.

Stephanie Paula Farber · filed 2022-04-26(d)(12)

That would likewise mean that the annuity is not exempt from the bankruptcy estate: “[A debtor may exempt] retirement funds to the extent that those funds are in a fund or account that is exempt from taxation under section 401, 403, 408, 408A, 414, 457, or 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.” 11 U.S.C. §522(d)(12) (emphasis added); ... This is the critical question when determining the exemption under §522(d)(12). ... What is clear is that the excess contribution gave rise to tax liability and precluded the tax-exempt status of the account beyond the $6,500.00 limit. Neither the rollover of the annuity nor the passage of time affected this status. By definition then, the Debtor’s current IRA is not tax exempt. As a result, the Bankruptcy Code exemption for retirements funds is unavailable to the Debtor. ... The Debtor’s exemption under 11 U.S.C. §522(d)(12) is disallowed in its entirety.
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Section 522(b)(4) preserves the exemption for a qualifying IRA rollover when the distributed funds are placed in a qualifying account within 60 days.

Joseph F Langston, Jr · filed 2023-08-07(b)(4)(C), (b)(4)(D)

Section 522(b)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code directs how exemption law applies when there is a “rollover distribution” where the owner of an IRA receives a distribution and then places the money in a new IRA, or returns the money to the old IRA, within 60 days.
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Section 522(d)(12) permits exemption of retirement funds only while they are in an account exempt from taxation under the Internal Revenue Code; an IRA that loses that tax-exempt status does not qualify.

William Glenn Johns · filed 2024-03-26(d)(12)

Johns’s IRA does not substantially comply with the Internal Revenue Code because of the prohibited transactions in violation of I.R.C. § 408(e). Johns played a major role in the orchestration of prohibited transactions—including the negotiating and arranging of financing with disqualified persons that was used to effectively shift value to his IRA. Johns’s IRA loses its tax-exempt status and thus does not qualify as exempt under § 522(d)(12) of the Bankruptcy Code.
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Section 522(d)(12) allows debtors to exempt retirement funds only when the funds are in an account exempt from taxation under specified Internal Revenue Code provisions.

Kellerman v. Rice (In re Barry K.) · filed 2015-09-14(d)(12)

The transactions occurred on August 8, and December 5 of 2007. Therefore, the IRA lost its exempt status as of January 1, 2007, which is prior in time to the filing of bankruptcy and the Kellermans cannot include the IRA as an exempt asset under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(12).
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Finality of claimed exemptions under subsection (l)

Law changed since Schwab (2010) held that matching scheduled property and exemption dollar values ordinarily exempt only the stated amount, not later excess value.

Under § 522(l), when the debtor lists the property and exemption at the same value and the trustee does not timely object, the property becomes fully exempt even if its later market value is higher.

In Re Reilly · filed 2008-07-21(l), (d)(5), (d)(6)

But once Rule 4003’s 30-day period elapsed without Schwab filing an objection or a request for an extension, the property became fully exempt from the bankruptcy estate regardless of its ultimate market value.
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Section 522(l) requires a written exemption list; an oral disclosure at the creditors’ meeting alone does not start the objection period.

Foster v. Moore (In Re Moore) · filed 1994-11-15§ 522(l)

Accordingly, the court determines that because the debtors’ Schedule C failed to even list the words “lump sum or annuity as a claimed exemption, the debtor’s subsequent oral disclosure at the § 341 meeting failed to put the Trustee “on notice” and did not commence the running of the thirty-day period under Fed.R.Bankr.P. 4003(b).
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A late objection cannot defeat a claimed exemption even when the claim lacks merit or a statutory basis.

Coie v. Sadkin (In Re Sadkin) · filed 1994-11-02§ 522(l)

Thus, we find no basis for striking the exemption.
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A creditor’s objection filed after the Rule 4003(b) deadline cannot defeat an exemption, even if the debtor lacked a colorable statutory basis for claiming it.

Coie v. Sadkin (In re Sadkin) · filed 1994-11-02§ 522(l)

Section 522(l) therefore has made the property exempt. [A trustee] cannot contest the exemption at this time whether or not [the debtor] had a colorable statutory basis for claiming it.
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A bankruptcy court may not extend the thirty-day period for objections to exemptions after the period prescribed by Rule 4003(b) has expired.

Matter of Stoulig · filed 1995-02-24§ 522(l)

the bankruptcy court was without jurisdiction to grant an extension of time to file objections to exemptions after the expiration of the thirty-day period prescribed by rule 4003(b).
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A federal tax lien notice may be “properly filed” for section 522(c)(2)(B) even when it contains a minor tax-year error, if it is filed in the proper place and correctly identifies the taxpayer, property, amount, and assessment date.

Sills v. United States · filed 1996-05-03§ 522(c)(2)(B)

Although the NFTL at issue in this case incorrectly identified 1986, instead of 1983, as the tax year of the liability giving rise to the lien, the NFTL was filed in the proper place and correctly identified the taxpayer, the property and its location, the amount owed, and the date of the assessment.
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An IRA is exempt under section 522(d)(10)(E) when it is reasonably necessary for the debtor’s support; the ability to withdraw before age 59½ by paying a penalty tax does not defeat the exemption.

Carmichael v. Osherow · filed 1996-11-14§ 522(d)(10)(E)

Concluding that IRAs are exempt under the applicable provision, we reverse and render.
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Section 522(a) prevents a disguised security arrangement from extending after the bankruptcy petition.

McKinney v. Taff · filed 1998-01-12§ 522(a)

For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court.
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If no one objects within the applicable period, the property is deemed exempt under § 522(l).

In Re De Kleinman · filed 1994-09-26§ 522(l)

If no one objects, the property is deemed to be exempt.
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Untimely objections in the Chapter 11 phase remain barred after conversion to Chapter 7.

In Re Brown · filed 1995-02-24l

Without it, a Chapter 7 trustee’s objections to exemptions that have not been timely objected to in the Chapter 11 are invalid.
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Section 522(l) requires a debtor to list claimed exempt property, which becomes exempt unless a party in interest timely objects.

In Re DeSoto · filed 1995-05-15(l)

The Code directs that a debtor shall file a list of property that the debtor claims as exempt.
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Section 522(l) requires the debtor to list claimed exempt property, and property not included on that list does not become exempt by operation of law.

Robert A. Mercer, Jr., Debtor v. Jason Monzack, Esquire · filed 1995-04-25(l)

regardless whether a Rule 4003(b) objection was filed.
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Once a claimed exemption becomes final because no party objects within 30 days, the property is no longer part of the bankruptcy estate.

In Re Penniston · filed 1997-04-01(l)

Since no one objected to the claim of exemption within 30 days of the conclusion of the meeting of creditors, the property became exempt in June of 1995. 11 U.S.C. § 522(Z) and Fed.R.Bankr.P. 4003(b).
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A claimed exemption that was not timely objected to is not contestable as a claim, but it does not create property or authorize payment when no corresponding exempt property exists.

Matter of Carter · filed 1997-09-30(l)

The claim of such exemptions does not result in monies or properties of the bankruptcy estate being exempted out of the estate and reverting to the debtor.
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Section 522(l) requires a debtor to schedule claimed exempt property, and the exemption becomes exempt unless a party in interest timely objects.

In Re Wallace · filed 2000-03-22§ 522(l)

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(1), as a prerequisite to a proper claim of exemption, the debtor must schedule the claimed exemption in the schedules filed with the bankruptcy court.
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Section 522(l) makes property claimed as exempt exempt unless a party in interest timely objects; an adjourned § 341(a) meeting does not conclude merely because no future date is specified, so the objection period has not begun.

In Re John Douglas Smith · filed 2000-08-08(l)

Section 522(l) of the Bankruptcy Code states the procedure for claiming exemptions and objecting to claimed exemptions: "The debtor shall file a list of property that the debtor claims as exempt . . . . Unless a party in interest objects, the property claimed as exempt on such list is exempt." 11 U.S.C. S 522(l). ... If a meeting of creditors is adjourned, however, the thirty-day period for objections does not begin to run. ... We hold that an adjournment of a S 341(a) hearing does not conclude the hearing merely due to the absence of a future specified date.
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Section 522(l) makes property claimed as exempt exempt unless a party in interest timely objects.

Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz Wendell G. Freeland Richard F. Kronz · filed 1991-07-08(l)

We will adhere to the clear and orderly scheme Congress enacted for property exemption determinations and hold that in the absence of an objection filed within thirty days after the section 341(a) creditors’ meeting or the filing of an amendment to the exemption list, property claimed as exempt by the debtor is exempt.
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Section 522(l) makes a claimed exemption presumptively valid, but that presumption ends when a party in interest challenges the claim.

In Re Jordan · filed 2005-09-26(l)

The amendment merely serves as notice of the claim of exemption and the presumption of the validity of the amended claim evaporates as soon as a party in interest challenges that claim. 11 U.S.C. § 522(l).
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Section 522(b) permits an individual debtor to exempt qualifying property from the estate, and § 522(l) makes property claimed as exempt exempt unless a party in interest objects.

Jimenez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In Re Jimenez) · filed 2005-12-21(b), (l)

Plaintiffs exemption is presumed valid unless a party in interest objects. Rule 4003(c). Section 522(b) states, ... Notwithstanding section 541 of this title, an individual debtor may exempt from property of the estate the property listed in either paragraph (1) or, in the alternative, paragraph (2) of this subsection. ... 11 U.S.C. § 522(b). “Unless a party in interest objects, the property claimed as exempt on such list is exempt.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(l). ... When Wells Fargo froze the accounts, Plaintiff had exercised her right to exempt the account funds; therefore, Plaintiff had a direct economic interest in the funds, which was adversely affected by Wells Fargo’s administrative freeze.
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Section 522(l) makes property claimed as exempt exempt unless a party in interest objects.

In Re Tatum-Charlemagne · filed 2006-09-14(l)

Failure to object to the property claimed as exempt on Schedule C is exempt.
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Section 522(i) and the objection deadline protect a timely claimed homestead exemption when no party objects within the Rule 4003(b) period.

In Re Novak · filed 2006-10-17(i)

Because no objection has been filed with respect to the Debtor’s claim of a homestead exemption within the time limits set forth under FRBP 4003(b), the Debtor is entitled to $10,000 from the 50% of the proceeds arising from the sale of the Property that represents his interest in the Property before the remainder of such proceeds is distributed to BONY.
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Section 522(g) does not defeat a timely unobjected exemption; under § 522(i) and Taylor, the claimed homestead exemption remains payable from proceeds recovered by the trustee.

In re Nersinger · filed 2006-11-09(g), (i)

The Debtor’s Schedule C claimed $30,961.09 homestead exemption, not timely objected to, is allowed and must be paid from the proceeds of the sale of the Car-dile Drive Property being held by the Trustee.
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Section 522(l) and Taylor prevent a trustee from conveying property claimed as an in-kind exemption when no timely objection preserved a challenge to the exemption.

Olson v. Anderson · filed 2006-11-28(l)

the interest claimed as exempt is fully exemptible at that amount.
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Section 522(l) treats property claimed as exempt as exempt when no timely objection is filed.

In Re Trammell · filed 2007-11-09(l)

No one filed an objection to the claim of exemption in the Vehicle, and the time to do so has long passed. Accordingly, the Vehicle is exempt.
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Section 522(b) allows a debtor to remove properly claimed property from the bankruptcy estate, and § 522(l) makes the exemption effective when no timely objection is filed.

Olson v. Anderson (In Re Anderson) · filed 2007-11-07(b), (l)

A properly filed exemption removes property from the bankruptcy estate, and consequently from the reach of creditors and the bankruptcy trustee.
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Section 522(l) makes a claimed exemption effective when no timely objection is filed, and § 522(g) does not bar that exemption when the property was not transferred and recovered by the trustee.

Rainsdon v. Farson (In Re Farson) · filed 2008-04-03(l), (g)

Farson is entitled to the exemption she claimed in the Mustang under Idaho Code § 11-605(3) because Plaintiff did not timely object to that exemption claim. Plaintiff may not rely on § 522(g) as a defense to the exemption claim.
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Section 522 protects only the property or value actually claimed as exempt in the schedules; an unobjected-to exemption does not automatically cover an entire asset when the schedules reasonably claim only a stated share.

Barroso-Herrans v. Lugo-Mender · filed 2008-05-07(d)(5), (l)

But, as we have earlier recognized, Taylor does not tell us what has been claimed as exempt--only that whatever has been claimed as exempt is beyond the estate's grasp once the deadline has elapsed.
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Section 522(l) makes a claimed exemption effective unless a party in interest objects, and the objecting party bears the burden of showing the claimed exemption is improper.

In Re Downey · filed 2009-01-06(l), (d)(1), (d)(4)

Property that is claimed as exempt will be exempt unless a party-in-interest objects. 11 U.S.C. § 522(1). An objecting party must establish by a preponderence of the evidence that the debtor is not entitled to claim the disputed exemption.
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Section 522(1) allows a claimed exemption when no party objects, so the exempt property is no longer property of the bankruptcy estate.

Nazar v. Carmichael (In Re Carmichael) · filed 2010-09-21(1)

The Mortgaged Property is not property of the estate.
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Section 522(l) makes property claimed as exempt exempt when no party in interest objects, even if the debtor lacked a colorable basis for the exemption.

Leicht v. Anspach (In re Anspach) · filed 2010-11-10(l)

If no one objects to an exemption, § 522(Z) exempts the property even if the debtor had no colorable basis for claiming the exemption.
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Section 522(l) makes a claimed exemption effective when no party in interest objects, but the exemption removes only the debtor’s specified-dollar interest, not the asset itself.

Lentz v. Myers (In re Myers) · filed 2013-02-14(l)

Unless a party in interest objects, the property a debtor claims as exempt will be exempt from the bankruptcy estate.
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Section 522(l) makes property listed as exempt exempt when no party in interest objects during the applicable objection period; the property then generally revests in the debtor.

Mwangi v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In Re Mwangi) · filed 2014-08-26(l)

If a party in interest does not object during the objections period, however, “the property claimed as exempt on such list is exempt.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(l). ... Because all interested parties failed to act during the objections period, however, the account funds passed out of the bankruptcy estate and revested in the Debtors on October 19, 2009. ... On that date, the Debtors developed a right to possess and control the account funds.
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Under § 522(l), a timely adversary complaint challenging the basis for a claimed exemption can qualify as the required objection, preventing the exemption from becoming final.

Lee v. Dane Field · filed 2018-05-07(l)

The Bankruptcy Code requires the debtor to file a list of claimed exemptions, and provides that “[u]nless a party in interest objects, the property claimed as exempt on such list is exempt.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(l). ... Because it was apparent that the adversary action’s sole purpose was to prevent Lee from retaining the exemptions, Lee had adequate notice that the trustee objected to them. Accordingly, while including an express objection to the claimed exemptions in his complaint or other filing would have been a better practice, the trustee’s action in filing the adversary complaint sufficiently constituted an objection to the exemption that satisfies Rule 4003.
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Section 522(b)(3)(A) fixes the applicable state-law exemption status as of the bankruptcy petition date, and § 522(l) makes property claimed exempt exempt when no timely objection is filed.

William Joseph Montanez · filed 2020-04-01(b)(3)(A), (l)

The state of affairs and the state law applicable on the petition date determine what is and is not exempt in a bankruptcy case. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A); Owen, 500 U.S. at 314 n.6 (deferring to this statutory language). This focus on the petition date is known as the “snapshot” rule: the parties take a snapshot of the case on the filing date and all rights are fixed. ... Without a timely objection, “the property claimed as exempt on [Schedule C] is exempt.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(l).
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Section 522(l) makes property claimed as exempt exempt unless a party in interest objects.

DuVall v. County of Ontario, New York · filed 2020-09-29(l)

By operation of § 522(l) of the Code, the property claimed as exempt became exempt on May 16, 2019. The County was not “ambushed.” It dropped the ball and let the deadline to object pass.
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Section 522(l) makes a properly claimed exemption effective unless a party in interest objects, while property not adequately claimed remains in the bankruptcy estate.

Zellmer v. Helms · filed 2021-03-02(l)

A symmetrical waiver rule burdens the creditors, with § 522(l) providing that “[u]nless a party in interest objects, the property claimed as exempt on such list is exempt.”
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Section 522(l) makes a debtor’s claimed exemption presumptively valid unless a timely objection is filed, with the objector bearing the burden of proving the exemption improper.

Christopher Faherty and Jaclynn Faherty · filed 2022-04-20(l)

Absent any timely objection, a debtor’s claim of exemption is presumptively valid. 11 U.S.C. § 522(l).
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Section 522(l) makes claimed property exempt when no timely objection is filed, even if the exemption lacks a legal basis.

In re Kazi · filed 1993-02-02(l)

Under Taylor, once the 30-day period to object expires, a debtor's claimed exemption cannot be challenged regardless whether it has a basis in law.
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Section 522(l) makes property claimed as exempt on a debtor’s filed list exempt if no party in interest objects.

In re Fenessy · filed 1993-06-14(l)

As there were no objections by a party in interest, including the trustee, within 30 days of the list being filed, the property claimed as exempt on such list is exempt.
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Section 522(l) makes a claimed exemption effective unless a party in interest objects within the required period.

In Re Rosenzweig · filed 2000-02-29(l)

The Court concludes that the Trustee did not timely object to the Debtor’s claimed exemption in the property, nor did the Trustee request or the Court grant an extension to the 30-day exemption period. Thus, under the Code, Rule 4003(b) and the Taylor, Salzer and Kazi cases, the Trustee cannot now timely object to the Debtor’s claim of exemption, whether or not the Debtor had a colorable statutory basis for claiming it.
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Section 522(l) makes property claimed as exempt exempt when no party in interest timely objects, removing it from the bankruptcy estate.

In Re: Martin · filed 2021-04-27(l)

When a debtor claims an exemption pursuant to section 522(b), “[u]nless a party in interest objects, the property claimed as exempt . . . is exempt.” Id. § 522(l). ... Thus, by operation of the above-mentioned statutes and rules, Martin’s interests in the Westbrook Property and the 2005 Honda Accord were not part of his bankruptcy estate.
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Section 522(l) does not require a timely objection to an above-limit exemption when the debtor’s statements during the objection period prevent the claim from clearly asserting that exemption.

In Re: Monte Masingale v. Munding · filed 2024-07-26(l)

The debtors did not properly claim an above-limit homestead exemption that required an objection within the 30-day period. Masingale’s homestead exemption is thus limited to the amount of the statutory cap.
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Section 522(l) requires a debtor to list claimed exemptions, which become exempt unless a party in interest objects.

In Re Buck · filed 1982-01-07(l)

Under 11 U.S.C. Section 522(1) the Debt- or shall file a list of property that he claims as exempt and unless a party in interest objects, the property claimed as exempt is deemed exempt. Section 522 does not specify when the election by the Debtor must be made, and the bankruptcy rules do not address this matter. ... Thus, this Court hereby allows the Debtor to amend his election of exemptions to that under the State law, effective as of the date of conversion on July 29, 1981.
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Law changed since Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz (1992) held that a claimed exemption becomes effective after the objection deadline even without a valid statutory basis.

Section 522(l) requires a statutory basis for a claimed exemption even when no party timely objects.

Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz (In Re Davis) · filed 1989-09-07(l)

They construe this subsection as implicitly containing the additional requirement that there be a statutory basis for the claimed exemption before the failure of any party in interest to timely object to it has any legal effect. ... Although plausible arguments can be made in support of either of these positions, this Court is convinced that the view articulated in In re Bennett, supra at 894-95, is the superior view.
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Debtor’s trustee-like avoidance power under subsection (h)

A debtor may stand in the trustee’s shoes under section 522(h) to avoid an involuntary transfer of the debtor’s homestead when the Chapter 13 trustee has not attempted to avoid it, subject to the applicable section 544 requirements.

Trinh v. Intertex, Inc. · filed 2000-03-10§ 522(h)

when the property was his homestead; the transfer was involuntary; and a Chapter 13 trustee did not attempt to avoid the transfer.
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For a state-law exemption under section 522(b)(2)(A), the court applies the state law in effect when the petition was filed.

In re Orso · filed 2000-06-27§ 522(b)(2)(A)

federal law requires this court to apply the state law in effect at the time the debtor filed his bankruptcy petition.
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A state-law exemption for homestead-sale proceeds retains its statutory six-month reinvestment limit during bankruptcy; proceeds not reinvested within six months lose the exemption.

In re Zibman · filed 2001-12-13§ 522(b)(2)(A)

Any exemptions claimed, however, are determined by the facts and the law as they exist on the date of filing the bankruptcy petition.
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A payment designated as part of a divorce property division is not exempt under section 522(d)(10)(D) as alimony, support, or maintenance when the decree separately provides meaningful alimony and the documents unambiguously characterize the payment as property division.

Hendren v. Evert (In re Evert) · filed 2003-08-26§ 522(d)(10)(D)

Because we conclude that that is the situation here, we reverse.
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Section 522(f) permits a debtor to avoid a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in qualifying household goods to the extent of the applicable exemption.

General Finance Corp. of Colorado v. Ruppe (In re Ruppe) · filed 1980-02-21§ 522(f)

the security interest may be avoided to the extent of the exemption in the television set and in the stereo system.
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A debtor must elect either the federal exemptions or the alternative state-law scheme authorized by section 522(b); the debtor cannot claim both.

McClanahan v. Kimball (In re Kimball) · filed 1980-01-29§ 522(b)

The debtor is allowed to choose either the exemptions specified in Section 522(d) or Federal exemptions other than those found in Section 522(d), plus exemptions allowed under State law.
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Property held by spouses as tenants by the entirety that is not part of the bankruptcy estate cannot be claimed as exempt under section 522(d)(1).

Matter of Jeffers · filed 1980-02-19§ 522(d)(1)

they may not claim exemptions for it under Section 522(d)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code.
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The value and status of exempt property are determined when the bankruptcy petition is filed.

In re Crump · filed 1980-01-14§ 522

The value and status of exempt property in bankruptcy is determined as of the date the petition is filed.
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Section 522(f) applies to security interests created before the Bankruptcy Code took effect.

Boulton v. General Finance Loan Corp. (In re Boulton) · filed 1980-04-01§ 522(f)

The complaint and answer establish that the security interest of General Finance Loan Corporation of Iowa is void under 11 U.S.C.
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A debtor may use section 522(f) to avoid a lien only on property the debtor has actually declared exempt; the exemption does not extend to undeclared nonexempt property.

In re Dardar · filed 1980-04-28§ 522(f)(2)

exempt property does not exist until the debtor specifically declares exemptions.
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Section 522(f) is unconstitutional as applied to pre-enactment security interests.

Hoops v. Freedom Finance (In re Hoops) · filed 1980-04-25§ 522(f)

Section 522(f), as applied to preenactment security interests, simply goes too far.
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Section 522(h) allows debtors to avoid a transfer that a trustee could avoid under § 548, but only to the extent of the debtors' applicable homestead exemption.

McKeever v. McClandon (In McKeever) · filed 1994-04-14§ 522(h)

Because the McKeevers have shown that a trustee could have set aside the transfer under 11 U.S.C. § 548, they are entitled under Section 522 to avoid the transfer to the extent of their homestead exemption.
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Section 522(h) allows a debtor who is not a debtor in possession to pursue an avoidance action only to take advantage of the debtor’s exemptions.

Owen v. Treadway (In Re Owen) · filed 1994-06-23(h)

A debtor who is not a debtor in possession may bring an avoidance action only to take advantage of the debtor’s exemptions.
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The debtor's avoidance right under § 522(h) is derivative of the trustee's avoidance power, so the debtor cannot recover a transfer that the trustee could not avoid under § 547.

Moore v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (In re Moore) · filed 1995-02-10(h)

A debtor’s rights under § 522(h) are derivative in that they arise from the trustee’s right to avoid transfers of exempt property when the trustee has failed to assert such a right.
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Section 522(h) permits a Chapter 13 debtor to avoid an involuntary transfer when the trustee could have avoided it, did not do so, and the debtor could have exempted the property; the debtor satisfied those requirements using the claimed § 522(d)(1) exemption.

Callanan v. International Fidelity Insurance (In Re Callanan) · filed 1995-12-19(h), (d)(1)

This subsection permits a Chapter 13 debt- or to bring an avoidance action if (1) the trustee could have brought such an action; (2) the trustee did not bring the action; (3) the transfer was involuntary and the debtor did not conceal the property or the debtor could have avoided the transfer under § 522(f)(2); and (4) the debtor could have exempted such property had the trustee actually avoided the transfer.
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Section 522(h) permits a debtor to step into the trustee’s position and avoid a transfer under § 547(b) when the trustee does not pursue avoidance, subject to § 522(g)(1).

Edl v. Kinast (In Re Edl) · filed 1997-04-01(h)

Ms. Edl stands in the shoes of a trustee in bankruptcy pursuant to § 522(h) and (g)(1) and may avoid any transfer meeting the five requirements of § 547(b).
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Section 522(h) lets a debtor step into the trustee’s shoes to avoid a § 547 transfer when the trustee declines to act, but only to the extent the debtor could have exempted the property.

Braxton v. Bureau of Unemployment Compensation Benefits & Allowances (In Re Braxton) · filed 1998-09-10(h)

If a transfer is avoidable by the trustee under § 547 and the trustee does not attempt to avoid such transfer, the debtor may step into the shoes of the trustee to avoid a transfer to the extent that the debtor could have exempted such property if the trustee had avoided the transfer. 11 U.S.C. § 522(h).
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Section 522(h) lets a debtor avoid a transfer only to the extent the debtor could have exempted the property, and only when the transfer is avoidable by the trustee and the trustee does not attempt to avoid it.

Carroll v. Manor Care of Largo, Inc. (In Re Carroll) · filed 1999-07-13(h)

Debtors’ action fails because section 522(h) of the Bankruptcy Code empowers a debtor to avoid a transfer only to the extent that the debtor could have exempted the property.
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Section 522(h) limits a Chapter 13 debtor's avoidance power to recovering potentially exempt property when the trustee does not attempt to avoid the transfer.

Smoot v. Swann Hill Condominium Unit Owners Ass'n (In Re Smoot) · filed 1999-07-30§ 522(h)

This court finds that the avoidance powers of a Chapter 13 debtor are limited to those set out in § 522(h) of the Code — that is, to recover potentially exempt property if the trustee fails to act.
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Section 522(h) allows a debtor to avoid a transfer only when the trustee could avoid it and the debtor could exempt the property under section 522(g), including the involuntary-transfer and nonconcealment conditions.

In Re Lafoon · filed 2002-02-22(h), (g)

Section 522(h) authorizes a debtor to avoid a transfer of property pursuant to the trustee’s avoidance powers if the trustee does not exercise these powers and the debtor could have exempted the property under § 522(g).
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Section 522(h)(2) requires a debtor seeking derivative avoidance to establish that the trustee does not attempt to avoid the transfer; an unserved exemption amendment does not establish trustee waiver.

Saults v. First Tennessee Bank (In re Saults) · filed 2002-09-11(h)(2)

Absent such approval, however, the debtor’s § 522(h) action is premature.
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Section 522(h) allows a Chapter 13 debtor to commence a § 548 avoidance action when the property to be recovered is exempt from execution.

Ryker v. Current (In Re Ryker) · filed 2003-08-13(h)

In a limited context, a Chapter 13 debtor undoubtedly does have standing to initiate an avoidance action when the property to be reclaimed or recaptured is exempt from execution. ... That a Chapter 13 debtor may commence a § 548 avoidance action pursuant to § 522(h) is beyond dispute.
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Section 522(h) lets a debtor avoid a trustee-avoidable transfer only when the transfer was involuntary and not concealed, so it does not permit avoidance of a voluntarily granted mortgage.

Terry v. Witten & Carter, P.C. (In Re Terry) · filed 1986-01-03(h)

Section 522(h) is limited by the provision of Section 522(g), which requires that-in order for the debtor to exempt property from the estate, the property must have been both involuntarily transferred by the debtor and not concealed by the debtor. Subsections (g) and (h) of Section 522 are not provisions that enable the debtor to bring property into the estate, but are specific restrictions on the debtor’s general power to exempt estate property.
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Section 522(h) lets a debtor avoid a qualifying transfer to the extent the debtor could have exempted the property under § 522(g)(1); when a state has opted out of the federal exemptions, the applicable state exemption scheme determines that extent, with the transferred property treated as it would have existed before the transfer.

Bank of America v. Stine · filed 2003-12-30(h), (g)(1), (b)(1)

Subsections (g) and (h) enumerate the derivative powers a debtor has to avoid certain pre-petition transfers of property.
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Section 522(h) lets a debtor avoid an involuntary transfer of exempt property only if five statutory conditions are met, including that the trustee has not attempted avoidance and the property could have been exempted under § 522(g).

Patton v. State Street Bank (In Re Patton) · filed 2004-09-16(g) and (h)

Section 522(h) allows the debtor to avoid certain transfers of exempt property. The debtor must meet five conditions in order to do so: (1) the transfer cannot have been a voluntary transfer of property by the debtor; (2) the debtor cannot have concealed the property; (3) the trustee cannot have attempted to avoid the transfer; (4) the debtor must exercise an avoidance power usually used by the trustee that is listed within § 522(h); and (5) the transferred property must be of a kind that the debtor would have been able to exempt from the estate if the trustee (as opposed to the debtor) had avoided the transfer pursuant to one of the statutory provisions in section 522(g).
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Section 522(h) gives a debtor only the trustee’s avoidance power, so expiration of the trustee’s § 546(a) limitations period bars the debtor’s corresponding avoidance action.

Verner v. Verner (In Re Verner) · filed 2005-01-06(h)

Second, because a bankruptcy trustee would be barred by the passage of the § 546(a)(1) limitations period from avoiding Mrs. Verner’s property interest via § 544(a), the Debtor would now be precluded from attempting himself to so avoid Mrs. Verner’s property interest via § 522(h).
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Section 522(h) lets a debtor avoid a transfer the trustee could avoid when the trustee does not act, but only to the extent the debtor could exempt the property under § 522(g)(1), which requires that the transfer be involuntary and not concealed.

Smith v. Primus Automotive Financial (In Re Smith) · filed 2006-02-16(h), (g)(1)

Therefore, this court holds that the signature by Debtor of the Consent to Distribution did not transform what was undoubtedly an involuntary transfer to one that was voluntary for purposes of the application of Section 522(g). ... In conclusion, the court holds that there is no dispute of material fact. Debtor has standing pursuant to Section 522(h) and its incorporated requirement under 522(g)(1) to bring this preferential transfer avoid-anee action.
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Sections 522(g)(1) and (h) prevent a Chapter 13 debtor from independently maintaining the trustee’s avoidance actions without satisfying their statutory requirements.

Funches v. Household Finance Consumer Discount Co. (In Re Funches) · filed 2008-02-05(g)(1), (h)

Therefore, I hold that the Debtor may not maintain her avoidance actions in her capacity as a chapter 13 debtor without satisfying the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 522(g)(1) and (h). Because she cannot do so, the § 544 claim must be dismissed.
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Section 522(h) lets a debtor exercise the trustee’s § 545 lien-avoidance power in appropriate circumstances, subject to the statutory conditions and proof that the lien is avoidable.

In Re Cramer · filed 2008-09-12(h)

On the scheduled ruling date, the court acknowledged that section 522(h) does in fact allow a debtor to exercise a trustee’s lien avoidance powers under section 545 in certain circumstances.
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Section 522(h) does not allow a debtor to avoid a judgment lien when the debtor did not claim the homestead exemption needed to make the property exempt under § 522(g)(1).

In Re Gross · filed 2008-10-07(h), (g)(1)

Because her residence is not now exempt, the debtor may not assert any avoidance rights under section 522(h).
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Section 522(h)(1) and (2) lets a debtor avoid a transfer that the trustee could avoid when the trustee does not attempt to do so.

In Re Webb · filed 2010-05-19(h)(1) and (2)

Because the trustee has not attempted to avoid the transfer to Kwik Cash in the five months since the case was filed, the Court finds that the debtors may properly bring such an action.
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Section 522(g) makes an exemption too late only after a trustee avoids a transfer and obtains recovery or turnover, subject to the statute’s exception for involuntary transfers.

In Re OBrien · filed 2011-01-04(g)

The debtor cannot amend to claim that property as exempt because it is already gone.
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Section 522(g)(1)(A) permits a debtor to exempt property recovered by the trustee only if the transfer was not voluntary.

In Re Pfiester · filed 2011-01-24(g)(1)(A)

Debtor voluntarily transferred property.
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Section 522(g)(1)(A) prevents a debtor from newly claiming an exemption in property already avoided by a trustee after the debtor voluntarily transferred it, but it does not itself defeat a state-law rule barring avoidance of property that was exempt before the transfer.

Sullivan v. Welsh (In Re Lumbar) · filed 2011-03-03(g)(1)(A)

State law is more fundamental; and it simply bars the Plaintiff from obtaining avoidance in the first place.
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Section 522(g) bars a debtor from claiming an exemption in property recovered by the trustee under § 550 when the transfer was voluntary.

Osberg v. Halling (In Re Halling) · filed 2011-05-09(g)

she is not entitled to subsequently claim them as exempt.
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Section 522(g)(1)(A) allows a debtor to exempt property recovered by a trustee only if the transfer of that property was not voluntary.

Lassman v. OneWest Bank, FSB (In Re Swift) · filed 2011-10-07(g)(1)(A)

Section 522(g) of the Bankruptcy Code limits a debtor’s ability to exempt property recovered by a trustee to involuntary transfers.
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Section 522(h) allows a Chapter 7 debtor to use specified trustee avoidance powers only to the extent the debtor could have exempted the property under § 522(g)(1).

Johnston v. City of Middletown (In re Johnston) · filed 2012-12-21(h)

Accordingly, Johnston may not use § 547 to avoid the setoff.
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Section 522(h) permits a Chapter 13 debtor to bring a § 544(a) avoidance action only after the Chapter 13 trustee fails to do so.

Beskin v. Bank of New York Mellon (In re Perrow) · filed 2013-09-05(h)

A Chapter 13 debtor may only bring a section 544(a) action after the Chapter 13 trustee fails to do so. ... Congress chose in section 522(h) to allow the debtor to step into the shoes of the trustee for certain avoidance actions under limited circumstances.
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Section 522(h), read with § 522(g), allows a debtor to avoid a prepetition preferential transfer when the property could have been exempted, the transfer was involuntary, and the trustee has not pursued avoidance.

Pierce v. Collection Associates, Inc. · filed 2013-12-30(h), (g)

However, 11 U.S.C. § 522(h), when read in conjunction with 11 U.S.C. § 522(g), allows a debtor to avoid prepetition preferential transfers if (1) the property transferred would have been exempt; (2) the property was not transferred voluntarily; and (3) the trustee has not sought to bring an avoidance action.
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A Chapter 13 debtor may exercise the trustee’s avoidance powers only when the debtor satisfies the requirements of § 522(g) and § 522(h), including the involuntary-transfer requirement.

Atkins v. Gelt Properties, LLC (In re Atkins) · filed 2015-02-27(g), (h)

the unambiguous statutory text, which provides that a chapter 13 debtor may exercise the chapter 13 trustee’s avoidance powers only if the debtor can satisfy the requirements of § 522(g) and (h).
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Section 522(h) permits debtors to exercise the trustee’s avoidance power when the trustee does not attempt the avoidance, but the power to avoid does not itself authorize recovery beyond applicable exemptions.

Smith, Keith v. Sipi, LLC · filed 2016-01-20(h)

It is true that the Smiths as debtors have the power to avoid the transfer just as their trustee would. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(h). As the bankruptcy court explained, where a transfer is avoidable under § 548 but the trustee does not attempt to avoid it (which the bankruptcy court found was the case here), the debtors themselves may avoid the transfer. But the power to avoid is only the power to unwind the transfer. No authority would allow the Smiths themselves to recover the full value of the property simply because they can avoid the tax sale.
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Section 522(h) permits a debtor to avoid a transfer only to the extent the debtor could have exempted the property under § 522(g)(1), when the trustee could have brought but did not bring the action.

Kalesnik v. HSBC Bank USA, National Ass'n (In re Kalesnik) · filed 2017-07-11(h)

For that reason, this Court adopts the majority view and holds that Chapter 13 debtors do not have standing to exercise a trustee’s avoidance powers outside the narrow confines of § 522(h).
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Sections 522(g) and 522(h) limit a Chapter 7 debtor's use of the trustee's avoidance powers when the transfer was voluntary, subject to the statutory exception for an avoidance under § 522(f)(1)(B).

In re Kalabat · filed 2018-10-19(g), (h)

But such power is limited by the combination of §§ 522(g) and 522(h), so as to preclude the Chapter 7 debtor's use of the trustee's avoidance power under § 544(a) when the lien at issue was given as a voluntary transfer by the debtor.
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Section 522(h) lets a debtor avoid a transfer only to the extent the debtor could have exempted the property, and only when the transfer is avoidable by the trustee and the trustee does not attempt to avoid it.

White-Lett v. The Bank of New York Mellon, Corp. · filed 2021-03-12(h)

Given that the Trustee does not have standing to challenge the RRA Assignment contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions in the Complaint she cannot invoke 11 U.S.C. § 522(h) as a basis for standing. That subsection provides that “the debtor may avoid a transfer of property of the debtor or recover a setoff to the extent that the debtor could have exempted such property under subsection (g)(1) of this section if the trustee had avoided such transfer, if— (1) such transfer is avoidable by the trustee under section 544, . . .; and (2) the trustee does not attempt to avoid such transfer.” Because the transfer was not avoidable by the trustee, it is not avoidable by Plaintiff standing in his shoes.
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Section 522(h) lets a debtor avoid a qualifying transfer only to the extent of the debtor’s exemption in the property.

Franco v. Real Portfolio 13, LLC · filed 2025-03-17(h)

What is more, a debtor cannot exercise the same avoidance powers as chapter 13 trustee under Section 548. In re Wright, 649 B.R. 625, 629 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2023). Rather, a debtor may avoid a transfer pursuant to Section 522(h), 11 U.S.C. 522(h), and avoidance through this section is limited to the extent of a debtor’s exemption in the property. Id. at 629-30. ... In this case, the Debtor has not claimed an exemption in the Property. Even if she had claimed an exemption, she could not avoid at least some of the judgment liens against the Property.
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Section 522(h) lets a debtor avoid an involuntary transfer of property to the extent the debtor could have exempted it, subject to the section's conditions.

Roberson v. Hunter (In Re Roberson) · filed 1980-10-17(h)

This provision allows a debtor to avoid a transfer of property to the extent the debtor could have exempted such property if the transfer was involuntary and the property had not been concealed by the debtor and if such transfer could be avoided by trustee as a preference under Section 547, were it not exempt, but trustee has not attempted to do so.
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Retroactive application and the exemption election

A debtor’s survivorship interest in tenancy-by-the-entirety property remains in the estate after the interest is exempted under section 522(b)(2)(B), to the extent state law permits creditors to reach it.

Waldschmidt v. Shaw (In re Shaw) · filed 1980-06-18§ 522(b)(2)(B)

The Congress did not intend to give a trustee for the estate of one spouse the rather drastic authority to sell the entire property unless the entire interest of the debtor spouse as tenant by the entirety is included in the estate.
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Law changed since Security Industrial Bank (1982) held that § 522(f)(2) does not destroy pre-enactment security interests.

Applying section 522(f) to a pre-November 6, 1978 security interest was not sufficiently shown to be unconstitutional, so the court avoided the lien.

In re Middleton · filed 1980-06-19§ 522(f)

The weight of this presumption is especially difficult to overcome at the trial court level.
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A debtor’s choice between the state and federal exemption systems becomes final after the applicable objection period, so the debtor may not later switch systems.

In re Duggan · filed 1980-06-24§ 522(b)

At some point the right to switch from one system to another must end and there be some finality to a choice.
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Section 522(g)(1) bars a debtor from claiming an exemption in property knowingly concealed from the trustee and later recovered for the estate.

Matter of Dorricott · filed 1980-07-08§ 522(g)(1)

A debtor may not claim exempt property which he has knowingly concealed from the trustee.
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In an opt-out state, section 522(f) does not protect an exemption that state law denies because a lien encumbers the property.

Panesky v. CIT Financial Services (In re Panesky) · filed 1980-07-08§§ 522(b), 522(f)(2)(A)

If the debtors are not entitled to claim the exemptions under Section 2329.66, then Section 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code has no application whatsoever, since there are no exemptions to protect for the debtors.
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A spouse who did not earn the wages generating a joint tax refund has no “debtor’s interest” in that refund to claim as exempt under section 522.

Matter of Smith · filed 1980-07-10§ 522

Hence, the rational of the Helsel case in 1963 has not been changed.
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For section 522(a)(1), “fair market value” in a Chapter 7 exemption valuation is equivalent to liquidation value in the bankruptcy context.

In re Walsh · filed 1980-07-11§ 522(a)(1)

A valuation is always a stage in some proceeding which has a practical purpose.
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Section 522(f) preempts an inconsistent Ohio restriction and permits an Ohio debtor to avoid qualifying nonpurchase-money liens despite the state opt-out.

Curry v. Associates Financial Services (In re Curry) · filed 1980-07-21§§ 522(b), 522(f)

However, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. Section 2329.-661(C) is in direct conflict with 11 U.S.C. section 522(f) and the act of Congress prevails over the conflicting state law.
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In a joint case, each debtor must choose either the state or federal exemption scheme, and a debtor who elects state exemptions must satisfy the state-law conditions.

Ageton v. Cervenka (In re Ageton) · filed 1980-07-24§§ 522(b), 522(m)

Each debtor may choose the state exemptions but must abide by the state rules to obtain the state protection.
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A waiver of the homestead exemption is not avoidable under subsection (f) when it is neither a judicial lien nor a lien on the listed personal property.

Bank of Middlesex v. Parkinson (In re Ballard) · filed 1980-08-04§ 522(f)

The Ballards have no other evidence.
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A judicial lien is not avoidable under subsection (f)(1) when mortgages leave no exemptable interest for the lien to impair.

Day v. Boteler (In re Boteler) · filed 1980-08-05§§ 522(b), 522(f)(1)

the judicial lien is not subject to avoidance.
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Law changed since The 2005 amendment defined household goods in § 522(f)(4), restricting the former broad functional test and excluding some items.

Stereo equipment and a television recorder used for household enjoyment qualify as household goods under subsection (f)(2)(A), even though they are not appliances or musical instruments.

Beard v. Dial Plan (In re Beard) · filed 1980-08-07§ 522(f)(2)(A)

The rule of ejusdem generis does not apply.
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Tenancy-by-the-entirety interests are exempt under subsection (b)(2)(B) when state law makes them immune from execution by one spouse’s creditors.

Bass v. Thacker (In re Thacker) · filed 1980-08-08§ 522(b)(2)(B)

This is obviously what Congress intended to exempt.
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For cases filed before the 1994 amendments, the § 522(d)(1) exemption amount is the amount in effect on the petition date.

In Re Swanson · filed 1997-04-02(d)(1), (m)

Because the 1994 Amendments apply only to cases filed after October 22,1994, the effective date of the Amendments, cases filed before the effective date are not entitled to the 1994 expanded exemption scheme but are subject to the exemption scheme in effect at the time of the debtors’ filing.
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Judicial liens under subsection (f)(1)

Section 522(f)(1) permits full avoidance of a judicial lien impairing a homestead exemption even when the underlying debt may be nondischargeable.

In Re Ash · filed 1994-03-23§ 522(f)(1), § 522(d)(1)

For the foregoing reasons, the debtor’s motion is granted, and the attachment in the amount of $20,000 recorded on November 12, 1991 in the Waterbury land records against property known as 41 Edin Avenue, Waterbury, Connecticut is avoided and declared null and void pursuant to Bankruptcy Code § 522(f).
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Section 522(h) does not let a Chapter 7 debtor use § 545(2) to avoid a properly filed tax lien, which remains protected by § 522(c)(2)(B).

In Re Robinson · filed 1994-04-20§ 522(h), § 522(c)(2)(B)

Under the statutory scheme of § 522, as well as the most recent case law addressing debtors’ avoidance powers under that section, a Chapter 7 debtor may not use § 522(h) to avoid a transfer that a trustee might have avoided under 11 U.S.C. § 545(2).
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Under § 522(f)(1), a judicial lien must both fix a liability to the debtor’s exempt property and impair the exemption; an unenforceable lien can impair the exemption by clouding title.

In the Matter of E.C. Henderson and Phyllis Henderson · filed 1994-04-20§ 522(f)(1)

We do not agree that whether the judicial hen “fixed” is irrelevant to whether a debtor can utilize § 522(f)(1).
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A lien created through confession of judgment is a judicial lien avoidable under subsection (f)(1) to the extent it impairs the debtor’s real-property exemption.

Natale v. Kirk Mortgage Co. (In re Natale) · filed 1980-08-12§ 522(f)(1)

This was judicial process.
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Refinancing extinguishes a purchase-money character, making the resulting security interest avoidable under subsection (f).

Matter of Jones · filed 1980-08-15§ 522(f)

The renewal note which was accepted by the lender in the refinancing of the original note was accepted in satisfaction of an antecedent debt.
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Subsection (c) does not prevent a valid purchase-money lien from being enforced against exempt property, and subsection (f)(2)(A) does not avoid that lien.

Associates Financial Services Co. v. Greenly (In re Greenly) · filed 1980-08-18§§ 522(c), 522(f)(2)(A)

Holders of valid liens on exempt property are entitled to retain their rights unimpaired by bankruptcy.
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A mobile home and automobile do not qualify for subsection (f)(2) lien avoidance when the debtor claims them under state homestead and motor-vehicle exemptions rather than as property of the types listed in that subsection.

Moore v. Household Finance Corp. (In re Moore) · filed 1980-08-19§ 522(f)(2)

The Court must deny this proposition.
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A real-estate broker’s automobile is a tool of trade under subsection (f)(2)(B) when its use is necessary to carry on the business, even without equity in the vehicle.

Credithrift of America, Inc. v. Dubrock (In re Dubrock) · filed 1980-08-19§ 522(f)(2)(B)

It was not employed as a means for lien avoidance.
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Section 522(f)(1) permits avoidance of a judicial lien to the extent the property could have been exempted without the lien.

Fluharty v. Fluharty (In Re Fluharty) · filed 1980-12-10§ 522(f)(1)

a debtor may avoid a judicial lien on any property to the extent that the property could have been exempted in the absence of such lien.
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A judicial lien securing a divorce property-division debt is avoidable under § 522(f)(1) to the extent it impairs the debtor’s exemption.

Feldman v. Grimes (In Re Grimes) · filed 1985-01-25§ 522(f)(1)

The $3,300 debt charged against debtor’s share of proceeds from the sale of the family residence is in the nature of a property division. Because the judgment debt arising therefrom is neither designated as nor actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support, it is the subject of a judicial lien properly avoidable under § 522(f)(1) to the extent that it impairs Debtor’s $4,500 exemption, ... to the full extent of $3,300.
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A debtor may exempt the right to receive Social Security benefits under section 522(d)(10)(A) where federal exemptions apply.

In Re Hughes · filed 1980-12-18§§ 522(b), 522(d)(10)(A)

The debtor is allowed to exempt his right to receive social security benefits in those states where the federal exemptions apply.
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Law changed since The 1984 amendment barred joint debtors from electing different federal and state exemption schemes.

One spouse’s election of California exemptions does not require the other spouse to elect the same system; each spouse may independently select federal or state exemptions.

Matter of Brosius · filed 1980-12-22§§ 522(b)(1), 522(b)(2), 522(m)

neither requires the election of the California exemptions by Mr. Brosius nor precludes his selection of the federal bankruptcy exemptions.
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Section 522(f)(1) permits a debtor to avoid a judgment lien that impairs an exemption even when a subordinate, unavoidable federal tax lien also encumbers the property, if the judgment lien would otherwise be avoidable.

In re Diliberto · filed 1993-01-22(f)(1)

Unlike the case where there is a consensual subordinate lien, where there is a non-consensual unavoidable subordinate federal tax lien, its existence does not affect the ability of a debtor to avoid a superior judgment lien to the extent that the debtor would otherwise be able to avoid that judgment lien if the non-consensual unavoidable tax lien did not exist.
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Under § 522(f)(1), unavoidable liens are deducted first, without regard to state-law priority, to determine whether a judicial lien impairs an exemption and may be avoided.

In re Bradshaw · filed 1993-01-22(f)(1)

The Court must first subtract those liens which are not avoidable pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code. The Court must then determine whether or not a judicial lien impairs the debtor’s exemption.
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Section 522(f)(1) permits a debtor to avoid a judicial lien in full when the lien impairs an exemption, even if the lien exceeds the exemption amount.

Lapointe v. Snelling & Snelling, Inc. (In Re Lapointe) · filed 1993-01-25(f)(1)

The language of § 522(f)(1) — “to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption” — does not exclude the right of the debtor to remove the dead hand effect of a judicial lien.
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Section 522(f)(1) allows a debtor to avoid a judicial lien that impairs the debtor’s right to property potentially exempt under § 522(b).

In Re Waltjen · filed 1993-01-29(f)(1)

Therefore, American’s lien impairs Debtor’s right to that property, and Debtor has a right to avoid that lien pursuant to § 522(f)(1).
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Section 522(f)(1) does not allow a debtor to avoid a lien that did not fix on the debtor’s pre-existing interest in property.

In Re Dale · filed 1993-03-23(f)(1)

The lien granted in the dissolution decree is not avoidable under section 522(f)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code because such lien did not fix upon a pre-existing interest of the debtor in property.
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Section 522(f)(1) permits a debtor to avoid a judicial lien only to the extent it impairs the debtor’s exemption; any remaining portion of the lien is not avoidable.

In Re Abrahimzadeh · filed 1994-01-03§ 522(f)(1)

Thus, it is clear that a debtor does not have the power to void a judicial lien which impairs his homestead exemption, except to the extent that the value of the exemption is impaired.
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Section 522(f)(1) permits avoidance of a judicial lien only to the extent it impairs an exemption the debtor would have been entitled to claim, so the lien may not be avoided in full when its value exceeds that exemption.

Esler v. Orix Credit Alliance (In Re Esler) · filed 1994-03-17(f)(1)

As to the motion to avoid lien in its entirety pursuant to Section 522(f), the Court finds that the cited Code section only permits the avoidance of judicial liens to the extent that such liens impair exemptions to which the debtors “would have been entitled.”
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Notes 1–150 of 4,569, oldest cases first.

2,652 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

In Re McLouth, the court cites § 522(b)(2)(A) only as a contrast to § 362(a)'s wording and as background for the petition-date rule governing exemptions; it does not decide the meaning, requirements, or application of § 522(b)(2)(A). opinion →
Nelson v. La Crosse County District Attorney (In Re Nelson), the court mentions § 522(f) in a footnote as an example of Congress's broad bankruptcy power and notes that it survived a constitutional-takings challenge; the court does not construe or apply § 522(f). opinion →
In re Johnson, the opinion reports and analogizes Pennsylvania decisions applying §§ 522(d)(6) and (d)(5), but the court’s own ruling concerns the Ohio exemption statute; it does not independently decide a federal § 522 claim. opinion →
In Re Ronald Tamecki, the court mentions § 522(b)(2)(B) only to describe the debtor's claimed exemption in the background. The decision construes and applies § 707(a)'s good-faith dismissal standard, not § 522. opinion →
In Re: Ronald M. Tamecki, Sr., Debtor Ronald M. Tamecki, Sr. v. Frank, section 522(b)(2)(B) is mentioned as the exemption claimed and as part of the debtor’s argument, but the court decides only whether dismissal for lack of good faith under § 707(a) was proper. It does not construe or determine the operation of § 522(b)(2)(B). opinion →
In Re Collett, the court decided whether the annuity was exempt under Missouri Revised Statute § 513.430(10)(e), not under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E). Section 522(d)(10)(E) appears only as an analogous federal provision cited in a footnote and is not independently construed or applied. opinion →
Tate v. NationsBanc Mortgage Corp. (In Re Tate), the opinion mentions § 522(b) only in a general statement that exemptions are often governed by state law, while deciding jurisdiction, attorney-fee reasonableness under § 506(b), preemption, and related issues. It does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 522(b). opinion →
Holloway v. Southeast Alabama Medical Center & Golden Peanut Co. (In Re Holloway), section 522 appears only in the findings of fact as the statutory basis for the debtor's claimed personal-property exemption; the court did not interpret or apply § 522 in deciding whether the judgment lien survived confirmation. opinion →
Jacoway v. Wolfe (In Re Jacoway), section 522 is cited only as general background for the federal exemption scheme and the California opt-out framework. The court does not interpret or apply § 522; its holding concerns exemption under California law. opinion →
In Re Coones, section 522(f) appears only in the opening procedural-history statement describing the debtors’ motion to avoid liens; the court does not analyze, interpret, or decide the motion under § 522(f). opinion →
In Re Smith, the court only notes that Kathy Smith raised whether the lien was avoidable under § 522(f)(1), then expressly states that the issue was not before it and makes no determination of it. opinion →
In Re Inmon, § 522(d) is mentioned only in describing Arkansas’s statutory election between state exemptions and federal exemptions; the operative analysis concerns abandonment of an Arkansas homestead. opinion →
In Re Strober, § 522(f)(1) appears only as a comparative example in an argument about § 506(a); the operative holdings concern §§ 506 and 1322(b)(2). opinion →
In Re Herbert, § 522(d)(10)(E) appears only as statutory background while the court applies Ohio exemption law. opinion →
Mallin v. Mallin (In Re Mallin), § 522(f)(1) is mentioned only to describe Farrey and is expressly treated as inapplicable to the issue decided. opinion →
Riggs National Bank of Washington v. Perry (In Re Perry), § 522 appeared only in passing; the holding concerned the automatic stay under § 362. opinion →
In Re Rhoten, the court reserved the exemption issue and did not establish a holding about § 522. opinion →
Wells v. West Greeley National Bank (In Re Wells), § 522(f) appeared in the complaint and argument; the court decided Colorado homestead law. opinion →
In Re Cycyk, § 522(b)(1) was cited only to state Ohio’s inapplicability of federal exemptions; the holding interpreted Ohio law. opinion →
Firestone v. Metropolitan Life Insurance (In re Di Piazza), the court identified § 522(b)(2)(A) as a possible issue but deferred ruling pending an evidentiary hearing. opinion →
Simmons v. Peoples Bank of Danville (In Re Simmons), the court interpreted § 522(b), so this citation is not incidental; retained here only as a duplicate ledger entry for the batch. opinion →
In Re Howland, § 522(d)(11)(C) and § 522(b)(1) appeared only in comparisons and a parenthetical report of another case. opinion →
In re Langston, § 522(d)(1) and (5) appeared only as claimed exemptions; the court decided conversion under § 1307(a). opinion →
Breakiron v. Ward (In Re Breakiron), § 522(f) appeared only as an implied argument; the court decided the credit agreement and Pennsylvania law. opinion →
United States v. Security Pacific Finance Co., the court reported the Supreme Court’s interpretation of § 522(f)(2) but provided no independent construction. opinion →
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Lefevre (In Re Lefevre), § 522(g) and (h) appeared only in the debtor’s argument; the court decided ownership and perfection. opinion →
Smith v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. (In Re Smith), § 522(d) appeared only in the debtor’s claimed exemptions; the lien ruling rested on security agreements and state law. opinion →
In Re Goodin, § 522(d)(1) appeared only in summaries of other courts’ decisions; this court applied Ohio law. opinion →
In Re Encinas, § 522(f) appeared in describing the confirmed plan and argument; the court decided §§ 541 and 552(b). opinion →
Ledford v. McCormick (In Re McCormick), § 522 appeared only in a list of Bankruptcy Code provisions and was not construed. opinion →
Schewel Furniture Co. v. Goard (In Re Goard), § 522 appeared only in the debtor’s argument; the court decided state-law purchase-money and relief-from-stay issues. opinion →
In Re Utica Floor Maintenance, Inc., the opinion addressed § 366 and related provisions, not § 522. opinion →
In Re Stinson, § 522(e) appeared only in a concluding carve-out; the court decided the converted-case exemption timing under §§ 348 and 522(b)/(d). opinion →
Hertzberg v. H. Hirschfield & Sons, Inc. (In Re Caro Products, Inc.), § 522(f) appeared only in a report of another bankruptcy court’s ruling. opinion →
In Re Smith, § 522(f) was mentioned only as an action the attorney did not attempt; the court did not construe it. opinion →
Massachusetts v. Dartmouth House Nursing Home, Inc. (In Re Dartmouth House Nursing Home, Inc.), § 522(f)(2) and § 522(e) appeared only in a list of provisions, not in the court’s analysis. opinion →
Hall v. Cooper (In Re Cooper), § 522(f) appeared only in describing the debtor’s adversary proceeding. opinion →
Gist v. Beneficial Finance Co. (In re Gist), § 522(f) appeared only as the statutory ground asserted in the complaint; the court resolved the case under U.C.C. requirements. opinion →
Owen v. Haney, § 522(f)(1) appeared only in describing a separate lien-avoidance action; the court decided res judicata under § 523(a)(6). opinion →
Matter of Ignasiak, § 522(d)(1) appeared only in a report of another bankruptcy court’s ruling; this court relied on state tenancy-by-the-entirety law. opinion →
In Re Raikes, § 522 was mentioned only as a general reference to exemptions while assessing income and assets; the court did not construe the section. opinion →
Zimmerman v. Starnes (In Re Fields), § 522 appeared only in a jurisdiction footnote, and exemptions were not before the court. opinion →
Matter of Colby, the court said whether an equitable lien was a judicial lien under § 522(f)(1) was premature and did not decide the issue. opinion →
Landmark Finance Corp. v. Stewart, the court recounted the creditor’s § 522(f) argument but did not construe or apply the provision. opinion →
Bennett v. Rainier National Bank (In re Bennett), the appellate court remanded because the lower court’s ambiguous order did not reveal its rationale; it did not decide what § 522(f) requires. opinion →
Olsen v. Deutscher (In Re Nashville White Trucks, Inc.), § 522(f)(1) appeared only in a report of another court’s constitutional ruling; this court decided the § 362 issue. opinion →
BA Business Credit Corp. v. DiToro (In Re DiToro), § 522(d) appeared only as the debtors’ claimed exemption; the statutory construction concerned § 552(b), not § 522. opinion →
Bailey v. Bailey (In Re Bailey), § 522(f) was mentioned in the debtor’s lien-avoidance claim, but the court held that issue moot after recognizing an equitable lien and did not construe § 522(f). opinion →
Hiles v. Pennsylvania, Department of Public Welfare (In re Hiles), the opinion referenced the Third Circuit’s cognovit-lien holding and bankruptcy jurisdiction; it did not add a distinct construction of § 522. opinion →
Raymos v. Collins (In Re Collins), § 522 appeared in the debtor’s exemption and discharge background; the holding denied discharge for a false oath. opinion →
Cook v. AVCO Financial Services, Inc. (In Re Cook), the opinion held gap-period application of § 522(f)(2) unconstitutional on its facts, duplicating the already recorded contrary retroactivity line; it is retained as treatment evidence rather than a new annotation. opinion →
Hollytex Carpet Mills v. Tedford, § 522(b) was applied to the filing-date exemption law in the plan-confirmation background; the appeal did not decide the judicial-lien objection raised for the first time. opinion →
In Re Mitruka, § 522(f) appeared in the proposed Chapter 13 plan; the court denied confirmation for lack of good faith and did not construe lien avoidance. opinion →
Campbell v. Farmland Industries, Inc. (In Re Jones), § 522(g) and (h) were discussed in the procedural history of a preference action; the court held the trustee estopped by an earlier judgment. opinion →
Campbell v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (In Re Campbell), § 522 appeared in the turnover statute and exemption background; the court resolved whether a repossessed vehicle remained estate property. opinion →
Central Mortgage Co. v. Galbraith (In Re Galbraith), § 522(f)(1) appeared only as the basis of an earlier judgment-lien order; the opinion decided relief from stay for a mortgage foreclosure. opinion →
Terre Haute First National Bank v. Davis (In Re Davis), § 522 was cited to define property eligible for redemption under § 722; the holding concerned nonconsensual installment redemption. opinion →
Kirschenbaum v. Feola (In Re Feola), § 522(b)(2)(B) appeared in the trustee’s argument about a joint sale under § 363(h); the court did not construe the exemption provision. opinion →
Community State Bank v. Fitzgerald (In Re Fitzgerald), § 522 appeared in the bankruptcy background; the opinion did not contain a holding construing the section. opinion →
In Re Johnson, § 522(f) was discussed only after the court found the collateral was not exempt tools of trade; the lien was not avoided on that factual basis. opinion →
Lincoln National Bank v. Conti (In Re Conti), § 522(c)(2) appeared in the discussion of a contractual lien and exemption misconduct; the holding applied the trustee’s strong-arm powers and denied the exemption on equitable grounds. opinion →
In Re Coomes, the opinion applied a local filing deadline and denied a late section 522 lien-avoidance motion; the timing rule is already represented by the directly construing cases in this record. opinion →
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Sawyer (In Re Sawyer), § 522(c) was cited in a discussion of lien survival after discharge; the decision concerned relief from stay and turnover of a vehicle. opinion →
Eggleston v. Third National Bank (In Re Eggleston), § 522(g) and (h) supplied the statutory route for a preference recovery, but the operative holding applied § 547 to set aside garnished-wage payments. opinion →
Lekvold v. Henderson (In Re Lekvold), § 522(f)(1) was cited in classifying a child-support lien; the court held the lien statutory and analyzed its secured status under § 545(2). opinion →
In Re Iler, § 522(d)(10)(E) appeared in the debtor’s exemption argument, but the holding concerned whether renewal commissions were property of the estate under § 541. opinion →
Lafayette Trust Bank v. Cressman (In re Cressman), § 522(d)(5) appeared in the homestead and stay background; the court’s ruling concerned the automatic stay and avoidability of judgment notes. opinion →
Myers v. Beneficial Finance Co. of Virginia (In Re Myers), the opinion noted that the furniture lien would be avoidable under § 522(f)(2), but decided the creditor’s abusive post-discharge detinue practice and discharge injunction. opinion →
First National Bank of Colorado Springs v. Hamilton (In Re Hamilton), § 522 appeared in the order concerning crop proceeds, while the operative statutory analysis concerned the after-acquired-property effect of § 552. opinion →
Juergens v. Rice (In re Rice), the opinion applied Ohio’s state exemption law to the policy cash surrender value; § 522 was only the federal citation in the case background. opinion →
Lawson v. Liberty National Bank & Trust Co., the holding concerned the lien’s preference status under § 547; the court did not decide the number of exemptions under § 522. opinion →
In Re Pettit, the judicial lien was cancelled through the confirmed Chapter 13 plan under § 1327(c), not construed under § 522. opinion →
Brown v. Morris Plan of California (In Re Brown), the opinion addressed the required adversary-complaint procedure and timing for § 522(f), but did not reach a merits construction because the notice was insufficient. opinion →
In Re St. Laurent, § 522(d) and Maine’s opt-out were part of the debtor’s failed dismissal argument; the court denied dismissal under § 707 and did not construe the exemption provision. opinion →
Matter of Noonan, § 522(b) and (d) appeared in an asset-value footnote; the decision addressed an involuntary Chapter 11 and contract assumption, not exemptions. opinion →
Flagg v. Flagg (In Re Flagg), § 522 appeared in the bankruptcy background to a motion for relief from stay; the opinion decided whether state divorce proceedings could continue. opinion →
Matter of Ross, § 522 was cited in the parties’ argument about pension exemptions; the holding affirmed Chapter 13 income-deduction orders and held exemptions personal to the debtor. opinion →
In Re Myers, § 522(d) appeared in the exemption background; the opinion did not construe the cited provision. opinion →
Sarkis v. American State Bank of Rapid City (In Re Sarkis), § 522 was cited in a turnover argument, but the decision classified the bank’s setoff/lien under state law and § 553. opinion →
Willard v. Willard (In Re Willard), § 522 appeared only in a reserved discussion of exemptions; the decision concerned the effect of a postpetition state divorce judgment on estate property. opinion →
Taylor v. Widdowson (In Re Taylor), § 522(c)(1) was cited in an automatic-stay/criminal-prosecution dispute, not construed as the basis of the holding. opinion →
Sachs v. Ryan (In Re Ryan), § 522 was not construed; the decision held a state forfeiture action stayed under § 362. opinion →
Rocky Mountain Ethanol Systems, Inc. v. Mann, Inc. (In Re Rocky Mountain Ethanol Systems, Inc.), § 522(h) appeared in the preference-action background; the holding concerned avoidance under § 547 and turnover under § 542. opinion →
Weller Realty, Inc. v. Taulbee (In re Taulbee), § 522 appeared in a proposed distribution calculation in an equitable recharacterization dispute; the opinion did not construe the exemption rules. opinion →
Lancaster v. Easterly (In Re Easterly), § 522(f)(2) described the requested relief, but the decision resolved ownership of the guns and a nondischargeable fraud debt. opinion →
In Re Sutton, § 522(b) and (d) appeared in the exemption and abandonment background; the holding concerned irrevocable abandonment of residence-sale proceeds. opinion →
In Re Theodore Ted McCoy and Carolyn Brown McCoy Bankrupts, Mickey D. Wilson, Trustee v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation, the decision applied the former Bankruptcy Act and Oklahoma law; § 522(d) appeared only as later comparative support. opinion →
In re Perkins, § 522(b)(1) identified Ohio’s opt-out while the holding construed Ohio life-insurance exemptions. opinion →
Stein Enterprises, Inc. v. Golla, § 522(d)(2) appeared only in a footnote comparing bankruptcy’s motor-vehicle exemption; the holding concerned waiver of appellate costs. opinion →
Memory v. Brasington (In Re Brasington), § 522(b)(1) and (d) identified Alabama’s opt-out and the claimed homestead; the holding applied Alabama occupancy law. opinion →
Travelers Insurance Co. v. Angus (In Re Angus), § 522(d)(5) appeared in the trustee’s exemption position; the court held that the ring was held in constructive trust for the insurer. opinion →
Lewiston Seaport Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Prine (In Re Prine), § 522(d)(10)(D) identified a claimed child-support exemption; the holding concerned Chapter 13 good faith. opinion →
In Re Smith, § 522(f) appeared in the debtors’ proposed Chapter 13 plan; the decision concerned student-loan discharge and good faith. opinion →
McInnis v. Cooper Communities, Inc., § 522(b) appeared only as an example of a federal statute allowing state override; the decision concerned usury preemption under the Monetary Control Act. opinion →
In Re Cruseturner, § 522 identified property eligible for redemption under § 722; the holding construed installment redemption and the automatic stay. opinion →
In Re Hawkins, § 522 appeared only in a footnote about liens that do not impair exemptions; the order concerned abandonment procedure and notice. opinion →
Woodman v. L. A. Olson Co. (In Re Woodman), § 522(f)(1) was raised as an unsuccessful argument in a preference action; the holding concerned garnishment timing. opinion →
Dade Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Rodriguez (In re Rodriguez), § 522(b) and (f) described exempt property and lien-avoidance jurisdiction; the holding concerned termination of the automatic stay. opinion →
In Re Sanford, § 522 supplied the exemption-election framework, but the holding construed California’s residential-execution exemption. opinion →
Countrywide Home Loans v. Dickson (In re Dickson), § 522(h) mentioned but not decided. opinion →
Matter of Cottingim, § 522(d)(1) was cited as the model for Ohio’s homestead provision; the holding construed Ohio law and the evidence of residence. opinion →
In Re Bassin, § 522 appeared only as the current-version cross-reference for the former Bankruptcy Act’s exemption rule. opinion →
Bassin v. Stopher, § 522 appeared only as the current-version cross-reference for the former Bankruptcy Act’s exemption rule. opinion →
Coronado v. Beach Furniture & Appliance, Inc. (In Re Coronado), § 522(f)(2) supplied the procedural context, but the court voided the security agreement under Arizona law rather than construing § 522. opinion →
In re Orwig, § 522(d) identified Ohio’s federal opt-out; the holding applied Ohio’s residence and occupancy rules. opinion →
In Re Heard, § 522(f) described the debtor’s uncontested lien-avoidance use in a Chapter 13 plan; the decision concerned plan good faith. opinion →
In Re Grimes, § 522(c) and (e) were cited to support bankruptcy jurisdiction over exempt property; the holding concerned jurisdiction and mortgage-debt claims. opinion →
Guild Mortgage Co. v. Cornist (In Re Cornist), § 522(d)(5) identified the claimed exemption; the operative issue concerned the automatic stay and foreclosure. opinion →
In Re Featherstone, § 522(d)(10)(E) was used as a comparison to Ohio’s exemption statute; the holding concerned Chapter 13 plan confirmation. opinion →
Provident National Bank v. Hockstein (In Re Hockstein), § 522(d)(1) appeared in a footnote identifying the claimed exemption; the opinion did not construe it. opinion →
In Re Eisenberg, § 522 was cited in a footnote concerning the meaning of property of the debtor under the automatic stay. opinion →
In Re Yee, § 522 was cited in legislative background and a general description of exemptions; the opinion concerned Chapter 13 discharge policy. opinion →
Federal National Mortgage Ass'n v. DiBona (In Re DiBona), § 522 was cited in explaining estate property and exemption objections; the holding concerned who must be named in stay-relief litigation. opinion →
Matter of Estridge, § 522(d) identified Florida’s opt-out; the holding concerned qualification for Florida’s state homestead exemption. opinion →
Pickus v. Vitagliano (In Re Pickus), § 522(d) identified assets claimed exempt; the holding concerned automatic-stay contempt. opinion →
Colonial Mortgage Service Co. v. Dallasta (In Re Dallasta), § 522(f)(1) appeared in a footnote as an alternative that would not change the stay-relief result. opinion →
England v. Federal Deposit Insurance (In re England), § 522(b)(2)(A) cited to identify the exemption election; the decision turns on Texas homestead law. opinion →
Walden v. McGinnes, § 522 cited in a general description of bankruptcy exemptions; the decision construes Texas insurance-benefit law. opinion →
Youngblood v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (In re Youngblood), § 522(b) cited as background; the decision turns on the Texas exemption and Internal Revenue Code qualification rules. opinion →
Electric City Merchandise Co. v. Hailes, § 522(h) identifies the debtor’s proposed recovery; the holding concerns aggregation under § 547(c)(8). opinion →
Hibernia National Bank v. Brown, § 522(b) supplies the state opt-out framework; the holding concerns deference to the IRS under Louisiana exemption law. opinion →
Realty Portfolio, Inc. v. Hamilton (In re Hamilton), § 522(h) is part of the requested relief; the holding concerns the hypothetical bona fide purchaser under § 544(a)(3). opinion →
State Farm Life Insurance v. Swift, § 522(b)(1) identifies the Texas exemption election; the holding concerns whether causes of action replacing lost exempt property belong to the debtor. opinion →
Internal Revenue Service v. Luongo, § 522(c) is discussed alongside § 553, but the court leaves open whether § 522(c) immunizes exempt property from setoff. opinion →
In re Zibman, § 522(b)(2)(A) is a basis for the holding and is recorded above. opinion →
Pequeno v. Schmidt (In re Pequeno), § 522(d)(11)(E) is a claimed exemption; the operative dispute concerns the character of a civil-rights judgment. opinion →
Norris v. Thomas, § 522 supplies the exemption framework; the decision construes Texas homestead law as applied to a liveaboard boat. opinion →
Coppola v. Beeson (In re Coppola), § 522(b) identifies the federal/state exemption framework; the decision turns on Texas tax qualification of the retirement account. opinion →
Barron v. Countryman, § 522(f) appears only in a citation to Maddox concerning trustee powers; the holding concerns attorney-fee administration. opinion →
Belsome v. Belsome, § 522(d) identifies the federal exemptions Louisiana debtors cannot elect; the holding construes Louisiana’s vehicle exemption. opinion →
Gutterman v. First National Bank of Anchorage, § 522 is cited in a discussion of the newly effective Code, but the decision construes Alaska exemption law. opinion →
Mason v. Eastman Kodak Co., § 522(d)(10)(E) is discussed prospectively; the pension decision applies pre-Code/ERISA analysis. opinion →
Matter of Upright, § 522(b)(1) identifies the exemption election; the decision concerns venue and trustee authority. opinion →
In re Mosley, § 522(l) is discussed in a transition-era question involving the Bankruptcy Act; the record does not construe the operative exemption rule beyond that context. opinion →
In re Cobb, § 522 is cited in resolving whether amended exemption schedules were timely; no substantive statutory construction is stated. opinion →
In re Cramer, § 522(b) identifies the individual-debtor limitation; the decision turns on whether the business was a partnership under state law. opinion →
In re Blount, § 522(f) is treated as undisputed in a reaffirmation proceeding governed by § 524. opinion →
Dotson v. Bradford (In re Bradford), § 522(h) is applied to a transfer the court found the trustee could not avoid; the operative disposition is procedural and fact-specific. opinion →
First & Merchants National Bank v. Richmond Lumber & Building Supply Co. (In re Norris), § 522 appears in a historical cross-reference while the court applies the former Bankruptcy Act. opinion →
Matter of Berry, § 522(d) is cited to explain that Ohio preempted the federal exemptions; the decision concerns Chapter 13 plan treatment. opinion →
In re Howell, § 522 appears in a general description of the Code’s fresh-start scheme; the decision concerns setoff and federal benefits. opinion →
In re Mendenhall, § 522(d)(10)(E) is unavailable because the petition predated the Code; the holding applies the former Bankruptcy Act. opinion →
In re Hill, § 522(d)(11)(D) is compared with Ohio law; the exemption is denied under Ohio’s proof requirements. opinion →
In re Ford, § 522(b)(2) frames a tenancy-by-the-entirety dispute; the holding concerns estate property and Maryland law. opinion →
Rutherford v. Associates Financial Services Co. (In re Rutherford), § 522(b)(1) supplies constitutional context; the decision applies a fact-specific balancing discussion to Ohio security interests. opinion →
Matter of Harland, § 522(d) is used in the Chapter 13 best-interest comparison; the holding concerns good faith under § 1325(a)(3). opinion →
Rodrock v. Security Industrial Bank, § 522(f) is the subject of a constitutional challenge to pre-Code liens; no final operative holding is captured in the reviewed passage. opinion →
General Finance Corp. of Colorado v. Ruppe (In re Ruppe), § 522(f) is recorded above; the remaining discussion concerns classification of household goods. opinion →
In re Thompson, § 522(b) is mentioned in a footnote describing Virginia’s opt-out; the holding construes Virginia’s homestead statute. opinion →
Palestino v. Palestino (In re Palestino), § 522(f) appears as an example in the discussion of adversary filing fees; the holding concerns in forma pauperis fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. opinion →
In re Hill, § 522(f) is mentioned as an unrelied-on ground for avoiding judgment liens; the decision concerns attorney-fee reasonableness under § 329. opinion →
Matter of Lang, § 522 is cited in a general description of exempt property; the decision concerns dismissal under § 707. opinion →
In Re Marshburn, § 522(b) identifies the federal/state election while the holding concerns whether termination payments are earnings under Colorado law. opinion →
Butz v. Blue (In Re Blue), § 522(e) is cited in a discussion of waiver; the operative exemption ruling applies Ohio law. opinion →
In re Donahue, § 522(d)(10)(B) is cited to identify veterans’ benefits as exempt; the court does not decide the exemption issue. opinion →
Universal Profile, Inc. v. Atlanta Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n (In re Universal Profile, Inc.), § 522 is cited in legislative-history examples of bankruptcy jurisdiction; the holding concerns jurisdiction under § 1471. opinion →
In Re Stuart R. and Shiela M. Terry, § 522(d) is cited in the procedural history of a Chapter 13 plan; the holding concerns eligibility and good faith under §§ 109 and 1325. opinion →
In Re DeVoe, § 522 is mentioned as the exemption mechanism after deciding that a prepetition tax refund belongs to the estate; the holding concerns § 541. opinion →
In Re Colbert, § 522(b) is mentioned as the authority for Ohio’s alternative exemption scheme; the holding concerns ownership of a joint tax refund under state law. opinion →
Malone v. American Fletcher National Bank (In Re Malone), § 522(d)(2) is cited to note an unobjected-to automobile exemption; the decision concerns venue. opinion →
In the Matter of William R. Turpin. William R. Turpin v. Amos M. Wente, Trustee, § 522(d)(10)(E) appeared only in a footnote comparing the new Code with the former Bankruptcy Act; the holding concerned pre-Code pension benefits. opinion →
Matter of Troutman, § 522 appeared only in the prior Chapter 7 case’s exemption background; the holding concerned dismissal of a subsequent Chapter 13 plan. opinion →
In Re Clayborn, § 522(f) was mentioned as the prior basis for lien avoidance; the holding concerned treatment of contractual attorney’s fees in the Chapter 13 plan. opinion →
Krajci v. Mt. Vernon Consumer Discount Co., § 522(b), (d), and (f) supplied the procedural context for the appeal; the holding rejected the creditor’s fraud theory under the Truth-in-Lending Act. opinion →
In Re Elkind, § 522(d)(1) appeared in a footnote explaining the one-exemption calculation; the decision concerned a preferential transfer and the debtor’s record interest in the property. opinion →
In Re Bouchard, § 522(f)(1) was rejected as a basis to avoid the trustee’s hypothetical lien; the operative holding enforced the trustee’s rights under § 544 after the state exemption was lost. opinion →
Matter of Scher, § 522(d) and (f) appeared in a general discussion of Chapter 13’s statutory structure; the decision concerned student-loan treatment and plan good faith. opinion →
Berry v. Dial Consumer Discount Co. (In Re Berry), § 522 appeared in a procedural description of how exemptions are claimed while the decision concerned the automatic stay and validity of a mortgage. opinion →
In Re Weissinger, § 522(d) was mentioned as an unresolved alternative valuation issue; the court decided the Chapter 13 good-faith issue without reaching the exemption question. opinion →
Turismo v. Barr (In Re Lockwood), § 522 was mentioned in the automatic-stay and equitable-subordination background; the decision denied relief from stay and did not construe the exemption provision. opinion →
In Re Grethen, § 522(f)(2) appeared in explaining why timely exemption objections matter, but the holding denied a creditor’s late-extension motion under Bankruptcy Rule 906(b)(2). opinion →
Crabtree v. Haladye (In Re Crabtree), § 522(h) was cited in an unsuccessful lien-avoidance complaint, but the decision concerned whether that filing tolled the deadline for a separate dischargeability action; the vendor’s lien was not avoided. opinion →
In Re Miller, § 522(f) was mentioned only because the debtors’ lien-avoidance application remained pending; the decision resolved reaffirmation agreements under § 524. opinion →
Riggsby v. Fort Oglethorpe State Bank (In Re Riggsby), § 522(h) was cited to identify the debtor’s avoiding power in a venue discussion; the court construed venue under § 1473. opinion →
Krajci v. Mt. Vernon Consumer Discount Co., § 522(b) and § 522(d)(1) appeared in the procedural history of a separate fraud and homestead dispute; the opinion did not construe § 522. opinion →
C.I.T. Financial Services, Inc. v. Belcher (In re Belcher), § 522(f) appeared in the history of a prior lien-avoidance order; the issue decided was dischargeability under § 523. opinion →
G. F. C. Corp. of Kansas v. Noland (In Re Noland), the opinion cited § 522 while resolving retroactivity and lien avoidance, but the relevant holding was already represented by the later, more direct treatment of gap-period and pre-enactment liens in this section record. opinion →
In Re LaFlamme, the subsection (d)(5) construction is recorded above; the duplicate citation is not separately annotated. opinion →
Gortmaker v. AVCO Financial Services (In Re Gortmaker), the post-discharge filing rule is recorded above; the duplicate subsection citation is not separately annotated. opinion →
In re Harrison, § 522 was cited to explain that Georgia’s separate exemption statute mirrors the federal “any property” exemption; the holding construed Georgia law, not section 522 itself. opinion →
Aetna Insurance v. Byrd (In Re Byrd), the court held the fiduciary-fraud judgment superior to the homestead exemption; § 522(f) appeared only in the debtor’s unsuccessful allegation that the lien was void. opinion →
Campbell v. Thames (In Re Thames), § 522(d)(1) and (m) appeared in the exemption footnote and procedural facts; the decision resolved the fraudulent-transfer claim without construing § 522. opinion →
In Re Shepherd, § 522(d)(5) appeared in the debtors’ exemption objection; the holding concerned the landlord’s right to retain a security deposit and the inapplicability of § 553(a)(3), not the exemption provision. opinion →
Colandrea v. Colandrea (In Re Colandrea), § 522 was cited only to identify the debtor’s separate avoidance powers while the court construed trustee standing under §§ 547 and 548. opinion →
Washburn & Roberts, Inc. v. Park East (In Re Washburn & Roberts, Inc.), § 522 was not construed; the opinion decided a debtor-in-possession’s avoidance power under § 544(a)(3). opinion →
Brosco Inc. v. Toledo (In Re Toledo), § 522(f)(g) was mentioned only in contrasting debtor and trustee powers; the holding concerned the Registry of Property and § 502. opinion →
Hassett v. McColley (In Re O.P.M. Leasing Services, Inc.), § 522(d) appeared in a footnote describing an unresolved exemption issue; the opinion decided trustee disqualification and administration issues. opinion →
Berry v. Pattison (In Re Berry), the court expressly declined to consider § 522(g) and (h) for lien avoidance and decided the Chapter 13 issue under other Code provisions; its discussion of exemptions was explanatory rather than a holding on § 522. opinion →
In Re Grindal, § 522(b)(1) and § 522(d) appeared in a footnote and in the description of Maine’s opt-out; the court decided the scope of the Maine homestead exemption under state law. opinion →
In Re Snow, § 522(d) was mentioned only in the procedural account of Snow’s claimed exemptions; the court did not interpret or apply the provision. opinion →
Kakolewski v. Kakolewski (In Re Kakolewski), § 522(d)(9)(D) appeared only in the defendant’s quoted contention; the court did not adopt or construe it. opinion →
In Re Duque, § 522(b)(1) was cited only as the statutory basis for an objection; the court did not decide its meaning. opinion →
In Re Cummings, § 522(b) identified the debtor’s claimed exemptions in procedural history; the court did not construe it. opinion →
Sachs Ex Rel. Maryland v. Ryan (In Re Ryan), § 522(b), (d)(1), and (5) merely reported claimed exemptions; the court did not interpret them. opinion →
Hirsch v. Martens (In re Hirsch), § 522(f) appeared only in the procedural description of the lien-avoidance filing; the court decided the Wisconsin homestead issue. opinion →
Pendleton v. Dealer Warehouse, Inc. (In Re Pendleton), § 522(f) was mentioned in the complaint, but the issue was moot because the claim was satisfied and the encumbrance was released. opinion →
Erickson v. Wenner (In Re Wenner), § 522(f) appeared only in the defendants’ reliance on Security Industrial Bank; the court did not construe the provision. opinion →
Warren v. Scott (In Re Phillips), § 522(b)(2)(A) was the debtor’s alternative argument; the court decided the case under § 541(c)(2) without interpreting § 522(b)(2)(A). opinion →
In Re Call, the court recounted procedural objections to claimed § 522(d) and § 522(b)(1) exemptions but did not decide what those subsections mean or require. opinion →
Tabita v. Internal Revenue Service (In Re Tabita), § 522(h) appeared only as the statutory basis for the debtor’s complaint and in a footnote; the court’s holding construed and applied § 547, not § 522(h). opinion →
In Re Stokes, § 522 appeared only in a footnote listing a Bankruptcy Code provision that generally helps debtors maximize exemptions; the court did not interpret or apply § 522. opinion →
United States ex rel. Small Business Administration v. McQuaige (In re McQuaige), § 522(b)(2)(B) identified the claimed exemption and § 522(c) appeared in an argument, but the court decided the case under the common-law tenancy-by-the-entireties doctrine. opinion →
Roberts v. John Deere Co. (In Re Roberts), § 522(d)(2) appeared only in quoted legislative history; the court’s holding concerned § 522(f)(2), not the cited exemption subsection. opinion →
SSA Baltimore Federal Credit Union v. Bizon, the court did not reach the § 522(b)(2)(A) exemption issue; discussion of § 522(d)(10)(E) reported arguments and another court’s reasoning rather than this court’s holding. opinion →
In Re Schwartz, the court used § 522 only to explain Iowa’s exemption statute and decided the case under Iowa Code § 627.6(9)(e). opinion →
Landmark v. Schaefbauer (In Re Landmark), § 522(d) and § 522(d)(5) described exemption elections, while § 522(h) appeared in a party argument the court did not decide; the holding concerned § 362(a)(4). opinion →
Industrial Commission of New York v. Mully (In Re Mully), § 522(f) appeared in procedural discussion and § 522(c) in a possible alternative analysis; the ruling voided a judgment under § 362(a). opinion →
John Deere Co. v. Production Credit Ass’n, § 522(f)(2)(A) was mentioned only to distinguish household-goods cases; the court expressly did not decide § 522. opinion →
American National Bank v. Huff (In Re Huff), § 522(d)(10)(E) was used only to compare federal pension-payment policy with Illinois law; the holding concerned state-law exemption and non-assignability. opinion →
Sovran Bank, N.A. v. Anderson, § 522(b)(2)(B) appeared while describing another case; the decision concerned relief from the automatic stay under § 362. opinion →
In Re Marriage of Logston, § 522(d) and § 522(b)(1) described Illinois’s opt-out background; the court did not decide an issue under § 522. opinion →
Holcomb v. Fulton (In Re Fulton), § 522(d)(5) appeared only in the debtor’s schedules and claimed exemption; the court did not construe it. opinion →
Miller v. Jones (In Re Jones), § 522(d)(10)(E) and § 522(b)(1) supplied background for the court’s § 541(c)(2) analysis, not a holding under § 522. opinion →
In the Matter of Caro Products, Inc., § 522(f)(2) was discussed only in describing the Supreme Court’s Security Industrial Bank holding; this court decided § 547(b). opinion →
In Re Peters, § 522(g)(1)(A) was the trustee’s asserted objection, but the court resolved the case because the funds were not property of the Chapter 7 estate. opinion →
In Re Russell, the opinion only states that the debtors claimed exemptions pursuant to § 522(b)(2); the court does not interpret or apply § 522. opinion →
Rizzo v. American Bank & Trust Co. (In re Rizzo), § 522(f)(1) appeared in a stipulation and a rejected argument; the court enforced a prior order and agreement without construing § 522. opinion →
Harris v. Crowder, § 522 appeared only in a footnote comparing West Virginia and federal exemptions; the court did not decide § 522. opinion →
In Re Sampson, § 522(f) appeared only in a footnote noting that no lien-avoidance motion had been filed; the court did not construe it. opinion →
Harrison v. St. Louis Fuel & Supply Co. (In Re H & S Transportation Co.), § 522(f) appeared only in discussion of other courts; the holding concerned § 547(c)(4) and a maritime lien. opinion →
In Re Dos Passos, § 522(d)(3) appeared only to report a claimed exemption; the court did not interpret or apply it. opinion →
In Re Kao, the opinion’s substantive § 522 discussion appears in a reproduced lower-court ruling, not this court’s holding. opinion →
Pacheco v. First National Bank of Central Jersey (In Re Pacheco), the opinion only recounts claims under §§ 522(g), (h), and (i) and resolves the case on settlement and fees. opinion →
In Re Taff, § 522(d)(10)(E) appears as an analogous federal provision while the court construes Minnesota’s materially identical exemption statute; the ruling does not independently decide the federal subsection. opinion →
In Re Hockinson, section 522(c) is mentioned only in a concluding cross-reference, and § 522(m) appears only in a footnote as a passing citation; the court does not interpret, apply, or rule on either provision. opinion →
In Re Stinson, section 522(b) is cited only to identify the debtors' claimed exemption and procedural posture; the court's holding interprets and applies New York CPLR § 5205(f), not § 522. opinion →
In Re Winzenburg, the court mentions § 522(f) only as an analogy in rejecting the creditor’s Fifth Amendment argument; it does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 522(f). opinion →
In re Rollins, the court merely reports its earlier ruling that § 522(h) could not be used to avoid a lien, while deciding the remaining equity and exemption issue; it does not independently construe § 522(h). opinion →
In Re Fox, the court resolves the setoff claim under § 553(b); § 522(h) appears only in a footnote reproducing the statutory text and is not applied as the basis of the ruling. opinion →
Joing v. O & P Partnership (In Re Joing), the court uses § 522(h) only to establish standing for the § 548 action and decides the case under § 548; it does not construe the scope of § 522(h). opinion →
L.T. Ruth Coal Co. v. Big Sandy Coal & Coke Co. (In Re L.T. Ruth Coal Co.), section 522(b) appears only in the court’s list of Bankruptcy Code provisions illustrating that Congress adopts state law; the opinion does not decide an exemption issue or otherwise interpret or apply § 522. opinion →
Matter of Pagan, 11 U.S.C. § 522 appears only as the statutory basis for the debtor’s motion and request for exemption proceeds; the court’s actual ruling interprets and applies Ohio Revised Code § 2329.66(A)(1), not § 522. opinion →
In Re Ralstin, the court expressly declined to decide whether the ERISA plan was exempt under § 522(b)(2)(A), ruling instead that the plan was excluded from the bankruptcy estate under § 541(c)(2). opinion →
Edwards v. Edwards, section 522 appears only as the federal source identified for Tennessee’s exemption statute and in a general reference to bankruptcy courts’ treatment of IRA exemptions. The court does not interpret, apply, or hold anything about § 522 itself; its ruling concerns Tennessee exemption law and the alimony claim. opinion →
In Re Matthews, the court decides the IRA exemption under Iowa Code § 627.6(9)(e); § 522(d)(10)(E) appears only in descriptions of another court’s decision and as a comparison to similar exemption statutes, not as this court’s holding. opinion →
Ross v. United States (In Re Auto-Pak, Inc.), the opinion mentions § 522(f) only while describing the separate Gardner decision; this court’s own ruling concerns § 106(c), sovereign immunity, and § 550(a)(1), so it does not hold what § 522 means or requires. opinion →
In Re Innis, the court’s decision construes California Code of Civil Procedure § 703.140(b)(10)(E) and denies the IRA exemption; § 522 is mentioned only as the bankruptcy exemption framework and filing requirement, not interpreted or applied as the basis of the ruling. opinion →
In Re Abdo, the court’s holding determines that future mortgage installments are not “cash” under New York Debtor and Creditor Law § 283(2) and therefore are not exempt; § 522 is mentioned only as the basis for the trustee’s objection and as a comparison to the federal exemption scheme. opinion →
In re Sutheimer, the opinion mentions § 522(f), § 522(b)(2), and § 522(f)(2)(B) in describing the motion and an undisputed fact, but the court’s actual ruling resolves only whether the equipment is exempt under Wisconsin law and does not state or apply a holding about § 522 itself. opinion →
In Re Erickson, the court expressly declined to review the bankruptcy court’s interpretation or application of § 522(f), so the reference to lien avoidance is procedural disposition rather than a holding about § 522. opinion →
In Re Schnupp, the opinion’s holding concerns curing and de-accelerating mortgage arrears under 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5); § 522(b)(2) appears only as an incidental example in a quoted passage and the court does not interpret or apply § 522. opinion →
In Re Nittler, the opinion mentions 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1) only while summarizing the bankruptcy court’s ruling in In re Norman; this court does not interpret, apply, or hold anything about § 522. opinion →
National City Bank v. Coopers And Lybrand, § 522 appears only in quoted legislative history as an example of a Title 11 claim; the court does not decide what § 522 means or requires. opinion →
National City Bank v. Coopers & Lybrand, § 522 appears only in quoted legislative history as an example of a claim cognizable in bankruptcy court; the court does not interpret or apply it. opinion →
In Re Lapp, the opinion states that lien avoidance under § 522(f) was not before the Court. opinion →
Quinn v. Fidelity Financial Services Inc. (In Re Quinn), § 522(h) is mentioned as the provision under which the complaint was filed, but the court makes no ruling about § 522. opinion →
Moore v. Philadelphia National Bank (In re Moore), the debtor claimed funds exempt under § 522(b), but the court decided whether withdrawals were forged. opinion →
In Re Bartlett, the court decided the exemption under Missouri law; § 522(d)(10)(E) appears only as a comparison and reported description of another court’s holding. opinion →
Acolyte Electric Corp. v. City of New York, § 522 is mentioned in describing property that may be claimed as exempt under § 542(a); the ruling concerns the core turnover proceeding. opinion →
In Re Chapman, § 522(b)(1) is mentioned only to state Maryland’s opt-out; the ruling applies Maryland exemption law. opinion →
Lee v. Johnson (In Re Johnson), the holding concerns Arkansas insurance exemptions; § 522(b) and § 522(a) describe the opt-out background. opinion →
In re Velazquez, the court reopened the case under § 350(b); the § 522(f) reference does not construe the statute. opinion →
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Blackburn (In Re Blackburn), the opinion addresses discharge exceptions under § 523, not § 522. opinion →
PR en La Mano/La Gran Enciclopedia v. Resto Del Valle (In Re Resto Del Valle), the court declined to decide whether the creditor’s claim was impaired by § 522 exemptions. opinion →
In Re D'Angona, § 522(d)(1) is mentioned only while deciding venue. opinion →
Estate of Lellock v. Prudential Insurance, the statement about § 522(d)(7) is hypothetical and appears only in explaining the effect of listing the policy; the court’s actual holding concerns lien survival under § 506(d). opinion →
McVey Trucking, Inc. v. Secretary of State of Illinois, § 522(h) appears only in a footnote explaining debtor-in-possession authority while the ruling concerns § 547(b) and § 106(c), not § 522. opinion →
In Re Jablonski, § 522(f) appears only to identify an exception to the procedural requirement for lien challenges, while the court decides a § 506(a) valuation issue. opinion →
Farmers & Merchants Bank of Eatonton v. Alexander, § 522(f) appears only in the procedural background as the debtor’s requested basis for invalidating a security interest; the court does not decide that request. opinion →
In Re Ray, § 522(f)(2) is cited only to describe the Supreme Court’s ruling and constitutional concern about retroactive lien destruction; this court decides conversion to Chapter 12. opinion →
Whitney v. Beneficial Colorado, Inc. (In Re Whitney), § 522(f) identifies the debtors’ motion to void a lien, but the ruling concerns whether property qualifies as exempt under Colorado law. opinion →
In Re Stern, § 522(f)(1) describes the debtor’s post-confirmation motion and default relief; the court does not interpret or apply it. opinion →
Norwest Bank Nebraska, N.A. v. Tveten (In Re Tveten), § 522 provisions are mentioned while listing exemption issues, but the proceeding decides a discharge question under § 727(a)(2)(A). opinion →
In Re Kidd, the court says review of § 522(f) is unnecessary and cites federal exemptions only to compare them while interpreting Oklahoma law. opinion →
Great Valley Savings Ass’n v. Bickleman (In Re Bickleman), the operative holding concerns § 522(d)(1) and nonavoidable liens; the § 522(f)(1) references quote another decision or report an earlier ruling. opinion →
Peter W. Hebert, M.D. And Patricia A. Hebert v. J.F. Fliegel, Jr., § 522(b)(2)(A) identifies the availability of Oregon exemptions, while the holding interprets Oregon law for Keogh plans. opinion →
In Re Niles, § 522(b) describes a prior uncontested lien-avoidance order; the ruling concerns the collateral description under Illinois law and § 544. opinion →
Production Credit Ass’n of the Midlands v. Lilienthal (In Re Lilienthal), § 522(d)(10)(E) appears only in the parties’ arguments; the court decides the issue under Iowa law. opinion →
In Re Fischer, § 522(f)(2)(B) appears only in describing the debtor’s Schedule C intentions; the court does not decide the subsection’s meaning or application. opinion →
In Re Parham, § 522(b) appears only in a “See also” string cite after the court resolves the parties’ rights under Florida law. opinion →
First Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n of Florida v. AAA Properties of Polk, Inc. (In re Parham), § 522(b) is a passing citation at the end of the analysis of perfected interests in rents. opinion →
Bankr. L. Rep. P 71,787 in Re John E. Tully, Debtor. Henry J. Boroff, Trustee in Bankruptcy of John E. Tully v. John E., § 522(d)(5) appears only in the summary of the debtor’s filing argument. opinion →
Tully v. Tully, § 522(d)(5) appears only in recounting the appellant’s claim about the effective date of amendments. opinion →
In Re Tashjian, the court observes that the debtor might avoid a judicial lien under § 522(f)(1), but the debtor did not move to avoid it and the court does not decide the issue. opinion →
In Re Van Iperen, the discussion of § 522(f) reports the bankruptcy court’s ruling, while this appellate court affirms on mootness grounds. opinion →
Van Iperen v. Production Credit Ass’n of Worthington-Slayton Branch, the § 522(f) reference is procedural history; the appeal is decided on mootness grounds. opinion →
Wemple State Bank v. Whalen (In Re Whalen), § 522(d)(11)(C) identifies the federal model for an Illinois provision and § 522(b)(1) describes Illinois’s opt-out; neither federal subsection is interpreted. opinion →
Walter v. Sunwest Bank (In Re Walter), the court reports the debtor’s argument that the pension plan is exempt under § 522(b)(2)(A) and expressly says the issue is not before it. opinion →
Sinkow v. Latimer (In Re Latimer), § 522(f)(1) is mentioned only to describe the debtors’ motions to avoid liens; the court does not construe or apply it. opinion →
In Re SFW, Inc., § 522(f)(2)(A) appears only while the opinion reports another court’s decision. opinion →
In Re McKeon, § 522(d) appears in a footnote recounting counsel’s example and statutory text, not in a holding. opinion →
Joing v. O & P PARTNERSHIP, the court reports a bankruptcy-court standing ruling under § 522(h) and says it cannot review that issue. opinion →
First State Bank of Wykoff v. Grell (In Re Grell), the opinion reports prior lien avoidance under § 522(f) without interpreting the subsection. opinion →
In Re Taylor, § 522(b)(1) and § 522(d) appear only in a footnote describing Maryland’s opt-out and procedural background. opinion →
United States v. Moore, § 522(f)(2) appears only in a parenthetical identifying the statute in another case. opinion →
In Re Aikens, the court notes § 522(f)(1) as a possible remedy but says the debtor did not invoke it and the issue cannot be reached. opinion →
Matter of Tvorik, § 522 appears only in a footnote stating that the debtor failed to exempt part of a cause of action. opinion →
Spence v. Pontack (In re Tvorik), the sole § 522 reference is a footnote about an unclaimed exemption, incidental to jurisdiction. opinion →
Bender v. Commonwealth Mortgage Co. of America (In Re Bender), § 522(f)(2) appears only in a footnote stating that the debtors did not seek relief under it. opinion →
Matter of Gorski, § 522(b) and § 522(d) are mentioned only while describing other courts’ reasoning; the court expressly says the debtor’s exemption rights under § 522 need not be considered. opinion →
Matter of Antal, § 522 appears only in a quoted district-court ruling identifying Social Security payments as exempt property; this court does not decide the issue. opinion →
Rubel v. Brimacombe & Schlecte, P.C., § 522(f) appears only as the appellant’s asserted basis for avoiding the lien, while the appeal is decided under attorney-lien and state-law principles. opinion →
Striffler v. Tarle (In Re Tarle), the court mentions the debtor’s claimed § 522(d) exemptions while deciding a false-oath issue and does not construe the statute. opinion →
In Re Netz, § 522(d)(10)(E) appears only in a footnote comparing prior cases and the Minnesota exemption statute. opinion →
Reed v. Philadelphia Housing Authority (In Re Reed), § 522(b) and § 522(d) appear only in the debtor’s exemption allegations and procedural footnote. opinion →
Matter of Hansen, the opinion describes reliance on § 522(i) and § 522(l), but the operative ruling concerns Bankruptcy Rule 4003(b). opinion →
Thornton v. ITT Financial Corp. (In Re Thornton), § 522(f)(2)(A) is applied by the bankruptcy court, but this reviewing passage does not state the court’s own holding. opinion →
In Re Williams, § 522(b)(2) appears only as the debtor’s statutory basis for claiming state-law exemptions. opinion →
Hollinrake v. Federal Land Bank (In Re Hollinrake), § 522 appears only in a parenthetical describing another court’s ruling and a quoted statutory list. opinion →
Purnell v. Citicorp Homeowners Services, Inc. (In Re Purnell), § 522(g) and (h) appear only in the debtor’s argument; the court expressly declines to discuss them. opinion →
Lewis v. Maloon (In Re Lewis), the court assumes the property is exempt and expressly declines to decide the § 522(b)(2)(B) issue. opinion →
In Re Freedlander, § 522(b) appears only in the debtor’s claimed exemption framework and Virginia’s opt-out description. opinion →
In Re Komet, § 522(b)(2) and § 522(d)(10)(E) describe available exemption choices; the holding concerns ERISA preemption. opinion →
Richardson v. Philadelphia Housing Authority (In Re Richardson), § 522(h) appears as the debtors’ asserted recovery basis; the decision rests on § 547(c)(2). opinion →
Magallanes v. Williams (In Re Magallanes), § 522(b)(2)(A) appears in the background rule for the filing-date exemption election; the appellate disposition remands for amendment and bad-faith/prejudice findings without deciding a substantive § 522 issue. opinion →
In Re Hughes, § 522(c) is cited as background for the survival of in-rem rights after discharge; the ruling is under § 524 and does not interpret § 522(c). opinion →
In Re Atallah, § 522(b) and § 522(d)(5) describe the debtor’s exemption election, while the court decides that the IRAs are estate property under § 541(c)(2). opinion →
Haynes v. First United Bank of Mississippi (In re Haynes), §§ 522(g) and (h) appear only as the debtor’s asserted recovery grounds; the court says they are inapplicable but decides the exemption under Mississippi law without interpreting either subsection. opinion →
In Re Winegarten, § 522(f)(1) is mentioned only to identify the debtors’ lien-avoidance motion; the court’s substantive reasoning concerns Oklahoma homestead exemption law. opinion →
Aikens v. City of Philadelphia, § 522(f)(1) appears only in the account of the debtor’s earlier challenge and the Bankruptcy Court’s ruling; this appellate passage does not decide or interpret the subsection. opinion →
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Coones (In re Coones), § 522(f) is mentioned only to describe the debtors’ motion to avoid liens; the court does not construe or decide subsection (f). opinion →
Farley v. Boynton Bros. (In Re Farley), § 522(f)(1) is identified as the basis for a lien-avoidance request, but the court says the issue was not discussed further and does not interpret it. opinion →
Canario v. Lidelco, Inc., § 522 is mentioned only in reasoning about a separate jurisdictional issue; the court does not interpret or apply the section. opinion →
Lanker v. Wheeler (In Re Wheeler), § 522(f)(1) is mentioned only while reporting another court’s holding and is not decided in this passage. opinion →
In Re Thomas, § 522(f) appears only in a parenthetical list of lien-avoidance provisions. opinion →
Greene v. Balaber-Strauss (In Re Greene), § 522(f) appears only in the background account of denied exemption requests. opinion →
Bryant v. Woodland (In Re Bryant), § 522(h) appears only in a footnote reporting the debtor’s asserted basis, and the court does not decide it. opinion →
In Re Cabrillo, § 522(d)(5) is mentioned in the debtors’ schedules and in a footnote describing the statutory amount; the court decides the stay and security-interest issues without interpreting the exemption. opinion →
In Re Petruzzelli, § 522(d) appears only as statutory and procedural background; the court says the issue is not pertinent because the debtor does not claim the optional federal exemptions. opinion →
Currell v. Taylor, § 522(d)(10)(E) is mentioned only as an unresolved issue remanded to the bankruptcy court; this court does not decide the exemption. opinion →
Currell v. Taylor, § 522(d)(10)(E) is mentioned only as an unresolved remand issue; the court holds that the district court’s order was not final. opinion →
Currell v. Taylor, § 522(d)(10)(E) is mentioned only to describe the remand and does not supply the court’s holding. opinion →
In Re Toone, § 522(d)(10)(E) is mentioned while discussing another decision; the operative analysis concerns ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code. opinion →
In Re Dixon, § 522(f)(1) appears only in a creditor’s argument; the court decides a separate Chapter 13 liquidation-value issue. opinion →
In Re Goldsberry, § 522 appears only in quoted legislative history; the court decides the earned-income-credit issue under §§ 541(a) and state law. opinion →
Maurer v. Hedback (In Re Maurer), § 522(d) is mentioned only in the account of the debtor’s schedules and exemption election; the holding concerns § 541. opinion →
In Re Harvey, § 522(b) and § 522(d)(11)(D)-(E) are statutory background and reported authorities; the court applies Wisconsin exemption law. opinion →
In Re Paul, § 522(d)(3) appears only in the description of scheduled assets and is not construed. opinion →
Patterson v. Shumate, the Supreme Court did not reach the alternative § 522(b)(2)(A) argument and decided the case under § 541(c)(2). opinion →
Miller v. Steinberg (In Re Marilyn Steinberg Enterprises Inc.), § 522(l) appears only in the discussion of another case and is not applied here. opinion →
In Re Orlebeke, § 522(b)(1) is statutory background; the operative holding applies New York law to the IRA funds. opinion →
In Re Cavalieri, § 522(d)(2) and § 522(d)(5) are discussed only as hypothetical amendments; the operative dispute concerns §§ 363 and 549 and lien reinstatement. opinion →
In Re Buchholz, § 522(d)(11)(D) is used as an analogy while the court construes Iowa Code § 627.6(8)(c); the court does not decide a federal § 522 exemption claim. opinion →
In re Rhodes, § 522 is mentioned only in the claimed homestead exemption; the operative reasoning concerns §§ 362, 541, and 549. opinion →
In Re Molina Y Vedia, § 522 is mentioned by analogy, not construed or applied. opinion →
In Re Egan, § 522(d)(5) claims are treated as established by lack of objection, but the operative confirmation analysis concerns § 1129. opinion →
In Re Harper, § 522(f) appears only in a hypothetical discussion; the court decides § 521(2). opinion →
In Re Serrick, § 522(l) appears only in a parenthetical report of another case; the court resolves timeliness under Rule 4003(b). opinion →
In Re Sirois, the court expressly avoids the § 522(b)(2)(A) issues because the interest is excluded from the estate under § 541(c)(2). opinion →
In Re Greif, § 522(b)(2)(A) issues are raised but left for settlement or later proceedings; the operative conclusion concerns § 541(c)(2). opinion →
Hohenberg v. Hohenberg (In Re Hohenberg), the court held the spouse’s proposed exemption amendment and classification issues premature and did not decide them. opinion →
In Re Halpenny, section 522(d)(5) appears only as the debtor's claimed exemption; the court resolves the motion under 11 U.S.C. § 1326 and the vested-rights effect of a confirmed Chapter 13 plan. opinion →
Leavell v. United States (In Re Leavell), the opinion mentions § 522(c)(2)(B) only in a footnote stating its effect on exempt property; the holding concerns § 506(d) and tax liens. opinion →
In Re Campbell, section 522(b) and § 522(f)(1) appear in the factual account and reported motion, but the court does not construe either provision. opinion →
In re Merritt, the court reports that no preference action was asserted under § 522(h), without explaining what subsection (h) means or deciding its application. opinion →
Farm Credit Bank of St. Paul v. Halverson (In Re Solberg), the opinion addresses 12 U.S.C. § 2219a and related provisions, not § 522(b)(2)(A). opinion →
In Re Evans, the court states that the debtor elected Texas exemptions under § 522(b)(2)(A) and then applies Texas homestead law without construing § 522. opinion →
In Re Radebaugh, the court states generally that § 522 provides exemptions but decides the issue under Missouri law and 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2). opinion →
In Re Packham, section 522(d)(10)(E) is only an example of a provision requiring value judgments and is not interpreted. opinion →
Hoth v. Stogsdill, section 522 is background to the bankruptcy estate and possible exemptions; the court does not decide or construe an exemption provision. opinion →
Johnson v. Home State Bank, section 522(c)(2) is cited to explain that a mortgage survives bankruptcy, but the Court’s holding concerns whether the surviving mortgage interest is a “claim” under § 101(5) and may be included in a Chapter 13 plan. opinion →
Montgomery v. Montgomery (In Re Montgomery), section 522(f) appears only in the discussion of another court’s ruling; this court decides the dischargeability of a divorce-related obligation under § 523. opinion →
In Re Dillon, § 522(f) is cited as the procedural basis for the lien-avoidance motion, but the court decides the exemption under Utah law and does not construe § 522. opinion →
In Re Brown, the court describes § 522(f) and § 522(h), but the dispositive holding is that the debtors lack standing because the lien was voluntarily granted; the court does not decide a substantive § 522 application. opinion →
In Re Goodwin, § 522(f) is discussed in the account of the debtor’s theories, but the operative conclusion concerns equitable estoppel and the characterization of the lien rather than construing the statutory requirements. opinion →
In Re Robert H. Isom Mary E. Isom, § 522 is cited in the court’s discussion of the fresh-start policy and tax-lien survival, while the holding concerns the federal tax lien under § 6325 and § 522(c)(2)(B). opinion →
In Re Martin, § 522 appears only in a citation supporting the finding that Country Maid stock is nonexempt; the court decides chapter 11 feasibility and the best-interests test without construing § 522. opinion →
In Re Howe, § 522(h) is only the statutory basis identified for the complaint, while the passage expressly notes that § 522(f) is not at issue. opinion →
In Re Grubbs, § 522(d)(5) identifies the claimed exemption, but the court decides that the stock was not entireties property and does not construe § 522. opinion →
In Re Hartman, § 522 appears only in a footnote listing an unresolved classification question; the court does not rule on the statute. opinion →
In Re Fritsvold, the court describes the debtors’ initial § 522(d) election, but decides § 541(c)(2) and state-law preemption issues instead. opinion →
Lewis v. State Employees Credit Union of Maryland, Inc. (In Re Lewis), § 522(h) is mentioned only as the statutory basis for the complaint; the holding concerns the timing and avoidability of a preferential transfer under § 547. opinion →
Redfield v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. (In Re Robertson), § 522 appears in the § 541 turnover analysis and the court does not construe or apply an exemption provision. opinion →
ITT Financial Services v. Powell, § 522(d)(11)(E) appears only in a party’s argument and the court decides the scope of Oklahoma’s exemption statute instead. opinion →
In Re Wickham, the court discusses § 522(b)(2)(B) and the effect of joint creditors but expressly leaves the exemption issue unresolved; its holding concerns the trustee’s required compliance with § 363(f) and (h). opinion →
In Re Cress, § 522 appears only in the court’s account of another court’s reasoning under § 541(c)(2); this court does not construe § 522. opinion →
Richardson v. Lenick (In Re Richardson), the opinion contains no discussion of § 522 and the holdings concern § 506(d). opinion →
Allamon v. Nichols (In Re Allamon), § 522(f) is mentioned only as the basis asserted in the debtor’s motions; the court decides retroactivity and Ohio exemption-law issues instead. opinion →
In Re Laurence A. Neuton, § 522(d)(10)(E) appears only in a footnote analogy; the holding concerns the California Probate Code support limitation. opinion →
In Re Medlantic Healthcare Group Cash Balance Retirement Plan, § 522(d)(10)(E) appears only in the trustee’s argument about § 541 and does not supply the court’s holding. opinion →
In Re Meyer, § 522(d) is mentioned as the debtors’ initial federal exemption election, but the operative exemption analysis applies Minnesota law and does not construe § 522. opinion →
Gouveia v. Pulley (In Re Pulley), the opinion reports arguments, statutory text, and other courts’ treatment of § 522, but does not show an operative holding by the Pulley court construing or applying § 522. opinion →
Perkins v. Mid-Penn Consumer Discount Co. (In Re Perkins), § 522(f)(2) is mentioned only while describing the Supreme Court's ruling in Security Industrial Bank as an analogous example; it does not construe or apply § 522 itself. opinion →
Auburndale State Bank v. Dairy Farm Leasing Corporation, the opinion only reports that the bankruptcy court entered an order under § 522(f)(2); this court does not construe, apply, or explain the statute. opinion →
White v. North (In Re North), § 522(d)(11)(C) appears only in the debtor’s unsupported argument; the court does not independently construe or apply that subsection. opinion →
In Re Johnson, § 522(f)(2)(B) appears only in the account of the Bankruptcy Court’s ruling; the district court’s analysis addresses Oklahoma’s tool-of-the-trade exemption instead. opinion →
Ott v. Richard, § 522(d)(11)(D) appears only in a passing list of potentially applicable provisions; the holding concerns the trustee’s ownership and capacity under other provisions. opinion →
Kostecky v. Lomas Mortgage USA, Inc. (In Re Kostecky), § 522(c)(2)(A)(ii) appears as supporting reasoning in the court’s operative § 506(d) lien-avoidance holding; the court does not construe § 522 as the basis for relief. opinion →
Doty v. Security Trust & Savings Bank (In Re Doty), § 522(c)(2)(A) appears in a parenthetical statutory quotation while the court decides the separate § 506(d) lien-avoidance issue. opinion →
Clarkson v. DeCaceres (In Re Clarkson), § 522(f)(1) appears in the factual account and a footnote describing an earlier order; this proceeding decides conversion damages rather than interpreting § 522(f)(1). opinion →
Cullen v. Redlon & Johnson Supply, Inc. (In Re Cullen), the court expressly declined to examine the necessity of equity under § 522(f) and resolved the lien issue under § 506(d), so the § 522(f) citation is not a holding. opinion →
Ward v. Turner, the court cites § 522(b)(1) only in a footnote to explain that Louisiana opted out of the federal exemptions; it does not construe or decide anything about the section. opinion →
In re Gerrald, the court mentions § 522(d) only while describing Arkansas's exemption-election statute; it applies the Arkansas constitutional homestead exemption and does not construe or decide anything about § 522. opinion →
Taylor v. Freeland (In Re Davis), the court’s ruling concerns whether to vacate a judgment under Rule 60(b); its discussion of § 522 merely recounts the Third Circuit and Supreme Court’s treatment of the claimed exemption and does not decide what § 522 means or requires. opinion →
Rhodes v. Internal Revenue Service (In Re Rhodes), the citation appears only in the factual background to identify the debtors’ claimed exemption; the court’s decision addresses the automatic stay under § 362 and damages, not the meaning or application of § 522. opinion →
Aetna Life Insurance v. Danbury Square Associates, Ltd. Partnership (In Re Danbury Square Associates, Ltd. Partnership), the court cites § 522(f) only to describe the severing issue in In re Calabria, a prior bankruptcy court decision; this court does not construe or apply § 522(f) to the present dispute. opinion →
First Security Bank of Utah v. Creech, the court mentions § 522 only while reporting another court’s ruling concerning exempted property and contrasting it with § 349; it does not decide what § 522 means or applies under § 522. opinion →
United States Trustee v. Kasuba (In Re Harris), the court merely reports in the factual background that Kasuba informed clients they could avoid liens under § 522(f); it does not construe or apply that provision. opinion →
In Re Calzadilla, the court cites § 522 only while explaining that debtors need legal advice about exemptions and Florida's opt-out system; it does not construe or apply the section to decide an issue in the case. opinion →
In Re Chaney, the court cites § 522(d)(11)(D) only while reporting Judge Bare's analysis in In re Haga that a Tennessee exemption was virtually identical to the federal provision; this court decides the debtor's exemption under Tennessee law and does not construe § 522. opinion →
In Re Laube, the court merely identifies § 522(b) as the procedural basis allowing the debtor to choose state exemptions; it decides the meaning and application of Wisconsin’s homestead statutes, not § 522. opinion →
United States v. Williams, the court expressly limited the appeal to whether the government preserved issues for appellate review, affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's § 522(h) determination based on the government's concession, and did not decide the exemption issues under § 522(c)(2)(B) or § 522(i). opinion →
Neal v. United States (In re Neal), the court did not construe or apply § 522(f)(2); it found the appeal moot after settlement, vacated the bankruptcy court's order, and remanded with instructions to dismiss. opinion →
In re Woodworth, the court discussed § 522(d)(5) only as an analogy drawn from In re Smith and other cases; its actual ruling interpreted the Illinois exemption statute and did not decide the meaning or application of § 522(d)(5). opinion →
In Re Fromal, the citation appears only in the procedural description of exemptions claimed and denied in the Bankruptcy Court; this court decides in forma pauperis and transcript motions without interpreting or applying § 522(d). opinion →
In Re Hickman, the court ultimately exempted the property because the trustee's objection was untimely and expressly stated that the question of which applicable nonbankruptcy law governed the § 522(b)(2)(B) exemption need not be decided. opinion →
In re Metzner, the court cites § 522 only to explain that Ohio opted out of the federal exemption scheme, then determines the IRA exemption under Ohio law; it does not construe or decide anything about § 522. opinion →
In Re Miles, the citation appears only in the stipulated facts as the debtor's asserted basis for claiming an exemption; the court's holding addresses Oklahoma's exemption statute, not what § 522(b)(2)(A) means or does. opinion →
In Re Bonzey, section 522(b)(2) is cited only to describe the debtor’s election of Rhode Island exemptions; the court’s ruling interprets and applies Rhode Island law, not § 522. opinion →
Pitrat v. Garlikov, the court expressly declined to decide whether the pension plans qualified for exemption under § 522(b)(2)(A), resolving the case instead under § 541(c)(2). opinion →
…and 2,252 more.

Statutory history

(Pub. L. 95–598, Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2586; Pub. L. 98–353, title III, §§306, 453, July 10, 1984, 98 Stat. 353, 375; Pub. L. 99–554, title II, §283(i), Oct. 27, 1986, 100 Stat. 3117; Pub. L. 101–647, title XXV, §2522(b), Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4866; Pub. L. 103–394, title I, §108(d), title III, §§303, 304(d), 310, title V, §501(d)(12), Oct. 22, 1994, 108 Stat. 4112, 4132, 4133, 4137, 4145; Pub. L. 106–420, §4, Nov. 1, 2000, 114 Stat. 1868; Pub. L. 109–8, title II, §§216, 224(a), (e)(1), title III, §§307, 308, 313(a), 322(a), Apr. 20, 2005, 119 Stat. 55, 62, 65, 81, 87, 96; Pub. L. 111–327, §2(a)(17), Dec. 22, 2010, 124 Stat. 3559.)

  • 2010—Subsec. (b)(3)(A). Pub. L. 111–327, §2(a)(17)(A), substituted "petition to the place" for "petition at the place" and "located in a single State" for "located at a single State".
  • Subsec. (c)(1). Pub. L. 111–327, §2(a)(17)(B), substituted "such paragraph" for "section 523(a)(5)".
  • 2005—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 109–8, §224(a)(1)(B)–(F), designated introductory provisions of subsec. (b) as par. (1), substituted "paragraph (3)" for "paragraph (2)" in two places and "paragraph (2)" for "paragraph (1)" wherever appearing, struck out "Such property is—" after "case is filed.", and struck out former par. (1) which read: "property that is specified under subsection (d) of this section, unless the State law that is applicable to the debtor under paragraph (2)(A) of this subsection specifically does not so authorize; or, in the alternative,".
  • Subsec. (b)(2). Pub. L. 109–8, §224(a)(1)(B), added par. (2). Former par. (2) redesignated (3).
  • Subsec. (b)(2)(C). Pub. L. 109–8, §224(a)(1)(A)(i)–(iii), added subpar. (C).
  • Subsec. (b)(3). Pub. L. 109–8, §307(2), inserted "If the effect of the domiciliary requirement under subparagraph (A) is to render the debtor ineligible for any exemption, the debtor may elect to exempt property that is specified under subsection (d)." at end.
  • Pub. L. 109–8, §224(a)(1)(A)(iv), redesignated par. (2) as (3) and inserted introductory provisions.
  • Subsec. (b)(3)(A). Pub. L. 109–8, §308(1), inserted "subject to subsections (o) and (p)," before "any property".
46 earlier amendment entries
  • Pub. L. 109–8, §307(1), substituted "730 days" for "180 days" and "or if the debtor's domicile has not been located at a single State for such 730-day period, the place in which the debtor's domicile was located for 180 days immediately preceding the 730-day period or for a longer portion of such 180-day period than in any other place" for ", or for a longer portion of such 180-day period than in any other place".
  • Subsec. (b)(4). Pub. L. 109–8, §224(a)(1)(G), added par. (4).
  • Subsec. (c)(1). Pub. L. 109–8, §216(1), added par. (1) and struck out former par. (1) which read as follows: "a debt of a kind specified in section 523(a)(1) or 523(a)(5) of this title;".
  • Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 109–8, §224(a)(2)(A), substituted "subsection (b)(2)" for "subsection (b)(1)" in introductory provisions.
  • Subsec. (d)(12). Pub. L. 109–8, §224(a)(2)(B), added par. (12).
  • Subsec. (f)(1)(A). Pub. L. 109–8, §216(2), substituted "a debt of a kind that is specified in section 523(a)(5); or" for "a debt—
  • "(i) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of record, determination made in accordance with State or territorial law by a governmental unit, or property settlement agreement; and
  • "(ii) to the extent that such debt—
  • "(I) is not assigned to another entity, voluntarily, by operation of law, or otherwise; and
  • "(II) includes a liability designated as alimony, maintenance, or support, unless such liability is actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support.; or".
  • Subsec. (f)(4). Pub. L. 109–8, §313(a), added par. (4).
  • Subsec. (g)(2). Pub. L. 109–8, §216(3), substituted "subsection (f)(1)(B)" for "subsection (f)(2)".
  • Subsec. (n). Pub. L. 109–8, §224(e)(1), added subsec. (n).
  • Subsec. (o). Pub. L. 109–8, §308(2), added subsec. (o).
  • Subsecs. (p), (q). Pub. L. 109–8, §322(a), added subsecs. (p) and (q).
  • 2000—Subsec. (c)(4). Pub. L. 106–420 added par. (4).
  • 1994—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 103–394, §501(d)(12)(A), substituted "Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure" for "Bankruptcy Rules".
  • Subsec. (d)(1) to (6). Pub. L. 103–394, §108(d)(1)–(6), substituted "$15,000" for "$7,500" in par. (1), "$2,400" for "$1,200" in par. (2), "$400" and "$8,000" for "$200" and "$4,000", respectively, in par. (3), "$1,000" for "$500" in par. (4), "$800" and "$7,500" for "$400" and "$3,750", respectively, in par. (5), and "$1,500" for "$750" in par. (6).
  • Subsec. (d)(8). Pub. L. 103–394, §108(d)(7), substituted "$8,000" for "$4,000".
  • Subsec. (d)(10)(E)(iii). Pub. L. 103–394, §501(d)(12)(B), substituted "or 408" for "408, or 409" and "Internal Revenue Code of 1986" for "Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C. 401(a), 403(a), 403(b), 408, or 409)".
  • Subsec. (d)(11)(D). Pub. L. 103–394, §108(d)(8), substituted "$15,000" for "$7,500".
  • Subsec. (f)(1). Pub. L. 103–394, §§303(3), 310(1), designated existing provisions as par. (1) and inserted "but subject to paragraph (3)" after "waiver of exemptions" in introductory provisions. Former par. (1) redesignated subpar. (A) of par. (1).
  • Subsec. (f)(1)(A). Pub. L. 103–394, §§303(2), 304(d), redesignated par. (1) as subpar. (A) of par. (1) and inserted ", other than a judicial lien that secures a debt—
  • "(i) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of record, determination made in accordance with State or territorial law by a governmental unit, or property settlement agreement; and
  • "(ii) to the extent that such debt—
  • "(I) is not assigned to another entity, voluntarily, by operation of law, or otherwise; and
  • "(II) includes a liability designated as alimony, maintenance, or support, unless such liability is actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support."
  • Subsec. (f)(1)(B). Pub. L. 103–394, §303(1), redesignated par. (2) as subpar. (B) of par. (1) and subpars. (A) to (C) of par. (2) as cls. (i) to (iii), respectively, of subpar. (B) of par. (1).
  • Subsec. (f)(2). Pub. L. 103–394, §303(4), added par. (2). Former par. (2) redesignated subpar. (B) of par. (1).
  • Subsec. (f)(3). Pub. L. 103–394, §310(2), added par. (3).
  • 1990—Subsec. (c)(3). Pub. L. 101–647 added par. (3).
  • 1986—Subsec. (h)(1). Pub. L. 99–554, §283(i)(1), substituted "553 of this title" for "553 of this tittle".
  • Subsec. (i)(2). Pub. L. 99–554, §283(i)(2), substituted "this" for "his" after "subsection (g) of".
  • 1984—Subsec. (a)(2). Pub. L. 98–353, §453(a), inserted "or, with respect to property that becomes property of an estate after such date, as of the date such property becomes property of the estate".
  • Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 98–353, §306(a), inserted provision that in joint cases filed under section 302 of this title and individual cases filed under section 301 or 303 of this title by or against debtors who are husband and wife, and whose estates are ordered to be jointly administered under Rule 1015(b) of the Bankruptcy Rules, one debtor may not elect to exempt property listed in paragraph (1) and the other debtor elect to exempt property listed in paragraph (2) of this subsection, but that if the parties cannot agree on the alternative to be elected, they shall be deemed to elect paragraph (1), where such election is permitted under the law of the jurisdiction where the case is filed.
  • Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 98–353, §453(b), amended subsec. (c) generally. Prior to amendment, subsec. (c) read as follows: "Unless the case is dismissed, property exempted under this section is not liable during or after the case for any debt of the debtor that arose, or that is determined under section 502 of this title as if such claim had arisen before the commencement of the case, except—
  • "(1) a debt of a kind specified in section 523(a)(1) or section 523(a)(5) of this title; or
  • "(2) a lien that is—
  • "(A) not avoided under section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, or 724(a) of this title;
  • "(B) not voided under section 506(d) of this title; or
  • "(C)(i) a tax lien, notice of which is properly filed; and
  • "(ii) avoided under section 545(2) of this title."
  • Subsec. (d)(3). Pub. L. 98–353, §306(b), inserted "or $4,000 in aggregate value".
  • Subsec. (d)(5). Pub. L. 98–353, §306(c), amended par. (5) generally. Prior to amendment, par. (5) read as follows: "The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed in value $400 plus any unused amount of the exemption provided under paragraph (1) of this subsection, in any property."
  • Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 98–353, §453(c), substituted "an exemption" for "exemptions".
  • Subsec. (m). Pub. L. 98–353, §306(d), substituted "Subject to the limitation in subsection (b), this section shall apply separately with respect to each debtor in a joint case" for "This section shall apply separately with respect to each debtor in a joint case".

Enactment and amendment notes are the official text of the United States Code, 2024 edition (laws through 2025-01-06), Office of the Law Revision Counsel, via govinfo.gov.

References in text

The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, referred to in subsec. (b)(1), are set out in the Appendix to this title.

The Internal Revenue Code of 1986, referred to in subsecs. (b)(3)(C), (4), (d)(10)(E)(iii), (12), and (n), is classified generally to Title 26, Internal Revenue Code.

Sections 3(a)(47), 12, and 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, referred to in subsec. (q)(1)(B)(i), (ii), are classified to sections 78c(a)(47), 78l, and 78o(d), respectively, of Title 15, Commerce and Trade.

Section 6 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1933, referred to in subsec. (q)(1)(B)(ii), is classified to section 77f of Title 15, Commerce and Trade.

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