11 U.S.C. § 522

Section 522(d) permits a debtor who elects the federal exemptions to exempt property not otherwise exempted up to the applicable combined exemption amount.

In Re Davies · filed 1983-03-03(d)

Ms. Davies opted for the Federal exemptions, which included combined exemptions of $7,900 covering any property not otherwise exempted. 11 U.S.C. Section 522(d). Since Ms. Davies at the time her petition in bankruptcy was filed held assets of only $2,264 and had debts consisting of $7,320 in unsecured claims, the $400 held by the.creditor is exempt property and must be returned to her.

Section 522(g) permits a debtor to exempt property recovered through an involuntary transfer if the debtor did not conceal the property.

Riggsby v. Fort Oglethorpe State Bank (In Re Riggsby) · filed 1983-09-27(g); (g)(1)(B)

The plaintiffs cannot recover if the transfer in question was “voluntary”. 11 U.S.C. § 522(g). The transfer in question was not the plaintiffs deposit of the check. It was the bank’s taking of the deposit as payment on the plaintiff’s debts. Obviously this was not a voluntary transfer in the usual sense. ... The defendant also argued that this property was concealed by the debtors and therefore cannot be claimed as exempt. 11 U.S.C. § 522(g)(1)(B). The defendant admits, however, that the debtors revealed the existence of the account at the meeting of creditors. Furthermore, the debtors filed their complaint within two weeks after the meeting. The court thinks there was no concealment sufficient to deny the right to exempt the recovery.

Section 522(h) does not permit a debtor to avoid a voluntary transfer because the debtor could not have exempted the property under § 522(g)(1).

M & T Mortgage Corp. v. Trosky (In Re Trosky) · filed 2006-09-07(h), (g)(1)

Because the Debtors could not have exempted any property under § 522(g)(1), they cannot avoid a transfer of property under § 522(h).

Section 522(h) does not let a debtor avoid a transfer he voluntarily agreed to.

In Re Dalip · filed 1996-04-03(h)

None of the elements of legal duress were pleaded, so Debtor’s present effort cannot succeed under 11 U.S.C. § 522(h) because the transfer order was agreed to.

Section 522(h) does not let a debtor avoid an interest the debtor voluntarily transferred.

In Re Lewis · filed 1997-07-25(h)

This authority, however, is conditioned on the debtor having not made a voluntary transfer of the interest. 11 U.S.C. § 522(h), (g)(1)(A). The debtor in this matter, however, executed the security agreement of his own volition, and he therefore is precluded from invoking § 522(h) to avoid the Worlands’ interest in the vehicle.

Section 522(d)(6)'s $750 exemption limit does not limit lien avoidance under § 522(f)(2) when state-exempt property is of the same kind as implements or tools of the trade listed in § 522(d)(6).

In Re Brzezinski · filed 1985-07-25(d)(6)

Such lien avoidance is not limited to the $750 amount contained in 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(6).

Section 522(d)(1), (d)(2), and (d)(5) authorize the specified homestead and personal-property exemptions, but property may not be exempted under § 522(d)(5) beyond the applicable statutory limit.

In re Melander · filed 2014-03-13(d)(1), (d)(2), (d)(5)

TCF’s objections to the claimed exempted property under § 522(d)(1), § 522(d)(2), and § 522(d)(5), are sustained in part to the extent that the Debtors have exceeded their § 522(d)(5) exemptions.

Section 522(h) lets a debtor avoid a qualifying transfer to the extent the debtor could exempt the property under § 522(g), and creating a security interest is not itself a transfer of the property that defeats the exemption.

Hawley v. Bentz (In re Hawley) · filed 1985-08-30(h)

The only transfer by a debtor which bars his exemption rights is a transfer of his property, not the attempted creation of a security interest therein, valid or invalid.

Section 522(f) permits a Chapter 13 debtor to avoid a nonpossessory, non-purchase-money lien against large farming equipment and implements.

In Re Schyma · filed 1985-12-09(f)

The § 522(f) remedy may be applied to avoid nonpossessory, non-purchase money liens against large farming equipment and implements. ... Thus, Debtors may use the remedy of lien avoidance under § 522(f) to avoid First American’s nonpossessory, non-purchase money lien against their farming equipment and implements.

Section 522(f) permits a debtor to avoid a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money lien by affirmative action; otherwise the lien survives discharge.

In Re Williams · filed 1982-01-18(f)

Section 522 does not make a nonpossessory nonpurchase money lien void but simply voidable. The debtor desiring to remove the encumbrance must affirmatively act either by filing a motion, as is permissible in the Western District of Kentucky (In Re Schweitzer, 17 B.R. 39 [Bkrtcy.W.D.Ky. 1981], aff’d U.S.Dist.Ct., November 24, 1981), or by commencing an adversary proceeding under Rule 701, R.B.P. The provision is permissive, and if the debtor for whatever reason does not act, then the lien survives his bankruptcy discharge.

Section 522(f)(2) lets a debtor avoid certain nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money liens on household goods.

Slater v. Household Finance Corp. (In Re Slater) · filed 1982-05-10(f)(2)

For the reasons set out below the Court concludes that such a security interest is properly avoidable under § 522(f)(2) of the Code.

Section 522(f)(2)(A) lets a debtor avoid a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in specified household goods to the extent it impairs an available exemption.

In Re Faughn · filed 1986-09-05(f)(2)(A)

Section 522(f)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code permits a debtor to avoid a nonpos-sessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in household furnishings, household goods, or appliances which are held primarily for the personal, family, or household use of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor to the extent that the lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor otherwise would be entitled.

Section 522(m) allows joint debtors to exercise exemptions independently, but does not apply when a state has opted out of the federal exemptions and limited residents to state-law exemptions.

In Re Reisnour · filed 1985-12-18(m)

Nor does section 522(m) of Title 11, United States Code, compel a different result. North Dakota has elected to limit state residents to the exemptions provided by North Dakota law. N.D.CENT.CODE 28-22-17 (Supp.1983). Although 11 U.S.C. § 522(m) allows joint debtors to exercise their exemptions independently, that section does not apply where a state has “opted out” of the federal exemptions and limited its residents to state exemptions.

When a state opts out of the federal exemptions in § 522(d), § 522(m) does not require separate exemption amounts for joint debtors under that state’s exemption scheme.

In Re Lenox · filed 1986-02-27(m)

Thus, a state may validly provide that a married couple must share a single homestead exemption.

Section 522(f)(2)(B) permits a debtor to avoid a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in implements or tools of the trade, notwithstanding a waiver of an exemption, to the extent the lien impairs an exemption.

Dominion Bank of the Cumberlands, Na v. James R. Nuckolls Judy M. Nuckolls · filed 1985-12-18(f)(2)(B)

We conclude, however, that under section 522(f) the debtors may avoid the Bank’s lien despite their waiver of the homestead exemption. ... A debtor may use this subsection to avoid liens on property over which he claims an exemption even if he had previously agreed to create the lien by granting to the creditor/lienholder a security interest in the property. ... The language of the statute is straightforward — the avoiding power applies “[notwithstanding any waiver.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(f). ... Although the focus of congressional concern appears to have been contracts of adhesion covering consumer goods, the statute is not so limited. The debtor’s knowledge of or intent to grant the security interest or waiver of exemption sought to be avoided is irrelevant, and the statute expressly covers property other than household goods. ... Despite the Bank’s assertion to the contrary, the lien it holds is a “nonposses-sory, nonpurchase-money security interest” under section 522(f)(2). ... Determination of the applicability of section 522 to each piece of equipment is a fact-specific determination best made in the first instance by the bankruptcy court.

Section 522(f)(1) permits a debtor to avoid a judicial lien only when the lien is against the debtor's interest in the property; after the debtor conveys the property, that condition is not met.

In Re Vitullo · filed 1986-03-18(f)(1)

The judicial liens passed with the property when it was conveyed to Mr. and Mrs. Ensman.

Section 522(f)(2)(B) permits avoidance of a purchase-money security interest in tools once the purchase price is fully paid and the remaining interest is unperfected and nonpurchase-money.

In Re Sherman · filed 1987-07-10(f)(2)(B)

the purchase money security interest of Snap-On-Tools is avoided as to those tools because the creditor’s security interest is an unperfected nonpurchase money security interest.

Section 522(f)(1)(B)(ii) permits avoidance of a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in a tool of the trade only to the extent the item qualifies for the applicable exemption; it does not cover value claimed under a wildcard exemption.

In Re Vasina · filed 2006-02-13(f)(1)(B)(ii)

Because Ms. Vasina’s car falls under the tool-of-the-trade exemption for a portion of its value, her motion will be granted to that extent. Section 522(f)(1)(B) does not cover the portion of the value Ms. Vasina seeks to exempt under the “wildcard” exemption allowed in § 25-1552.

Section 522(c) does not prevent a preserved creditor setoff from being applied before the debtor’s exemption reaches the remaining property.

In re Buttrill · filed 2016-03-31(c)

The right of AAFES under the TOP was preserved and the debtor’s exemption of the refund only applied to the amount that remained after the statutory offsets were applied.

Section 522(c) protects exempt property from liability for prepetition debts, but the court held that the exemption does not defeat a creditor’s valid right to set off mutual prepetition debts.

Posey v. United States Department of the Treasury-Internal Revenue Service · filed 1993-06-25(c)

Based on the foregoing, this Court holds that the tax refund claimed as exempt does not affect the right of the United States, acting through its agency the IRS, to set-off a mutual debt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 553.

Section 522(c) protects properly exempt property from a creditor’s postpetition setoff of a prepetition debt in a chapter 7 case when the setoff right was not exercised before bankruptcy.

Riley v. U.S. Department of Agriculture Rural Development (In re Riley) · filed 2012-06-07(c)

Finally, this Court will remain with the majority position that the exemption trumps the right of set-off in a chapter 7 when the right is not exercised pre-petition.

Section 522 allows a debtor’s properly claimed exemption to defeat a creditor’s prepetition setoff right under § 553.

In re: Larry Edward Wood · filed 2019-12-16(b)(3)

In sum, the Court finds that § 522 of the Bankruptcy Code trumps the offset provisions of § 553 of the Bankruptcy Code and § 6402 of the TOP. As such, the Bankruptcy Court correctly concluded that the Debtors are entitled to recover the $6,086 tax overpayment at issue in this case.

Section 522(c)'s general protection for exempt property from prepetition debts does not bar the government's statutory setoff of a debtor's tax overpayment against a debt owed to the government.

Wood v. HUD · filed 2021-04-07(c)

This offset right supersedes the general exemption protections of § 522(c). As against the government’s right to setoff, the Woods’ income tax overpayment is not exemptible. The Woods have no right to demand turnover of the overpayment.

Section 522(l) makes property exempt when the debtor claims it and no party in interest objects, while §§ 522(c) and (k) provide limited exceptions that do not include a surcharge for failure to turn over estate property.

Scrivner v. Mashburn · filed 2008-08-08(l), (c), (k)

The Code contains specific provisions governing exemptions. See 11 U.S.C. § 522. Generally, if the debtor claims property as exempt and “a party in interest” does not object, that property is exempt from property of the estate. See § 522(l); see also Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003. Furthermore, the Code contains a limited number of exceptions to the rule that exempted property cannot be used to satisfy pre-petition debts or administrative expenses. See § 522(c), (k). These enumerated exceptions do not include a surcharge of exempt property for failure to turn over estate property. Because the Code contains explicit exceptions to the general rule placing exempt property beyond the reach of the estate, we may not read additional exceptions into the statute.

Section 522(f)(2)(A) measures impairment by adding the judicial lien, all other liens, and the exemption amount, then comparing that sum with the property's value without liens; § 522(a)(1) sets that value as fair market value on the petition date.

In Re Kelly · filed 2004-06-22(f)(2)(A)

Section 522(f)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor to avoid a judgment lien “on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled.” For purposes of this section, “a lien shall be considered to impair an exemption to the extent that the sum of — (i) the lien; (ii) all other liens on the property; and (iii) the amount of the exemption that the debtor could claim if there were no liens on the property; exceeds the value that the debtor’s interest in the property would have in the absence of any liens.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(A). In this context, the statute defines value to mean “fair market value as of the date of the filing of the petition.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(a)(1).

Section 522(f)(2) measures impairment by adding the judicial lien, all other liens, and the exemption amount, then comparing that sum with the value of the debtor’s interest in the property absent liens.

In Re Gregory Rockhouse Ranch · filed 2007-12-21(f)(2)

Impairment is determined by applying the following formula, found in 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2): ... For purposes of this subsection, a lien shall be considered to impair an exemption to the extent that the sum of— ... (i) the lien; ... (ii) all other liens on the property; and ... (iii) the amount of the exemption that the debtor could claim if there were no liens on the property; ... exceeds the value that the debtor’s interest in the property would have in the absence of any liens. ... 11 U.S.C. § 522(f).

Section 522(f)(2)(A) measures judicial-lien impairment using the lien amounts, other liens, exemption amount, and property value as of the bankruptcy petition date.

In re Martinez · filed 2012-01-24(f)(2)(A)

The petition date is the operative date to make determinations under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(A), including determinations of lien amounts and the value of the exempt property. To avoid a judicial lien under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(A) against property that was property of the estate on the petition date, the lien must impair the exemption as of the petition date.

Section 522(f)(2)(A) measures exemption impairment by comparing the property’s value with the sum of the lien, other liens, and the available exemption.

Zachary Ober and Jennifer Ober · filed 2020-04-08(f)(2)(A)

Applying the formula set forth in § 522(f)(2)(A) demonstrates that the Pacific Avenue Lien impairs the Debtors’ Arizona Homestead Exemption and should be avoided in its entirety.

Section 522(g) bars a debtor from exempting property recovered by the trustee when the debtor voluntarily transferred it, but it does not defeat an exemption in the debtor's remaining equity in the property.

In Re Schaefer · filed 2005-09-21(g)

Moreover, the trustee's avoidance powers cannot defeat the Schaefers' homestead exemption. Assuming the trustee avoided the April 2003 mortgage either as a preference or as a fraudulent transfer, the mortgage would be preserved for the benefit of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 551. Because the mortgage was a voluntary transfer, Schaefers would not be able to exempt any such property recovered by the trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 522(g). Avoidance of the mortgage, however, would not defeat the debtors' claim of exemption in the equity in their home. Debtors would retain the homestead subject to a mortgage held by the trustee. Schaefers' homestead exemption claim appears to be limited to their equity in the property.

Section 522(k) provides that exempt property is not liable for payment of administrative expenses.

In Re Eads · filed 2004-03-10(k)

Payment of Checkett & Pauly’s administrative claim out of the exempt proceeds of entireties property is impermissible under § 522(k).

Section 522(k) bars using exempt property to pay administrative expenses such as attorney fees.

In re Aubry · filed 2016-09-22(k)

Because section 522(k) explicitly prohibits the use of exempt property to satisfy administrative expenses such as attorney fees, the bankruptcy court was not authorized to invoke a judge-made equitable exception to order otherwise.

Section 522(k) generally bars charging exempt property with administrative expenses, subject to statutory exceptions.

Holley v. Corcoran (In Re Holley) · filed 2016-10-25(k)

As noted, 11 U.S.C. § 522(k) prohibits a bankruptcy court from charging exempt property for administrative expenses (with exceptions not relevant here), even where a debtor has engaged in misconduct.

Section 522(k) permits surcharge of exempt property for the reasonable costs and expenses of recovering that property, but not for the trustee’s general commissions.

In re Taylor · filed 2016-12-13(k)

However, commissions represent general compensation to the trustee and are not per se a cost or expense that the trustee incurred in connection with his efforts to recover the injury award. Consequently, they are an ordinary administrative claim for which the trustee is unable to surcharge exempt property under 11 U.S.C. § 522(k).

Section 522(k) generally protects property exempted under § 522 from liability for administrative expenses, subject only to its two specified exceptions.

Springel v. Prosser · filed 2018-06-19(k)

That statute provides that property exempted under § 522 (the Code provision that specifies the criteria that renders property exempt from the bankruptcy estate, generally for pre-bankruptcy debts) cannot be used to pay any administrative expenses.

Section 522(k) generally protects exempt property from liability for administrative expenses unless a statutory exception applies.

In re Morgan · filed 2018-09-11(k)

the trustee must still follow the clear directive of the Bankruptcy Code, that unless allowed by a statutory exception, [p]roperty that the debtor exempts ... is not liable for payment of any administrative expense.

Section 522(k) protects property exempted under § 522 from liability for administrative expenses, subject to two specified exceptions.

Jeffrey J Prosser · filed 2017-02-23(k)

By ordering the transfer of the Anna’s Hope exempt property to the Chapter 7 Trustee to pay the Trustee’s attorney’s fees and expenses, the Bankruptcy Court violated § 522(k)’s express terms and the dictates of Law, and exceeded the limits of its authority under § 105(a).

Section 522(k) prevents a bankruptcy court from using exempt property to pay a trustee’s attorney’s fees as an administrative expense, even when the fees resulted from the debtor’s fraud.

Law v. Siegel · filed 2014-03-04(k)

The Bankruptcy Court thus violated §522’s express terms when it ordered that the $75,000 protected by Law’s homestead exemption be made available to pay Siegel’s attorney’s fees, an administrative expense.

Section 522(h) allows a chapter 13 debtor to avoid a transfer when the transfer is avoidable by the trustee and the trustee does not attempt to avoid it, but limits the debtor’s avoidance and recovery to the extent of the debtor’s exemption; it does not authorize direct or derivative recovery beyond that amount.

Wright v. Trystone Capital Assets, LLC · filed 2023-05-18(h), (h)(1), (h)(2), (i)(1), (g)

Section 522(h) provides that a debtor may avoid a transfer of property under sections 544, 545, 547, 548, and 549 if the transfer is avoidable by the trustee and the trustee does not attempt to avoid the transfer. 11 U.S.C. § 522(h). Since trustees and chapter 11 and 12 debtors already can assert avoiding powers “directly,” section 522(h) is the means by which chapter 7 and 13 debtors can avoid transfers. The difference from what the court will then call “direct” standing is that section 522(h) limits the chapter 7 and 13 debtors to avoiding transfers of property “to the extent” of the debtor’s exemption of that property. 11 U.S.C. § 522(h). ... The court believes no further relief can be granted to a chapter 13 debtor bringing an avoidance action outside of section 522 because a chapter 13 debtor has no right to bring that action, directly or derivatively. Therefore, it was not that in the trustee’s absence the Wood court could not accord “complete relief” to the creditors of the estate (who were not even the plaintiffs), but that the court could not accord the relief requested at all because the debtor had no standing to recover in excess of his exemption. Mr. Wright is receiving all of the relief he is entitled to in the award of his exemption. Except as under section 522(k), not applicable here, nobody but Mr. Wright is entitled to his exempted funds. Accordingly, the trustee is not an indispensable party.

Section 522(h) is the only Bankruptcy Code authority allowing a chapter 13 debtor to avoid a transfer when the trustee does not do so, and it limits the debtor’s avoidance and recovery to the extent of the debtor’s exemption; it does not authorize derivative standing.

Leneto Runee Wright · filed 2023-05-18(h)

The court believes no further relief can be granted to a chapter 13 debtor bringing an avoidance action outside of section 522 because a chapter 13 debtor has no right to bring that action, directly or derivatively. Therefore, it was not that in the trustee’s absence the Wood court could not accord “complete relief” to the creditors of the estate (who were not even the plaintiffs), but that the court could not accord the relief requested at all because the debtor had no standing to recover in excess of his exemption. Mr. Wright is receiving all of the relief he is entitled to in the award of his exemption.

Section 522(h) gives a debtor who can exempt property standing to bring an avoidance action, while § 522(c)(2)(B) leaves exempt property liable for a tax lien without barring the federal homestead exemption.

Hampton v. Ont. Cnty. · filed 2018-07-18(h), (c)(2)(B), and (d)(1)

Under the plain language of Section 522(h), debtors who can exempt property have standing to bring avoidance actions. ... Furthermore, the County interprets Section 522(c)(2)(B) as barring the Appellants from claiming the federal homestead exemption, when it merely provides that exempt property remains liable for a tax lien.

Section 522(h) lets a debtor pursue avoidance or recovery of a transfer only to the extent the recovered property could have been exempted.

Quisenberry v. American State Bank (In Re Quisenberry) · filed 2004-03-25(h)

Section 522(h) grants the debtor standing to “recover a setoff to the extent that the debtor could have exempted such property.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(h) (emphasis added).

Section 522(h) permits a debtor to pursue recovery of a preferential transfer only to the extent the funds can be claimed as exempt.

Rebecca E Wolfe · filed 2025-05-22(h)

A debtor may pursue a similar preference action to the extent that the debtor could claim the funds as exempt. 11 U.S.C. § 522(h); see also In re Jardine, 120 B.R. 559, 560–62 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1990) (chapter 13 debtor may use trustee’s avoiding powers for involuntary transfers of otherwise exempt property where trustee has not acted). Accordingly, pursuant to §§ 547(b) and 522(h) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Debtor initiated her preference claim against Diane Bies, and in that preference action, upon Debtor’s receipt of the funds in accordance with this order, her preference claim will be limited.

Section 522(d)(11)(D) exempts certain payments on account of personal bodily injury, and the exemption does not apply when no personal bodily injury is alleged.

Dalley v. Mitchell Rubenstein & Associates, P.C. · filed 2016-03-18(d)(11)(D)

But Dalley’s second amended complaint does not allege that Dalley suffered any personal bodily injury as a result of MRA’s debt-collection efforts; furthermore, in this context, the wildcard exemption relates only to a debtor’s ability to recover some, or all, of the proceeds of a legal claim if the trustee successfully litigates that claim, and it does not vest in the debtor any legal right to pursue the claim herself.

Section 522(d)(11)(D) lets a debtor exempt up to $7,500 for personal bodily injury, excluding pain and suffering and actual pecuniary loss.

In Re Territo · filed 1984-01-18(d)(11)(D)

That section states in relevant part that a debtor is allowed to exempt "a payment, not to exceed $7,500 on account of personal bodily injury, not including pain and suffering or compensation for actual pecuniary loss, of the debtor or an individual of whom the debtor is a dependent." ... This Court has heard evidence concerning the nature of the debtor's injuries and finds they constitute actual bodily injury as intended by the Bankruptcy Code. ... Accordingly, the debtor should be allowed an exemption for money received as compensation for those injuries.

Section 522(d)(11)(D) permits an exemption for personal injury settlement proceeds that include pain and suffering damages when the debtor also suffered appreciable or cognizable physical injury.

In Re Scotti · filed 2000-01-14(d)(11)(D)

The Court finds the Trustee’s argument to be unpersuasive because, as stated above, compelling case law holds that a debtor may exempt the proceeds of a personal injury settlement, which include damages for pain and suffering, as long as the debtor also endured appreciable or cognizable physical injury. The Court finds that the severity of Debtor’s injuries do rise to the level of appreciable or cognizable physical injury, and therefore, he may properly exempt $16,150 of the proceeds of the personal injury settlement.

Section 522(d)(11)(D) permits a debtor to exempt an interest in a spouse’s personal injury claim if that interest is property of the debtor’s own estate.

In Re Bippert · filed 2004-05-27(d)(11)(D)

Contrary to the position of the Trustee, section 522(d)(11)(D) in fact does permit Clyde to claim as exempt part of Sandra’s personal injury claim, because Clyde has (or at least potentially has) a property interest in the personal injury claim.

Section 522(d)(11)(D) excludes settlement proceeds compensating actual pecuniary losses from the personal bodily injury exemption.

Walsh v. Kelin (In Re Kelin) · filed 2006-05-11(d)(11)(D)

As such, the proceeds do not fall within the scope of § 522(d)(ll)(D) and therefore are not subject to the allowed exemption she claimed in the lawsuit in accordance with this provision.

Section 522(d)(11)(D) requires a bodily injury with a harmful physical impact; psychological harm alone does not qualify.

In Re Keenan · filed 2011-01-07(d)(11)(D)

But the most basic point is inescapable: the statutory language presupposes a chain of causality between a tortfeasor’s actions toward the physical person of the debtor-claimant (“bodily”) and a harmful impact on that physical person (“injury”) for damages to fall under the protection of § 522(d)(ll)(D).

Section 522(d)(11)(D) exempts payments on account of personal bodily injury, but does not cover a discrimination claim that involves no bodily injury.

In Re Flattery · filed 2011-03-23(d)(11)(D)

Section 522(d)(ll)(D) is limited to payments on account of personal bodily injury. Nothing in the debtor’s MCAD claim involves personal bodily injury and thus § 522(d)(ll)(D) is unavailable to her.

Section 522(1) makes a claimed exemption effective when no timely objection is filed; a court cannot permit a late objection after the objection period expires.

In Re Rolfes · filed 2004-03-11(1)

The court also can not extend the time to object after it has expired.

Section 522(l) makes a claimed exemption effective unless a party in interest timely objects, and a clear objection in an adversary complaint can satisfy that requirement without a separate formal pleading.

Lynn E. Feldman, Chapter 7 Trustee v. Buffenmeyer · filed 2020-12-09(l)

Thus, an exemption will be permitted unless a timely objection is filed. ... I conclude that the Trustee’s objection here – as a timely filed count in the Adversary Proceeding – is valid.

Section 522 governs a debtor’s claimed exemptions, but misstating an exemption does not provide a basis to deny discharge; an objection to the exemption must be timely.

Ashton v. May · filed 2024-06-14

Count XII asks that the Debtor’s discharge be denied for failure to take the proper exemptions pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §522. This count could be dismissed as having failed to state a claim; there is no provision in the Code denying the Debtor a discharge for misstating an exemption. Viewing the Count in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the allegation may—barely—be read as an objection to the Debtor’s stated exemptions. However, even if Count XII is considered an objection to the Debtor’s stated exemption, the cause of action must be dismissed because it was filed out of time.

A trustee need not object to a claimed exemption to preserve estate value unless the basis for the objection appears on the face of Schedule C.

In re Gregory · filed 2013-03-07(l)

Thus, the trustee is relieved of the obligation to object to a claim of exemptions, unless the basis for that objection is found on the face of Schedule C.

Section 522(l) does not allow a claim of exemption to be denied because the property may also be disposable income or available to pay creditors under a plan modification.

In re McAllister · filed 2014-04-03(l)

It does not permit a denial of a claim of exemption because the property may also be disposable income or available for the payment of claims under a modification.

Section 522(1) governs objections to a debtor’s claimed exemptions, and an inconsistent Bankruptcy Rule time limit is ineffective.

In Re Langley · filed 1982-06-30(1)

To the extent that Bankruptcy Rule 403 limits the time in which objections to the debtor’s claim of exemptions may be filed, however, the Rule is inconsistent with 11 U.S.C. § 522(1), and is, therefore, ineffective.

Section 522(i) permits untimely objections when the claimed property is legally nonexempt.

In Re Stutterheima · filed 1988-07-11(i)

As the Bank points out, Section 522(i) presupposes that debtor has exempted legally allowable exemptions. This Court and the majority of courts thus construe Section 522(i) to permit untimely objections to exemptions where, as a matter of law, the debtors’ claimed exempt property is not exempt.

A trustee cannot defeat a claimed § 522(d)(5) exemption in a tax refund solely through a chapter 13 disposable income objection that was not ripe when the exemption objection was decided.

Matos v. Rivera (In re Matos) · filed 2012-09-26(d)(5)

Section 522(d)(5) allows a debtor to claim a general exemption of up to $1,150 ($2,300 in joint eases), plus up to $10,825 ($21,650 in joint cases) of any unused portion of the homestead exemption. ... Because an objection based upon § 1325(b) was not ripe when the bankruptcy court issued the Exemption Order and we can discern no other basis upon which the Trustee objected to the Debtor’s exemption in the Refund, the Trustee failed to sustain his burden with respect to the Objection and the Exemption Order cannot stand.

Section 522(l) authorizes the bankruptcy court to resolve an objection to a claimed exemption; state law determines the nature and scope of a state-law exemption.

GMAC Mortgage, LLC v. Orcutt · filed 2014-02-28(l)

Once Debtors claimed the exemption and GMAC objected, the Bankruptcy Court was statutorily authorized to resolve the dispute between the parties concerning the application of the homestead exemption, which necessarily required the Bankruptcy Court to apply Vermont law since state law "governs the nature and scope” of an exemption.

Section 522(c)(1) keeps exempt property liable for prepetition domestic support obligations.

In Re Howell · filed 2004-07-01(c)(1)

The debtor’s exempt property remains liable for prepetition support arrears. 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(1).

Section 522(c)(1) keeps exempt property liable for domestic support obligations without removing its exempt status or requiring the trustee to object to the exemption.

In Re Ruppel · filed 2007-01-09(c)(1)

Section 522(c)(1) does not provide that property exempted under § 522 loses its exempt status with respect to tax debts and DSO’s. Rather, it provides that notwithstanding its exempt status, exempt property remains liable for those debts. Collection of a DSO therefore does not require that claimed exemptions be objected to, and Trustee’s objection will therefore be denied.

Section 522(c)(1) does not authorize a Chapter 7 trustee to object to a claimed exemption or administer otherwise exempt property for the benefit of a domestic support obligation claimant.

In Re Vandeventer · filed 2007-04-20(c)(1)

This Court joins them in concluding that the BAPCPA amendment to § 522(c)(1) does not provide a Chapter 7 trustee with a valid basis to object to a claimed exemption or to administer otherwise exempt property for the benefit of a domestic support obligation claimant.

Section 522(c)(1) leaves exempt property liable during or after bankruptcy for domestic support obligation debts.

In re: Tucker · filed 2025-03-27(c)(1)

In other words, under § 522(c)(1), exempt property remains liable during or after the case for any DSO debt.

Section 522(c)(1) leaves exempt property liable for domestic support obligations but does not disallow the exemption or authorize a chapter 7 trustee to liquidate the property to pay them.

In Re Covington · filed 2006-09-22(c)(1)

Section 522(c)(1) does not provide for the disallowance of an exemption. Rather, it provides that property exempted by the debtor is nonetheless liable for a domestic support obligation. Disallowance of the exemption is not a predicate to the enforcement of a domestic support obligation against the property. The next issue is whether, by virtue of section 522(c)(1), the trustee may liquidate the exempt property in order to pay the domestic support obligation. The court concludes that he may not.

Section 522(c)(1) allows holders of domestic support obligations to pursue exempt property but does not limit a debtor’s right to claim an exemption.

In Re Bozeman · filed 2007-10-29(c)(1)

However, § 522(c)(1) does not limit a debtor’s right to claim the exemption. ... This Court agrees with this analysis and therefore, the objections must be overruled.

Section 522(c)(1) leaves exempt property liable for domestic support obligations, and state courts may decide whether the property can be reached for those debts.

Tarone v. Tarone (In Re Tarone) · filed 2010-07-26(c)(1)

Moreover, the State Court had concurrent jurisdiction to determine whether Mrs. Tarone may reach the Debtor’s share of the Homestead Exemption under § 522(c)(1). That section provides, in part, that exempt property, although not liable for certain prepetition debts of the debtor, is liable for debts of the kind specified in § 523(a)(5), i.e., domestic support obligations.

Section 522(f)(1)(B) does not let a debtor avoid a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in money or a deposit account because those assets are not among the listed property types.

Muhammad v. Pittsburgh Teachers Credit Union (In Re Muhammad) · filed 2004-09-22(f)(1)(B)

Of particular relevance to the instant matter, a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in money or a deposit account with a financial institution may not be avoided under § 522(f)(1)(B) because neither money nor deposit accounts are among the types of property listed in § 522(f)(l)(B)(i)-(iii).

Section 522(d)(10)(D) does not allow an exemption for alimony payments in which the debtor had no legal or equitable interest when the bankruptcy petition was filed.

Dean v. Telegadis (In Re Dean) · filed 2004-11-22(d)(10)(D)

As of the petition date, debtor herself had no interest, legal or equitable, in retaining the monthly payments she received from her former husband. She previously had transferred that right to Telegadis. As a consequence, the right to retain the alimony payments was not property of debtor’s bankruptcy estate and was not exemptible pursuant to § 522(d)(10)(D) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 522(b)(3)(A) requires eligibility for a state-law homestead exemption to be determined as of the bankruptcy petition date, so an earlier denial based on residence at a different time does not bar the claim.

Michael Elsworth Denton · filed 2023-12-21(b)(3)(A)

Just as the scope of property of the estate must be determined as of the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition, so must a debtor’s eligibility for exemptions claimed in the bankruptcy.

Section 522(p)(2)(B)’s safe-harbor exception to the homestead cap does not apply when the debtor did not transfer equity from a previous principal residence into the current one.

In Re Leung · filed 2006-12-06(p)(1), (p)(2)(B)

Accordingly, I conclude that the exception to the statutory cap does not apply.

Section 522(p)(2)(B) allows equity transferred from an earlier principal residence in the same state to be exempted beyond the federal homestead cap, subject to the applicable state exemption limit.

In Re Summers · filed 2006-05-31(p)(2)(B)

However, because the Debtors transferred approximately $54,000 of equity from an Arizona homestead purchased outside the 1,215 day window, the Debtors are entitled to claim an additional exemption in the homestead pursuant to the “safe harbor” provision of § 522(p)(2)(B) subject to the $150,000 cap imposed by A.R.S. § 33-1101.

Section 522(p) limits the homestead exemption available to a debtor who has owned the homestead for less than 1,215 days.

In Re Virissimo · filed 2005-10-31(p)

While as set forth in the Memorandum Opinion this court believes that the statute is applicable to Nevada residents and hence limits the amount of homestead which they may claim, another judge in the Ninth Circuit has held to the contrary.

Section 522(p) does not count passive market appreciation during the 1,215-day period as an interest acquired by the debtor for purposes of the homestead cap.

In Re Chouinard · filed 2006-12-20(p)

Passive market appreciation is not an interest that a debtor “acquires” during the 1,215-day period.

Section 522(o)(4) reduces a debtor’s homestead exemption to the extent its value comes from non-exempt property converted into the homestead with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.

Marie Jean Golino · filed 2022-09-14(o)(4)

But to reduce the value of the Debtor’s interest in her homestead under § 522(o), Sutton must prove that the Starr Ridge Drive property was non-exempt.

Section 522(o) reduces the value of a claimed homestead exemption to the extent attributable to nonexempt property disposed of within ten years with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor.

Johnnie Odessa Johnson · filed 2022-01-28(o)

The four elements required to establish an objection under § 522(o) are: (1) the debtor disposed of any portion of any property within the 10 years preceding the bankruptcy filing; (2) the debtor could not exempt such property; (3) at least a portion of the proceeds from the sale of the nonexempt property were used to buy, improve, or reduce the debt on a property the debtor claims exempt as a homestead; and (4) the debtor disposed of the nonexempt property with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud a creditor. ... Each of the elements must be met for a debtor’s state law homestead exemption to be limited by § 522(o).

Section 522(o) permits reducing a debtor's homestead exemption when the debtor fraudulently converts non-exempt assets into homestead property, by the value of the property converted.

Kolb v. Bentley (In re Bentley) · filed 2019-04-09(o)

Under § 522(o), the Bankruptcy Code provides that if there is a conversion of non-exempt assets into homestead property, here cash arising from the sale of the Cord, done with fraudulent intent, the value of the Debtor's homestead exemption may be reduced by the value of the property disposed of. ... The Court will reduce the value of the Debtor's exemption under § 522(o) by $ 112,767.04.

Section 522(o) requires courts to use the badges-of-fraud approach to determine whether a debtor acted with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud when converting nonexempt property into a homestead.

Addison v. Seaver · filed 2008-08-07(o)

Given the similarity of the language among these statutes, we conclude that the badges of fraud approach should also apply to determine a debtor’s intent under § 522(o).

Section 522(o) reduces the value of a homestead exemption attributable to property converted into the homestead within ten years before filing with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor, and that intent may be inferred from badges of fraud.

In Re Maronde · filed 2005-11-08(o)

The more pressing question, and the one which the parties litigate here, is whether Debtor is subject to the limitation provided in § 522(o). This turns on whether Debtor acted “with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor” when he sold his truck and trailer and used the non-exempt proceeds from the sales to increase the equity in his homestead by $18,750.46. ... It is only logical to assume that Congress intended that by using essentially the same phrase in § 522(o), cases construing the fraudulent conveyance and discharge provisions also would apply to add body to the bare words of this new Congressional language.

Section 522(o) reduces a debtor’s homestead exemption to the extent its value comes from nonexempt property converted into the homestead within 10 years before filing with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor.

In Re Lacounte · filed 2005-12-08(o)

The foregoing provision is limited to conversion by a debtor of nonexempt property into a homestead exemption with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor.

Section 522(o)(4) reduces the value of a claimed homestead to the extent attributable to nonexempt property disposed of within ten years before filing with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor.

In Re Agnew · filed 2006-11-06(o)(4)

Second, the Court finds that the phrase “intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor” in 522(o) should be construed the same as the identical phrase in 727(a)(2)(A). ... Debtors did not act with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor when acquiring the homestead, and no portion of the homestead value is attributable to fraudulent conversion of nonexempt assets within ten years before filing.

Section 522(o)(4) reduces a homestead exemption by the value of nonexempt property converted into the homestead with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.

Turner v. Keck (In Re Keck) · filed 2007-03-02(o)(4)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Trustee’s objection to Debtor’s homestead exemption is sustained in the amount of $15,972.79. Debtor’s homestead exemption is reduced by $15,972.79, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(o)(4), and the Court grants the estate an equitable lien against the real property located at 2010 SW James Street, Topeka, Kansas.

Section 522(o) permits reduction of a homestead exemption when nonexempt assets were converted into the homestead with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.

Addison v. Seaver (In Re Addison) · filed 2007-03-30(o)

Hence, the denial under § 522(o) of the Debtor’s exemption in the homestead equity resulting from the payment was not clearly erroneous.

Section 522(o) permits denial or reduction of a homestead exemption when nonexempt assets were converted into the homestead with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.

Lance v. Addison v. Randall L. Seaver · filed 2007-03-30(o)

Hence, the denial under § 522(o) of the Debtor’s exemption in the homestead equity resulting from the payment was not clearly erroneous.

Section 522(o) bars exemption of homestead value attributable to nonexempt property sold or otherwise disposed of within ten years before filing to increase homestead equity.

In Re Sissom · filed 2007-05-11(o)

The meaning of this statute is plain: a debtor may not exempt the value of his homestead attributable to the infusion of proceeds obtained through the sale of nonexempt property within the ten-year period prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition.

Section 522(o) does not reduce a homestead exemption when the debtor’s prepetition mortgage payments were not made with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.

In Re Anderson · filed 2008-04-11(o)

In short, the Court concludes that the debtor here did nothing more than take advantage of an exemption to which he is entitled. While his actions were intentional, the Court cannot find that they were done with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud.

Section 522(o) limits a homestead exemption when its value is attributable to nonexempt property converted into the homestead with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor; the court held that the badges-of-fraud approach applies and that § 522(o) supplies a 10-year look-back period.

Addison v. Seaver · filed 2008-08-07(o)

We reject the Trustee's position that § 522(o) provides a new standard for determining what type of evidence establishes a debtor's "intent to hinder, delay, or defraud" a creditor when the debtor converts nonexempt assets into his homestead. Rather, in our view, § 522(o) merely establishes a 10-year look-back period, from the date of the bankruptcy filing, from which such evidence may be considered.

Section 522(o)(4) reduces a debtor’s homestead exemption when the debtor converts nonexempt property into the homestead with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor within ten years before bankruptcy.

In Re Osejo · filed 2011-02-24(o)(4)

The Trustee’s written objection asks that the Debtor’s claimed homestead exemption of $50,847.05 be reduced by $40,959.06 under 11 U.S.C. § 522(o)(4). At the evidentiary hearing conducted February 17, 2011, Trustee’s counsel reaffirmed that $40,959.06 is the amount requested. I find that the Debtor converted at least that amount of non-exempt property into homestead property during the year preceding her bankruptcy filing, and I find that she did so with intent to hinder creditors. The Trustee’s objection at ECF No. 52 is accordingly SUSTAINED.

Section 522(o) reduces the value of a homestead exemption when the debtor converts nonexempt property into homestead property within the preceding 10 years with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor.

In Re Ellis · filed 2011-04-15(o)

There are four elements to establishing an objection under Section 522(o): (1) the debtor disposed of property within the 10 years preceding the date of filing of the bankruptcy petition; (2) the property that the debtor disposed of was not exempt; (3) some of the proceeds from the sale of the nonexempt property were used to buy a new homestead, improve an existing homestead, or reduce the debt secured by an existing homestead; and (4) the debtor disposed of the nonexempt property with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud a creditor.

Section 522(o) reduces a homestead exemption when, within 10 years before bankruptcy, a debtor converts nonexempt property into the homestead with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor.

Wolters v. Lakey · filed 2011-07-18(o)

(1) that the debtor disposed of property within the 10 years preceding the filing of the bankruptcy petition, (2) that the proceeds from such disposition were used to increase the value of the debt- or’s homestead, (3) that the property disposed of was not itself exempt, and (4) that in doing so, the debtor acted with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud a creditor.

Section 522(o)(4) reduces a homestead exemption to the extent its value reflects nonexempt property transferred within ten years with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor.

In Re Lafferty · filed 2012-04-03(o)(4)

The requirements of section 522(o) are met and Debtors’ homestead exemption should be reduced to $0. Trustee’s Objections to Exemption are sustained.

Section 522(o)(4) reduces a homestead exemption only when a definite portion of the claimed exemption is attributable to property the debtor disposed of with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor and that the debtor could not have exempted.

Old Republic National Title Insurance v. Levasseur (In re Levasseur) · filed 2012-10-29(o)(4)

Subsection (o)(4) requires a showing (a) that a definite portion of the property claimed as exempt is attributable to property “that the debtor disposed of ... with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor” and (b) that the debtor could not exempt the property, or a portion of the property, so disposed of.

Section 522(o) requires actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor before reducing a homestead exemption for converted nonexempt property.

In re Corbett · filed 2012-07-30(o)

The phrase “intent to hinder, delay or defraud a creditor” is similar to the language employed by Congress in 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A) and 727(a)(2) and requires actual, as opposed to constructive, fraud.

Section 522(o)(4) reduces the value of a claimed homestead exemption only to the extent attributable to a debtor’s fraudulent conversion of nonexempt property within ten years before filing.

In re Bushey · filed 2016-10-14(o)(4)

Section 522(o) does not limit Debtor’s claimed homestead exemption for two rea-sons.

Section 522(o) reduces a debtor's homestead exemption to the extent nonexempt property was converted into homestead equity within 10 years before filing with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor.

Holley Performance Products, Inc. v. Coppaken (In re Coppaken) · filed 2017-05-31(o)

Ron’s homestead exemption is therefore reduced by $927,620.24, the amount that represents the equity in Debtors’ homestead that was increased by Ron’s fraudulent conduct.

Section 522(o) reduces a debtor’s homestead exemption by the value attributable to property fraudulently disposed of within the preceding ten years to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors, and the trustee may object under Rule 4003(b)(2).

Graybill v. Thomas · filed 2020-04-22(o)

Indeed, this case involves not one but two independent bases for sustaining Trustee’s objection: 11 U.S.C. § 522(o) and Florida law defining the scope of its homestead exemption. ... As for Graybill’s argument that Trustee could not object properly under § 522(o) when traveling under Rule 4003(b)(2), rather than the general rule: it is misguided. Under the plain text of both Rule and statute, Trustee objected properly. Therefore, we affirm as to this issue.

Section 522(o)(4) requires reducing a debtor’s homestead exemption when the debtor converts non-exempt assets into the homestead within ten years before filing bankruptcy with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor.

Marc D Wolfson and Mary Anne Wolfson · filed 2023-10-20(o)(4)

Put another way, “§ 522(o)(4) requires the Debtors’ homestead exemption to be reduced to the extent that Debtors converted non-exempt assets into the claimed homestead within ten (10) years before the bankruptcy filing, if the transfer was done with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor.”

Section 522(o)(4) requires reducing a debtor’s homestead exemption when nonexempt property was converted into the homestead within 10 years of bankruptcy with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.

Harry Monroe Ashwood, V and Stacie Marie Ashwood · filed 2025-09-30(o)

Next, § 522(o)(4) effectively creates a four-part test that requires an exemption to be reduced when 1) the debtor disposed of property within 10 years of the petition date; 2) the property disposed of was not subject to any exemption, i.e., non-exempt; 3) the proceeds of the disposed of property were used to increase the debtor’s interest in exempt homestead property, i.e., conversion of non-exempt property into exempt homestead property; and 4) such action was done with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.

Section 522(o) reduces a homestead exemption only to the extent its value is attributable to nonexempt assets transferred into the homestead with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.

In re Enloe · filed 2015-12-03(o)

Because Enloe utilized both exempt and non-exempt assets in the construction of his home, the entire value of the home is not attributable to the non-exempt assets. Enloe transferred $195,000.00 of non-exempt assets from the annuity and $110,000.00 of exempt assets from the Raymond James IRA. Accordingly, only 63.9% of the homestead’s value is properly “attributable” to the non-exempt assets.

Section 522(f)(2)(A) measures impairment using the debtor’s partial interest in jointly owned property; liens are subtracted in reverse priority, and liens already avoided are excluded from the calculation.

In Re White · filed 2005-11-23(f)(2)(A)

The common reading of the “debtor’s interest in the property” suggests something more limited than the entire property when the debt- or jointly owns the property. ... Application of the formula in § 522(f)(2)(A) requires that the liens be subtracted in order of reverse priority and that those that are avoided not be included in the calculation.

Section 522(f)(2)(A) counts only the debtor’s one-half share of jointly owed liens when calculating impairment of the debtor’s one-half interest in the property.

Nelson v. Scala (In Re Nelson) · filed 1998-12-21(f)(2)(A)

Robert and Donata Nelson are jointly and severally liable on these liens. However, only Robert Nelson is obligated on Scala’s judicial lien of $24,000. Therefore, the proper sum for the amount of “all other liens” is the amount Nelson is obligated to pay, which is one-half of $134,626.32 ($67,-313.16).

Section 522(f)(2)(A) uses the debtor’s share of jointly owned property to determine whether a judicial lien impairs an exemption.

Summit Bank v. VESSEL" HARBOR LIGHT" · filed 2001-04-11(f)(2)(A)

In light of these cases, and because Summit Bank has not challenged this method of calculation, this Court will value Nicholson’s interest as one-half of the total value of the property when determining whether the judgment should be cancelled and discharged as avoidable under the law of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 522(q)(1) does not apply when a debtor elects federal exemptions instead of state or local exemptions.

Pandarinathan · filed 2025-11-18(q)(1)

Accordingly, section 522(q)(1) is inapplicable as the Debtor has not elected to exempt property under state or local law pursuant to section 522(b)(3)(A).

Section 522(q)(1)(B)(iv) caps a state-law homestead exemption when the debtor owes a debt arising from a criminal act causing serious physical injury or death, and “criminal act” does not require a conviction or a particular level of culpability.

In Re Larson · filed 2006-04-05(q)(1)(B)(iv)

All of the forgoing authorities, including the one case from Massachusetts, recognize that the phrase “criminal act” does not require a conviction or a certain level of culpability. ... Because Congress requires a conviction for purposes of § 522(q)(1)(A) and a criminal act for § 522(q)(1)(B)(iv), the latter cannot include the requirement of the former. ... Based upon the forgoing, I conclude that the term “criminal act” is sufficiently clear and that its application does not lead to an absurd result. I further' conclude that the language does not have or require a descriptive culpability.

Section 522(q) requires actual fraud by the debtor, not merely an intent to hinder or delay, when a creditor objects under its fraud provision.

In Re Presto · filed 2007-10-05(q)

Section 522(q) requires actual fraud, and not merely an intent to hinder or delay.

Section 522(q)(1)(B)(iv) caps a state-law homestead exemption when the debtor's debt arises from a criminal act causing serious physical injury or death, and the term criminal act includes crimes of negligence.

Larson v. Howell · filed 2008-01-23(q)(1)(B)(iv)

We hold that the term "criminal act" in § 522(q)(1)(B)(iv) does not exclude crimes of negligence.

Section 522 does not prevent a Chapter 7 trustee from objecting to exemptions after conversion of a Chapter 13 case when the property is brought back into the estate under § 348(f)(1)(A).

Wiggins v. Frank (In Re Wiggins) · filed 2006-04-13(b)(1)

Section 522 therefore does not defeat the Chapter 7 trustee’s right to file objections.

Section 522(b)(3) lets a debtor elect the federal exemptions when its domiciliary requirement leaves the debtor ineligible for every state-law exemption.

In Re Underwood · filed 2006-05-24(b)(3)

The undesignated sentence at the bottom of 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3) provides that “[i]f the effect of he domiciliary requirement under subpara-graph (A) is to render the debtor ineligible for any exemption, the debtor may elect to exempt property that is specified under subsection (d).” ... Thus, it means exactly what it says: if the 730-day domiciliary requirement under subparagraph (A) renders a debtor ineligible for any state exemptions, the debtor may claim federal exemptions.

Section 522(b)(3) can leave a debtor eligible to claim the federal exemptions under § 522(d) when the state-law exemptions identified by the domicile rule are unavailable.

In Re Nickerson · filed 2007-09-07(b)(3)(A), (b)(3)

ACCORDINGLY, the Trustee’s Objection to Exemptions is OVERRULED. The Debtor is entitled to claim exemptions under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d).

Section 522(b)(3)(A) permits a debtor to elect the federal exemptions in § 522(d) when the domiciliary rule leaves the debtor ineligible for any exemption under applicable state law.

CLINTON JACOB KAUER and ALICIA MARIE KAUER · filed 2020-06-29(b)(3)(A)

The Trustee believes it is enough per the word “any” in the hanging paragraph of § 522(b)(3)(A) that these exemptions simply be available for hypothetical non-resident debtors, even if these Debtors in particular are not eligible for them. The Court disagrees. ... The Trustee has not pointed to a single exemption under Idaho law that Debtors could claim here. To hold as the Trustee urges would result in a de facto denial of all exemptions to these Debtors.

Section 522(b)(3) permits a debtor to claim federal exemptions when the applicable state exemptions are unavailable to that debtor.

Ulrich v. Kauer · filed 2020-12-31(b)(3)

But the “hanging paragraph” following § 522(b)(3)(C) is intended to ensure that debtors are not denied the opportunity to claim “any” exemption.

Section 522(b)(3)(A) lets a debtor claim federal exemptions when the applicable state law denies her state exemptions.

In Re Long · filed 2012-05-07(b)(3)(A)

If those exemption rights are denied to her by the operation of that law, she may claim the federal exemptions under the plain language of (b)(3)(A), the hanging paragraph.

Section 522(p)(1) does not cap a debtor’s homestead exemption when the debtor acquired the homestead before the 1,215-day look-back period, even if mortgage payments during that period increased equity.

In Re Anderson · filed 2007-10-02(p)(1)

The Court therefore concludes that § 522(p)(l) is inapplicable to a debtor who purchases his homestead outside the 1,215-day look-back period. The accumulation of equity during the look back period by paying down the mortgage is instead limited by the operation of § 522(o).

Section 522(p)(1)(A) limits a debtor’s homestead exemption when the debtor acquired an interest in residential property within 1,215 days before filing.

Agin v. Stella (In Re Stella) · filed 2012-03-07(p)(1)(A)

Stated another way, this Court finds that the cap imposed by section 522(p) does not conflict with the policy of liberally construing homestead entitlement so as to permit debtors to conflate trusts, such as the one in the instant case, offensively to take advantage of an available exemption, particularly where the trust was established for a legitimate purpose.

Section 522(p)(1)(D) does not cap a state-law homestead exemption when title changes solely by operation of law and the debtor does not actively acquire an additional interest.

In re Welch · filed 2013-01-17(p)(1)(D)

The merger of equitable and legal title by operation of Massachusetts law that occurs when an individual becomes both the sole trustee and sole beneficiary of a trust is not an acquisition of title for purposes of Bankruptcy Code § 522(p).

Section 522(p)(1) caps the state-law homestead exemption for a debtor's interest in real property acquired within the 1,215-day period before the bankruptcy petition, including when the property is impressed with homestead rights.

Odes Ho Kim v. Dome Entertainment Center, Inc. · filed 2014-04-09(p)(1)

If our decision in Rogers stood for the proposition that all homestead interests, even those in real property acquired during the statutory 1,215-day window, are not “interests” within the meaning of § 522(p) or § 541(a), then a debtor’s homestead “interest” in real property acquired within the 1,215-day window would never become part of the bankruptcy estate even though both the real property and the homestead rights in that real property were acquired within the 1,215-day period. This is an unreasonable construction of the Bankruptcy Code. Congress did not intend for “interest,” as used in § 522(p) and § 541(a), to exclude real property acquired within the statutory window that is impressed with homestead rights. It is beyond doubt that the intent and purpose of the BAPCPA was to limit the dollar amount of homestead exemptions. The words Congress chose to express this intent in § 522(p) and § 541(a) are plain and unambiguous. The words “interest” as used in these sections include a debtor’s interest in real property that was acquired within the statutory window, even if that real property is a homestead.

Section 522(p)(1) caps a debtor’s state-law homestead exemption for an interest in real property acquired during the 1,215-day period before filing, including when the property is a homestead.

Kim v. Odes Ho Kim · filed 2014-04-11(p)(1)

The words “interest” as used in these sections include a debtor’s interest in real property that was acquired within the statutory window, even if that real property is a homestead.

Section 522(p) does not cap a homestead exemption for property owned before the 1,215-day period when it becomes homestead during that period.

In re Gamboa · filed 2017-12-21(p)

D. That the exemption, if allowed at all, should be limited to $160,375 under § 522(p) of the Bankruptcy Code. The Court found that Property owned prior to the 1,215 day period that becomes homestead within 1,215 days of the bankruptcy filing is not subject to the § 522(p) cap, citing and agreeing with In re Reinhard, 377 B.R. 315 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2007).

Section 522(p)(1)(A) limits the value of a state law homestead exemption for property acquired within 1,215 days before bankruptcy.

Bruess v. Dietz (In re Bruess) · filed 2015-10-29(p)(1)(A)

That section was added by the 2005 BAPCPA amendments to the Bankruptcy Code and provides a limitation on the dollar value of certain state law exemptions for recently acquired property. ... The only issue in this appeal is whether Ms. Bruess “acquired” the property in which she claims her homestead exemption within the 1215-day period preceding the filing of the petition thus limiting her homestead exemption to $155,675.00. ... The only evidence presented at the hearing overwhelmingly supports the bankruptcy judge’s finding of fact that Donn Bruess did not intend to convey the property until he instructed his attorney to record the deed. There being no evidence to the contrary, the bankruptcy court’s fact findings were not clearly erroneous. Therefore, we affirm.

Section 522(f)(2)(C) does not exclude a judgment lien from avoidance merely because a later foreclosure judgment adjudicates it as a valid junior lien; the lien must arise out of the mortgage-foreclosure judgment.

In Re Kelly · filed 2006-09-20(f)(2)(C)

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the exception of § 522(f)(2)(C) is inapplicable because the Creditor’s lien did not arise “out of a mortgage foreclosure” judgment, but was merely adjudicated to be a junior and valid lien. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(C).

Section 522(f)(2)(C) protects a judgment enforcing a mortgage lien from avoidance but does not protect a separate deficiency-judgment lien arising from the foreclosure.

In re Shea · filed 2015-07-02(f)(2)(C)

This Court concludes Debtors may, because § 522(f)(2)(C) protects the judgment for foreclosure of the mortgage lien from avoidance, but not any judgment lien that may arise from a deficiency judgment entered in or after a mortgage foreclosure action has been commenced.

Section 522(p)(1) limits a debtor’s homestead exemption for a quantifiable monetary interest acquired during the preceding 1,215 days, but “interest” does not include merely changing property’s classification to a homestead.

Wallace v. Rogers (In Re Rogers) · filed 2006-10-16(p)(1)

By ruling that the term “interest” does not encompass the classification of real property as a homestead, the court concludes that the limitations of § 522(p) are wholly inapplicable to this case.

Section 522(o)(4) does not reduce a homestead exemption merely because the debtor designated property as a homestead, and § 522(p)(1)(D) does not cap the exemption when the debtor acquired the underlying property interest more than 1,215 days before filing; a judicial lien that fully impairs the resulting exemption may be avoided under § 522(f)(1).

In Re Lyons · filed 2006-11-22(o)(4), (p)(1)(D), (f)(1)

The plain language of Section 522(o) indicates that the debtor must have “disposed of’ nonexempt property within 10 years of filing bankruptcy. ... The Court finds that recording a homestead, which is essentially taking advantage of a exemption available under state law, is not analogous to these types of transfers and is not within the meaning of Section 522(o). ... The plain language of Section 522(p) indicates that the debtor must have acquired an interest in the property within 1,215 days of filing. The term “interest” refers to some quantitative amount of legal or equitable value. ... The homestead is not a quantifiable interest; it is a classification of property under state law. ... Thus, the Court finds that Sections 522(o) and (p) do not apply and that Debtor is entitled to the $500,000.00 homestead exemption under Massachusetts law, which Green Valley’s lien fully impairs.

Section 522(p) does not limit a debtor’s exemption merely because the debtor acquired homestead status during the 1,215-day period; homestead status alone is not an acquired property interest.

Venn v. Reinhard (In Re Reinhard) · filed 2007-10-16(p)

The acquisition of Florida homestead status alone does not fall within the limits on exemptions imposed by § 522(p). Homestead status under Florida law is not a property interest. The homesteader’s legal or equitable claim to or right in the homestead property arises prior to and independently of the acquisition of homestead status. Homestead status simply exempts the homesteader’s existing share in the property from forced sale and limits its alienability. Therefore, the Debtor did not acquire any amount of interest in value in the Seaside Property when it acquired homestead status.

Section 522(o) reduces the value of a homestead exemption to the extent it was funded by property disposed of within ten years before bankruptcy with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors; that intent is evaluated when the homestead was purchased.

In Re Booth · filed 2009-10-29(o)

Congress did not delineate what the phrase “intent to hinder, delay, or defraud” means when it enacted Section 522(o). ... The purchase of the Property is the relevant time period for evaluating the Debtor’s intent pursuant to the plain language of 11 U.S.C. Section 522(o).

Section 522(o) and (p) provide grounds to object to a debtor’s homestead exemption and reduce the amount claimed as exempt; they must be pursued through an exemption objection, not an adversary action to avoid a fraudulent conveyance.

Menotte v. Champalanne (In Re Champalanne) · filed 2010-02-05(o) and (p)

In order to make use of subsections (o) and (p), the proper remedy is to file an objection to exemption, not to file an adversary proceeding seeking to avoid a fraudulent conveyance.

Section 522(p) caps the amount of a debtor’s homestead exemption based on the amount of interest acquired during the statutory look-back period.

T.D. Farrell Construction, Inc. v. Schreiber (In re Schreiber) · filed 2012-01-26(p)

The Court finds that the amount of interest debtor acquired within the look back period does not exceed the cap of § 522(p). Therefore, debtor’s claim of exemption does not violate § 522(p).

Section 522(o)(4) reduces a claimed homestead exemption to the extent its value comes from nonexempt property disposed of within ten years with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor; mere conversion of nonexempt property to exempt property is insufficient by itself.

In re Arends · filed 2014-03-04(o)(4)

The case law is clear, however, that it requires more than a showing that debtor simply converted non-exempt property to exempt property. ... The statute and case law thus require a showing of fraudulent intent. Because direct evidence of fraudulent intent is rarely available, the Eighth Circuit has stated that courts should apply the “badges of fraud” approach to determine intent under § 522(o).

Section 522(o) reduces exempt homestead equity attributable to property fraudulently disposed of before bankruptcy, while the § 522(p) cap is measured on the petition date and later appreciation does not create an estate interest once the exemption is fixed under § 522(c).

In re Colliau · filed 2016-05-20(o), (p), and (c)

Subsection 522(o) reduces the “value of [the debtor’s] interest” in the homestead. ... Since their exemption was limited to an “amount of interest” equal to fair market value up to $311,000, it is this “interest” — the Debtors’ actual equity— that must be reduced under subsection 522(o) by $11,156. Though not clear in the statute, the only sensible reading is that the amount by which the Debtors’ interest is reduced is made available to the estate. ... Based on that valuation, the Debtors’ equity is below the cap imposed by subsection 522(p) and so the bankruptcy estate had no interest in the property on the petition date. Whether the property appreciates in value in the months and years to come is irrelevant because the exemption removed the property from- the estate as of the petition date.

Subsections (o) and (p) limit a debtor’s homestead exemption and must be applied through an objection to the exemption rather than an action to recover a fraudulent transfer.

Jensen v. Anderson (In re Anderson) · filed 2016-10-06(o), (p)

In order to make use of subsections (o) and (p), the proper remedy is to file an objection to exemption, not to file an adversary proceeding seeking to avoid a fraudulent conveyance.

Section 522(o) reduces a debtor's homestead interest only to the extent that fraudulent conversion of nonexempt property actually contributes to homestead equity, rather than by the amount spent on improvements.

Crabtree v. McDermott · filed 2017-01-24(o)

Section 522(o) authorizes a bankruptcy court to reduce the value of a debtor's interest in a homestead to the extent such value, i.e., the value of the debtor's interest in the homestead, is "attributable" to the debtor's fraudulent conversion of nonexempt property into increased equity in the homestead. Section 522(o) says nothing about the value of that nonexempt property.

Section 522(p) caps a homestead exemption acquired within 1,215 days before bankruptcy, while § 522(o) reduces even that capped value when non-exempt assets were used with intent to hinder creditors.

Mehdipour v. Rensin (In re Rensin) · filed 2019-05-03(o), (p)

Sections 522(o) and (p) are easily reconciled; indeed, they are intended to work together. Section 522(p) automatically limits the value of a homestead exemption where the home was acquired during the 1,215 days prior to the bankruptcy. Section 522(o) provides for a reduction in the homestead value claimed, including the capped homestead value when section 522(p) applies, where it is shown that the debtor used non-exempt assets to obtain value in a homestead with the intent to stymie creditors.

Section 522(o) can reduce a state-law homestead exemption only when the claimed property's value is attributable to property disposed of within ten years to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors; mere conversion or acquisition is insufficient without that intent.

Joshua Allen Ingram and Ashley Ingram · filed 2024-05-24(o)

Even if the Court could consider the Objection to Exemptions as raising § 522(o) despite any reference to it, that subsection only applies to property claimed as a homestead, leaving the Court with no statutory authority to disallow the exemptions claimed for the Knightsville Property, the Jeep Wrangler, or the Household Goods. ... Additionally, the Class Action Creditors have not put forth sufficient evidence for the Court to limit Debtors’ homestead exemption claim under § 522(o). Following the conclusion other bankruptcy courts have come to regarding the intent standard, the Court finds that the Class Action Creditors needed to prove that Debtors used non-exempt assets to purchase the Primary Residence with the specific intent of defrauding creditors. ... Mere acquisition of the property within the 10-year lookback period provided by § 522(o), however, is simply not enough to establish the requisite intent.

Section 522(o) requires a reduction in the value of a debtor’s homestead when its statutory conditions are met.

In re Tarkanian · filed 2014-06-30(o)

In the instant case, the express language of Section 522(o) requires this court to reduce the value of the Debtors’ homestead.

Section 522(o) reduces a homestead exemption when its value comes from nonexempt property disposed of within ten years with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor.

In Re Jones · filed 2008-11-26(o)

Section 522(o) requires a reduction in the homestead exemption to the extent that the value of the exemption is attributable to nonexempt property that the debtor disposed of within 10 years of filing for bankruptcy, if the conversion was made “with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor.” ... The Debtors’ actions are not fraudulent.