11 U.S.C. § 522

Section 522(f) permits a debtor to avoid a judicial lien impairing an exemption even when the exemption was waived or not properly perfected.

In Re Stacher · filed 1985-06-13(f)

Assuming for the sake of argument that debtors did not properly perfect their homestead declaration or did not timely act in that regard, their ability to avoid the lien would not be affected. The act of waiving an exemption, a positive giving up of a right, can be nullified by a motion to avoid a lien. Certainly then the failure to properly perfect an exemption cannot be an abrogation of the right to avoid a lien as provided for by Section 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code. Thus, debtors may avoid the lien.

Section 522(f) permits a debtor to avoid a lien on household goods that impairs an exemption even when state law does not define lien-encumbered property as exempt.

In Re Weiss · filed 1985-07-31(f)(2)(A) and (f)(2)(B)

However, it is clear property need not necessarily be defined as exempt under state law to be the subject of lien avoidance under § 522(f). Accordingly, I conclude that the motion to void lien pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f), insofar as it applies to Aetna’s nonposses-sory, nonpurchase money security interest in household goods, should be and is granted.

Section 522(f) does not permit lien avoidance when the applicable Texas personal-property exemption excludes encumbered property.

In Re Wolfe · filed 1985-08-07(f)

The Fifth Circuit opinions in McManus and Allen have resolved the issue as to whether § 522(f) can be used to avoid the creditor’s lien in the face of the Texas personal property exemption statute. These two cases have squarely decided the issue in favor of the creditor under identical factual circumstances as those existing in the case before this Court.

Section 522(f)(1) lets a debtor avoid a judicial lien that impairs an exemption, even when the property has no equity.

In Re Stiger · filed 1985-12-10(f)(1)

Under this section a debtor is entitled to avoid a lien against property which may be held as exempt. However, as indicated in Pine v. Credithrift of America, Inc., supra, the prerequisite to exercising the avoidance power of Section 522(f) is entitlement to an exemption in the property. As indicated in Morelock v. All-Phase Electric Supply Co. (In re Morelock), 35 B.R. 518 (Bkcy.N.D.Ohio 1985), a debtor is not required to have equity in the property in order to exercise the avoidance power. As that case pointed out, a debtor has interests other than equity which may be used in order to apply the authority of Section 522(f).

Section 522(f)(1) permits a debtor to avoid a judicial lien to the extent it impairs an exemption, including avoiding the lien entirely when prior liens consume the property's nonexempt value.

In Re Braddon · filed 1986-02-11(f)(1)

The correct interpretation of the phraseology of subsection 522(f) which is in question does not limit the avoidance of liens to a maximum of the allowed exemption but avoids only those liens which impair the exemption.

Section 522(f)(1) permits a debtor to avoid a judicial lien when the debtor properly claims an exemption in the affected property.

Harville v. Morris (In Re Harville) · filed 1986-04-07(f)(1)

It is Section 522(f) that permits a debtor to avoid a lien if four requirements are met: ... The second requirement under Section 522(f)(1) is that the debtor must properly claim an exemption in the relevant property.

Section 522(f) allows a debtor to avoid a judicial lien only when it impairs an exemption available under subsection (b).

Commercial Credit Corp. v. Brooks (In Re Brooks) · filed 1986-05-22(f)

Having determined that Commercial Credit’s judicial lien on Brooks’ residence is not subject to a preference in favor of Brooks’ homestead exemption, then Section 522(f) does not come into play. Commercial Credit’s lien simply doesn’t impair “an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this section.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(f).

Section 522(f)(2)(B) allows a debtor to avoid a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in exempt tools of the trade despite a contrary reading of state exemption law.

In re Rodgers · filed 1986-08-14(f)(2)(B)

The amendments to 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) in 1984 eliminated this “stacking” and stated that in joint cases, both debtors must take either the Federal or the State exemptions. If the Allen decision is followed, the effect of this statutory change would be to allow debtors who are resident in Texas to take advantage of 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) if they take the Federal exemptions, but to deny them the benefits of that section if they take the Texas exemptions. Such a result would be contrary to Texas’ long history of liberal construction of exemptions. For these reasons, this Court respectfully declines to follow the reasoning in Allen and adopts instead the opinion of Judge Ayers in Thompson.

Section 522(f) lets a debtor avoid a lien on property to the extent that the lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor is entitled.

In Re Punke · filed 1987-01-16(f)

The same statute entitles the debtor to “avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor on property to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor [is] entitled....” 11 U.S.C. § 522(f).

Section 522(f) allows a debtor to avoid a lien to the extent it impairs an exemption, but a judicial lien on tenancy by the entirety property cannot be avoided when only one spouse files for relief.

Jackson v. Farmers State Bank (In Re Jackson) · filed 1987-05-26(f)(1)

The only relief available for a debtor who seeks to retain property free of any lien is to avail himself of the opportunity to avoid the lien under § 522(f) to the extent that the lien impairs his exemption. This the debtor could not do inasmuch as a judicial lien against tenancy by the entirety property may not be avoided when only one spouse has filed for relief.

Section 522(f) permits a debtor to avoid a judicial lien impairing an exemption only when the debtor has a present cognizable interest in the property.

In Re Carilli · filed 1986-09-30(f)

Interpreting the phrase “an interest of the debt- or in property” according to its plain meaning leads to the conclusion that the debtor must have a present cognizable interest in the property for her to have standing to move the court pursuant to section 522(f). ... It is indisputable that at the time she filed her motion she had relinquished all interests in the Woodbury Road property. ... Consequently, the debtor loses his standing to seek relief pursuant to § 522(f).

Section 522(f)(1) lets a debtor avoid a judicial lien to the extent it impairs an exemption.

In Re Waldman · filed 1987-12-24(f)(1)

The appropriate date at which we must measure both the value of the Debtor’s Premises and the amount of the liens against it, for purposes of an 11 U.S. C. § 522(f)(1) calculation, is December 5, 1985, the date that the bankruptcy case was filed. ... Since the value of the property as of that date ($39,000.00), less the unavoidable liens (at least $32,000.00, and probably as much as $43,000.00), less the Debtor’s allowable exemptions (apparently $7,900.00, per 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(2) and (d)(5)), results in negative number, all of Gershman’s liens are avoidable.

Section 522(f) does not allow a debtor to avoid a lien that no longer exists on the bankruptcy date.

Ricke v. National Bank of the Commonwealth (In Re Ricke) · filed 1988-03-31(f)

§ 522(f) cannot be construed to allow avoidance of a lien no longer in existence at the date of bankruptcy.

Section 522(f) lets a debtor avoid a judicial lien to the extent it impairs an exemption to which the debtor would otherwise be entitled.

In Re Hager · filed 1988-08-22(f)

Furthermore, the bankruptcy court’s decision of June 30, 1986 does not discuss the merits of a Section 522(f) claim, and expressly grants leave to renew under that section at a later date. ... For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Bankruptcy Court, filed on March 31, 1987, voiding appellant’s judgment lien except to the extent of $1,250.98 is AFFIRMED.

Section 522(f)(1) allows a debtor to avoid a judicial lien when the debtor's mortgage debt plus homestead exemption equals or exceeds the property's value.

In re Staley · filed 1989-01-26(f)(1)

As stated above, the better reasoned interpretation of 11 U.S.C. § 522(f), and that which is supported by the clear weight of the decisional law, provides that exemption impairment is established where the sum of total mortgage indebtedness, plus the homestead exemption, equals or exceeds the value of the debtor’s property.

Section 522(f)(1) allows a debtor to avoid a judicial lien impairing an exemption, but not a properly constituted attorney’s charging lien.

In Re Sacco · filed 1989-03-15(f)(1)

Therefore, we agree with the conclusion of the bankruptcy court in In re Sacerdote; we hold that a properly constituted attorney’s charging lien is a secured debt which may not be avoided pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1).

Section 522(f)(1) permits a debtor to avoid a judicial lien to the extent it impairs an otherwise available exemption.

Harris v. Herman (In Re Herman) · filed 1990-10-24(f)(1)

Section 522(f) allows a debtor to avoid the fixing of a judicial lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that the lien impairs an otherwise available exemption. ... Analysis under section 522(f) involves: (1) determining whether the debtor would have been entitled to claim the exemption in the absence of the lien; and (2) determining the extent to which any available exemption is impaired by the judicial lien.

Section 522(f)(1) allows a debtor to avoid a judicial lien that impairs an exemption only if the debtor has perfected the claimed exemption as required by applicable state law.

Tarpley v. Housing & Urban Development (In re Tarpley) · filed 1991-01-04(f)(1)

Unlike the debtors in Morris, the debtors in this case benefit by claiming their homestead exemption and therefore should be required to comply with the procedures for securing it set out in Title 34 of the Virginia Code. ... Because perfection was untimely, the debtors have no exemption to use for section 522(f) lien avoidance purposes. ... For purposes of avoiding a lien pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f), a Virginia Chapter 13 debtor must perfect claimed exemptions in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Virginia Code.

Section 522(f)(1) allows a debtor to avoid a judicial lien to the extent necessary to preserve an exemption, subject to its limits.

Simonette v. First National Bank of PA (In re Simonette) · filed 1992-01-02(f)(1)

Debtor seeks to utilize 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) to avoid the judicial liens to the extent necessary to allow the debtor his exemptions. ... We faced the same problem in In re Baldwin, 84 B.R. 394 (Bankr. WD Pa 1988). Our conclusion there, based upon the authorities therein cited, was that the debtor’s subsequent execution of a consensual mortgage lien ratifies as consensual all that is on the record prior thereto and that the debtor may not upset the state lien law priority by avoiding a prior lien while leaving intact a subordinate lien. Debtor may therefore not avoid any of the liens in question under § 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 522(f)(1) allows a debtor to avoid a judicial lien that impairs an exemption without a fixed filing deadline, subject to actual prejudice.

In Re Dodge · filed 1992-03-26(f)(1)

No time limit is prescribed in the Bankruptcy Code or the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure for a debtor to bring a motion under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) to avoid a judicial lien that impairs an exemption.

Section 522(f)(1) lets a debtor avoid a judicial lien only to the extent that it impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled without the lien.

Sheaffer v. Marshall National Bank & Trust Co. (In Re Sheaffer) · filed 1993-07-20(f)(1)

In my view such a result is in accordance with the plain wording of the statute which states that the debtor may avoid the fixing of lien only “to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption” to which the debtor would have been entitled absent the judicial lien. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f). It is thus fair to conclude from the statute that an exemption is not impaired unless its amount is diminished in value.

Section 522(f) determinations use the petition date as the operative date for valuing the residence, exemption entitlement, and liens.

In Re Salanoa · filed 2001-05-16(f)

The Court holds the petition date is the operative date to make all § 522(f) determinations.

Section 522(b) requires a debtor to have an underlying property interest to claim an exemption, even when state homestead law benefits the debtor as a family member.

In Re Ellis · filed 2011-03-25(b)

Here, Mrs. Ellis admittedly had no interest in the Property and therefore cannot exempt one. Put simply, the benefit an estate of homestead affords to non-owning family members of a declarant does not amount to a cognizable claim of exemption under 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) without an underlying property interest.

A claimed exemption does not automatically exempt property when the schedules misidentify the property and fail to identify the debtor’s actual interest.

Moldo v. Clark (In Re Clark) · filed 2001-08-06(l)

Such a claim of exemption is not effective to render exempt any direct interest that Debtor may have in the trust that holds title to the subject lots.

Section 522(g) measures the debtor’s exemption in a transferred asset as if the involuntary transfer had not occurred, using the debtor’s exemption rights at the bankruptcy filing.

Price v. Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. (In Re Price) · filed 2001-08-30(g), (h)

Because section 522(g) requires that transferred assets be treated as if no involuntary transfer had occurred, no consequence attaches to the fact that garnished funds went to M & T and were not cash in the debtor’s possession on the filing of the bankruptcy petition.

Section 522(g) does not support summary judgment disallowing claimed exemptions when the alleged transfers and their connection to the exempt assets remain unproved.

Independent Health Association, Inc. v. DiMarco · filed 2025-09-19(g)

Plaintiff has not identified with specificity the alleged transfers and the identity of the recipient of the transfers, nor has the Plaintiff produced evidence that the transfers were fraudulent. Plaintiffs have also not yet produced evidence that the assets that the Debtor has claimed as exempt were funded by the overpayments the Debtor received from the Plaintiffs. Therefore, there is insufficient evidence before this Court at this time to reach a conclusion as to the impropriety of any transfer and the claimed exemptions of the same.

Section 522(g)(1)(A) bars a debtor from exempting property recovered by the trustee when the debtor voluntarily transferred that property.

Carlos Resendez, Jr., and Marlene Resendez v. Dwight Lindquist, William Westphal and J. J. Mickelson · filed 1982-10-20(g)(1)(A)

In a Chapter 13 proceeding, transfer of property to the trustee is voluntary on the part of the debtor. It signifies the willingness of the debtor to repay the creditors. ... Since the debtor voluntarily made the payments in question to a Chapter 13 trustee for the benefit of creditors, it would be unfair to permit the monies to be now claimed as exempt under his Chapter 7 proceeding on the basis that they had not been distributed to the creditors.

Section 522(f)(2)(C) excludes judgments arising out of mortgage foreclosures from the lien-avoidance provision.

Ivy v. US Bank National Association · filed 2019-05-29(f)(2)(C)

Finally, the Court finds that the debtor is not entitled to avoid US Bank’s lien under §522(f), which unambiguously provides that “[t]his paragraph shall not apply with respect to a judgment arising out of a mortgage foreclosure.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(C). The state court’s foreclosure decree is precisely such a judgment.

Section 522(f)(2)(C) does not exclude a deficiency judgment from lien avoidance merely because it arose in a mortgage-foreclosure proceeding; the exclusion applies to a judgment of foreclosure and sale.

In Re Smith · filed 2001-12-12(f)(2)(C)

This court must presume that Congress was particular in its selection of words for section 522(f)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. Notably, part (C) of that paragraph excludes its application to “a judgment arising out of a mortgage foreclosure”, but not necessarily to all judgments arising out of mortgage foreclosure proceedings. A judgment of foreclosure and sale arises out of a foreclosure, as an equitable suit, and it is the judgment of foreclosure and sale to which subdivision 522(f)(2)(C) makes reference. In contrast, a deficiency judgment is a legal remedy which, by statute, is allowed as a relief that is incidental to the foreclosure. Being otherwise distinct at common law from the foreclosure process, a deficiency judgment arises from rights of legal origin and not from a foreclosure in equity. Accordingly, in the view of this court, a deficiency judgment is not subject to the exclusion of 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(C).

Section 522(f)(2)(C) prevents a debtor from avoiding a lien based on a mortgage foreclosure deficiency judgment.

In Re Vincent · filed 2000-12-20(f)(2)(C)

The Mortgage Exclusion applies to the Dime Judgment Lien, and accordingly, that lien is not avoidable under Section 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 522(f)(2)(C) does not prevent avoidance of a mortgage deficiency judgment lien; it clarifies that a foreclosure judgment does not turn the underlying mortgage into an avoidable judicial lien.

Banknorth, N.A. v. Hart (In Re Hart) · filed 2003-05-08(f)(2)(C)

Section 522(f)(2)(C) does not create different treatment for "a judgment arising out of a mortgage foreclosure." Instead, Congress used § 522(f)(2)(C) to contrast mortgage foreclosure judgments from liens which are avoidable under § 522(f), clarifying that the entry of a foreclosure judgment does not convert the underlying consensual mortgage into a judicial lien which may be avoided.

Section 522(d)(5) does not exempt a stock option that had value at the petition date when the debtor has already used the available wildcard exemption.

In Re Dibiase · filed 2001-11-02(d)(5)

Thus, the option cannot be claimed as exempt property under § 522(b).

Section 522(d)(1) measures a homestead exemption against the debtor’s equity after unavoidable liens, and the exemption cannot void a valid mortgage lien.

In Re Zubrod · filed 2001-10-05(d)(1)

Only if there is equity remaining in the property after this calculation can a debtor exempt it from property of the estate up to the limit provided by § 522(d)(1). However, a debtor cannot use § 522(d)(1) to void any portion of an otherwise valid lien.

Section 522(c)(2)(A) excepts a debt secured by a lien that has not been avoided from the protection otherwise afforded to exempt property.

In Re Guido · filed 2006-06-09(c)(2)(A)

Nor does the answer to the second question — whether § 522(c) impacts the effect of the Homestead Statute upon the Second Mortgage — run in the Debtor’s favor. ... Among the debts that are excepted from the protection of a debtor’s exception under § 522(c) is: ... As between the Debtor and the Trustee, the Second Mortgage has not been avoided, but has been preserved for the estate by § 551. Accordingly, § 522(c) provides the Debtor with no greater protection from the Trustee than the Debtor would have had from a mortgagee under non-bankruptcy law.

Section 522(d)(7) allows a debtor to exempt the unmatured life insurance contract itself, but not separate rights under the contract such as its loan value.

In Re Oxford · filed 2002-02-21(d)(7)

[11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(7)] exempts a life insurance contract, other than a credit life insurance contract, owned by the debtor. This paragraph refers to the life insurance contract itself. It does not encompass any other rights under the contract, such as the right to borrow out the loan value. Because of this provision, the trustee may not surrender a life insurance contract, which remains property of the debtor if he chooses the Federal exemptions. ... The Court agrees with and adopts this approach, and it finds and concludes that the policies themselves are properly exempted.

Section 522(d)(7) exempts an unmatured life insurance contract owned by the debtor, other than a credit life insurance contract, while § 522(d)(8) provides a limited exemption for accrued dividend or interest or loan value in such a contract when the insured is the debtor or the debtor’s dependent.

Wallace v. Crawford (In re Meyers) · filed 2012-11-14(d)(7), (d)(8)

Under the federal exemptions of Section 522(d), Congress expressly provided two exemptions for unmatured life insurance contracts owned by the debtor. The first, Section 522(d)(7), allows a debtor to exempt “[a]ny unmatured life insurance contract owned by the debtor, other than a credit life insurance contract.” ... Second, Bankruptcy Code Section 522(d)(8) provides a limited exemption for insurance contracts possessing present value to the owner, “... not to exceed in value $11,525 ... in any accrued dividend or interest under, or loan value of, any unmatured life insurance contract owned by the debtor under which the insured is the debtor or an individual of whom the debtor is a dependent.” This provision provides debtors with a limited exemption for any present value in an unmatured life insurance contract owned by the debtor, when the insured is the debtor or an individual on whom the debtor is dependent. ... When Congress has provided an exemption for specific property under Section 522(d) it is a clear indication that Section 541(a)(1) brings such property into the bankruptcy estate in the first instance. ... Given these two exemptions, it is clear that Congress intended unmatured life insurance contracts would initially enter the bankruptcy estate under Section 541(a)(1), but potentially subject to removal by exemption. To construe it otherwise would render the exemption provided under Sections 522(d)(7) and 522(d)(8) superfluous.

Section 522(l) requires a debtor seeking to exempt an entire asset to claim that exemption unambiguously; listing an exemption equal to the asset’s scheduled value does not necessarily do so.

In Re Mitchell · filed 2009-01-28(l)

In this court’s view, it is the Debtor’s burden to unambiguously claim an exemption by declaration under Taylor.

A wildcard exemption claim protects only the value claimed, not an entire asset whose schedules are ambiguous; the trustee may administer value above the exemption amount.

Morgan-Busby v. Gladstone (In Re Morgan-Busby) · filed 2002-01-07(l)

However, regardless of the number of Shares owned by Debtors, they could only exempt them up to $10,838 in sales proceeds.

A debtor who partially claims a section 522(d)(5) exemption does not automatically exempt the entire asset, so the trustee need not object to preserve the estate's interest above the statutory exemption.

Stoebner v. Wick · filed 2002-01-09(d)(5), (l)

Because we hold that the asset was only partially exempted, our application of Taylor differs.

Section 522(l) makes a claimed exemption effective only for the debtor’s specified-dollar interest, not the entire asset, when the exemption is dollar-limited.

Christine M Sugar · filed 2023-02-10(l)

Although § 522(l) does not distinguish between dollar-limited and in-kind exemptions, the “property claimed as exempt” must refer to the dollar amount claimed as exempt. The language for the exemption is not the property but the interest in the property. Any other interpretation would ignore the nature of the North Carolina homestead exemption. Further, Local Form Schedule C-1 clearly limits the homestead exemption to the dollar amount claimed by a debtor.

Section 522(d)(11)(B) permits a wrongful death payment exemption only if the debtor would have been dependent on the deceased when the right to that payment arose.

Walsh v. Hendrickson (In Re Hendrickson) · filed 2002-02-26(d)(11)(B)

In other words, an exemption is properly taken under § 522(d)(11)(B) only if the debtor would have been a dependent of the deceased individual when the right to receive a particular payment arises.

A debtor may not amend an exemption claim after the trustee has reasonably relied on the original claim and suffered prejudice in administering the estate.

Pope v. Clark (In Re Clark) · filed 2002-02-21(l)

The Trustee detrimentally relied on Debtors’ $7,500 exemption claim in pursuing recovery of the proceeds of the PI Case and therefore has established the requisite prejudice to justify disallowance of the amendment.

Section 522(l) makes property claimed as exempt exempt when no timely objection is filed, so the property leaves the bankruptcy estate.

In Re Van Stelle · filed 2006-10-04(l)

There is the preliminary question of whether the insurance proceeds even remained as property of the estate when Debtors’ plan was confirmed. Debtors’ schedules indicate that the Malibu was in fact titled in Debtor Karen Van Stelle’s name and that she claimed the same as exempt pursuant to Section 522(d)(2). Moreover, Trustee did not file an objection to the exemption claimed. Consequently, it would appear that the Malibu ceased being property of the estate on December 4, 2005, which is the 30th day after Debtors’ first meeting of creditors had concluded. 11 U.S.C. § 522(l) and Fed. R.Bankr.P. 4003(b).

Property listed as exempt is treated as exempt when no party in interest objects.

Tigue v. Sosne (In Re La'Teacha Tigue) · filed 2007-04-05(l)

In addition, property which a debtor lists as exempt under § 522(b) is deemed exempt unless a party in interest objects. 11 U.S.C. § 522(2). ... Because no one objected, the debt- or’s exemption was allowed under 11 U.S.C. § 522(i) and the property ceased being property of the estate.

Section 522(l) allows a claimed exemption to become effective when no party in interest objects, causing the property to cease being property of the bankruptcy estate.

Tigue v. Sosne · filed 2007-04-05(l)

In addition, property which a debtor lists as exempt under § 522(b) is deemed exempt unless a party in interest objects. 11 U.S.C. § 522(l). ... Because no one objected, the debtor’s exemption was allowed under 11 U.S.C. § 522(l) and the property ceased being property of the estate.

Section 522(Z) provides that property claimed as exempt becomes exempt, and passes out of the estate to the debtor, when no timely objection is filed and the objection period expires.

Mwangi v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re Mwangi) · filed 2012-04-06(Z)

The Court rejects the proposition that a debtor’s mere claim of an exemption removes that property from the estate. Under § 522(Z), the debtor files a list of property the debtor “claims as exempt,” and “[ujnless a party in interest objects, the property claimed as exempt on such list is exempt.” Consequently, the debtor only “claims” an exemption and other interested parties are given an opportunity to object. This is reflected in Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4003(b)(1), which provides that an interested party must file an objection within thirty days after the first meeting of creditors, or thirty days after the debtor files an amended list of claimed exemptions, whichever is later. If an interested party objects, the bankruptcy court “shall determine the issues presented by the objections.” Fed. R. Bankr.P. 4003(c). However, if no one objects, under § 522(Z) the property “is exempt.” Based on this statutory language and Rule 4003, the Court concludes that if no one timely objects to a debtor’s claimed exemption, then the property is exempt from property of the estate and passes to the debtor upon expiration of the time to object.

Section 522(l) makes a claimed exemption effective unless a party in interest objects, after which the court determines whether the exemption is properly claimed.

Gregory Todd Givans · filed 2021-05-17(l)

A debtor’s claim of exemptions is presumptively valid unless a party-in-interest, such as the Trustee, objects.

Section 522(l), read with the court’s notice, requires a debtor to amend exemption schedules within 15 days after the creditors’ meeting, subject to an extension for excusable neglect.

In Re Williams · filed 1982-11-23(l)

The court’s finding in Brewer was based upon a reading of both 11 U.S.C. § 522(7) and this court’s order and notice which is regularly issued for each debtor’s meeting of creditors. ... This court found in Brewer that these provisions required the debtor to file any amendment to his exemption schedules within 15 days after the debtor’s meeting of creditors, with the limited exception that an amendment to exempt newly discovered assets would be allowed without leave of court pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 110. ... The court will accordingly enter an order denying the debtor’s application to amend his exemption schedules.

Section 522(1) does not make a claimed exemption final before the bankruptcy estate closes, allowing amendment of the exemption list after an objection subject to Rule 110.

In Re Fisher · filed 1983-01-24(1)

Under the Bankruptcy Code there is no provision comparable to § 47a(6) requiring the filing of a trustee’s report of exemptions. The Code relieved the trustee of the obligation of filing such a report and resolves the issue of the approvability of the exemptions by providing that, “Unless a party in interest objects, the property claimed as exempt on such list [schedule B-4] is exempt.” § 522(1). Due to the inapplicability of Rule 403(c) of the Code, there is no provision in the Rules or the statute providing for the finality of exemption claims prior to the closing of the estate.

A debtor may amend a Section 522 exemption claim before the case closes, but prejudice to the trustee or creditors can bar the amendment.

In Re Cudeyro · filed 1997-10-20

Conversely, unless prejudice or bad faith is demonstrated, the debtor’s second amendment is permissible, as this bankruptcy case has not yet been closed. ... Against this backdrop, I am convinced that the instant factual setting presents a situation in which Ms. Cudeyro should not be permitted to amend her scheduled exemptions. The objectors have presented sufficiently clear evidence of prejudice that would be caused by this amendment.

Section 522(d)(5) does not permit a debtor to exempt a tax refund that, after a valid setoff, does not exist as property of the estate.

In Re Shortt · filed 2002-05-17(d)(5)

Because this Court has concluded that AAFES has a valid right of setoff, and because the amount of the Debt exceeds the amount of the 2000 tax refund, the Debtors are “not entitled to a refund and the tax refund did not become property of the estate. Absent an interest in the estate to the refund, it could not properly be exempted by the debtor under § 522.” ... Thus, while the Debtors claimed the 2000 tax refund as exempt, they were not legally entitled to any refund and their attempt to exempt it is of no legal consequence.

Section 522(b) does not allow a debtor to claim an exemption in separately owned property of the debtor’s spouse when the debtor has no present property interest in that property.

In re Hampshire · filed 2014-02-27(b)

Rather, I conclude that Mr. Hampshire does not have a present property interest in the Inheritance that may be claimed as exempt under 11 U.S.C. § 522(b).

Section 522(g) does not let a trustee avoid allegedly exempt property; it provides the mechanism for a debtor to exempt property returned to the estate and sets the requirements for doing so.

Moser v. Bank of Tyler (In re Loggins) · filed 2014-04-21(g)

However, the Trustee’s presentation of § 522(g) as an alternative method of avoidance is defeated by a plain reading of the statute. Section 522(g) does not entitle a trustee to avoid the transfer of arguably exempt property. Rather, it provides the mechanism by which a debtor may exempt property returned to the estate and the requirements for doing so.

Section 522(f)(2)(A) measures exemption impairment by adding the judicial lien, other liens, and the exemption, and the court held that lien priority matters, so a junior nonavoidable lien is excluded from the calculation.

In Re Radcliffe · filed 2002-05-24(f)(2)(A)

Section 522(f)(2)(A) provides that the calculation for determining impairment of the exemption includes the hen in question, all other hens and the debtor’s exemption. ... We therefore join the courts that construe the language of the statute to prevent the unjust result produced by merely totaling all liens and the exemption; otherwise, LPP’s lien would be avoided in its entirety, which would produce a windfall to the Debtor. ... The Court concludes that the priority of liens is material to considering a lien avoidance motion under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f). In this case, we must exclude from the calculation the state tax lien which is junior in priority to the lien of LPP and any previous avoided liens on the Property.

Section 522(f)(2)(A) determines impairment by adding the judicial lien, all other liens on the property, and the exemption amount, and permits avoidance to the extent that total exceeds the debtor’s interest in the property without liens.

Taras v. Cadle Co. (In Re Taras) · filed 2004-01-16(f)(2)(A)

Applying the mathematical formula provided by § 522(f)(2)(A) gives the following: Cadle’s lien of $18,911 and Debtor’s half of the IRS tax lien in the amount of $194,584 total $213,495. Adding Debtor’s maximum exemption of $20,000 makes the total $233,495, which exceeds Debtor’s undivided 1/2 interest in the property by $169,591. Thus, Cadle’s lien is entirely avoidable because it impairs the exemption to which Debtor is entitled in the absence of any liens.

Section 522(f)(2)(A) bars using state-law lien priority in the impairment calculation and requires counting all liens on the property, including statutory tax liens.

Radcliffe v. LPP Mortgage Ltd · filed 2005-03-30(f)(2)(A)

In Brinley v. LPP Mortgage, Ltd., Nos. 03-5607/5653, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 4606 (6th Cir. Mar. 22, 2005), the court held that the straightforward language of § 522(f)(2)(A) does not permit courts to account for state priority law in making the exemption-impairment calculation. Adhering to that precedent, we reject LPP’s argument that the state tax lien, though junior to LPP’s lien, may not be considered in the calculation. ... Section 522(f)(2)(A) does not draw a distinction between statutory and recorded liens but instead refers expansively to “all other liens on the property.” ... Because there is no dispute that a statutory lien arose in this instance by operation of law when Radcliffe failed to pay his real estate taxes, see Ky. Rev. Stat. § 134.420, and because this tax debt may be collected against him personally, the language of § 522(f)(2)(A) requires this lien to be included in the impairment-exemption calculation.

Section 522(f)(2)(A) requires nonavoidable encumbrances on co-owned property to be deducted from the property’s total value before calculating the debtor’s fractional interest for judicial-lien avoidance.

All Points Capital Corp. v. Meyer (In Re Meyer) · filed 2007-07-31(f)(2)(A)

Hence, nonavoidable encumbrances on co-owned property must be deducted from the total value of the property before a debtor’s fractional interest is determined.

Section 522(f)(2)(A) calculates the extent to which a judicial lien impairs an exemption by adding the judicial lien, other liens, and the exemption amount, then subtracting the debtor’s unencumbered interest in the property.

Ruby Jeane Sawyers · filed 2021-07-06(f)(2)(A)

Under § 522(f), only the portion of a judicial lien that impairs the exemption may be avoided by the debtor. ... Section 522(f)(2)(A) provides a specific formula for calculating the extent to which a lien impairs a debtor’s homestead exemption. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(A). ... The extent of the impairment is the amount that a creditor’s lien will be avoided. ... Because Waltrip’s lien is smaller than the extent of the impairment, the entirety of Waltrip’s lien can be avoided. Therefore, we affirm the bankruptcy court’s decision to avoid the entirety of Waltrip’s lien.

Section 522(f)(2)(A)’s impairment calculation may use an alternate formula when joint owners have asymmetrical secured debts, preserving the debtor’s exemption while leaving nonexempt equity subject to a judicial lien.

Amrik S Pabla and Dalwinder Kaur Pabla · filed 2021-09-30(f)(2)(A)

Given the asymmetry here, however, the proper approach is to apply the alternate formula, which shows that the lien cannot be avoided.

Section 522(f)(2)(A)’s impairment formula controls over the prior practice of subtracting joint obligations and the homestead from the full property value before calculating the debtor’s share.

In Re Pascucci · filed 1998-09-24(f)(2)(A)

I also disagree with the Bank’s argument that Congress has failed to specify clearly its intent to overrule the prior practice of deducting the joint obligation and the exemption from the fair market value when deciding whether to avoid a lien. Although the practice may have been prevalent in Massachusetts, as the Bank contends, Congress, by opting for a specific formula, has spoken clearly, even if its reasons for so acting are obscure. The amendment has overridden any contrary prior practice.

Section 522(f)(2)(A) calculates lien impairment using the exemption amount the debtor is entitled to claim, rather than the amount actually claimed.

In Re Scotti · filed 2011-10-03(f)(2)(A)

Because a lien avoidance calculation should be based on the amount of exemption to which a debt- or is entitled rather than the amount of exemption the debtor has actually taken, the Court, in assessing the avoidability of the judicial lien presently at issue, will use $49,875.

Section 522(f)(2)(A) includes the full balance of other liens when calculating whether a judicial lien impairs an exemption, even when the debtor owns only half the property.

In re Kindall · filed 2014-01-14(f)(2)(A)

The plain language of the statute provides for the inclusion of “all other hens on the property.” Therefore, the full $130,000 balance of the consensual first mortgage hen will be included in determining the extent Chase’s judgment hen impairs Debtor’s exemption.

Section 522(d)(11)(C) permits a debtor to exempt life-insurance proceeds to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and the debtor's dependents, measured by subsistence needs and relevant financial factors.

In Re Collins · filed 2002-07-03(d)(11)(C)

Property is exempt under Section 522(d)(11)(C) of the Bankruptcy Code to the extent that it is “reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependant of the debtor.... ” ... After a review of the relevant factors, I find that all of the insurance proceeds are reasonably necessary for the subsistence of this Debtor and her two minor children. Consequently, the Trustee’s Objection to the Debtor’s exemption is hereby overruled.

Section 522(d)(11)(C) allows exemption of life-insurance proceeds only to the extent reasonably necessary for the debtor’s current and future support, without requiring preservation of the debtor’s pre-petition lifestyle.

Bierbach v. Walck (In Re Walck) · filed 2011-10-11(d)(11)(C)

When a court determines whether insurance proceeds are necessary for a debtor’s support under § 522(d)(ll)(C), it not necessary to insure that a debtor is able maintain her pre-petition lifestyle. Rather, the court must evaluate whether the funds are reasonably necessary for her current and future support.

Section 522(d)(1) exempts a debtor's aggregate interest in residential property only up to a specified dollar amount; any value exceeding the claimed exemption remains property of the estate.

In Re Barksdale · filed 2002-07-23(d)(1)

The exemption in a debtor’s residence is limited to a dollar amount. Thus the debtor’s residence, to the extent that it exceeds the amount of the exemption claimed, remains property of the estate.

Section 522’s exemption protections yield when a Chapter 11 debtor’s retention of exempt property conflicts with the absolute priority rule in § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).

In Re Gosman · filed 2002-07-30

Accordingly, the provisions set forth in Section 522 prevail in Chapters 7, 11, and 13, unless otherwise contradicted by a specific provision. Here, the specific provision is Section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).

Section 522(j) gives a dependent spouse only a derivative right to claim exemptions available to the debtor, not an independent exemption right.

In Re Stephens · filed 2003-01-14(j)

The rights of a dependent of a debtor under 11 U.S.C. § 522(J) are derivative of the rights of the debtor and are limited to asserting exemptions that are available to the debtor.

Section 522(b) provides exemptions to individual debtors, so property distributed from a dissolved partnership may be claimed as an individual exemption.

In Re Schmitt · filed 1986-01-21(b)

property of the individuals, even though in some cases jointly owned, it is exemptable under 11 U.S.C. § 522 and Iowa Code § 627.

Section 522(b)(1) permits only an individual debtor to claim property as exempt from the bankruptcy estate.

In re: ROBERT W. HUNT M.D., a Medical Corporation · filed 2014-03-26(b)(1)

The right to claim property as exempt from property of the estate under § 522(b) is afforded only to “individual” debtors. ... Because MD, as a corporation, was not entitled to claim exemptions under § 522(b), the bankruptcy court correctly disallowed MD’s exemption claims.

Section 522(b) incorporates state-created exemptions into the Bankruptcy Code, but a transferee who is not the debtor cannot assert the debtor’s homestead exemption against the debtor’s creditors.

Zeddun v. Griswold (In re Wierzbicki) · filed 2016-07-27(b)

State-created homestead exemptions, which are incorporated into the Bankruptcy Code by 11 U.S.C. § 522(b), facilitate fresh starts for debtors by allowing them to shield from creditors specific assets or amounts that otherwise would be part of the bankruptcy estate. ... Griswold, however, is not the debtor in this bankruptcy action, so he is not entitled to a homestead exemption from Wierzbicki’s creditors. ... And the availability of a homestead exemption to Wierzbicki has nothing to do with the fair market value of the farm when she transferred it.

Section 522(b) permits a debtor to exempt property from the bankruptcy estate, but does not give non-debtor third parties standing to claim exemptions for that property.

Dymarkowski v. McConegly · filed 2021-01-12(b)

Moreover, 11 U.S.C. §522(b) “permits a ‘debtor’ to exempt property from property of the estate, but no provisions of the Bankruptcy Code provide standing for non-debtor third parties to claim exemptions in property of the estate.”

Section 522(b) permits a debtor to claim an applicable state-law exemption; another person cannot claim it on the debtor’s behalf.

Estate of Wattar v. Fox (In re Sharif) · filed 2017-03-10(b)

As the Bankruptcy Court explained, Ragda is not the debtor in the underlying bankruptcy case and therefore not entitled to take advantage of the state-law exemption on Debtor’s behalf.

Section 522 exemptions are personal to the debtor; a transferee cannot assert the debtor’s potential exemption to defeat avoidance of a transfer.

Mostoller v. Garrett · filed 2022-04-06

That determination, however, also does not end the question because Debtor received the $15,000.00 personal injury settlement before he made the Transfer, and as explained above, Defendant may not assert Debtor’s exemption in defense of Plaintiff’s § 548 claim.

Section 522(b) allows only an individual debtor to claim an exemption from property of the bankruptcy estate.

Kapila v. Morgan (In Re Morgan) · filed 2002-10-10(b)

Section 522(b) provides that only “an individual debtor may exempt from property of the estate the property listed” in the schedules. She is not an individual debtor.

Section 522(d)(11)(A) allows a debtor to exempt a right to receive, or property traceable to, an award under a crime victim’s reparation law, covering compensation for physical injury or death from a violent crime rather than restitution for converted money or property.

In Re Seymour · filed 2002-11-06(d)(11)(A)

Accordingly, the Court is persuaded that the exemptions found in § 522(d)(ll) and in O.C.G.A. § 44 — 13—100(a)(ll) are all intended to protect a debtor’s right to payments that would either replace a loss of the debtor’s future source of support or would serve to compensate the debtor for an injury to his person. Therefore, the Court agrees with the Trustee that the reference made by the statute to an award under a crime victim’s reparation law is meant to include compensation for victims who suffer physical injury or death from a violent crime, rather than compensation payable as restitution for money or property that is wrongfully converted.

Section 522(d)(11)(A) permits a debtor to exempt an award under a crime victim’s reparation law without requiring bodily injury.

In Re Soares · filed 2012-03-06(d)(11)(A)

Section 522(d)(ll)(A) is not ambiguous and makes no reference to personal bodily injuries, let alone limiting any recovery under a crime victim’s reparation law to such personal injuries.

Section 522(b)(3)(B) permits an exemption for property held as tenants by the entirety only when the interest is exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law.

In re Rodriguez · filed 2008-09-18(b)(3)(B)

Section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code permits debtors to exempt an interest in property held as tenants by the entirety to the extent it is “exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(B). ... The court will disallow the claim of exemptions based on 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(B), the claim of tenants by the entirety in the motor vehicles.

Section 522(b)(3)(B) permits a debtor to exempt an interest in property held as a tenancy by the entirety to the extent applicable nonbankruptcy law exempts it from process.

In re Edelson · filed 2015-07-08(b)(3)(B)

The Debtor claims her beneficial interest in 2915 W. Farwell as fully exempt under Illinois law, made applicable in this case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(B) (authorizing exemption of an interest in property held as tenancy in the entirety “to the extent that such interest ... is exempt from process under applicable non- . bankruptcy law[.]”). ... For these reasons, Loventhal has failed to show that the interest currently held by the Debtor would not qualify as an interest held in tenancy by the entirety under Illinois law. On this basis, the pending objection to the Debtor’s claimed interest will be overruled.

Section 522(b)(3)(B) allows a debtor to exempt an interest in property held as a tenant by the entirety when that interest is exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law.

In Re Weber · filed 2006-06-29(b)(3)(B)

Under the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor may claim an exemption in “any interest in property in which the debtor had, immediately before the commencement of the case, an interest as a tenant by the entirety ... to the extent that such interest ... is exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(B) (amended 2005).

Section 522(b)(2)(B) preserves an exemption for entireties property only to the extent that applicable non-bankruptcy law would shield it from creditors.

Matter of Hunter · filed 1990-12-11(b)(2)(B)

To the extent that creditors of one spouse cannot, under state law, reach entireties property § 522(b)(2)(B) continues this protection. ... Nonetheless, where joint creditors of both a debtor and a non-debtor spouse can reach entireties real estate the exemption or immunity recognized by this part of the Bankruptcy Code does not apply; it is available only “to the extent that” the interest would not be reachable under applicable non-bank-ruptcy law.

Section 522(b)(1) permits but does not require an individual debtor to claim exemptions, while § 522(l) requires the debtor to file a list of property claimed as exempt under subsection (b).

In re: Kirtikumar Menon · filed 2018-02-13(b)(1), (l)

But § 521 and Rule 1007 do not expressly require a debtor to file a “schedule of exemptions.” Exemptions are governed by § 522 which allows, but does not require, an individual debtor to claim exemptions in his assets. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1). Section 522(l) then states that the “debtor shall file a list of property that the debtor claims as exempt under subsection (b) of this section.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(l) (emphasis added). Rule 4003 implements § 522; Rule 4003(a) provides: “A debtor shall list the property claimed as exempt under § 522 of the Code on the schedule of assets required to be filed by Rule 1007.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003(a) (emphasis added). Accordingly, Rule 4003(a) resolves any ambiguity; Schedule C is a part of the required “schedule of assets” and must be filed in some form alongside Schedule A/B and within Rule 1007’s 14-day timeline.

Section 522(b) permits a debtor in a Chapter 11 reorganization to claim qualifying property exemptions, and the exemptions are not limited to cases where insufficient assets remain after creditors are satisfied.

Buroker v. Raybourn · filed 1986-01-14(b)

The reversal in this case turns on the failure of the Amended Plan of the Rayb-ourns to provide for the exemption rights of the debtors-appellants. Once property has come into a bankrupt estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541(a), the debtor is permitted to exempt certain property under the authority of 11 U.S.C. § 522(b). ... The Court notes that the clear thrust of the exemption provisions is to ensure a debtor a fresh start, and that neither the legislative history of 11 U.S.C. § 522 nor Ohio law provides an indication that exemptions may be claimed only in cases where there are insufficient assets to provide for the amounts of the exemptions after the satisfaction of the debtors’ creditors.

A debtor claiming exemptions under § 522(d) must identify the specific exemptions so creditors receive adequate notice.

In re Wilson · filed 2006-02-06(d)

Additionally, on Schedule C to each of the Voluntary Petitions filed by the Debtors, Debtors simply stated, “employment of exemptions under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) to be determined in the bankruptcy plan.” Debtors never moved to amend Schedule C to assert the exemption. This is simply not sufficient to put creditors on notice of specific exemptions to be raised in the case.

Section 522 requires a debtor to schedule a cause of action and claim it as exempt before the bankruptcy court enters an order; until then, the property remains in the bankruptcy estate.

Kocher v. Campbell · filed 2011-06-09

In order to claim the exemption, the debtor must list the cause of action as an asset in his schedule B and then claim it as exempt property on his schedule C using forms prescribed by the bankruptcy rules. The bankruptcy court may thereafter enter an order exempting the listed property. Until such an order is entered, the property remains a part of the bankruptcy estate.

Section 522(l) requires a debtor to file a list identifying the property claimed as exempt; an ambiguous listing that does not put the trustee on notice does not establish a valid exemption merely because no objection was filed.

In re: Jerry Slates · filed 2012-10-31(l)

Rule 4003(a) specifies the procedure for claiming exemptions, requiring the debtor to “list the property claimed as exempt . . . on the schedule of assets required to be filed by Rule 1007.” See also § 522(l)(“The debtor shall file a list of property that the debtor claims as exempt under subsection (b) of this section.”) ... We note, however, that neither this Panel nor the Ninth Circuit has interpreted Taylor as holding that failure by the trustee to object to a claim of exemption will always result in the debtor being entitled to a full exemption in the subject property. ... Therefore, under Hyman and its progeny, "in order to determine whether a debtor is entitled to a full exemption in the property upon the trustee's failure to object, the court must inquire whether the information that the debtor provided in his or her Schedule C should have put the trustee on notice that he or she ought to have filed an objection to a claim of exemption." ... Therefore, because Trustee (or any creditor of Slates) was not able to determine from reading the schedules that Slates was claiming the State Court Action as exempt, Slates failed to assert a valid exemption. Thus, Trustee was not required to object to it under Rule 4003(b). ... Accordingly, the bankruptcy court did not err in determining that the State Court Action was property of the estate and not exempt.

Section 522(1) allows a debtor to exempt a right of action only after taking affirmative steps to remove the exempt property from the bankruptcy estate.

Lohman v. Melcher Manufacturing, Inc. · filed 2015-07-23(1)

Rights of action may be subject to exemption under II U.S.C. § 522(1), but the debtor must take affirmative steps to remove exempt property from the estate. 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(1), 541; Linklater v. Johnson, 53 Wn. App. 567,570,768 P.2d 1020 (1989).

Section 522(l) requires a debtor to file a list of property claimed as exempt, but does not require the exemption claim to be filed specifically on Schedule C.

Perry v. Chase Auto Finance (In re Perry) · filed 2015-11-13(l)

Furthermore, neither § 522 nor Rule 4003 require that a claim of exemption be made on Schedule C, merely that the Debtor file a list of assets claimed as exempt.

Section 522(1) treats property as exempt when the debtor claims it, no party in interest objects, and a statute authorizes the exemption.

Cannon v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc. · filed 2021-09-10(1)

“An asset is exempt from the bankruptcy estate if: (1) the debtor lists it as a claimed exemption; (2) no party in interest objects; and (3) a statute authorizes the exemption.”

Section 522(l) allows a debtor who lists valid Virginia homestead exemptions in a bankruptcy petition to claim them despite filing the homestead deed in the wrong jurisdiction.

In Re Morgan · filed 1981-12-04(l)

The remaining issue for consideration is whether the debtor, having listed the proper exemptions in his petition but having filed his Homestead Deed in the wrong jurisdiction, should be denied his exemptions. ... It, therefore, follows that the debtor having listed his exemptions in his petition in accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 522(l), setting forth the proper listed exemption section under Virginia law, must be allowed his exemptions. Any other interruption would be inconsistent with Section 522(7) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 522(7) permits a debtor’s dependent to claim the debtor’s exemptions, including additional exemptions when the debtor’s exemptions are inadequate and the claim does not unduly prejudice the debtor.

In Re Crouch · filed 1983-09-15(7)

When a debtor who has not met obligations to support a spouse has claimed inadequate exemptions, the spouse should be permitted to claim additional exemptions as long as the additional exemptions do not unduly prejudice the debtor.

Section 522(l) requires a debtor to claim an exemption; an objection prevents the claim from being treated as exempt unless the objection is resolved.

Miller v. Accelerated Bureau of Collections, Inc. · filed 1996-05-16(l)

The exempting of property in bankruptcy is not a self-executing process; that is, the exemption must be claimed. If property is claimed to be exempt, it is so categorized unless a party in interest objects to the exemption.

An exemption under § 522(b) is valid only if the debtor schedules the asset as exempt, no party in interest successfully objects, and a statute authorizes the exemption.

Bowie v. Rose Shanis Financial Services, LLC · filed 2004-12-09(b)

11 U.S.C. § 522(b) and Bankruptcy Rule 4003(a) and (b) set out the very specific conditions that must be satisfied for an exemption of property from a bankruptcy estate to be valid. ... In this case, Bowie never listed his cause of action against Rose Shanis as a claimed exemption, either when he initially filed for bankruptcy or as an amendment at any time thereafter.

Section 522(b)(1) permits a debtor to claim exemptions but does not require the debtor to do so.

In Re Bennett · filed 2008-10-08(b)(1)

Pursuant to § 522(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, “an individual debtor may exempt from property of the estate” various items or amounts specified under either the federal or state scheme of exemptions. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1). The term “may” indicates that the debtor is not required to claim exemptions.

Section 522(l) requires a debtor to list property claimed as exempt on the bankruptcy schedules; an omitted exemption cannot first be claimed on reconsideration.

Delaney v. Messer · filed 2023-03-20(l)

The statutory text places the burden of claiming an exemption squarely on the debtor—and prescribes a specific point in time when the debtor must do so.

Section 522(h) allows a debtor to exempt property recovered by avoiding a transfer only when the transfer was involuntary and the trustee has not recovered the property.

In Re Buelow · filed 2002-12-19(h)

A debtor may only exempt property recovered by the avoidance of a transfer if the transfer was involuntary and the trustee has not acted to recover the property. 11 U.S.C. § 522(h) (2002). If a debtor voluntarily grants the security interest avoided, the debtor is not entitled to exempt the interest recovered.

Section 522(g) bars a debtor from exempting property recovered by a trustee through avoidance of a fraudulent transfer, but does not apply to property that was already in the estate when the bankruptcy petition was filed.

In re Osborn · filed 2006-05-30(g)

Under bankruptcy law, a debtor is barred from exempting property which the trustee recovers by avoiding a fraudulent transfer. 11 U.S.C. § 522(g). However, Osborn’s joint tenancy interest does not fall within this bar because as to this interest there is nothing for the trustee to recover. Section 522(g) only applies to property restored to the estate, not property already in the estate on the date of filing.

Section 522(g)(1) bars a debtor from claiming an exemption in property recovered by the trustee when the debtor voluntarily transferred the property before bankruptcy.

In Re Carter · filed 2006-06-09(g)(1)

where a debt- or voluntarily transfers property pre-petition, the debtor cannot claim an exemption in property recovered by actions of the trustee.

Section 522(g) permits a debtor to exempt property recovered through a trustee’s avoidance action only when the debtor proceeds under the conditions specified by that subsection.

In Re: Stergios Messina v. · filed 2012-08-06(g)

However, a debtor may benefit from an avoidance if he files an exemption, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(g). “[T]he basic purpose of section 522(i)(2) is to make such property available to the debtor as well as the estate, but only as expressly provided; that is, ‘to the extent that the debtor may exempt such property under subsection (g) [of section 522] or paragraph 1 of [section 522(i)]’.” See In re Simonson, 758 F.2d 103, 106 (3d Cir. 1985). Appellants very clearly stated that they had no intention of filing under 11 U.S.C. § 522(g). As such, the fact that they filed for Chapter 7 but did not file for an exemption under 11 U.S.C. § 522(g) precludes them from receiving anything from Appellee’s avoidance action.

Section 522(g) permits exemption of property recovered through the trustee’s chapter 5 avoidance and recovery powers when the relevant transfer is a prepetition transfer, rather than the transfer into the estate at filing, and it does not generally limit exemptions in property included in the estate under § 541(a)(1).

In re Dawson · filed 2018-12-07(g)

The more natural view of the statute, and the one the court adopts, is that the "transfer" referred to in § 522(g) is the prepetition transfer (either of title or possession) that made it necessary for the trustee to exercise the chapter 5 avoidance and recovery powers enumerated in the section and to reel the property back into the estate, not the transfer that occurs upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition.

Section 522(g) permits a debtor to exempt garnished wages recovered as an avoidable preference.

Guernsey v. Old Kent Bank (In re Guernsey) · filed 1996-12-11(g)

Because the debtor may exempt the transfers under § 522(g) and because the trustee did not attempt to avoid the transfers under § 522(h), Old Kent shall pay forthwith the sum of $676.95 to the plaintiff, Vicki L. Guernsey.

Section 522(b) requires joint debtors to elect a single exemption scheme rather than combining federal and state exemptions.

Seung v. Silverman · filed 2003-01-22(b)

Section 522(b) of the Bankruptcy Code expressly states that in joint debtor cases, as here, one debtor may not elect to exempt property under the federal bankruptcy exemption scheme while the other debtor elects to exempt property under the federal non-bankruptcy, state or local exemption schemes. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b). Rather, the joint debtors must elect one exemption scheme.

Section 522(m) doubles the § 522(p) homestead exemption cap for joint debtors.

Dykstra Exterior, Inc. v. Nestlen (In Re Nestlen) · filed 2010-12-21(m)

We conclude that because § 522(m) provides that all sections of § 522 “apply separately with respect to each debtor in a joint case,” § 522(p)’s exemption cap of $136,875 must be doubled in this joint case.

Section 522(d)(1) permits a debtor to exempt a lien as an aggregate interest in real property used as a residence by the debtor’s dependent.

Keller v. Johnson · filed 2003-02-04(d)(1)

We therefore conclude that a lien is an interest in real property and qualifies as an aggregate interest in the minor child’s residence under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1).

Section 522(d)(1) requires the debtor or a dependent to actually occupy the property as a residence before the bankruptcy filing; future intent to occupy is insufficient.

In Re Gandy · filed 2005-07-29(d)(1)

Thus, under the plain language of the statute, the phrase “uses as a residence” indicates a present use or occupancy as opposed to a future intent to occupy. Accordingly, the Court concludes that § 522(d)(l)’s plain language unambiguously requires actual occupancy at a point prior to the bankruptcy filing.

Section 522(d)(1) permits a debtor to claim a federal exemption in real property used as a residence only if the debtor is residing there when the bankruptcy case begins.

In Re Boward · filed 2005-08-29(d)(1)

Section 522(d)(1) affords a debtor the opportunity to elect a federal bankruptcy law exemption in real property that the debtor “uses as a residence.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1). The statutory language is free of ambiguity and plain in its meaning: the debtor must be residing in the property at the time of the commencement of the bankruptcy case.

Section 522(d)(1)'s residence exemption does not include separately purchased, fenced-off adjacent land with no structures or family household use, even when the debtor owns and uses that land.

Lanier v. Beaman · filed 2008-08-08(d)(1)

A reasonable assessment of the law dictates that “residence” does not include land bought separately from the land on which a home is located; separated by a fence; on which there are no structures; on which no family member parks or stores equipment; and on which activity occurs that is entirely separate from the day to day household activities normally expected in a residence.

Section 522(d) does not protect property held as a tenancy by the entirety, while § 522(d)(1) allows a debtor to exempt up to $20,200 in real or personal property used as a residence.

In Re Tompkins · filed 2010-05-06(d), (d)(1)

When a debtor claims the federal exemptions under § 522(d), property held as a tenant by the entireties is not protected. ... Instead, § 522(d) permits a debtor to claim an exemption of $20,200 for real and personal property that the debtor uses as a residence. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1). Thus, when a debtor has an interest in entireties property and selects the federal exemptions, the entireties property is analyzed as if it was a tenancy in common with the debtor's interest in that tenancy in common subject to the claims of the debtor's individual and joint creditors.

Section 522(d)(1) permits a debtor to exempt an aggregate interest in real property the debtor uses as a residence, including adjoining property used consistently with residential purposes even when it is listed on a separate tax bill.

Corcoran v. McDonald (In re McDonald) · filed 2012-03-20(d)(1)

The sole issue before the Court is whether the Debtors’ claimed exemption of a vacant parcel of land adjacent to the parcel of property where the resident is located, is allowed under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1). Section 522(d)(1) exempts the debtor’s aggregate interest in real property that the debtor uses as a residence. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1). ... In this case, the Debtors have shown and the Bankruptcy Court has so found, that the local taxing authority granted the Debtors homestead exemption on the vacant property adjacent to the property where the Debtors’ home is located. Michigan law further provides that a principal residence may include unoccupied property adjoining or contiguous to the dwelling. Nothing in the Bankruptcy Code expressly prohibits exemptions for real property that is adjoining but listed on separate tax bills. The Bankruptcy Court’s factual finding that the Debtors use the vacant property adjacent to their home consistent with residential use is not clearly erroneous. The Bankruptcy Court’s application of Michigan’s definition of homestead or residential property also is not in error.

Section 522(d)(1) allows a debtor to exempt a capped aggregate interest in residential real or personal property used as a residence, but does not include pre-petition insurance proceeds for damage to that residence in the residence's exempt value.

In Re Lauwagie · filed 2012-05-15(d)(1)

Insurance proceeds for pre-petition damage to a residence are not real or personal property that the debtor uses as a residence. Consequently, the proceeds are not calculable as part of the aggregate interest of the debtor in the residential property that is the subject of the exemption.

Section 522(d)(1) permits an exemption for real or personal property used as a residence by the debtor or a dependent, with present use assessed as of the petition date.

In re Tankersley · filed 2017-08-28(d)(1)

“Section 522(d)(1) allows a debtor to exempt her “aggregate interest, not to exceed $22,975 in value, in real property or personal property that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor uses as a residence ....” 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1) (2012). The language of this statute must be interpreted according to its plain meaning unless such an interpretation would lead to an absurd result. ... Once it is determined that the debtor has a residence, Section 522(d)(1) then requires that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor “uses [the property] as a residence.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1) (2012). The employment of the present tense verb “uses” has been construed as requiring a present use of the residence as of the bankruptcy petition date. ... Based on the foregoing discussion, the Court finds that the Trustee has met his burden of proving the Debtors are not entitled to claim an exemption in the 17 Acre Tract under Section 522(d)(1). The 17 Acre Tract was not used as a residence by either Debtor or any dependent of either Debtor on the petition date. Further, even if the Debtors were found to have intended to use the property as a residence, the property is uninhabitable, and the Debtors are not physically or financially able to either repair the house or prepare the property to accommodate, a travel trailer to use as a dwelling. Finally, as the Court has previously stated, the circumstances surrounding the rental of the property do not support a finding of constructive use of the property during a temporary absence. For these reasons, the Trustee’s Objection as to the exemption of the 17 Acre Tract under Section 522(d)(1) is sustained.”

Section 522(d)(1) exempts qualifying property only when the debtor or a dependent uses it as a residence at the bankruptcy filing, so proceeds from a prepetition sale of the residence do not qualify.

In re: Kathy Ellen Richards · filed 2022-08-25(d)(1)

Section 522(d)(1) applies to property that the debtor “uses” as a “residence.” ... For these reasons, we conclude the language in § 522(d)(1) does not permit Debtor to exempt the proceeds from the prepetition sale of her former residence.

Section 522(d)(1) can exempt a debtor’s remainder interest in a family home even when the debtor cannot occupy it at the time of filing, based on the totality of the circumstances.

In Re DeMasi · filed 1998-12-04(d)(1)

However, the determining factor should not be so mechanical as to require a debtor to occupy the home on the filing date or use the address on the bankruptcy filing. ... For the preceding reasons, this Court concludes that this home is DeMasi’s “residence” under the peculiar circumstances of this case.

Section 522(d)(1) permits a residence exemption during a debtor’s physical absence if the debtor intends to return, but claiming domicile elsewhere defeats that intent.

In Re Lusiak · filed 2000-03-09(d)(1)

Thus, by definition, a debtor claiming to be domiciled in Michigan would not have the necessary intent to return to Ohio so as to satisfy the residency requirement of § 522(d)(1).

Section 522(d)(1) permits a debtor to claim a residence exemption if the debtor physically occupied the property for a significant period as a principal home.

In Re Marsico · filed 2002-04-26(d)(1)

After reviewing New Hampshire law governing “residence” and “homestead” the Court concludes under principles of New Hampshire law the Debtor may establish the Property as his residence, for purposes of section 522(d)(1), if he physically occupied the Property for a significant period of time as his principal home.

Section 522(d)(1)'s residence exemption does not cover the debtor's legal claims.

Augustin v. Danvers Bank · filed 2007-03-28(d)(1)

11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1). No part of that or any other statutory provision recognizes an exemption of the kind of legal claims at issue here.

Section 522(d)(1) limits a debtor’s federal residence exemption to the statutory maximum; postpetition appreciation beyond that amount belongs to the bankruptcy estate.

Klein v. Chappell (In Re Chappell) · filed 2007-07-11(d)(1)

Because there was no abandonment and the case has not been closed, the residence remains property of the estate, subject to the unopposed exemption up to the maximum amount permitted by § 522(d). Under well-settled Ninth Circuit law, any postpetition appreciation in value in the residence in excess of the maximum amount permitted by the exemption statute invoked inures to the benefit of the estate. The use of federal exemptions does not work to change that result.

Section 522(d)(1) permits a debtor to exempt a home used as a residence even if it is not the debtor’s principal residence.

In re Demeter · filed 2012-08-31(d)(1)

This is so because “residence” as used in § 522(d)(1), unambiguously, is not limited to a “principal residence,” and a debtor can have more than one “residence.”

Section 522(d)(1) permits a debtor to exempt an interest in property that the debtor’s dependent uses as a residence, even if the debtor lives elsewhere.

In re: Maresca · filed 2019-09-30(d)(1)

Applying the “plain meaning” approach to this case, the Property qualifies for the federal exemption set forth in Section 522.

Section 522(q)(B)(ii) is among the statute’s specified fraud-related grounds, and a generic scheme of fraud is not by itself a valid federal-law objection to a state wildcard exemption.

Dannie L. Bennett, Jr and Maria J. Bennett · filed 2024-01-24(q)(B)(ii)

The fraud provisions in 11 U.S.C. § 522 are fraud in connection with educational funds, 11 U.S.C. 522(c)(4), fraud in connection with a homestead exemption, 11 U.S.C. § 522(o)(4), and fraud in a fiduciary capacity or in connection with registered securities, 11 U.S.C. § 522(q)(B)(ii). Certain fraud may be the basis to deny a discharge or the dischargeability of a debt. See 11 U.S.C. § 523; 11 U.S.C. § 727. But a generic “scheme of fraud” is not a valid objection to Nebraska’s wild card exemption under federal law.

In an exemption proceeding under § 522, a trustee must prove the debtor’s bad faith by a preponderance of the evidence.

Gillman v. Ford (In Re Ford) · filed 2007-05-17

Accordingly, we hold that a trustee seeking to establish a debtor’s bad faith in an exemption proceeding under § 522 must do so by a preponderance of the evidence.

Under § 522(f), the debtor bears the burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence.

Alessandro v. People's Bank (In Re Alessandro) · filed 2000-01-18(f)

Moreover, a debtor bears the burden of persuasion under § 522(f) by a preponderance of the evidence.

Fraud asserted to defeat a state-law exemption claimed under § 522(b) must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.

Gill v. Stern (In re Stern) · filed 2003-02-04(b)

Admittedly, Grogan addressed exceptions to the discharge of debts, as provided in 11 U.S.C. § 523, and this case concerns eligibility for state law exemptions under 11 U.S.C. § 522. ... Grogan’s “mode of analysis” definitively “undercuts the theory” of In re Love that proof of fraud sufficient to negate a state law exemption must be clear and convincing. ... Accordingly, we view the evidence in this case in light of the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof.

Under § 522(l), property claimed as exempt remains property of the bankruptcy estate until the exemption is allowed or the objection period expires; an unopposed claim then makes it exempt by operation of law.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Jimenez · filed 2008-08-06(l)

However, property is not summarily removed from the bankruptcy estate immediately upon the debtor’s claim of exemption. Property that is entitled to be exempted is initially regarded as estate property until it is claimed and distributed as exempt. ... Thus, property that the debtor claims is exempt does not cease being property of the estate until the exemption is allowed or until the time for making objections expires.

Section 522(1) makes property claimed as exempt exempt only if no party in interest objects, and until the objection period expires without objection, the property remains part of the bankruptcy estate.

Taunt v. Patrick (In Re Patrick) · filed 2003-03-26(1)

Property claimed exempt remains property of the estate “until at the earliest, when the time for filing objections to an exemption expires without objection.” ... The time for filing objections to exemptions was extended several times by consent of the parties and did not expire until December 8, 2002, by which time the trustee had filed an objection to the debt- or’s claim of exemptions. Accordingly, the property claimed exempt by the debtor remained property of the estate when the trustee took possession of the gas station on November 9, 2001. The debtor’s argument that he had the right to retake possession of the gas station on November 10, 2001, because the property was exempt is thus without merit.

A claimed exemption remains in the bankruptcy estate until the objection period expires, regardless of whether the debtor chose the federal or state exemption scheme.

Olson v. Parker (In Re Parker) · filed 2008-09-16(b), (l)

Consequently, it really made no difference what exemption scheme had been chosen, for the undivided entireties interest claimed as exempt would not have transferred out of the estate under either circumstance until at least the deadline for objecting to exemptions had passed.

Section 522(f)(2)(A)'s impairment formula includes junior consensual liens among “all other liens” and must be applied as written when determining how much of a judicial lien impairs an exemption.

Kolich v. Antioch Laurel Vet. · filed 2003-05-02(f)(2)(A)

Rather, the issue is whether “all other liens” in subsection 522(f)(2)(A)(ii) includes consensual liens junior to the judicial lien at issue. ... Having carefully considered these conflicting precedents, we find no sufficient basis for concluding that the statutory formula produces, in this situation, a result “demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.” ... With the competing equities both hard to weigh and finely balanced, our task is simply to apply § 522(f)(2)(A) as Congress wrote it.

For calculating whether a judicial lien impairs an exemption, § 522(f)(2)(A) includes all other liens on the property, including junior liens; § 522(f)(2)(B) excludes only liens that have already been avoided.

The Cadle Co. v. Taras · filed 2005-04-29(f)(2)(A), (f)(2)(B)

As an initial matter, we note subsection (B) of 522(f)(2) does not refer to the priority position of liens under state law. Rather, that subsection simply states when liens have already been avoided, they should not be considered in the impairment calculation. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(B). ... We agree with the Eighth Circuit and apply its reasoning here. We conclude the bankruptcy court correctly included Taras’ half of the junior tax lien, $194,584, when it computed the extent to which Taras’ home exemption was impaired under the statutory formula in § 522(f)(2)(A).

Section 522(f) permits avoidance of a judicial lien only to the extent the lien impairs the exemption under the statutory formula.

Garran v. SMS Financial V, LLC (In Re Garran) · filed 2003-07-28(f)(1), (f)(2)(A)

Avoidance of judicial liens under § 522(f) is not an all-or-nothing matter; a debtor is permitted to avoid only that portion of the judicial lien that infringes upon the exemption to which he is entitled.

Section 522(f)(2)(A)(ii) requires federal tax liens, like mortgages, to be included among the other liens when determining whether a judicial lien impairs an exemption.

In Re Brody · filed 2003-08-05(f)(2)(A)(ii)

The plain language of Section 522(f) reinforces this conclusion. In determining whether an exemption is impaired, federal tax hens, like mortgages, must be considered.

Section 522(f)(2)(A) requires impairment to be calculated by adding liens and claimed exemptions and comparing the sum with the property's value; an Ohio dower interest is neither a lien nor an exemption for that calculation.

In Re Rudicil · filed 2006-06-07(f)(2)(A)

Section 522(f)(2)(A) clearly states that only two things can be aggregated: liens and claimed exemptions. The sum of the liens and exempt amounts is then compared to the value of the debtor’s interest in the property to determine the extent of impairment. Mrs. Rudicil’s dower interest is clearly not the same as her claimed exemption which Debtors acknowledge to be $5,000.00. Nor is the dower interest a lien.

Section 522(f)(2)(A) excludes a fraudulent mortgage from the exemption impairment calculation even if the mortgage has not yet been avoided.

In Re Jones · filed 2003-10-14(f)(2)(A)

This Court reads the emphasized language in step two to mean that avoidable liens do not first need to be avoided before being excluded from the § 522(f)(2)(A) impairment calculation.

Section 522(b) does not permit a debtor to claim a new exemption for scheduled property after the bankruptcy case has closed, so the debtor cannot use § 522(f)(1) to avoid a lien based on that new exemption.

In Re Oster · filed 2003-05-06(b)

Based on the plain language of section 522(b), the court concludes that a debtor’s right to claim an exemption of scheduled property terminates upon closure of the bankruptcy case. No other interpretation is compatible with the rest of the Bankruptcy Code.

Sections 522(d)(5) and (d)(6) allow a debtor to exempt only a dollar-limited interest in property, rather than the property itself, when the claimed interest's value is within the statutory cap.

Schwab v. Reilly · filed 2010-06-17(d)(5), (d)(6)

As noted above, §§522(d)(5) and (6) define the “property claimed as exempt” as an “interest” in Reilly’s business equipment, not as the equipment per se. Sections 522(d)(5) and (6) further and plainly state that claims to exempt such interests are statutorily permissible, and thus unobjectionable, if the value of the claimed interest is below a particular dollar amount.

Section 522(d)(1) permits a debtor to exempt only the specified dollar amount of qualifying property, so an unobjected-to exemption does not exempt the entire property or bar a timely avoidance action.

Lim v. Greenfield · filed 2003-06-06(d)(1)

In this case, the debtor did not claim an exemption for the entire property under § 522(b)(2)(B) (applicable to entire-ties property). Instead, he claimed an exemption under § 522(d)(1), which is limited to a dollar value of $16,150. Thus, even accepting defendants’ argument, the bankruptcy court would have retained jurisdiction over the property because the debtor did not exempt the entire property. ... Because the trustee did not object within the 30-day period, Mark Greenfield will receive the $16,150 exemption whether or not the transfer of the property is voided. ... The trustee’s decision not to object to the claimed exemption did not deprive the bankruptcy court of its jurisdiction to decide the avoidance proceeding that was timely commenced by the trustee under § 548.

Section 522(d) permits a debtor to exempt specified property from the bankruptcy estate; when the exemption is properly claimed and unobjected to, the property is withdrawn from the estate and no longer available to the trustee for distribution.

Marcia E Waddell · filed 2025-03-28(d)

The Bankruptcy Code permits individuals to claim certain property as exempt from the bankruptcy estate. ... “When a debtor properly exempts a property interest under § 522, the exemption withdraws that property interest from the estate and, thus, from the reach of the trustee for distribution to creditors. Such an exempted property interest revests with the debtor and no longer belongs to the estate.” ... The chapter 7 trustee and creditors may object the claimed exemptions, but if the there are no objections or the objections are overruled, the exempt property ceases to be property of the estate. ... Here, the Debtor claimed the Judgment as exempt and there were no objections. As such, the Judgment is no longer property of the Estate.

Section 522(f) places the burden of contesting a lien on the debtor, and a lienholder's time to litigate runs from the debtor's lien-avoidance motion rather than from the meeting of unsecured creditors.

Schoonover, Fred v. Karr, Edward · filed 2003-06-09(f)

Motions under §522(f) to avoid liens fall under Rule 4003(d), not Rule 4003(b)—and Rule 4003(d) does not set a 30-day schedule but instead provides that “[a] proceeding by the debtor to avoid a lien or other transfer of property exempt under §522(f) of the Code shall be by motion in accordance with Rule 9014.” In turn, Rule 9014 leaves deadline-setting to the bankruptcy judge. The upshot is that lienholders have more time than general unsecured creditors, a dispensation essential if lienholders are to enjoy any chance to watch the proceedings from afar and enforce their liens later. Just as §522(l) and Rule 4003(b) put the onus of timely objection on general unsecured creditors, so §522(f) and Rules 4003(d) and 9014 put the onus of contesting a lien on debtors; the clock for lienholders runs from the motion under §522(f) and not from the meeting of unsecured creditors. To the extent that In re Chinosorn, 248 B.R. 324, 327-28 (N.D. Ill. 2000), reaches a different conclusion, it is disapproved. (As far as we can tell, this is the first appellate consideration of the question whether Rule 4003(b) and Taylor affect the time available to lienholders.) Karr’s objection was timely.

Section 522(f) motions to avoid liens are governed by Rule 4003(d), not the 30-day objection period for general unsecured creditors; the lienholder's contest period runs from the motion.

In the Matter Of: Fred E. Schoonover, Debtor-Appellant · filed 2003-06-09(f)

Once they receive notice, lien-holders litigate on the schedule appropriate to a proceeding under § 522(f), not the schedule for general creditors.

Section 522(f) lien-avoidance motions are governed by Bankruptcy Rule 4003(d), and the bankruptcy court may determine the validity of the lien in that proceeding without requiring an adversary proceeding.

In Re Egan · filed 2012-04-27(f)

A bankruptcy court can determine the validity, priority, or extent of a lien or other interest in property through an adversary proceeding or a proceeding under Rule 4003(d). ... Proceedings to avoid a lien under § 522(f) are governed by Rule 4003(d). ... Since the Motion was presented to the Court in a proceeding under Rule 4003(d), the Court has authority to determine the validity of the liens at issue outside of an adversary proceeding.

Section 522 does not permit a debtor to avoid a consensual lien on collateral.

Laurion v. CorePlus Federal Credit Union · filed 2025-03-14

5. The Court rejects the Debtor’s request for a release of the lien on the Truck for reasons stated in this case (i.e., he cannot avoid the consensual lien under 11 U.S.C. § 522 and the violation here does not support such an extraordinary remedy for a nominal harm).

Section 522(e) makes an exemption waiver unenforceable against a creditor holding an unsecured claim as of the bankruptcy petition date for property the debtor may exempt under § 522(b).

In Re Hebert · filed 2003-09-19(e)

The court concludes that § 522(e) is applicable to creditors who hold an unsecured claim against the debtor as of the date of the bankruptcy petition. As discussed above, the judgment lien of Midwest Fuels did not attach to Hebert’s homestead. It had unsecured claim against him of the date of his filing. Therefore, § 522(e) renders the waiver unenforceable as a matter of federal law.

Section 522(d)(11)(D) allows a debtor with separate rights to payments for bodily injuries from separate incidents to claim a separate exemption for each payment right.

In Re Comeaux · filed 2003-12-29(d)(11)(D)

In light of the statutory ambiguity, the general recognition that exemptions should be construed liberally in a debtor’s favor, and the likelihood that the unfortunate victim of multiple incidents resulting in separate inflictions of personal bodily injury will need the small degree of financial protection which § 522(d)(11)(D) affords, the Court concludes that a debtor, who owns multiple rights to receive a payment on account of personal bodily injury arising from separate and distinct incidents, is entitled to claim a § 522(d)(11)(D) exemption for each such payment right. Accordingly, the Trustee’s objection to the Comeauxs’ multiple claims of exemption under § 522(d)(11)(D) is overruled.

Section 522(l) automatically allows listed exemptions absent objection, but a late filing postpones that automatic allowance and does not forfeit substantive exemption entitlement.

In Re Montanaro · filed 2004-02-25(l)

In short, the consequence of a late-filed claim of exemptions is that the protection of the limitations period granted by Rule 4003(b) is forfeited. Thus, the time to object remains open so that § 522(l) automatic allowance does not occur until the trustee abandons the property. Nevertheless, if the debtor is entitled to the exemptions as a matter of substantive law, then the debtor ultimately receives the exemptions.

Section 522(b) limits exemptions to property of the bankruptcy estate, and § 522(1) requires the debtor to list the property claimed exempt.

In Re Marrama · filed 2004-04-01(b), (1)

An exemption may be claimed only in property of the estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(b). By way of example, the statute allows a debtor to claim an exemption in “[t]he debtor’s aggregate interest, not to exceed $17,425 in value, in real or personal property that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor uses as a residence ...” 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1). ... It is the Debtor’s obligation to specify all property that he claims to be exempt in his schedules. 11 U.S.C. § 522(1) (“[t]he debtor shall file a list of property that the debtor claims as exempt ... ”), Bankruptcy Rules 1007 and 4003(a).

Section 522(f) allows an Ohio debtor to avoid a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in household goods that impairs an exemption available under Ohio law, despite a conflicting state lien-preservation provision.

Phillips v. Household Finance Corp. (In re Phillips) · filed 1981-08-28(f)

Therefore, it is the conclusion of this Court that debtors, domiciled in Ohio, may avoid nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interests in their household goods pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 522(f), the Federal bankruptcy law provision permitting lien avoidance, notwithstanding Ohio Rev.Code Section 2329.661(C), the State of Ohio exemption law provision disallowing any exemption that would invalidate an existing security interest.

Section 522(f)(2)(A) permits a debtor to avoid a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in exempt household goods, including when the interest attached before enactment.

In the Matter of Willis R. Gifford and Jacqueline M. Gifford, Bankrupts-Appellees, Appeal of Thorp Finance… · filed 1982-08-18(f)(2)(A)

Following a rehearing of the appeal en banc, we now hold that Section 522(f) applies to Thorp's security interest and that it is not unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment.

Section 522(f)(2)(A) permits avoidance of a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in household furnishings, but not a valid purchase-money security interest.

Keller v. Household Finance Corp. Retail Services (In Re Keller) · filed 1983-02-16(f)(2)(A)

To fall within the scope of § 522(f), the lien must be either a judicial lien or a nonpossessory, nonpur-chase-money security interest. ... Based on the foregoing, this Court is satisfied that the assignment of the installment contract from Unclaimed Freight to Household Finance did not destroy the purchase money character of the original security interest and it remained a purchase money security interest in spite of the assignment. ... Therefore, the Debtors are not entitled to avoid Defendant’s lien under § 522(f).

Section 522(f)(2) permits avoidance of a lien on exempt property only to the extent the lien is nonpurchase-money, so a purchase-money security interest survives to the extent it secures the unpaid price of the original item.

Pristas v. Landaus of Plymouth, Inc. · filed 1984-09-07(f)(2)

To apply the “dual-status” doctrine, it is necessary to determine the extent to which a particular item continues to secure its own price and the extent to which payment of other purchases is affected. If that allocation can be made, the purchase-money security interest survives and will not be avoided. The creditor’s interest will be nullified under section 522(f)(2) only to the extent that it is nonpurchase-money security.

Section 522(f)(2)(A) lets a debtor avoid a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in household goods to the extent it impairs an exemption.

Farris v. Barclays American Financial, Inc. (In Re Farris) · filed 1981-01-14(f)(2)(A)

The court concludes that under § 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code and under the Tennessee statute, the debtors can avoid Barclays’ security interest so that there will be equity up to the amount of the exemption that would be allowed in the absence of the security interest.

Section 522(f) lets a debtor avoid a non-purchase money security interest on exempt property to the extent the property could have been exempted without the lien.

Kursh v. Dial Finance Co. (In Re Kursh) · filed 1981-03-12(f)

It is my conclusion as indicated by the legislative history and the cases above cited that § 522(f) permits the debtor to avoid a non-purchase money security interest “to the extent that the property could have been exempted in the absence of the lien.” H.R.Rep.No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 362 (1977) and S.Rep.No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 76 (1978), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, p. 5787 (under subsection (e)).

Section 522(f)(2)(A) allows a debtor to avoid a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in specified household goods and furnishings.

Bond's Jewelers, Inc. v. Linklater (In Re Linklater) · filed 1985-04-17(f)(2)(A)

The purchase money security interest in the jewelry is not avoidable under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(A).