11 U.S.C. § 522

Section 522(c) leaves exempt property liable for a properly filed tax lien.

Matter of Driscoll · filed 1986-01-31(c)

Further, section 522(b) and (g)(1) must be read in conjunction with section 522(c) which provides in relevant part: ... 11 U.S.C. § 522(c). Thus it is clear that Congress did not intend to grant chapter 13 debtors the trustee’s power to avoid tax liens.

Section 522(c) generally protects exempt property from creditors but preserves liens that have not been avoided.

Palatine National Bank v. Harrigan (In Re Harrigan) · filed 1987-05-01(c)(1), (c)(2)(A)

The general rule under 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(1) is that debtors’ exempt property is not available to creditors. However, an exception is made as to property secured by a lien that is not “avoided” under § 522(c)(2)(A).

Section 522(c)(2)(B) keeps exempt property liable for a properly noticed tax lien and prevents chapter 13 debtors from using section 545(2) to circumvent that protection.

In Re Mattis · filed 1988-11-28(c)(2)(B)

However, 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(2)(B) bestows added protection upon perfected tax liens and provides that exempt property remains liable for a tax lien, notice of which has been properly filed. We agree with those courts which have concluded that a debtor’s limited standing to avoid statutory liens under 11 U.S.C. § 545 must be reconciled with the protection afforded perfected tax liens under 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(2)(B). Like those courts, we hold that Congress did not intend to allow chapter 13 debtors to circumvent the effects of § 522(c)(2)(B) by invoking the trustee’s avoiding power under § 545(2).

Section 522(c)(2)(B) prevents a debtor from using the exemption and avoidance powers in subsections (g) and (h) to avoid a properly filed tax lien on exempt property.

Royal v. First Interstate Bank of Commerce (In Re Straight) · filed 1997-04-14(c)(2)(B)

This specific provision overrides the general exemption and avoidance powers granted in section 522(g) and (h), and precludes Straight from avoiding the Tax Lien in this case.

Section 522(c)(2)(A) keeps exempt property liable for debt secured by an unavoided lien, so a Chapter 13 plan cannot compel lien release before plan completion and discharge.

In Re Day · filed 2003-04-16(c)(2)(A)

Both section 349(b) and section 522(c) imply that the stripping of the lien must await plan completion.

Section 522(c)(2)(B) leaves exempt property subject to a properly filed tax lien even when the underlying tax debt has been discharged.

Miles v. Comm'r · filed 2007-07-31(c)(2)(B)

We have specifically held that a discharge from personal liability in a chapter 7 bankruptcy case does not extinguish a prepetition Federal tax lien. Iannone v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 287 (2004); see also 11 U.S.C. sec. 522(c)(2)(B) (providing that exempt property remains subject to properly filed tax liens even though the underlying tax claim may have been discharged); Connor v. United States, 27 F.3d 365, 366 ... (9th Cir. 1994) (“A preexisting lien on property, however, remains enforceable against that property even after an individual’s personal liability has been discharged.”).

Section 522(c)(2)(B) leaves exempt property subject to a tax lien for which notice was properly filed.

United States v. Berk · filed 2007-08-17(c)(2)(B)

In addition, 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(2)(B) directs that while property can be exempt from liability for any debt ... of the debtor before the commencement of a bankruptcy case, there is an exception for a debt secured by a. lien, specifically a tax lien filed with proper notice.

Section 522(c)(2)(B) leaves exempt property subject to preexisting federal tax liens despite a debtor’s personal discharge in bankruptcy.

Litwak v. Comm'r · filed 2009-12-21(c)(2)(B)

Any existing Federal tax liens remain in effect and attach to assets owned before the date of filing the bankruptcy petition. Iannone v. Commissioner, supra at 293 (citing 11 U.S.C. section 522(c)(2)(B) (2000) and Connor v. United States, 27 F.3d 365, 366 (9th Cir. 1994) (“A preexisting lien on ... property, however, remains enforceable against that property even after an individual’s personal liability has been discharged.”)). ... Additionally, respondent would be able to collect $8,400 from petitioner in rem using assets exempt from petitioner’s estate because the Federal tax liens for 2000, 2001, 2002, 2004, and 2005 precede petitioner’s hypothetical October 2008 bankruptcy filing and those liens attached to the exempt assets.

Section 522(c)(2)(B) does not protect Social Security benefits excluded from the bankruptcy estate from liability for an unfiled federal tax lien.

Michael A. Rios and Janelle R. Rios · filed 2023-03-03(c)(2)(B)

Because the Debtors’ Social Security benefits never came into the bankruptcy estate, they were not “exempted” under 11 U.S.C. § 522. Nothing in § 522(c) prevents the Debtors’ Social Security benefits from remaining liable for a debt secured by the tax lien.

Under § 522(g), a judicial lien arising by operation of law from a consent judgment is an involuntary transfer, allowing the debtor to avoid the lien.

Berman v. Forti · filed 1999-02-03(g)

The Fortis consented to the entry of judgment against them. It was not this agreement or consent, however, that on its own effected a transfer of property. Rather, the property interest was transferred only later, when the judgment had been entered, indexed, and recorded and the lien arose. The Fortis did not consent to these subsequent happenings and the transfer was not voluntary.

Once property is claimed exempt under § 522 and no timely objection is filed, it is no longer part of the bankruptcy estate and may be used by the debtor; § 522(c) does not require the trustee to safeguard it until completion of a Chapter 13 plan.

Gamble v. Brown (In Re Gamble) · filed 1999-02-23(c) and (l)

The plain language of the bankruptcy code and precedent from this court are clear that exempt property is no longer part of the bankruptcy estate, and is available for the debtor's use. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(c) and (l); In re Hall, 752 F.2d at 584.

Once property is claimed exempt and no timely objection is filed, it is no longer part of the bankruptcy estate and is available for the debtor’s use; § 522(c) does not require safeguarding it until a Chapter 13 plan ends.

Gamble v. Brown (In Re Gamble) · filed 1999-02-23§ 522(c), § 522(l)

The plain language of the bankruptcy code concerning exempt property states that “property claimed as exempt on such list is exempt.” 11 U.S.C. 522(l). To follow the bankruptcy court’s holding would cause us to disregard this time period for objecting, and in effect, extend the period for objecting to these exemptions until a debtor has completed the bankruptcy plan.

Section 522(h) permits a debtor to avoid a qualifying transfer of exempt property when the trustee does not attempt to avoid it, limiting recovery to the amount that could have been exempted.

William v. United States, Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service (In Re Williams) · filed 1992-10-29(h)

A debtor has standing to avoid preferential transfers of its property claimed exempt. 11 U.S.C. § 522(h). ... However, because Williams claimed $1,400.00 of the funds as exempt, 11 U.S.C. § 522(h) limits Williams recovery to $1,400.00.

Under § 522(l), property claimed as exempt becomes exempt when the objection period expires without an objection; an exempt asset then revests in the debtor.

Mwangi v. Wells Fargo Bank · filed 2014-08-26(l)

Because the property is only “claimed as exempt” during this 30-day objection period, it may be inferred that the property is not deemed exempt, and therefore the property does not revest in the debtor, until the end of the objection period.

Under § 522(f)(1)(B)(ii), a debtor qualifies as a farmer whose farm implements or tools may be protected from a lien only if the debtor is legitimately engaged in farming and has a credible and sincere intent to continue farming.

Johnson v. Border State Bank · filed 1999-02-24(f)(1)(B)(ii)

However, regardless of the amount of income derived from farming and regardless of how many other trades the debtor is engaged in, in order to be considered a farmer for § 522(f)(1)(B)(ii) purposes, the debtor must be legitimately engaged in the enterprise of farming and express a credible and sincere intent to continue farming into the future.

Section 522(d)(3) does not limit exempt household goods to items absolutely essential to a debtor’s fresh start; exempt goods may be convenient or useful items with a functional nexus to daily household life.

In Schreiber · filed 1999-03-16§ 522(d)(3)

But the Legislative history of Me. Rev.Stat.Ann. tit. 14, § 4422(3) and of 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(3) (upon which the Maine statute is based) do not reveal such an intention.

Section 522(d)(3) does not categorically exclude firearms, fishing rods, or fishing reels from the household goods exemption.

Local Union No. 38, Sheet Metal Workers' International Assoc. v. Andershonis (In Re Andershonis) · filed 2004-07-29(d)(3)

However, the Court refuses to embrace a per se rule that these items are not “household goods” under the section.

Section 522(f)(1) determines a debtor’s entitlement to an exemption as of the bankruptcy petition date.

In Re States · filed 1999-03-26(f)(1)

The proper time for determining whether a debtor is entitled to an exemption under § 522(f) is the time of the filing of the bankruptcy petition.

Under 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B) and § 522(g)(1), a debtor cannot exempt entireties property later purchased with deposited individual funds because that purchase is a voluntary transfer of the debtor's property.

Reitmeyer v. Meinen (In Re Meinen) · filed 1999-03-26§ 522(b)(2)(B); § 522(g)(1)

To the extent that plaintiff succeeds on her Count 7 because defendants have used the deposits in question to subsequently purchase other assets which they presently hold as en-tireties property, the debtor may not exempt such subsequently-acquired entireties property under 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B) and (g) because the debtor, by purchasing such subsequently-acquired entireties property, has voluntarily converted his individual funds into said entireties property, which voluntary conversion is appropriately viewed as a voluntary transfer by the debtor of his own personal property.

Under § 522(l), a trustee’s failure to object within the Rule 4003(b) period bars a challenge to the validity of a properly claimed exemption but does not bar a later challenge to the property’s valuation, which § 522(a)(2) measures at fair market value as of the petition date.

In Re Shelby · filed 1999-03-30§ 522(l); § 522(a)(2)

However, the Trustee is not bound by the Shelbys’ valuations of the property claimed as exempt and, even though the 30-day time period of Rule 4003(b) has run, he may object to the valuation placed by the Shelbys on the original items of household goods and furnishings claimed as exempt when they filed their bankruptcy petition in addition to the valuation placed by the Shelbys on the late-disclosed items claimed by them as exempt in their amended Schedule C.

Under § 522(d)(1), a debtor cannot exempt a residence while simultaneously denying any interest in it.

In Re Montanez · filed 1999-04-15(d)(1)

Section 522(d)(1), on which debtor relies for this exemption, allows a debtor to exempt the debtor’s aggregate interest, up to the defined limit, in real property used as a residence. As a matter of plain statutory meaning and common sense, a debtor cannot exempt her interest in property and, simultaneously, deny any interest in that property.

Under § 522(h), a debtor may use the trustee’s avoidance power only for property the debtor could exempt under § 522(g)(1), so the debtor cannot avoid a voluntary transfer such as a consensual grant of a security interest.

GAF Linden Employees Federal Credit Union v. Robertson (In Re Robertson) · filed 1999-04-28§ 522(h); § 522(g)(1)

Although 11 U.S.C. § 522(h) provides that the debtor may exercise the trustee’s power to avoid a transfer of property that the debtor could exempt under 11 U.S.C. § 522(g)(1), the debtor may not avoid a voluntary transfer, including the consensual grant of a security interest (perfected or unperfected). 11 U.S.C. § 522(g)(1).

Section 522(f)(1)(B) does not permit avoidance of a nonpossessory, non-purchase-money lien on a mobile home because a mobile home is not a household good or furnishing.

American General Finance, Inc. v. Hoss (In Re Hoss) · filed 1999-04-28§ 522(f)(1)(B)

However, a mobile home is in no manner a household good or furnishing, as required under that subsection.

Under 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B), a debtor's interest in property formerly held as a tenancy by the entirety is not exempt when the spouses' acts sever that tenancy and convert the property to a tenancy in common before bankruptcy.

In Re Stanke · filed 1999-05-0411 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B)

The result is that the Properties, now held in the Jerome L. Stanke trust, are held as tenants in common by Jerome and Carol and therefore Jerome’s interest is not exempt under § 522(b)(2)(B).

Under § 522(b)(2)(A), an involuntary debtor may claim as exempt homestead improvements commenced during the gap period between filing of the involuntary petition and entry of the order for relief.

In Re Hodes · filed 1999-06-16(b)(2)(A)

This Court agrees that where involuntary debtors exercise their rights under § 303(f) during the gap period and commence improvements to their homestead, they are entitled to claim as exempt the improvements commenced during the gap period.

Section 522(b)(2)(A) fixes the state or local exemption law as of the petition date, but it does not fix the property encompassed by that exemption as of that date in an involuntary case.

In Re Gaudreault · filed 2004-09-02(b)(2)(A)

Based upon these complementary statutes and the persuasive reasoning set forth in In re Wilson ... I agree with the Debtor that the filing of the Declaration of Homestead during the gap period did not run afoul of 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A). As such, I will overrule the objection on this ground.

Section 522(d)(11)(D) covers a personal bodily injury even when the injury is not permanent.

In Re Lawton · filed 2005-03-03(d)(11)(D)

Accordingly, this Court concludes that a “personal bodily injury” embraced by Section 522(d)(ll)(D) need not be permanent to be exemptible.

Section 522(b)(2)(A) fixes the debtor’s homestead exemption based on the law applicable on the date the original bankruptcy petition was filed, including after conversion from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7.

In Re Alexander · filed 1999-06-30§ 522(b)(2)(A)

The right to claim a homestead exemption is determined under 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) and 348(a); and, is based on the debtor’s homestead at the time the original bankruptcy petition was filed.

Section 522(d)(10)(E) does not exempt an annuity or similar plan based on age or length of service unless it qualifies under the specified Internal Revenue Code provisions; a privately purchased annuity that does not so qualify is not exempt under the federal statute.

In Re McCabe · filed 1986-03-14(d)(10)(E)

Thus, as can be seen, Congress excluded from the Federal exemptions any annuities, pensions, profitsharing or other similar plans or contracts based on age or length of service which did not meet the definitions of a qualified pension plan under the Internal Revenue Code. Therefore, a privately purchased annuity, pension plan, or other similar contract, that did not qualify as an individual retirement account or retirement bond would not have qualified as an exemption under the Federal statute.

Section 522(g)(1) prevents a debtor from exempting property recovered by the trustee under § 551 when the transfer was voluntary.

Vieira v. Pearce (In Re Pearce) · filed 1999-07-16(g)(1)

The debtor is prohibited from exempting property recovered by the trustee under § 551 if such transfer was voluntary.

Under § 522(f)(1)(A), a judicial lien that impairs a properly claimed homestead exemption is avoidable, but if the affected creditor objects, the court should delay recording the avoidance order until discharge.

In Re Prince · filed 1999-08-02§ 522(f)(1)(A)

This Court believes that when an affected creditor objects, the avoidance of a lien which impairs a properly claimed exemption should be delayed until the entry of an order of discharge.

Under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1), a debtor may exempt post-petition sale proceeds when the property was the debtor’s homestead or residence on the bankruptcy petition date, including when court-ordered removal leaves only constructive occupancy.

Makoroff v. Buick (In Re Buick) · filed 1999-08-13§ 522(d)(1)

Because the debtor utilized the Timber-creek property as his homestead or residence on May 13, 1999, the Court must UPHOLD the debtor’s exemption of the aforesaid proceeds under § 522(d)(1) and OVERRULE the Trustee’s objection thereto.

An IRA qualifies as a “similar plan or contract” and is exempt under § 522(d)(10)(E).

Hermes v. Ribitwer (In Re Hermes) · filed 1999-09-15(d)(10)(E)

Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, this Court concludes that the IRA is exempt under § 522(d)(10)(E).

An IRA qualifies as a similar plan or contract and is exempt under § 522(d)(10)(E).

In Re: Robert D. McKown Dianna M. McKown Debtors. Gary R. Farrar v. Robert D. McKown Dianna M. McKown · filed 2000-02-14§ 522(d)(10)(E)

Though not identical to the listed kinds of plans (which would make the statutory inclusion of “similar” plans superfluous), an IRA is similar enough to be treated as a “similar plan or contract.” We thus hold, like our sister circuits, that an IRA qualifies for exemption under statutory language tracking 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E), including the California language.

Section 522(f) does not impose a statute of limitations on motions to avoid liens; instead, equitable laches governs whether delay bars reopening for lien avoidance.

Harvey v. Flener (In Re Harvey) · filed 1999-09-21§ 522(f)

Congress did not impose a statute of limitations, either on reopening the case in general or on motions to avoid liens in particular; thus, we must rely on laches — an equitable concept — to address such matters.

Section 522(f) lets a debtor avoid a lien that impairs an exemption, and it sets no deadline for filing the complaint.

Bennett v. Commercial Credit Plan (In Re Bennett) · filed 1981-08-13(f)

Section 522(f) provides that as to certain exempt property, “The debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled.” There is no time limit as to when a complaint must be filed.

Section 522(f)(1)(A) permits avoidance only of a judicial lien, so a lien created by agreement and merely enforced in court is not avoidable.

Thompson v. Unruh (In Re Thompson) · filed 1999-11-15(f)(1)(A)

Section 522(f)(1)(A) allows the debtor to avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent it impairs an exemption if the lien is a judicial lien. ... It was not the action in state court that created the lien. ... Even though the Ap-pellees brought an action in state court which ultimately settled the amount of the hen, it is not a “judicial hen.”

Section 522(f)(1) does not permit avoidance of a consensual security interest, even when a state court has entered a foreclosure judgment.

Nichols v. BJ Fox Enterprises, Inc. (In Re Nichols) · filed 2001-08-24(f)(1)

The latter consensual lien is very different from a “judicial lien,” and it is not subject to avoidance under § 522(f)(1)(A).

Section 522(f)(1)(A) does not permit avoidance of a statutory lien merely because the lien was later enforced through a state-court judgment.

Reece v. Parkview Villas of Scottsdale Owners' Ass'n (In Re Reece) · filed 2001-08-24(f)(1)(A)

The Association’s hen is a statutory hen as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(53). Therefore, the statutory hen is not subject to avoidance as impairing the Debtor’s homestead exemption, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1)(A).

Section 522(f) does not permit avoidance of a statutory workers compensation lien.

Rieman v. Allied Insurance (In re Rieman) · filed 2003-01-23(f)

the Worker’s Compensation lien is a statutory lien and is, therefore, not ... avoidable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f).

Section 522(f)(1)(A) permits avoidance of a lien impairing an exemption only when the lien is a qualifying judicial lien; a mechanic’s lien remains a statutory lien even after foreclosure and entry of judgment.

In re Cunningham · filed 2012-08-14(f)(1)(A)

The court determines that any action by Cunningham to seek to affect the hen of Timber Ridge cannot be pursued pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) because Timber Ridge’s assertion of a mechanic’s lien, including the judgment obtained in state court with respect to that lien, does not constitute a “judicial lien” as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(36), and is therefore not within the scope of liens which may be avoided pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1)(A).

Section 522(b) permits a state to define and limit its own bankruptcy exemptions; Louisiana's homestead limitations therefore do not conflict with the federal exemption scheme.

Mazoue v. Traina (In re Mazoue) · filed 1999-10-22§ 522(b)

this Court finds that Louisiana's limitations of its own homestead exemption are proper under the State's prerogative, granted by Congress, to establish its own property exemption laws.

Section 522(b) permits states to opt out of the federal exemption list and use state-created exemptions in bankruptcy.

In Re Buzza · filed 2002-12-12(b)

By allowing states to “opt-out” of the list of federal exemptions in favor of those created under state law, Congress clearly contemplated the important role state exemption statutes would play in bankruptcy.

Section 522(b)(2)(A) uses the debtor’s domicile and the bankruptcy filing date to identify the applicable state exemption law.

In Re Stone · filed 2005-09-06(b)(2)(A)

Thus, if a bankruptcy petition is filed in a venue other than the debtor’s domicile, exemptions are determined based on the debtor’s domicile rather than on the place where the case is filed.

Section 522(b)(3)(A) fixes the validity of a claimed exemption by the debtor’s rights as of the bankruptcy petition date.

In Re Wiley · filed 2012-04-03(b)(3)(A)

The validity of a claimed exemption is determined as of the petition date. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A); ... Moreover, for bankruptcy purposes, a debtor’s right to an exemption must be measured as of the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition.

Section 522 fixes a properly claimed state-law homestead exemption at the petition date and preserves it against later changes, unless an enumerated exception applies.

Hull v. Rockwell · filed 2020-07-30(b)(3)(A), (c)

Therefore, we must conclude that the complete snapshot rule applies to homestead exemptions taken pursuant to § 522, where none of the statute's enumerated exceptions applies. None of these explicit exceptions applies to Rockwell's case, nor does Hull contend that one does, so Rockwell's homestead exemption taken on the day he filed for bankruptcy must be viewed as unchanging, even in the face of his later sale of the property.

Section 522(b)(3)(A) fixes a debtor’s bankruptcy exemptions by the state-law exemptions in effect when the petition is filed.

In re: Randolph Neil Chapman and Sheryl E. Chapman, Debtors. · filed 2026-03-11(b)(3)(A)

Section 522 asks only what is exempt under state law at the time of the petition, not what state legislators intended or understood would happen in federal court. 944 F.3d at 683–84.

Section 522(f) does not apply when state law prevents a judicial lien from attaching to exempt property, because the exemption is not impaired.

Albuquerque Chemical v. Arneson Products · filed 1999-11-30(f)

Because Albuquerque Chemical’s lien has not attached (and can never attach) to the Browns’ homestead exemption, the exemption is not impaired by the lien and, as in Sanders and Shafner, “§ 522(f) is superfluous and without application.”

Section 522(f) permits Chapter 13 debtors to avoid listed creditors’ judicial liens after completing plan payments and receiving a discharge when the creditors are not prejudiced.

In re Pressley · filed 1999-12-08(f)

The question before the Court is whether Chapter 13 debtors may avoid judicial liens held by listed creditors after the Debtors’ have completed their plan payments and received a discharge. ... Finding no evidence of prejudice to the creditors, the Court shall grant the requested rehef. Accordingly, it is hereby ... ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Debtors’ Motion to Reopen Case and to Avoid Liens Pursuant to Section 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code is GRANTED.

Section 522(d)(11)(D) exempts the statutory maximum, or a lesser amount, of a personal-bodily-injury payment only to the extent that amount can be traced into the proceeds.

In Re Rauser · filed 2004-07-28(d)(11)(D)

However, the exempt portion of the undiscounted Personal Injury Claim nevertheless must be reduced to the statutory maximum (i.e., $17,425.00). That is because the amount “trace[d]” (and thus exempted) under Section 522(d)(ll)(D) is not capped by the statutory maximum but, rather, it is the statutory maximum (or some lesser amount) which itself must be “trace[d]” under the statute.

Section 522(d)(11)(E) permits exemption of the settlement proceeds reasonably necessary to support debtors with chronic medical conditions and related financial problems.

In Re Whitson · filed 2005-01-19(d)(11)(E)

Considering all these circumstances, particularly the Debtors’ chronic medical conditions and the associated financial problems, the Court finds that the balance of the settlement funds are reasonably necessary for the support of the Debtors. Therefore, the Trustee’s objection is overruled and the entire balance of the settlement proceeds is determined to be exempt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(ll)(E).

A debtor may seek to avoid a lien under § 522(f) independently of whether the creditor filed a proof of claim.

In Re Weaver · filed 2000-01-31(f)

In fact to the contrary, an action to avoid a hen under § 522(f) stands completely independent and separate from any proof of claim filed by a creditor given the fact that a henholder is not required to file a proof of claim in order to preserve his hen in bankruptcy, while a debtor can bring an action under § 522(f) without the creditor having first filed a proof of claim.

Section 522(f) does not let a debtor avoid a mortgage-foreclosure lien when the lien arises from the purchase-price mortgage and no applicable exemption is impaired.

In Re Liberman · filed 2000-01-31(f)(1)(A)

Therefore, the Court finds that Liberman is not entitled to claim an impairment of his exemption under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f), since no such exemption exists. In any event, the Court further notes that Section 522(f), by its own terms, “shall not apply with respect to a judgment arising out of a mortgage foreclosure.”

Section 522(d)(11)(D) limits the exemption to payments on account of personal bodily injury and excludes non-bodily personal injuries such as mental anguish.

Longhenry v. Wyatt (In Re Longhenry) · filed 2000-02-25(d)(11)(D)

It is noteworthy that Congress expressly limited the exemption to bodily injuries incurred and excluded amounts for mental anguish.

Section 522(f)(1) permits a debtor to avoid a judicial lien on an interest in property when the debtor owned the property at the bankruptcy petition date, even if the property was later conveyed.

Carroll v. Memorial Medical Center, Inc. (In Re Carroll) · filed 2001-02-02(f)(1)

I conclude that the proper time to determine whether Debtor has an interest in the property is the time of the filing of the bankruptcy case.

Section 522(d)(5) permits only the debtor or a dependent on the debtor’s behalf to exempt the debtor’s property interest, so a spouse with no interest in the inheritance cannot claim it under her separate exemptions.

Matter of Freund · filed 1983-08-30(d)(5)

Joint petitioners have separate bankruptcy estates. 11 U.S.C. § 302(b). The separate bankruptcy estate of a joint petitioner consists only of property in which that debtor has a legal or equitable interest. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(b), each joint petitioner may exempt certain property from their individual bankruptcy estates. An exemption is personal in nature and can only be asserted by or on behalf of the debtor. Section 522(b) and (7). Because Jacqueline has no interest in the estate of Evelyn Freund, all of Thomas’s bequest is property of Thomas’s bankruptcy estate. Only Thomas or a dependent on his behalf may claim his interest in his mother’s estate to be exempt under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5). Because Jacqueline had no interest in the inheritance prior to bankruptcy, her bankruptcy estate has no claim to the inheritance and no exemption of the inheritance can be claimed by her or on her behalf.

Section 522(f)(1) permits avoidance of a judicial lien that impairs an exemption, but the debtor must still have the affected property interest when avoidance is sought.

Robert Lawrence Moody, Jr. · filed 2021-09-30(f)(1)

Notwithstanding the fixing of exemption rights at filing of the petition, a debtor must still have the interest in exempt property to which the lien attached under Farrey at the time a judicial lien is sought to be avoided by him or someone standing in his shoes.

Section 522(f) allows a debtor to avoid a lien only to the extent the lien impairs an exemption in the debtor's equity.

Miller v. Peoples Bank of Miller (In Re Miller) · filed 1980-11-28(f)

Such reasoning not only ignores the express wording of section 522(f) which makes lien avoidance dependent upon the power to exempt the property under section 522(b), but it creates the specter of unlimited lien avoidances in a manner never foreseen or intended by the framers of the new bankruptcy laws.

Section 522(f) does not require equity in property before a debtor may assert a homestead exemption; the debtor need only have an interest in the property.

In Re Brown · filed 1985-05-31(f)

There is no language in 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) that would require the debtor to have an equity interest in the property before asserting a homestead exemption. Instead, the sole requirement is that the debtor have “an interest” in the property.

Property transferred before the bankruptcy filing, in which the debtor retained no interest, is not property of the estate and therefore is not subject to exemption under § 522(b).

In re Lofton · filed 2000-03-27(b)

Thus, on December 17, 1999, when she filed this bankruptcy case, the debtor had no property interest in the $46,281.10. Since the debtor had no property interest in the funds, they did not become property of the estate and thus, are not, as of the commencement of the case, subject to exemption under section 522.

Section 522(f)(1)(A) permits avoidance of a judicial lien impairing an exemption on Florida homestead property when the lien secures an obligation that is not alimony, maintenance, or support.

In Re Lowe · filed 2000-03-29(f)(1)(A)

This Court agrees with the majority opinion. Any hen on homestead real property creates a cloud on the title and renders the title unmarketable. The cloud on the title clearly impairs the homestead exemption. The Bankruptcy Code seeks to prevent just such an impairment by avoiding the lien and giving the debtor a true fresh start and the ability to enjoy his exempt property, with only a few exceptions. Section 522(f)(1)(A) is applicable to real property protected by Florida’s homestead exemption.

Section 522(g) bars a debtor from exempting property recovered by the trustee when the debtor voluntarily transferred it and cannot avoid that transfer under § 522(f).

In Re Donahue · filed 2000-03-30(g)

Given the voluntariness of the transfer creating the security interest in the truck and the plain meaning of the statute, Debtors can not satisfy the requirements of § 522(g)(1) and are therefore not entitled to any exemption distribution from the Trustee.

Section 522(g)(1) bars a debtor from claiming as exempt property that the debtor knowingly concealed and failed to disclose.

In Re Park · filed 2000-03-17§ 522(g)(1)

A debtor may not claim as exempt property which he knowingly concealed and failed to disclose to trustee which normally would be exempt had it been properly scheduled and claimed.

Section 522(b) permits a debtor to exempt only an asset of the bankruptcy estate; a tax overpayment extinguished by a valid IRS setoff is not an asset that can be exempted.

Beaucage v. United States Internal Revenue Service · filed 2006-06-02(b)

without an asset, there can be no valid exemption.

Section 522(g) permits a debtor to exempt property recovered by the trustee when the debtor's transfer of that property was involuntary and the debtor did not conceal it.

In re Schmitt · filed 2018-12-18(g)

Accordingly, if the payment is recovered and becomes property of the estate, the "involuntary" requirement of section 522(g) will not preclude the debtor from claiming the payment as exempt.

Section 522(g)(1)(A) permits a debtor to exempt property recovered by the trustee only when the transfer was not voluntary; equity recovered from a voluntary prepetition transfer therefore cannot be exempted.

Kaler Ex Rel. Arzt v. Overboe (In Re Arzt) · filed 2000-08-29(g)(1)(A)

While the Code, thus, provides that once a trustee avoids a preferential transfer the property becomes property of the estate, ... Section 522(g) also provides that a debtor can exempt any equity created by the avoided transfer only under certain circumstances: ... (g) Notwithstanding sections 550 and 551 of this title, the debtor may exempt under subsection (b) of this section property that the trustee recovers under sections 510(c)(2), 542, 543, 550, 551, or 553 of this title, to the extent that the debtor could have exempted such property under subsection (b) of this section if such property had not been transferred, if— ... (1) (A) such transfer was not a voluntary transfer of such property by the debtor; and ... (B) the debtor did not conceal such property; or ... (2) the debtor could have avoided such transfer under subsection (f)(2) this section. ... None of those circumstances are present here. Debtors voluntarily chose to transfer most of the equity in their homestead prior to filing their Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, and the Debtors could not have avoided these two mortgages under section 522(f).

Section 522(g)(1)(A) permits a debtor to exempt property recovered by the trustee only when the avoided transfer was not voluntary; a debtor who voluntarily transferred the property cannot claim the exemption.

Kaler v. Overboe · filed 2000-08-29(g)(1)(A)

Section 522(g) also provides that a debtor can exempt any equity created by the avoided transfer only under certain circumstances: ... None of those circumstances are present here. Debtors voluntarily chose to transfer most of the equity in their homestead prior to filing their Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, and the Debtors could not have avoided these two mortgages under section 522(f).

Section 522(g) allows a debtor to exempt property recovered by the trustee when the debtor could have exempted it before transfer, the transfer was involuntary, and the debtor did not conceal the property.

Tavenner v. Smoot · filed 2001-07-16(g)

First, § 522(g) of the Bankruptcy Code apparently anticipates this result. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(g) (1994). That statute permits the debtor to exempt property recovered by the trustee under certain circumstances, namely if the debtor could have exempted such property had it not been transferred and if the transfer was involuntary and the debtor did not attempt to conceal the property. See id. Section 522(g) is, thus, premised on the notion that a bankruptcy trustee can avoid the transfer of exemptible property and recover the property.

Section 522(g) does not bar an exemption when the trustee neither avoided nor recovered the property claimed exempt.

Marie v. Green (In Re Green) · filed 2001-07-10(g)

Accordingly, the Trustee’s argument that she can use § 522(g) to prohibit the Debtors’ exemptions is inapposite.

Section 522(g) bars a debtor from exempting property recovered as a fraudulent transfer.

Crews v. Bosonetto (In Re Bosonetto) · filed 2001-12-12(g)

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(g), a debtor may not exempt property which is recovered as a fraudulent transfer.

Section 522(g)(1)(A) bars a debtor from exempting property recovered by the trustee when the debtor voluntarily transferred that property.

In Re Bethea · filed 2002-02-12(g)(1)(A)

Specifically, under 11 U.S.C. § 522(g)(1)(A), the debtor may only exempt a hen recovered by the estate if the transfer of a hen interest in the residence “was not a voluntary transfer of such property by the debt- or.” ... Thus, § 522(g)(1)(A) precludes that debtor from exempting the lien once avoided.

Section 522(g)(1) does not bar a homestead exemption when the trustee recovered property from the transferee rather than property in which the debtor claimed the exemption.

Zubrod v. Duncan (In Re Duncan) · filed 2002-01-03(g)(1)

This being the case, § 522(g)(1) has no application to the exemption claimed by the Debtor in the Property, and the Debtor is entitled to his exemption, which was not otherwise timely objected to by the Trustee.

Section 522(g) allows a debtor to exempt property recovered by the trustee only if the debtor did not conceal the property, unless the debtor could have avoided the transfer under § 522(f)(2).

Borock v. Bidlofsky (In Re Bidlofsky) · filed 1985-12-20(g)

As developed below, the funds in the two Comerica Bank accounts are plainly property of the estate which the bank was and is required to turn over to the trustee pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 542. Thus, under § 522(g) it can be exempted by the debtors only if the debtors “did not conceal such property”. In light of the Court’s holding that the debtors did conceal this property, as noted above, the Court must sustain the trustee’s objection to the debtors’ claim of exemption in this property.

Section 522(g) prevents a debtor from exempting property recovered by the trustee when the debtor voluntarily transferred that property.

Sergeant v. G.R.D. Investments L.L.C. (Schaefer) · filed 2005-09-21(g)

Because the mortgage was a voluntary transfer, Schaefers would not be able to exempt any such property recovered by the trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 522(g).

Section 522(g) permits a debtor to exempt property recovered by the trustee despite § 551 only when the transfer was not voluntary; a debtor cannot claim the exemption for voluntarily transferred property.

Riley v. Sullivan (Sullivan) · filed 2008-05-09(g)

Under § 522(g), “[notwithstanding ... § 551, the debtor may exempt ... property that the trustee recovers ... (1)(A) if such transfer was not a voluntary transfer of such property by the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(g). Since the conveyance by the debtor was voluntary, he acquired no exemption rights under § 522(g).

Section 522(g) does not let a bankruptcy court deny a debtor's homestead exemption for property fraudulently transferred and voluntarily reconveyed before bankruptcy, even when a creditor's efforts prompted the reconveyance.

Stornawaye Financial Corp. v. Hill · filed 2009-04-01(g)

We hold that 11 U.S.C. § 522(g) does not authorize the bankruptcy court to deny a debtor's homestead exemption with respect to property that had been fraudulently transferred and then voluntarily reconveyed pre-petition, even though the retransfer came about through the efforts of a creditor.

Section 522(g)(1) bars a debtor from exempting property the trustee recovers through an avoidance power after the debtor voluntarily transferred it, and the trustee need not initiate an adversary proceeding to recover it.

In Re Floyd · filed 2009-11-16(g)(1)

Thus, a trustee can recover property based on his avoidance power for purposes of § 522(g)(1) without resort to litigation.

Section 522(g) allows a debtor to exempt property recovered by the trustee only when the statutory conditions are met, including that the debtor did not voluntarily transfer the property.

Sullivan v. Welsh · filed 2011-10-12(g)

Indeed, § 522(g) of the Code provides that, if a trustee recovers property under § 550, including property which was fraudulently transferred, the debtor may claim an exemption in the recovered property unless the transfer by the debtor was a voluntary one. ... If, instead of retaining such property and claiming it exempt, the debtor voluntarily opted to transfer it prior to filing bankruptcy, the Code prohibits that debtor from then claiming an exemption if the trustee in the subsequent bankruptcy succeeds in avoiding that transfer as fraudulent.

Section 522(g)(1)(A) bars a debtor from exempting property recovered by the trustee when the debtor voluntarily transferred it, but the provision is not implicated when there is no recoverable property because the interest was restored before bankruptcy.

Lassman v. Patts (In Re Patts) · filed 2012-05-04(g)

Section 522(g) allows a debtor to exempt property that the trustee recovers, subject to certain limitations. ... Section 522(g)(1)(A), however, does not allow the exemption of property recovered by the trustee if the transfer was a voluntary transfer by the debtor. ... the Court finds that the statute is not in play here because, for all of the above stated reasons, the Debtor has no need to exempt property that is owned by Patts when her interest therein is not subject to avoidance and recovery by the Trustee.

Section 522(g)(1) limits a debtor’s ability to exempt property recovered by a trustee to property that was not voluntarily transferred.

Sikirica v. Wettach (In re Wettach) · filed 2013-03-26(g)(1)

The Trustee may thus recover the balances in the PNC entireties’ account and in the one Dollar Bank account ... to exemption will be granted.

Section 522(g)(1) requires both that the debtor's transfer was involuntary and that the debtor did not conceal the property; failure of either condition makes the exemption unavailable.

In re McKinnon · filed 2013-08-27(g)(1)

So both of these conditions must be present. If either the transfer was a voluntary transfer or if the transfer was not disclosed, then § 522(g) is unavailable to the Debtor.

Section 522(g) permits a debtor to exempt property recovered by the trustee only when the transfer was involuntary and not concealed, or when the debtor could have avoided the transfer under § 522(f)(1)(B); § 522(g)(2) applies only to security interests in personal property.

DeGiacomo v. First Call Mortgage Co. (In re Reznikov) · filed 2016-03-29(g)

Section 522(g) states: ... (2) the debtor could have avoided such transfer under subsection (f)(1)(B) of this section. ... Accordingly, a debtor may claim recovered property as exempt only if either (1) the transfer of the property was not a voluntary transfer by the debtor and the debtor did not conceal the property or' (2) the debtor could have avoided such transfer under § 522(f)(1)(B). ... Neither option applies here. ... Nor may the Debtor exempt the avoided Mortgage under § 522(g)(2), which applies exclusively to security interests on diverse types of personalty; that subsection plainly has no application to a mortgage on realty, and I do not understand the Debtor to contend otherwise. In summary, neither subsection (g)(1) nor (g)(2) applies, and therefore the Debtor may not claim the value of the recovered mortgage as exempt.

Section 522(g)(1) permits a debtor to exempt property recovered by a trustee only if the debtor did not voluntarily transfer or conceal the property.

Sui v. Marshack · filed 2017-05-18(g)(1)

The bankruptcy court properly denied Sui’s claimed homestead exemption because the record shows that Sui voluntarily transferred the property prior to filing his bankruptcy petition and failed to disclose any interest in the property or schedule secured claims that might have alerted the chapter 7 trustee to the transfer. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(g)(1) (allowing a debtor to exempt property recovered by a trustee if the debtor did not voluntarily transfer or conceal the property); Glass v. Hitt (In re Glass), 60 F.3d 565, 568-69 (9th Cir. 1995) (explaining requirements for 11 U.S.C. § 522(g)(1) to apply).

Section 522(g)(1) allows a debtor to exempt property recovered by the trustee only if the debtor did not voluntarily transfer it from the estate and did not conceal it.

Elliott v. Weil · filed 2017-06-14(g)(1)

As relevant here, a debtor may exempt property recovered by the bankruptcy trustee under 11 U.S.C. § 542 only if (1) the property was not voluntarily transferred from the estate by the debtor, and (2) the debtor did not conceal the property. 11 U.S.C. § 522(g)(1).

Section 522(g) bars a debtor from exempting voluntarily transferred property only when the trustee has actually recovered it for the estate.

In re Chambers · filed 2017-08-24(g)

Because Trustee has not recovered the property, § 522(g) does not apply and cannot bar Debtors’ exemption.

Section 522(g) allows exemption of recovered property only when its conditions are met, including that the transfer was involuntary and nonconcealed or avoidable under § 522(f)(1)(B); § 522(f)(1)(B) does not apply to real property.

Nesse v. Harispe · filed 2020-01-14(g), (f)(1)(B)

It is undisputed that the transfer was voluntary, and it is not possible for the Debtor to utilize 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1)(B) because that provision does not apply to real property. ... The requirements of § 522(g) are for the Debtor to satisfy when property is brought back into the estate, and the Trustee is here seeking a holding that the Debtor cannot satisfy that provision. ... In this case, there was a voluntary transfer that triggered avoidance powers, and now the Trustee is seeking a holding that section 522(g) prevents a claim of exemption.

Section 522(g)(1) allows a debtor to claim property recovered through avoidance as exempt when the transfer was not voluntarily made by the debtor.

Aurzada v. Jenkins · filed 2020-04-17(g)(1)

To the contrary, Congress expressly acknowledged the potential for the avoidance of otherwise exempt property in providing a debtor with the means under section 522(g) to claim the property as exempt post-avoidance, provided the transfer was not voluntarily made by the debtor.

Section 522(g)(1)(A) bars a debtor from exempting property recovered by a trustee when the debtor voluntarily transferred it, but it does not bar an exemption in an interest already belonging to the estate that the trustee need not recover.

Teresa Nadeau · filed 2022-02-14(g)(1)(A)

Looking at the language of §522(g), the statute only limits a debtor’s right to claim an exemption in property “that the trustee recovers”. Here, the Debtor’s interest as a “lifetime beneficiary” was property of the Debtor’s estate at the time of filing. The interest the Debtor had as a “lifetime beneficiary with respect to the Property under the Trust” does not need to be recovered, meaning the Debtor does not bear the burden of showing that they are entitled to claim an exemption in property recovered by the Trustee. This court also cannot rely on “equity” to read out the limitation on a debtor’s right to claim an exemption to property that a trustee “recovers.” Law v. Siegel, 571 U.S. 415, 421-24, 134 S. Ct. 1188, 188 L. Ed. 2d 146 (2014). Accordingly, the Debtor may claim a homestead exemption in the property, up to the value of her “lifetime beneficiary interest.”

Section 522(g) permits a debtor to exempt property recovered by the trustee under specified Bankruptcy Code powers only if the statutory conditions are met; it does not apply when a creditor, rather than the trustee, recovers or returns the property.

Ivy Tran Pham Ngo · filed 2026-03-16(g)

“As a threshold matter, and by its terms, § 522(g) pertains to the debtor’s right to exempt property that the trustee recovers using certain avoidance powers provided under the Code . . . § 522(g), by its terms, applies only to property recovered by the trustee, and not to property returned to the bankruptcy estate as a result of efforts by a creditor.”

Section 522(g) lets a debtor claim an exemption in property recovered by the trustee when the transfer was involuntary and the debtor did not conceal the property.

Redmond v. Tuttle (In Re Tuttle) · filed 1981-10-22(g)

Since the debtors’ deposits were clearly the type of transfer contemplated by the bankruptcy code, their final argument raised on appeal must also fail.

Section 522(g) governs when a debtor may claim as exempt property recovered by the trustee.

Everwed Co. v. Ayers (In Re Ayers) · filed 1982-05-04(g)

The court further concludes that 11 U.S.C. § 522(g) is inapplicable in this proceeding since the debtors are not attempting to claim exempt any property which the trustee has recovered.

Section 522(g)(1)(A) allows a debtor to exempt recovered property when the transfer was not voluntary and the debtor did not conceal it.

In Re Dargis · filed 1984-02-17(g)(1)(A)

For all of the foregoing reasons, we find that the debtor has failed to show that the transfer in question was not voluntary under § 522(g)(1)(A).

Section 522(g) permits a debtor to exempt property recovered by a trustee through avoiding powers only when the statutory conditions are met, including that the transfer was not voluntary.

Langston v. Porter (In re Porter) · filed 1984-05-08(g)

Section 522(g) gives to the debtors the qualified right to exempt property recovered by the trustee as a result of the trustee’s use of his avoiding powers. ... I further conclude that those recovered monies may not be exempted by the debtors.

Section 522(g)(1) permits a debtor to exempt property recovered by the trustee only when the transfer was involuntary and the debtor did not conceal the property.

In Re Gingery · filed 1985-05-02(g)(1)

A literal reading of Section 522(g) compels the conclusion that a recovered asset cannot be exempted if it was transferred voluntarily regardless of whether or not such transfer was concealed. This interpretation is based upon the use of the conjunctive “and” placed between the two conditions set forth in Section 522(g)(1).

Section 522(g)(1)(A) bars a debtor from recovering an interest in exempt property when the debtor voluntarily granted that interest.

In Re Mahaner · filed 1983-11-04(g)(1)(A)

In fact, 11 U.S.C. § 522(g)(1)(A) expressly espouses the policy that a debtor cannot recover an interest in exempt property if he voluntarily granted such interest.

Section 522(g) allows a debtor to exempt property recovered by a trustee only if the debtor could exempt it under § 522(b) and did not voluntarily transfer it.

Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Holly (In Re Holly) · filed 1989-06-02(g)

As correctly pointed out by Movant’s counsel, however, the Debtor is not free to claim an exemption in these monies by virtue of 11 U.S.C. Section 522(g) which provides generally that a debtor may exempt property which has been recovered by the trustee but only to the extent that the debtor has a sustainable exemption under 11 U.S.C. Section 522(b) and only to the extent that the transfer of that property by the debtor prior to the filing of the Chapter 7 case “was not a voluntary transfer of such property by the debtor.” As applied to the facts in this case, I conclude that payments made by a Chapter 13 debtor or on behalf of a Chapter 13 debtor by such debtor’s employer is a voluntary transfer and thus the debtor has no right to exempt such payments.

Section 522(g)(2) permits a debtor to exempt property recovered after a voluntary transfer if the debtor could have avoided the transfer under § 522(f)(2).

In Re Flitter · filed 1995-04-25(g)(2)

However, § 522(g)(2) opens the debtor’s right back out again, for the classes of assets that are subject to a debtor’s lien avoidance powers under § 522(f).

Sections 522(g) and (i) do not cover a trustee’s sale of an estate asset as a recovery that lets the debtor claim an exemption.

In re Hughes · filed 1999-10-18(g), (i)

Finally, the provisions of § 522(g) and (i), which allow a debtor to exempt certain property recovered during the administration of the bankruptcy estate, do not aid Debtors. A sale of an estate asset by the Trustee is not included among the ... types of recoveries that these subsections address.

Section 522(g) governs exemptions in property recovered by the trustee and does not apply when the trustee recovers no property.

Woodard v. Stewart (In Re Stewart) · filed 2001-10-01(g)

In this proceeding, there has been no recovery of property by the Trustee, and no possibility of recovery of entireties property by the Trustee. Section 522(g) of the Bankruptcy Code is inapplicable to this proceeding.

Section 522(g)(1) prevents a debtor from exempting property she voluntarily transferred after the trustee recovers it for the estate.

In Re Villegas · filed 2007-03-22(g)(1)

Once the Trustee regained title to the Property for the estate, § 522(g) now prevents the Debtor from reasserting a claim of exemption in the Property.

Section 522(d)(10)(D) exempts alimony, support, or separate maintenance only to the extent reasonably necessary for the debtor's or a dependent's support; an equitable-distribution property settlement is not exempt under this provision.

In Re Ellertson · filed 2000-08-30(d)(10)(D)

Section 522(d)(10)(D) authorizes the debtor to claim an exemption for any “alimony, support, or separate maintenance, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor.” However, an equitable distribution in the nature of a property settlement is property of the estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541, and neither state law nor Section 522(d)(10) provides authorization for the debtor to claim such property interest as exempt. ... There is nothing in the Marital Settlement Agreement or the Final Dissolution of Marriage that indicates that the equitable distribution award is alimony. All relevant facts and circumstances lead to the conclusion that the award is a property settlement. Thus, the equitable distribution payments are property of the bankruptcy estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541 and are not subject to exemption under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(D).

Section 522(d)(10)(D) exempts a debtor’s right to receive alimony, support, or separate maintenance only to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor or a dependent.

In Re Brackett · filed 2001-03-06(d)(10)(D)

This Court has held that when determining whether an award constitutes alimony or a property settlement under § 522(d)(10)(D), the facts must be “examined in accordance with § 523(a)(5) [dischargeability] principles.” ... After reviewing the six factors relevant to the Court’s determination, it appears that only the first factor supports a finding that the Payments were intended as alimony. The balance of the factors strongly suggests that Debtor and Morgan intended the money for debt repayment and the Payments are therefore a property settlement.

Section 522(d)(10)(D) does not require resort to interpretive factors when a divorce decree separately provides meaningful alimony, clearly classifies the obligation as property division, and the label matches the obligation’s characteristics without evidence of concealment.

In the Matter Of: Elizabeth Ann Evert, Debtor. Marsha G. Milligan, Trustee C. Daniel Roberts & Associates P.C. v. Evert · filed 2003-08-06(d)(10)(D)

We hold only that, at least for purposes of section 522(d)(10)(D), where in the agreed divorce decree there is 1) also a meaningful separate alimony provision, 2) the obligation in question is described as being part of the property division, 3) the label given to the obligation in question is matched by its actual characteristics, and 4) the evidence does not suggest the parties conspired to disguise the true nature of the obligation in order to subvert the bankruptcy or tax laws, there is no ambiguity necessitating the use of the ... factors to essentially work backwards to determine the nature of the obligation. Because we conclude that that is the situation here, we reverse.

Section 522(d)(10)(D) exempts a debtor’s right to receive alimony, support, or separate maintenance only to the extent reasonably necessary for the debtor or a dependent’s support; it does not exempt an intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim.

Tilley v. Anixter Inc. · filed 2005-11-01(d)(10)(D)

The statute that she cited to support her assertion that this claim was exempt from distribution to creditors was one authorizing an exemption for “[t]he debtor’s right to receive ... alimony, support, or separate maintenance, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor.” 11 USCS § 522(d)(10)(D). It does not authorize any exemption for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Section 522(d)(10)(D) exempts a debtor’s right to receive alimony, support, or separate maintenance only to the extent reasonably necessary for the debtor’s or a dependent’s support; a payment that is actually a property settlement does not qualify.

Mason v. Korwin (In Re Korwin) · filed 2007-12-10(d)(10)(D)

While we are sympathetic to Debtor’s plight, there can only be one conclusion and that is that the intent of the parties was that the fund at issue was a property settlement that cannot be exempted under § 522(d)(10)(D) as “alimony, support, or separate maintenance.”

Section 522(d)(10)(D) exempts a debtor’s right to receive alimony, support, or separate maintenance to the extent reasonably necessary for the debtor’s or a dependent’s support.

DeHart v. Miller (In Re Miller) · filed 2010-02-05(d)(10)(D)

The Award is an obligation that was structured to enable Debtor to maintain daily necessities such as food, housing and transportation during a transitional period.

Section 522(d)(10)(D) exempts only true alimony, support, or separate-maintenance payments reasonably necessary for the debtor or a dependent’s support, not property-division payments.

In re Kooi · filed 2016-03-22(d)(10)(D)

These items are not exempt under § 522(d)(10)(D).

Section 522(c) identifies the debts for which exempt property remains liable, so a state-law exception that adds protection for a particular creditor or excludes property from the estate is preempted by the Bankruptcy Code's exemption scheme.

J&M Securities, LLC v. Moore · filed 2013-07-08(c)

To the extent § 513.510 would except Moore’s homestead from exemption as to J&M specifically, we hold that this type of exception is preempted by the specific exceptions listed in § 522(c) of the Code. To the extent § 513.510 would except Moore’s homestead from exemption from property of the estate, we hold that this result is at odds with the Code’s exemption scheme–and is also preempted.

Section 522(c)(1) protects exempt property from prepetition debts except specified nondischargeable taxes; accordingly, an exempt tax overpayment may be set off against a priority tax claim but not a general unsecured tax claim.

In Re Pace · filed 2000-12-18(c)(1)

Consequently, this Court finds that although the IRS can set off the overpayments against the priority tax claim pursuant to § 522(c), it cannot use the overpayments in which the Debtors have claimed an exemption to offset general unsecured tax claims.

Section 522(c)’s protection extends only to property actually subject to the debtor’s exemption.

S & C Home Loans, Inc. v. Farr (In Re Farr) · filed 2002-05-06(c)

“Exempted property” in § 522(c) means only the property that is subject to the exemption.

Section 522(c) protects properly exempted property from collection on a debt, subject to statutory exceptions.

Collins v. Tielsch (In Re Tielsch) · filed 2003-09-24(c)

However, Collins may not henceforth attempt to satisfy her alimony award from any asset that the Debtor has properly exempted pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522.

Section 522(c) protects properly exempted property from prepetition debts but does not protect non-exempt assets, their proceeds, or ill-gotten gains transferred through another entity.

Steffen v. Gray, Harris & Robinson, P.A. · filed 2003-09-19(c)

Steffen is correct that property exempted during Bilzerian’s bankruptcy case (Bilzerian’s interest in the Bieoastal stock) would not be subject to debts that arose prior to his bankruptcy case (the SEC disgorgement order). ... Nothing in the plain language of Section 522(c) would exempt, however, the SEC’s ability to seek disgorgement against assets held by BHC, if they were ill gotten gains from Bilzerian’s securities fraud. Similarly, Section 522(c) does not allow Bilzerian or Steffen to protect other non-exempt assets or their proceeds by transferring those assets or proceeds to or through BHC after the filing of Bilzerian’s bankruptcy.

Section 522(c) protects property exempted under § 522 from liability for prepetition debts, subject to the exceptions stated in the statute.

In Re Fonke · filed 2005-02-01(c)

Section 522(c), however, specifically deals with the liability of property exempted under § 522. Accordingly, in determining the issue of liability of exempt property for prepetition debts, § 522(c) is the more specific statute. Therefore, § 522(c) trumps § 348 as to whether previously exempted property may be liable for prepetition debts by being recaptured by the estate.

Section 522(c) protects property exempted under § 522 from administration for debts that arose before the bankruptcy case, subject to the provision’s statutory exceptions.

In Re Skorich · filed 2005-10-19(c)

Accordingly, such exempt property is not subject to administration by the Trustee.

Section 522(c) generally protects exempt property from liability for the debtor’s prepetition debts, subject to limited exceptions.

National City Bank v. Hartman (In re Hartman) · filed 2005-12-21(c)

For purposes of this controversy, an important aspect of an allowable exemption in bankruptcy is that, subject to some limited exceptions, such property is “not liable during or after the case for any debt of the debtor that arose ... before the commencement of the case[.]” 11 U.S.C. § 522(c). Ergo, to the extent that those funds held in Ms. Hartman’s IRA are exempt, the Plaintiff may not look to such funds as a source to satisfy its claim.

Section 522(c) generally protects property scheduled as exempt from post-petition setoff by prepetition creditors, but the protection extends only to the amount actually exempted.

Moore v. United States Department of Housing & Urban Development (In Re Moore) · filed 2006-04-20(c)

Prepetition creditors generally may not execute a post petition setoff on property scheduled as exempt by the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 522(c). In this case, the debtor scheduled his 2003 tax returns as exempt, and valued the asset at $1.00. Prior to the closing of the case he did not amend his schedules to claim the full amount of the refund exempt even after he discovered the exact amount of the offset. However, the case has been reopened. Under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1009(a) the debtor may amend schedules “as a matter of course at any time before the case is closed.” Thus, the debtor is currently positioned to amend schedules to increase the amount of the claimed exemption.

Section 522(c) generally protects exempt property from liability for prepetition debts, but property that never became part of the bankruptcy estate cannot be classified as exempt.

Houchens v. United States Department of Agriculture Rural Development (In Re Houchens) · filed 2008-02-05(c)

Since the debt exceeded the tax refund, the Debtor was not entitled to a refund and the refund never became property of the estate. Therefore, it could not be classified as exempt property under 11 U.S.C. § 522 and Debtor’s claimed exemption on her Petition was of no legal consequence.

Section 522(c) protects exempt property from liability for prepetition debts, including nondischargeable debts, unless one of four specified exceptions applies.

KANCILIA v. Pearson · filed 2008-06-23(c)

Notably, there is no general exception provided for nondischargeable debts. The plain language of section 522(c) thus provides that exempt property cannot be used to satisfy "any" debt that aroge prior to the bankruptey-including a nondischargeable one-unless that nondis-chargeable debt falls within one of the four enumerated exceptions.

Section 522(c) protects property exempted under § 522 from liability for prepetition debts, but it does not apply to property excluded from the bankruptcy estate under § 541.

In re Bell · filed 2012-07-30(c)

The Debtor’s exclusion of, rather than exemption of, his interest in the 401(k) Plan leads to the question, whether § 522(c) applies to assets that have been excluded from the estate under § 541? Based on the plain language of § 522(c), I hold that the answer is “no.”

Section 522(c) generally protects property exempted under § 522 from liability for prepetition debts, subject to listed exceptions.

Copley v. United States (In re Copley) · filed 2016-03-22(c)

Congress, in § 522(c), has expressly enumerated the kind of debts with respect to which allowed exemptions do not apply. ... Similarly, the Court finds that the Debtors’ exemption in their 2013 tax refund supersedes the setoff rights of the United States under § 553.

Section 522(c) protects property properly exempted under § 522 from liability for prepetition debts, subject to the statute’s exceptions and unless the bankruptcy case is dismissed.

Romo v. Montemayor (In re Montemayor) · filed 2016-03-09(c)

Once a property interest has been exempted, the property is not liable for most pre-petition debts, absent dismissal of the case.

Section 522(c)'s protection of exempt property from prepetition debts does not prevent a creditor's preserved right to offset a mutual prepetition debt under § 553(a).

Copley v. United States · filed 2020-05-12(c)

The very broad scope of Section 553(a) necessarily includes the property exemption provisions contained in 11 U.S.C. § 522(c). Although Section 522(c) generally provides that exempt property cannot be used to satisfy prepetition debt, that provision, as a part of Title 11, must be read in conjunction with the unambiguous language of Section 553(a). As a result, we must interpret Section 522(c) in a way that does not “affect” the “right of a creditor to offset a mutual debt.” 11 U.S.C. § 553(a). A contrary construction, permitting Section 522(c) to subordinate the government’s offset rights, would violate that statutory directive.

Section 522(c) generally protects exempt property from liability for prepetition debts, subject to the statute’s exceptions.

Eric L. Bizeau · filed 2025-03-21(c)

“Exempt property, with exceptions not applicable here, is not available for recovery for discharged debts.”

Section 522(c) generally protects exempt property from liability for prepetition debts, but in this Chapter 13 case the court held that the more specific § 1306(a) estate-inclusion rule controls over § 522(c).

In re: Wanda Harding Staker · filed 2026-02-05(c)

This strongly supports the Trustee’s argument in this case that Section 1306(a) is the more specific statute, and therefore, should control over Section 522(c)’s more general provisions, which applies under every Chapter, as does Section 541(a). ... On balance, the Court holds that Cordova, which held that gaining full ownership rights in former tenants by the entirety property was a meaningful change, and Carroll v. Logan, which held that Section 1306(a) is the more specific statute, compel the conclusion that Ms. Staker’s Property is no longer exempt.

Section 522(c)(1) leaves exempt property liable for debts for support.

Matter of Coleman · filed 1984-01-31(c)(1)

Relief as to exempt property, while not strictly necessary under § 522(c), may have been sought for reasons of caution: as such relief is the movant’s right, it is granted.

Section 522(c) generally protects exempt property from liability for prepetition debts, subject to listed exceptions.

In Re Haupt · filed 1981-12-21(c)

Second, and perhaps most importantly, there is no legal basis for HFC’s position. HFC has apparently overlooked the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 522(c) (1979), which states that property exempted by the debt- or is not liable for any prepetition debt, except in circumstances not relevant here.

Section 522(c) protects exempt property from liability for debts that arose before the bankruptcy case.

Matter of Hadden · filed 1986-01-22(c)

11 U.S.C. § 522(c) provides that “property exempted under this section is not liable during or after the case for any debt of the debtor that arose ... before the commencement of the case_” ... Therefore, insofar as property exempted is not liable for a debt which arose before the commencement of a case, because a debt is defined in terms of a claim, anything which would qualify as a claim is equally dischargeable as a debt.

Section 522(c) protects an exempt homestead, up to the claimed exemption amount, from collection of a prepetition debt even if that debt is nondischargeable.

In Re Hyde · filed 2005-09-26(c)

Thus, the Fund, as the holder of a prepetition claim, was precluded from taking any action against the Debtor’s estate of homestead to the extent of $300,000, even though this Court has determined that its judgment is nondis-chargeable.

Section 522(c) prevents exempt property from being liable for a debtor’s prepetition debt, but does not protect it from liability for a postpetition debt.

Barber v. K-B Building Co. (In Re Barber) · filed 2006-03-17(c)

Assuming for the sake of argument that the allegations in the complaint are true, we conclude that liability for any payments made to Portage National Bank that were made prior to March 22, 2001, the date on which debtor’s bankruptcy case commenced, arose pre-petition. Pursuant to § 522(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, the property exempted by debtor cannot be liable for that debt. We conclude otherwise with respect to any payments to Portage National Bank and to 1st Summit Bank that were made after commencement of this bankruptcy case. Any liability for such payments would have arisen post-petition and would not be prohibited by § 522(c).

Section 522(c) protects exempt property from collection of a prepetition debt, including a nondischargeable debt, unless a listed exception applies.

Bricker v. Scalera (In re Scalera) · filed 2014-11-19(c)

Thus, in order to execute against the exempted Inherited IRA the Movants must show that the underlying debt qualifies as one of the four exceptions set forth under § 522(c)(l)-(4).

Section 522(f)(1) does not let a debtor avoid a lien when the lien attached to the property interest before the debtor acquired that interest.

Wheeler v. Tolland Bank (In re Wheeler) · filed 2000-12-18(f)(1)

The Court held, based upon § 522(f)(l)’s “purpose and history,” that “unless the debtor had the property interest to which the lien attached at some point before the lien attached to that interest he or she cannot avoid the fixing of the lien under the terms of § 522(f)(1).” ... The court concludes that, under Connecticut law, the debtor did not have the property interest to which the lien attached at a point prior to attachment of the lien to that interest, and that she cannot avoid the lien under § 522(f).

Section 522(f)(1)(A) does not let a debtor avoid a judicial lien that attached to property before the debtor acquired the interest burdened by it.

In Re Jaber · filed 2009-05-22(f)(1)(A)

Because no lien was fixed on Sulieman’s fee simple interest, obtained after the fixing of the creditors’ judgment lien, Sulie-man cannot avoid the creditors’ lien.

Section 522(c)(2) preserves a creditor’s right to enforce a mortgage lien through foreclosure after a Chapter 7 bankruptcy discharge.

Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Holden (Slip Opinion) · filed 2016-07-01(c)(2)

the Code provides that a creditor’s right to foreclose on the mortgage survives or passes through the bankruptcy.

Section 522(c)(2) keeps exempt property liable for a debt secured by a lien unless the lien is avoided under § 522(f) or (g) or void under § 506(d); § 522(c)(2)(A)(ii) protects a surviving in rem lien to the extent it is not void under § 506(d).

Donna Miriam Hopper · filed 2021-08-05(c)(2), (c)(2)(A)(ii)

Section 522(c)(2) codified the holding of Long v. Bullard by providing that the property remains liable during and after the case for debt secured by a lien that is (i) not avoided under subsections (f) or (g), and (ii) not void under § 506(d). 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(2); Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. at 83 (“Codifying the rule of Long v. Bullard, . . . the Code provides that a creditor’s right to foreclose on the mortgage survives or passes through the bankruptcy.”). Therefore, while § 524(a)(1) declares the obligation uncollectible against the debtor personally, § 522(c)(2) shields the remaining in rem lien, allowing it to pass through bankruptcy.

Section 522(c)(2) preserves exempt property as security for a prepetition debt secured by a lien that bankruptcy did not avoid, so the creditor's lien and foreclosure rights survive discharge.

Copper Creek Homeowners Association, V. Wilmington Savings Fund Society · filed 2022-04-11(c)(2)

The Bankruptcy Code provides that a creditor’s right to foreclose on secured property survives the bankruptcy. Id. at 83; 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(2). A lien on real property passes through bankruptcy unaffected.

Section 522(c)(2) preserves a creditor’s right to enforce a mortgage lien against property after the debtor receives a bankruptcy discharge.

Clarke-James v. The Bank Of NY Mellon · filed 2025-03-13(c)(2)

Codifying the rule of Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617, 6 S.Ct. 917, 29 L.Ed. 1004 (1886), the Code provides that a creditor's right to foreclose on the mortgage survives or passes through the bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(2); Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305, 308–309, 111 S.Ct. 1833, 1835–1836, 114 L.Ed.2d 350 (1991); Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291, 297, 111 S.Ct. 1825, 1829, 114 L.Ed.2d 337 (1991); H.R.Rep. No. 95–595, supra, at 361. Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 82–83 (1991). Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s receipt of a discharge did not discharge the mortgage or other liens on the Property and acts to enforce the mortgage or liens did not violate the discharge injunction.

Section 522(c)(2) leaves exempt property liable for debts secured by liens that have not been avoided under the specified Bankruptcy Code provisions.

Dicent v. Boncidium, LLC · filed 2025-05-07(c)(2)

Rather, the Supreme Court has held that while a bankruptcy discharge relieves the individual debtor of liability, the Bankruptcy Code “provides that a creditor’s right to foreclose on the mortgage survives or passes through the bankruptcy.” ... (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(c)(2), 524(a)(1)); ... Accordingly, even accepting the plaintiff’s allegations that her property was subject to a bankruptcy discharge, this would not foreclose the servicer of her mortgage loan from enforcing a lien through foreclosure.

Section 522 preserves a creditor's right to foreclose on a mortgage after the debtor's bankruptcy discharge.

Haney v. Phillips · filed 2000-12-20

Codifying the rule of Long v. Bullard, id., the Bankruptcy Code now provides that a creditor’s right to foreclose on the mortgage survives or passes through the bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 522; Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78 (1991).

Section 522(d)(10)(E) covers payments under death benefit plans and similar plans, while § 522(d)(11) separately addresses life insurance proceeds.

In Re Selfe · filed 2001-03-02(d)(10)(E) and (11)

Reading 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) and (11) together, it is clear that Congress has identified life insurance proceeds as something other than a payment of the type designated" in § 522(d)(10)(E), and the exclusion of the term life insurance proceeds .from § 522(d)(10)(E) was deliberate. Any other reading would reduce § 522(d)(ll) to mere surplusage and undermine the cumulative nature of the federal exemption scheme. H.R. No. 95-595.

Section 522(f)(2)(A) measures lien impairment using the value of the debtor’s interest in the property, and permits avoidance of a judicial lien to the extent the statutory total exceeds that value.

In re Coressel · filed 2001-03-19(f)(2)(A)

After evaluating the foregoing considerations, as they relate to the different figures put forth by the Parties concerning the value of the Debtor’s residence, the Court finds that for purposes of § 522(f), the appropriate valuation of the Debtor’s residence is the Forty-eight Thousand Nine Hundred dollar ($48,-900.00) asking price the Debtor and her husband sought from the property. Accordingly, in conformance with the formula set forth in § 522(f), the judgment lien held by the Tonjes against the Debtor’s interest in the subject property may be avoided in full.

Section 522(f) permits a debtor to avoid a judicial lien only when it impairs an exemption and the lien had attached to the debtor's property at filing.

In Re Hamilton · filed 2002-12-05(f)(1)(A), (f)(2)(A)

Where a judgment has not become a lien on any of the debtor’s property at the filing of the bankruptcy petition, Section 522(f) cannot apply.

Section 522(f)(2) permits avoidance of a judicial lien only when there is both an available exemption and a judicial lien, and the lien impairs the exemption.

Schalebaum v. Town of Wolfeboro (In Re Schalebaum) · filed 2001-04-19(f)(2)

In most cases, this type of motion involves nothing more than applying the mathematical formula provided by section 522(f). However, in order to utilize section 522(f), there must be an exemption and there must be a judicial lien. Whether either exists in this case is the real question posed by the motion. ... For the reasons stated above, the Debt- or’s motion to avoid Wolfeboro’s attachment lien on the proceeds from the sale of his homestead pursuant to § 522(f) is denied as there was no homestead exemption in the proceeds as of the date of the bankruptcy.

Section 522(f)(1)(A) lets a debtor avoid a judicial lien to the extent it impairs an exemption to which the debtor is entitled, provided the debtor proves the statutory requirements for lien avoidance.

In Re Johnson · filed 2001-06-05(f)(1)(A)

Debtors move to avoid Creditor’s judgment lien on their homestead real property under Section 522(f)(1)(A) which provides in pertinent part, “the debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would otherwise be entitled.” 11 U.S.C. 522(f)(1)(A). Section 522(f) requires a four-part analysis, in which Debtors have the burden of proving the following: “(1) an exemption to which they are entitled under § 522(b); (2) that the property is listed on debtor’s schedules and claimed as exempt; (3) that the lien impairs the exemption; and (4) that the hen is judicial rather than consensual.” ... Here, there is no dispute regarding any of the four elements. ... Here Debtor’s have at most approximately $24,000 in equity in the home after the tax lien and deed of trust are considered. Creditors’ judicial hen obviously impairs Debtors’ homestead exemption. 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(f)(1)(A); (f)(2)(A); ... Debtors’ motion to avoid Creditors’ judicial hen (Docket No. 38) will be granted.

Section 522(f)(1)(A) does not allow avoidance of a judgment enforcing a restrictive covenant because the judgment is not a judicial lien.

In Re Willets · filed 2001-05-10(f)(1)(A)

this Court holds that a judgment enforcing a restrictive covenant is not a judicial lien subject to the lien avoidance mechanisms afforded by the Bankruptcy Code.