11 U.S.C. § 522

Section 522(f)(1)(B)(ii) permits avoidance of a nonpossessory, non-purchase-money lien on qualifying tools of the trade, but property used to produce a salable product is not automatically a tool of the trade.

In Re Smith · filed 1996-12-11§ 522(f)(1)(B)(ii)

The use of property to create a salable product does not automatically establish that property as a tool of the trade. This Court must follow the established definition of tools of the trade in this jurisdiction, instruments of manual operation, and reject the argument that breeding cattle are tools of the Debtors’ trade.

Section 522(f)(1) permits avoidance of a qualifying nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in household goods to the extent it impairs an exemption.

In Re Spano · filed 1998-02-02§ 522(f)(1)

may also avoid Chase’s purported non-possessory, nonpurehase-money security interest in household goods to the extent it impairs an exemption.

Section 522(f)(1)(B) permits a debtor to avoid an exemption-impairing lien on tools of the trade only when the lien is a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest; an agreement preserving possession makes the lien unavoidable.

In re Beeman · filed 2001-02-21(f)(1)(B)

Therefore, under the clear terms of the agreement between Klotz and Beeman, Klotz is hereby deemed in possession of the pickup and mobile box trailer (with air compressor) and his lien is declared unavoidable under § 522(f)(1)(B).

Section 522(f)(1)(B) lets a debtor avoid a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in tools of the trade when it impairs an exemption; breeding livestock can qualify as such tools.

In Re Larson · filed 2001-03-12(f)(1)(B)

Where, as here, the Livestock is “breeding stock,” the Creditors’ nonpossessory nonpurchase money liens in the Livestock are avoidable under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) because of the nature of the “breeding stock” and the necessity of “breeding stock” in the Debtors’ cattle operation.

Section 522(f)(1)(B)(ii) permits avoidance of a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in implements, professional books, or tools of the debtor's trade; the phrase “of the trade of the debtor” modifies “implements” as well as “professional books” and “tools.”

In Re Thompson · filed 2001-05-29(f)(1)(B)(ii)

In the present case, a construction of § 522(f) as requested by Debtors would require the court to read out of the statute the comma that exists between the word “tools” and the phrase “of the trade of the debtor.” Indeed, in their response brief, Debtors exclude the comma in their citation to the statutory language. The more appropriate construction of the statute is that suggested by Bank in which the word “implements,” like the words “professional books” or “tools,” is modified by the phrase “of the trade” of the debtor. Thus, the lien subject to avoidance under § 522(f) must be on property that constitutes “implements” or “tools” of the trade of the debtor.

Section 522(f)(1)(B) permits a debtor to avoid a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in tools of the trade to the extent it impairs an exemption available under § 522(b).

In Re Kieffer · filed 2002-06-19(f)(1)(B)

Farm Credit also concedes that its lien on the subject farm equipment is a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money lien. ... Based upon the evidence and law recited above, the Court finds that debtor Paula Kieffer had an ownership interest in the farm equipment, was principally engaged in farming, is entitled to a $7,500 tools of the trade exemption in the farm equipment under Kansas law, and may avoid Farm Credit’s lien on the subject farm equipment. The debtors’ motion to avoid the lien of Farm Credit is granted.

Section 522(f)(1)(B)(ii) permits a debtor to avoid a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money lien on a qualifying tool of the trade.

In Re Giles · filed 2006-04-10(f)(1)(B)(ii)

At all relevant times, the Debtor has remained in possession of the Automobile. In these circumstances, NTL’s lien is non-possessory and subject to avoidance under § 522(f) (1) (B) (ii).

Section 522(f)(1)(B) lets a debtor avoid a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money lien on exempt property when the property is a tool of the debtor’s trade.

Orange Country's Credit Union v. Garcia (In Re Garcia) · filed 2013-03-05(f)(1)(B)

We also hold that if an exempt vehicle is a tool of the debtor’s trade and is secured by a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money lien, the debtor can avoid the lien pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1)(B).

Section 522(f)(1)(B)(ii) does not treat a liquor license as a tool of the trade eligible for lien avoidance under the federal exemptions.

In re Nickeas · filed 2013-08-06(f)(1)(B)(ii)

In conclusion, for lien avoidance under § 522(f), a liquor license is not a tool of the trade. The debtors’ may not avoid Apex’s lien on their liquor license.

Section 522(f)(1)(B)(ii) permits a debtor to avoid a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in a tool of the trade when it impairs an exemption, and federal law determines whether the property qualifies as a tool of the trade.

Richard Allen Eppenbaugh, Jr. · filed 2019-04-01(f)(1)(B)(ii)

However, lien avoidance is a federal remedy to be interpreted by the federal courts. ... In Cleaver, the B.A.P. stated “[t]he fact that an exemption claimed by debtors is in property that is not considered a ‘tool of the trade’ under state law is irrelevant to the issue of whether the lien can be avoided.” ... At its essence, Cleaver holds that the bankruptcy court must first look to see if the creditor has a nonpossessory, non-purchase money security interest in a tool of the trade as defined by federal law. If so, the bankruptcy court then looks to state law to determine if the lien impairs an exemption to which the debtors would have been entitled. The exemption can be any exemption to which the debtors would have been entitled and does not need to be a tool of the trade exemption.

Section 522(f)(1)(B)(ii) does not allow a debtor to avoid a lien on a car used only to commute to work because the car is not a tool of the trade.

In Re King · filed 2011-05-05(f)(1)(B)(ii)

Therefore, this Court finds that Debtor’s 2003 Honda Pilot is not a “tool of the trade” for lien avoidance purposes under § 522(f)(l)(B)(ii).

Section 522(f)(1)(B)(ii) permits lien avoidance on a motor vehicle as a tool of the trade if the vehicle is necessary to and used in the debtor’s trade.

Garcia v. Orange County's Credit Union (In Re Garcia) · filed 2011-05-25(f)(1)(B)(ii)

Thus, the Court agrees with the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s adoption of the “emerging rule” that a motor vehicle may be considered a tool of the trade if it is necessary to, and is used by the debtor to carry on his or her trade.

The court held that § 522(b)'s opt-out provision is constitutional because allowing states to set exemption levels is rationally related to the Bankruptcy Code's fresh-start goal.

In Re Butcher · filed 1995-11-28§ 522(b)

This Court finds that Section 522(b) is rationally related to the fresh start made available to debtors by the Bankruptcy Code.

A claimed exemption protects only the amount actually claimed, leaving surplus value in the bankruptcy estate when the schedules do not claim the entire asset as exempt.

In Re Jackson · filed 1995-10-05(e)

with any surplus value to remain a part of the bankruptcy estate for distribution to creditors. By not using the term “100% exempt”, or other language, to provide a warning or a red flag to the Trustee, the Debtors limited their recovery to the precise statutory amount that they claimed as exempt.

A debtor who claims a specific dollar amount under § 522(d)(1) receives that amount, not the entire property or later appreciation, when the exemption was not presented as unlimited.

In Re Bregni · filed 1997-12-22§ 522(d)(1), § 522(b)

Accordingly, the Court finds that the condominium remained property of the estate.

Section 522(d)(5) limits a debtor’s exemption to the amount actually claimed, so unclaimed appreciation remains property of the estate.

In Re Einkorn · filed 2005-09-29(d)(5)

For the reasons stated in Bregni, Hy-man and Heflin, the Court concludes that the Einkorns are limited to their $1.00 claimed exemption and that Shapiro’s motion should be granted.

Section 522(d)(5) does not protect funds that debtors concealed and later attempted to add to their exemption schedules; the court may sustain the objection and allow only the properly supported exemption amount.

In Re Barrows · filed 2009-01-09(d)(5)

The trustee’s objection to the exemption of the debtors’ checking account held at TCF Bank is sustained. The TCF account is exempt only to the extent of $825.00.

Section 522(l) places the burden on the objecting party to prove that a claimed exemption is improper after the debtor lists the property claimed exempt.

In Re Roberts · filed 2001-11-15(l)

the burden of persuasion, however, always remains with the objecting party.

Section 522 permits a party in interest whose financial interest may be affected to object to a debtor’s claimed exemptions.

In Re Barnes · filed 2002-04-12(l)

The term “party in interest” is broad enough to include anyone whose financial interest may be affected by the outcome of a bankruptcy case.

Section 522(l) prevents a trustee from setting aside a claimed exemption after the deadline to object has expired.

Ezrol v. Lane (In Re Lane) · filed 1995-12-06(l)

The Court must first amend its original Conclusions of Law to recognize that pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(1) and FRBP 4003, a trustee or creditor must file an objection to the debtor’s exemptions within thirty (30) days of the debtor’s § 341 meeting. ... Hence, consistent with Taylor, this Court finds that the Trustee may not utilize § 548(a)(1) and § 550 to set aside the Debtor’s homestead exemption after the deadline for filing an objection thereto has expired.

Section 522(l) requires debtors to list property they claim exempt; the court barred a renewed claim after the debtors withdrew it and the court’s deadline passed.

In re Hale · filed 2014-06-27(l)

The Bankruptcy Code requires that a “debtor shall file a list of property that the debtor claims exempt under [§ 522(b)].” 11 U.S.C. § 522(l). ... Also, the court, in its prior scheduling order, established a firm deadline for the Debtors to claim an exemption regarding the Stockbridge, Michigan real property. Exemptions were timely claimed and then withdrawn. The deadline has passed. It is now too late to again seek to claim any possible exemption in the real property.

The court held that § 522(g)(1)(A) barred the debtors from exempting property voluntarily transferred and later recovered by a trustee, while § 522(c) protected only property exempted through bankruptcy from nondischargeable claims.

In Re Kampen · filed 1995-12-14(g)(1)(A), (c)

Had the trustee in the chapter 7 case sought to avoid the transfer under state law using 11 U.S.C. § 544(b), and had he subsequently recovered the property from Kampen Farms, Kampens could not have claimed it as exempt. This is because their transfer of the property was voluntary. 11 U.S.C. § 522(g)(1)(A). ... Furthermore, it is only property exempted through bankruptcy that is protected from nondischargeable claims. 11 U.S.C. § 522(c).

Section 522(b)(3)’s choice-of-laws provisions do not preempt state laws that prohibit applying a state’s exemptions to property located outside the state; the safety clause can leave the debtor eligible for the federal exemptions.

Stephens v. Holbrook (In Re Stephens) · filed 2009-03-09(b)(3)

It appears to this Court that Congress was not seeking to exercise any preemption right by § 522(b)(3)(A), which expressly allows states to opt out of the federal exemption system and impose their own exemptions within the bankruptcy context.

Section 522(b) requires the bankruptcy court to apply the exemption law of the debtor’s domicile, even when the property is located in another state.

In Re Stockburger · filed 1996-01-23(b)

Next, looking at the context of § 522(b), the Court concludes that a plain reading of the section leads to this result: it is the debtor’s domicile which governs. Nowhere does section 522(b) refer to the location of the property, nor does it refer to the location of the bankruptcy court. The statute clearly makes the exemption dependent upon the state law of the debtor’s domicile.

Section 522(b)(3)(A)'s 730-day domiciliary period is measured in calendar days by counting backward from the calendar day before the petition is filed, not by counting 24-hour periods from the filing time.

In Re Dufva · filed 2008-05-13(b)(3)(A)

The majority view favors the approach of counting backward from the petition date, ... and I agree. ... The natural, ordinary reading of “days” in this phrase means calendar days, not 24-hour periods beginning at a particular moment on a particular day. The phrase “date of the filing of the petition” must, therefore, mean the day on which the petition was filed, ... such that we begin counting backward on the calendar day before the petition was filed.

Section 522(b)(3)(A) determines which state’s exemption law applies by looking to the debtor’s domicile during the preceding 730 days, or the preceding 180 days when the debtor was not domiciled in one state for the full 730-day period.

In Re Grant · filed 2008-02-27(b)(3)(A)

In other words, if Debtor was a resident of at least two states during the two year period preceding the filing of this case, the state of his residency for the six months preceding the two year period would control the exemptions he could claim.

Section 522(b)(3)(A) fixes the applicable state-law exemption as of the bankruptcy petition date, and a valid exemption existing then passes the exempt property out of the estate.

In Re Mayer · filed 2008-06-12(b)(3)(A), (c)

Bankruptcy exemptions are determined and fixed “on the date of the filing of the petition.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A). If the debtor claims a right to a valid exemption existing on the petition date, the exempt property passes out of the bankruptcy estate back to the debtor.

A debtor cannot avoid a judicial lien under § 522(f)(1) when the debtor did not own an interest in the property before the lien attached.

In Re Mingo · filed 1995-12-12(f)(1)

Under the reasoning of ... Farrey v. Sanderfoot, ... then, Debtor owned no interest in this property before the liens attached, and therefore, the fixing of these hens may not be avoided under Section 522(f)(1).

Under § 522(f)(1)(A), a debtor may avoid a judicial lien only if the debtor acquired the property interest before the lien attached.

Weeks v. Pederson (In Re Pederson) · filed 1999-02-25(f)(1)(A)

A debtor must acquire an interest in property before the judicial lien attaches in order to be able to avoid the lien under § 522(f)(1).

Section 522(f)(1) does not permit a debtor to avoid a judicial lien that attached before the debtor acquired the interest to which the lien fixed.

In Re Warfield · filed 1993-06-23(f)(1)

Thus, just as Mr. Sanderfoot never possessed his new “fee simple interest” before the lien “fixed”, and § 522(f)(1) was not available to him, that section is not available to Debtor in the current situation. This result is reached since the Debtor never possessed his new interest in the property prior to the fixing of Eubank’s lien.

Section 522(d)(10)(E) permits exemption of payments from a similar plan when restricted hardship withdrawals provide future earnings in a time of need comparable to disability, illness, or age, subject to the statute's reasonable-support limit.

In Re Destremps · filed 1996-02-26(d)(10)(E)

Using that test, I conclude that because of the way in which the plan administrator construes the term “unforeseeable emergency”, payments for that reason are only made to provide future earnings in a time of need which is comparable to disability, illness or age.

The court held that § 522(d) allows a state to opt out of the federal bankruptcy exemptions, making Florida's state exemptions govern the debtors' homestead claim.

In Re Beebe · filed 1998-08-31§ 522(d)

Under subsection (d) of § 522, a state may chose to opt out of the federal exemptions and substitute state exemptions. Florida has chosen to opt out of the federal exemptions, so state exemptions control the determination of what property is exempt from the bankruptcy estate.

Under § 522(d)(5), the Debtor could exempt $6,200 of the IRA, but the balance of the IRA was not exempt.

Scholl v. Scholl (In Re Scholl) · filed 1999-06-04§ 522(d)(5)

I ruled that the Debtor could exempt $6,200 of the IRA under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5), but that the balance of the IRA was not exempt.

Section 522(d)(1)'s exemption amount does not apply when the debtor did not elect the exemptions available under § 522(d).

Krasny v. Gi Nam (In Re Gi Nam) · filed 2000-12-20(d)(1)

A review of Debtor’s Schedules reveals that Debtor did not elect the exemptions available under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d). Therefore, the amount allowed by § 522(d)(1) is irrelevant to Debtor’s claimed exemptions.

Section 522(d) permits a debtor to elect the federal exemptions, and a debtor who makes that election is bound by it rather than later claiming a state homestead exemption.

Carpenter v. Fanaras (In Re Fanaras) · filed 2001-06-25(d)

In his petition, Joseph elected the federal exemptions pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) and he is bound by his election. I find no evidence to support his current claim for a state homestead exemption.

Section 522(d) allows a debtor to exempt an interest in entireties property through the specified federal exemption categories, subject to the applicable exemption limits.

In Re Segen · filed 2010-11-03(d)

As a matter of law, the Debtor may exempt entireties property under the federal exemptions set forth in § 522(d). Accordingly, Gross’ Objection is denied.

Section 522(d) identifies exemptions available to debtors in bankruptcy cases.

MPM Financial Group, Inc. v. Morton · filed 2009-06-29(d)

Based upon the legislative history and record; and upon our reluctance to interpret a statute in such a way that, by implication, renders other statutes meaningless or superfluous; and upon the principle that words which have "a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law" (KRS 446.080(4)) should be construed accordingly, we conclude that KRS 427.170, as modified in 2005, authorizes only Kentucky residents in bankruptcy cases to avail themselves of the exemptions specified under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d), and that such exemptions are not otherwise available to debtors in Kentucky.

Section 522(d) provides the federal exemptions available to a debtor.

In re Chaffins · filed 1982-01-07(d)

However, assuming for the purposes of discussion that they were no longer residents then the ruling of this Court in In re Hawkins, 15 B.R. 618 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Va., A.D., 1981) would be applicable and they would be entitled to claim the federal exemptions of 11 U.S.C. § 522(d).

Section 522(d) allows joint debtors to claim federal exemptions separately from state exemptions without reducing the federal exemptions by amounts claimed under state law.

Emmerich v. Lampi · filed 1982-04-27(d)

After reviewing the facts herein and applicable California law we find that this Panels’ decision in In re Ageton, 14 B.R. 833 (9th Cir. Bkrtcy.App.1981) is also applicable in California. Contrary to the decision of the trial court below the debtors may claim state exemptions and then may claim federal exemptions without reduction for any amounts claimed exempt under state law.

The court held that a debtor may avoid a judicial lien impairing an exemption, including the Ohio wildcard exemption, and that when the debtor has no equity in the property, the lien is avoidable in full.

In Re Miller · filed 1996-04-03§ 522(f), especially § 522(f)(1) and (f)(2)(A)

This Court also concludes that under the plain reading of the definition of impairment as explained by Congress, the judicial lien shall be avoided in full where the debtor has no equity in the property.

Section 522 governs property claimed as exempt, but a debtor’s attempted exclusion of a trust interest under § 541(c)(2) is not a § 522 exemption, so the § 522-related Rule 4003(b) objection deadline does not apply.

Spenlinhauer v. Spencer Press, Inc. (In Re Spenlinhauer) · filed 1996-05-13§ 522(b), (l)

In short, Rule 4003 does not apply to the attempted exclusion of Debtor’s interest in the Trust because Debtor was attempting to exclude his interest in the Trust pursuant to seetion 541(c)(2) rather than attempting to exempt it from the estate pursuant to section 522.

Section 522(f) permits a debtor to avoid a judicial lien that impairs an exemption under the statutory arithmetic formula, even without a pending execution or foreclosure.

In Re Jakubowski · filed 1996-05-17§ 522(f)(1), (f)(2)(A)

It appears obvious and unambiguous to this Court that a debtor will be able to avoid a hen when it meets the impairment criteria, and this criteria contains no present execution requirement.

Section 522(f)(2)(A) determines impairment by formula even without a forced sale, and federal law governs lien avoidance notwithstanding state limits on when an exemption becomes effective.

In Re Williams · filed 1998-10-15§ 522(f)(1); § 522(f)(2)(A)

In bankruptcy, “whether a lien ‘impairs’ an exemption may be determined in every case by simply applying the formula set forth in § 522(f)(2), regardless of the limitations on the exemption contemplated by state law.”

A debtor may avoid a judicial lien under § 522(f)(1) when the lien impairs an exemption, and the relevant property interest is assessed at the bankruptcy petition date.

Gibson Group, Ltd. of Pinellas County v. Cooper (In Re Cooper) · filed 1996-07-01(f)(1)

The Bankruptcy Code is clear that the time to examine whether the Debtor had an interest in the property is at the date of the filing of the petition.

Section 522(d)(5) permits a debtor to exempt only the debtor’s own interest in property, so a debtor with no interest in land cannot claim it under the wildcard exemption.

In Re Czerneski · filed 2005-09-13(d)(5)

Since he has no interest in the land, he cannot claim the land exempt under the wildcard exemption.

Section 522(f)(1) permits a debtor to avoid a judicial lien when the debtor held an interest in the property before the lien fixed to that interest, even if a later divorce decree augmented the debtor’s interest.

In Re Ashcraft · filed 2008-12-01(f)(1)

This same analysis applies here. Both Debtor and Ashcraft had a community interest in the homestead when Creditor’s lien first affixed to the property. While Debtor’s interest was later augmented by the decree, such does not change the analysis. Because Creditor’s lien affixed to Debtor’s interest in the property prior to the parties’ divorce, the first element required for lien avoidance under § 522(f)(1) is met.

Section 522(f)(2)(A) treats the value of a debtor’s interest in tenancy-by-the-entirety property as the property’s full fair-market value when calculating whether liens impair an exemption.

In Re Heaney · filed 2011-06-24(f)(2)(A)

Thus, for purposes of Section 522(f) the value of Debtor’s interest in the Property, irrespective of liens, is $500,000.00 — its fair market value.

Section 522(f)(2)(A) requires the debtor’s interest in property, absent liens, to be valued at its fair market value for the lien avoidance formula.

Rodgers, Powers & Schwartz, LLP v. Minkina · filed 2023-08-24(f)(2)(A)

Moreover, the Snyder approach impermissibly departed from Congress's explicit instructions to value the debtor's interest in the property absent any liens as the fair market value thereof for the purposes of the § 522(f) formula.

Section 522(f)(1) permits a debtor to avoid a judicial lien only if the debtor still has an interest in the property when the bankruptcy petition is filed.

In Re Wilkinson · filed 1996-05-24(f)(1)

The term “interest of the debtor in property” can only be understood as referring to an interest of the debtor in property existing on the date of the bankruptcy filing, not an interest the debtor may have had sometime in the near or distant past.

Section 522(f)(1) permits a debtor to avoid a judicial lien only if it fixed on the debtor’s interest in the property.

Cecilia M. Hector · filed 2022-03-21(f)(1)

The Debtor cannot avoid the lien since the lien never fixed on her interest in the Property.

Section 522(a)(2) requires exempt property to be valued at its generally accepted fair market value, with reasonable exposure to the appropriate market.

In Re Mitchell · filed 1989-06-30(a)(2)

For these reasons, this court joins the majority of courts in holding that “fair market value” has its generally accepted meaning as it is used in section 522(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. The court further holds that the phrase again has its generally accepted meaning as it is used in Texas’ personal property exemption statute, section 42.001(a) of the Texas Property Code. The appropriate valuation standard is thus “fair market value,” incorporating as it does an exposure of the item to the appropriate market for a reasonable period of time.

Section 522(d) limits exemptions in an interest in property to a statutory amount, so a claim of “100% of FMV” is subject to objection unless amended to fit that limit.

In Re Salazar · filed 2011-03-23(d)

The Court holds that an objection to an exemption claim of “100% of FMV” for an exemption to an allowable interest in property is a facially valid objection. Unless the debtor cures the exemption claim by amending it to place it within the statutory limit, the objection must be sustained.

Section 522(g) does not let debtors exempt property recovered by the trustee when they voluntarily transferred that property.

In Re Ed L. Mahaffey in Re Violet L. Mahaffey, Debtors. Brenda Allen Satterfield Ed L. Mahaffey Violet L. Mahaffey v. Wa · filed 1996-07-10§ 522(g)

The Mahaffeys cannot protect the remainder from the trustee pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(g) since they voluntarily transferred the property.

Section 522(g) bars a debtor from exempting property recovered by the trustee when the debtor voluntarily transferred that property.

Satterfield v. Sigmon · filed 1996-07-10§ 522(g)

The Mahaffeys cannot protect the remainder from the trustee pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(g) since they voluntarily transferred the property.

Section 522(f) permits a debtor to avoid a lien impairing an exemption, but § 522(g) prevents that route when the property was voluntarily transferred and recovered by the trustee, so the debtor cannot avoid a consensual lien.

Mattheiss v. Title Loan Express (In Re Mattheiss) · filed 1997-10-20§ 522(f), § 522(g)

C. Mattheiss, however, cannot avoid TLE’s lien herself pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) because it is not the type of involuntary lien which can be avoided after turnover pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(g).

Property properly exempted under § 522 is not liable for a debt secured by an unfiled tax lien.

Rich v. United States Ex Rel. Internal Revenue Service (In Re Rich) · filed 1996-07-11§ 522(c)(2)(B)

However, if the Current Plan is not ERISA qualified, it is included in the estate and was properly claimed and allowed as exempt. As exempt property, the Current Plan would not be subject to an unfiled tax lien pursuant to § 522(c)(2)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code.

A debtor may claim an exemption in property recovered through trustee avoidance powers when the debtor did not voluntarily transfer that property.

Peebles v. Commercial Credit Corp. (In Re Peebles) · filed 1996-07-12§ 522(g)

Commercial Credit argues that Debtor is ineligible to assert an exemption claim under 11 U.S.C. § 522(g) because the Debtor voluntarily transferred the Residence, i.e., the Debtor voluntarily signed the mortgage. The argument fails because the mortgage which the Debtor signed covered only the Vacant Lot. Conversely, Debtor did not sign a mortgage covering the Residence. Hence, Debtor is not attempting to exempt property which he previously transferred.

Section 522(b)(2)(B) protects tenancy-by-the-entirety property only to the extent that applicable state law makes it immune from process.

In Re Planas · filed 1996-07-19§ 522(b)(2)(B)

This court is satisfied that notwithstanding the use of the term “exempt from process” Section 522(b)(2)(B) is not a source of an additional exemption right created by the Code but merely a recognition by the Code of the amount of the property held by a debtor together with a non-debtor spouse as tenants by the en-tireties to the extent the property is immune from process under applicable local law.

Section 522(c) does not displace a creditor’s right of setoff under section 553(a) against property claimed as exempt.

In Re Martinez · filed 2000-12-08(c)

In conclusion, this Court agrees with the analysis in ... that the IRS’s right of setoff is unaffected by the Debtors’ claim that their 1999 tax refund is exempt property.

Section 522(c) does not prevent a creditor with a valid right of setoff from offsetting a mutual debt against exempt property.

Wiegand v. Tahquamenon Area Credit Union (In Re Wiegand) · filed 1996-08-06§ 522(c)

This Court believes the latter cases to be better reasoned and therefore holds that a creditor may exercise its right of setoff against exempt property.

Section 522(d)(11)(D) excludes compensation for pain and suffering and actual pecuniary loss but must be construed to provide a meaningful exemption for payments made on account of personal bodily injury, including physical loss of freedom and function.

Gaertner v. Claude (In Re Claude) · filed 1997-03-25(d)(11)(D)

Athough § 522(d)(ll)(D) excludes from the scope of the exemption payment in compensation for pain and suffering and actual pecuniary loss, this Court believes that the statute must provide for a meaningful exemption of a payment made on account of personal bodily injury.

The § 522(d)(11)(D) personal-injury exemption is limited to payments specifically compensating permanent injuries, not pain, suffering, or actual pecuniary loss.

In Re Gregoire · filed 1997-05-29(d)(11)(D)

It appears that the exemption is limited to payments made specifically to compensate for permanent injuries suffered by the debtor.

Section 522(d)(11)(D) permits a debtor to exempt qualifying personal-injury payments, and the trustee objecting to that exemption bears the ultimate burden of proving that a portion of an unallocated settlement is nonexempt.

In Re Harrington · filed 2003-12-29(d)(11)(D)

Significantly, there is substantial jurisprudence that confirms that the trustee must bear this burden of proof, even when the objection to a debtor’s exemption claim under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(11)(D) is based upon the absence of a specific damage allocation in a settlement agreement. ... Accordingly, a trustee cannot escape the burden of proof assigned to an objecting party under Rule 4003(c) because the exemption claim relates to a settlement agreement which fails to allocate damages into specific categories of recovery.

Section 522(d)(11)(D) permits a debtor to exempt a payment up to the statutory cap for personal bodily injury, excluding pain and suffering and actual pecuniary loss; the debtor need not apportion a settlement when the evidence supports treating the payment as bodily-injury compensation.

Walsh v. Reschick (In Re Reschick) · filed 2006-06-07(d)(11)(D)

The Court concludes that the documents and other evidence produced by the debtors adequately set forth a basis for an exemption under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(11)(D) and that the injuries sustained by Mr. Reschick, on their own, are extensive enough to account for the settlement award he received. Therefore, the entire present value of the Annuities can be treated for purposes of the debtors’ exemptions as “on account of personal bodily injury.” As such, Mr. Reschick’s Section 522(d)(11)(D) exemption is therefore proper.

Section 522(d)(11)(D) permits an exemption for payments on account of personal bodily injury without requiring the injury to be permanent, including qualifying loss-of-consortium proceeds, but excludes pain and suffering and compensation for actual pecuniary loss.

In Re Shumac · filed 2010-03-04(d)(ll)(D)

The plain reading of the exemption and the accompanying legislative history provides no definitive conclusion that the “personal bodily injury” must be of a permanent nature. ... The Court finds that the injuries suffered by the Debtor are the type of “personal bodily injury” covered by that term as used in § 522(d)(ll)(D). ... To the extent a settlement or judgment is entered in favor of the Debtors for both personal injury and loss of consortium, the exemptions are considered valid under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(ll)(D), and the Trustee’s objections to those exemptions are overruled.

Section 522(d)(11)(D), read with § 102(7), permits exemption of one or multiple payments for bodily injury but caps the total exemption at the statutory amount.

Robin Blount · filed 2020-11-17(d)(11)(D)

Section 522(d)(11)(D), read in light of section 102(7), authorizes the Debtor to exempt the right to receive either a payment or multiple payments received on account of either or both the Personal Injury Cases, but limits the total exemption amount to the statutory cap of $22,975.

Section 522(f) does not authorize a debtor to avoid a federal tax lien.

In re Pullara · filed 1996-08-22§ 522(f)

when the Internal Revenue Service filed its objection to the motion, it stated that a tax lien cannot be avoided under the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 522(f), which is absolutely correct.

Section 522(c) protects property exempted under § 522 from liability for pre-petition debts, so treating that property as disposable income under § 1325(b)(2) conflicts with § 522(c).

In Re Ferretti · filed 1996-09-10§ 522(c)

The clear language of 11 U.S.C. § 522(c) protects exempt property, regardless of form, from pre-petition debts. This express limitation cannot be ignored for purposes of defining disposable income under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2). To include exempt property within the parameters of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) directly conflicts with § 522(c).

Section 522(c) protects properly exempted property from liability for pre-petition debts, and § 522(c)(4)'s fraud exception does not permit access to exempt assets for student-loan debt absent debtor fraud.

Schatz v. Access Grp., Inc. (In re Schatz) · filed 2019-07-26(c)(4)

Applying these principles of statutory construction to the issue before us supports the positions advocated by Schatz, namely, that by explicitly permitting exempt assets to be liable for pre-petition student loan debt incurred through fraud under § 522(c)(4), Congress did not intend to allow creditors to access exempt assets for payment of pre-petition student loan debt in the absence of such debtor fraud.

Section 522(c) protects property exempted in bankruptcy from liability for pre-petition debts during or after the case.

Rhodes v. Pecanland Village Shopping Center LLC · filed 2022-12-14(c)

Section 522(c) conferred a protected status on Debtor’s family home because she exempted it during her bankruptcy case. Due to the home’s protected status, Defendant has no right to contest the transfer of the fully exempted property from one spouse to the other.

Section 522(b) allows a debtor to exempt qualifying property from the bankruptcy estate, and property within the exemption value that is not timely challenged is removed from the estate.

In Re Elia · filed 1996-07-12§ 522(b)

However, if a debtor claims certain property as exempt, the claim of exemption is not challenged by the trustee or a creditor within a fixed period of time, and the court-determined value of the property is equal to or less than the exemption, the property which is claimed as exempt is carved out of the estate and is no longer property of the bankruptcy estate.

Section 522(b) permits a debtor to claim certain property as exempt from the bankruptcy estate, and once allowed, the property is no longer estate property.

Powell v. Yarbrough (In re Yarbrough) · filed 2015-10-02(b)

Section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code allows the debtor to claim certain property as exempt from the bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (2012). ... The Movants are correct that once the Court allowed the homestead exemption, the Residence was no longer property of the bankruptcy estate.

Section 522(b) allows a debtor to exempt certain property from the bankruptcy estate, so exempt property is retained under the exemption rather than under a Chapter 11 plan.

James Andrew Joseffy · filed 2023-09-08(b)

Exempt property is retained under § 522. Section 522(b) specifically authorizes a debtor to exempt certain property from the estate.72 In short, an individual chapter 11 debtor does not retain exempt property under the plan.

Section 522 permits qualifying property, including exempt income, to remain exempt from the bankruptcy estate.

Matter of Brady · filed 1987-05-27

Appellant points out that her monthly Social Security check is exempt property from her bankruptcy estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 522; 42 U.S.C. § 407(b); Mo.Rev.Stat. §§ 513.427 and 513.430(10)(a) (1986). This court agrees with appellant that it was error to dismiss her Chapter 7 petition on the grounds that she could pay her unsecured creditors with exempt income.

Section 522 allows a debtor to exempt certain property from the bankruptcy estate, subject to the statute's requirements.

Matter of Truax · filed 1989-09-01

Pursuant to the stipulation of the Trustee and the Debtor, $54.01 of the refund for the tax year 1988 is hereby determined to be exempt personal property under 11 U.S.C. § 522. The remainder of the tax refund is not exempt property under 11 U.S.C. § 522, is hereby determined to be property of the estate, and is subject to administration by the Trustee.

Section 522 permits an individual debtor to exempt property from the bankruptcy estate to the extent allowed by the applicable exemption statute.

Whittington v. Gilbralter Savings & Loan Ass'n (In Re Spain) · filed 1988-12-16

Therefore, the proper inquiry is not whether the debtor’s interest in the property in question became an asset of the estate, but rather to what extent it is to be exempted therefrom under 11 U.S.C. § 522. ... The exemption section (§ 522) permits an individual debtor to take out of the estate that property that is necessary for a fresh start and for the support of himself and his dependents.

Section 522(b)(2)(A) permits an opt-out-state debtor to claim applicable federal exemptions outside section 522(d), or applicable state and local exemptions.

Matter of Layton · filed 1990-05-29(b)(2)(A)

Returning to the facts of this case, Kenneth Layton can not exempt the COERS retirement account under a section 522(b)(2)(A) federal exemption. COERS is a creature of local law and, as such, is not similar to any of the property interests set forth in the legislative history of section 522(b)(2)(A). ... Since Iowa has opted out of the federal exemption scheme, the debtor can not utilize section 522(d)(10)(E).

Section 522 permits an individual debtor to remove property needed for a fresh start from the bankruptcy estate.

Williams v. Giamanco (In Re Starr) · filed 1991-01-24

Section 522 permits an individual debtor to "take out of the estate” that property which is necessary for a fresh start and for the support of the debtor and his dependents.

Section 522(b)(3) does not preempt a state-law limitation restricting a homestead exemption to property located within that state.

James L. Ryan and Janice D. Ryan · filed 2024-01-31(b)(3)

Based on the relevant case law, this Court is persuaded that §522(b)(3) should not be read to preempt the provision in the Texas homestead exemption statute that limits exempt homesteads to those located within the state of Texas. The Texas homestead exemption cannot be given extraterritorial effect, and the Trustee’s objection to the Debtors’ homestead exemption must be sustained.

When applicable state law displaces the federal exemption scheme, § 522(b)(1) makes the state exemptions—not § 522(d)—control.

Hunter v. Patton (In Re Patton) · filed 1996-07-23§ 522(b)(1)

Contrary to the Debtors’ argument, Ohio law, rather than § 522(d), controls their entitlement to an exemption.

For the state-law exemption option in § 522(b)(2)(A), the debtor's domicile—not the property's location or the bankruptcy court's location—determines which state exemption law applies.

In Re Harold E. Stockburger, Sr. Rebecca A. Stockburger, Debtors, Jerry Farinash, Trustee v. Harold E. Stockburger, Sr. · filed 1997-01-31§ 522(b)(2)(A)

The plain reading of § 522(b) leads to the conclusion that it is the debtor's domicile which governs. Nowhere does § 522(b) refer to the location of the property, nor does it refer to the location of the bankruptcy court. The statute clearly makes the exemption dependent upon the state law of the debtor's domicile.

Section 522(b)(1) allows a state to opt out of the federal exemptions in § 522(d), leaving domiciliary debtors limited to state-law and general federal exemptions.

In Re MacKta · filed 2000-04-18§ 522(b)(1)

Residents of Virginia filing bankruptcy petitions may claim only those exemptions allowable under state law and general (nonbankruptcy) federal law.

Section 522(b) provides one federal exemption scheme while allowing a state to opt out and establish its own exemptions.

In Re Parsons · filed 2000-08-30§ 522(b), § 522(b)(2)(A)

The Code provides one exemption scheme in section 522(d), ... however, it also allows a state to opt out of this scheme and establish its own.

Section 522(d)(5) does not exempt property in which the debtor had no property interest when the bankruptcy petition was filed.

Estate of Haiko v. McGinley · filed 2002-05-15(d)(5)

If, under state law, a debtor does not have a property interest in disputed property upon filing a bankruptcy petition, he cannot shelter that property under provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. ... Because the property did not belong to Neil or to the McGinleys collectively, the Bankruptcy Court could not act to exempt the property.

Section 522(b) permits a state to opt out of the federal exemptions in § 522(d) and establish its own exemption scheme, including exemptions that protect the same, more, or less property and impose its own eligibility requirements.

In Re Goering · filed 1982-11-09(b)(1), (b)(2)(A)

Section 522(b) expressly grants broad discretion to the states and an open-ended opportunity to determine what property may be exempt as long as the state law does not conflict with property exempt under federal law other than the exemption list of 522(d). The section does not mandate that debtors be guaranteed a right to exempt particular types of property. The unambiguous language of Sec. 522(b) implicitly indicates a state may exempt the same property included in 522(d), more property than that included in 522(d), or less property than that. In fact, states may also prescribe their own requirements for exemptions which may either circumscribe or enlarge the list of exempt property.

Section 522(b)(1) offers debtors a choice between the federal exemptions in § 522(d) and exemptions under other federal or state law, subject to a state’s opt-out.

Shirley T Sherrod · filed 2024-03-15(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3)(A)

Thus, § 522(b)(1) offers debtors a choice between utilizing either the exemptions set forth in § 522(d)—which South Carolina has opted out of—or those provided by federal non-bankruptcy law and state law.

Section 522(d)(5)’s aggregate cap means that previously allowed exemptions reduce the amount available to exempt another property, leaving only the unused balance for the IRA.

Walsh v. Galloway (In Re Galloway) · filed 2001-01-11(d)(5)

After the exemptions totaling $3,373.97 are allowed, it follows that he may exempt only $126.03 of the value of the above IRA ($3,500.00 — $3,373.97 = $126.03).

Section 522(d)(5)'s wild-card exemption covers any property of the bankruptcy estate, including wages already withheld and equity in a growing crop.

United States v. Christensen · filed 1996-09-19§ 522(d)(5)

Consequently, the Court holds that defendant Christensen may claim under the “wild card” exemption weekly net disposable wages already withheld by his employer pursuant to the garnishment. The phrase “any property,” construed broadly by the Seventh Circuit and the bankruptcy courts, also includes equity in a growing crop. The government does not contest defendant Christensen’s claim to crop equity under § 522(d)(5). Therefore, the Court holds that defendant Christensen is entitled to claim additional equity in a growing crop under § 522(d)(5).

For debtors choosing state-law exemptions, § 522(b)(2)(A) uses the law applicable on the bankruptcy filing date to determine what property may be exempt.

In Re Smoinikar · filed 1996-10-03§ 522(b)(2)(A)

The Bankruptcy Code identifies the date of filing as dispositive. Section 522(b)(2)(A) allows debtors to exempt from the bankruptcy estate any property which is exempt under “state or local law that is applicable on the date of the filing.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A).

Under § 522(b)(2)(A), a debtor’s entitlement to a state-law exemption is fixed on the bankruptcy petition date.

Mueller v. Buckley (In Re Mueller) · filed 1998-01-28§ 522(b)(2)(A)

Under this section, a debtor’s right to an exemption is fixed as of the date of his or her filing in bankruptcy.

Under § 522(b)(2)(A), a debtor’s entitlement to a state-law exemption is fixed on the bankruptcy petition date.

Mueller v. Buckley · filed 1998-01-28§ 522(b)(2)(A)

Under this section, a debtor’s right to an exemption is fixed as of the date of his or her filing in bankruptcy.

Section 522(d)(10)(E) permits an annuity exemption only to the extent reasonably necessary for the debtor’s and dependents’ support.

In Re Mann · filed 1996-10-11§ 522(d)(10)(E)

The facts show that the annuity is not a reasonable necessity for the support of the debtors, the requirement for claiming it as exempt under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E).

The $5,000 cap on lien avoidance does not apply to every debtor using state exemptions; it applies only when both § 522(f)(3)(A) and (B) are satisfied, including the relevant state-law condition concerning consensual liens.

In Re Ehlen · filed 1996-10-16§ 522(f)(3)

The use of the conjunctive “and” between subparts (A) and (B) of § 522(f)(3) indicates that both requirements must be satisfied before the section is applicable to a particular debtor or class of debtors.

Exempt property remains subject to payment of nondischargeable support claims.

In Re Cole · filed 1996-11-01§ 522(c)(1)

Section 522(c)(1) makes exempt property subject to the payment of nondischargeable support claims.

Section 522(c)(1) keeps exempt property liable for alimony and support obligations, including an alimony-arrears judgment.

Galtieri v. Galtieri (In Re Galtieri) · filed 2006-02-16(c)(1)

More importantly, the Bankruptcy Court did not make or modify an alimony determination in distributing assets of the bankruptcy estate. Rather, the Bankruptcy Court explained that 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(1) allows access to property otherwise exempt under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1) for the alimony arrears judgment, which exceeds the amount of Galtieri’s claimed exemption. We reject Galtieri’s “double-dipping” theory of attack on the Bankruptcy Court’s order.

Section 522(c)(1) keeps exempt property liable for debts nondischargeable under § 523(a)(5), but not debts nondischargeable under § 523(a)(15).

Clary-Ghosh v. Ghosh · filed 2020-09-30(c)(1)

In the context of marital dissolution proceedings, the exception enumerated in § 522(c)(1) only applies to debts determined to be non-dischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(5), not those ... determined to be non-dischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(15).

Section 522(c)(1) leaves exempt property liable for debts for child support described in § 523(a)(5).

In re Rouse · filed 1992-09-29(c)(1)

Having cleared all the foregoing hurdles, the Debtors run up against 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(1) which provides: ... Thus any part of the funds under the control of the Friend of the Court and the Circuit Court for the County of Ottawa, State of Michigan, for confinement costs are not subject to the debtors’ right to exemption under 11 U.S.C. § 522. Even though an income tax refund from any governmental unit is a part of the debtor’s estate and is generally an asset that can be exempted under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) up to the limits set therein, the court must deny the request of these Debtors for the turnover of the 1991 federal income tax refund in the amount of $1,054.85 since exemptions do not protect property from liability for child support, etc. as described under § 523(a)(5).

When a debtor elects a state exemption, § 522(c) still limits the debts for which the exempt property remains liable, so a state-law exception for pre-homestead debts is ineffective in bankruptcy.

In Re Boucher · filed 1996-12-02§ 522(c)

In light of the clear command of section 522(c) and the pre-emptive power of Congress under its constitutional authority to establish uniform bankruptcy laws, congressional approval of the use of state exemptions cannot be taken to extend to exemptions that protect debts left unprotected by section 522(e).

Section 522(c) preempts state-law exceptions to a homestead exemption when the debt is not one of the debts for which § 522(c) preserves liability.

In Re Ballirano · filed 1999-05-06§ 522(c)

Therefore, BBC’s objection on that ground is overruled.

Section 522(c) preempts a state exemption provision that makes otherwise exempt property liable for prepetition debts outside the statute’s listed exceptions.

In Re Stewart · filed 2000-02-29§ 522(c)

§ 522(c) does not allow states to define the categories of debts to which such an exemption applies when such categories do not fall within the three subparagraphs of § 522(c).

Section 522(c) generally protects exempt property from liability for prepetition debts unless a statutory exception applies.

Farley v. Romano (In Re Romano) · filed 2006-10-30(c)

Moreover Farley did not set forth or prove grounds for objecting the Romano’s homestead under 11 U.S.C. § 522(c).

A debtor may not claim purchase-money collateral as exempt and then avoid the creditor’s security interest under § 522(f).

In Re Ogando · filed 1996-12-06§ 522(f)

Because Sears’ security interest is of the purchase money variety, the Debtor cannot benefit from claiming the property as exempt and then seeking to avoid the security interest pursuant to the avoidance powers contained in section 522(f).

Section 522(f) does not permit debtors to avoid a valid purchase money security interest in exempt household goods.

In Re Smallwood · filed 1982-05-10(f)

The issue before the Court relates to the nature or character of the interest involved —i.e., whether the interest is a purchase money security interest, and as such is not subject to avoidance under § 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code. ... WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Kentucky Finance Company is the holder of a valid purchase money security interest in household goods which is not subject to avoidance by the debtors pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f).

Section 522(f) treats a purchase-money security interest as retaining that character after a refinancing novation, so the debtor cannot avoid it on the theory that the novation made it nonpurchase-money.

In Re Schwartz · filed 1985-08-27(f)

In accordance with the above discussion we will enter an order denying the debtors’ motion for lien avoidance under § 522(f).

Section 522(f)(1)(B) does not permit a debtor to avoid a lien securing a purchase-money security interest.

In re Saxe · filed 2013-03-22(f)(1)(B)

As a result, the purchase-money security interest that FSA has in the skidsteer remains intact, and the Debtors may not avoid the lien under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f).

Section 522(f) does not allow a debtor to avoid a purchase money security interest merely because the debt was refinanced, if the parties intended the original debt and security interest to continue.

In re Billings · filed 1988-01-27(f)

Therefore, if the security interest held by creditor retains its status as a purchase money security interest despite the refinancing, then debtors may not avoid the security interest under Sec. 522(f). ... Thus, our conclusion that refinancing of a purchase money loan does not automatically extinguish the creditor's purchase money security interest in the debtor's collateral comports with the scheme of the UCC.

Section 522(f)(1) requires a debtor to take the prescribed action to avoid a judgment lien rather than allowing the lien to disappear automatically through discharge.

John Deere Co. v. Blevins · filed 1996-12-20§ 522(f)(1)

The Housers were required to take certain actions regarding the avoidance of the hen. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1).

Section 522(f)(1) permits a debtor to avoid a judicial lien only while the debtor retains an interest in the property; once a court order transfers the garnished wages, the debtor cannot avoid the lien.

In Re Heerlein · filed 2006-01-17(f)(1)

Accordingly, this Court finds that Debtor lost any interest in the garnished wages no later than the entry of the Order by the district court on October 3, 2005.

Section 522(b)(3)(B) permits a debtor using state-law exemptions to exempt an interest held as a tenant by the entirety only to the extent that the interest is exempt from process under nonbankruptcy law.

Stephen Norman Weiss · filed 2022-03-15(b)(3)(B)

The continuance of that right subjects the Debtor’s interest in the Property to process, which in turn, requires the disallowance of any exemption under 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(B).

Section 522(b)(2)(B) makes a tenancy-by-the-entirety interest exempt only to the extent that applicable nonbankruptcy law protects it from process.

Grant v. Himmelstein (In Re Himmelstein) · filed 1996-12-23§ 522(b)(2)(B)

Section 522(b)(2)(B) requires a court to ascertain whether the property would be “exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B) (1996).

Section 522(g) limits a debtor’s exemption of property recovered through the trustee’s avoidance efforts when the debtor voluntarily transferred the property or could not have avoided the transfer under § 522(f)(2).

In Re Ulrich · filed 1997-01-10§ 522(g)

The Debtor may not use §. 522(g)(1) to claim an exemption in the Ford Thunderbird because the Debtor’s grant of a security interest in his vehicle to the Bank was a transfer of property as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(54). There was no evidence to suggest that the notation of the Bank’s lien on the title to the vehicle was not a voluntary act by the Debtor. Moreover, the Debtor may not claim an exemption in the Thunderbird under § 522(g)(2) because he could not have avoided the transfer under § 522(f)(2).

Section 522(j) allows a debtor to exempt property avoided or recovered under subsections (g) and (i) only to the extent the debtor has not already used the applicable exemption.

DeBarros v. National City Bank (In re DeBarros) · filed 2002-02-25(j)

Debtor’s power to avoid a lien under this section is limited by 11 U.S.C. § 522(j) that provides: ... (j)Notwithstanding subsections (g) and (i) of this section, the debtor may exempt a particular kind of property under subsections (g) and (i) of this section only to the extent that the debtor has exempted less property in value of such kind than that to which the debtor is entitled under subsection (b) of this section. ... Finally, the court will consider what the result would be if the Debtor were to avail himself of the maximum exemption allowable in the real property subject to § 522(j). ... The remaining unused amount of exemption available to him is $1,039.00. ... The Debtor’s avoidance power is limited to this, the amount of exemption available to him.

Section 522(g) permits a debtor to claim an exemption in property or value recovered by the trustee through an avoidance action, to the extent the property would otherwise be exempt under applicable law.

Memory v. Jefferson Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n (In Re Fair) · filed 1983-02-25(g)

To the extent that trustee avoids any liens or encumbrances, such as a judicial lien, under his special avoiding powers (here, Section 547), then the debtors may claim as exempt that amount of property which is exemptable to them under the laws of Alabama. This exemption is available against the trustee from any property recovered or any transfer set aside. (11 U.S.C. Sec. 522(g), (h))

Section 522(g)(1)(A) allows a debtor to exempt property recovered by the trustee only when the debtor did not voluntarily transfer it; voluntary prepetition payments therefore cannot be claimed exempt after recovery.

In re Conley · filed 2003-07-30(g)(1)(A)

Only to the extent permitted by 11 U.S.C. § 522(g) may bankruptcy debtors successfully claim exemptions in property recovered or recoverable by the bankruptcy trustee. If the payments in question had been obtained by the creditors involuntarily from the Debtors, such as by means of legal process, the Debtors might successfully claim exemptions in them to the extent allowable under Virginia Law. Because they were made voluntarily, however, Code § 522(g)(1)(A) precludes the claimed exemptions.

Section 522(b) permits a debtor to exempt certain property from the bankruptcy estate, while § 522(g)(1) permits exemption of recovered property only when the debtor did not voluntarily transfer or conceal it.

Gold v. Laines (In Re Laines) · filed 2005-02-18(b), (g)(1)

Section 522(b) then permits a debtor to "exempt from property of the estate” certain enumerated property. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b). ... Section 522(g) allows a debtor to claim recovered properly exempt to the same extent as if he had not transferred the property provided that it "was not a voluntary transfer of such property by the debtor” and the debtor did not conceal the property transferred. 11 U.S.C. § 522(g)(1). Thus, if a debtor voluntarily transfers property within the provisions of § 548(a)(1) and the trustee recovers the property, the debtor may not claim the property exempt from the bankruptcy estate.

Section 522(g) bars a debtor from exempting property recovered through the trustee’s avoiding powers when the debtor voluntarily transferred it, even if the trustee did not take formal action to recover it.

In Re Hicks · filed 2006-05-09(g)

In effect, so long as the trustee asserts the estate’s interest in the property when faced with an unperfected or otherwise avoidable lien, the property has been recovered by the trustee, and the debtor may not claim such property as exempt.

Section 522(g)(1) bars a debtor from exempting property voluntarily transferred and recovered by a trustee through specified avoidance powers, but does not apply when the trustee does not recover property through avoidance.

Kuhnel v. Russell (In Re Kuhnel) · filed 2006-08-01(g)(1)

The plain language of § 522(g)(1) provides that a debtor cannot assert any exemption in property that a trustee recovers after the debtor’s voluntary transfer of the property. Section 522(g)(1) deals with property that a trustee recovers in various ways, including pursuing the classes of avoidance actions enumerated in § 550(a).

Section 522(g) prevents a debtor from subsequently claiming an exemption in property subject to a lien that the trustee successfully avoided when the debtor voluntarily transferred the lien to the creditor.

In Re Beene · filed 2006-11-27(g)

Furthermore, the mortgage lien that a Trustee could avoid under section 544 would not result in property subject to an exemption claim. After a debtor has voluntarily transferred a lien in property to a creditor and the Trustee has successfully avoided that lien, the debtor may not subsequently exempt the property that was subject to the lien. 11 U.S.C. § 522(g) (2000).

Section 522(g) permits a debtor to exempt property recovered by the trustee only if the transfer was not voluntary; therefore, voluntarily made preferential payments cannot be exempted.

In re Gillenwater · filed 2012-09-18(g)(1)(A)

Only to the extent permitted by 11 U.S.C. § 522(g) may bankruptcy debtors successfully claim exemptions in property recovered or recoverable by the bankruptcy trustee. If the payments in question had been obtained by the creditors involuntarily from the Debtors, such as by means of legal process, the Debtors might successfully claim exemptions in them to the extent allowable under Virginia Law. Because they were made voluntarily, however, Code § 522(g)(1)(A) precludes the claimed exemptions.

Section 522(g) does not permit debtors to claim an exemption in property to the extent a trustee avoids a mortgage and assumes the creditor’s equity position.

Seelen v. Couillard (In re Couillard) · filed 2012-11-09(g)

The trustee objected to the debtors’ exemption in the property to the extent that if the trustee were successful in avoiding the mortgage, the trustee would assume the bank’s equity position and the debtors would not be entitled to an exemption under 11 U.S.C. § 522(g). This objection will be sustained.

Section 522(g) permits an exemption in property recovered by a trustee only when the debtor’s transfer was involuntary and not concealed, and a trustee’s steps to obtain possession can constitute recovery without a formal proceeding.

In re Bub · filed 2015-04-01(g)

The Debtor’s argument is based on a misunderstanding of the statute. The Debtor fails to recognize that the Debtor’s pledge of the Viper as collateral is a voluntary “transfer,” and it follows that Jaylyn Sales’ storage of the Viper with Triple G was done in furtherance of that transfer. ... While there is no evidence in this case that the Trustee threatened to commence an action in order to recover the Viper, the steps the Trustee took to obtain possession of the Viper from a third party and to administer the asset free of any claimed lien were sufficient in this case to constitute a recovery of the property by the Trustee.

Section 522(g)(1)(A) bars a debtor from exempting property recovered by the trustee when the debtor voluntarily transferred it.

In re Randolph · filed 2016-01-29(g)(1)(A)

In order to prevail on a § 522(g)(1)(A) objection, there must be (i) a recovery by the trustee under his avoidance powers of (ii) property voluntarily transferred by the debtor.

Section 522(g) allows a debtor to exempt property recovered by the trustee only if the transfer was not voluntary and the debtor did not conceal the property.

Marchand v. Whittick (In re Whittick) · filed 2016-03-17(g)

Here, the Bankruptcy Code does provide a basis for denying the exemption: section 522(g).

Section 522(g)(1) permits a debtor to claim an exemption in property recovered for the estate only when the debtor did not voluntarily transfer it and did not conceal it.

Goodrich v. Fuentes · filed 2017-04-17(g)(1)

Title 11, section 522(g) of the United States Code does not prevent Fuentes from claiming a homestead exemption in the Property, because the parties agree that Fuentes neither transferred the Property nor concealed the Property.

Section 522(g)(1) bars a debtor from claiming an exemption in voluntarily transferred property recovered by the trustee, but that bar does not apply when a creditor, rather than the trustee, recovers the property.

Benny R. Knight, Sr. · filed 2023-08-07(g)(1), (g)(1)(A), (g)

Littleton was decided in relevant part under 11 U.S.C. § 522(g)(1), which specifies circumstances in which a debtor may claim an exemption in property that comes into the bankruptcy estate through the trustee’s avoiding powers. Under this provision, the debtor may not claim an exemption in property the debtor voluntarily transferred. 11 U.S.C. § 522(g)(1)(A). But this condition applies specifically to “property that the trustee recovers.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(g). Here, a creditor recovered the property. This distinction is fatal to the Estate’s argument. “‘Trustee’ and ‘creditor’ are separate nouns, with distinct meanings, and the Bankruptcy Code does not treat them as synonyms.” Stornawaye Fin. Corp. v. Hill (In re Hill), 562 F.3d 29, 33 (1st Cir. 2009). The following Code provisions confer the trustee’s avoiding powers: 11 U.S.C. §§ 510(c)(2), 542, 543, 550, 551, and 553. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(g). In chapter 7 cases, these powers are exclusive to the trustee. 562 F.3d at 33. And even if they were not, “a creditor who files a pre-petition suit under state law to annul a fraudulent conveyance cannot conceivably be thought to have availed himself of any of these powers. . . . [because] the bankruptcy estate was not even in existence when the creditor sued.” Id. at 34. Littleton is therefore inapposite.

Section 522(g) bars a debtor from exempting property recovered after avoidance of the debtor’s voluntary transfer.

Carter v. Homesley (In Re Strom) · filed 1985-02-04(g)

11 U.S.C. § 522(g), however, provides that a debtor may not claim an exemption in such property if the transfer avoided was a voluntary transfer of the debtor.

Section 522(g) permits a debtor to claim an exemption in recovered property only if the debtor could have exempted it absent the transfer and the transfer was involuntary.

Mason v. Young (In Re Young) · filed 1999-09-08(g)

Section 522(g) provides that where property has been recovered for the benefit of the estate pursuant to § 550, the debtor may nonetheless assert an exemption in the recovered property “to the extent that the debtor could have exempted such property under [§ 522(b) ] if such property had not been transferred, if ... such transfer was not a voluntary transfer of such property by the debtor[.]” 11 U.S.C. § 522(g).

Section 522(g)(1) and (2) limits a debtor’s ability to exempt property recovered by a trustee under § 551 when statutory conditions are not met.

Bank of Delaware v. De Shong (In re De Shong) · filed 1981-09-22(g)(1) and (2)

Under § 522(g)(1) and (2) a debtor is entitled to exempt property recovered by a trustee under § 551 only if certain conditions are met. The debtor cannot meet either of those conditions. First, his purchase of the automobile and the giving of the security interest was a voluntary transfer. Second, he cannot avoid under 522(f)(2) a purchase-money security interest in an automobile.

Section 522(g) permits a debtor to claim an exemption in recovered property only when the transfer was involuntary or the debtor could have avoided it under § 522(f).

In Re Racca · filed 1984-04-19(g)

Specifically the court holds: that a Louisiana debtor may not claim his exemption under 522(g) on property subject to a voluntarily placed chattel mortgage, at least to the extent of that mortgage.

Section 522(g)(1)(A) prevents a debtor from exempting property recovered by the trustee after the debtor voluntarily transferred it away.

In Re Rollins · filed 1986-04-24(g)(1)(A)

Section 522(g)(1)(A) is meant to prevent the debtor from exempting property that is available to exempt only because the trustee has recovered it in spite of the debtor’s having voluntarily transferred it away. Between the debtor and the Bank, the Bank had the superior right to the $6,000 as collateral for the debtor’s other debts to the Bank. The debtor voluntarily gave the Bank the superior right to the $6,000, and it became available to exempt only when the trustee recovered $3,000. This appears to be exactly the kind of situation in which § 522(g)(1)(A) is meant to deny the debtor an exemption.

Section 522(g) does not allow a debtor to exempt proceeds recovered by a trustee through a § 544 lien avoidance action.

Ryen v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A. (In re Smith) · filed 1989-10-16(g)

This debtor may not utilize § 522(g) to claim an exemption in the proceeds of the trustee’s § 544 lien avoidance action for three reasons.

Section 522(g) permits exemption of property recovered by the trustee only under specified conditions, while § 522(i)(1) permits exemption of property recovered through the debtor’s own § 522(h) action.

In Re Fabian · filed 1990-12-26(g)(1), (i)(1)

It follows from the foregoing that debtors may not exempt the shares of stock pursuant to § 522(g). In addition, debtors are not entitled to exempt said stock pursuant to § 522(i)(l), which provides as follows: ... As the above language makes explicit, debtors may exempt property pursuant to this provision only if they have prevailed in an action brought by themselves pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(h). In the case at hand, the trustee is pursuing the alleged preference. ... In short, debtors may not exempt the shares of stock pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(g)(1), or (i)(l) and, to the contrary, the Order permitting the filing of an amended Schedule B-4 will be vacated.

Section 522(g)(1) does not require a trustee to file an adversary proceeding or obtain a final judgment to defeat a debtor’s exemption claim.

Hitt v. Glass (In Re Glass) · filed 1994-03-11(g)(1)

It is not necessary for the trustee to commence a formal adversary proceeding or obtain a final judgment to prevail on an objection to a debtor’s claim of exemption pursuant to § 522(g)(1).

Section 522(g)(1) bars an exemption in voluntarily transferred property the trustee recovers, even after Rule 4003(b)’s objection deadline.

Russell v. Kuhnel (In Re Kuhnel) · filed 2007-07-25(g)(1)

But because a trustee will rarely be able to recover property within the thirty-day period of Rule 4003(b), the nature of § 522(g) is such that it precludes exemptions in recovered property even beyond the time limit imposed by Rule 4003(b).

Section 522(g) prevents a debtor from exempting a voluntary transfer recovered by a trustee when the household goods lien exception does not apply.

Dallas R Law · filed 2021-12-29(g)

It is worth noting that in the case before this Court, the funds recovered by a chapter 7 trustee in a preference action under §547 would not be subject to a claim of exemption by the Debtor because the transfers were voluntary and did not involve a non-purchase money lien on household goods.

Section 522(g) prevents a debtor from exempting recovered property that the debtor voluntarily transferred or concealed.

Smith v. Gan · filed 2025-03-31(g)

The Bankruptcy Court used the ... standards outlined in 11 U.S.C. § 522(g), which states that property that was transferred ... voluntarily or concealed cannot qualify for an exemption. ... The Court agrees with the Bankruptcy Court’s analysis that ... the Homestead Exemption does not apply, and Smith should be denied fees associated with the Homestead Exemption litigation and the appeals that followed.

A state law qualifies as an exemption under § 522(b)(2)(A) only if it permanently sequesters property from creditors in a way equivalent to removing it from the bankruptcy estate.

In Re Lawrence · filed 1997-01-14§ 522(b)(2)(A)

This is so because the word “exempt” as used in § 522(b)(2)(A) must be given the meaning intended by Congress. In bankruptcy, property of the debtor that is “exempt from property of the estate” is property that the debtor may sequester to himself forever beyond the reach of his creditors in bankruptcy.

When a debtor elects a state-law exemption under § 522(b), the bankruptcy court determines the exemption’s scope under state law.

In Re Chabot · filed 1998-02-02§ 522(b)

When a debtor elects to claim an exemption under state law pursuant to this section, the bankruptcy court looks only to state law to determine the scope of that exemption.

Property exempted under § 522 is generally not liable for administrative expenses, so the debtor’s homestead exemption takes precedence over those claims except for the statute’s specified exceptions.

Scott v. United States Trustee (In re Allen) · filed 1997-01-15§ 522(k)

None of the parties dispute that 11 U.S.C. § 522(k) precludes assessing administrative expenses against a debtor’s homestead exemption except in certain situations not relevant to the instant case.

Section 522(k) does not bar payment of administrative expenses from property proceeds when no equity exists for a homestead exemption to attach to.

Daniel Gallagher · filed 2023-10-25(k)

Here, the homestead exemption is not denied; there is simply no equity in the real property for the homestead exemption to attach to, and consequently the payment of the domestic support obligation and administrative expenses incurred to create a recovery for the domestic support claimant is not the product of an impermissible surcharge of the homestead exemption.

A judicial lien impairs an exemption when the lien, other liens, and the exemption amount together exceed the debtor’s lien-free interest in the property.

In Re Diegel · filed 1997-01-17§ 522(f)(2)(A)

The definition of impairment as set forth in § 522(f)(2)(A) is intended to provide a “simple arithmetic test to determine whether a lien impairs an exemption.”

Section 522(f)(1)(A) permits avoidance of a judicial lien when the lien, other liens, and the exemption together exceed the debtor’s lien-free interest in the property.

Bache-Wiig v. Fournier (In Re Bache-Wiig) · filed 2003-09-17(f)(1)(A), (f)(2)(A)

Thus, the judgment hen is avoidable; and, were it not for the mortgage, the Defendant’s claim would be entirely unsecured.

Section 522 exempts maintenance-and-cure payments as both a disability, illness, or unemployment benefit and support reasonably necessary for the debtor.

In Re Coltellaro · filed 1997-01-27§ 522(d)(10)(C) and § 522(d)(10)(D)

Thus, to the extent the state court awards the Debtor relief in the form of maintenance and cure, this Court finds that it is exempt under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(C). In addition, this Court finds that maintenance and cure is also support or separate maintenance “reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor” under section 522(d)(10)(D) because the shipowner will be obligated to provide the Debtor with a living allowance which is “closely analogous to an alimony or maintenance obligation arising firom divorce.”

Section 522(g) does not bar an exemption when the transfer was avoided before bankruptcy by a divorce court, rather than by the trustee under one of the provisions listed in § 522(g).

McFatter v. Cage · filed 1996-12-18§ 522(g)

This Court agrees with the Bankruptcy Court; § 522(g) does not apply here.

A security interest that was originally nonpossessory does not become possessory merely because the creditor later repossesses the collateral, so the debtor may avoid it when it impairs an exemption.

In Re White · filed 1996-12-19§ 522(f)(2)(B)

Therefore, the Bank’s lien on the listed farm equipment is avoided.

Section 522(f)(2)(A) treats a lien as impairing an exemption when the lien, other liens, and the exemption amount together exceed the value of the debtor’s interest in the property without liens.

In Re Orr · filed 2004-01-05(f)(2)(A)

Applying the statutory formula to the hen amounts and values agreed upon by the parties, the Court finds that the debtor is entitled to avoid the Bank’s hen in full.

Section 522(f) permits lien avoidance only when the lien impairs an exemption available under § 522(b), and § 522(b)(1) allows states to define the exemptions available to their residents.

Thorp Credit, Inc. v. McGuire (In re McGuire) · filed 1985-02-28(f)

By its own language, § 522(f) applies only to the avoidance “of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this section, ...” (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, the threshhold question before a debtor can avoid any lien pursuant to § 522(f) is what exemption is provided by the statutes.