11 U.S.C. § 362

Section 362(c)(1) governs when the automatic stay ends for acts against property of the bankruptcy estate, including filing a notice of trustee sale.

Barrow v. NewRez LLC · filed 2021-03-11(c)(1)

Here, because filing of a Notice of Trustee Sale is an act against the property of the estate, the termination of the bankruptcy stay is governed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1).

Section 362(a) protects property a Chapter 13 debtor acquires after plan confirmation but before the case closes.

Banks v. Kam's Auto Sales (In re Banks) · filed 2014-10-17(a)

Accordingly, the Court holds that the automatic stay under § 362 applies to property interests acquired by a Chapter 13 debtor after confirmation of her plan but before the closure of her case.

Section 362(k)(1) affords no damages for repossessing a vehicle after stay relief when the motion adequately identifies the vehicle by its VIN despite conflicting model and year descriptions.

de la Madrid v. Popular Auto (In re Gil de la Madrid) · filed 2014-12-04(k)(1)

For this reason, this Court finds that the VIN is the marker for identification of a vehicle when methods of identification such as year, model and make are imprecise and contradictory. Therefore, this Court concludes that a violation of the automatic stay did not occur in the case at hand.

Postpetition service of a notice listing a prepetition violation date does not automatically violate the automatic stay.

In re Best Payphones, Inc. · filed 2015-01-14

Assuming that the Postpetition NOVs list prepetition dates of violation, it does not automatically follow that the City violated the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) bars acts to possess or control undistributed Chapter 13 plan funds held by a trustee while those funds remain property of the estate.

In re Elrod · filed 2015-01-14(a)(3)

Thus, any act to obtain possession of undistributed funds or to exercise control over or interfere with undistributed funds violates 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(b)(3) excepts from the automatic stay a notice to redeem that preserves a prepetition tax lien rather than enforcing it.

JP Morgan Chase, N.A. v. Hagemeyer · filed 2015-02-11(b)(3)

Since the action of giving of a notice to redeem is one to preserve rather than to enforce the tax lien, it should be excepted from the stay.

Section 362(b)(4) allows a court to continue proceedings to police misconduct before it despite a bankruptcy filing.

Iris Connex, LLC v. Dell, Inc. · filed 2017-01-25(b)(4)

Perhaps more importantly, the Court retains jurisdiction to police misconduct before the Court under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).

Section 362(b)(3) does not permit a creditor to keep an impounded vehicle to perfect a lien.

In re Howard · filed 2018-04-19(b)(3)

This provision does not authorize continued possession of impounded vehicles in contravention of the Thompson ruling. Perfection of liens encompasses recording notes and mortgages, not possession of collateral.

Section 362(b)(3) excepts continued possession of a debtor’s vehicle from the automatic stay when possession maintains perfection of a valid prepetition possessory lien under generally applicable law effective against earlier-acquired interests.

The City of Chicago v. Kennedy · filed 2018-05-04(b)(3)

As a result, the city’s possessory interest in Kennedy’s vehicle meets the criteria for an exception to the automatic stay.

Section 362(b) does not exempt a monetary claim against Puerto Rico from the automatic stay merely because federal project funds are involved.

Medina v. Del Valle Group, S.P. Y Otros · filed 2019-05-21(b)

Es correcto que la Sec. 362(b) de la Ley de Quiebras federal, 11 USC sec. 362(b), menciona una serie de excepciones a la paralización automática. Sin embargo, este caso no cae en ninguna de ellas. ... De esta forma, no hay duda de que este caso trata de una reclamación monetaria, por lo que el caso está paralizado.

Section 362(b) does not plainly exempt a civil damages claim under 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a) for a violation of the federal child pornography statute from the automatic stay.

LNU v. Milliman · filed 2023-07-19(b)

The present matter does not appear to plainly fit within any exception to the automatic stay identified under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b).

Section 362(b)(3) excepts a tax purchaser’s filing of a tax-deed petition and service of required notice from the automatic stay; incurring costs for those steps also does not violate the stay.

In re Application of the County Treasurer & ex officio County Collector of Will County · filed 2024-02-06(b)(3)

In this context, Bates and Wilson make sense, and we agree with their conclusion that the mere filing of a tax-deed petition and service of notice is excepted from the automatic stay. And, if these actions do not violate the stay, we fail to see how incurring costs to take these steps violates the stay.

Section 362(b)(21) excludes actions to enforce real property liens from the automatic stay when the debtor is ineligible under § 109(g).

Benn v. Herr · filed 2024-03-15(b)(21)

Congress has explicitly carved out from the automatic stay actions to “enforce any lien against or security interest in real property” against someone found to be an ineligible debtor under § 109(g). 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(21).

The exceptions in § 362(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iv) and (b)(4) allow an appeal involving domestic violence custody, child support, and related fee and sanctions orders to proceed despite a party’s Chapter 7 filing.

Sarkissian v. Darbinian CA2/5 · filed 2025-09-05(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iv), (b)(4)

The exemptions to the stay set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iv) and 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) apply, and render the stay inapplicable.

Section 362(b)(3) excepts acts to perfect an interest in property from the automatic stay when the trustee’s rights are subject to that perfection under section 546(b).

Virginia Beach Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Wood · filed 1990-04-18(b)(3)

Under § 362(a)(4), any act to perfect any lien against property of the estate is stayed by the filing of a bankruptcy petition under 11 U.S.C. §§ 301-303. An exception to § 362(a)(4) exists, though, for acts taken “to perfect an interest in property to the extent that the trustee’s rights and powers are subject to such perfection under” 11 U.S.C. § 546(b). 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(3).

Exceptions to Section 362(a)'s automatic stay are decided case by case; the stay may be modified to allow litigation over the validity of a debtor's claimed asset when the debtor will not suffer undue hardship.

Liquidadora de Bienes, Inc. v. Alelí Corp. (In re Alelí Corp.) · filed 1987-02-25(a)

The question whether to allow exceptions to sec. 362(a) is to be decided on a case-by-case basis. ... This is one of those cases where the exception applies.

Section 362(b)(3) permits post-petition perfection of a lien in the limited circumstances allowed by § 546(b).

Jones v. Salem National Bank (In re Fullop) · filed 1993-09-21(b)(3)

However, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(3), 11 U.S.C. § 546(b) provides an exception to the general rule that the petition stays actions to perfect an interest and allow the post-petition perfection of a lien in limited circumstances.

Section 362(b)(24) excepts from the automatic stay a transfer that is not avoidable under § 544 or § 549.

In Re Striblin · filed 2006-08-31(b)(24)

Because the Sale is not a transfer to which § 549 applies in the first instance, it is not “not avoidable under section 549” and is therefore not an exception to the automatic stay as set forth in § 362(b)(24). Because none of the exceptions to the automatic stay applies, Mankus’ purchase of the Property at the Sale was void and without effect.

A debtor alleging that discovery directed to nondebtor codefendants violated the automatic stay must plead facts about the discovery sufficient to make a § 362(k) claim plausible.

Popple v. Elliott Greenleaf & Siedzikowski, P.C. (In re Popple) · filed 2015-06-19(k)

Here, the discovery requests which allegedly violate the automatic stay are not even summarized in the Complaint, much less attached as exhibits. ... I merely conclude that the Debtor has failed to state a plausible claim for relief against Elliott Green-leaf under § 362(k).

A bankruptcy court has discretion to deny arbitration of an automatic-stay violation claim when arbitration would conflict with the purposes of § 362.

Walker v. Got'cha Towing & Recovery, LLC (In re Walker) · filed 2016-06-17

All of these considerations demonstrate that the purposes of the FAA and the Bankruptcy Code are best served by allowing the bankruptcy court to exercise discretion over whether arbitration of a stay violation should be compelled.

Section 362(a) makes postpetition issuance, service, and recordation of a foreclosure sale notice void regardless of whether the violator had notice of the bankruptcy.

Maria Luz Navarro · filed 2023-08-04(a)

At a very minimum, each of these provisions render the issuance, service, and recordation of the Notice of Trustee’s Sale void without regard to notice and, thus, without regard to whether they are technical or willful violations of the automatic stay.

A complaint plausibly alleges an automatic stay violation when it alleges that the IRS knowingly collected prepetition taxes from money owed to a debtor after the bankruptcy filing.

Jeffrey Charles Denton and Vicky L Denton · filed 2024-12-30

The Complaint alleges that the IRS collected prepetition taxes from monies owed to Mr. Denton after this case was filed by contacting clients of Mr. Denton and PDR, Inc. The Complaint alleges that collection letters demanding payment for prepetition taxes from Mr. Denton were sent after the case was filed. The Complaint also alleges that the IRS Revenue Officer and the IRS were aware that the Plaintiffs had filed bankruptcy when collection efforts were undertaken, which may be construed as a willful violation of the stay.26 When these allegations are taken as true, the Plaintiffs have stated a cause of action for violation of the automatic stay that is plausible on its face.

A complaint alleging a § 362(a) stay violation must identify the subsection violated and specify which actions each defendant took.

Ard v. Zold · filed 2025-04-11(a)

While the Complaint alleges facts required to support an action for a stay violation against Defendants, as defined - Ron Zold, Judy Vanderveer, and Wm Weston Jones Newton - it fails to address the threshold issue of which subsection of § 362(a) was violated, which Defendant(s) took 18 See ECF No. 1, at ¶ 12. which action(s) to violate the stay, and muddles factual allegations in a prayer for relief.

A claimed violation of a court-imposed stay requires evidence that the challenged act occurred while the stay was in effect; proof that an act occurred on a day when the stay applied for only part of the day is insufficient without its timing.

Carter-Washington v. Wilmington Trust, National Association · filed 2025-06-24

The comment indicating a partial “trash out” was completed on November 3, 2022, is not significantly probative of a violation of the court-imposed stay insofar as the stay was not in effect for the entirety of November 3, 2022, and there is no indication when on November 3, 2022 the partial “trash out” was completed or when the partial completion was documented in the asset inspection report.

Section 362 bars collection of claims that arose before bankruptcy, and a damages claim for a willful stay violation requires an allegation of injury.

Foster · filed 2025-10-30(a)(6), (k)(1)

Relevant here, it is unlawful for a creditor to “collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the” bankruptcy proceedings. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6). Plaintiff never alleges which claim Barber Emerson attempted to collect from him, when that claim arose, or how that collection effort violated § 362. He thus has failed to state a plausible claim for relief under that statute. What’s more, only a plaintiff “injured by a[] willful violation of a stay” may recover damages. Id. § 362(k)(1). Plaintiff hasn’t alleged that Barber Emerson acted willfully. Nor has he alleged how he suffered injury. His claim thus fails to surmount the 12(b)(6) standard, and the court dismisses it.

Section 362 makes a tax sale conducted in violation of the automatic stay, and a tax deed issued from that sale, void.

In Re Shamblin · filed 1989-06-30(a)

The tax sale and subsequent tax deed violated the automatic stay and are void.

Section 362(a) does not bar litigation of pending state-law claims in state court when the bankruptcy court abstains from those claims and directs the parties to proceed there.

Loos v. Koperski (In re Koperski) · filed 2015-11-05(a)

The Plaintiff and the Defendant shall proceed to litigate and to obtain decision on all such claims that are presently pending in the lawsuit between them in the Olmsted County, Minnesota District Court. Neither 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) nor 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) will bár them from doing so.

Section 362(d)(4)(A) requires sufficient evidence that the bankruptcy filing was part of a scheme involving a transfer of real property without the secured creditor’s consent before the court grants in rem stay relief.

In re Everton Aloysius Sterling · filed 2015-12-22(d)(4)(A)

Under Section 362(d)(4), the Court must find that the “filing of the petition was part of a scheme to delay, hinder and defraud” a creditor and that said scheme also included the transfer of properties without consent.

A bankruptcy court may supplement § 362(d)(4) with § 105(a) to grant in rem stay relief to a real property owner who is not a secured creditor when repeated bankruptcy filings form a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud.

Harold Jon Jackson, Jr · filed 2025-06-17(d)(4)

The Court holds that section 362(d)(4), when supplemented by the Court’s equitable powers in section 105(a), allows it to grant in rem relief to an owner of real property such as Movant.

Section 362(b)(22) does not permit a landlord to continue an eviction based on a magisterial district court judgment while a timely appeal to the court of common pleas remains pending, even if the tenant loses the supersedeas.

Bedford Hill Community v. Brown (In re Brown) · filed 2016-02-01(b)(22)

Based upon the foregoing, the Court will enter a separate Order denying the motion for relief from stay on the grounds that section 362(b)(22) does not apply to the judgment of a magisterial district court on appeal to the court of common pleas, notwithstanding the termination of a supersedeas.

Section 362(a)(3)-(6) does not require a creditor to release a valid prepetition bank account attachment when the creditor takes no postpetition action and merely maintains the status quo.

Kipps v. Stincavage-Kipps · filed 2022-03-31(a)(3)-(6)

Because the Defendant did not take any post-petition action to “control” the accounts that had been frozen and the Defendant did not gain any advantage with respect to the Debtor or property of the estate, the mere retention of the status quo of a valid pre-petition state court attachment or lien without more, is not a violation of §362(a)(3) - (6). See id. at *7.

Section 362(a)(1)-(6) does not require a creditor to withdraw a valid prepetition attachment when the creditor takes no postpetition action to advance the garnishment or otherwise change the status quo.

Margavitch, Jr v. Southlake Holdings, LLC · filed 2021-10-06(a)(1)-(6)

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff has failed to establish that Defendants’ refusal to withdraw the valid pre-petition attachment once they were informed that Plaintiff had filed for bankruptcy was a violation of §362(a)(1) - (6).

Section 362(a)(1)-(6) does not make a Chapter 7 creditor’s failure to release prepetition account attachments a willful stay violation when the creditor never possessed the funds and reasonably preserved the trustee’s interest in nonexempt funds.

In re Rielly · filed 2016-02-11(a)(1)-(6)

Although E.I. had actual notice of the Debtor’s bankruptcy filing on January 4, 2016, its inaction in failing to release its trustee process attachments of the' funds in the Joppa checking and the brokerage accounts in this Chapter 7 case does not amount to an exercise of control over or an action to enforce a lien on property of the estate or property of the Debtor and did not constitute a willful violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1), (2), (3), (4), (5) and/or (6).

Section 362(a)(3) bars a creditor from obtaining findings in a proceeding nominally against nondebtors that assert control over estate property by establishing a perfected security interest in it.

In re Johnson · filed 2016-04-28(a)(3)

The Court thus finds that even though the Arbitration Award was nominally against the Johnsons and TJI, RFF violated § 362(a)(3) when it sought to exercise control over property of the Debtor’s estate by including in the Award findings that RFF has a perfected security interest in the Player Contract.

Section 362(a) does not stay an order that merely impleads nondebtor third parties in supplementary proceedings without taking estate property or collecting from the debtor.

P & S & Co v. Mak · filed 2018-05-30(a)

The automatic stay in section 362(a) does not apply to the trial court’s order impleading the third party defendants.

Section 362’s automatic stay may warrant staying an entire case, including claims against nondebtor defendants, when the debtor is an indispensable party.

Woody v. David Stanley Consultants, LLC · filed 2019-11-26

The Court agrees with Defendant David Stanley Consultants, LLC that a stay of the entire proceeding is appropriate since Defendant American Coal Company is an indispensable party.

Section 362(a)(1) extends the automatic stay to a nondebtor only in unusual circumstances, such as when the nondebtor’s interests are so intertwined with the debtor’s that the debtor is the real party in interest.

Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. Smoky Mountain Country Club Property Owners Association, Inc. · filed 2020-02-06(a)(1)

On balance, however, the undersigned does not find that this situation presents the “unusual circumstances” necessary to justify expanding the automatic stay imposed by Section 362(a)(1).

Section 362(a)(1) does not extend the automatic stay to nondebtor defendants without evidence that litigation against them would materially affect the debtor’s reorganization.

Mardice v. Ebony Media Operations, LLC · filed 2021-01-15(a)(1)

In the absence of any evidence that pursuing damages against the two individual Defendants alone would materially affect Ebony’s reorganization effort, I decline to extend the automatic stay to Defendants Burnett and Gibson.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not extend to nondebtor codefendants merely because a debtor filed for bankruptcy.

Eastern Funding, LLC v. CWI Commercial Laundry Equipment, Inc. · filed 2021-03-23

Accordingly, the Court finds that the bankruptcy case filed by Tammy Wisinsky does not operate as a stay or otherwise effect the current proceedings directed at either Craig Wisinsky or CWI.

Section 362(a)(1) stays a judicial proceeding against the bankruptcy debtor, but does not stay an appeal against a nondebtor that has not been replaced by the debtor as a party.

Strobel v. Johnson & Johnson · filed 2021-10-21(a)(1)

Section 362(a)(1) of the United States Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1)) provides that an automatic stay imposed upon the filing of a bankruptcy proceeding shall stay “the commencement or continuation . . . of a judicial . . . proceeding against the debtor.” The debtor in the bankruptcy proceeding at issue here is LTL. Because LTL is not a party to this appeal, the appeal does not qualify as a “judicial . . . proceeding against the debtor.”

Section 362(a) permits a stay to extend to nondebtor defendants when the claims against them are inseparable from those against the debtor.

Capitol Eye Care, Inc. v. Tehum Care Services, Inc. · filed 2023-03-28(a)

Though Plaintiffs contest applying the stay to defendants beyond Defendant Tehum, Plaintiffs’ own allegations make clear that Plaintiffs believe all defendants are inseparable for purposes of this lawsuit. Further, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas has extended the automatic stay in this matter only until May 18, 2023. It is unlikely any party will suffer any prejudice by a brief delay pending further direction from the bankruptcy court. Accordingly, it is ORDERED this matter is stayed against all defendants through May 18, 2023.

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay an appeal against individuals when the debtor is not a party and no longer provides their representation.

Bennett v. MDOC · filed 2023-07-21(a)(1)

Because Corizon itself is not a party to this appeal, and because Corizon is no longer responsible for the representation of the individual Corizon defendants, this appeal is no longer “a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor” and thus the automatic stay does not apply.

Section 362(a) stays an appeal against the debtor, but deciding a related appeal against nondebtors does not by itself extend the stay to them.

Saraf v. Ebix, Inc. · filed 2024-03-27(a)

As we have held, the fact that deciding the non-debtors’ appeal would “effectively decid[e] [the debtor’s] stayed appeal” is no basis to extend the automatic stay to the non-debtors. ... We thus stay this appeal only with respect to Ebix, Inc. and will proceed to consider the merits of the appeal with respect to Defendants-Appellees Raina and Hamil.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not extend to a suit against a nondebtor member of bankrupt limited liability companies absent a showing of unusual circumstances warranting that extension.

Shafirovich v. Saleh · filed 2025-06-26(a)

Accordingly, the automatic stay from the Companies’ bankruptcy does not extend to the instant matter and shall be lifted.

Section 362 generally stays proceedings against the debtor, and its automatic stay extends to a nondebtor codefendant only in narrow circumstances.

Paulson v. McKowen · filed 2020-03-06(a)(1)

At bottom, Mr. McKowen seeks to invoke the narrow exception to general rule that a debtor’s automatic bankruptcy stay does not extend to nondebtor co-defendants. But for the reasons discussed above, this court does not find that exception applicable here.

Section 362(a)(1)’s automatic stay does not extend to nondebtor co-defendants who are independently liable on the plaintiff’s claim.

Travelers Casualty & Surety Company v. East Coast Welding & Construction Co., Inc. · filed 2022-12-02(a)(1)

Accordingly, the automatic stay imposed by operation of § 362 does not extend to defendants Mr. and Mrs. Brown and the Court may consider plaintiff’s Motion with respect to only these defendants.

Section 362(a)(1) and (3) automatically stay a guardianship proceeding against a bankruptcy debtor that seeks to control the debtor’s property and affairs.

Cianci v. Chaput · filed 2016-06-16(a)(1), (a)(3)

Therefore, when Chaput filed for bankruptcy, the guardianship proceeding in the Superior Court was automatically stayed pursuant to both § 362(a)(1) and (3) of the United States Bankruptcy Code, since the guardianship proceeding was against the bankruptcy debtor — Chaput — and constitutes an act seeking to control his property and manage his affairs.

Section 362(a)(6) permits creditors to accrue late fees, collection costs, and penalties on nondischargeable debt during bankruptcy for collection from the debtor after the stay ends.

In re Jordan · filed 2016-07-01(a)(6)

And, as explained above, nothing in the Bankruptcy Code prohibits holders of non-dischargeable debt from accruing late fees, collection costs and penalties during the case so that they can collect them from debtors personally once the automatic stay expires. The automatic' stay therefore does not prohibit creditors from accruing those amounts.

Section 362(a)(1) does not bar taking a debtor’s deposition as a non-party witness in litigation against non-debtors absent unusual circumstances warranting an extension of the stay.

Innerwood & Co. v. Privett (In re Privett) · filed 2016-09-08(a)(1)

The Employment Action does not constitute a proceeding to recover a claim against Privett because she is no longer a party in the case. As such, taking Privett’s deposition does not fall within the § 362 automatic stay. Privett has not identified any unusual circumstances that would warrant extending the stay to block her deposition.

Section 362(a)(1) does not prevent discovery from a debtor as a witness for claims against nondebtor parties.

Hong v. Mommy's Jamaican Market Corp. · filed 2023-05-18(a)(1)

Section 362(a)(1) bars “the commencement or continuation . . . of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1). This provision, however, cannot extend to the discovery of information from debtors.

Section 362 does not bar a party from seeking discovery or testimony from a nonparty debtor for claims against a nondebtor.

Seiler Tucker Inc. v. Genie Investments · filed 2025-08-04

Accordingly, requesting discovery or testimony from non-party debtors is not enjoined by the automatic stay.

The automatic stay did not bar deposition of the debtor as a witness on live claims against a nondebtor.

Cosmo Import & Export, LLC v. Anolik · filed 2024-05-09(a)(1)

As in Bridge, Section 362’s automatic stay does not bar Plaintiffs from deposing Anolik ... their still-live vicarious liability claims against Fidelis.

Section 362(d)(4) requires a supported finding that a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud a creditor involved unauthorized property transfers or multiple bankruptcy filings.

In re: Roberto Lara Ramirez · filed 2016-12-02(d)(4)

In order to grant § 362(d)(4) relief, a bankruptcy court must find: “(1) the debtor engaged in a scheme, (2) to delay, hinder or defraud the creditor, and (3) which involved either the transfer of property without the creditor's consent or court approval or multiple filings.” ... Under these circumstances, we must vacate the bankruptcy court’s grant of § 362(d)(4) relief and remand for a new determination of this issue.

Section 362(d)(4) permits in rem relief when a creditor proves a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud; proof of any one of those purposes suffices.

In re Mendiola · filed 2017-09-15(d)(4)

The amendment made clear that to warrant in rem relief, a creditor need only show a scheme to delay, or to hinder, or to defraud—the creditor need not prove all three.

Section 362(d)(4) does not directly apply without a secured creditor’s motion, but it can support in rem relief from the automatic stay by analogy when combined with § 105(a).

Rafah Hana Hermiz Dawood · filed 2019-07-29(d)(4)

Section 362(d)(4) does not literally apply here, because the Court is not acting on the motion of a secured creditor. But when combined with § 105(a), § 362(d)(4) does lend support, by analogy, to the in rem relief being granted here.

Section 362(d)(4) permits in rem relief only when an automatic stay is in effect; a creditor cannot obtain that relief when the stay never arose under section 362(c)(4).

Jeffrey Perkins · filed 2019-12-16(d)(4)

It logically follows that the Movant cannot obtain “relief from the stay” under subsection (d)(4) in this case because the stay was never in effect. The language of subsection 362(d), which provides relief “with respect to a stay of an act against real property under subsection (a),” compels the interpretation that the stay must be in effect as a condition precedent to obtaining in rem relief pursuant to (d)(4).

Section 362(d)(4) permits a party to request in rem relief when a bankruptcy petition is part of a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors involving multiple bankruptcy filings affecting the property.

Smith v. U.S. Bank N.A. · filed 2020-02-06(d)(4)

Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4), a party may request in rem relief from the bankruptcy court if it can show “the filing of the petition was part of a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors that involved... multiple bankruptcy filings affecting such real property.” The bankruptcy court sufficiently explained why it found that Smith’s petition was part of a scheme to hinder U.S. Bank.

Section 362(d)(4) permits in rem relief from the automatic stay when a bankruptcy filing is part of a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud a secured creditor involving multiple bankruptcy filings affecting real property.

Katsuhiko Yokoi · filed 2020-05-07(d)(4)

In addition, U.S. Bank is entitled to in rem relief under section 362(d)(4) because the filing of the instant case was part of a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud U.S. Bank that involved multiple bankruptcy filings affecting the Property.

Section 362(d)(4) permits in rem relief from the automatic stay when the record supports a finding that the relief is warranted.

Sepehry-Fard v. U.S. Bank National Association · filed 2020-11-16(d)(4)

The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by granting in rem relief to U.S. Bank because the record supports the finding that such relief was warranted.

A movant seeking in rem relief under § 362(d)(4)(B) bears the burden of showing that multiple bankruptcy filings were part of a scheme to hinder, delay and defraud it.

Brian B Corriette · filed 2022-04-05(d)(4)(B)

To obtain this relief, KHC bears the burden of showing that the various petitions filed by Debtor and Zoe Holdings are part of a scheme to hinder, delay and defraud KHC under Section 362(d)(4)(B).

Section 362(d)(4) permits prospective relief from the automatic stay when a transfer of an interest in real property without the secured creditor’s consent or strategically timed bankruptcy filings form a scheme to hinder or delay that creditor.

Maria Mori · filed 2022-11-21(d)(4)

Here, Windward Bora has established a scheme under § 362(d)(4)(A) by the transfer, without its consent, of an interest in the Property to the Debtor four days before a scheduled foreclosure sale so that her chapter 13 filing would invoke the automatic stay to stop the sale that was not stayed by the filing of Mr. Mori’s Third Bankruptcy Case. Windward Bora has also established a pattern of bankruptcy filings by the Debtor and Mr. Mori each strategically timed to hinder and delay the exercise by Windward Bora of its rights as a secured creditor against the Property pursuant under § 362(d)(4)(B).

Section 362(d)(4) does not permit in rem relief concerning property that is not part of the bankruptcy estate.

Lula Mae Woodson · filed 2023-10-26(d)(4)

The court is unable to grant in rem relief pursuant to § 362(d)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code because the Property is not property of the estate.

Section 362(d)(4) permits in rem stay relief when multiple bankruptcy filings affecting real property are part of a scheme to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.

Michele D Rothman · filed 2023-10-31(d)(4)

In light of all of the foregoing, the court finds that this bankruptcy case is part of a scheme to hinder, delay, and defraud creditors to the Property and relief from the stay is warranted under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4).

Section 362(d)(4) permits in rem stay relief for a scheme involving multiple bankruptcy filings that aims to hinder or delay creditors, without proof of intent to defraud.

Town & Country Event Center LLC · filed 2025-10-10(d)(4)

It suffices to prove either a purpose to hinder or a purpose to delay. In other words, intent to defraud is not essential.

Section 362(d)(4) requires a request by a party in interest and adequate notice before a court may grant in rem relief from the automatic stay.

YiHe Forbes, LLC v. City of Chelsea · filed 2025-11-20(d)(4)

The Court concludes that, at a minimum, the Bankruptcy Court abused its discretion by considering the in rem relief on its own motion without a request by the City or another party in interest as required by § 362(d) and without adequate notice to YiHe.

Section 362(d)(4) permits in rem stay relief for a secured party affected by a bankruptcy filing even if it is not the debtor’s creditor and the real property is not estate property.

Collective Concepts LLC · filed 2025-12-30(d)(4)

For these reasons, the Court concludes it had authority to grant relief under § 362(d)(4) even though PennyMac is not a creditor of the Debtor and the Property is not property of the Debtor’s estate.

Section 362(d)(4) permits prospective in rem relief even after the automatic stay in the pending case has expired.

Winsome Wallace · filed 2026-01-26(d)(4)

Because in rem relief operates prospectively and runs with the property, its availability does not hinge on whether the stay remains in effect in the pending case.

Section 362(d)(4) permits in rem relief even after the automatic stay has expired by operation of law.

Kathleen A Rabon · filed 2026-04-03(d)(4)

Considering the facts and circumstances of this case, ... the Court is persuaded by this and other cases holding that in rem relief is not foreclosed merely because the stay has expired by operation of law.

Section 362(d)(4) permits in rem relief only when the property at issue belongs to the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.

Andrew Consiglio · filed 2026-04-29(d)(4)

However, in rem relief pursuant to Bankruptcy Code § 362(d)(4) is only applicable if the Property is property of the Debtor’s bankruptcy estate.

Section 362(d)(4) permits in rem relief when multiple bankruptcy filings affecting real property are part of a scheme to delay, hinder, and defraud creditors.

Phien Dinh Le · filed 2026-06-17(d)(4)

Based on this record, and in the absence of any opposition or explanation from the Debtor, the Court concludes that the Debtor filed the 2026 Case as part of a scheme to delay, hinder, and defraud creditors involving multiple bankruptcy filings affecting real property, within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4).

A pending § 362(k) motion for damages for a willful automatic stay violation survives dismissal of the bankruptcy case, but a motion filed only after dismissal does not.

Ibrahim v. Goshen Mortgage REO, LLC · filed 2019-08-28(k)

It is well established, however, that a pending motion under § 362(k) for willful violation of the automatic stay survives the dismissal of the bankruptcy case because the purpose of such proceedings—“to compensate victims of violations of the automatic stay and punish the violators”—“is not negated by dismissal of the underlying bankruptcy case.” ... Here, however, neither the Stay Violation Motion nor the Motion for Reconsideration were pending at the time the case was dismissed. The Debtor did not file a timely appeal of the Order Denying Stay Violation Motion and did not file the Motion for Reconsideration until after the bankruptcy court dismissed his case. Therefore, there was no pending § 362(k) motion which survived dismissal.

A pending § 362(k) motion for a willful automatic stay violation survives dismissal of the bankruptcy case, but a reconsideration motion filed after dismissal does not make an already denied claim pending.

Ibrahim v. Bankowski · filed 2019-08-28(k)

It is well established, however, that a pending motion under § 362(k) for willful violation of the automatic stay survives the dismissal of the bankruptcy case because the purpose of such proceedings—“to compensate victims of violations of the automatic stay and punish the violators”—“is not negated by dismissal of the underlying bankruptcy case.” ... Therefore, there was no pending § 362(k) motion which survived dismissal.

A claim for damages for a willful violation of the automatic stay must be brought in bankruptcy court.

J. J. Cranston Construction Corp. v. The City of New York · filed 2022-04-29

The Court agrees with Defendant that, under binding Second Circuit precedent, a claim seeking recovery of damages for willful violations of the automatic stay must be brought in Bankruptcy Court and that, accordingly, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action.

A debtor may seek relief for a violation of the automatic stay under Section 362 through an adversary proceeding, even though a contested motion is also available.

Butler v. City of Chicago · filed 2024-05-24(k)

But just because a debtor may seek relief under Section 362 through a contested motion does not mean a debtor may not seek relief through an adversary proceeding.

A bankruptcy court may decline to compel arbitration of automatic-stay violation claims when arbitration would undermine its authority to enforce the stay and centralize bankruptcy disputes.

Goldman Sachs Bank USA v. Brown · filed 2025-03-17

Here, arbitrating Plaintiffs’ claims would inherently conflict with the Bankruptcy Code’s objectives, as it could undermine the Bankruptcy Court’s authority (1) to enforce the automatic stay to protect debtors and creditors’ rights and (2) to provide a single centralized forum for resolving disputes related to the Plaintiffs’ bankruptcy proceedings. The Bankruptcy Court thus had discretion to deny Goldman Sachs’ motion to compel arbitration.

A claim under § 362(k) for violating the automatic stay must be brought before the bankruptcy court.

Galope v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. · filed 2016-12-14(k)

As to Galope’s federal claim under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k), the district court properly dismissed it because it could only have been brought before the bankruptcy court.

Section 362(b)(24) excepts a transfer from the automatic stay when it is not avoidable under section 544 and is not avoidable under section 549, even if the transfer falls outside section 549(a) or an avoidance limitations period has expired.

Silva v. MBB Properties, LLC (In Re Silva) · filed 2016-12-15(b)(24)

We reject the theory advanced by Silva and hold that the applicability of section 362(b)(24) is not limited to transfers that could have been avoidable under section 549. Rather, the relevant inquiry for this portion of section 362(b)(24) is simply whether the transfer is not avoidable under section 549. This category captures transfers that fall outside the scope of section 549(a); transfers that fall within an exception to section 549(a) as set forth in subsections (b) and (c); and transfers that are barred by section 549’s two-year statute of limitations, 11 U.S.C. § 549(d).

Section 362(a)(6) does not prohibit sending a debtor a final account statement for informational purposes when an accompanying letter makes clear that the prepetition balance remains under bankruptcy protection and no payment is sought.

Sciortino v. Gwinnett County Department of Water Resources (In re Sciortino) · filed 2016-12-19(a)(6)

Given the informational purpose and the disclaimer contained in the Letter which accompanied the Final Statement, the Court concludes that the Final Statement and the Bankruptcy Package did not constitute an attempt to collect a debt. As a result, sending the Bankruptcy Package to Plaintiff did not violate the automatic stay.

Purely informational documents sent to a debtor do not violate the automatic stay.

Palazzo v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC · filed 2026-03-20(a)

And because documents that are purely informational in nature do not violate the automatic stay, see In re Duke, 79 F.3d 43, 46 (7th Cir. 1996), we hold that the district court properly granted Appellees summary judgment on Count II.

Section 362(a) does not prohibit communications to a debtor that are purely informational and do not seek to collect a debt.

Palazzo v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC · filed 2026-03-31(a)

And because documents that are purely informational in nature do not violate the automatic stay, see In re Duke, 79 F.3d 43, 46 (7th Cir. 1996), we hold that the district court properly granted Appellees summary judgment on Count II.

Section 362(a)(6) does not prohibit informational loan statements that do not attempt to collect a debt.

Palazzo v. Bayview Loan Servicing LLC · filed 2023-03-31(a)(6)

Here, the three types of statements the defendants sent to Palazzo were informational in nature. ... As a matter of law, they do not violate Section 362’s automatic stay barring debt collection efforts.

Section 362(a)(3) protects an executory contract that is property of the estate; unilateral termination of the contract may violate the automatic stay.

MMM Healthcare, Inc. v. Santiago (In re Santiago) · filed 2017-01-05(a)(3)

The court thus finds that the debtor’s provider agreement is an executory contract, and therefore considered property of the estate. As such, the unilateral termination of an executory contract may constitute a violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a nondebtor from terminating a debtor-in-possession’s executory contract under an ipso facto clause when no statutory exception applies.

In re Firstenergy Solutions Corp. · filed 2019-01-15(a)(3)

The automatic stay prohibited such termination, and Meadville violated the stay by proceeding with that termination.

Section 362's automatic stay does not bar performance of a pre-petition executory contract when the contract has not been rejected with bankruptcy court approval.

In Re Billy H. Harbour, Debtor. Donald W. Huffman v. Hopkins-Lewis Company, in Re Billy H. Harbour, Debtor. Donald W. Hu · filed 1986-09-17

The trustee's invocation of the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362 is unavailing. Hopkins-Lewis was bound to perform the executory contract under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 365 unless the contract was rejected with bankruptcy court approval.

Section 362(b)(1) excepts a contempt proceeding from the automatic stay only when the party invoking the exception demonstrates that the proceeding is criminal in nature.

In re Thompson · filed 2017-01-09(b)(1)

Thus, under the “circumstances” approach, the Motion must be denied due to Creditor’s failure to introduce evidence sufficient to demonstrate that the circumstances surrounding the Contempt Proceeding make it criminal in nature.

Section 362(b)(1) permits a criminal contempt proceeding to continue despite a bankruptcy filing when the contempt penalty is unconditional.

Nixon v. Attorney General of the State of Texas, Ken Paxton, Texas Comptoller of Public Accounts, Et Lal., Texas H · filed 2018-06-21(b)(1)

Section 362(b)(1) of the bankruptcy code provides the filing of a bankruptcy petition does not operate as a stay of the commencement or continuation of a criminal action or proceeding against the debtor. ... Unlike the order in In re Small, the 2012 Order committed Nixon to the county jail for 180 days and provided no opportunities for Nixon to probate that sentence. See id. at 529. Thus, Nixon was held in criminal contempt.

Section 362(b)(1) excepts criminal contempt proceedings from the automatic stay when they uphold or vindicate a court’s authority or dignity.

Scott Deutsch · filed 2020-01-29(b)(1)

This Court agrees with decisions holding that criminal contempt proceedings fall within the § 362(b)(1) exception if the criminal contempt order that was entered, or is being sought, is intended to uphold or vindicate the court’s authority or dignity.

Section 362(a) does not stay a punitive criminal contempt order that does not enforce a creditor’s claim against the debtor.

In Re Maloney · filed 1996-12-30(a)

The December 16 Order thus is clearly criminal in nature. Nothing in the December 16 Order implicates any claim against the Debtor by Mrs. Maloney. It simply punishes Debtor for disregarding the State Court’s prior order. Accordingly, the December 16 Order is not subject to the automatic stay provisions of section 862(a).

Section 362(a)'s automatic stay does not bar criminal contempt proceedings that punish disobedience of a court order.

Skripek v. Skripek · filed 1997-05-19(a)

Courts have repeatedly held that criminal contempt proceedings do not fall within the scope of the automatic stay under section 362 (a) of the United States Bankruptcy Code (11 USC § 362 [a]; see, In re Maloney, 204 Bankr 671; In re Moon, 201 Bankr 79, 84-86; In re Newman, 196 Bankr 700, 704; In re Campbell, 185 Bankr 628; In re Kearns, 168 Bankr 423; In re Rook, 102 Bankr 490, 493-494; see also, Scully v Iowa Dist. Ct., 489 NW2d 389, 392-393 [Iowa]).

A bankruptcy court’s decision to grant relief from the § 362 automatic stay is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Bristol v. U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. · filed 2019-11-14

The decision whether to grant relief from the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362 is within the bankruptcy court’s discretion and may be overturned on appeal only for abuse of discretion.

Section 362(a) permits a bankruptcy court to enforce the automatic stay against the government’s withholding of Medicare payments from a debtor.

In re: THG Holdings · filed 2019-12-05(a)

The Government remains unlikely to prevail on its underlying appeal of the Payment Order, as University Medical Center remains good law and binding precedent that recognizes the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction to enforce the automatic stay to prevent the Government from withholding Medicare payments from the Debtors.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits withholding Medicare payments for services performed after a provider files for bankruptcy because the payments are estate property.

In re: THG Holdings · filed 2020-09-09(a)(3)

University Medical Center remains good law and binding precedent recognizing that withholding of Medicare payments for post-petition services performed by a healthcare provider in bankruptcy constitutes a violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(6) does not prohibit a creditor from issuing a payoff statement at the debtor’s request to facilitate the debtor’s transaction when the statement is not an attempt to collect the debt.

Hull, Ch. 7 Trustee v. FSB · filed 2020-01-03(a)(6)

The act of issuing the Payoff Statement was not a coercive or harassing attempt to collect a debt. It was, instead, generated at the Debtor’s request to facilitate a transaction that the Debtor wished to pursue. As such, the issuance of the Payoff Statement did not violate the automatic stay.

Section 362(a) does not toll the running of a property tax sale redemption period.

Thomas B Thompson · filed 2020-01-15(a)

Unlike what Debtor is implying, the automatic stay provision of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) does not toll the running of the redemption period.

Section 362(b)(22) permits continuation of certain eviction proceedings only when the debtor resides as a tenant under a lease or rental agreement.

R. Susan Woods · filed 2020-02-04(b)(22)

While that subsection applies to the continuation of certain eviction proceedings, the plain language limits its application to situations involving a debtor that “resides as a tenant under a lease or rental agreement.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(22). There is no question that the Debtor here did not reside at the Property pursuant to a lease or rental agreement with the Defendants.

Section 362(b)(22) excepts an eviction proceeding from the automatic stay only when the debtor resides as a tenant under a lease or rental agreement.

Woods v. Alina's Real Estate, LLC · filed 2020-02-04(b)(22)

While that subsection applies to the continuation of certain eviction proceedings, the plain language limits its application to situations involving a debtor that “resides as a tenant under a lease or rental agreement.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(22). There is no question that the Debtor here did not reside at the Property pursuant to a lease or rental agreement with the Defendants.

Section 362(b)(22) does not except a Kentucky eviction from the automatic stay unless the landlord obtained a warrant of eviction before the bankruptcy petition.

Bill J. Connley · filed 2020-11-19(b)(22)

Under Kentucky law, the warrant of eviction serves as the “final judgment of possession” for purposes of § 362(b)(22).

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits a creditor from seeking a receiver for a corporation wholly owned by the debtor when that would interfere with the debtor’s estate property rights to manage the corporation and receive salary or distributions.

Mark M. Bello · filed 2020-02-13(a)(3)

The filing of a motion for the appointment of a receiver of Lawsuit Financial, Inc. (“LFC”) (the “Receivership Motion”) by the “Michaelian Parties,” in the case of Judith Michaelian and Estate of Marshall S. Michaelian v. Lawsuit Financial, Inc. and Mark M. Bello, Case No. 2:17-cv-13321-TGB-MKM (the “District Court Case”), was a violation of the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). The filing and prosecution of such motion was an attempt to exercise control over, to interfere with, and to alter, property rights the Debtor has on account of his 100% shareholder interest in LFC, which property rights became property of the Debtor’s bankruptcy case on the petition date under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).

Section 362 requires debtor’s counsel to obtain a court order before disbursing a prepetition retainer after the bankruptcy petition is filed.

Rafael Golan · filed 2020-02-19

What the stay means practically in the context of counsel to a chapter 11 debtor is that no disbursements can be made postpetition from any retainer held as of the petition date absent a court order.

Section 362(a) stays postpetition construction lien filings, enforcement of prepetition construction liens, and collection on bonded lien claims that affect a debtor contractor’s estate, but permits independent claims against a nondebtor property owner that do not affect estate property.

Hollister Construction Services, LLC · filed 2020-03-13(a)

For the reasons set forth above, the Court determines that any party who files a post-petition lien, or who attempts to enforce a pre-petition lien, or who attempts to collect on a bonded claim violates the stay. However, to the extent the Subcontractors seek state law remedies against a non- debtor property owner that do not affect the bankruptcy estate—such as quantum meruit or unjust enrichment claims—there is no stay violation.

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay direct claims against a nondebtor based on its own alleged PACA trust responsibilities.

Coast-to-Coast Produce, LLC v. Lakeside Produce USA, Inc. · filed 2023-12-29(a)(1)

Perhaps more significantly, some of the plaintiffs’ claims against Lakeside USA arise out of its own alleged PACA trust responsibilities. That is a direct, rather than derivative, theory of liability; a bankruptcy stay would have no effect on those claims.

Section 362’s automatic stay can prevent a plaintiff from establishing successor corporation liability against a nondebtor when doing so requires pursuing claims against debtor defendants.

Board of Trustees of the Kern County Electrical Workers Pension Fund v. Measurement Instrumentation and Controls, Inc. · filed 2024-08-23

Here, Plaintiffs assert recovery against Measurement depends on establishing liability against Defendants Key Electric, Inc. Robert David Smith, and Sharyn Smith through a theory of “successor corporation liability.” (Doc. 53 at 8-9). Plaintiffs contend it would be “impossible” to establish this liability without violating the automatic stay. Id. The Court agrees.

Section 362(a)(1) stays claims against a nondebtor when the action is effectively an attempt to recover assets belonging to the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.

MBFMCA, LLC v. MILLER · filed 2024-10-04(a)(1)

However, the automatic stay does apply when the action against a non- debtor is merely "a cloaked attempt to find assets of the bankrupt debtor." ... The Court agrees with James Miller that Axent-Midwest is the "real party in interest" in this litigation.

Section 362(a)(1) does not automatically extend the stay from a debtor to claims against a separate defendant.

Robinson v. Corizon Health Incorporated · filed 2025-09-22(a)(1)

Here, in contrast, the automatic stay triggered by the bankruptcy filing never applied to Dr. Stewart.

Section 362(a) stays proceedings against defendants who file for bankruptcy, but the stay does not extend to nondebtor codefendants merely because of asserted unusual circumstances.

Decker · filed 2025-10-20(a)

Given the Ninth Circuit’s explicit rejection of the Decker Defendants’ position, the Court declines to extend the automatic stay to the Deckers (or, for that matter, to Passage).

Section 362(a)(1) allows a creditor to pursue a vicarious liability claim against a nondebtor based on the debtor’s conduct if the creditor does not seek judgment against the debtor and the debtor will not be bound by the result.

In re Bridge · filed 2019-05-03(a)(1)

This ruling does not prevent movants from proceeding against the hospital on a vicarious liability claim, so long as they do not violate the automatic stay in doing so, i.e., if they comply with the conditions discussed in section II(E)(3) above.

Section 362(a)'s automatic stay applies to debtor defendants and does not prevent claims against nondebtor codefendants from proceeding.

Fucci v. Bowser · filed 2021-05-03(a)

In this case, Rockwell Entities are the debtor parties. The non-debtor parties have not opposed the Motion or otherwise shown that vacating the stay will be a hardship to them. Therefore, it is appropriate and consistent with Tenth Circuit caselaw to lift the automatic stay with respect to all parties other than the Rockwell Entities.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not prohibit or toll an insurance policy’s deadline for reporting a claim.

Junious R. Valentine v. Federal Insurance Company · filed 2020-03-26

We hold that the automatic stay did not prohibit or toll the notice period in the insurance policy.

Section 362’s automatic stay permits sanctions for litigation conduct.

352 Capital GP LLC v. Wear · filed 2024-10-07

However, sanctions for litigation conduct are a recognized exception to the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(4) exempts a motion for Rule 11 sanctions to deter litigation misconduct from the automatic stay, even if the motion implicates the debtor or the bankruptcy estate.

BIOCONVERGENCE LLC v. ATTARIWALA · filed 2020-04-20(b)(4)

To the extent the Motion for Sanctions might be construed as targeting Ms. Attariwala or otherwise infringing upon the interests of the bankruptcy estate, we are persuaded that a motion for Rule 11 sanctions falls within a statutory exemption to the automatic bankruptcy stay.

Section 362(b)(4) allows a court to impose sanctions for litigation misconduct despite the automatic stay.

National Products Inc v. Innovative Intelligent Products LLC · filed 2025-07-14(b)(4)

Accordingly, a court may apply sanctions for litigation misconduct despite the automatic stay in accordance with the exemption prescribed in 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).

A state court hearing a case must determine whether Section 362's automatic stay applies to that case.

MINELLI VS. HARRAH'S RESORT ATLANTIC CITY (L-1509-15, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-05-19

In other words, a state trial court must decide its own jurisdiction to hear the case before it, including, specifically, whether that case is stayed by operation of Section 362.

A non-bankruptcy court may determine whether the automatic stay applies to proceedings pending before it.

Adelson · filed 2024-09-30

Courts have uniformly held that when proceedings against a debtor or property potentially protected by the automatic stay commence or continue in a non-bankruptcy court, that court properly determines whether the automatic stay applies to the proceeding.

Section 362(a)(1), (3), and (6) do not prohibit the singular act of pulling a debtor’s credit report because it does not commence a proceeding, obtain estate property, or collect a claim.

Vargas v. Prestamos Del Rey LP · filed 2020-06-22(a)(1), (a)(3), (a)(6)

After considering the decisions in Mahoney and Keller, the Court agrees with Defendant that the singular act of pulling a credit report is neither the commencement of a legal proceeding under § 362(a)(1), an act to obtain possession of property of the estate under § 362(a)(3), nor an act to collect, assess, or recover claims against the debtor under § 362(a)(6).

Section 362(a)(3) and (a)(6) bar a shareholder from using equity voting rights to take control of a debtor in order to improve its position as a creditor.

OGGUSA, Inc. · filed 2020-07-02(a)(3), (a)(6)

A shareholder that uses its equity voting rights to improve its position as a creditor is acting to exercise control over property of the estate and attempting to collect on its claim in violation of the stay.

Section 362(k) requires a debtor seeking damages for a willful stay violation to prove that the violation caused damages.

Jacqueline Elizabeth Ard and Terry Frank Nicola · filed 2025-04-29(k)

Even if the Court were able to find that a willful violation of the stay occurred, in order to recover damages under § 362(k), the Debtor must also prove that they suffered damages resulting from the action.

Section 362(k)(1) permits recovery for an injury when a stay violation was a but-for cause, even if other factors also caused the injury.

Houck v. Substitute Trustee Services, Inc. · filed 2020-10-06(k)(1)

“But for” causation, however, just requires that the stay violation constitutes a cause of the injury, not the only cause, as the Supreme Court recently reminded us in a different context.

Section 362(b)(9)(B) permits a governmental unit to notify a debtor of tax delinquency, but a notice demanding payment by a set date falls outside the exception and violates the automatic stay.

Michael W. Payack · filed 2020-11-12(b)(9)(B)

The act of mailing Debtor the Tax Notice, which included a demand for payment by a date certain, falls outside the narrow exception from the automatic stay provided by § 362(b)(9)(B), and violates that automatic stay provided by § 362(a)(6).

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay a settlement agreement itself when no action to enforce it against the debtor is pending.

Diaz-Morales v. Rubio-Paredes · filed 2021-05-10(a)(1)

But, no such action is now pending, and the settlement agreement itself does not trigger the automatic stay.

Section 362(k) does not require a claimant to contact the defendant before filing a claim for violation of the automatic stay.

Defeo, Jr. v. Winyah Surgical Specialists, P.A. doing business a · filed 2021-09-27(k)

While there is no express or implied requirement in 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) to contact a defendant in advance of filing a Complaint asserting a § 362(k) claim, Debtor’s Counsel’s obligations under Rule 9011 to conduct a reasonable investigation of the factual allegations in a complaint may in some circumstances require such contact to ensure that counsel has sufficient evidentiary support to include those allegations where such evidence is not otherwise available.

Section 362(a)(1) stays substitution and revivor of a claim against a bankruptcy debtor because revivor commences a new action against the debtor.

Patricia Diane Doty as of the Estate of Frankie Foster v. Richmond Health Facilities-Kenwood, Lp D/B/A Kenwood Health & · filed 2022-03-24(a)(1)

As Kenwood Health & Rehabilitation Center filed for bankruptcy protection, any effort at reviving the cause of action in the name of the new personal representative would be “a new action” commenced against a bankruptcy debtor and therefore, stayed.

Section 362(a) automatically bars repossession of a debtor’s property after the bankruptcy filing and requires return of property taken in violation of the stay.

Hamby v. Fouts · filed 2022-04-28(a)

Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), prohibits an entity from taking any act, after the filing of a bankruptcy case, to take possession of property of the debtor. The provision is automatic and is binding on all parties. Taking possession of the Vehicle, therefore, violated the automatic stay. It must be returned to the Debtor immediately.

Section 362(a)(6) prohibits applying postpetition mortgage payments to prepetition obligations outside the debtor’s plan.

Pope v. US Bank, National Association, as Legal Title Trus · filed 2022-08-15(a)(6)

Rushmore violated the automatic stay by applying Ms. Pope’s postpetition Monthly Mortgage Payments pursuant to the contractual terms of the Loan. Although the Defendants insist that the Bankruptcy Ledger reflects the actual application of funds pursuant to the Plan’s terms, the Account Activity Statements, tax statements, and Escrow Statements demonstrate that Rushmore applied various postpetition escrow payments to prepetition obligations.

Section 362(a)(6) bars a creditor from receiving an automatic payment on a prepetition debt after bankruptcy when the debtor has not clearly consented to the payment after filing.

O'Neal v. Beneficial of Tennessee, Inc. (In Re O'Neal) · filed 1994-01-05(a)(6)

Accordingly, the court finds that Beneficial’s receipt of the debtors’ automatic loan payment constituted a stay violation under § 362(a)(6).

Section 362(a)(3) stays attempts to control estate property, but the stay cannot be enforced against a party holding that property unless the court has personal jurisdiction over the party.

Sheehan v. Breccia Unlimited Company · filed 2022-09-07(a)(3)

The filing of a bankruptcy petition triggers an automatic stay prohibiting any attempts to exercise control over any property of the es- tate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). Prohibitions on such attempts, how- ever, cannot be enforced if a court does not have personal ju- risdiction over the party holding the property.

Section 362 allows a bankruptcy court to hear a claim that the IRS violated the automatic stay and grant relief without waiting for the debtor to exhaust IRS administrative remedies.

Denton v. United States of America, Internal Revenue Service · filed 2024-12-30

The bankruptcy court is charged with enforcing the automatic stay. As such, it has the authority to hear and grant relief for actions for violation of the automatic stay. It need not defer to the IRS and its administrative remedies before it may exercise this authority.

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay a nondebtor corporation’s amendment of its articles to authorize additional shares, without issuing them, when the estate owns a minority interest.

Christopher S. Harrison · filed 2022-09-20(a)(3)

Upon full review of the parties’ arguments and memoranda, the court agrees with the reasoning set out in SS Body Armor and the authorities cited therein, which demonstrate that the automatic stay does not apply to the limited action EbenConcepts seeks to take, as articulated in its Motion – that being the amendment of its Articles of Incorporation to authorize the issuance of additional shares, and nothing more.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay as to an individual debtor 30 days after a later bankruptcy case is filed if the debtor had a case pending and dismissed within the preceding year.

Schneorson v. Barry S. Franklyn Esq. · filed 2022-09-29(c)(3)(A)

Accordingly, under Bankruptcy Code section 362(c)(3)(A), the automatic stay terminated with respect to Plaintiff on April 5, 2022, the 30th day after the petitioning creditors filed the involuntary petition.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay as to a debtor 30 days after filing when the debtor had a case pending and dismissed within the preceding year.

Schneorson v. Schneorson · filed 2022-09-29(c)(3)(A)

Here, the Bankruptcy Case was filed against Plaintiff, an individual. The First Case was pending within the preceding one year and was dismissed. Accordingly, under Bankruptcy Code section 362(c)(3)(A), the automatic stay terminated with respect to Plaintiff on April 5, 2022, the 30th day after the petitioning creditors filed the involuntary petition.

Section 362(c)(3) terminates the automatic stay 30 days after a new petition when the debtor had another bankruptcy case dismissed within the previous year and does not obtain an extension.

Marjorie Partch · filed 2022-11-29(c)(3)

In accordance with section 362(c)(3), the automatic stay terminated on the thirtieth day after filing the Debtor’s petition.

When a debtor’s prior bankruptcy case was dismissed within the preceding year, the automatic stay ends on the 30th day as to actions against the debtor concerning a debt or property securing it.

Robert Lee James, Jr. · filed 2019-12-13(c)(3)(A)

With a prior case having been dismissed within a ... year of the filing of this case, 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A) required that the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) “with respect to any action taken with respect to a debt or property securing such debt or with respect to any lease shall terminate with respect to the debtor on the 30th day after the filing” of the petition in this case.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) ends the stay after thirty days as to a debtor whose prior case was dismissed within the past year, including for a lease, but leaves property of the estate protected.

Brynesha Anne Guilford · filed 2020-07-28(c)(3)(A)

The stay has expired as to Debtor but not as to property of the estate.

The automatic stay tolls the limitations period for bringing a foreclosure action during the bankruptcy case.

Skipworth v. Reverse Mortgage Solutions Inc · filed 2022-10-04(a)(1)

The Bankruptcy Code provides for an automatic stay of any judicial “proceeding against the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1). ... The automatic stay tolled the running of the statute of limitations for 193 days.

Section 362(k) preempts state law defenses, including the business judgment rule, to liability for a willful violation of the automatic stay.

Sarah-jane Parker · filed 2022-10-27(k)

Appellants’ argument based on certain state law defenses, including the state business judgment rule, fails because 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) preempts those defenses.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits a receiver with notice of bankruptcy from intentionally withholding estate property after a turnover demand.

Preferred Ready-Mix LLC v. Berleth · filed 2022-11-09(a)(3)

Additionally, his actions were not in good faith and in contravention of the provisions of the automatic stay. Furthermore, the Court finds that Berleth did more than just passive retention of estate property, as demand was made.

Section 362(a)(3) protects a debtor’s possessory interest in property, but a foreclosure does not violate the stay merely because the debtor retains possession without a legal or equitable interest.

Kennedy, Jr. v. Najarian Capital, LLC · filed 2022-11-17(a)(3)

Because the Property was not property of the bankruptcy estate as of the petition date, the automatic stay did not prevent a foreclosure of the Property, and the foreclosure was not a stay violation. The Debtor held a possessory interest in the Property which was protected by the stay, but the foreclosure did not affect it.

Section 362(a)(3) does not prevent foreclosure based solely on a debtor’s possessory interest in real property, because foreclosure does not affect that interest.

Jennings v. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC D/B/A MR. COOPER · filed 2023-05-09(a)(3)

Foreclosure does not affect a debtor’s possessory interest in real property. ... Therefore, Plaintiff cannot state a claim by alleging that the foreclosure sale violated the automatic stay by affecting his possessory interest in the Property.

Section 362(a) protects a debtor’s continued possession after foreclosure, so the purchaser must obtain stay relief before seeking dispossession even if the debtor’s ownership interest has ended.

Olajuwon Akeem Meadows · filed 2026-05-28(a)

Accordingly, a purchaser at a foreclosure sale may not dispossess a debtor without first obtaining relief from the automatic stay, even where the debtor’s ownership interest has already been extinguished.

Section 362(a)'s automatic stay may protect a debtor's possessory interest in premises.

Trizec Colony Square, Inc. v. Gaslowitz (In Re Addon Corp.) · filed 1999-02-25(a)

It is well established that a possessory interest may be protected by the § 362(a) automatic stay.

Section 362(k) permits personal liability for a corporate agent who personally directs, authorizes, or participates in a willful violation of the automatic stay.

Hamby v. Fouts · filed 2022-11-29(k)

As such, the Court concludes that Georgia’s recognition of a corporate agent’s liability for his personal conduct in the commission of a tortious act is consistent with the conclusion that a corporate agent or officer is personally responsible for a violation of the automatic stay where the evidence shows that the individual personally directed, authorized, or participated in the violation.

Section 362(a) does not stay repossession of property in which the debtor has no legal right to remain or other property interest.

Harper v. Schulte · filed 2024-07-31(a)

Whether Harper owed Schulte money or not, she had no right to remain on the property and therefore the automatic stay did not apply to Schulte’s right to repossession.

Section 362(a) does not bar a proceeding to correct a mortgage satisfaction affecting only a nondebtor cotenant’s interest when the debtor’s property interest remains unimpaired.

BUSBY · filed 2022-12-14(a)

Ms. Busby has not shown the petition to strike or Judge Rothstein’s February 7, 2020 Order violated the automatic stay or implicated the concerns addressed by the automatic stay in section 362(a).

Section 362’s automatic stay does not cover securities personally owned by nonbankrupt partners rather than the debtor partnership.

Costa & Head Land Co. v. National Bank of Commerce (In Re Costa & Head Land Co.) · filed 1986-12-22

The automatic stay provided in 11 U.S.C. § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code is not applicable in this case. ... None of the parties contends that the automatic stay provision in § 362 applies to this case, and the evidence is clear that the securities are the personal assets of the Heads and are not truly assets of the debtor partnership.

A state court may determine whether a proceeding before it is subject to the automatic stay, while the bankruptcy court retains authority to interpret and enforce the stay.

Inn World Report, Inc. v. MB Fin. Bank NA · filed 2022-12-20

We note that a state court’s ability to determine whether a proceeding before it is subject to the automatic stay does not deprive a bankruptcy court of its authority under the Bankruptcy Code to interpret the scope of the automatic stay or to address violations of it.

A court hearing a pending action may decide whether Section 362’s automatic stay applies to that action in the first instance.

Ampersand Publishing, LLC v. National Labor Relations Board · filed 2023-10-18

It is well-established that the court in which an action is pending has the authority to determine if the automatic stay applies in the first instance.

Section 362 permits state courts, as well as bankruptcy courts, to determine whether the automatic stay applies.

In Re Cummings · filed 1996-10-17

It is well-settled that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with bankruptcy courts to determine the applicability of the automatic stay.

Only federal courts may determine whether the automatic stay applies; a state court's determination does not preclude bankruptcy court review.

In Re Robert Gruntz, Debtor. Robert Gruntz v. County of Los Angeles Los Angeles District Attorney · filed 1999-02-04

Determinations regarding the applicability of the automatic stay in bankruptcy are exclusively within the purview of the federal courts.

Section 362(a)(1) stays a declaratory judgment claim against a debtor who has filed for bankruptcy.

Ironwood Capital Partners, LLC v. Gordon Jones, II · filed 2020-06-05(a)(1)

Because this claim for declaratory relief constitutes a “judicial . . . action or proceeding against the debtor,” it is subject to the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(1) stays acts that continue litigation, but status hearings held only to gather information do not resume the litigation.

Crockett v. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC D/B/A MR. COOPER · filed 2020-01-27(a)(1)

Although 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) stays any act to continue a civil action (meaning continuing to litigate the civil action), Nationstar did not act to continue litigating the civil action, as is evident from its attorneys’ filings of January 9, 2019, and July 9, 2019 (filings for which the caption listed MTGLQ as the plaintff).

Section 362(a)(1) stays a pending suit against a corporation that files for bankruptcy, preventing entry of a final judgment against it while the stay applies.

Hallisey v. DECA Corp. · filed 1995-11-15(a)(1)

The court did not proceed with the claim against the defendant corporation once it had initiated bankruptcy proceedings, however, because of the automatic stay a bankruptcy filing provides. ... Consequently, no final judgment against the corporation could have been entered upon which res judicata could be grounded.