11 U.S.C. § 362

Section 362’s automatic stay continues as to a chapter 13 debtor when appellate proceedings resume against a corporate co-appellant.

Xenon Educational Systems, Inc. v. Barnett Bank of Broward County, N.A. · filed 1997-05-07

The stay of section 362 continues, of course, as to appellant Eric Ronkin, the chapter 13 debtor.

Section 362 stays a suit against Chapter 7 debtors, so a court may enter default judgment against other defendants while leaving the debtors out.

CenterState Bank N.A. v. Two Dudes Foods, LLC · filed 2020-11-03

On March 16, 2020, the Sachs Defendants entered a Suggestion of Bankruptcy, notifying this Court of their Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings and the automatic stay of the instant suit against them pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 1201, 1301. (Doc. No. 14). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment is analyzed with respect to defaulting defendants only—the McGlone Defendants and LLC Defendants (“Defaulting Defendants”).

Section 362(a)(1)’s automatic stay can extend to an employee whose interests are intimately intertwined with the debtor’s.

Green v. Connections Community Support Programs, Inc. · filed 2021-11-23(a)(1)

Pursuant to Section 362(a), the filing of CCSP’s voluntary petition under Chapter 11 operates as a stay to legal proceedings against CCSP and its employees.

Section 362(d)(2) does not authorize stay relief based on lack of equity alone when the property is necessary to an effective reorganization.

Singh Bros Express LLC · filed 2025-02-14(d)(2)

The Court finds that the Debtors have established a reasonable possibility of a successful reorganization within a reasonable time and that the Registry Funds are necessary for that reorganization. Accordingly, All Track is not entitled to relief from stay under § 362(d)(2).

Under § 362(d)(2)(B), a debtor cannot defeat stay relief with a vague, speculative possibility of a liquidating plan; the debtor must show a reasonable possibility of confirming one within a reasonable time.

Roger J. Ottoman · filed 2024-12-06(d)(2)(B)

In making his vague and speculative argument about a possible liquidating plan, therefore, the Debtor has failed to meet his burden of showing that the Property is necessary to an effective reorganization under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2)(B).

A debtor seeking to retain property under the automatic stay must show that reorganization requires the property and is feasible within a reasonable time.

Bruce Charles Durand · filed 2024-03-19(d)(2)(B)

To show that the property is necessary for an effective reorganization, a debtor must show both of the following: (a) reorganization is impossible without the property; and (b) reorganization is feasible within a reasonable time.

Section 362(d)(2) permits relief from the automatic stay as to property only when the debtor lacks equity in it and the property is unnecessary to an effective reorganization.

Barcelona Capital, LLC v. Neno Cab Corp. · filed 2023-01-23(d)(2)

Creditor moved for relief from the automatic stay with respect to specific property, Debtor’s taxi medallions, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2). ECF No. 4-1 ¶¶ 57–58. Creditor met its burden to prove that Debtor lacked equity in the medallions because Debtor reported to the Bankruptcy Court that the medallions were worth only $150,000, and Debtor owed Creditor $1.6 million in principal alone. Id. ¶ 57; Bankr. ECF No. 27-1 at 7; Bankr. ECF No. 27-2 at 1. However, the Bankruptcy Court easily could have concluded that the medallions were necessary for an effective reorganization because they were among “Debtor’s only asset[s] and source of future income.” In re 300 Wash. St., 528 B.R. at 554 (denying motion for relief from the automatic stay). The Bankruptcy Court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying relief from the automatic stay with respect to the taxi medallions.

Under § 362(d)(2), property cannot be necessary to an effective reorganization when the debtor’s case is a Chapter 7 liquidation.

ROTHMAN v. SN SERVICING CORPORATION · filed 2024-06-06(d)(2)

Furthermore, because Appellant’s bankruptcy case is now a liquidation under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, no reorganization will occur, and the Property cannot be necessary to an effective reorganization.

Section 362(d)(2) does not provide relief from the stay for a summary process action against the debtor rather than an act against property.

Cheryl Yeboah · filed 2025-11-12(d)(2)

Subsection (d)(2), however, does not apply because the summary process action is an act against the Debtor, not the Property.

Section 362(d)(2) permits continued protection under the automatic stay when the debtor lacks equity in the property but has a reasonable probability of successfully reorganizing within a reasonable time.

In re Wisconsin & Milwaukee Hotel LLC · filed 2026-01-05(d)(2)

But weighing the evidence presented in the context of whether to now grant the Lenders’ request for relief from the §362(a) stay, the court finds that the evidence demonstrates that the debtor continues to have a reasonable probability of successfully reorganizing.

Section 362(d)(2) requires relief from the automatic stay when the debtor has no equity in the property and the property is not necessary for an effective reorganization.

Camorette Michelle James · filed 2026-03-25(d)(2)

Upon a showing that there was no equity in the Property and that the Property is not necessary for an effective reorganization, the Court was required to lift the automatic stay.

Section 362(d)(2)(B) permits denial of stay relief when the debtor has a reorganization plan in process with a realistic chance of confirmation, even if the current plan is not yet confirmable.

In re Wisconsin & Milwaukee Hotel LLC · filed 2026-04-02(d)(2)(B)

As explained above, however, stay relief under §362(d)(2) is properly denied when the debtor has a reorganization plan in process that has a “realistic chance of being confirmed”; “the bankruptcy judge need not find a plan per se confirmable”.

Section 362(d)(2) permits relief from the stay when the debtor has no equity in property and has not shown that it is needed for an effective reorganization; needing a car for transportation alone does not establish necessity.

In Re Baez · filed 1989-07-06(d)(2)

Movant has also satisfied the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2). It is an uncontested fact that there is no equity in the property (see finding of fact number six). On the other hand, debtor/respondent has failed to meet her burden to establish that the car is needed for an effective reorganization. ... Debtor’s testimony that she needs the car as a means of transportation establishes, at best, a convenience, not a necessity. Accordingly, the movant is entitled to have the stay lifted pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2).

Section 362(d)(2) permits a debtor to defeat a motion for relief from the stay by showing a reasonable possibility of confirming a reorganization plan within a reasonable time.

In Re Bonner Mall Partnership, Debtor. Bonner Mall Partnership v. U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. · filed 1993-08-04(d)(2)

As noted above, the precise issue posed by Bancorp’s motion for relief from stay is not whether Bonner’s plan will ultimately be confirmed under section 1129 but whether there is a reasonable possibility that it can be confirmed within a reasonable time. That is all that Bonner need show to defeat Ban-corp’s section 362(d)(2) motion.

Section 362(d)(2) requires denial of relief from the stay when the debtor has equity in property necessary to an effective reorganization.

Heritage Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Hester (In Re Hester) · filed 1984-05-01(d)(2)

With respect to § 362(d)(2), the Lender in this matter is not entitled to relief because in this Chapter 13 debt adjustment proceeding the debtor’s place of residence is deemed necessary for an effective reorganization. Moreover, the Lender did not establish that the debtor did not have equity in such property. The Lender had the burden of proof to show that the debtor lacked such equity, 11 U.S.C. § 362(g)(1), and it failed to so establish a lack of equity.

Section 362(d)(2) permits relief from the automatic stay only when the debtor has no equity in the property and the property is unnecessary to an effective reorganization.

Federal National Mortgage Ass'n v. Million (In Re Million) · filed 1984-04-06(d)(2)

Federal also argues pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) that the debtors have no equity in the premises and that the property is not necessary to an effective reorganization. The evidence does not support this argument. The debtors stated at the hearing that retention of their home is essential to their plan and that its loss would destroy their attempt at financial reorganization.

Section 362(d)(2) permits relief from the automatic stay when the debtor has no equity in the property and no realistic prospect of an effective reorganization that requires it.

In re Williams · filed 2012-07-30(d)(2)

After additional briefing, the Court finds that the stay is due to be lifted pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2). ... Thus, the Court finds that the subject collateral is not necessary to the debtor’s effective reorganization. There is simply not a reasonable possibility of successful reorganization as it is highly probably that same would be followed by a liquidation of the subject property following confirmation. Accordingly, the stay is due to lift in favor of Wells Fargo.

Section 362(a)(6) does not bar mortgage statements that, read as a whole, disclaim an attempt to collect, direct payments to the bankruptcy trustee, and do not threaten late charges.

Freedom Mortgage Corporation v. Dean · filed 2023-01-26(a)(6)

Overall, because Freedom’s mortgage statements disavowed any attempt to collect a debt and did not threaten late charges, the mortgage statements were not an “act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against” the Deans.

Section 362(a)(6) prohibits a mortgage creditor from including prepetition attorney’s fees in the total monthly payment in a way that pressures the debtor to pay them directly, despite an informational-purpose disclaimer.

In re: David Orlansky & Sharon Lynn Orlansky · filed 2023-04-14(a)(6)

Here, Rocket created a situation where the standard disclaimer was clearly contradicted by a demand for payment. Though we expect damages in this case to be relatively minimal, we conclude that the statements constituted a violation of § 362(a)(6).

Section 362(a) may permit postpetition mortgage statements showing charges and payment defaults, even inaccurate ones, when adequate bankruptcy disclaimers are given.

Thomas · filed 2026-03-06(a)

However, displaying charges and payment defaults— even inaccurate ones—on monthly billing statements and online records may not violate the automatic stay where adequate bankruptcy disclaimers are given.

Section 362(c)(3)(B) permits extension of the stay to unknown creditors upon a finding that the second filing was in good faith as to them.

(BK)In Re Herbert Edward Miller · filed 2023-01-30(c)(3)(B)

Nothing in this section precludes a party in interest from moving for an automatic stay as to all known and unknown creditors, so long as the court determines the filing of the second case is in good faith as to all known and unknown creditors. Likewise, nothing in the text precludes the bankruptcy court from determining the automatic stay extends to all parties, even unknown creditors.

Section 362(a)(4) requires evidence that a creditor knowingly and in bad faith asserted an invalid prepetition security interest before that mere assertion constitutes a stay violation.

Byman v. RRL Capital Investments, LLC · filed 2023-09-07(a)(4)

Thus, the Court concludes that for this action to constitute a stay violation, additional evidence must be provided that the Security Interest was asserted in bad faith and with knowledge that the Security Interest was invalid.

Section 362(a)(6) does not require a creditor to undo a prepetition exercise of proxy rights over pledged stock merely because that exercise sought to collect a debt.

CII Parent, Inc. · filed 2023-04-12(a)(6)

While it is fair to say, as Debtor does, that Twin Brook’s Actions were an attempt to collect or recover on its Loan,” those actions happened pre-bankruptcy. As discussed above, pre-bankruptcy Debtor appointed Twin Brook as its attorney-in-fact and proxy and the Proxy Notice solidified Twin Brook’s ability to exercise the proxy. As of the petition date, therefore, Debtor did not have the right to vote the Pledged Equity.

The automatic stay bars collection of nondischargeable debts on the same terms as other claims.

Sheila Marie Chesney · filed 2023-12-21(a)

The stay applies to nondischargeable debts just as it does to the claims of other creditors.

Section 362(a) bars collection of a nondischargeable student loan during a Chapter 13 case except through the plan or after relief from the stay.

Branch v. Unipac/Nebhelp (In Re Branch) · filed 1994-12-13(a)

When this Chapter 13 case was filed, the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) prohibited the student loan creditor from attempting to collect the nondischargeable student loan balance, except through the Chapter 13 plan or after obtaining relief from the automatic stay or, in the alternative, until awaiting the closing of the case.

A creditor that agrees to postpone a Section 362(e)(1) stay relief hearing cannot invoke the provision’s deadline by filing a materially identical motion without leave.

GoldenTree Asset Management LP v. FOMB · filed 2024-01-22(e)(1)

The Bondholders were subject to a scheduling order. They never sought relief from that order. Nor did they ever claim that the order's postponement of a final hearing on the third-lift stay motion violated section 362(e)(1). Thus, we agree with the Title III court that the Bondholders could not unilaterally circumvent that scheduling order by simply refiling -- without leave -- a materially identical version of their stayed third motion. To hold otherwise would be to invite chaos.

A bad faith bankruptcy filing can constitute cause for relief from the automatic stay under § 362(d)(1).

Rita Renae Lewis · filed 2024-02-28(d)(1)

“Bad faith filing” is a basis for relief from the automatic stay.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause when a debtor files bankruptcy in bad faith to delay foreclosure.

In re: Clark · filed 2025-02-14(d)(1)

In addition, the Bankruptcy Court properly found that cause existed to grant Santander relief from automatic stay under Section 362(d)(1) because Mr. Clark may not delay state foreclosure proceedings through filing for Chapter 13 bankruptcy.

Section 362(l)(1) delays the eviction exception to the automatic stay when a debtor files the required certification, even if the debtor did not make the certified rent deposit.

Mark A. Focht · filed 2024-03-19(l)(1)

This view is inconsistent with the statutory language of Section 362(l)(1), which, read literally, does not require actual payment of the required deposit; rather, Section 362(l)(1) merely requires the filing of a “certification” as specified by subsections (A) and (B) of Section 362(l)(1).

Section 362(k)(1) does not make its remedy for willful automatic stay violations exclusive when a debt collector pursues a state collection action during the stay and the conduct also supports an FDCPA claim.

Nelson v. St. Catherine University · filed 2024-05-21(k)(1)

The Court further finds that where, as here, a plaintiff alleges that a debt collector pursued a state collection action in violation of the automatic stay provision, FDCPA enforcement does not irreconcilably conflict with enforcement of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay a postpetition suit for prospective injunctive relief against a debtor’s ongoing unlawful conduct merely because compliance may cost money.

Minor Child v. Roman Cath Ch · filed 2024-07-17(a)(3)

In sum, Section 362(a)(3) does not stymie Minor Children’s state court suit for prospective injunctive relief.

Section 362(k) authorizes an independent damages claim for injury from an automatic stay violation that survives the underlying bankruptcy case.

New London v. Speer · filed 2024-08-13(k)

Considering the express statutory language in 11 U.S.C. § 362 (k) creating a right to damages for individu- als injured by violations of the automatic stay, and con- sistent with federal precedent construing the same, we conclude, and the parties agree, that 11 U.S.C. § 362 (k) authorizes an independent cause of action for damages that survives the disposition of the underlying bank- ruptcy case.

Section 362(a)(1) does not require a court to lift an existing temporary restraining order preserving disputed assets held by nondebtors while proceedings are stayed.

Allstate Insurance Company v. Mirvis · filed 2024-09-26(a)(1)

As the Court noted in its initial Order, “permitting the TRO to remain in effect, particularly as to the Non-Debtor Respondents’ assets, best furthers the public policy considerations behind the automatic stay provision, which is intended to maintain the status quo.” (7/29/2024 Docket Order (citing In re Anderson, 884 F.3d at 390).)

Section 362(b)(3) does not except a creditor’s continued possession of a debtor’s vehicle to preserve a possessory lien from the automatic stay.

Jackson, III v. Paintmaster Premiere LLC · filed 2024-11-15(b)(3)

Rather, the Court joins other courts that have disagreed with the analysis in Hayden and Vega and will follow the opinions7 leading to the Seventh Circuit’s Fulton decision in holding that § 362(b)(3) does not except from the automatic stay a creditor’s efforts to maintain possession of a vehicle to preserve a possessory lien.

Section 362(b)(3) does not permit a creditor to retain a debtor’s vehicle after bankruptcy to preserve a possessory lien when doing so interferes with the debtor’s right to possess estate property.

Jackson, III v. Paintmaster Premiere LLC · filed 2024-11-15(b)(3)

While §§ 362(b)(3) and 546(b)(1) provide an automatic stay exception to prevent a bankruptcy petition from interfering with a creditor’s ability to perfect a lien post-petition under nonbankruptcy law, this exception does not allow a creditor’s perfection efforts to interfere with a debtor’s right to possess estate property.

Section 362(a)(1) stays a USDA proceeding against a debtor over a prepetition claim once the debtor files for bankruptcy, absent relief from the stay.

M & M Packaging, Inc. v. Mineo · filed 2024-11-22(a)(1)

Absent Bankruptcy Court relief from the automatic stay, which Plaintiff does not contend it obtained, the action before USDA was stayed once the Sprout bankruptcy petition was filed.

Section 362(c)(4)(A) prevents the automatic stay from taking effect when two prior bankruptcy cases were pending and dismissed within the previous year.

James Patrick Hardin and Amber Frances Hardin · filed 2024-12-05(c)(4)(A)

Accordingly, pursuant to § 362(c)(4)(A), the automatic stay did not go into effect upon the filing of their current case.

Section 362(d)(4) does not require proof that the debtor intended to defraud a creditor; a scheme to delay or hinder can support in rem stay relief.

Maria A Karpuleon · filed 2024-12-06(d)(4)

That revision makes it clear that a creditor need not show a debtor’s intent to defraud to secure relief under §362(d)(4).

Section 362(d)(4)(B) requires relief from the stay when multiple bankruptcy filings affecting real property are part of a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors; the timing of filings and selective notice to creditors can establish that scheme.

Nicholas Stephen Wallace and Pascale Marie Wallace · filed 2025-05-06(d)(4)(B)

The timing of these filings alongside the Debtors’ initial listing of (and notice to) only those creditors actively seeking foreclosure or replevin is enough for this Court to conclude that the filing of the petition in this case was part of a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors.

Section 362(d)(4)(B) requires the movant to prove a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors involving multiple bankruptcy filings before obtaining in rem stay relief.

Eric R. Braverman · filed 2026-01-16(d)(4)(B)

The Court concludes that the Stay Relief Movant has not met its burden to demonstrate the Debtor’s “scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors that involved . . . multiple bankruptcy filings.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4)(B).

Section 362(d)(4) permits relief from the automatic stay when a bankruptcy filing is part of a scheme to hinder, delay, or defraud a secured creditor involving a transfer of the real property without that creditor’s consent.

In Re Nelson · filed 2026-03-13(d)(4)

Relief was warranted under Section 362(d)(4) because the Property was transferred without Wells Fargo’s consent. Additionally, Ms. Nelson acted as part of a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud Wells Fargo from foreclosing on the Property.

Section 362’s automatic stay requires creditors to obtain relief before intervening in state court litigation against the debtor; the court granted that relief on an unopposed complaint.

Bitner v. Borne Chemical Co. (In Re Borne Chemical Co.) · filed 1980-11-10

The aforesaid motion to intervene, etc., filed by Bitner, et al., was successfully opposed by the debtor Borne Chemical Corn-pany because of movants’ failure to obtain relief from the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362. ... The debtor advancing no objection to the relief sought in the above captioned complaint, the requested relief is granted.

Section 362(k)(1) permits pre-petition creditors to recover damages for willful violations of the automatic stay.

Ayers v. Neugebauer · filed 2025-03-28(k)(1)

Pre-petition creditors may recover damages for willful violations of the automatic stay.

A creditor that lacks standing to avoid a postpetition transfer also lacks standing to seek contempt sanctions for alleged willful violations of the automatic stay.

Lilly v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (In re Natchez Corp. of West Virginia) · filed 1992-01-28

Because the FDIC lacked standing to avoid Lilly’s acts to transfer property of the Natchez estate post-petition, it also lacked standing to seek contempt sanctions for Lilly’s alleged willful violations of the stay.

Section 362(h) does not give a corporate debtor standing to seek damages for a willful violation of the automatic stay.

Ontario Entertainment Corp. v. Chicago Title & Trust Co. (In Re Ontario Entertainment Corp.) · filed 1999-08-25(h)

However, this Court has held that a corporate debtor such as OEC does not have standing to assert violations under § 362(h).

A debtor must allege a plausible injury to pursue a § 362(k) claim involving an asset the debtor lacks authority to possess or control.

Perry v. Key Auto Recovery · filed 2018-08-20(k)

In appeal no. 17-55520, the bankruptcy court properly granted summary judgment to JPMorgan Chase, because Perry did not have standing to pursue his claims. See Mwangi v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re Mwangi), 764 F.3d 1168, 1177 (9th Cir. 2014) (debtor failed to allege plausible injury under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) where debtor lacked authority to possess or control asset).

A creditor cannot pursue a § 362(k) damages claim belonging to the bankruptcy estate when the trustee has not abandoned or assigned it.

U Lock, Inc v. · filed 2025-01-13(k)

Here, Snyder lacks statutory standing under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) to seek damages for Biros’s purported automatic stay violations.

A court may set a deadline to file and properly notice motions under § 362(k)(1) for automatic stay violations and deem the claims waived if that deadline is missed.

Jacqueline Elizabeth Ard and Terry Frank Nicola · filed 2025-01-10(k)(1)

In the interest of judicial economy, the Court orders Debtors to file any such § 362(k)(1) motions, with notice to such creditors and certificates of service that comport with the rules of this Court on or before 5 P.M. on January 24, 2025. If Debtors do not file and properly notice such motions within 14 days of the entry of this Order, their claims concerning the violation of the automatic stay shall be deemed waived.

Section 362's automatic stay does not prohibit a creditor from transferring a debt owed by the debtor because the transfer is neither a proceeding against the debtor nor an act to collect the claim.

LVNV Funding, LLC v. Washington · filed 2025-02-07(a)

Citibank's transfer of the debt it held did not constitute an action or proceeding against defendant or an act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against defendant.

Section 362(a) stayed the creditor’s fraudulent transfer claim.

Alhaj v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) · filed 2023-08-31(a)

For the foregoing reasons, MDP’s motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, stay, is granted in part insofar as the fraudulent transfer claim is stayed under 11 U.S.C. § 362.

A monetary sanctions order under § 362(k) is not an ordinary money judgment and may be enforced through contempt rather than a writ of execution.

Mackenzie R Alexander · filed 2025-03-18(k)

This Court agrees with Hernandez and the other cases cited above that a sanctions order with a monetary component, including under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k), is not an ordinary money judgment. ... Therefore, a contempt proceeding is an appropriate means to enforce a sanctions order, and the moving party need not seek a writ of execution under Federal Civil Rule 69(a)(1).

Section 362 does not prevent the IRS from continuing an inquiry into a church debtor’s tax status or require the church to stop complying with an order to produce records for that inquiry.

United States v. Universal Life Church · filed 1990-04-04

In this case, the government does not approach the respondent church as a creditor demanding payment, but rather to inquire as to whether the tax status previously granted is still appropriate. ... Respondent is directed to resume compliance with the Court’s prior orders within ten (10) days of this Memorandum Decision.

Section 362(b)(9) allows a taxing authority to audit a taxpayer after the taxpayer files for bankruptcy.

James Patyrak and N.Y. Thymes & Deli, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation · filed 2025-05-08(b)(9)

The filing of a bankruptcy petition by a taxpayer does not prevent Taxation from commencing and completing an audit against that taxpayer.

Section 362(b)(9) excepts government audits to determine tax liability from the automatic stay.

TIETIG v. COMMISSIONER · filed 2001-07-25(b)(9)

However, 11 U.S.C. sec. 362(b)(9) (1994) provides an exception to the automatic stay for audits conducted by the Government to determine tax liability.

Section 362(a)(2) stays enforcement of a prepetition judgment against the debtor or estate property.

In re Hyong Jin Kim · filed 1981-11-10(a)(2)

In order to determine the extent of the damages to which the Mandinas are entitled, this court must consider New York State law and the terms of the Stipulation, including the fact that certain damages which were the subject of the prior civil court judgment are subject to automatic stay under § 362 of the Code-...These damages are properly excluded under the Code and the Stipulation itself.

Section 362(a)(2) stays enforcement of a prepetition judgment even when the judgment does not arise from a bankruptcy claim.

In the Matter of Barry Stuart Udell, Debtor-Appellee. Appeal of the Standard Carpetland Usa, Inc. · filed 1994-03-03(a)(2)

The automatic stay prescribed by the Bankruptcy Code applies to “judgment[s] obtained before the commencement of the case under this title,” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2), whether or not the judgment arises out of a “claim.”

Section 362 requires a creditor that repossessed property after a bankruptcy filing to take affirmative steps to restore the filing-date status quo once it learns of the petition.

Miller v. Savings Bank of Baltimore (In Re Miller) · filed 1982-07-28

In recognition of this problem, creditors have been required, when necessary, to take affirmative steps to restore the status quo at the time of the filing of the petition for relief.

Section 362’s automatic stay prevents a Chapter 11 debtor from being joined as a party in another court while the stay remains in effect.

American Financial Corp. v. General Electric Credit Corp. · filed 1983-02-23(a)

The automatic stay of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362, precludes our making Itel a party here.

Section 362(a)(3) protects a debtor’s possession of property under the automatic stay even after the debtor’s other interests have ended.

Marcott v. Euclide (In Re Marcott) · filed 1983-06-02(a)(3)

Mere possession of property has been found to be “a scintilla of equitable interest,” adequate to come within the bankruptcy estate and the protection of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(b)(2) permits a spouse to pursue alimony collection despite the automatic stay.

In Re Crouch · filed 1983-09-15(b)(2)

Mrs. Crouch, however, would have a collection advantage over the IRS in that she would not be subject to the automatic stay in accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2).

Section 362(b)(2) excepts collection of support from property outside the bankruptcy estate, but does not except contempt proceedings brought against the debtor personally.

Kearns v. Orr (In Re Kearns) · filed 1993-11-24(b)(2)

The contempt proceedings against Kearns were brought against Kearns personally and, therefore, were not excepted under § 362(b)(2).

Section 362(a)(7) stays a creditor from applying a prepetition deposit against prepetition charges after the debtor files for bankruptcy.

Brooks Shoe Manufacturing Co. v. United Telephone Co. (In Re Naudain, Inc.) · filed 1983-09-21(a)(7)

Finally, it is undisputed that United Telephone violated the automatic stay provisions of section 362(a) of the Code by applying the deposit (plus the accrued interest thereon) to the charges.

Section 362(a)(6) prohibits a creditor from collecting a prepetition debt after the bankruptcy filing and before discharge.

Walker v. M & M Dodge, Inc. (In Re Walker) · filed 1995-04-24(a)(6)

Nonetheless, the Court finds that M & M Dodge's post-petition, yet pre-dis-charge, collections from the Walkers violated § 362(a)(6).

Section 362(b)(5) permits a district court to enforce an asset-freeze injunction in a governmental regulatory action so long as it does not enforce a money judgment.

Federal Trade Commission v. R.A. Walker & Ass'n · filed 1983-10-27(b)(5)

Thus, Co Petro establishes the rule that section 362(b)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code permits a district court to enter an injunction against the transfer of assets and to enforce that injunction so long as it does not amount to the enforcement of a money judgment.

Section 362(a)(4) prohibits acts to create, perfect, or enforce a lien against property of the bankruptcy estate.

Richlands National Bank v. Smith · filed 1983-10-28(a)(4)

Furthermore, the automatic stay provision of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4) prohibits “any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate.” Thus, the trustee had no duty to protect the Bank’s “secured” interest.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not apply to temporary cease and desist orders issued by thrift regulators under 12 U.S.C. § 1818 in these circumstances.

Carlton v. Firstcorp · filed 1992-08-12

We think that the Supreme Court's reasoning in MCorp, that the automatic stay does not apply to internal administrative proceedings, applies equally to temporary cease and desist orders of regulatory agencies in these circumstances.

Section 362 permits a state to seek a consumer protection injunction against a bankrupt business, but bars monetary relief against that business.

People v. 21st Century Leisure Spa International Ltd. · filed 1991-05-23(b)(4), (5)

Lastly, the court notes that although no monetary relief may be obtained from 21st Century, it is appropriate for the State, in enforcing laws such as consumer protection acts, to exert such power as is necessary to protect its citizens from deceptive consumer practices (see, In re Charter First Mtge., 42 Bankr 380; see also, United States v Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 818 F2d 1077; 11 USC § 362 [b] [4], [5]).

Section 362(b)(4) permits the EEOC to pursue a sex discrimination suit against a debtor despite the automatic stay.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Valley Kitchens, Inc. (In Re Valley Kitchens, Inc.) · filed 1986-12-29(b)(4)

Because that suit is in progress, and its bringing did not violate the § 362 stay pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1), we deem it appropriate to abstain from hearing the liquidation question.

Section 362(b)(4) allows FERC to exercise its regulatory power during a utility’s bankruptcy, including ordering continued performance under filed power agreements.

California Department of Water Resources v. Calpine Corp. · filed 2006-01-27(b)(4)

There is little doubt that after Calpine filed for reorganization, FERC could have exercised its regulatory power and ordered Calpine’s continued performance under the Power Agreements that Calpine seeks to reject.

Section 362, read with subsections (b)(4) and (b)(5), permits governmental acts necessary to end a continuing violation of valid regulatory laws to proceed without the automatic stay, even when the estate must give up possession of some property.

Cournoyer v. Town of Lincoln · filed 1985-09-12(a)(3), (b)(4)-(5)

Viewing the language of § 362(a)(3) in the context of §§ 362(b)(4) and (b)(5), and of 28 U.S.C. § 959(b), it is clear that Congress meant to exempt from the stay governmental acts necessary to end a continuing violation of valid regulatory laws, cf. Matter of National Hospital & Institutional Builders, 658 F.2d 39 (2d Cir.1981) — even where the estate is forced to cede possession of some of its property. Indeed, the language of § 959(b) suggests to me that a bankruptcy court is obligated to permit such enforcement actions to proceed.

Section 362(b)(4) excludes governmental actions to enforce police or regulatory power from the automatic stay.

United States v. Silva · filed 2007-02-05(b)(4)

The Court, therefore, holds that the automatic-stay provision of the Code does not apply. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).

The automatic stay expires when the thirty-day deadline for a stay ruling passes, but the court may enjoin foreclosure under § 105(a) after that deadline.

Banco Popular De Puerto Rico v. Landron Vallejo (In Re Landron Vallejo) · filed 1987-04-07(e)

Banco Popular is also correct in stating that as a general rule the stay is deemed lifted if the Court does make a decision within the thirty (30) days specified in Rule 4001(b). ... Accordingly, the Court, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) hereby enjoins Banco Popular from prosecuting any action to foreclose on property of the debtor even though the thirty (30) day period has expired.

Section 362 prevents payment to creditors after a bankruptcy filing without direction from the bankruptcy court.

United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc. v. Sanders · filed 1987-05-29

Even if he did have knowledge of the overpayment, by the time the mistaken payment was received, Sanders was not at liberty to pay any creditors, voluntary or involuntary, without direction of the bankruptcy court (11 U.S.C. § 362). This conduct cannot be characterized as a wrongful exercise of dominion over property.

Section 362(a)(6) stays an action to foreclose a mechanic’s lien when the action seeks to collect a debt of the debtor.

In Re Babylon Ltd. Partnership · filed 1987-07-10(a)(6)

Further, action to foreclose on the lien is an act to collect a debt of the Debtor and apparently stayed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6).

Section 362’s automatic stay covers debtors but does not extend to nonbankrupt codefendants.

Stanley-Vidmar v. Marineland, Inc., No. Cv 88 0296438 S (Dec. 17, 1991) · filed 1991-12-17

Even though a stay in bankruptcy pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362 is limited to debtors and does not cover non-bankrupt co-defendants, Teachers Ins. Annuity Association of America v. Butter, 803 F.2d 61 , 65 (2d Cir. 1986), the claims against both defendants here are interrelated since Strol is an officer of Marineland, Inc., and the corporation acted through Strol.

Section 362(a)(1) stays proceedings against the debtor but does not automatically stay claims against nonbankrupt co-defendants.

Matthews v. Johns-Manville Corp. · filed 1982-09-24(a)(1)

The plain language of the statute belies defendants’ expansive reading of the scope of this provision and compels our conclusion that the protections of § 362(a) are only afforded to the debtor-bankrupt.

Section 362(h) does not permit monetary penalties against state governmental bodies or their subdivisions when the Eleventh Amendment bars them.

In Re Geiger · filed 1992-03-04(h)

Firstly, we note that, in Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't. of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96, 109 S.Ct. 2818, 106 L.Ed.2d 76 (1989), the Court appears to foreclose any imposition of monetary penalties against state governmental bodies or their subdivisions under 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) in light of the Eleventh Amendment. ... The only potential basis for any imposition of monetary damages against the instant Defendants is, therefore, under this court's contempt power.

Section 362 does not bar a creditor’s plan that contemplates foreclosure when the creditor must first prevail in an adversary proceeding.

In Re Oaks Partners, Ltd. · filed 1992-03-06

The plan offered by First Union is something more than an order granting relief from the stay, because First Union is obligated to pay all administrative claims and all unsecured claims in full. First Union would not be required to pay these claims, if it sought and obtained relief from the automatic stay. Furthermore, First Union’s Plan does not automatically allow foreclosure, since First Union recognizes that prior to any foreclosure, it still must prevail in the adversary proceeding. Accordingly, debt- or’s objection on this ground is overruled.

Section 362(a) prohibits garnishing a debtor’s wages after the bankruptcy filing under a prepetition writ.

Taylor v. Mississippi Learning Institute (In Re Taylor) · filed 1993-02-22(a)

The parties also agree that as to those funds that were withheld after the debtor filed her bankruptcy case, i.e., $844.59, that said monies were garnished in violation of the automatic stay set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). As such, these wages should not have been withheld pursuant to the writ of garnishment.

Section 362(a)(3) renders void a trust amendment that irrevocably excludes the debtor as a beneficiary in violation of the automatic stay.

Lawrence v. Chapter 7 Trustee (In Re Lawrence) · filed 2000-07-31(a)(3)

The fact that the trustees of the Lawrence Family Trust are aware of the distinction between a revocable and an irrevocable exclusion of a beneficiary is demonstrated by the June 16, 1999 amendment seeking to make the appellant’s exclusion irrevocable, even though that amendment is void as being in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) and the stay order entered by Judge King in Pompano-• Windy City Partners, Ltd. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., No. 93-6489-CIV-KING.

A trustee seeking full sale proceeds as compensatory damages for a violation of the automatic stay must prove the asset was part of the bankruptcy estate, but need not bring a separate avoidance claim to do so.

In Re Just Brakes Corporate Systems, Inc., Debtor. David A. Sosne, Trustee v. Reinert & Duree, P.C. · filed 2002-07-15(a)(6)

We held that the Trustee had to prove the trademark was part of the bankruptcy estate before the full sale proceeds could be awarded as compensatory damages for Defendants’ violation of the automatic stay. We did not hold that the Trustee had to bring new avoidance claims under 11 U.S.C. §§ 547-550, or otherwise replead those claims, in order to establish the estate’s property interest for purposes of this § 362(a) proceeding.

Section 362(k) requires proof of actual damages caused by a stay violation to recover damages.

Pansier v. United States · filed 2020-02-10(k)

In addition, Appellants only presented unsupported allegations that they suffered damages as a result of the IRS’s conduct, since the IRS did not actually collect from the notice of levy until after the 14-day stay expired on March 9, 2019.

Section 362(a) prohibits a creditor from collecting student loan debt while the debtor’s bankruptcy case is pending.

Bender v. Educational Credit Management Corp. (In Re Bender) · filed 2003-05-05(a)

During the pendency of their bankruptcy, ECMC is prohibited from taking any action to collect on the student loan debts, see 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (providing automatic stay), and it is limited to receiving pro-rata payments along with other unsecured creditors under the Chapter 13 plan, see Groves v. LaBarge (In re Groves), 39 F.3d 212, 215 (8th Cir.1994) (separate classification of student loan debt in Chapter 13 plan unfairly discriminated against other creditors).

Section 362 prevents a supplier with a long-term contract from walking away while the debtor pays for new deliveries.

Coporation v. Capital Factors Inc · filed 2004-02-24

They may, for example, have long term contracts, and the automatic stay prevents these vendors from walking away as long as the debtor pays for new deliveries.

Section 362’s automatic stay prevents vendors with long term contracts from stopping deliveries while the debtor pays for new deliveries.

In the Matter of: Kmart Corporation · filed 2004-02-24

They may, for example, have long term contracts, and the automatic stay prevents these vendors from walking away as long as the debtor pays for new deliveries. See 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362 stays creditors from taking action to collect a debt during a bankruptcy case, apart from filing a proof of claim.

United States Internal Revenue Service v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Industrial Commercial Electrical, · filed 2005-01-04

When the petition is filed, an automatic stay comes into effect, see 11 U.S.C. § 362, which forbids creditors from taking any action to collect on a debt, other than filing a proof of claim with the Bankruptcy Court, see id. § 501. ... ICE has no power to collect on the debt during the pendency of the bankruptcy case, so the earliest the debt would come due would be upon discharge (in which case ICE would apparently receive zero cents on the dollar) or upon dismissal of Management’s case (for bad faith, say).

Section 362(b)(4) excepts governmental enforcement of state and federal labor laws from the automatic stay.

Worth & Co. v. Department of Labor & Industry · filed 2007-12-27(b)(4)

Because the Bankruptcy Code provides an exception to the automatic stay for enforcement of state and federal labor laws, the underpaid workmen here were not without remedy.

Section 362(b)(2)(A)(iii) exempts child custody issues from the automatic stay, allowing review of a parenting plan while other issues remain stayed.

In the Matter of the Marriage of: Rebecca Bies & Alexander Bies · filed 2023-03-02(b)(2)(A)(iii)

With the agreement of the parties, this court subsequently bifurcated the issues on appeal so as not to delay review of assignments of error related to the parenting plan. See Order Re: Bifurcation, In re Marriage of Bies, No. 38293-1-III, at 2-3 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2023); see also 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(A)(iii) (issues “concerning child custody” exempted from automatic stay).

Section 362’s automatic stay suspends enforcement of a restraining notice but does not end the notice’s restraint on transferring the debtor’s property.

Broome v. Citibank, N. A. · filed 1995-08-22(a)

However, our courts have interpreted the effect of a stay on a restraining notice in a different manner. ... "Likewise, the stay provisions of section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code has no effect upon the restraining notice. A stay has the effect of suspending enforcement and may prevent the judgment creditor from coming into possession of the funds. A stay has no effect on a restraining notice which merely acts as an injunction. (Nardone v Long Is. Trust Co., 40 AD2d 697.)” ... Therefore, based upon the facts as stipulated to by the parties, this court finds that the defendant bank violated the restraining order by releasing the funds in the judgment debtor’s account to someone other than the Marshall pursuant to the restraining notice.

Section 362(a)(1) bars a suit outside the Bankruptcy Court to enforce a debtor’s secondary liability after the debtor files for bankruptcy.

United States v. Galletti · filed 2004-03-23(a)(1)

When respondents filed for bankruptcy, an automatic stay barred the Government from bringing suit outside the Bankruptcy Court to enforce respondents’ secondary liability.

Section 362(a), as incorporated into PROMESA Title III, stays a § 1983 damages action against Puerto Rico officials when the Commonwealth bears the defense costs and potential judgment.

Betancourt-Rivera v. Vázquez-Garced · filed 2018-05-16(a)

This case is stayed pursuant to 48 U.S.C. § 2161(a) and 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a) and 922.

Section 362(d) gives the court discretion to tailor stay relief when competing mortgagees seek to foreclose on the same property, subject to other applicable law.

Monopearl, Inc. v. Feldstein (In re Del Gizzo) · filed 1980-08-08(d)

It appears, therefore, that where two mortgagees seek to foreclose on the same property at the same time, § 362(d) gives the court discretion to tailor the relief to the facts, provided such action does not conflict with any provision of the Bankruptcy Code or other principle of law governing the relationship between secured creditors.

Section 362(a)(4)’s stay does not reach a foreclosure sale completed before the bankruptcy petition was actually filed, even if both occurred on the same day.

Holloway v. Kleitz (In Re Kleitz) · filed 1980-09-19(a)(4)

Moreover, nothing in the legislative history of the Reform Act indicates that Congress intended that the automatic stay provisions of Section 362(a) should affect acts done at any time prior to the actual filing of the bankruptcy petition. Rather, the filing of the petition, which serves to commence a debtor’s case, appears to be the focal point for determining the effectiveness of the stay and the parameters of the estate.

Section 362(c) ends the automatic stay over estate property when the property leaves the estate and ends the stay over other acts when the bankruptcy case is dismissed, closed, or reaches specified discharge circumstances.

Caffree v. Doctorman · filed 2005-08-03(c)(1), (c)(2)(A)-(C)

Rather, the automatic stay in bankruptcy of an act against property continues only until the subject property “is no longer property of the estate; and (2) the stay of any other act . . . continues until the earliest of – the time the case is closed; . . . dismissed; or . . . [under specified circumstances] a discharge is granted or denied.” 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(c)(1) & (2)(A) (B) & (C). Therefore, the district court was not prevented by the bankruptcy stay from entering its dismissal order.

Section 362(a) makes an applicable stay arise automatically when a bankruptcy petition is filed; a separate suggestion of bankruptcy does not trigger it.

Glanz v. Mendelson · filed 2000-12-19(a)

To the extent a bankruptcy proceeding may stay a state court receivership, that result followed automatically from the filing of the petition for bankruptcy.

Section 362(c)(2)(C) ends the automatic stay when an individual Chapter 7 debtor receives a discharge.

In Re Ulrich · filed 2011-08-12(c)(2)(C)

Once a debtor’s discharge has entered, the stay is no longer in effect.

Section 362(a)'s automatic stay generally begins when a bankruptcy case is filed, but a Chapter 15 petition alone does not trigger it.

In re Worldwide Education Services, Inc. · filed 2013-06-17(a)

Except in a Chapter 15 bankruptcy case, such as this one, the automatic stay in bankruptcy pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) applies from the moment that a bankruptcy case is filed.

Under § 362(c)(1), the stay against property terminates when exempt property is no longer part of the estate.

Cook v. Cook (In re Cook) · filed 1981-07-31(c)(1)

The parties agree that it is exempt under Florida law. The stay is, therefore, terminated with respect to the house in question which is no longer property of this estate.

Section 362(c)(2) keeps the stay against a debtor and the debtor’s property in place after property is exempted, until the case closes or is dismissed, or discharge is granted or denied.

Powell v. Yarbrough (In re Yarbrough) · filed 2015-10-02(c)(2)

Although the Residence is no longer property of the estate, Section 362(a) continues to stay actions against the Debtors and property of the Debtors until the earliest of the time the case is closed, dismissed, or in an individual Chapter 7 proceeding, the time a discharge is granted or denied.

Section 362(a)(1) automatically stays a prepetition suit against the debtor, but the court may dismiss the claims on their merits rather than stay the action.

Teel v. American Steel Foundries · filed 1981-12-28(a)(1)

The undersigned acknowledges, in accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1), that the filing of this petition operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of "the commencement ... of a judicial ... proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title." ... Rather than stay these claims, it is better to resolve the claims on their merits.

Section 362(a) bars continuation of a judicial proceeding, including entry of an order dismissing the action, while the stay remains in effect.

Pope v. Manville Forest Products Corporation · filed 1985-12-12(a)

We simply hold that the entry of the particular order of dismissal in the appeal before us was prohibited by the section 362 stay.

Section 362(a)(6) stays acts to collect, assess, or recover prepetition claims against the debtor, subject to statutory exceptions.

York Linings International, Inc. v. Harbison-Walker Refractories Co. · filed 2005-12-28(a)(6)

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6), the filing of a bankruptcy petition stays "any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the [bankruptcy] case." See also Hammes v. Brumley, 659 N.E.2d 1021, 1025 n. 1 (filing of petition automatically stays judicial action against the debtor in bankruptcy). "Therefore, unless a creditor falls into an explicitly enumerated exception to the automatic stay as listed in the Bankruptcy Code, a creditor is prohibited from proceeding with a lawsuit against a debtor in bankruptey." Id. (citation omitted). Thus, when H-W filed its bankruptey petition, there came into existence an automatic stay against any act by YLI to pursue a claim against H-W that arose before that debt.

Section 362(a) stays monetary claims against debtors, preventing the court from adjudicating those claims while the stay remains in effect.

Gibson v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. · filed 2014-05-19(a)

As the parties acknowledge, Plaintiffs’ claims for monetary relief as to Defendants GMAC Mortgage, LLC, Residential Funding Corporation and Residential Funding Company, LLC, are currently subject to the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). ... Based on the operation of the partial stay, the Court concludes that at summary judgment only Plaintiffs’ claims for wrongful foreclosure, breach of the Deed of Trust, and promissory estoppel may be addressed.

Section 362(a)(1) stays the continuation of an FDCPA claim against a debtor when a bankruptcy court’s stay modification does not permit that claim to proceed.

Young v. Ditech Financial LLC · filed 2019-09-03(a)(1)

The court therefore concludes that Mr. Young’s FDCPA claim—but not his claims for quiet title and declaratory relief—are subject to the automatic stay. See 11 U.S.C. § 362. Accordingly, the court STAYS this case with respect to Mr. Young’s FDCPA claim until the automatic stay is lifted.

Section 362(d) requires the bankruptcy court to assess adequate protection despite a state replevin judgment whose writ has not been executed.

Rikes v. Henderson (In re Henderson) · filed 1982-01-22(d)

Since the right of possession of Plaintiff in the state court and the right in the context of bankruptcy case administration are not the same issues, the mere issuance of the writ, as stayed, does and cannot constitute a determination of such bankruptcy court issues as adequate protection.

Section 362(a)(7) applies to both reorganization and liquidation cases.

Waste Management of Tennessee, Inc. v. Barry Parker's, Inc. (In Re Barry P. Parker's, Inc.) · filed 1983-07-19(a)(7)

It is nevertheless clear that § 362(a)(7) applies to both reorganization and liquidation cases.

Contempt for violating the automatic stay requires knowledge of the stay’s prohibitions; knowledge of the bankruptcy filing alone is insufficient.

Associated Hobby Manufacturers, Inc. v. Rohde & Liesenfeld, GMBH & Co. (In Re Associated Hobby Manufacturers, Inc.) · filed 1983-10-26(a)

The debtor has proved that R & L had knowledge of the filing of the petition for reorganization under the Code prior to its removal of the goods, but we find that the debtor has failed to establish that R & L had knowledge of the proscriptions imposed by the automatic stay when it removed the goods from the Maersk Marine Terminal.

Section 362(d)(1) permits limited relief from the automatic stay to determine liability and damages on a personal injury claim while barring collection of any resulting judgment.

In Re Bock Laundry MacHine Co. · filed 1984-03-08(d)(1)

This Relief is granted only to the extent that the named Movants are permitted to resume their personal injury actions against the Debtor-In-Possession for the purpose of determining liability and the amount, if any, of damages. It is FURTHER ORDERED that the Movants will not attempt, in any manner, to collect on any judgments which result from their personal injury actions.

Section 362(a)(6) stays acts by any entity to collect, assess, or recover a prepetition claim against the debtor.

O'Connor v. Methodist Hospital of Jonesboro, Inc. (In Re O'Connor) · filed 1984-06-11(a)(6)

11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6) states: ... a petition ... operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title. The Court cannot envision a more obvious example of an act to collect or recover a claim against the property of a debtor than the issuance of a garnishment.

Section 362(a)(6) stays acts to collect claims against a debtor, including acts pursued in foreign litigation.

In Re Chiles Power Supply Co., Inc. · filed 2001-06-14(a)(6)

I find, therefore, that this Court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendants, and that their actions ... are in violation of the automatic stay and the channeling injunction.

Section 362 automatically stays acts to control estate property, collect prepetition debts, or set off claims, and permits relief only for established cause.

In RE McKAY · filed 2009-12-09(a), (a)(3), (a)(6), (a)(7), (d)(1)

The automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. Section 362(a) immediately arose on the Petition Date by operation of law. The automatic stay bars the Patricia Estate from any act to retain or exercise control over property of the estate or to collect, assess, recover or setoff the prepetition indebtedness against the Debtor. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a)(3), (a)(6), (a)(7). The Patricia Estate ... has no enforceable right of setoff or recoupment pursuant to applicable law. 11 U.S.C. § 553(a); In re Smith, 737 F.2d at 1553. It has failed to establish cause for relief from the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 362(d)(1); In re Radcliffe, 372 B.R. 401, 418 (Bankr.N.D.Ind.2007). Its Motion for Relief from Stay is due to be denied. Any retention of the Debtor’s inheritance benefits would constitute a violation of the automatic stay. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a)(3), (a)(6), (a)(7).

Section 362(d) limits modification or conditioning of the automatic stay to economic concerns under Title 11.

In re Goetz · filed 1984-09-05(d)

This Court’s power to modify or condition the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. sec. 362(d) is limited to the economic concerns expressed in Title 11 of the United States Code.

Section 362 automatically stays actions upon a bankruptcy filing, but a bankruptcy court may limit the stay’s effect in appropriate future cases.

Modica v. OZONE PARK FUNDING ASSOCIATES · filed 2010-12-06

The common thread in these cases is the well-engrained understanding that the bankruptcy court can limit the effect of the automatic stay provisions of the Code in hypothetical future cases with respect to a debt or property that had already been subject to bankruptcy jurisdiction. That is precisely what Judge Feller has done here in simply limiting the automatic stay provision but only insofar as the Módicas seek to apply it to the real property that secured the mortgage debt owed to Ozone Park.

Section 362(a)(1) stays proceedings against a debtor, while sections 362(b)(4) and (5) except certain governmental police or regulatory actions from the stay.

In Re Geffken · filed 1984-10-30(a)(1), (b)(4), (b)(5)

Nevertheless, this court has no difficulty in concluding that the Commission’s action under O.R.C. section 4123.79 against the debtor is subject to the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. section 362(a)(1) and is not subject to the exceptions to the stay under section 362(b)(4) and (5).

Section 362 automatically stays covered proceedings but exempts criminal prosecutions and police or regulatory actions, subject to determining whether they serve as a guise for debt collection.

Enstar Energy, Inc. v. Anderton (In Re First Texas Petroleum, Inc.) · filed 1985-08-23(a), (b)(1), (b)(4)

The plaintiffs have attempted to characterize the criminal prosecution as a subterfuge which allows deféndants, as creditors, to circumvent the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). The stay does not provide blanket protection. To the contrary, Congress limited the power in § 362(b) providing, inter alia, exceptions for both criminal prosecutions, § 362(b)(1), and state enforcement of its police or regulatory powers, § 362(b)(4). The policies underlying sections 362(a) and 362(b) may conflict and when the two provisions intersect, the court must determine whether criminal prosecution or police or regulatory powers serve as a guise for debt collection. The policy conflict between sections 362(a) and 362(b)(1) merits consideration.

Section 362(b)(4) permits governmental units to commence or continue actions enforcing police or regulatory powers despite the automatic stay.

Brock v. American Messenger Service, Inc. · filed 1986-10-09(b)(4)

This action is therefore exempt under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) from the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay provision.

Section 362 stays acts to set off debts owed to a debtor after a bankruptcy petition is filed.

Bankr. L. Rep. P 70,553 First National Bank of Louisville v. Hurricane Elkhorn Coal Corporation II Logan & Kanawha Coal · filed 1985-05-21

A setoff has occurred, and one party is seeking to characterize the setoff as violative of the automatic stay since it allegedly functioned against a Chapter 11 debtor. ... Given the bank’s position in this equitable action, it is incumbent upon it to prove that the setoff actually functioned as against the Chapter 11 debtor.

Section 362(d)(1) entitles an entity with an interest in property to adequate protection when the automatic stay prevents it from exercising that interest.

Doty v. Pulliam (In Re Pulliam) · filed 1985-11-07(d)(1)

While disputes regarding the amount and form of adequate protection payments are questions of fact reviewable under the clearly erroneous standard, the present case involves the legal issue of whether the creditor's interest in the present value of the debt is “an interest in property" under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1), so as to be entitled to adequate protection.

Section 362(d)(1) allows the stay to remain in effect when an equity cushion and monthly payments provide adequate protection to an undersecured creditor.

In Re Goode · filed 1991-09-21(d)(1)

The Court finds that in addition to the above equity cushion said payments would provide adequate protection to First State on its outstanding loan to APG. The Court therefore denies First State’s Motion to Modify the Automatic Stay so long as said adequate protection payments are made to First. State.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause, including lack of adequate protection of a creditor’s interest.

Jenkins v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (In re Jenkins) · filed 2018-01-09(d)(1)

A creditor may obtain relief through modification of the stay if it can demonstrate "cause," which includes "the lack of adequate protection" of the creditor's interest. ... The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by modifying the automatic stay for SPS after finding that Jenkins lacked adequate protection.

Lack of insurance may constitute cause for relief from the automatic stay under § 362(d)(1), but insurance is not required for adequate protection in every case.

R&J Contractor Services, Inc. v. Vancamp · filed 2023-04-06(d)(1)

Accordingly, the Court is satisfied that a lack of insurance may form the basis for cause under § 362(d)(1). However, this should not be taken to mean that insurance is required to find adequate protection in all circumstances.

Section 362(d)(1) permits a court to deny stay relief despite missed mortgage payments when a substantial equity cushion adequately protects the creditor.

Selim David Moche · filed 2026-03-09(d)(1)

Accordingly, in light of the substantial equity cushion, the Court concludes that “cause” does not exist to lift the stay to permit foreclosure under § 362(d)(1).

Section 362(a) automatically stays proceedings against the petitioning debtor, but generally does not stay proceedings against codefendants or guarantors.

Allegheny International Credit Corp. v. Bio-Energy of Lincoln, Inc. · filed 1985-11-29(a)

The automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code apply only to a “proceeding against the [petitioning] debtor,” see note 4, supra, and not against others.

Section 362(a)(1)'s automatic stay can extend to nondebtor codefendants when unusual circumstances make relief without all parties infeasible.

Belington Bank v. Masketeers Co. · filed 1991-07-18(a)(1)

Based upon the unusual circumstances of the present case, we hold that the bankruptcy stay filed on May 16, 1985, was applicable to the entire proceeding, including not only The Masketeers Company, but also the four individual defendants, Hathaway, Lewis, Miller, and Daddysman.

Section 362(a)(1) generally does not stay proceedings against nonbankrupt codebtors or guarantors when one debtor files for bankruptcy.

Peerless Oil & Chemical, Inc. v. Hermanos Torres Pérez, Inc. · filed 2012-07-13(a)(1)

Por consiguiente, cuando en un pleito hay varios codeudores, garantizadores o fiadores, estos no pueden ampararse en la quiebra de uno de los deudores para alegar también la paralización del proceso en su contra.

Section 362(a) automatically stays certain creditor actions after a bankruptcy petition but does not toll specific statutory periods or stop contractual deadlines from running.

Beverages International, Ltd. v. Schenley Affiliated Brands Corp. (In Re Beverages International, Ltd.) · filed 1986-06-19(a)

Section 362(a), while it automatically stays certain creditor actions upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, does not and was not intended to toll the running of specific time period.

Section 362(c)(3)(B) requires a hearing on an objected-to motion to continue the stay to be completed within 30 days of the later bankruptcy filing.

In re Markoch · filed 2018-04-19(c)(3)(B)

At the hearing to consider the present Motion, the court explained that because more than 30 days from the petition date had passed, it was no longer possible to complete the hearing within the statutory period as to U.S. Bank-the only creditor who objected to the Motion. ... So, returning to this case, as a matter of law the automatic stay "terminate[d] with respect to the [D]ebtor on the 30th day after the filing of the later case"-as to U.S. Bank (who objected to the Motion), but not as to others (who did not object).

Section 362(e)’s 30-day deadline does not prevent a bankruptcy court from using § 105(a) to continue the automatic stay.

Medical Plaza, Ltd. v. Medical Plaza Associates, Ltd. (In Re Medical Plaza Associates, Ltd.) · filed 1986-12-11(e)

However, most courts which have decided the propriety of a bankruptcy court’s use of the power granted it in section 105(a) to extend the automatic stay beyond the 30-day limit in section 362(e) have found that exercise of power to be proper. ... We agree that such exercise of the bankruptcy court's power pursuant to section 105(a) is proper.

Section 362(d)(2)(B) requires a debtor claiming that property is necessary for an effective reorganization to show a reasonable possibility of successful reorganization; the property's indispensability alone is insufficient.

In Re New American Food Concepts, Inc. · filed 1987-01-20(d)(2)(B)

The indispensability of property is not, however, a sufficient basis to establish that the property is necessary for an effective reorganization. ... There must also be some demonstration that a reasonable possibility of a successful reorganization exists.

Section 362(d)(2)(B) requires a reasonable possibility of successful reorganization within a reasonable time for property to be necessary to an effective reorganization.

In Re U.S. Advertising Inc. · filed 1991-09-04(d)(2)(B)

We also conclude that the Debtor’s proposal satisfies the standard for § 362(d)(2)(B), as announced by the Supreme Court in United Sav. Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 108 S.Ct. 626, 98 L.Ed.2d 740 (1988). In Timbers, the Court noted that the phrase “necessary to an effective reorganization” in § 362(d)(2)(B) means that “there must be ‘a reasonable possibility of a successful reorganization within a reasonable time.’ ”

Section 362(d)(2)(B) requires a debtor to show a reasonable prospect of effective reorganization within a reasonable time to keep the stay in place when the debtor has no equity in the property.

In Re Building 62 Ltd. Partnership · filed 1991-10-16(d)(2)(B)

The Debtor has made a valiant attempt to meet its burden but unfortunately, rather than presenting the Court with a reasonable prospect of reorganization, it demonstrated what is commonly known as terminal euphoria. On that basis the Debtor has failed to meet its burden under § 362(d)(2)(B). The Court will not address the alternate grounds for Relief set forth in BayBank’s Motion. The Motion for Relief from Stay is granted.

Section 362(d)(2) requires relief from the automatic stay when the debtor lacks equity in the property and cannot show that the property is necessary for an effective reorganization.

Magnolia Portfolio, LLC v. Dye (In re Dye) · filed 2013-11-22(d)(2)

As described above, Debtors do not have equity in the remaining properties. Therefore, relief from the stay must be granted unless Debtors have met their burden to prove that the collateral is necessary for an effective reorganization. ... Debtors have failed to establish that their proposed plan has a realistic chance of being confirmed and, thus, Sand Bank Road and 33-37 W. North Street are not necessary for an effective reorganization.

Section 362(a)(1) stays actions against a debtor, while section 362(b)(4) excepts governmental police or regulatory actions.

CPI Crude, Inc. v. United States Department of Energy · filed 1987-08-19(a)(1), (b)(4)

In short, the Court is persuaded that the administrative proceedings giving rise to the RO at issue here did not violate the automatic stay provision of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) and that the RO is therefore valid and enforceable.

Section 362 stays actions against a bankrupt debtor, but does not stay the debtor's own action or toll the time to prosecute it.

Scarborough v. Duke · filed 1988-10-05

The trial court held that the filing of a petition in bankruptcy does not abate an action filed by the bankrupt, only those actions filed against the bankrupt. The automatic stay operates only against actions pending against the bankrupt. 11 U.S.C. § 362. We find no error in this holding.

Section 362(a)'s automatic stay does not bar a suit based on a claim arising after the bankruptcy petition when the suit is directed essentially at the debtor's liability insurer.

Oglesby v. Cooper Manufacturing Corp. · filed 1992-06-09(a)

Furthermore, at the time Plaintiff filed this suit, the stay order in that proceeding did not apply to causes of action such as this one, which arose after the filing of the debtor’s petition.

Section 362(a) prohibits a creditor from unilaterally withholding a debtor’s disability benefits to recoup an overpayment without obtaining relief from the automatic stay.

Matter of Scharff · filed 1992-08-03(a)

In order to discourage creditor self-help, which may result in violations of the automatic stay, and to put the burden of obtaining relief from the automatic stay on the claimant, and because of the broad protection of debtors intended through the automatic stay and court supervision of cases, this court will find Deere & Co. to have violated the automatic stay of § 362(a).

Section 362 stays actions against a bankruptcy debtor and may exceptionally stay proceedings against nonbankrupt codefendants when the debtor is the real party defendant.

Porter v. AC&S Inc · filed 2002-01-03

Section 362 is rarely, however, a valid basis on which to stay actions against non-debtors. ... By exception, a bankruptcy court may invoke § 362 to stay proceedings against nonbankrupt co-defendants where such identity between the debtor and the third-party defendant exists that the debtor may be said to be the real party defendant and that a judgment against the third-party defendant will in effect be a judgment or finding against the debtor. ... Here, Garlock is one of scores of different asbestos makers, users, importers, etc., with no interest to establish such an identity with debtor Federal-Mogul/Gasket Holdings. There is no claim of a formal tie or contractual indemnification to create such an identity of interests.

Section 362 automatically stays claims against a debtor but generally does not stay actions involving the debtor’s nondebtor codefendants.

Smith v. Able Supply Company · filed 2002-01-03

First, there was no 11 U.S.C. § 362 automatic stay of actions available to the non-debtor co-defendants of the debtor, Federal-Mogul/Gasket Holdings. Therefore, while § 362 acted to stay any claims against the Federal-Mogul entities, including Garlock’s putative claim of contribution, it carried no force to stay actions as between the remaining co-defendants, the debtor and the various plaintiffs.

Section 362(a) automatically stays actions against a debtor or its estate, generally does not stay actions against nondebtor co-defendants, and permits an exception when the nondebtor is effectively the real party defendant.

Fox v. AC & S Inc · filed 2002-01-03(a)

Section 362 is rarely, however, a valid basis on which to stay actions against non-debtors. See Wedgeworth v. Fibreboard Corp., ... 706 F.3d 541, 544 (5th Cir. 1983)(“[w]e join [the cited courts] in concluding that the protections of § 362 neither apply to co-defendants nor preclude severance”). By exception, a bankruptcy court may invoke § 362 to stay proceedings against nonbankrupt co-defendants where such identity between the debtor and the third-party defendant exists that the debtor may be said to be the real party defendant and that a judgment against the third-party defendant will in effect be a judgment or finding against the debtor. A.H. Robins Co., 788 F.2d 994, 999 (4th Cir. 1986). In that case, however, the non-debtor co-defendants were indemnified associates, employees or insureds of the debtor sole manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device. Here, Garlock is one of scores of different asbestos makers, users, importers, etc., with no interest to establish such an identity with debtor Federal-Mogul/Gasket Holdings. There is no claim of a formal tie or contractual indemnification to create such an identity of interests.

Section 362 automatically stays claims against a bankruptcy debtor but generally does not stay actions against nondebtor codefendants, subject to an identity of interests exception.

Allphin v. AC & S Inc · filed 2002-01-03

First, there was no 11 U.S.C. § 362 automatic stay of actions available to the non-debtor co-defendants of the debtor, Federal-Mogul/Gasket Holdings. Therefore, while § 362 acted to stay any claims against the Federal-Mogul entities, including Garlock’s putative claim of contribution, it carried no force to stay actions as between the remaining co-defendants, the debtor and the various plaintiffs.

Section 362 generally stays actions against a bankruptcy debtor and property of the bankruptcy estate, with limited application to actions against nondebtors.

Mims v. AC & S Inc · filed 2002-01-03

First, there was no 11 U.S.C. § 362 automatic stay of actions available to the non-debtor co-defendants of the debtor, Federal-Mogul/Gasket Holdings. Therefore, while § 362 acted to stay any claims against the Federal-Mogul entities, including Garlock’s putative claim of contribution, it carried no force to stay actions as between the remaining co-defendants, the debtor and the various plaintiffs.

Section 362 automatically stays claims against a debtor but generally does not stay actions involving nondebtor codefendants.

Coats v. ACands, Inc · filed 2002-01-03

First, there was no 11 U.S.C. § 362 automatic stay of actions available to the non-debtor co-defendants of the debtor, Federal-Mogul/Gasket Holdings. Therefore, while § 362 acted to stay any claims against the Federal-Mogul entities, including Garlock’s putative claim of contribution, it carried no force to stay actions as between the remaining co-defendants, the debtor and the various plaintiffs.

Section 362 automatically stays claims against a bankruptcy debtor but generally does not stay actions involving non-debtor co-defendants.

Douglas v. Able Supply Co · filed 2002-01-03

First, there was no 11 U.S.C. § 362 automatic stay of actions available to the non-debtor co-defendants of the debtor, Federal-Mogul/Gasket Holdings. Therefore, while § 362 acted to stay any claims against the Federal-Mogul entities, including Garlock’s putative claim of contribution, it carried no force to stay actions as between the remaining co-defendants, the debtor and the various plaintiffs.

Section 362 stays actions against a bankruptcy debtor and generally does not stay actions against non-debtor co-defendants.

Diaz v. Able Supply Co · filed 2002-01-03

First, there was no 11 U.S.C. § 362 automatic stay of actions available to the non-debtor co-defendants of the debtor, Federal-Mogul/Gasket Holdings. Therefore, while § 362 acted to stay any claims against the Federal-Mogul entities, including Garlock’s putative claim of contribution, it carried no force to stay actions as between the remaining co-defendants, the debtor and the various plaintiffs.

Section 362 automatically stays findings or judgments against a debtor in connection with related litigation.

Goldstein v. Help at Home, Inc. (In Re Help at Home, Inc.) · filed 2003-03-11

The State Court is to make no findings as to or judgment against the Debt ors ... [naming each bankruptcy debt- or] ... in connection with the Baretz claims, as any such findings or judgment would violate the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362's automatic bankruptcy stay does not prevent an appeal from being deemed moot.

Aiello v. Connolly · filed 2003-03-14

We reject Aello’s contention that the automatic bankruptcy stay, 11 U.S.C. § 362, prevents his appeal from being deemed moot.

Section 362 automatically stays proceedings against a party that files for bankruptcy but does not shield a nonbankrupt codefendant.

Allstate Insurance Company v. Nassiri · filed 2024-03-18

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362, ... the filing of a bankruptcy court action imposes an immediate and automatic stay on any proceeding against Med Ed Labs. ... The court is aware that Allstate may still proceed in this action against Nassiri, as Nassiri is not shielded by the bankruptcy filing.

Section 362 permits a court to continue a stay of foreclosure while the mortgagee is adequately protected.

First Investment Co. v. Custer (In Re Custer) · filed 1982-03-15

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiffs should be, and are hereby further stayed from continuation of actions against the defendant Debtors and enforcement of judgments against the property of the estates ... so long as the respective plaintiff mortgagees are adequately protected, or until further order herein.

Section 362(a)'s automatic stay does not bar a tax levy on a nondebtor creditor's claim against a bankruptcy estate when the levy does not affect the debtor, estate assets, or other creditors' interests.

United States v. Hemmen · filed 1995-04-07(a)

Any perceived effect of a tax levy on the debtor, the estate's assets or the interests of other creditors is purely chimerical. The only interests reached by the levy belonged to a non-debtor, Al-Hadid.

Section 362(a) does not stay an action against a nondebtor that does not implicate the debtor’s property.

Edge Petroleum Operating Co. v. GPR Holdings, L.L.C. · filed 2007-03-28(a)

The provision does not apply, however, to actions not directed against the debtor or property of the debtor.