11 U.S.C. § 522

Section 522(g) does not let a debtor claim a tax lien avoided by the trustee for the debtor’s own benefit.

United States v. Warfield · filed 2021-04-19(g)

Although the government’s argument has some force, and the outcome might be different if the Court were writing on a blank slate, DeMarah compels the result that Debtor cannot recover the avoided Tax Lien under § 522(g).

A properly filed tax lien, including its tax penalties and statutory additions, remains enforceable against exempt property because § 522(c)(2)(B) specifically excepts tax liens from the general exemption protection and related lien-avoidance rule.

Savage v. United States ex rel. Internal Revenue Service (In re Savage) · filed 1997-11-13§ 522(c)(2)(B)

However, penalties are part of the “tax liens” covered by this section.

Section 522(f) does not avoid an equitable lien that is not a judicial lien, and § 522(c) leaves exempt property liable for a secured lien that was not avoided.

Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Carpenter (In Re Carpenter) · filed 1999-12-21§ 522(f), § 522(c)

Wal-Mart’s equitable lien therefore would not be avoidable under Section 522(f) as a judicial lien. ... Thus, by the terms of Section 522(c), Carpenter is liable for the equitable lien even though the proceeds of her recovery are otherwise exempt.

Section 522(f)(2)(A) allows avoidance only to the extent a lien impairs an exemption; the lien may be only partially avoidable.

In Re Amoakohene · filed 2003-07-23(f)(2)(A)

Whether the creditor’s hen will in fact be completely or partially avoided will depend on the value of the debtor’s interest in the collateral, the amount of the debt secured by the hen, and the amount of the exemption.

The entireties exemption under § 522(b)(2)(B) does not protect the property from a properly noticed tax lien because § 522(c)(2)(B) applies.

In Re Pletz · filed 1997-11-25(b)(2)(B), (c)(2)(B)

That exemption does not apply to protect property from liability for a debt secured by a tax lien for which notice has been properly filed. 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(2)(B).

Section 522(f)(1)(A) does not permit a debtor to avoid a judicial lien unless the debtor has a property interest to which the lien attached.

Canelos v. Mignini (In Re Canelos) · filed 1997-12-11(f)(1)(A)

Debtors may not avoid judicial liens under section 522(f) unless they have a property interest to which the liens have attached.

Section 522(b)(2)(B) limits an exemption for entirety or joint-tenancy property to the extent the interest is exempt from process under applicable local nonbankruptcy law.

Voiland v. Gillissie (In Re Gillissie) · filed 1997-12-15§ 522(b)(2)(B)

By limiting the exemption to that property “exempt from process under applicable non-bankruptcy law,” § 522(b)(2)(B) clearly intended to limit a debtor’s exemption to those available under applicable local law.

Section 522(b)(2)(A) makes the state or local exemption law applicable on the date the bankruptcy petition is filed govern the debtor's exemptions.

In Re Hutton · filed 1990-01-18(b)(2)(A)

The bankruptcy code provides that a debtor may exempt from property of the estate "any property that is exempt under ... State or local law that is applicable on the date of the filing of the petition." 11 U.S.C. Sec. 522(b)(2)(A) (1988). The federal statute is dispositive. When Fox filed his state action is irrelevant for purposes of determining exemptions.

Section 522(b)(2)(A) determines the applicable state exemption law as of the date the bankruptcy petition is filed.

Fox v. Hutton (In re Hutton) · filed 1990-01-18(b)(2)(A)

The bankruptcy code provides that a debtor may exempt from property of the estate “any property that is exempt under ... State or local law that is applicable on the date of the filing of the petition.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (1988). The federal statute is dispositive. When Fox filed his state action is irrelevant for purposes of determining exemptions.

Section 522(b)(3)(A) applies the state or local exemption law applicable on the petition date, and determining which law is applicable is a question of federal law.

In Re Evans · filed 2006-12-05(b)(3)(A)

Section 522 also determines the operative date for claiming an exemption, which may be different than that provided in state law. A bankrupt debtor may elect exemptions under “State or local law that is applicable on the date of the filing of the petition.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A). The parties in this case disagree as to what law was applicable to these Debtors on that date. The Trustees’ argument asks the Court to find that the applicable law is the same as the law that would be applied to a debtor in a state court collection proceeding without regard to the language of § 522(b)(3)(A). The Court finds that just as the appropriate choice of law is found in § 522, based on these facts the law “applicable on the date of the filing of the petition” is a question of federal law as well, not state law as the Trustees assert.

Section 522(b)(3)(A) determines the applicable state exemption law by the debtor’s domicile during the specified 730-day period, or, if the debtor was not domiciled in one state for that period, during the preceding 180-day period.

In Re Varanasi · filed 2008-03-27(b)(3)(A)

The formula for determining a debtor’s exemptions contained in 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A) incorporates New Hampshire exemption law as the applicable state law in this case because the Debtors have not lived in Ohio for two years prior to filing this case, but they did live in New Hampshire for the six months prior to that two year period. Therefore, Debtors’ election to use New Hampshire’s homestead exemption is not an impermissible extraterritorial application of state law.

Section 522(b)(2)(A) allows a debtor to exempt property exempt under applicable state or nonbankruptcy federal law.

In Re Shuman · filed 1986-12-19(b)(2)(A)

Code section 522(b)(2)(A) allows the debt- or to exempt from the bankruptcy estate property that is exempt from execution under applicable state or nonbankruptcy federal law. ... Thus, the Plans do not qualify for exemption under section 522 on those grounds. Moreover, as discussed above, the Plans do not constitute valid spendthrift trusts under Nevada law. Therefore, the Plans do not qualify for exemption under section 522.

Section 522(c)(2)(B) preserves valid tax liens after a bankruptcy discharge, so the discharge does not prevent enforcement of those liens against estate property.

Internal Revenue Service v. Orr · filed 1998-01-14(c)(2)(B)

Second, a § 6321 lien is not limited by a discharge in bankruptcy: such a discharge only extinguishes the debtor’s personal liability, 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1), and does not prevent the enforcement of valid tax liens against the debtor’s bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(2)(B).

Attorney fees awarded in a paternity action to obtain child support constitute a support debt, so the judicial lien securing them cannot be avoided under § 522(f)(1)(A).

In Re Allen · filed 1998-01-22§ 522(f)(1)(A)

For the reasons stated, the Court finds that Rath’s fee award imposed against the debtor in the state court paternity action constitutes a support debt within the exception of 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1)(A). As a result, the debtors may not avoid Rath’s lien against their homestead property which secures this debt.

The wildcard exemption reaches the debtor's right to receive up to the exempt amount from legal claims, but it does not give the debtor control over prosecuting those claims.

In Re Fetner · filed 1998-01-25§ 522(d)(5)

The consequence is that an allowance of this $3,000 exemption will not vest the debtor with the right to control, solely or jointly with the trustee, the pursuit of the legal claims.

Section 522(d)(10) does not exempt accumulated Social Security benefits, and a debtor must rely on the separate Social Security Act exemption instead of claiming both exemptions.

In Re Lazin · filed 1998-01-26§ 522(d)(10)

While it is true that an exemption claimed under § 522(d)(10) does not exempt accumulated Social Security benefits, Debtor’s counsel represented that the exemption claimed was based on non-bankruptcy federal law. ... The Debtor must choose between the two, rather than enjoy the benefits of both.

This Court decided that § 522(d)(10)(A) does not exempt accumulated Social Security benefits held in a bank account.

In re Sluis · filed 1998-12-03(d)(10)(A)

An exemption claimed under § 522(d)(10)(A) does not exempt accumulated Social Security benefits.

Section 522(b)(2) permits a debtor to elect the federal exemptions in subsection (d), and § 522(d)(10)(A) exempts the debtor’s right to receive a social security benefit, not accumulated benefits already paid.

In Re Carpenter · filed 2008-10-14(b)(2), (d)(10)(A)

If a debtor chooses the alternative of taking exemptions listed in the Bankruptcy Code, he may exempt, among other things, his “right to receive a [future] social security benefit,” but not an accumulated benefit that has already been distributed. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d)(10)(A).

Section 522(d)(10)(A) exempts a debtor's right to receive a social security benefit, but not funds previously paid as such a benefit.

Carpenter v. Ries (In Re Carpenter) · filed 2009-07-13(d)(10)(A)

As the Bankruptcy Court concluded, the cashier’s check held by Carpenter does not constitute the “right to receive” a social security benefit, but instead represents funds which were previously paid as such a benefit. Therefore, the Bankruptcy Court correctly held, Carpenter would not be entitled to exempt them from his estate under § 522(d)(10)(A).

Section 522(d)(10)(A) exempts a debtor’s right to receive Social Security benefits, but it does not determine whether a non-filing spouse’s benefits are included in the debtor’s disposable income.

In Re Miller · filed 2011-01-11(d)(10)(A)

Trustee relies on section 522, a section of the Code that sets forth the exemptions a debtor may take with regard to various interests in property. The issue here is not a matter of Debtor’s exemptions but instead involves the calculation of Debtor’s income. Debtor is not trying to take an exemption for her husband’s Social Security income, but instead is trying to exclude that income from being used to calculate the disposable income she has available to pay creditors. The benefit belongs to Debtor’s husband, as does the right to claim any exemption in the benefit. As a result, the Court finds that section 522(d)(10)(A) is inapplicable here.

Section 522(d)(10)(A) allows a debtor to exempt social security benefits from the bankruptcy estate.

United States v. Devall · filed 1983-05-16(d)(10)(A)

Any doubt that social security benefits are included in the estate, and are therefore subject to income deduction orders, is eliminated by the provision of the Bankruptcy Reform Act that expressly allows the debtor to exempt social security benefits from the estate, 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(A).

Sections 522(b)(2)(A) and 522(d)(10) reaffirm that Social Security benefits become part of a debtor’s estate only if the debtor chooses to include them.

In Re Buren · filed 1984-01-23(b)(2)(A), (d)(10)

And while our reading of the Code also suggests that sections 522(b)(2)(A) and 522(d)(10) are hortatory reaffirmations of the uncontested fact that social security payments only become part of a debtor's estate if he chooses to include them, such a construction hardly presents the kind of "positive repugnancy" between sections 407 and Chapter 13 that must exist for a court to declare a repeal by implication.

Section 522(b)(2)(A) and (d)(10) allow debtors to leave Social Security benefits out of their bankruptcy estates; the benefits enter only if the debtor chooses to include them.

Hildebrand v. Social Security Administration · filed 1984-01-23(b)(2)(A), (d)(10)

And while our reading of the Code also suggests that sections 522(b)(2)(A) and 522(d)(10) are hortatory reaffirmations of the uncontested fact that social security payments only become part of a debtor’s estate if he chooses to include them, such a construction hardly presents the kind of “positive repugnancy” between sections 407 and Chapter 13 that must exist for a court to declare a repeal by implication.

Section 522(d)(10)(A) lets a debtor exempt the right to receive social security benefits from the bankruptcy estate.

In Re Buren · filed 1980-10-10(d)(10)(A)

Section 522 of the Code provides for exemptions that may be taken at the option of the debtor. The debtor’s right to receive social security benefits may be exempted from the property of the estate, if he or she so desires. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(A).

Section 522(b) allows a state-law bankruptcy exemption only when the state statute fully, permanently, and unequivocally places the property beyond creditors’ reach.

Lawrence v. Jahn (In Re Lawrence) · filed 1998-03-18(b)

When Congress enacted 11 U.S.C. § 522(b), it intended to provide for exemptions of property from bankruptcy where the state statute fully, permanently and unequivocally exempts the debtor’s property from the reach of his creditors.

Section 522(d)(10)(E) allows a debtor to exempt payments from a similar retirement plan when payment can be triggered by one of the listed events, even if other events can also trigger payment, to the extent reasonably necessary for support.

In Re Lightbody · filed 1999-10-22(d)(10)(E)

The Court holds that the conditions for distribution listed in § 522(d)(10)(E) are not exclusive and that Lightbody’s interest in the plans maybe exempted to the extent reasonably necessary for Lightbody’s support.

Section 522(d)(10)(E) exempts payments under certain retirement plans, when received on account of specified events, to the extent reasonably necessary for the debtor’s and dependents’ support.

In Re Savage · filed 2000-04-27(d)(10)(E)

Although the funds in Mrs. Savage’s IRA accounts do not have the protections ordinarily afforded ERISA Qualified Plans, section 522(d)(10)(E), does provides for an exemption in “a payment under a stock bonus, pension, profit sharing, annuity, or similar plan or contract on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service, to the extent reasonable necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor.” The issue for this court, thus, is whether the funds in Mrs. Savage’s IRA will be reasonably necessary for the debtors’ support. ... The Court has reviewed the case authority and compared the facts in those cases to the debtors’ situation and finds that the debtors should be allowed to retain the larger of Mrs. Savage’s two IRA’s. ... Under the facts of this case, the debtors do not have sufficient time and the wherewithal to replenish the retirement accounts which would provide funds reasonably necessary for their future support.

Section 522(d)(10)(E) exempts only benefits that the debtor is currently eligible to receive because of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service, subject to the statute's support-necessity limitation.

In Re Dale · filed 2000-08-25(d)(10)(E)

What I do hold is that Section 522(d)(10)(E) applies only to the exemption of benefits which the debtor is currently eligible to receive on account of one of the criteria enumerated in that subsection.

Section 522(d)(10)(E) exempts a debtor’s right to receive qualifying retirement benefits, and traceable proceeds from a qualified 401(k) distribution remain exempt after being deposited into a checking account.

In Re Ladd · filed 2001-02-06(d)(10)(E)

Regardless of the tax status of those proceeds, they would be exempt from creditors under F.S. § 222.21(2)(a), and would be exempt from the bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E).

Section 522(d)(10)(E) can exempt a § 408 IRA only when it is a similar plan or contract, payable on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service, and reasonably necessary for the debtor's or a dependent's support.

In Re Skipper · filed 2002-02-13(d)(10)(E)

The Court concludes that the most harmonious interpretation of § 522(d)(10)(E) is that Congress intended to exempt § 408 IRAs to the extent they are “similar plans or contracts”; payable “on account of illness, disability, death, age or length of service”; and “reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor.”

Section 522(d)(10)(E) exempts payments from a pension, annuity, or similar plan only when they are on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service and reasonably necessary for support; an IRA is not automatically exempt and must satisfy those requirements.

Rousey v. Jacoway (In Re Rousey) · filed 2002-09-13(d)(10)(E)

11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E). There are essentially three main requirements that a debtor must meet to properly claim as exempt payments from an investment plan/income stream: payments are exempt only if they (1) are received pursuant to a pension, annuity, or similar plan or contract; (2) are on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service; (3) are reasonably necessary for the debtor’s support or for the support of a dependent of the debtor. ... Thus IRA plans would still have to meet the requirements under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) in order for IRA funds to be exempt under that provision.

Section 522(d)(10)(E) permits a debtor to exempt the right to receive certain disability benefits under an insurance policy, subject to the insurer’s right of recoupment.

In Re Lord · filed 2002-10-16(d)(10)(E)

Furthermore, MetLife has a right to recoup pre-petition overpayments to the Debtor. Therefore, the Debtor’s claimed exemption of disability payments under Section 522(d)(10)(E) is ALLOWED subject to MetLife’s right of recoupment.

Section 522(d)(10)(C) does not fully exempt privately purchased disability-insurance proceeds; § 522(d)(10)(E) limits them to what is reasonably necessary for support.

In Re Wegrzyn · filed 2003-03-18(d)(10)(C), (d)(10)(E)

the Court SUSTAINS the Trustee’s Objection in so far as it holds that § 522(d)(10)(C) is inapplicable and that income streams from a privately purchased disability insurance contract are exempt only to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of a debtor and his or her dependents pursuant to § 522(d)(10)(E).

Section 522(d)(10)(E) exempts a debtor’s right to receive qualifying retirement-plan payments, rather than the accumulated assets of a Keogh plan itself.

In Re Clark · filed 1982-03-08(d)(10)(E)

In the instant case the debtor is 37 years of age and actively engaged in the practice of medicine. At the present time he is receiving no payments under the plan. Thus, the court is not required to determine whether payments are “necessary for the support of the debtor.” ... This court concludes that the debtor may not exempt under § 522(d)(10)(E) the approximately $55,000 in the Keogh plan.

Section 522(d)(10)(E) exempts qualifying pension payments only to the extent reasonably necessary for the debtor's support and subject to the subsection's listed exceptions.

In Re Werner · filed 1983-07-06(d)(10)(E)

This, coupled with the fact that the Debtor is not receiving any payments from his TRA, leads me to find that the TRA is not reasonably necessary for his support.

Section 522(d)(10)(E) exempts retirement benefits only to the extent reasonably necessary for the debtor's and dependents' support, meaning subsistence rather than lifestyle maintenance.

Roeder v. Cauvel (In Re Cauvel) · filed 1992-10-02(d)(10)(E)

To qualify for an exemption under § 522(d)(10)(E), the Debtor must demonstrate to the Court that the funds are "reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E). ... “The phrase ‘to the extent reasonably necessary for the support’ is properly construed to refer to subsistence, not to lifestyle maintenance.”

Section 522(d)(10)(E) permits a debtor to exempt an IRA as a similar plan or contract providing payments on account of age, subject to the statute’s other conditions and the reasonably necessary support limitation.

In Re: Jerald E. Brucher, Debtor. Darrell R. Dettmann, Chapter 7 Trustee v. Brucher · filed 2001-03-08(d)(10)(E)

The sole question presented in this appeal is whether an Individual Retirement Account (IRA) can be excluded from a bankruptcy estate (or “exempted,” to use the statutory term) pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E). Following the reasoning of three other courts of appeals, we answer the question “yes.”

Section 522(d)(10)(E) exempts an annuity only when it is employment-related future income intended to replace wages lost through retirement, disability, or the death of a wage earner, and it is reasonably necessary for the debtor’s support.

Ortiz v. Rajala · filed 2010-08-09(d)(10)(E)

To qualify for an exemption under § 522(d)(10)(E), the benefits received must: ... 1) be in the nature of a stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, annuity, or similar plan or contract ... 2) arise on account of illness, disability, death, age or length of service ... 3) be reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and the debtor’s dependants. ... A § 522(d)(10)(E) exemption protects future income streams which are intended to replace wages lost upon retirement, disability, or the death of a wage earner upon whom the claimant was dependent.

Section 522(d)(10)(C) exempts a disability benefit paid in lieu of lost future earnings, while § 522(d)(10)(E) exempts an annuity or similar employment-related payment made on account of disability to the extent reasonably necessary for support.

In Re Jones · filed 2011-01-25(d)(10)(C), (d)(10)(E)

An exemption under § 522(d)(10)(C) requires the benefit be received as payment in lieu of future earnings of a debtor whose ability to generate future earnings has been reduced or lost because of disability, illness, or unemployment. ... An exemption under § 522(d)(10)(E) requires the benefits received (1) be in the nature of a stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, annuity, or similar plan or contract; (2) arise on account of illness, disability, death, age or length of service; and (3) are reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and the debtor’s dependents. ... Under these facts and under the plain language of § 522(d)(10), this particular FELA settlement is exempt under both subsections (d)(10)(C) and (E).

Sections 522(d)(10) and (d)(11)(E) limit these income and lost-earnings exemptions to the amount reasonably necessary for the debtor’s and dependents’ support.

In re Greenly · filed 2012-10-12(d)(10), (d)(11)(E)

Therefore, this Court finds that the operative inquiry as to whether Mrs. Greenly is entitled to her Claimed Exemptions is whether the Payments are reasonably necessary for her support and the support of her dependents.

Section 522(d)(10)(E)'s exception to the pension exemption applies only when all three statutory conditions are shown, including that the plan was established under the auspices of an insider who employed the debtor when the rights arose.

In re Valentine · filed 2014-07-11(d)(10)(E)

The exemption allowed under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10) is subject to an exception that arises when each of three components is demonstrated. ... However, the statutory exception also requires that the plan be established “under the auspices of an insider that employed the debtor at the time the debtor’s rights under such plan or contract arose.” ... Thus, the exception does not apply, so that the HOOPP pension is fully exempt.

Section 522(d)(10)(E) permits exemption of qualifying retirement plan payments only to the extent reasonably necessary for the debtor’s and dependents’ support.

Bentz v. Sawdy (In Re Sawdy) · filed 1985-02-07(d)(10)(E)

We are not prevented by the majority holding in In re Clark from concluding the subject funds retain their exempt status under state law even though they are claimed and disallowed as a federal exemption because the trust provides for the debtor’s future instead of his present needs.

Section 522(d)(10)(E) exempts qualifying pension and retirement benefits only to the extent reasonably necessary to support the debtor and dependents.

Matter of Velis · filed 1991-01-23(d)(10)(E)

Although the phrase “to the extent reasonably necessary for ... support” in § 522(d)(10)(E) is not statutorily defined, Congress clearly intended its scope to be limited to subsistence, rather than broadened, as debtor contends, to encompass lifestyle maintenance. ... Thus, because the basic needs of debtor and his dependents will be met without recourse to debtor’s interest in the Pension Plan, the Keogh Plan, and the IRA, the Pension and Retirement Benefits are not reasonably necessary for the support of debtor and his dependents. Accordingly, Judge Moore’s conclusion that debtor was not entitled to an exemption under § 522(d)(10)(E) will be affirmed.

Section 522(d)(10)(E) does not exempt these debtors’ IRAs because the tax penalty for early withdrawal prevents a qualifying right to receive payment.

In Re Snyder · filed 1996-07-16(d)(10)(E)

I am constrained, therefore, to abide by the rationale of In re Clark and conclude that the exemptions under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) simply cannot extend to the Debtors’ IRAs.

Section 522(d)(10)(E) treats an IRA as a similar plan or contract eligible for exemption, even if the debtor can withdraw funds early by paying a penalty.

Carmichael v. Osherow · filed 1996-11-14(d)(10)(E)

We hold that for purposes of §522(d)(10)(E), an IRA is a “similar plan or contract.”

Section 522(d)(10)(E) exempts the right to receive pension payments, but not retirement payments already paid out when the debtor files for bankruptcy.

In Re Moore · filed 1997-10-10(d)(10)(E)

Even if the Debtors rely on the exemption set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E), the same reasoning would apply. ... Again, the emphasized language suggests that the exemption only applies to the right to receive future payments. ... Thus, the Court finds that the retirement payments which were already paid out at the time the Debtors filed their bankruptcy are not exempt.

Section 522(d)(10)(E) may permit a debtor who was at least 55 when filing to exempt an IRA, to the extent it is reasonably necessary for the debtor’s and dependents’ support.

Pineo v. Fulton (In Re Fulton) · filed 1999-11-03(d)(10)(E)

So as to best reconcile the Third Circuit’s holdings in Clark and Velis, its rationale therein for its appendage to the plain language of § 522(d)(10)(E) (i.e., the word “present” before the already-existent phrase “right to receive”), and the pending situation in the instant case, this Court holds that a debtor/IRA beneficiary who has reached at least age 55 by the time of his or her petition fifing is then close enough to age 59/6 so that said debtor (a) shall be deemed to then have a sufficiently present right to receive payment from his or her IRA, and (b) consequently may potentially exempt said IRA under § 522(d)(10)(E).

A debtor’s right to payment from a qualified IRA may be exempt even when payment is available for reasons other than age, subject to the requirement that the payments be reasonably necessary for support.

In Re Kramer · filed 2000-05-17(d)(10)(E)

If the statutory language, as analyzed by the court in Carmichael, allows exemp-tibility based on age, yet does not require payment to be on account of age, then so be it. ... Accordingly, Trustee’s objection is overruled. Debtor shall submit an order consistent with this opinion, including setting an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether the payments are reasonably necessary.

Section 522(d)(10)(E) does not exempt an IRA as payable on account of age when the debtor can withdraw it early despite a 10 percent penalty; the funds must also be reasonably necessary for support.

In Re Bowder · filed 2001-06-07(d)(10)(E)

As in Huebner, the fact that Bowder would suffer a 10 percent penalty for early withdrawal does not make the IRA payable on account of age under the statute. ... The Court finds that the Debtor has ample time and ability to prepare for retirement, including entirely re-funding the relatively modest IRA, and that the IRA is therefore not reasonably necessary to sustain his basic needs in retirement and not exempt.

Section 522(d)(10)(E) allows an IRA to qualify for exemption even when its benefits are not presently payable, to the extent reasonably necessary for the debtor’s support.

In Re Burkette · filed 2002-04-24(d)(10)(E)

The court agrees with Carmichael that an IRA is a “similar plan” within the meaning of § 522(d)(10)(E). ... Contrary to the court’s finding in Clark, § 522(d)(10)(E) does not limit the debtor to a present right to receive a payment from a retirement plan and the court will not inject that requirement into the statute.

Section 522(d)(10)(E) exempts retirement funds only to the extent reasonably necessary for the debtor’s support, based on the debtor’s personal and financial circumstances.

In Re Gosnell · filed 2005-12-19(d)(10)(E)

In applying these factors to the Debtors’ case, the Court finds that the IRA amount, minus the wild card exemption, is not reasonably necessary for the Debtors’ support.

Section 522(d)(10)(C) covers temporary contractual disability benefits, while § 522(d)(10)(E) covers more permanent employment-related payments and limits the exemption to amounts reasonably necessary for the debtor's and dependents' support.

Sheehan v. Lincoln National Life · filed 2001-01-05(d)(10)(C) and (E)

Therefore, according to the legislative history, both § 522(d)(10)(C) and (E) would permit a debtor to exempt a lost income disability policy, which is intended to replace future lost wages, and this alone does not distinguish either exemption. ... In other words, (d)(10)(C) covers temporary contractual benefits while (d)(10)(E) covers more permanent employment-related benefits.

Section 522(d)(10)(C) exempts a debtor’s right to receive a disability, illness, or unemployment benefit, distinct from property traceable to benefits already received under § 522(d)(11).

In Re Wydner · filed 2011-07-11(d)(10)(C)

neither statute provided for the exemption of disability benefits received pre-petition.

Section 522(d)(10)(C) exempts a disability payment when it is in the nature of lost future earnings.

In Re Mercer · filed 1993-09-16(d)(10)(C)

It is reasonable therefore, to conclude that a disability payment is exempt under the Code if the payment is in the nature of lost future earnings.

This Court held that a life annuity purchased with inherited cash and paying the debtor immediately for life is not exempt under § 522(d)(10)(E) because it was not established on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service.

In Re St. John · filed 1998-06-08§ 522(d)(10)(E)

It is clear from the stipulated facts that the debtor’s annuity was not established “on account of illness, disability, death, age or length of service.” ... This annuity comes neither within the plain language of § 522(d)(10)(E) nor within its purpose.

Under § 522(d)(1), the debtors could exempt their interest in the mobile home because the preserved avoided lien was valueless and therefore did not interfere with the exemption.

Boyd v. Old Kent Bank (In Re Spaniak) · filed 1998-06-26§ 522(d)(1)

In this adversary proceeding, however, because the court finds that the avoided lien, though preserved, is valueless, the avoided lien will not interfere with the Debtors’ ability to claim exemptions in the mobile home.

The court held that § 522(c) overrides a state-law exception denying the homestead exemption for contractual debts incurred before the debtor acquired the homestead estate.

Fracasso v. Reder (In Re Fracasso) · filed 1998-07-15(b)(2)(A), (c)

That panel determined that § 522(c) of the Bankruptcy Code overrides the provision in the state statute excepting from the debtor’s homestead exemption contractual obligations incurred prior to acquisition of the homestead estate. ... We agree.

Section 522(f)(1) cannot be used to avoid a lien that was never validly perfected.

In Re Mozingo · filed 1998-07-15(f)(1)

Since there is no valid lien against the Debtors’ property at issue, there is no lien against which 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) or any other Code section need or can be utilized, and the Motion must be denied.

For the § 522(f) impairment calculation, a debtor who co-owns property with nondebtors is valued by the debtor’s specific fractional interest rather than the entire property value.

In Re Holcomb · filed 2000-01-20§ 522(f)(1)(A), § 522(f)(2)(A)

The language of 11 U.S.C. 522(f) seems to clearly state that it is valuation, for purposes of that statute, of only ... the interest of the debtor in property, ... the debtor’s share of the property, which is at issue.

This court held that only individual debtors may exempt property of the bankruptcy estate, so a corporation and a partnership cannot claim the Retain Certificates or other estate assets as exempt.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. D & L Nicolaysen (In Re D & L Nicolaysen) · filed 1998-07-21§ 522(b)

Second, the Debtors, a corporation and a partnership, were ineligible to claim the Retain Certificates or any other assets as exempt. Only individual debtors may exempt property of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b).

Under § 522(a)(2), stock-sale proceeds that become property of the estate after the petition date are valued at their fair market value on the date they become estate property.

In Re Wiczek-Spaulding · filed 1998-08-05(a)(2)

Accordingly, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(a)(2), because the proceeds became “property of the estate after such date” [of filing the petition], its value is the fair market value “as of the date such property becomes property of the estate.”

Section 522(a)(2) measures the value of property claimed as exempt at its fair market value when the bankruptcy petition is filed, unless the debtor’s estate acquires it later.

Polis, Mary L. v. Getaways, Inc · filed 2000-06-28(a)(2)

The Code provides that the "value" of property sought to be exempted "means fair market value" on the date the petition for bankruptcy was filed, 11 U.S.C. sec. 522(a)(2), unless the debtor’s estate acquires the property later.

Section 522(a)(2) values property claimed as exempt at fair market value on the bankruptcy petition date, unless the property becomes estate property later.

Polis v. Getaways · filed 2000-07-24§ 522(a)(2)

The Code provides that the “value” of property sought to be exempted “means fair market value” ... mi the date the petition for bankruptcy was filed, ... unless the debtor’s estate acquires the property later.

Section 522(a)(2) values claimed exempt property at its fair market value on the petition date.

In Re McMullen · filed 2002-12-11(a)(2)

For property claimed as exempt, “ ‘value’ means fair market value as of the date of the filing of the petition....” 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(a)(2) (West 1993).

Section 522(a)(2) values exempt property at fair market value as of the petition date, or as of the date it becomes property of the estate.

In Re Crowell · filed 1985-08-13(a)(2)

This analysis is supported by the Code’s definition of value in the exemption section as “... fair market value as of the date of the filing of the petition”. 11 U.S.C. § 522(a)(2) (West 1979). This court finds that the value of exempt property must be determined upon the filing date or the date such property becomes property of the estate.

Section 522(a)(2) values a debtor’s interest at fair market value when the petition is filed, or, for property acquired after filing, when that property becomes part of the estate.

Willett, Michael W. v. Nat'l Capital Mgmt · filed 2008-09-12(a)(2)

Applying these principles to the matter before us, the Willetts’ case remained governed by the provisions covering property held by the debtors at the commencement of their action until December 21, 2005. On that date, their interest in the Evansville property, property belonging to the estate under § 541, changed from a remainder interest valued at $65,000, the fair market value when they filed their petition, to a fee simple interest valued at $95,000, the fair market value as of the date the property became part of the estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(a)(2).

Section 522(f)(2)(A) permits full avoidance of a judicial lien when senior liens exceed the property's value and the lien impairs an available exemption.

Butler v. Southern O Corp. (In Re Butler) · filed 1996-07-25(f)(2)(A)

The amount of the lien ($115,000.00 +), plus the amount of the other liens ($76,934.12), plus any exemption to which the Debtor might be entitled, exceeds the value of the property of $72,000.00. Thus, the hen will be avoided in its entirety.

Section 522(a)(2) values property claimed as exempt as of the petition date.

In Re Forti · filed 1998-08-14(a)(2)

The value of exempted property is determined as of the petition date. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(a)(2); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § ll-504(a)(2). Therefore, Debtors’ interests in these assets are exempt only to the extent of zero dollars.

Section 522(f)(2)(A) treats a lien as impairing an exemption only when the lien, other liens, and available exemption together exceed the value of the debtor’s interest in the property without liens.

In re Brumbaugh · filed 2000-07-05(f)(2)(A)

In applying the federal definition of impairment to the undisputed facts of this case, this Court finds that Welch’s lien does not impair Mrs. Brumbaugh’s homestead exemption. A lien is not considered to impair an exemption unless the sum of the lien, the other liens and the amount of the exemption the debtor could claim exceed the value of the debtor’s interest in the property in the absence of any liens.

Section 522(f)(2)(A) measures how much a lien impairs an exemption by comparing the property’s value with the sum of the lien, other liens, and the exemption the debtor could claim.

Frank J. Badolato, Jr. · filed 2022-07-25(f)(2)(A)

Further, upon application of the formula provided under § 522(f)(2)(A), the Debtor’s exemption in the Property is sufficiently impaired so as to avoid Renaissance Recovery’s Judgment Lien in its entirety.

A sold-out junior lienholder’s judgment lien obtained through an independent action on the underlying promissory note after foreclosure is a judicial lien avoidable under § 522(f)(1) and is not a judgment arising out of a mortgage foreclosure excluded by § 522(f)(2)(C).

California Central Trust Bank-Corp. v. Been (In re Been) · filed 1998-08-31(f)(1), (f)(2)(C)

CCTB’s lien is a judicial lien based upon a default judgment taken from the suit on the note and complaint for money damages. It does not come within the protections of 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(C).

A judgment lien obtained through an independent action on a promissory note after a mortgage foreclosure is not a judgment arising out of the mortgage foreclosure and therefore is not excepted from avoidance under § 522(f)(2)(C).

In Re Holland · filed 1998-11-04(f)(2)(C)

CCTB's lien is a judicial lien based upon a default judgment taken from the suit on the note and complaint for money damages. It does not come within the protections of 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(C).

Section 522(f)(2)(A) supplies the statutory calculation for determining when a lien is avoidable.

In Re: Dale E. Hanger Sandra S. Hanger, Debtors, Dale E. Hanger Sandra S. Hanger v. Bank of America, National Trust and · filed 1999-11-23(f)(2)(A)

As that decision correctly applied Bankruptcy Code section 522(f)(2)(A), 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(A), which provides a statutory calculation to determine when a lien is avoidable, the decision of the BAP is AFFIRMED.

Section 522(f)(2)(C) does not bar avoidance of a mortgage-deficiency judgment lien because a deficiency judgment arises from the underlying debt, not from the foreclosure itself.

In Re Linane · filed 2003-03-17(f)(2)(C)

deficiency judgments, as a remedy, are distinct from, and complementary to foreclosures, and arise out of the underlying obligation, not “out of a mortgage foreclosure” as required by Section 522(f)(2)(C).

Section 522(f)(2)(A) permits a debtor to avoid a nonpurchase-money security interest in exempt household goods even when the interest was granted before the Bankruptcy Code's effective date.

Centran Bank of Akron v. Ambrose (In Re Ambrose) · filed 1980-06-06(f)(2)(A)

Therefore it is the conclusion of the court that 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) can be applied retrospectively by the debtors to avoid a nonpurchase-money security interest in household goods, claimed exempt by the debtors, which was granted to the creditor prior to the effective date of the Bankruptcy Code. Therefore, the Reclamation Complaint should be dismissed.

Section 522(f)(2)(A) permits a debtor to avoid a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in exempt household goods when the lien was created after the statute’s enactment but before its effective date.

In Re Harry George Webber, Susan Marie Webber, Debtors. Harry George Webber, Susan Marie Webber, and the… · filed 1982-04-14(f)(2)(A)

Although a close question is presented, we agree with the bankruptcy court in the instant cases that it is "not unreasonable to impute to credit companies and their attorneys the knowledge and understanding of a new law after that law has been enacted." When Credithrift made the loans in July, 1979, it should have been fully aware that the exemption provisions of § 522 would become effective on October 1, 1979, and that any bankruptcy filed subsequent to that date could result in an avoidance of their liens on the exempt property. The bankruptcy court properly distinguished between cases where the liens arose before the enactment date and those arising after the enactment date where the creditor had knowledge of the prospective exemption provisions.

Section 522(f)(2)(B) permits avoidance of liens on specifically identified state-law implements without importing a federal dollar limit for tools of trade.

Flake v. People's State Bank of Mazomanie (In Re Flake) · filed 1983-09-15(f)(2)(B)

Where the state law is specific as to which implements can be exempted any general limitation there may be as to tools of the trade when treated by the statute as a general class does not apply.

Section 522(f)(2)(A) permits avoidance of qualifying nonpossessory, non-purchase-money liens on exempt household goods but excludes motor vehicles.

In Re Colbert · filed 1986-02-03(f)(2)(A)

However, § 522(f) does not permit avoidance of a lien on a car. The language of § 522(f)(2)(A), permitting lien avoidance, tracks precisely the language of § 522(d)(3) and (4) and, significantly, omits § 522(d)(2)’s reference to “one motor vehicle.”

Section 522(f)(2)(C) excludes a judgment arising out of a mortgage foreclosure from the statute's lien-avoidance provision.

Wells Fargo Home Mortgage v. Bemis, No. 558748 (Feb. 26, 2002) · filed 2002-02-26(f)(2)(C)

Section 522(f) sets forth the exceptions of certain property from the bankruptcy estate. Title 11 U.S.C. § 522 (f)(2)(C) provides that "[t]his paragraph shall not apply with respect to a judgment arising out of mortgage foreclosure." 11 U.S.C. § 522 (f)(2)(C). Because this action is one for foreclosure § 522(f) is inapplicable.

Section 522(f)(2)(C) excludes mortgage-foreclosure deficiency judgment liens from the debtor's lien-avoidance power.

In Re Criscuolo · filed 2008-04-18(f)(2)(C)

The Mortgage Exclusion serves that goal by providing mortgagees such as Webster with immunity from deficiency lien avoidance.

Section 522(f)(2)(A) treats a lien as impairing an exemption when the lien, other liens, and the exemption exceed the value of the debtor’s interest without liens; applying that formula, the judicial lien was fully avoidable.

In re Dougan · filed 2013-01-08(f)(2)(A)

Applying this formula to the Lien, the sum of the Lien ($101,683.33), all other liens on the property ($631,769), and the Homestead Exemption ($218,231) equals $951,683.33, which exceeds the value of the Debtors’ interest in the property ($850,-000) by $101,683.33. Therefore, the Lien is fully avoidable.

Section 522(f)(2)(C) does not preclude avoidance of a mortgage deficiency judgment lien; it clarifies that a foreclosure judgment does not convert a consensual mortgage into an avoidable judicial lien.

In re Pace · filed 2017-06-20(f)(2)(C)

Accordingly, the Panel holds that § 522(f)(2)(C) can and must be applied in accordance with its plain meaning; it does not preclude avoidance of mortgage deficiency judgment liens.

Section 522(f)(2)(A) measures impairment by adding the judicial lien, all other liens, and the exemption amount; only the portion of the lien that impairs the exemption may be avoided.

CREDITOR, SANTANDER BANK, N.A. v. MASLOWSKI · filed 2020-09-29(f)(2)(A)

The Court disagrees. The priority of “other liens” is irrelevant to the calculation under the § 522(f)(2)(A) formula. ... However, the Court agrees that the Bankruptcy Court erred in ordering that the entire Santander lien could be avoided. The Third Circuit has held that the plain language of § 522(f) permits only that part of a lien that interferes with the debtor’s exemption to be avoided. ... Consequently, $20,957.13 of nonexempt equity remains for the Santander lien to attach.

Section 522(f)(2)(C) does not bar avoidance of a mortgage deficiency judgment lien; it clarifies that a foreclosure judgment authorizing sale of mortgaged premises is not a judicial lien subject to avoidance under § 522(f)(1).

Waters M Le · filed 2021-10-29(f)(2)(C)

Based on its plain meaning, § 522(f)(2)(C) does not preclude avoidance of a mortgage deficiency judgment lien; it “clarifies that judgments authorizing the sale of mortgaged premises are not judicial liens subject to avoidance under § 522(f)(1).” ... The Deficiency Judgment is not a “judgment arising out of a mortgage foreclosure” and is avoided to the extent it impairs Debtor’s homestead exemption.

Section 522(f) permits a debtor to avoid a lien to the extent it impairs an exemption, using the statutory formula and valuing the property as of the petition date.

DOUEK v. NIKON INC. · filed 2022-01-25(f), (f)(2)(A), (a)(2)

The Bankruptcy Code allows lien avoidance “to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under [11 U.S.C. § 522(b).]” 11 U.S.C. § 522(f). A lien impairs an exemption to the extent that “the sum of – (i) the lien; (ii) all other liens on the property; and (iii) the amount of the exemption that the debtor could claim if there were no liens on the property; exceeds the value that the debtor’s interest in the property would have in the absence of any liens.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(A). The value of a property is determined as of the date of the filing of the petition. 11 U.S.C. § 522(a)(2). ... The Bankruptcy Court was correct. Under § 522, the Settlement Agreement does not affect the avoidance analysis because it was enacted after the Petition date. The “value” of a property is determined as of the date of the filing of the petition. 11 U.S.C. § 522(a)(2). Thus, the extent of Douek’s equity—and, by extension, the value of Nikon’s Lien under the State Court’s decision—is calculated as of that date. ... Thus, the Bankruptcy Court’s ruling is affirmed.

Section 522(f)(2)(C) bars avoidance of a judgment arising out of a mortgage foreclosure because the foreclosure judgment does not convert the underlying consensual mortgage into an avoidable judicial lien.

Brandy McWhorter and Barry Rhone · filed 2025-06-12(f)(2)(C)

The Court finds the reason for which Debtors seek to reopen this case, to avoid a “judgment arising out of a mortgage foreclosure,” is barred by § 522(f)(2)(C).

Section 522(f)(2) lien-avoidance actions have no fixed filing deadline under the Bankruptcy Code or Bankruptcy Rules.

Dushole v. Beneficial Finance Co. of Md. (In re Dushole) · filed 1983-08-16(f)(2)

No provisions of the Bankruptcy Code or of the Bankruptcy Rules have established a time limit for bringing an action to avoid a lien under Section 522(f)(2), and the Franklin decision, as Judge Turk forthrightly admits, represents the minority view.

Section 522(f)(2) lets a debtor avoid a qualifying lien on exempt property without a statutory deadline for bringing the action.

Yazzie v. Postal Finance Co. (In Re Yazzie) · filed 1982-10-01(f)(2)

At issue in this appeal is whether a complaint to avoid a lien pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2) must be brought within a specified time limit. ... We are persuaded by Swanson, supra, and the cases which follow its reasoning, that a time limit does not exist for the bringing of such actions.

Section 522(f)(2) lets a debtor avoid a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in specified household goods and other personal property when it impairs an exemption.

Peterson v. Thorp Credit and Thrift Co. · filed 1983-01-28(f)(2)

Examination of the existing bankruptcy rules fails to disclose any time limitation applicable to the debtor’s exercise of his newly created right under Section 522(f) to avoid the afixing of liens on his otherwise exempt personal property. Nor has such a limitation been attempted by way of a generally applicable local rule. Certainly, I know of no authority in this court to apply a limitation on an ad hoc or case by case basis. See In Re Swanson, supra, at pg. 854. Absent limitation, no reason appears why debtors may not assert such a right at any time.

Section 522(f)(2) lets a debtor avoid a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money lien on tools of the trade to the extent it impairs an exemption.

Schneider v. Fidelity National Bank (In Re Schneider) · filed 1984-02-02(f)(2)

Section 522(f) is applicable to Chapter 13 cases.

Section 522(f)(2)(B) allows a debtor to avoid a non-possessory, non-purchase money lien on implements or tools of the trade when the lien impairs an exemption.

Middleton v. Farmers State Bank of Fosston · filed 1985-01-18(f)(2)(B)

This Court agrees with the District Court’s broad reading of § 522(f)(2)(B). ... Farmers are forced to use large expensive implements to be farmers.

Section 522(f)(2)(B) lets Chapter 12 debtors avoid qualifying liens on farm equipment to claim the full amount of an available exemption.

In Re Ptacek · filed 1987-09-03(f)(2)(B)

The Debtors may claim the subject farm equipment exempt pursuant to section 28-22-03.-1(1) and may invoke section 522(f)(2)(B) in order to reach the full $15,000.00 joint exemption.

Section 522(f)(2) lets a debtor avoid a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in specified household goods when it impairs an exemption, subject to equitable limits on late avoidance based on creditor prejudice.

ITT Financial Services v. Ricks (In Re Ricks) · filed 1988-08-09(f)(2)

The key factor in allowing the late avoidance of a lien pursuant to § 522(f) is whether the creditor is sufficiently prejudiced so that it would be inequitable to allow avoidance of the lien.

A creditor may challenge whether property qualifies for an exemption when opposing a debtor’s lien avoidance motion, even if the creditor did not timely object to the scheduled exemption.

In Re Frazier · filed 1989-07-28(f)(2)

A secured creditor opposing such a motion may do so on the ground that the debtor would not be entitled to exempt the property subject to its lien even though the debtor has listed the property as exempt in her Schedules and the creditor has not objected to the exemption within the time specified by Bankruptcy Rule 4003(b).

Section 522(f)(2)(A) permits a debtor to avoid a judicial lien that impairs an exemption even when the debtor has no equity in the property.

Higgins v. Household Finance Corp. (In Re Higgins) · filed 1996-10-07(f)(2)(A)

The sum of these three figures, $120,181, exceeds $103,000, the value of the Debtors’ interest in the Property in the absence of any hens. Therefore, under the terms of the new statute, HFC’s hen is considered to impair the Debtors’ exemption.

Section 522(f)(2)(A) permits avoidance of a judicial lien only to the extent it impairs a debtor’s exemption.

In Re Mangold · filed 2000-01-20(f)(2)(A)

11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(A). Under this provision, a judicial lien that partially impairs an exemption is not avoidable in its entirety, but, instead, is avoidable only to the extent of the impairment.

Section 522(f)(2)(A) values a Rhode Island debtor’s interest in tenancy by the entirety property at 100 percent when calculating whether a judicial lien impairs an exemption.

In Re Strandberg · filed 2000-09-07(f)(2)(A)

These tenets of Rhode Island law, which are fully compatible with Snyder, bring the Court to the conclusion that for the purpose of applying the lien avoidance formula in Section 522(f), the debtor’s interest in tenancy by the entirety property should be valued at 100 percent.

Section 522(f)(2)(C) excludes mortgage foreclosure judgments from the impairment formula in § 522(f)(2), but does not bar lien avoidance under the rest of § 522(f).

In Re Bensen · filed 2001-05-17(f)(2)(C)

Accordingly, the court concludes the reference to “[t]his paragraph” in § 522(f)(2)(C) is, at most, a reference to § 522(f)(2) which incorporates the mathematical formula for determining the extent of impairment. It does not preclude application of all of subsection (f) of § 522 if there is a “judgment arising out of a mortgage foreclosure.”

Section 522(f)(2)(C) clarifies that a foreclosure sale judgment is not an avoidable judicial lien and does not prevent avoidance of a lien arising from a mortgage deficiency judgment.

Peoples Heritage Bank, N.A. v. Hart (In Re Hart) · filed 2002-08-15(f)(2)(C)

This Panel holds that the phrase “[t]his paragraph shall not apply to judgments arising out of mortgage foreclosures” in § 522(f)(2)(C) is intended to make clear that judgments authorizing the sale of mortgaged premises are not judicial liens subject to avoidance under § 522(f)(1), and has no bearing on the avoidability of mortgage deficiency judgments.

For property held by the entireties, § 522(f)(2)(A) measures lien impairment using the debtor’s one-half share of the equity after other liens are deducted.

In Re Coley · filed 2010-09-22(f)(2)(A)

Finally, I address whether any of the values in § 522(f)(2)(A) need to be cut in half, as the Debtor contends, due to the nature of the Debtor’s interest in the Property—that of a tenant by the entirety who owns an undivided one half interest in the Property. ... Miller is controlling precedent and instructs that the Debtor’s contention is correct. ... As mandated by Miller; GMAC’s judicial lien is avoidable under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f), except to the extent of $11,605.67.

Section 522(f)(2)(C) does not exempt mortgage deficiency judgment liens from avoidance, regardless of the state foreclosure process.

First National Bank v. Elza · filed 2015-08-21(f)(2)(C)

First National’s deficiency judgment liens are therefore not excepted from avoidance under § 522(f).

Section 522(f)(2)(C) does not bar avoidance of a mortgage deficiency judgment lien.

Philip R Mammen and Sunitha P Mammen · filed 2019-06-28(f)(2)(C)

The Court finds, therefore, that Section 522(f)(2)(C)does not operateto bar the avoidance of Union Bank’s deficiency judgment in this case.

A creditor cannot retain a judicial lien by paying the debtor the amount of the claimed exemption when the § 522(f)(2)(A) formula shows that the lien impairs the exemption.

Toplitzky v. Hooten (In Re Toplitzky) · filed 1998-11-13(f), (f)(2)(A)

Given the clear statutory language of § 522(f)(2)(A), as well as the hypothetical examples provided by Congress to aid in the application of this section, it was error for the bankruptcy court to allow the judgment creditor to retain his lien on the Debtor’s property simply by paying the Debtor the amount of his claimed exemption.

Section 522(c)(2)(B) preserves a tax lien on exempt property only when notice of the lien was properly filed.

Roper v. Barclay (In Re Roper) · filed 2002-10-19(c)(2)(B)

However, section 522(c)(2)(B) applies only to “a tax lien, notice of which is properly ... filed.”

This Court held that an exemption for pension benefits does not protect those benefits from a federal tax lien.

Allison v. United States (In Re Allison) · filed 1998-12-04(c)(2)(B)

Indeed, even though Congress has expressly granted exemption rights to a person under the Bankruptcy Code in section 522(a)(10)(E)(iii) (Montana has opted out of such section under Mont.Code Ann. § 31-2-106), such exemption does not affect a federal tax lien. 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(2)(B).

Section 522(c)(2)(B) preserves federal tax liens on property a debtor has exempted from the bankruptcy estate, allowing those liens to attach to exempt assets.

Dinatale v. United States (In Re Dinatale) · filed 1999-07-01(c)(2)(B)

Although section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code allows debtors to exempt stated property from the bankruptcy estate so that they might enjoy a fresh start, 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(2)(B), however, also provides for the survival of tax liens on property exempted.

Section 522(c)(2)(B) makes a properly filed tax lien effective against otherwise exempt property, so the lien attached to Tudisco’s pension.

In Re Ross Tudisco, Debtor, Ross Tudisco v. United States of America, Dept. Of Treasury, Internal Revenue Service · filed 1999-07-07§ 522(c)(2)(B)

Since, moreover, a properly filed tax lien is effective even against property exempt from the bankruptcy estate, the bankruptcy court was correct in dismissing Tudisco’s adversary proceeding.

Under § 522(c)(2), a prejudgment garnishment order that creates a lien secures a debt and therefore defeats the debtor’s exemption.

In Re Flynn · filed 1999-08-18§ 522(c)(2)

In summary, the Court holds, for purposes of § 522(c)(2), that Pamela Smith’s prejudgment garnishment order obtained against the Debtor was a “debt secured by alien.”

Section 522(c)(2) does not protect exempt property from a creditor’s prepetition setoff right merely because § 506(a) treats that setoff right as a secured claim.

In Re Bourne · filed 2001-03-02(c)(2)

Accordingly, the court concludes that a creditor who has a secured claim under § 506(a) because it has a right of setoff under § 553 does not fall within the lien exception of § 522(c)(2).

Section 522(c)(2) permits property to be exempted while remaining liable for a lien.

In Re DeLucia · filed 2001-04-24(c)(2)

A liened property may be exempted from a bankruptcy estate, although remaining liable for the lien.

Section 522(c)(2) provides that exempt property remains liable for debts secured by a lien unless the lien has been avoided under an applicable Bankruptcy Code provision.

Eastern States Life Insurance v. Strauss (In Re Crawford) · filed 2002-03-22(c)(2)

Property that is exempted under 11 U.S.C. § 522 remains liable for debts secured by a lien that has not been avoided under any of the applicable Bankruptcy Code provisions.

Section 522(c)(2)(B) preserves a Federal tax lien against exempt property after the debtor's personal liability has been discharged in bankruptcy.

Leissner v. Comm'r · filed 2003-07-01(c)(2)(B)

Federal tax liens are not extinguished by personal discharge in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. sec. 522(c)(2)(B) (2000); see also Johnson v. Home State Bank, supra at 84. Any existing Federal tax liens remain in effect and attach to assets owned prior to the date of filing the bankruptcy petition. 11 U.S.C. sec. 522(c)(2)(B) (2000); In re Connor, 27 F.3d 365, 366 (9th Cir. 1994) (“A preexisting lien on property, however, remains enforceable against that property even after an individual’s personal liability has been discharged.”).

Section 522(c)(2)(B) prevents a debtor from using § 522(h) to avoid a properly filed tax lien on exempt property.

In Re Piper · filed 2003-03-19(c)(2)(B), (h)

§ 522(c)(2)(B) prevents a Debtor from using § 522(h) to avoid a tax hen.

Section 522(c)(2)(B) keeps exempt property liable for a properly filed tax lien even after the debtor’s personal bankruptcy liability is discharged.

Iannone v. Commissioner · filed 2004-04-19(c)(2)(B)

Federal tax liens are not extinguished by personal discharge in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. sec. 522(c)(2)(B) (2000); see also Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 84 (1991). ... Any existing Federal tax liens remain in effect and attach to assets owned prior to the date of filing the bankruptcy petition. 11 U.S.C. sec. 522(c)(2)(B) (2000); In re Connor, 27 F.3d 365, 366 (9th Cir. 1994) (“A preexisting lien on property, however, remains enforceable against that property even after an individual’s personal liability has been discharged.”).

Section 522(c)(2)(B) keeps exempt property liable for a properly filed tax lien, including amounts for taxes, interest, and penalties, even if the lien is avoidable under § 724(a).

Gerulis v. United States Internal Revenue Service (In Re Gerulis) · filed 1985-09-18(c)(2)(B)

However, § 522(c)(2)(B) states that a lien is not avoided where there is “a tax lien, notice of which is properly filed.” There is a tax lien in this case. Notice was properly filed. Section 522(c)(2)(A) and (B) are connected by an “or”. This means that failure to meet the test of either section makes a lien unavoidable since 11 U.S.C. § 102(5) states that “or” is not exclusive. Section (A) requirements are not met due to avoidance of the lien under § 724(a). The Section (B) requirement is met since the IRS has a duly filed tax lien. Section B does not distinguish between taxes, interest and penalties. Therefore, the lien remains as to the tax, interest and penalty portions of the tax debt.

Section 522(c)(2)(B) preserves properly filed tax liens against exempt property, even after bankruptcy and regardless of whether the underlying tax obligation is discharged.

Koppersmith v. United States (In Re Koppersmith) · filed 1993-07-22(c)(2)(B)

Properly filed tax liens continue against exempt property unaffected by the bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(2)(B).

Section 522(c)(2)(B) keeps exempt property subject to a properly filed tax lien.

In Re Swafford · filed 1993-09-20(c)(2)(B)

Third and most importantly, § 522(c)(2)(B) makes it clear that exempt property remains subject to properly filed tax liens.

Section 522(c)(2)(B) excepts exempt property from protection against a debt secured by a properly filed tax lien, allowing the tax lien to take priority over a state-law homestead exemption.

Grochocinski v. Laredo (In Re Laredo) · filed 2005-12-15(c)(2)(B)

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court finds as a matter of law that the IRS’s lien takes priority over the Debtors’ claim of the state law exemption pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(2)(B).

Section 522(c)(2) makes an exempt property interest subordinate to a valid lien that has not been avoided under the Bankruptcy Code.

In Re Williams · filed 2006-06-21(c)(2)

For debtors who seek the protection of the Bankruptcy Code, it is the general rule that exempt property “is not liable during or after the case for any debt of the debtor that arose ... before the commencement of the case, ...” 11 U.S.C. § 522(c) (2005). Simply put, exempt property cannot be used to satisfy a prepetition debt. This Rule, however, is tempered by a few exceptions; notably for purposes of this matter, when the property is secured by a lien that is not otherwise avoided under applicable Bankruptcy Code provisions. 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(2) (2005). Ergo, as the Trustee argues, the Debtors’ right to claim an exemption in their property is inferior to that of the mortgage encumbering their residence.

Section 522(c)(2)(B) does not protect exempt property from a debt secured by a tax lien; an MVRA restitution order is treated as a tax lien and may reach the debtor's property.

United States v. Hyde · filed 2007-08-07(c)(2)(B)

In effect, then, the government possessed a tax lien against appellant's property, triggering one of the explicit exceptions to the Bankruptcy Code's protection afforded to a homestead exemption. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(2)(B). ... Thus, neither Massachusetts law nor the Bankruptcy Code restricts the reach of the MVRA's clear language.

Section 522(c)(2)(B) preserves a properly filed prepetition federal tax lien against the debtor’s property after a bankruptcy discharge, but the lien does not attach to property acquired postpetition.

Letantia Bussell and Estate of John Bussell, Letantia Bussell, Surviving Spouse v. Commissioner · filed 2008-05-29(c)(2)(B)

A Federal tax lien that is properly filed before a debtor files for bankruptcy attaches to the debtor’s property and is not extinguished by a subsequent bankruptcy discharge. See 11 U.S.C. sec. 522(c)(2)(B); Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. at 84; Connor v. United States, 27 F.3d at 366; Iannone v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. at 292-293. On the other hand, a prepetition lien does not attach to property acquired by the debtor after a bankruptcy petition is filed. See, e.g., United States v. McGugin (In re Braund), 423 F.2d 718, 718-719 (9th Cir. 1970).

Exempt property remains liable for a debt secured by a properly filed tax lien.

In Re Bryant · filed 2009-01-13(c)(2)(B)

Debtor may not exempt the refund from being offset because the IRS properly filed a tax lien prepetition. Exempted property is liable for “a debt secured by a lien that is a tax lien, notice of which is properly filed.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(2)(B).

Section 522(c)(2)(B) leaves claimed exempt property subject to tax liens securing prepetition claims.

In Re Duncan · filed 2009-05-14(c)(2)(B)

5. The Debtors as moving parties failed to satisfy their burden of proof to determine their homestead exemption and to compel the Trustee to release homestead proceeds. Debtors failed to initiate an adversary proceeding to determine the validity, extent and priority of federal and state tax liens on proceeds from the sale of their homestead as required under F.R.B.P. Rule 7001(2). Under 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(2)(B), any exemption claimed by the Debtors has no effect in the face of tax liens securing prepetition claims.

Section 522(c)(2) preserves a lien on exempt property when the lien was not avoided during the bankruptcy case, allowing the lien to survive discharge and remain enforceable against the property.

In Re Johnson · filed 2010-10-14(c)(2)

Under 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(2), a valid lien on property claimed as exempt, that is not avoided during the bankruptcy case, survives the debtor’s discharge and can be enforced against the property claimed as exempt.

Section 522(c)(2) keeps an unavoided lien effective against property claimed exempt, whether the exemption comes from § 522(d) or other law.

In re Wade · filed 2012-02-17(c)(2)

Even if the D.C. Code did not so provide, 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(2) — effective as to both exemptions under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) and exemptions under other law — makes an una-voided hen effective against any claim of exemption.

Section 522(c)(2)(B) allows a properly filed tax lien to be enforced against exempt property; a criminal restitution lien treated as a tax lien falls within this exception.

United States v. Robinson (In re Robinson) · filed 2012-11-21(c)(2)(B)

Therefore, an order of criminal restitution operates as a tax lien and, thus, can be enforced against exempt property. 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(2)(B).

Section 522(c)(2)(B) makes exempt property remain liable for a properly filed tax lien in its entirety, including penalties.

In re Hannon · filed 2014-07-09(c)(2)(B)

Thus, a properly filed tax lien remains attached to property that is exempted from the bankruptcy estate. Moreover, § 522(c)(2)(B) prevents the avoidance of the penalty portion of a tax lien on exempt property.

Section 522(c)(1) keeps exempt property liable for specified nondischargeable tax debts, while § 522(c)(2)(B)'s tax-lien exception requires a properly filed lien notice.

In re Villarreal · filed 2016-12-27(c)(1) and (c)(2)(B)

Because this is an unrecorded statutory assessment lien, § 522(c)(2)(B) does not apply. ... The court agrees with the United States that to the extent any portion of its claim is non-dischargeable, the Trustee could sell the Property to pay that portion of the proceeds that the United may attach pursuant to § 522(c)(1) and 26 U.S.C. § 6321. ... Therefore; the case as it presently stands allows the United States to pursue its rights under § 522(c)(1) to reach all the proceeds of the homestead, despite the Debtors’ state law homestead exemption.

Section 522(c) generally protects exempt property from pre-petition debts, but § 522(c)(2) excludes debts secured by liens unless the lien has been avoided or otherwise rendered void under specified Bankruptcy Code provisions.

In re Turner · filed 2016-09-16(c), (c)(2)

However, this protection does not apply to “a debt secured by a lien” unless the lien has been avoided under Sections 522(f), 522(g), 544, 545, 547, 548, 549 or 724(a), is void under Section 506(d) or is a tax lien for which notice has not been properly filed.

Section 522(c)(2)(B) leaves exempt property liable for properly filed tax liens but does not disallow the exemption or authorize liquidation of the property to satisfy those liens.

In re Christensen · filed 2016-12-14(c)(2)(B)

Section 522(c)(2)(B) does not compel the conclusion that the Debtors’ homestead exemption is disallowed ... or that the Trustee may liquidate the Homes in order to satisfy the tax hens to the detriment of the Debtors’ ... homestead exemptions.

Section 522(f)(1)(A) does not let a debtor avoid a statutory federal tax lien, and § 522(c)(2)(B) preserves a properly filed tax lien against exempt property.

Mae Helen Burge · filed 2019-10-14(f)(1)(A), (c)(2)(B)

The tax lien which is the subject of this dispute is not a judicial lien, but a statutory lien which may not be avoided under § 522(f). ... Not only is a tax lien not a judicial lien which can be avoided, § 522(c) of the Bankruptcy Code makes clear that even an exempt asset remains liable for certain debts, including “a debt secured by a lien that is a tax lien, notice of which is properly filed.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(2)(B).

Section 522(c)(2) preserves debt secured by a tax lien against exempt property, including a residence.

United States v. WEBB · filed 2020-09-14(c)(2)

Tax liens survive bankruptcy and may be enforced in rem even after the debtor has been discharged. See Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 84 (1991) ("[A] bankruptcy discharge extinguishes only one mode of enforcing a claim -- namely, an action against the debtor in personam -- while leaving intact another -- namely, an action against the debtor in rem."). The Bankruptcy Code preserves "debt secured by . . . a tax lien" against exempt property such as a residence. 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(2).

Section 522(c)(2)(B) keeps exempt property liable for a prepetition debt secured by a tax lien whose notice was properly filed, so the tax lien is paid before the debtor’s exemption.

Stein v. Baldwin · filed 2021-09-01(c)(2)(B)

Section 522(c)(2)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code provides, in pertinent part: ... (B) a tax lien, notice of which is properly filed[.] ... Therefore, a properly filed tax lien will be paid before a debtor’s exemption in the property.

Section 522(h) does not let a debtor avoid a properly filed tax lien, and § 522(i)(2) cannot be used to preserve a trustee-avoided tax lien for the debtor’s benefit because § 522(c)(2)(B) keeps tax liens attached to otherwise exempt property.

Hutchinson v. Irs · filed 2021-10-19(h), (i)(2), (c)(2)(B)

Section 522(h) does not authorize Plaintiffs to avoid the liens that secure the IRS’s penalties claim, and their first cause of action was therefore properly dismissed for failure to state a claim. ... Plaintiffs’ reliance on § 522(i)(2) fails because, under our decision in DeMarah, that provision is equally subordinate to § 522(c)(2)(B)’s bright-line rule that debtors lack “the right to remove tax liens from their otherwise exempt property.” 62 F.3d at 1252.

Section 522(c)(2)(B) keeps otherwise exempt property liable for a properly filed tax lien even when a trustee has avoided the lien, so the debtor cannot use § 522(h) or § 522(i)(2) to remove or preserve the lien for the debtor's benefit.

Hutchinson v. Irs · filed 2021-12-23(c)(2)(B)

Given the obvious contrast in language, § 522(c)(2)(B) would operate, vis-à-vis a debtor, to preserve “tax lien[s]” against otherwise exempt property regardless of whether the trustee has avoided them. This difference in language “belies any argument that the debtor can escape a part of the tax lien.” DeMarah, 62 F.3d at 1252 (emphasis added).

Section 522(c)(2)(B) keeps exempt property liable for a properly filed tax lien, even though the debtor may claim the exemption and seek to avoid a transfer of the property.

Gunsalus v. County of Ontario · filed 2022-06-27(c)(2)(B)

Section 522(c)(2)(B) is straightforward. It merely requires that the Gunsaluses—who seek to avoid the transfer of their home and not to avoid paying off the tax lien on that home—remain liable for the unpaid taxes even if the fraudulent conveyance action succeeds. ... The County thus incorrectly interprets Section 522(c)(2)(B) as barring the Gunsaluses from claiming the federal homestead exemption, when it merely provides that exempt property remains liable for a tax lien. They are not, as the County would have it, attempting to avoid paying the tax lien; they are attempting to avoid a transfer of the property. Accordingly, Section 522(c)(2)(B) does not deprive the Gunsaluses of standing under Section 522(h).

Section 522(c)(2)(B) excludes properly filed tax-lien debts from the protection otherwise afforded exempt property, so the debtor remains liable for unpaid taxes.

Hampton v. County of Ontario, New York · filed 2022-07-05(c)(2)(B)

The County is wrong. Section 522(c)(2)(B) “merely requires that the [Hamptons] . . . remain liable for the unpaid taxes even if the fraudulent conveyance action succeeds.” Gunsalus, — F. 4th —, 2022 WL 2296945, at *3. Because the Hamptons’ “Chapter 13 plan achieves just that result[,]” id., Section 522(c)(2)(B) does not render them ineligible for the federal homestead exemption.

Section 522(c)(2)(B) leaves a properly filed tax lien attached to exempt property, including the penalty portion, although the lien does not reduce the value of the exemption.

IN RE: SANDRA TILLMAN V. WARFIELD · filed 2022-11-18(c)(2)(B)

The value of the Debtor’s homestead exemption is not subject to a deduction of the IRS tax penalty lien. However, as compelled by our holding in DeMarah, the Debtor takes her exempt interest in the Prescott Property subject to the IRS tax penalty lien. See 62 F.3d at 1252 (“We hold that Congress has denied debtors the right to remove tax liens from their otherwise exempt property. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(2)(B). Moreover, we hold that even the penalty portion of the tax lien remains fixed on that property. We see nothing capricious or absurd about that. It simply adds to the taxpayer’s incentive to render unto the government that which is its due.”).

Section 522(c)(2)(B) makes an exemption ineffective against a properly filed tax lien.

John E. Maye · filed 2025-02-27(c)(2)(B)

Further, the Debtor’s claim of exemption is subject to, and ineffective against, a properly filed tax lien. 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(2)(B). The tax liens at issue were properly filed.

Section 522(c)(2)(A) leaves an unavoided lien attached to exempt property.

Howard v. Washington Hospital Center (In Re Howard) · filed 1983-08-02(c)(2)(A)

Although the plaintiff claimed the proceeds exempt pursuant to MD CTS. & JUD.PROC.CODE ANN., ll-504(b)(2) (1980), she must next prove that the defendant’s lien may be avoided.

Section 522 exemptions, whether federal or state, do not limit the extent of a federal tax lien.

In Re Voelker · filed 1993-12-23(c)(2)(B)

This Court acknowledges the well settled law that the bankruptcy exemptions of 11 U.S.C. § 522 — be they federal or state law exemptions — have no effect on the determination of the extent of a federal tax lien.

Section 522(c)(2) keeps exempt property liable for debts secured by liens that have not been avoided.

Onewest Bank, F.S.B. v. Mazzone · filed 2015-07-30(c)(2)

In any event, such argument is without merit (see 11 USC § 522 [c] [2]; Johnson v Home State Bank, 501 US 78, 82-84 [1991]; In re Scarpino, 113 F3d 338, 340 [2d Cir 1997]).

Section 522(c)(2)(B) keeps exempt property subject to properly filed tax liens even when the underlying tax claim has been discharged.

John J. Mongogna & Michelle L. Mongogna · filed 2025-08-18(c)(2)(B)

The IRS is well within its right to enforce its lien. A chapter 7 bankruptcy may discharge a person from personal liability for the federal taxes owed in some cases, discussed infra; however, it does not extinguish a pre-petition federal tax lien. Iannone v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 287, 293 (2004); see also 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(2)(B) (providing that exempt property remains subject to properly filed tax liens even though the underlying tax claim may have been discharged); 11 U.S.C. § 523 (codifying various exceptions to discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727 including tax debts).

Section 522(f)(2) lets a debtor avoid a nonpurchase money security interest in exempt collateral.

Booker v. Commercial Credit Corp. (In Re Booker) · filed 1981-02-25(f)(2)

Defendant has a nonpurchase money security interest in collateral claimed as exempt, and the lien of this nonpurchase money security interest may be avoided under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2).

Section 522(f)(2)(A) lets a debtor avoid a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in specified household goods to the extent it impairs an exemption.

In re Gifford · filed 1982-08-18(f)(2)(A)

Section 522(f) is narrowly drawn to permit avoidance only of nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interests in the listed items and only to the extent that these items are exempted property under Section 522(b).

Section 522(f)(2)(A) lets a debtor avoid a nonpossessory, nonpurchase money security interest in specified personal property only when the property is held primarily for personal, family, or household use.

Matter of Thompson · filed 1984-01-27(f)(2)(A)

The court thinks not. The debtor is engaged in the business of farming. He is raising livestock on a commercial scale, and it cannot be argued that the livestock or animals are used as pets or for personal slaughter to be consumed by his family. ... It is further, ORDERED, that a valid security interest in the debtors’ 210 exempt pigs under six months cannot be avoided by the debtors’ use of 11 U.S.C. § 522(f).

Section 522(c)(2)(B) permits a creditor with a valid lien filed before bankruptcy to collect from exempt property after discharge.

Fusaro v. Comm'r · filed 2003-12-29(c)(2)(B)

Under the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. sec. 522(c)(2)(B) (2000), any property exempt from administration as part of the ... bankruptcy’s estate is unavailable to the creditors of the debtor, including the IRS, after a bankruptcy discharge, unless the creditor filed a valid lien prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy case.