11 U.S.C. § 522

An IRA can qualify as a similar plan or contract for exemption under § 522(d)(10)(E) when its payment rights are tied to retirement, death, or disability.

Reitmeyer v. Gralka (In Re Gralka) · filed 1997-01-06§ 522(d)(10)(E)

This Court concludes that IRAs are significantly similar to “stock bonus, pension, profit sharing, [or] annuity ... plants] or contracts],”

The unused portion of a debtor’s § 522(d)(1) exemption may be applied under the wildcard exemption, even when the debtor has little or no unused equity in the residence.

In re Renfrow · filed 1997-01-17§ 522(d)(5)

The error in the trustee’s analysis is that he is substituting the term “equity” in paragraph (5) for the term that actually appears, “exemption.”

For cases filed before October 22, 1994, § 522(f)(2)(A)'s amended formula for determining when a lien impairs an exemption does not apply retroactively.

In Re Patrick J. Bentley, Fdba King of Hearts Fdba Between the Sheets, Debtor. Patrick J. Bentley v. Propertie · filed 1997-02-05§ 522(f)(2)(A)

Thus, those cases filed before the effective date of the 1994 Act continue to be interpreted under Chabot.

Section 522(d)(11)(E) exempts compensation for lost future earnings only for the period after the bankruptcy estate is created, and only to the extent reasonably necessary for support.

In Re Jackson · filed 2008-09-02(d)(11)(E)

Section 522(d)(ll)(E) applies only to post-petition loss of earnings.

Section 522(d)(11)(E) exempts compensation for a debtor’s loss of future earnings without requiring bodily injury, including compensation for a voluntary employment termination.

In Re Lewis · filed 2009-05-21(d)(11)(E)

Section 522(d)(11)(E) is clear, concise, and stands alone. It does not require bodily injury as a prerequisite for exemption. It simply exempts compensation for loss of future earnings. ... The debtor’s termination of her employment from Ford constitutes an event that resulted in a “loss of future earnings.” The EDOPP was offered to her as compensation for such termination. It is immaterial whether such compensation was negotiated by the parties, or whether such termination was voluntary. In either case, the EDOPP benefit is within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(11) as a “compensation” for such loss of future earnings, to wit, her wages while working at Ford.

Section 522(d)(11)(E) allows a debtor to exempt compensation for lost future earnings attributable to post-petition periods, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and dependents.

Jackson v. Novak (In Re Jackson) · filed 2010-01-22(d)(11)(E)

Given the design and goals of these provisions of the Code, we conclude that the bankruptcy and district courts properly interpreted “future” in § 522(d)(ll)(E) as looking forward from the date of the bankruptcy filing, not from some prior point in time, and hence correctly interpreted “loss of future earnings” in that section as referring to lost earnings for post-petition periods and not for periods prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition.

Section 522(d)(11)(E) exempts a debtor’s right to receive, or property traceable to, payment for loss of future earnings, to the extent reasonably necessary for support; it does not cover compensation for past lost wages.

Bush · filed 2019-09-16(d)(11)(E)

Because the employment suit did not include a claim for lost future earnings, Section 522(d)(11)(E) does not apply. The bankruptcy court correctly sustained Nathan’s objection and denied the claimed exemption.

Section 522(d)(11)(E) permits an exemption for property traceable to compensation for lost future earnings only to the extent reasonably necessary for support, and loss of future earnings generally requires diminished earning capacity or ability rather than replacement costs for a work tool.

Michael J. Spak · filed 2021-07-30(d)(11)(E)

Accordingly, relevant case law and commentary to the statute at issue lead this Court to conclude that loss of future earnings is tied to a debtor’s diminished capacity or ability to earn. ... The Court declines to extend the statute to include compensation for the loss of an instrument or tool used in previous employment—even where that tool or instrument is “necessary” to resume the previous job. ... Moreover, there are other exemptions for personal property found in § 522(d) which expressly exempt such assets, including, but not limited to, 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(2) [motor vehicles], 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(6) [tools of trade], and 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5) [catch-all].

Section 522(d)(11)(E) permits exemption of compensation for loss of future earnings, to the extent reasonably necessary for the debtor’s and dependents’ support; damages that accrued before the action began are not future earnings for this exemption.

Delaney v. Sullivan & Cromwell LLP · filed 2024-07-08(d)(11)(E)

However, here, Delaney only seeks compensation for damages that accrued prior to the commencement of the action, and none of those damages comprise "future earnings" for the purposes of exemption under 11 USC § 522 (d) (11) (E).

Section 522(d)(11)(E) permits an exemption for recovery attributable to lost earnings from the debtor’s personal services to the extent reasonably necessary to support the debtor or dependents.

In Re Tomaiolo · filed 1997-02-11(d)(11)(E)

I will permit the Debtor to amend his schedules to claim an exemption in that portion of any recovery on these claims which is attributable to loss of earnings from the Debtor’s personal services to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the Debtor or his dependents.

Section 522(d)(11)(E) permits exemption of payments for lost future earnings to the extent reasonably necessary for the debtor’s support.

In Re Cramer · filed 1991-08-08(d)(11)(E)

However, after reviewing the record, we conclude that Flame-Rite has not met its burden of proving that the entire balance of the jury award claimed as exempt by debtor under § 522(d)(ll)(E) represents anything other than loss of future earnings. ... Given the facts described above and our belief that due to debtor’s poor health and physical condition he is unable to work, we find that the trustee failed to meet her burden of proving that the amount exempted by debtor under § 522(d)(ll)(E) is not reasonably necessary for debtor’s support. ... Accordingly, we shall enter an order denying the trustee’s objection to debtor’s exemption under § 522(d)(ll)(E) and granting debtor’s motion under § 522(f)(1) to avoid Flame-Rite’s judicial lien.

Section 522(d)(11)(E) permits an exemption for compensation for lost future earnings; a judgment that did not award future lost wages does not qualify.

Pequeno v. Schmidt · filed 2004-03-31(d)(11)(E)

A debtor may claim as exempt monies received in remuneration for loss of future earnings. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(11)(E). ... All of his motions and correspondence at the time in question stressed the fact that the jurors had told him no award was made for future lost wages. ... Accordingly, this court finds that the Bankruptcy Court correctly found this judgment to be non-exempt.

Section 522(c)(1) allows a former spouse to levy on otherwise exempt property to enforce nondischargeable alimony, maintenance, and child-support debts.

In the Matter of Thomas Cullen Davis and Karen Joyce Davis, Debtors. Sandra Davis v. Davis · filed 1997-02-12§ 522(c)(1)

The text, purpose and history of § 522(c)(1) indicate that it creates an exception to § 522 that enables the former spouse of a debtor to levy upon the debtor’s otherwise exempt property to enforce payment of alimony, maintenance, and child support debts.

Section 522(c)(1) does not itself create liability or authorize execution against exempt property for a nondischargeable family-support debt; it preserves only the creditor's state-law rights and remedies that would have existed absent bankruptcy.

In the Matter Of: Thomas Cullen Davis Karen Joyce Davis, Debtors. Sandra Davis v. Davis · filed 1999-03-17(c)(1)

For all these reasons, we conclude that § 522(c)(1) does not “create” “liability” of exempt property for specified debts following bankruptcy. Instead, the section permits creditors holding such claims to proceed against the property after bankruptcy based on the rights and remedies they would have had under state law if bankruptcy had not been filed.

Section 522(c)(1) preserves a creditor’s state-law rights and remedies against exempt property for nondischargeable family-support debts, but it does not itself authorize execution or preempt state homestead law.

Davis v. Davis · filed 1999-04-06(c)(1)

Sandra is entitled, under § 522(c)(1), to enforce her nondischargeable judgment for family support obligations notwithstanding the exemption claim, but her remedy must be in accord with Texas law, since § 522(c) is not an execution statute and does not preempt relevant Texas law.

A debtor may use both exemptions to exempt different portions of a single personal-injury recovery.

In Re Bova · filed 1997-02-26§ 522(d)(11)(D) and § 522(d)(11)(E)

There is nothing in the Code that requires the Debtor to choose one exemption under which to claim all aspects of a single personal injury award.

An allowed exemption removes the property from the bankruptcy estate, but § 522(c)'s protection from prepetition creditors remains conditional during a Chapter 13 case, so cash proceeds must be safeguarded until plan completion.

Matter of Gamble · filed 1997-03-03§ 522(b), § 522(c)

I hold that property claimed exempt is property of the estate at filing. Upon resolution of any objection to the claim of exemption, it is carved out of the estate, but is not freed from the claims of pre-petition creditors until the case is concluded — and thus cannot be dismissed.

Section 522(b) lets a debtor choose between the federal exemptions and exemptions available under applicable state law, with the scope of a state-law choice controlled by state law.

Sholdan v. Dietz · filed 1997-03-13§ 522(b)

Under section 11 U.S.C. § 522(b), a debtor can choose to exempt from property of the bankruptcy estate that property which is exempt under the applicable state or federal law. See Hanson v. First Nat'l Bank, 848 F.2d 866, 868 (8th Cir.1988). Here, Sholdan elected a state-created exemption. The scope of the exemption is fixed by state law.

Section 522(b) allows a debtor to choose federal or applicable state exemptions, while an opt-out state limits the debtor to state-law exemptions.

In Re Haning · filed 2000-06-20§ 522(b)(1), § 522(b)(2)(A), § 522(b)(2)(B)

While the Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor to choose between exemptions, Florida citizens are not entitled to the federal exemptions listed in § 522(d). Florida citizens are entitled to only those exemptions allowed by state law.

Section 522(b) offers a federal exemption scheme and a state-law scheme, and an opt-out state’s law controls the exemptions available to its domiciled debtors.

In Re Moss · filed 2001-02-07(b), (b)(2)(A)

The State determines which exemption scheme should apply, ... whether it will opt-out of the federal exemption scheme and utilize the state’s exemption statute. Missouri has chosen to opt-out.

Exempt property may remain liable only for the categories of debts listed in § 522(c), so state law cannot make it liable for additional debts such as pre-homestead debts.

In Re Whalen-Griffin · filed 1997-03-14§ 522(c)

§ 522(c) of the Bankruptcy Code preempts state law with respect to defining the debts for which exempt property will be liable.

Under § 522(c), exempt property is not liable for a prepetition debt unless one of the section's listed exceptions applies, so § 553(a)'s setoff right must yield to the debtor's exemption for dischargeable tax debts.

United States v. Jones (In Re Jones) · filed 1999-02-23(c)

In sum, the IRS’s right of setoff under § 553(a) must yield to Debtor’s right to exempt and protect assets under § 522(c). Therefore, the court finds that because Debt- or properly exempted her 1995 federal income tax refund and the 1990 and 1991 tax debts for which the IRS intercepted her refund were dischargeable debts, setoff against those debts was impermissible under § 522(c).

In a case converted from chapter 13 to chapter 7, exemption eligibility is determined using the facts as they existed on the date the original bankruptcy petition was filed, not the conversion date.

In the Matter of Isidro C. Sandoval in the Matter of Martha C. Sandoval, Debtors. John Patrick Lowe v. Sandova · filed 1997-02-07§ 522(b)(2)(A)

For all the reasons discussed above, we conclude that the Sandovals’ homestead exemption must be determined as of the date of filing rather than as of the date of conversion.

Section 522 allows a debtor to exempt certain interests in the debtor’s own property and avoid judicial liens impairing those exemptions, but it does not authorize avoidance of liens on property belonging to third parties.

In Re Stephenson · filed 1997-02-10§ 522(b) and § 522(f)(1)

These powers, however, are limited solely to interests in property belonging to the Debtor. The Code does not permit the Debtor to avoid liens against the property of third parties, even when such liens may be invalid under state law.

Section 522(f) allows a debtor to extinguish a judicial lien that impairs an exemption so it cannot attach to future equity in the property.

Marshall v. Suntrust Bank, Savannah N.A. (In Re Marshall) · filed 1997-02-06§ 522(f)

This result is consistent with Congressional intent to cleanse a debtor’s property of certain pre-petition liens in an effort to promote the debtor’s fresh start.

A debtor must satisfy both § 522(b)'s exemption requirements and § 522(f)(1)(B)'s lien-avoidance requirements to avoid a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest.

In Re Liston · filed 1997-03-07§ 522(b)

The Court having determined that Debtor was not entitled to claim her Compac [sic] 486 Computer with hard drive and monitor or her Vita Master Treadmill as exempt under Oklahoma law, the requirement set forth in § 522(b) is not met.

Counting exempt post-petition income as Chapter 13 disposable income does not make the exempt property liable to unsecured creditors under § 522.

Stuart v. Koch · filed 1997-03-28(c)

Including exempt income in disposable income does not make exempt property "liable" to Chapter 13 unsecured creditors.

Section 522(c)'s protection for exempt property from liability for pre-petition debts does not prevent exempt income from being included in Chapter 13 disposable income.

In Re Eugene Wayne Koch, Debra Marie Nelson-Koch, Debtors. Barbara G. Stuart, United States Trustee v. Koch · filed 1997-03-28(c)

A recent decision not cited by the parties also rejected this line of authority, but on the ground that treating exempt income as Chapter 13 disposable income violates the mandate in § 522(c) that exempt property “is not liable” for any pre-petition debt. ... We disagree. Including exempt income in disposable income does not make exempt property “liable” to Chapter 13 unsecured creditors.

Section 522(c) does not prevent exempt income from being treated as disposable income in a Chapter 13 plan when the income is not reasonably necessary for the debtor’s support.

In re Springer · filed 2005-03-03(c)

This Court must concur with the reasoning employed by the majority of the courts that have addressed this issue. Although Chapter 13 debtors are entitled to claim property as exempt, the purpose of those exemptions is not the same for Chapter 13 debtors as for Chapter 7 debtors. By choosing to file a Chapter 13 rather than a Chapter 7 case, debtors are seeking the benefits of being allowed to retain their non-exempt property, while also obtaining a discharge of what is often a large portion of a significant amount of unsecured debt. Chapter 13 debtors also receive the benefit of a more liberal discharge (the so-called “superdischarge”) and often the option of curing defaults and arrearages on their secured debts, which enables them to save their homes and vehicles. The price for doing so is committing to pay all creditors all income that is not reasonably necessary for support received during a thirty-six month period. Because the operative statute does not indicate that this price is to be reduced by the amount of income that may also be exempt, this Court is inclined to adopt the reasoning and holding of the majority decisions and conclude that exempt income may constitute disposable income.

Section 522(c) does not prevent exempt property from being included in a Chapter 13 debtor’s disposable-income calculation because doing so does not make the property liable for creditors’ debts.

In re Brah · filed 2017-01-25(c)

Section 522(c) does not compel courts to depart from a plain meaning reading of §§ 101(10A) and 1325(b)(2) that permits inclusion of exempt income in disposable income.

Section 522(c)'s protection for exempt property does not prevent exempt funds from being included in a Chapter 13 debtor's disposable-income calculation under § 1325(b).

Ortiz-Peredo v. Viegelahn · filed 2018-03-29(c)

Chapter 13 relief is at the option of the debtor, and the limit placed on disposable income in Section 1325(b) does not render property that is exempt under Section 522(c) liable for prepetition debts, but rather defines the terms upon which Congress has made the benefits of Chapter 13 available.

Section 522(c) protects exempt property from prepetition debts, but does not prevent exempt income from being counted as projected disposable income in a Chapter 13 plan.

Eric A Olson · filed 2023-05-31(c)

The limit placed on disposable income in section 1325(b) does not render exempt property under section 522(c) liable for prepetition debts, but rather “defines the terms upon which Congress made the benefits of Chapter 13 available.” Stuart v. Koch (In re Koch), 109 F.3d 1285, 1289 (8th Cir. 1997).

Section 522(d)(10)(C) does not cover accidental-death-and-dismemberment proceeds payable for loss of a body part rather than lost income, and § 522(d)(11)(E) covers only payments compensating lost future earnings.

In Re Chavis · filed 1997-04-29(d)(10)(C) and (d)(11)(E)

the proceeds of this accidental death and dismemberment insurance policy are not analogous to or intended to be payments on account of lost income due to disability under § 522(d)(10)(C). ... because § 522(d)(ll)(E) covers only payments in compensation for lost future earnings, we must reject Debtor’s claim to exemption under § 522(d)(ll)(E).

Section 522(d)(10)(C) exempts only the debtor's right to receive disability benefits, not prepetition funds in a bank account merely traceable to that right.

Makoroff v. Panza (In Re Panza) · filed 1998-03-25(d)(10)(C)

The overall structure of § 522(d) of the Bankruptcy Code leads us to conclude that funds in a bank account that are derived from (or traceable to) a right to receive a disability payment are not also exempt by virtue of § 522(d)(10)(C).

Sections 522(d)(10)(C) and (d)(11)(E) do not exempt workmen’s-compensation proceeds deposited in a checking account when the statute protects only the right to receive benefits, not traceable proceeds.

Szybist v. Michael (In Re Michael) · filed 2001-04-12(d)(10)(C), (d)(11)(E)

It does not go the extra step and exempt property that is traceable from the original workmen’s compensation award.

Section 522(d)(10)(C) and (d)(11)(E) allow a debtor to exempt a lump-sum workers’ compensation award not received before the bankruptcy filing, as a disability benefit or compensation for loss of future earnings.

In re Hanh Hieu Dang · filed 2012-06-13(d)(10)(C) and (d)(11)(E)

Lump sum worker’s compensation awards may be exempted under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(C) when the funds have not yet been received at the time the debtor files his petition for relief under the Bankruptcy Code. ... However, if the award is considered as loss of future earnings, it is exempt under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(ll)(E). At the time the petition was filed, the Debtor had a right to receive the compensation for loss of future earnings. ... The award is exempt under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(C) and/or 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(ll)(E).

Section 522(d)(10)(E) exempts qualifying disability benefits, § 522(d)(11)(D) exempts up to $7,500 for personal bodily injury, and § 522(d)(11)(E) exempts compensation for lost future earnings.

Roeder v. Ziegler (In Re Ziegler) · filed 1993-07-07(d)(10)(E), (d)(11)(D), and (d)(11)(E)

Even if the temporary disability payments are property of the estate, such payments are exempt under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E). ... We find that the Debtor is entitled to an exemption to be paid from the Annuity Contract in the amount of $7,500 pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(ll)(D). ... The Annuity Contract does not represent “compensation of loss of future earnings” and therefore, the Debtor cannot claim as exempt the entire Annuity Contract pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(ll)(E).

Section 522(d)(10) allows a debtor to exempt certain disability benefits, including benefits already received and traceable in readily withdrawable funds.

In Re Frazier · filed 1990-07-25(d)(10)

The central question presented, then, is whether § 522(d)(10) is limited to payments not yet received when the bankruptcy case was filed. I conclude that it is not. ... Section 522(d)(10), which provides an exemption, must be liberally construed. A construction which exempts both benefits received and benefits to be received harmonizes Section 522(d)(10) with Section 407(a), which requires that “none of the moneys paid or payable ... shall be subject to ... the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law,” and represents the more liberal application. ... The fact that the disability benefit funds traced in the account have been commingled with other exempt funds is irrelevant to the consideration of whether the disability funds retain their exempt status under Section 522(d)(10). ... They continue to be protected by the exemption granted under Section 522(d)(10).

Section 522(d)(5) exempts only a specified dollar-value interest in an asset, so claiming less than the asset's value does not exempt the entire asset.

Soost v. NAH, Inc. (In Re Soost) · filed 2001-06-01(d)(5)

Accordingly, where the value of an asset exceeds the amount of the claimed exemption, the asset as a whole does not become exempt.

Section 522(d)(5) permits a debtor to exempt property only when the debtor has an ownership or monetary interest in the property that is part of the bankruptcy estate; a non-titleholder’s contingent right to possess a marital residence does not support a separate exemption.

In Re Cohen · filed 2001-07-10(d)(5)

Any property can be exempted under this subsection, provided that the property is part of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate under Bankruptcy Code § 541. ... In other words, a debtor must have an ownership interest in property before an exemption may be claimed. ... In this context, an interest in property implies a monetary interest, and something more than a mere right to use and/or reside in the property. ... Accordingly, Ms. Cohen is not entitled to her proposed exemption under § 522(d)(5) because her interest in the property is contingent upon, and an undetermined percentage of, Mr. Cohen’s fee interest. ... Ms. Cohen is not entitled to a separate exemption of her own as she would be if she also was a title holder.

Section 522(d)(5) permits a debtor to exempt an interest in any property only up to the applicable statutory dollar limit.

In Re: Susan E. Wick, Debtor. John R. Stoebner, Trustee-Appellant v. Susan E. Wick Teaching Temps, Inc. Nichols Kaster & · filed 2002-01-09(d)(5)

Under the federal exemption scheme applicable to her case, Ms. Wick had available to her the “wildcard” exemption of 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5) that allows a debtor to claim as exempt an interest in any property, up to a dollar limit. ... We reject Ms. Wick’s contention that listing “unknown” as the current market value of the exemptions is sufficient as a matter of law to make an asset fully exempt. ... Here, when a specific dollar figure given by statute limited the amount of the exemption, and the trustee did not forsake an interest in the options, either through inadvertence or misjudgment, listing “unknown” does not, by itself, render the options fully exempt. Ms. Wick exempted only up to $3,925 of the value of the options, not the entire asset.

Section 522(d)(5) permits a debtor to exempt an asset up to the amount claimed, so value beyond the exemption remains property of the bankruptcy estate.

Garzoni v. Taunt · filed 2003-01-08(d)(5)

Further, the court determined that Garzoni had, indeed, exempted the purchased litigation for a value of $1.00, with the remaining value belonging to the estate. ... Accordingly, this court hereby adopts the opinion of the district court entered April 6, 2001, and affirms the bankruptcy court’s sale of the Garzoni Action.

Section 522(d)(5) limits the debtor's aggregate wildcard exemption to the statutory dollar amount.

McKown v. United States Department of Agriculture · filed 2003-07-08(d)(5)

the aggregate value of their claimed exemptions exceeded the limit on the exemption.

Section 522(d)(1) allows a debtor to exempt property used as a residence, but a vacation timeshare used only sporadically and not as a permanent home does not qualify as a homestead residence.

In Re Brown · filed 2003-09-17(d)(1)

Given the purpose of the federal homestead exemption and the nature of the Debtors’ interest and use of their Florida vacation timeshare, this Court concludes that the timeshare is not a “homestead,” under Florida law, and thus cannot be claimed as exempt under the federal homestead exemption provision. Therefore, the Court must sustain the Trustee’s objection to the Debtors’ claim of exemption in their Florida timeshare because it is not a “residence” for purposes of § 522(d)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, the Trustee’s Objection to the Debtors’ claim of exemption in their Florida timeshare, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1), is sustained.

Section 522(d)(5) permits the debtors to exempt only their remaining interest in escrowed funds after the amounts required to be disbursed to other parties are deducted.

Burch v. Bonded Adjusters, Inc. (In Re the Consolidated Estates of Pelc) · filed 1983-06-01(d)(5)

In their Schedule B-4 attached to their petition, the Peles claimed the balance due from the sale of the property consisting of the June, 1982 installment specifying 11 U.S.C. Section 522(d)(5) as the statute giving rise to the exemption. ... Accordingly, the trustee’s complaint for avoidance and recovery of the transfers alleged as preferential is denied and he shall take nothing thereon. The debtors are entitled to claim as exempt only the portion of the funds subject to the escrow, if any, to which they are entitled under the escrow instructions over and above the instructed disbursements to others.

Section 522(d)(1) permits an exemption for a debtor's limited interest in real or personal property used as a residence by the debtor or a dependent, but a mere lien or collateral interest in the residence does not qualify.

Keller v. Johnson · filed 2004-07-12(d)(1)

Thus, we must consider whether a “[c]harge upon land for the payment of a debt or duty,” Gau, 41 N.W.2d at 448, qualifies as an “aggregate interest . . . in real property or personal property that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor uses as a residence . . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1). We hold that it does not. First, although the debtor’s lien is a personal property interest under Minnesota law, neither the debtor nor his dependent uses the lien as a residence. Second, the debtor has no ownership or possessory interest in the residence. We do not believe the debtor’s mere collateral interest in the residence rises to the level of a homestead right under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1).

Section 522(d)(5) permits a debtor to exempt a limited amount of property under the bankruptcy wild-card exemption; any value above the claimed exemption remains in the estate.

Ring, Donna S. v. Rameker, William J. · filed 2005-06-29(d)(5)

Like other property, though, a legal claim may remain outside the estate if the debtor utilizes an available exemption, 11 U.S.C. § 522, or the claim may revert back to the debtor if the trustee chooses to abandon it as estate property, id. § 554. ... Ring successfully exempted $7,374 of the settlement proceeds because no one objected, Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638 (1992), but to the extent the value of the inheritance claim exceeded that amount it remained estate property under the trustee’s control.

Section 522(d)(5)'s wildcard exemption cannot be used for omitted tax refunds when the debtor has already allocated it to other assets.

Seaver v. Markey (In Re Markey) · filed 2007-10-29(d)(5)

Under the Debtor’s original claim of exemptions, there was no mention at all of a right to tax refunds. This alone rendered them non-exempt. But in any event, the Debtor’s use of the “wild card” of § 522(d)(5) as to other assets left no unapplied exemption rights to use on the right to refunds.

Section 522(d)(5) permits a debtor to exempt an interest in property only up to the statute's maximum monetary amount, not the entire property in kind.

Lewandowski v. Lim · filed 2008-05-01(d)(5)

Section 522(d)(5) allows the Lewandowskis to exempt their interest in the property up to a value of $7,500, but does not allow them to make an “in-kind” exemption of the property.

Section 522(d)(5)'s claimed exemption does not automatically remove estate property or negate the court's determination that the property is estate property before the exemption is allowed.

Gonzales v. Steffien (In Re Steffien) · filed 2009-06-23(d)(5)

The fact that Mr. Steffien has claimed an exemption in his interest in the Property has no effect on this analysis. ... Exemptions claimed in property of the estate are not automatic.

Section 522(d)(1) does not cover a former-home lien interest when the debtor has neither ownership nor possession of the residence at filing.

In Re Fink · filed 2009-10-27(d)(1)

Therefore, the debtor’s lien interest in his former homestead does not qualify as an interest subject to the homestead exemption under federal law.

Section 522(d)(5) permits a debtor to exempt any property of the bankruptcy estate, including a cause of action, subject to the applicable statutory dollar limit and to the extent the property is unencumbered by a lien.

In Re Beaudoin · filed 2010-03-30(d)(5)

This Court’s view that the Section 522(d)(5) exemption applies to any property without limitation as to its character or type is aligned and consistent with the majority of the newer courts which have addressed the issue. Specifically, this Court determines that the Section 522(d)(5) exemption applies literally to all property of the estate as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 541, and not just the specific types of property listed elsewhere in Section 522 or causes of action specifically delineated in Section 522(d)(ll). Therefore, the Debtors may claim an exemption in the Proceeds of the Action under Section 522(d)(5) to the extent such proceeds are unencumbered by a lien, and are within applicable statutory limits.

Section 522(d)(5) limits a debtor’s right to retain property to the exemption’s dollar value, rather than creating an intrinsic right to retain the property itself regardless of value.

In Re Wiczek · filed 2011-06-16(d)(5)

The Debtors’ rights to retain the enterprise interests in the face of liquidation under Chapter 7 are statutorily delimited by value, in the text of § 522(d)(5). As a result, the Debtors have no intrinsic, preemptive right to retain the interests themselves, in-kind and without respect to their value.

Section 522(d)(1) allows a debtor to exempt qualifying property used as a residence, including associated rural land and oil and gas rights, subject to the section's value limit, while § 522(d)(5)'s wildcard exemption can reduce the amount available under § 522(d)(1) when the wildcard limit is exceeded.

Zebley v. Graff (In Re Graff) · filed 2011-08-23(d)(1), (d)(5)

Applying all of the foregoing law to the instant matter, the Court holds first that the entirety of the New Florence Realty, that is all 19.379 acres thereof and the accompanying oil and gas rights, constitutes the Debtors’ residence, as does the Debtors’ mobile home that remains situated on such realty. The Court so holds, in particular, because (a) the Debtors purchased all of the New Florence Realty as one tract of land, (b) it finds that the New Florence Realty and the Debtors’ mobile home comprise one item of property that is used by the Debtors as their residence, (c) the Debtors need not actually utilize every acre of the New Florence Realty in order for such realty to constitute their residence, and (d) the New Florence Realty is rural in nature, which means that a larger tract of surrounding land (i.e., 19 acres rather than, for instance, 1 or 2 acres) would commonly be conveyed with any structure located thereon. The Court then holds that the Debtors consequently may exempt the proceeds from the post-petition sale of the New Florence Realty up to the monetary limitation that is prescribed under § 522(d)(1), taking into proper account also, however, that such monetary limitation must be reduced (a) to the extent that the Debtors’ exemption of other property under § 522(d)(5) exceeds the monetary limitation contained therein, and (b) by the value that can be ascribed to the Debtors’ mobile home.

Section 522(d)(5) allows a debtor to exempt an aggregate interest in any property up to the statutory wildcard amount; when joint debtors claim the exemption, each may claim only the share of the property interest that belongs to that debtor.

In re Landsinger · filed 2012-07-23(d)(5)

To the extent the encumbrance on the rental property was reduced by principal payments made with marital funds up to the petition date, this rental property is marital. Allen and Roberta each have an undivided one-half interest in this amount. No other value has been shown to change Roberta’s individual property to marital. Allen can claim an exemption in only his share of this marital property.

Section 522(d)(5) exempts a specified dollar amount of the debtor’s interest in property, not necessarily the entire asset; a specific amount within the statutory limit controls over ambiguous “full fair market value” language elsewhere in the schedules.

Williams v. Biesiaba · filed 2013-08-23(d)(5)

Instead, the Supreme Court held that subsection 522(d)(5), and most of the other subsections of 522(d), define the property being exempted “as the debtor’s ‘interest’ — up to a specified dollar amount — in the assets described in the category, not as the assets themselves.” ... The Court therefore concludes that when Debtors included “full fair market value exempted” or similar language in column one but listed a specific monetary value within the limits of the identified statutory exemption in column three, the Trustee did not waive the Estate’s interest in the asset by failing to object to Debtors’ claimed exemption under Bankruptcy Rule 4003(b)(1).

Section 522(d)(1) permits a debtor to exempt only the debtor’s aggregate interest in a residence up to the statutory dollar limit, not the residence itself; an exemption claimed at $0 preserves only a zero-dollar interest.

Bob Woodward v. Schwartz · filed 2018-04-17(d)(1)

We conclude that the amount Chaban has preserved through his homestead exemption under § 522(d)(1) is his zero dollar interest in his residence.

Section 522(d)(5) allows a debtor to exempt a limited amount of property not otherwise specifically exempted.

In re Yovtcheva · filed 2018-09-19(d)(5)

the Debtor was entitled to fully exempt those modest proceeds.

Section 522(d)(5) permits a debtor to exempt an aggregate interest in any property up to $1,225 plus up to $11,500 of unused homestead-exemption amount, totaling $12,725 under the version applicable here.

Michael B White and Darla K White · filed 2020-01-10(d)(5)

He is correct that Section 522(d)(5) allows him a total of $12,725.

Section 522(d)(5) makes the unused portion of the federal homestead exemption available to non-homeowners, placing them on equal footing with homeowners for a fresh start.

Kenneth L Raessler and Claudia D Raessler · filed 2020-01-10(d)(5)

However, the House Report on the bill that later became the federal exemption statute clarifies that section 522(d)(5) was intended to avoid discrimination against the non-homeowner.

Section 522(d)(1) allows an individual debtor to exempt an aggregate interest in real property used as the debtor’s or a dependent’s residence, including an equitable ownership interest coupled with present possession.

Michael A. Luedke and Patricia G. Luedke · filed 2020-07-28(d)(1)

The debtors’ equitable ownership of the property, coupled with their present possessory interest, is sufficient under Wisconsin law to constitute an “aggregate interest” under the Code. ... Because the debtors’ beneficial interest in their residence qualifies as an “aggregate interest” under section 522(d)(1) and the amount of the claimed exemption is within the statutory cap of $25,150 per debtor, the debtors’ exemption is permissible under § 522(d)(1).

Section 522(d)(1) permits a debtor to exempt an interest in property used as a residence by the debtor or a dependent, including a non-primary residence.

In Re: Melissa Ann Maresca · filed 2020-12-14(d)(1)

The text of the statute, then, militates quite clearly in favor of interpreting the term “residence” in § 522(d)(1) to include both primary and non-primary residences.

Section 522(d)(5) does not authorize a bankruptcy court to grant a wildcard exemption for property the debtor did not claim as exempt; the debtor must assert the exemption.

Warfield v. Nance · filed 2024-03-26(d)(5)

In light of these principles, the bankruptcy court lacked authority to grant the federal wildcard exemption for Debtor’s RV when Debtor did not raise that exemption himself.

Section 522(d)(5) provides a wildcard exemption that a debtor may use to exempt otherwise nonexempt property, subject to the statutory value limit.

In Re Lange · filed 1990-02-15(d)(5)

Debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 7 on October 4, 1989. She selected the exemptions available under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d), and used the full “wild card” exemption of 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5) to exempt all of her equity in a motor vehicle not exemptible under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(2) and $350.00 in value in her “[t]ax refund for 1988.” ... She has been allowed an exemption for her 1988 refunds, but only to the extent of the sum of $350.00.

Section 522(d)(5) ordinarily exempts a debtor’s interest in property up to the claimed dollar amount; a debtor seeking to exempt the entire asset must make that intent clear in the schedules.

In Re: Bradley R. Orton v. · filed 2012-07-20(d)(5)

At the very least, the Court was clear that exemptions under § 522(d)(5) are presumed to preserve a debtor‟s “interest” in an asset rather than the asset itself; a debtor seeking to retain more than an “interest” must indicate that fact unambiguously in the Schedules.

Section 522(d)(5)’s wildcard exemption can cover a tax refund, and a trustee objecting to the exemption must prove the debtor is not entitled to it.

Santiago v. Rivera · filed 2012-09-26(d)(5)

This is commonly called the “wild card” exemption because it can be used to protect any kind of property whatsoever. ... Having disposed of the two arguments the Trustee raised in the Objection, we conclude that the Trustee failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating that the Debtors’ claim of exemption was in error.

Section 522(d)(1) lets a debtor exempt qualifying real or personal property used as a residence, up to the statutory value limit.

United States v. Miller · filed 2023-03-22(d)(1)

Section 522(d)(1), in turn, allows a debtor to exempt their “aggregate interest, not to exceed $27,900 in value, in real property or personal property . . . that the debtor . . . uses as a residence.”

Section 522(d)(5) allows a debtor to exempt any property, including tax refunds and wage withholdings, subject to the statutory dollar limits.

Leech v. Nichols (In Re Nichols) · filed 1980-06-25(d)(5)

In light of the earlier discussion as to the scope of the property of the estate, the court is of the opinion, and will so hold, that the meaning of “any property” found in § 522(d)(5) is that which is literally found in the words: one, or some, of whatever kind of those items which are subject to ownership, whether it is tangible or intangible, visible or invisible, corporeal or incorporeal, real or personal.

Section 522(d)(1) and (5) treat a federal residential exemption as used to the extent a state homestead exemption protects the debtor’s residence equity.

In Re Dill · filed 1980-10-01(d)(1), (d)(5), (m)

Considering the avowed purpose of the statutory provisions under consideration to allow debtors to elect between the State homestead or Federal exemption and not to discriminate with respect to non-property owning debtors, § 522(d)(1) and (5) should be held to provide that to the extent a debtor’s equity in his residence has been protected by a state homestead, whether claimed by a debtor or his spouse, the residential exemption provided by subdivision (1) has been used within the meaning of subdivision (5).

Section 522(d)(5) allows a debtor to exempt $400 plus any unused amount of the § 522(d)(1) residence exemption in any property.

In Re Carstens · filed 1981-01-26(d)(1), (d)(5)

Furthermore, paragraph (5) of subsection (d) permits the debtor to exempt: ... (5) The debtor’s aggregate interest, not to exceed in value $400 plus any unused amount of the exemption provided under paragraph (1) of this subsection, in any property. Therefore, the wife-debtor can utilize her aggregate interest in the homestead, not to exceed $7500 in value, to exempt any property, because she has used none of the homestead exemption to which she is entitled pursuant to § 522(d)(1).

Section 522(d)(5) permits a debtor to exempt any property up to the statutory value limit plus any unused homestead exemption, while § 522(d)(6) covers specified implements, professional books, and tools of the trade.

Caylor v. Moss (In Re Caylor) · filed 1983-07-14(d)(5) and (d)(6)

The claim that the license is subject to the exemption of $750.00 under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(6) for “implements, professional books or tools of the trade of the debtor” is disallowed on the ground that a license confers a right or privilege to transact a type of business, and is not a professional book or a tool or implement by means of which acts involved in the conduct of a trade or business are performed. Such right or privilege is, however, “property” in our opinion included in the exemption “in any property” provided in 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5) not to exceed the value of $400.00 plus any unused amount of the homestead exemption, subject, however, to the power of the Commonwealth to regulate, to approve or disapprove transfer of, and for reasons specified in applicable legislation and regulations, to revoke such license.

Section 522(d)(5) allows a debtor to exempt property up to the available statutory limit, even when the debtor mistakenly claims exemptions under other subsections.

In Re Wheeling · filed 1986-12-29(d)(5)

More importantly, we hold that the Debtor is not precluded from claiming his exemption under § 522(d)(5) by his erroneous claims of exemptions under other subsections. Therefore, the Debtor may exempt his $2,200 of scheduled assets under § 522(d)(5) and the objection of Hamot must be and hereby is dismissed.

Section 522(d)(1) exempts a debtor’s qualifying interest in property used as a residence, subject to the statutory value limit.

In Re Brent · filed 1987-01-12(d)(1)

11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1) refers to the debtor’s interest in real or personal property that the debtor uses as a residence. ... The legislative history uses the term “homestead” rather than the term “residence” used in the statute. We assume that Congress intended the words homestead and residence to be interchangeable. ... Consequently, because a homestead can only be relinquished voluntarily, we hold that a debtor prevented by a Court’s Order from returning to the homestead has not abandoned the homestead by virtue of such enforced absence.

Section 522(d)(1) permits a debtor to exempt an interest in a residence awarded through equitable distribution, even when the debtor does not hold title.

Hoffman & Schreiber v. Medina · filed 1998-09-18(d)(1)

We have thoroughly reviewed the record on appeal, and are convinced that the bankruptcy court’s legal conclusion concerning debtor’s right to take the exemption of $15,-000 under § 522(d)(1) is sound. We too find the language of the Final Judgment disposi-tive in that it clearly delineates the debtor’s legal interest in the marital home in which she resided with her children.

Section 522(d)(5) limits an exemption claimed under it to the available dollar amount, even when the debtor lists the exemption’s value as “unknown.”

In Re Hall · filed 2011-07-07(d)(5)

As in Schwab, this Court finds that it is more appropriate to view the Debtor’s specified § 522(d)(5) exemption (“an ‘interest’ ‘not to exceed’ a specified dollar amount,” Schwab, 130 S.Ct. at 2663 n. 10), as limited to the maximum dollar amount that provision allows.

Section 522(d)(5) lets a debtor exempt a capped dollar amount from an interest in estate property, rather than the property itself.

Yelverton v. Webster (In Re Yelverton) · filed 2014-08-06(d)(5)

A debtor filing a claim prior to April 1, 2010 may exempt up to $11,200 from his interest in property that is part of the bankruptcy estate. ... A debtor may not exempt property under this exemption, only a capped dollar amount from the debtor’s interest in the property.

Section 522(d)(5) allows a debtor to exempt an inheritance under the wildcard exemption, up to the applicable limit.

Daniel McGuire and Rita McGuire · filed 2022-06-24(d)(5)

For the reasons explained more fully below, the Court holds that Debtor Wife may claim the Inheritance as exempt under § 522(d)(5) and that it is immunized from creditors’ claims under § 522(c).

Under § 522(c), property exempt under applicable state law is not liable for prepetition debts unless a statutory exception applies.

Preblich v. Battley · filed 1997-07-07(c)

Under 11 U.S.C. § 522(c), any property that is exempt under state law (if the debtor has chosen state law exemptions) is not liable for any debt of the debtor that arose before commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings, unless one of the exceptions apply.

Property exempted under 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) is removed from the bankruptcy estate.

Roy v. Beilin, No. 31 50 57 (Sep. 8, 1997) · filed 1997-09-08§ 522(b)

While all property in which the debtors had an interest at the time the bankruptcy petition was filed becomes property of the bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541 , any property that is exempted under 11 U.S.C. § 522 (b) is removed from the estate.

Section 522(l) makes property listed as exempt exempt unless a party in interest objects.

In re: Amro M. Samy and Darla G. Samy · filed 2025-10-27(l)

Once an exemption is claimed, the property claimed exempt “is exempt” unless a party in interest objects.

A Chapter 13 debtor may avoid a prepetition transfer under § 522(h) when the statutory conditions are met, including that the transfer was involuntary, the property was not concealed, the trustee did not attempt avoidance, the debtor invokes an avoidance power listed in § 522(h), and the property could have been exempted under § 522(g).

Herring v. United States Internal Revenue Service (In Re Herring) · filed 1997-07-31(h)

In application, section 522(h) allows the debtor to avoid certain transfers of exempt property, provided that five conditions are met: (1) the transfer cannot have been a voluntary transfer of property by the debtor; (2) the debtor cannot have concealed the property; (3) the trustee cannot have attempted to avoid the transfer; (4) the debtor must exercise an avoidance power usually used by the trustee that is listed within section 522(h); and (5) the transferred property must be of a kind that the debtor would have been able to exempt from the estate if the trustee (as opposed to the debt- or) had avoided the transfer pursuant to one of the statutory provisions in section 522(g).

Section 522(h) lets a debtor avoid certain involuntary transfers of exempt property when the trustee has not tried to avoid them.

Realty Portfolio, Inc. v. Hamilton (In re Hamilton) · filed 1997-10-20§ 522(h)

Section 522(h) specifically grants debtors standing to avoid certain involuntary transfers of exempt property, such as homesteads, if the trustees have not themselves attempted to avoid the transfers.

Section 522(h) permits a debtor to avoid a transfer only if the transfer is one the trustee could avoid and the trustee does not attempt to avoid it, while § 522(g)(1)(A) requires that the transfer not have been voluntary.

Gardner v. Tyson (In Re Gardner) · filed 1998-02-24(g)(1)(A), (h)

If the Debtor means to imply that any transfer which a debtor ultimately reconsiders is, by reason of the reconsideration, rendered involuntary, it is difficult to envision a situation in which § 522(g)(1)(A) could ever bar a debtor from proceeding. This appears to be an unlikely reading of that Code section because it would render it meaningless.

Section 522(h) allows a Chapter 7 debtor to avoid a transfer the trustee could have avoided, but only to the extent the debtor could have exempted the property.

Bank of America, N.A. (USA) v. Stine · filed 2000-09-12(h)

In such a case 11 U.S.C. § 522(h) confers derivative authority upon the debtor to avoid the preference. Of course, Stine cannot use that authority to recover and retain for himself property in excess of the total amount of exemptions to which he was entitled under section 11-504.

Section 522(h) permits a debtor to avoid a transfer to the extent the debtor could have exempted the property, if the trustee could have avoided the transfer and did not attempt to do so.

In Re White · filed 2001-01-25(h)

To have standing under section 522(h), the debtor must prove that she could have exempted the property transferred; the trustee could have avoided the transfer under section 547; and that the trustee did not attempt to avoid the transfer.

Section 522(h) permits a debtor to use the trustee's avoiding powers only to avoid a transfer of property and does not authorize a declaratory action asserting that no transfer occurred.

Myers v. Household Finance Corp., III (In Re Myers) · filed 2001-03-27(h)(1)

Section 522(h) only allows a debtor to prosecute actions designed to avoid a transfer of property. It does not authorize suits seeking declaratory relief.

Section 522(h) lets a debtor avoid a transfer that the trustee could avoid, to the extent the debtor could exempt the property under § 522(g)(1), and § 522(i) lets the debtor recover the transferred asset after avoidance.

Price v. Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. (In Re Price) · filed 2001-04-04(h) and (i)

Once a lien is avoided, section 522(i) allows the debtor to recover the transferred asset. An essential predicate both for the transfer’s avoidance under section 522(h) and for recovery of the transferred asset under section 522(i) is that the asset be exempt under section 522(g)(1).

Section 522(g), together with § 522(h), permits a debtor to pursue the trustee’s avoiding powers and keep the recovered property exempt when the transfer was involuntary, the trustee did not pursue avoidance, and the property would otherwise be exempt; this remedy can be available to a Chapter 13 debtor.

Montgomery v. Dennis Joslin Co. II Ex Rel. Seasons Mortgage Group Inc. (In Re Montgomery) · filed 2001-06-15(g)-(h)

In the second, 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(g)-(h) grant a debtor a derivative right to exercise the trustee's avoiding powers against an involuntary transfer of otherwise-exempt property, and to retain the recovered asset as exempt. To gain standing under the terms of these statutes, a debtor must show that avoidance would lie as a remedy in favor of the trustee, that the trustee did not attempt to avoid the transfer, and that an exemption would be available for the property upon avoidance. ... Sections 522(g)-(h) are part of Chapter 5, a part of the Code that applies to bankruptcy cases generally pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 103(a). Thus, a debtor under Chapter 13 can gain such standing.

Section 522(h) authorizes a debtor to avoid a transfer of property when the trustee has not acted, but it does not authorize a declaratory suit asserting that no transfer ever occurred.

Buchholz v. Pacesetter Corp. (In Re Buchholz) · filed 2003-07-10(h)

Section 522(h) only allows a debtor to prosecute actions designed to avoid a transfer of property. It does not authorize suits seeking declaratory relief.

Section 522(h)(1) allows a debtor to avoid a transfer of exempt property when the transfer is avoidable by the trustee and the trustee does not attempt to avoid it.

Thomas v. Money Mart Financial Services, Inc. (In Re Thomas) · filed 2004-06-14(h)(1)

Section 522(h) gives debtors the power to avoid post-petition transfers of property pursuant to § 549 if “such transfer is avoidable by the trustee” and “the trustee does not attempt to avoid such transfer.”

Section 522(h) permits a debtor to avoid certain transfers only when the trustee could avoid them but does not, and only to the extent of the debtor's exemption under § 522(g)(1).

In Re Hannah · filed 2004-09-30(h)

Section 522(h) allows debtors to avoid a transfer of property under the trustee’s avoidance powers if the trustee does not attempt to do so, but only to the extent of the debtor’s exemption under § 522(g)(1). Such limited authority supports the conclusion that Congress did not intend to confer full avoidance powers upon the Chapter 13 debtor.

Section 522(h) does not let a debtor recover a setoff under § 553(b) when the setoff is not avoidable by the trustee because it did not improve the creditor's position.

Comer v. United States Social Security Administration (In Re Comer) · filed 2008-04-18(h)

This court holds that the Debtors may not utilize 11 U.S.C. § 522(h) to recover under 11 U.S.C. § 553(b) the setoff of the Debtors’ 2006 income tax refund against the prepetition claim of the SSA for overpayment of social security benefits because the insufficiency on the date of the setoff was not less than the insufficiency ninety days before the date of the filing of the Debtors’ petition.

Section 522(h) permits a debtor, in the circumstances described, to avoid a transfer under § 544 if a trustee could do so.

In Re Chase · filed 2008-06-03(h)

The Debtor’s standing to raise the Objection is based on the provisions of § 522(h) which permit a debtor in the circumstances of this case to avoid a transfer of property under § 544 of the Bankruptcy Code if a trustee could do so.

Section 522(h) lets a debtor avoid a trustee-avoidable transfer to the extent the debtor could have exempted the property under § 522(g)(1), when the trustee does not attempt the avoidance.

Howe v. Creditors Interchange Receivable Management, LLC (In Re Howe) · filed 2009-07-02(h)

Pursuant to § 522(h), a debtor “may avoid a transfer of property of the debtor ... to the extent that the debtor could have exempted such property under subsection (g)(1) of this section if the trustee had avoided such transfer, if — (1) such transfer is avoidable by the trustee under section .... 547....; and (2) the trustee does not attempt to avoid such transfer.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(h). When a debtor successfully avoids a transfer, he or she may also, pursuant to § 522(i), recover the property which was the subject of the avoidance in the manner prescribed by § 550 the same as if the trustee had avoided the transfer and may also exempt the property recovered under § 522(b).

Section 522(h) permits a debtor to avoid an involuntary transfer when the property was not concealed, could be exempted under § 522(g)(1), and the trustee does not attempt to avoid the transfer.

Martyak v. Tioga County (In Re Martyak) · filed 2010-02-05(h)

Code section 522(h) may be invoked if the transfer was involuntary, the property involved was not concealed by the debtor and an exemption would be available for the property upon avoidance.

Section 522(h) allows a debtor to avoid certain transfers when the transfer is avoidable by the trustee, the trustee does not act, the transfer was involuntary and not concealed, and the property could have been exempted.

In Re Dickson · filed 2011-08-26(h)

Accordingly, a Chapter 13 debtor has standing to avoid a transfer under § 522(h) if five conditions are met: (1) the transfer was not voluntary; (2) the transfer was not concealed; (3) the trustee did not attempt to avoid the transfer; (4) the debtor seeks the avoidance pursuant to §§ 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, or 724(a) of the Bankruptcy Code; and (5) the transferred property is of a kind that the debtor would have been able to exempt from the estate if the trustee had avoided the transfer under one of the provisions in § 522(g).

Section 522(h) permits a debtor to avoid a transfer that the trustee could avoid under specified conditions, to the extent the debtor could exempt the property, and § 522(e) makes a debtor’s waiver of that avoidance power unenforceable in a bankruptcy case.

Tyler v. Banks (In re Tyler) · filed 2013-06-06(h), (e)

Here, the Debtor can exempt a portion of the value of his home; thus he has standing under § 522(h) to bring a § 548 fraudulent transfer action. ... The Defendants argue that § 522(h) is inapplicable because the Debtor waived his homestead exemption in the Loan Agreement. Although § 522(e) provides that a “waiver of an exemption executed in favor of a creditor that holds an unsecured claim against the debtor is unenforceable,” the Defendants contend that this subsection does not apply to them because Excelsior was a secured, not unsecured, creditor. However, the Defendants appear to have overlooked the very next sentence in § 522(e), which provides that a “waiver by the debtor of a power under subsection ... (h) of this section to avoid a transfer ... is unenforceable in a case under this title.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(e). Accordingly, the Debtor could not have waived his right to bring this § 548 fraudulent transfer action pursuant to § 522(h).

Section 522(h) gives a debtor standing to avoid an involuntary, nonconcealed transfer when the trustee does not attempt avoidance, the debtor invokes a listed avoidance power, and the property could have been exempted under § 522(g).

McCarthy v. Brevik Law · filed 2013-10-28(h)

Therefore, a debtor has standing to bring an avoidance action under § 522(h) when: (1) the debtor’s transfer of property was involuntary; (2) the debtor did not conceal the property; (3) the trustee did not attempt to avoid the transfer; (4) the debtor seeks to exercise an avoidance power enumerated under § 522(h); and (5) the transferred property could have been exempted if the trustee had avoided the transfer under the provisions of § 522(g).

Section 522(g) makes a Chapter 13 debtor's trustee-substituting avoidance authority under § 522(h) contingent on the debtor's ability to exempt the property if the trustee successfully recovered it.

In re Varquez · filed 2013-12-13(g)

Under sections 522(g) and (h) of the Bankruptcy Code, Chapter 13 debtors have the authority to avoid a transfer in place of the Chapter 13 trustee, in the event that the debtors could have exempted the property if the trustee had successfully prosecuted the avoidance action.

Section 522(h) permits a debtor to avoid certain involuntary transfers of exempt property when the statute’s requirements are met, including that the trustee did not avoid the transfer and the debtor could exempt the property under § 522(g).

Bank of America, N.A. v. Welsh (In re Welsh) · filed 2015-10-01(g), (h)

A debtor must establish five requirements: (1) the debtor must have transferred the property involuntarily; (2) the debtor did not conceal the property; (3) the trustee did not attempt to avoid the property’s transfer; (4) the debtor wants to exercise avoidance powers listed within § 522(h)(1); and, (5) the debtor must be able to exempt the property from the estate if a trustee avoided the transfer pursuant to provisions found in § 522(g).

Section 522(h) permits a debtor to avoid certain transfers only when the trustee could avoid them, the trustee does not act, and the debtor could claim an exemption under § 522(g)(1); § 522(g) bars the exemption when the transfer was voluntary or the property was concealed.

In re Dobbs · filed 2019-01-07(g), (h)

Section 522(g) further limits the debtor's avoidance powers by precluding such avoidance if the debtor could not claim an exemption in the transferred property. Under this subsection, a debtor's right to claim an exemption in transferred property is precluded if the transfer was voluntary or the debtor concealed the property which was transferred. In this case, the Debtor voluntarily granted the mortgage lien to Wells Fargo, so she has no statutory right to seek to avoid the lien under § 522(h).

Section 522(h) permits a debtor to invoke a trustee’s avoidance power when the transferred property could have been exempted and the transfer is avoidable by the trustee.

Wilson v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA · filed 2020-02-14(h)

However, with an exception in 11 U.S.C. § 522(h), a debtor in a case under chapter 7 or 13 holds no authority to invoke § 547. ... Wilson has not pled facts establishing that the exception in § 522(h) applies. Wilson has not identified how her § 547 preference claim entails a transfer of property that she could have exempted under 11 U.S.C. § 522 had the transfer not been made. Section 522(h)(1) requires that such a transfer be avoidable by the trustee.

Section 522(h) allows a debtor to avoid a transfer of property when the transfer was involuntary, the property was not concealed, and the trustee did not attempt to avoid the transfer.

Gliee V. Gunsalus and Brian L. Gunsalus, Sr. - Adversary Proceeding · filed 2020-02-19(h)

And under § 522(h) of the Code, the debtor may avoid the transfer of that property if: (1) the transfer was not voluntary; (2) the property was not concealed by the debtor; and (3) the trustee did not attempt to avoid the transfer. 11 U.S.C. § 522(h) and (g)(1).

Section 522(h) permits a debtor who can exempt property to avoid a qualifying involuntary transfer when the trustee has not attempted avoidance, and § 522(c)(2)(B) does not eliminate that standing merely because exempt property remains liable for a tax lien.

DuVall v. County of Ontario, New York · filed 2021-02-18(h) and (c)(2)(B)

The District Court held that, where a debtor does not seek to avoid a tax lien under § 545, but instead is challenging the tax sale as constructively fraudulent under § 548, § 522(c)(2)(B) does not negate their standing under § 522(h). Id. Here, Ms. DuVall is seeking to avoid the tax sale as a constructively fraudulent transfer under § 548 of the Code. The situation here is identical to that presented to the District Court in Hampton. Under the binding precedent established by Hampton, Ms. DuVall does have standing to bring this action.

Section 522(h) gives a debtor standing to seek avoidance of a qualifying transfer when the trustee has not done so.

Grose v. City of Milwaukee · filed 2021-07-14(h)

Accordingly, the debtor has standing to bring her action to avoid defendant’s judgment under 11 U.S.C. § 548 and 11 U.S.C. § 522(h).

Section 522(h) permits a Chapter 13 debtor to avoid a transfer of property to the extent the debtor could have exempted that property.

Duvall v. County of Ontario, New York · filed 2021-11-09(h)

The Bankruptcy Code provides that a Chapter 13 debtor, “may avoid a transfer of property . . . to the extent that the debtor could have exempted such property. . .” Section 522(h). ... The Court concurs, and declines to follow the case law from other jurisdictions that has been cited by the County in support of a contrary result (Dkt. #6 at 41-42), none of which is authoritative in this Circuit. The Court also observes that setting aside the transfer of the Property does not prevent the County from collecting on the lien: the debtor has not attempted to use Section 522 to avoid the tax lien itself, but only the transfer of the Property.

Section 522(g) permits a debtor to pursue avoidance of an involuntary transfer of exempt property when the trustee has not sought avoidance.

Smith v. Brother Loan & Finance Co · filed 2022-01-28(g)

However, a debtor may pursue avoidance of pre-petition preferential transfers if “(1) the property transferred would have been exempt; (2) the property was not transferred voluntarily; and (3) the trustee has not sought an avoidance action.” In re James, 257 B.R. 673, 675 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2001); See 11 U.S.C. § 522(g)-(h)(2021); See In re Wade, 219 B.R. 815, 819 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1998). The parties here do not dispute Plaintiff’s authority to bring forth the avoidance action. The garnished wages in Table 1 plus the Final Payment are exempt, the wages were involuntarily transferred, and the trustee in Plaintiff’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy has not brought forth an avoidance action. Therefore, Plaintiff has standing to seek avoidance of the pre-petition transfer.

Section 522(h) permits a debtor to avoid a transfer when the transfer is avoidable by the trustee, the trustee does not attempt avoidance, and the debtor could have exempted the property under § 522(g)(1), which requires only that the debtor could have claimed an exemption under § 522(b).

Miranda v. TLB 2019 LLC · filed 2025-01-17(h)

Section 522(g)(1), however, only requires that a debtor “could have exempted” the property under state or federal law. 11 U.S.C. § 522(g)(1) (emphasis added). Miranda could have exempted her interest in the Property under New York law or the Bankruptcy Code’s federal exemptions from all of her creditors, whether she could exempt it from TLB or not. Further, she did in fact claim the New York exemption for the Property. ... Thus, Miranda has standing to bring her fraudulent transfer claims under sections 522(h) and 548(a)(1).

Section 522(h) permits a debtor to avoid a transfer to the extent the debtor could have exempted the property under § 522(g)(1), when the transfer is avoidable by the trustee under specified provisions and the trustee does not attempt to avoid it.

Reynolds v. County Of Suffolk · filed 2025-08-20(h)

Section 522(h) of the Bankruptcy Code provides in pertinent part: The debtor may avoid a transfer of property of the debtor ... to the extent that the debtor could have exempted such property under subsection (g)(1) of this section if the trustee had avoided such transfer, if— (1) such transfer is avoidable by the trustee under section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, or 724(a) of this title or recoverable by the trustee under section 553 of this title; and (2) the trustee does not attempt to avoid such transfer. 11 U.S.C. § 522(h). Reynolds did claim the Property as exempt under section 522(b) and the Trustee does not intend to set aside the Transfer. Further, Reynolds's “could have exempted such property under subsection (g)(1).” See 11 U.S.C. § 522(h); see In re Miranda, 667 B.R. 393-95. Thus, Debtor has standing to bring this action.

Section 522(h) lets a debtor avoid certain transfers that a trustee could avoid when the debtor could have exempted the property, the transfer was involuntary and unconcealed, and the trustee did not attempt avoidance.

Morris · filed 2025-11-14(h)

Finally, the debtor’s standing in place of the chapter 7 trustee to seek avoidance of the alleged preferential transfers as required by § 522(h) is also adequately alleged. The complaint states that the debtor could have exempted the property transferred, the transfers were involuntary and unconcealed, and the chapter 7 trustee could have avoided under § 547 the property transferred but chose not to do so.

Section 522(h) lets a debtor avoid certain transfers when the trustee could avoid them but does not, but only to the extent the recovered property can be exempted.

Coley · filed 2026-03-10(h)

section 522(h) grants standing to avoid transfers only to the extent the transfers were avoidable by the trustee. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(h). However, as is explained further below, these transfers are not avoidable by the Trustee because they are barred by collateral estoppel, they fail to meet the elements of sections 544 and 548, and several other issues exist which bar the claims. Moreover, section 522(h) allows a debtor to avoid transfers only to the extent that the recovered funds could be exempted. The Debtor states she intends to amend her Schedule C exemptions to include these funds as exempt under section 522(d)(5), or that she will exempt it as part of her homestead exemption. Dkt. No. 26. However, this argument fails, first because the Debtor’s most recent amendment maxed out her section 522(d)(5) exemption on her property located at 9 Patriot Walk, in Egg Harbor Township, and further, and second because the Blackwood Property is not the Debtor’s residence, she cannot claim an exemption under section 522(d)({1). See (Main Case) Dkt. No. 62. In short, the Debtor does not have standing under section 522(h) because the transfers in question are not avoidable, and because the Debtor has no available unused exemptions.

Section 522(h) lets a debtor avoid certain transfers, or recover a setoff, to the extent the debtor could have exempted the property under § 522(g)(1), when the transfer is avoidable by the trustee and the trustee does not attempt to avoid it.

In re Terry · filed 2014-10-17(h)

This Court summarily denied the City's argument that the Debtor lacked standing to request the relief sought by the Stipulation. In arguing that the Debtor lacks standing to assert §§ 544 or 548 claims, the City overlooked § 522(h). In relevant part, § 522(h) provides: The debtor may avoid a transfer of property of the debtor or recover a setoff to the extent that the debtor could have exempted such property under subsection (g)(1) of this section if the trustee had avoided such transfer, if— (1) such transfer is avoidable by the trustee under section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, or 724(a) of this title or recoverable by the trustee under section 553 of this title; and (2) the trustee does not attempt to avoid such transfer.

Section 522(h) lets a debtor avoid a qualifying transfer or recover a setoff when the trustee does not act; in a Chapter 13 case, recovery does not require the property to be exempt.

In Re Alexander · filed 1981-05-19(h)

Thus, while in the Chapter 7 setting a debtor would have to show that the transfer sought to be avoided was of exempt property in order to recover it, in the Chapter 13 setting no such limitation exists.

Section 522(h) lets a debtor recover a setoff to the extent the debtor could have exempted the property under § 522(g)(1) when the trustee does not attempt recovery.

In Re Hinson · filed 1986-10-10(h)

The Debtors seek to recover these funds pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(h) which provides: ... In the case at bar, it is clear that the setoff was not a voluntary transfer of property by the Debtors, the Debtors did not conceal the property, the property could have been exempted pursuant to section 522(b) and T.C.A. § 26-2-112, and the Trustee chose not to recover the property as it was being claimed as exempt.

Section 522(h) lets a debtor avoid a transfer to the extent the debtor could have exempted the property if the trustee had avoided it, when the transfer is avoidable and the trustee does not act.

Pruitt v. Gramatan Investors Corp. (In Re Pruitt) · filed 1987-04-15(h)(2)

Nevertheless, 11 U.S.C. § 522(h) confers upon the debtor the right to exercise a portion of the trustee’s avoiding powers, including the power to set aside a fraudulent transfer under 11 U.S.C. § 548. ... The debtor has claimed his interest in the property as exempt under New York state law and no timely objections have been sustained. Therefore, the debtor has met the additional hurdle set forth in § 522(h). ... Based on the foregoing analysis, this court finds that the debtor has standing to pursue this matter pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(h)(2).

Section 522(h) permits a Chapter 13 debtor to pursue an avoidance action when the trustee could avoid the transfer but does not, the transfer was involuntary and unconcealed, and the debtor could exempt the property.

Callanan v. International Fidelity Insurance (In Re Callanan) · filed 1995-12-19(h)

Having met the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 522(h), the Debtor is entitled to bring this action.

Section 522(h) does not give a debtor standing to avoid a voluntary transfer when the trustee attempted to avoid it and the property could not have been exempted.

Merrifield v. Benda · filed 1997-11-21(h)

In this case, the debtor fails to satisfy the first, third and final DeMarah factors since she voluntarily transferred the condominium unit, the trustee attempted to avoid the transfer and the debtor would not have been able to exempt the unit if the transfer were successfully avoided. Therefore, § 522(h) does not give the debtor standing to avoid the transfer.

Section 522(h) allows a Chapter 13 debtor to bring a preference action only if the debtor meets its requirements.

Miller v. Brotherhood Credit Union (In Re Miller) · filed 2000-08-15(h)

In sum, the Debtors have not demonstrated that they possess the requisite standing to maintain an action pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) and § 522(h). Furthermore, I conclude that the Debtors, as Chapter 13 debtors, may not maintain a preference action independently of the requirements of section 522(h).

Section 522(h) requires a debtor seeking to avoid a transfer to show an exemption that the transfer impairs.

Kartman v. North Suburban Tree Service Inc. (In Re Kartman) · filed 2006-09-29(h)

The Debtor failed to meet the statutory requirements of Section 522(h) since Kart-man did not show that the judgment he sought to avoid impaired an exemption to which he was entitled under Section 522(b).

Section 522(h) lets a Chapter 13 debtor avoid an involuntary transfer of property the debtor could exempt when the trustee could avoid the transfer but does not and the debtor did not conceal the property.

Fernando A. Neiva - Adversary Proceeding · filed 2024-02-09(h)

Having established each of those required elements, the Court rules that the transfer is avoidable by the Debtor pursuant to § 522(h) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 522(h) does not let a debtor avoid a transfer of property the debtor never owned and could not exempt.

Koger v. Usoroh · filed 2025-09-30(h)

To state what should be obvious, Elliott cannot utilize sections 522(h) and 548(a) to avoid a transfer of the Property because he never had an ownership interest in the first place.

Section 522(c) prevents a state-law exception for debts incurred before a homestead declaration from limiting the bankruptcy exemption.

In Re Mills · filed 1997-08-07(c)

I have stated only that the Massachusetts exception for debts incurred pre-homestead under M.G.L. eh. 188 § 1(2) is invalid in bankruptcy because it conflicts with 11 U.S.C. § 522(c) of the Bankruptcy Code.

The court held that § 522 preempts conflicting Massachusetts homestead-exemption exceptions for prior contracted debts and judicial liens.

In Re Weinstein · filed 1998-02-12(c), (f)

The exceptions for prior contracted debts and previously recorded judicial liens under the Massachusetts Homestead Act are preempted because they conflict with 11 U.S.C. § 522.

Section 522(b) allows exempt personal property to be removed from the bankruptcy estate and not liquidated by the trustee to pay creditors.

In Re Davis · filed 1999-01-13(b)

This additional exempt personal property is removed from the bankruptcy estate and is not liquidated by the case trustee to pay creditors. 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(b) and 522(c).

Section 522(b) permits qualifying property to be exempted from the bankruptcy estate, so an exempted homestead is outside the trustee’s assumption or rejection power under § 365.

In Re Matthew J. Casserino in Re Joani M. Casserino, Debtors, Ronald R. Sticka v. Matthew J. Casserino in Re Joani M. Ca · filed 2004-08-16(b)

An exempted homestead is therefore not subject to assumption or rejection by the trustee.

Section 522(c) does not prevent exempt property or income derived from it from being counted as disposable income under § 1325(b) in a Chapter 13 case.

In Re Launza · filed 2005-06-01(c)

Under a plain reading of § 1325(b), disposable income is not expressly limited by § 522(c). ... Finally, this reading of § 1325(b) does not ignore § 522(c). ... For these reasons, this Court will follow the majority line of cases that hold that exempt income, including personal injury settlement proceeds, are subject to the disposable income requirement of § 1325(b)(1).

Section 522(f)(1) does not let a debtor avoid a judicial lien that attached to a property interest before the debtor acquired that interest.

In Re LaBorde · filed 1999-03-29(f)(1)

As a result, the Debtor cannot avoid, by the use of Section 522(f)(1), the Judgment Liens on the one-half tenancy in common interest which she acquired from LaBorde.

Section 522(f)(1) requires the debtor to have owned the interest before the lien attached; a lien fixed before the debtor acquired the interest cannot be avoided.

In Re Cronkhite · filed 2003-03-14(f)

Section 522(f)(1) requires a debtor to have possessed an interest to which a hen attached, before the hen attached, to avoid the fixing of a hen on that interest.

Section 522(f)(1)(A) permits a debtor to avoid a judicial lien when the debtor’s ownership interest preceded the lien’s attachment, even if a divorce later changed the form of that interest.

In Re Ulmer · filed 1997-08-20(f)(1)(A)

The court concludes that Mr. Ulmer had an ownership interest in the real property prior to the attachment of Centura’s judgment lien and that Mr. Ulmer is not precluded from avoiding the lien under § 522(f)(1)(A).

Under § 522(g), alleged intentional concealment does not support denying a debtor’s exemption when the record is inadequate to determine whether applicable federal law forfeits the exemption.

Ybarra v. Rockwell International Corporation Donald W. Henry, Trustee Chapter 7 Trustee · filed 1997-09-17(g)

We also reject the appellants' first contention. We agree with the BAP and conclude that the record as it currently exists is inadequate to support a denial of Ybarra's exemption on the basis of intentional concealment. On remand, the bankruptcy court may develop the record in order to assess whether under the facts of this case and the applicable federal law Ybarra forfeited any right to an exemption.

Whether a payment is alimony for the § 522(d)(10)(D) exemption is determined under federal bankruptcy law using the relevant facts and circumstances.

In Re Sheffield · filed 1997-09-29(d)(10)(D)

Accordingly, federal bankruptcy law will be applied to determine whether the insurance proceeds are alimony for purposes of claiming an exemption under § 522(d)(10)(D).

Section 522(d)(10)(D) exempts a debtor’s right to receive alimony or support when the payments are intended for spousal sustenance and are reasonably necessary for the debtor’s or a dependent’s support.

Harbaugh v. Sweet (In Re Harbaugh) · filed 2001-01-23(d)(10)(D)

Today, the Court has interpreted alimony as being money that the parties intend for the purpose of providing sustenance for a spouse. ... Therefore, section 522(d)(10)(D), when read as a whole, exempts any payments from the bankruptcy estate that (1) are intended by the parties or the state court to support a spouse and (2) are, in the judgment of the bankruptcy court, reasonably necessary for such purpose.

Section 522(d)(10)(C) permits exemption of a present right to receive a disability benefit even when the claim seeks a lump-sum recovery and the policy was terminated before bankruptcy, so long as the recovery represents a disability payment.

Opel v. Daly (In Re Daly) · filed 2005-10-06(d)(10)(C)

The Court first notes that the pre-petition termination of the insurance policy is immaterial. ... Nothing within the unambiguous language of the section indicates a congressional intent to foreclose a debtor’s “right to receive” a disability benefit as a lump sum payment versus some type of continual stream of future payments.

Section 522(d)(10)(A) exempts a debtor’s right to receive a local public assistance benefit, but does not include public assistance benefits arising under federal or state law.

In re Espey · filed 2006-08-08(d)(10)(A)

This Court is firmly persuaded by the abundant and detailed exposition of this subject so far that the EIC does not constitute a “local” public assistance benefit for purposes of § 522(d)(10)(A). Likewise, that the WFC does not constitute a “local” public assistance benefit for purposes of § 522(d)(10)(A) is compelling under the same analysis. ... If Congress had intended § 522(d)(10)(A) to include within the scope of the exemption those public assistance benefits arising under federal and/or state law, it could have enumerated so with particularity, merely by adding the words “federal, state, or” preceding “local,” or simply by replacing the word “local” with the word “any.” But, that is not the language of the statute. Section 522(d)(10)(A) unequivocally provides for the exemption plainly and with precise limitation: “a local public assistance benefit.” The WFC public assistance benefit arises under state law. Accordingly, the WFC is not exempt pursuant to § 522(d)(10)(A).

Section 522(d)(10)(D) requires a bankruptcy court to determine under federal exemption law whether an asset labeled as alimony is properly exempt, based on an evidentiary hearing and factual findings.

In re: Daniel W. Brown v. · filed 2008-06-11(d)(10)(D)

In summary, while the court is not required to apply 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A) in reviewing payments exempted under § 522, the court is still required under federal exemption law to make a factual determination as to whether an asset labeled as “alimony” is properly exempted under § 522(d)(10)(D). Such a conclusion cannot be reached without the bankruptcy court conducting an evidentiary hearing and making findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Section 522(d)(10)(C) exempts a debtor’s right to receive a disability benefit, including a pending workers’ compensation claim, as determined at the bankruptcy filing date.

In Re Nielsen · filed 2009-01-09(d)(10)(C)

As of that date, the Debtor possessed a “right to receive ... a disability ... benefit.” The weight of authority classifies workers’ compensation benefits as a “disability benefit” under this subsection. ... Nothing else need be proven to come within the exemption umbrella of § 522(d)(10)(C).

Section 522(d)(10)(C) exempts a debtor's right to receive disability benefits, including payments made under a qualifying disability policy.

In re Williams · filed 2018-06-26(d)(10)(C)

There is little to suggest that the Settlement Agreement intends to resolve a tort claim; rather, the explicit language of the Settlement Agreement as well as the overall structure suggest that the benefits are pursuant to a separately created policy, which this Court interprets as a disability policy within the meaning of § 522(d)(10)(C).

Section 522(d)(10)(A) does not exempt tribal casino distributions paid equally to members regardless of need as public assistance benefits.

In Re Hutchinson · filed 2006-10-05(d)(10)(A)

Despite being for the “general welfare” of the tribal members, the Court finds that the per capita distributions are not public assistance benefits, and are thus not exempt under § 522(d)(10)(A).

Section 522(d)(11)(E) exempts a payment for lost future earnings only to the extent reasonably necessary for the debtor’s support.

In Re Rockefeller · filed 1989-06-15(d)(11)(E)

The trustee, however, argues that this subsection requires a two-part test. He says that only if the court first determines that the asset is a payment in compensation of loss of future earnings, (and only to that extent that it is) may the court then decide whether and to what extent it is reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor. I find the trustee’s reasoning more persuasive.

Section 522(d)(11)(E) exempts payments made to compensate a debtor for lost future earnings, not the future earnings themselves.

In Re Bartholomew · filed 1997-10-17§ 522(d)(11)(E)

At least it can be said, however, that any such exemption does not include future earnings, but only payments which are being made to the debtor as compensation for the loss of future earnings.

Section 522(d)(11)(E) exempts a payment compensating loss of future earnings without requiring that the loss result from bodily injury, to the extent reasonably necessary for the debtor’s support.

Gold v. Lewis · filed 2010-07-12(d)(11)(E)

Based on the unambiguous language of the statute, and contrary to the interpretation of the Trustee, we conclude that the legislature has not tied the loss of future earnings to a bodily injury.

Section 522(d)(11)(E) exempts loss-of-future-earnings payments to the extent they are reasonably necessary for the debtor’s support.

In Re Meyer · filed 2010-08-13(d)(11)(E)

The remaining question for the Court is whether the amount to be exempted is reasonably necessary for the Debtors’ support.

Section 522(d)(10)(A) exempts only a debtor’s right to receive unemployment compensation that remains unpaid at the petition date, not benefits distributed before filing.

In Re Wyman · filed 2010-09-27(d)(10)(A)

For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that the payment is property of the estate and not exempt.

Section 522(d)(10)(E) permits exemption of qualifying pension or profit-sharing payments to the extent reasonably necessary for the debtor’s and dependents’ support, considering future as well as current needs; its non-exemption criteria must all be satisfied.

In Re Miller · filed 1983-09-06(d)(10)(E)

However, the trustee misreads the three subsections. They are joined by the word, “and” and thus in order to be excepted from exempta-bility, all three criteria must be met. It is conceded that the plan was not established by or under the auspices of an insider and thus criterion (i) is not met and the exception does not apply. ... I think that Congress intended these provisions to look to the debtors future needs as well as the debtor's current needs. ... If it is true that this section deals with the right to future payments, then certainly the necessity for the debtor’s support should also be considered in the future when the payments will be received.

Section 522(c)(1) preserves a federal tax lien on property of the debtor held on or before the bankruptcy petition date, even if the underlying taxes are discharged.

Moore v. Internal Revenue Service (In Re Moore) · filed 1997-11-13§ 522(c)(1)

Rather, the Bankruptcy Code expressly provides that the tax hen continues to attach to all property of the debtor held on or before the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(1), (c)(2)(B).

A properly filed federal tax lien remains enforceable against exempt property after bankruptcy.

IRS v. Orr · filed 1999-07-26§ 522(c)(2)(B)

their property remains liable for a debt secured by a valid lien, including a tax lien.

Section 522(c)(2)(B) preserves properly filed federal tax liens against property despite the debtor’s personal discharge in bankruptcy.

Iannone v. Comm'r · filed 2004-04-19(c)(2)(B)

Federal tax liens are not extinguished by personal discharge in bankruptcy. ... Any existing Federal tax liens remain in effect and attach to assets owned prior to the date of filing the bankruptcy petition.

Section 522(c)(2)(B) preserves a properly noticed federal tax lien against property despite the debtor’s personal discharge in bankruptcy.

Woods v. Comm'r · filed 2006-03-09(c)(2)(B)

Federal tax liens of which notice has been filed are not extinguished by personal discharge in bankruptcy. ... Any pre-existing Federal tax liens remain in effect and attach to assets owned prior to the date of the filing the bankruptcy petition.