11 U.S.C. § 362

Section 362(a)(1) stays claims against a debtor, including counterclaims, but does not stay a suit the debtor brings.

JTH Tax LLC v. Cortorreal · filed 2024-08-23(a)(1)

Nevertheless, the automatic stay does not apply because Plaintiff is the debtor who initiated this proceeding. Now, if Defendant plans to assert any counterclaims against Plaintiff, then those claims would be subject to the automatic stay because that would be an action or proceeding against the debtor.

Section 362 stays an action as to a defendant that has filed for bankruptcy.

Bluegreen Vacations Unlimited, Inc. v. Timeshare Lawyers, P.A. · filed 2024-09-26

Pandora notified the Court that it filed for bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Wyoming. (ECF No. 580.) Accordingly, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362, this action has been stayed as to Pandora.

Section 362 stays proceedings involving a debtor in bankruptcy while allowing a counterclaim brought solely by nondebtors that does not affect the debtor to proceed.

SE Property Holdings, LLC v. Harrell · filed 2024-11-07

On September 29, 2023, David Harrell filed a suggestion of bankruptcy, which invoked the automatic stay protections of 11 U.S.C. § 362. Doc. 43. As of the date of this Memorandum Opinion and Order, David Harrell’s bankruptcy proceeding has not resolved. Therefore, this matter is stayed pursuant to the automatic stay and David Harrell is not a party to the counterclaim at issue, which is filed solely by Counterclaimants and does not affect David Harrell.

Section 362(a)(1) automatically stays proceedings against the debtor, but the stay does not extend to nondebtor defendants without a separate injunction.

Bowser v. Watson · filed 2024-11-20(a)(1)

No order issuing a preliminary injunction has been provided to this Court and neither this Court nor the bankruptcy court has the authority to otherwise “extend” the automatic stay to non-debtor defendants.

Section 362(a)(1) generally stays prepetition litigation against the debtor, but does not automatically protect nondebtor defendants.

Vega v. Carner · filed 2024-11-21(a)(1)

The protections of this automatic stay generally extend to the debtor alone.

Section 362(a)(1) generally stays prepetition litigation against the debtor, but does not automatically protect nondebtor defendants.

Wean v. Masters · filed 2024-11-21(a)(1)

The protections of this automatic stay generally extend to the debtor alone.

Section 362(a)(1) does not bar a creditor from seeking relief against codefendants that are not debtors in bankruptcy.

Water for Commerce Fund Management, LLC v. Refreshing USA, LLC · filed 2024-11-21(a)(1)

Because none of the other Receivership Defendants are debtors in bankruptcy proceedings, the automatic stay does not preclude Plaintiff from seeking and receiving relief against Defendants other than Refreshing USA.

Section 362(a)(1) generally stays prepetition litigation against the debtor, but does not protect nondebtor defendants unless the bankruptcy court extends the stay to them.

Hoover v. Miller · filed 2024-11-22(a)(1)

The protections of this automatic stay generally extend to the debtor alone. ... Because the automatic stay does not protect the defendants and the bankruptcy court has not enjoined litigation of claims against them, this case may proceed.

Section 362's automatic stay does not bar a creditor from adding a debtor corporation's alter egos as judgment debtors on a claim that belongs to the creditor rather than the corporation.

Union Patriot Capital Management II v. Del Castro CA2/5 · filed 2024-12-03(a)(1), (a)(2)

Accordingly, the automatic stay did not preclude the trial court from adding Patricia and Richard as judgment debtors based on their identity as alter egos of Hannibal Classics.

Section 362(a)(1) stays actions against the debtor, but its automatic stay does not extend to non-debtor defendants without a separate injunction under § 105(a).

McDuff v. Jones · filed 2024-12-04(a)(1)

The same is true here; no preliminary injunction has been issued, and neither this Court nor the bankruptcy court can otherwise “extend” the automatic stay to non-debtor defendants.

Section 362(a) automatically stays claims against a debtor that files for bankruptcy, but the stay does not automatically extend to other defendants.

UniCredit Bank Austria AG v. Inmobiliaria y Arrendadora Cuadro S.A. de C.V. · filed 2024-12-16(a)

Zummit’s bankruptcy automatically stayed all counts against it. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). Thus, assuming they are properly viewed as standalone counts, the counts brought only against Zummit (i.e., counts three and five) are stayed. The bankruptcy stay did not, however, automatically reach any of the other defendants.

Section 362(a)(1) stays proceedings against a debtor in bankruptcy but does not extend the stay to a nondebtor guarantor.

Trustees Of The Laborers Trust Fund v. LCM Corporation · filed 2025-01-02(a)(1)

Thereafter, in accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1), the court stayed the proceedings as to LCM. Consequently, Plaintiffs seek default judgment at this time only against Musgrove to whom the bankruptcy stay does not extend.

Section 362(a)(1) does not bar a court from denying motions that became moot for reasons unrelated to the bankruptcy.

Simpson v. Corizon Health Inc. · filed 2025-01-06(a)(1)

There is nothing in the statutory language that would prohibit the denial of motions which are now moot for reasons unrelated to the bankruptcy.

Section 362(a) does not stay a debtor’s prosecution of the debtor’s own claims or a defendant’s defense against those claims.

Bernard-Ex v. Lay · filed 2025-01-07(a)

But the automatic stay does not work that way. The Ninth Circuit has made clear that the stay provided by § 362 “does not prevent a plaintiff/debtor from continuing to prosecute its own claims nor does it prevent a defendant from protecting its interests against claims brought by the debtor.”

Section 362(a) does not automatically stay claims against nondebtor defendants who are outside the bankruptcy stay.

DAILEY v. CORRECT X PHARMACY · filed 2025-01-10(a)

Moreover, although the automatic stay does not extend to Defendants Gray and Josalin Jackson, the Court finds that the necessity of avoiding inconsistent results and promoting judicial economy justify staying the case as to them also.

Section 362(a) does not extend the automatic stay to a nondebtor warden, though the court may stay the claims against that defendant for judicial economy.

BONILLA-BONILLA v. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS · filed 2025-01-10(a)

Moreover, although the automatic stay does not extend to Defendant Warden Sampson, the Court finds that the necessity of avoiding inconsistent results and promoting judicial economy justify staying the case as to them also.

Section 362(a) does not automatically stay claims against non-debtor defendants outside the bankruptcy stay order, although a court may stay those claims for judicial economy.

MALDONADO v. EMMONS · filed 2025-01-10(a)

Moreover, although the automatic stay does not extend to Defendants Warden Emmons, Deputy Warden Smith, and ... Major Ayannuga, the Court finds that the necessity of avoiding inconsistent results and promoting judicial economy justify staying the case as to them also.

Section 362(a) does not automatically stay claims against defendants outside the bankruptcy stay; a court may separately stay those claims to avoid inconsistent results and promote judicial economy.

RODRIGUEZ v. BEASLEY · filed 2025-01-10(a)

Moreover, although the automatic stay does not extend to the remaining Defendants, the Court finds that the necessity of avoiding inconsistent results and promoting judicial economy justify staying the case as to them also.

Section 362 automatically stays proceedings against the debtor, but does not extend the stay to the debtor’s employees or other nondebtor defendants.

Smith v. Markwell · filed 2025-01-10(a)(1)

Under 11 U.S.C. § 362, all proceedings against the debtor, i.e., Wellpath, are automatically stayed; however, the automatic stay does not apply to Wellpath employees nor unrelated co-defendants.

Section 362(a)(3) does not bar a nondebtor defendant’s dismissal motion when that defendant asserts no claim to estate property in the action.

Nautilus Insurance Company v. Roadrunner Restoration Company, LLC · filed 2025-01-16(a)(3)

Furthermore, while a claim by Key Allegro against the policies (which are, of course, assets of the bankruptcy estate) would appear to fall within the provisions of the automatic stay — specifically 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3), which extends the automatic stay to any and all lawsuits that seek to obtain possession or control over estate property — Key Allegro is not asserting any claim to estate property, or any claim at all, in the action pending before this court.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not bar a trustee’s court-authorized sale of estate property for the benefit of creditors.

Johnnie Marene Thomas · filed 2025-01-23

However, Debtor fails to show how the Trustee’s sale of property of the bankruptcy estate for the benefit of creditors—specifically authorized by 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)—is a violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362 automatically stays claims against a debtor in bankruptcy, but does not stay claims against other defendants solely because the debtor is a party.

Altantawi v. Bouchard · filed 2025-02-06

For the reasons stated in that order, the Court has found that the case is automatically stayed under 11 U.S.C. § 362 as to Wellpath only. Thus, the Court will not evaluate or rule upon the pending motion as it applies to Wellpath, and the claims against Wellpath remain pending but stayed.

Section 362(a)(1) stays claims against the debtor but does not stay third-party claims the debtor brings.

Basuljevic v. Lauper · filed 2025-02-11(a)(1)

As relevant here, the automatic stay under Section 362 does not apply to the debtor’s third-party claims.

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay a civil action brought by the debtor because the action is not against the debtor.

Laurion v. PHH Mortgage Corporation · filed 2025-02-13(a)(1)

Because Laurion is the plaintiff here, this action is not “against the debtor” within the meaning of Section 362(a)(1) and is not subject to the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(1) ordinarily stays claims against a debtor, but does not stay third-party complaints or crossclaims or counterclaims brought by the debtor because those claims are not against the debtor.

Lawrence v. Flohr · filed 2025-02-26(a)(1)

However, third-party complaints, as well as crossclaims or counterclaims brought by the debtor are ordinarily not subject to an automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362 because they are not against the debtor.

Section 362(a) automatically stays claims against a defendant after that defendant files for bankruptcy.

Frouws v. Edgio Incorporated · filed 2025-02-27(a)

Because of this, the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) is in effect for Defendant Edgio.

Section 362 stays proceedings during a defendant’s bankruptcy but does not prevent a court from directing the defendant corporation to retain counsel and file a notice of appearance.

Komar v. SKS Bottle & Packaging, Inc. · filed 2025-03-12

This stay, however, does not stay the above direction that counsel appear for SKS in this action.

Section 362(a) extends the automatic stay to nondebtor defendants when continuing the action risks diminishing the bankruptcy estate.

Monge v. DH Brewing Incorporated · filed 2025-03-13(a)

This general rule, however, does not apply if an action would diminish the bankruptcy estate.

Section 362(a)(1) automatically stays claims against the debtor, but does not extend that stay to nondebtor codefendants; a district court may stay the remaining claims under its inherent authority.

Putman v. Tuscola, County of · filed 2025-03-17(a)(1)

Read generously, the CHC Defendants’ motion asserts three distinct bases for the Court stay this matter: 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), and the Court’s “inherent” powers. But as discussed in other cases involving CHC’s affiliates, the only legitimate basis for this Court to stay proceedings lies in the Court’s inherent powers.

Section 362(a)(1) generally does not stay actions against non-debtors or their assets.

Rabo Agrifinance, LLC v. Pamma · filed 2025-04-23(a)(1)

It does not generally apply to actions or portions of actions concerning non-debtors or their assets.

Section 362(a) stays proceedings against the debtor, but does not automatically stay proceedings against other parties.

Sage Growth Capital Fund I, LLC v. CPR Construction Cleaning, LLC · filed 2025-04-28(a)

That stay applies only to the proceedings against Mr. Maez, not to those against any other party.

Section 362(a) automatically stays proceedings against a debtor after the debtor files a bankruptcy petition.

Gardner v. Missoula County · filed 2025-05-01(a)

Accordingly, all proceedings in this matter against Wellpath Defendants will remain stayed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).

Section 362(a) requires a claim against an employee covered by the employer’s bankruptcy stay to be stayed, while a distinct claim against another defendant may proceed.

Webster v. Sheriff Peterson · filed 2025-05-02(a)

The stay, pursuant to Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code, prevents the continuation of any action against Wellpath, and thus, Defendant Kelly. (Doc. 21 at 2 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)).) ... In this instance, claims against Nurse Kelly must be stayed. There is no reason to stay Webster’s claim against Sgt. Moden.

Section 362(a)(1) automatically stays an action against a defendant that has filed for bankruptcy.

Giorgio v. WW International, Inc. · filed 2025-05-14(a)(1)

The Court agrees that the automatic stay provision applies to Defendant WW International, Inc.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not bar a judgment creditor’s restraining notice directed at a payment owed to a debtor’s member when compliance does not interfere with reorganization or distribution.

In Re: Wythe Berry Fee Owner LLC · filed 2025-06-12

After a hearing and briefing by the parties, the bankruptcy court issued an Order finding that the Restraining Notice did not violate the automatic stay that was in place during the bankruptcy proceedings pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362. ... The underlying state court judgment held by Chetrit against Goldman was final and was entered before bankruptcy proceedings commenced. Wythe Berry does not object to the Restraining Notice, and effectuating the Notice would not interfere with its reorganization efforts or with the fairness and efficiency of distribution. See In re Brickell, 292 B.R. 705, 708-10 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2003), aff'd, 142 F. App’x 385 (ilth Cir. 2005). For these reasons, the bankruptcy court’s decision authorizing Wythe Berry to comply with the Restraining Notice is affirmed.

Section 362 stays proceedings against a debtor after a bankruptcy filing but permits the court to dispose of claims against defendants who are not in bankruptcy.

Robb v. Robb Jr. · filed 2025-06-12

Therefore, before my decision could be docketed, all proceedings against George were stayed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362. In light of the automatic stay, I recalled the original decision and excised those portions that dispose of George’s motion on the merits. However, there is no reason not to issue so much of the decision as disposes of Kathryn’s claims against the Lawyer Defendants, none of whom is in bankruptcy and all of whom deserve to be let out of chancery.

Section 362’s automatic stay prevents a court from adjudicating a claim against a bankrupt debtor even if the plaintiff designates the debtor a nonparty for the motion.

Jaar v. Northern Genesis Acquisition Corp. · filed 2025-07-01

Plaintiff has presented no authority to the Court to support the notion that a litigant may avoid the automatic stay on bankruptcy that protects the debtor (and creditors) from continued litigation by simply designating the debtor as a nonparty to a litigation that is otherwise stayed as to that debtor.

Section 362(a) generally stays proceedings against the bankruptcy debtor, but does not extend the stay to non-debtor co-defendants.

Taft v. Salinas · filed 2025-07-15(a)

However, “[a]s a general rule, ‘the automatic stay of [Section 362(a)] protects only the debtor,’” not non-debtor co-defendants.

Section 362(a)(1) stays proceedings against bankrupt defendants but does not extend the stay to a nonbankrupt codefendant.

7-Eleven, Inc. v. Sisara LLC · filed 2025-08-26(a)(1)

That stay does not extend to the remaining defendant, Sisara.

Section 362(a) does not protect property outside the debtor’s estate.

Ditech Holding Corporation · filed 2025-08-28(a)

The protections of the stay apply only to property of the estate.

Section 362(a) generally does not stay an action against a nondebtor that is not directed at the debtor or estate property.

Bremer Bank, National Association v. Border Bank · filed 2025-10-29(a)

In other words, the automatic stay provisions of Section 362(a) generally do not apply to actions that are not directed against the debtor or the debtor’s property.

The automatic stay in § 362(a)(1) suspends a foreclosure proceeding only as to the parties who filed for bankruptcy, not other parties in the same case.

Herr · filed 2025-10-30(a)(1)

The foreclosure case also involves several other parties in addition to the plaintiffs; the automatic stay does not apply to those other parties (or to Enduring Love, a separate legal entity from the plaintiffs).

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay a lawsuit containing only claims brought by the debtor, rather than claims against the debtor.

Cedric Lavon Billups, Sr. and Donna Marie Billups v. Partners for Payment Relief DE II · filed 2025-11-17(a)(1)

While the filing of the Second Bankruptcy Case did not stay the State District Court Case (because the only claims asserted in the State District Court Case were claims by the Plaintiffs, as opposed to claims against the Plaintiffs), all action in the State District Court Case seemingly came to a grinding halt upon the filing of the Second Bankruptcy Case.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not automatically extend to non-debtors.

Jones · filed 2025-11-18

While the stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362 does not automatically extend to non-debtors, such as Defendant Cleaves, the Court stayed the case in its entirety to avoid inconsistent rulings between the Defendants.

Section 362(a)(1) stays claims against the debtor, but does not extend to the debtor’s counterclaims or a third party’s crossclaim in the same action.

Arden Silverman dba Capital Asset Protection v. Tedder Acquisition · filed 2025-12-15(a)(1)

For these reasons, the automatic stay triggered by Tedder’s bankruptcy filing applies only to its claims against Tedder in its capacity as a defendant in this action—it does not extend to the counterclaims brought by Tedder or the crossclaim brought by Tax Resolution Plus, Inc.

Section 362(a) stays actions against the debtor or property of the estate, but does not prevent dismissal of an action brought by the debtor.

Zaykaria · filed 2026-01-09(a)

Because the automatic stay, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), applies only to actions against the debtor or against property of the estate.

Section 362(a)(1) automatically stays proceedings against the debtor, but does not ordinarily stay proceedings against other defendants.

CMB Infrastructure Group IX, LP v. Cobra Energy Investment Finance · filed 2026-01-26(a)(1)

The plain language of this provision indicates that the stay applies only to actions against the debtor.

Section 362(a) prevents a district court from deciding a motion affecting a debtor’s potential interest in settlement proceeds while the bankruptcy case remains pending, unless the bankruptcy court permits it.

Baptiste · filed 2026-02-04(a)

Thus, this Court lacks jurisdiction to act on Plaintiff’s motion unless MMA’s bankruptcy case has been resolved or the Bankruptcy Court has issued an Order allowing this Court to proceed.

Section 362(a) bars a court from granting requested relief against bankruptcy debtors while the automatic stay applies, even if a codefendant is not independently stayed.

First Bank of the Lake v. VCJ Estates LLC · filed 2026-03-03(a)

That said, the specific relief Plaintiff requests in the instant Motion necessarily makes it an action against Defendants Gonzales and Breaux, which the Court is prohibited from doing under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).

Section 362(a)(1) stays proceedings against the debtor but does not stay claims against nonbankrupt codefendants.

Daigle v. Anco Insulations, Inc. · filed 2026-03-04(a)(1)

The bankruptcy stay against Whittaker had no effect on the claims pending against the other non-bankrupt defendants.

Section 362(a) stays proceedings against bankruptcy debtors but does not extend the stay to nondebtor codefendants.

Linda Reynolds, as Administratrix of the Estate of Sue Buchanan v. Richard E. Blair, D.O. · filed 2026-03-06(a)

This Court entered an order requiring appellees Blair and Henson to show cause why the appeal should not proceed against them given that the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) did not extend to them.

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay a pending motion to dismiss when deciding it cannot affect the debtor’s estate and can only benefit the debtor.

Muckerheide · filed 2026-03-31(a)(1)

Given the parties’ positions, Mr. Malhotra’s representations of the trustee’s position, and the fact that this proceeding cannot affect the debtor’s estate and can only benefit the debtor, the Court rules that the automatic stay does not apply to Defendants’ pending motion to dismiss and that the motion is therefore ripe for adjudication.

Section 362(a)(1) stays litigation against the debtor, including discovery, preservation of testimony, entry of judgment, and service of process.

In Re White Motor Credit Corp. · filed 1981-05-18(a)(1)

Section 362 operates to stay as well the “employment of [any] process,” e. g., discovery request, preservation of testimony, seeking entry of judgment after a successful appeal, or service of process and joinder of parties thereby.

Section 362(a)(1) stays an action against a Chapter 7 debtor but does not prevent the court from proceeding against its guarantor.

Midwest Corp. v. Global Cable, Inc. · filed 1988-05-09(a)(1)

By letter dated February 12, 1988, defendant advised the Court that Global Cable had filed for bankruptcy pursuant to Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code on December 18, 1987. Accordingly, the action is stayed against defendant Global Cable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1). The Court will consider, however, plaintiff’s motion against defendant Brown.

Section 362(b)(6) addresses an exception to the automatic stay; it does not authorize a transfer when no stay is at issue.

Hill v. Spencer Savings & Loan Ass'n (In Re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman, Inc.) · filed 1989-01-13(b)(6)

First, section 362(b)(6) deals solely with an automatic stay, setting forth the guidelines for determining which actions and transactions by the debtor are subject to such a stay. The instant controversy does not involve the scope or application of an automatic stay; thus, defendants’ reliance on section 362(b)(6) is misplaced.

Section 362 does not bar a debtor’s own motion for affirmative relief to modify child support.

Classe v. Classe · filed 1989-06-13

Father’s motion to modify is a petition for affirmative relief; this is not an action by another party against father to recover a debt or claim, as prohibited by 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362 automatically stays proceedings against a debtor after a bankruptcy filing but does not toll causes of action brought by the debtor.

A. Groppe & Sons Glass Co. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. · filed 1991-07-12

The United States Congress has established that the commencement or continuation of any legal proceeding against the debtor will be automatically stayed by the filing of a petition in bankruptcy, until adjudication or dismissal of the petition. (11 U.S.C. § 362.) However, a cause of action brought by the debtor is not tolled by the Bankruptcy Act.

Section 362(a) automatically stays claims against a defendant who files for bankruptcy, but does not require a stay of the entire action against other defendants.

Sturge v. Diversified Transport Corp. · filed 1991-09-04(a)

Since the filing of the two lawsuits, defendant Berman has filed a petition for reorganization with the United States Bankruptcy Court, and thus both actions are automatically stayed against Berman pursuant to Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). ... While the Court disagrees with plaintiffs’ contention that this entire action must be stayed and has therefore severed and dismissed the claim against the moving defendants, the Court will grant plaintiffs’ request for a stay of the remaining claim pending the bankruptcy proceedings.

Section 362’s automatic stay in a corporate tenant’s bankruptcy case applies to a landlord’s right to demand surrender of jointly leased property from an individual cotenant.

In re Progressive Restaurant Systems, Inc. · filed 1997-02-25

It does not make a great deal of sense to argue about the effect of § 365(d)(4) in the Fen-tress case in light of the fact that whatever right Wendy’s would enjoy to demand “surrender” from Fentress would be subject to the automatic stay in the corporate case.

Section 362(a) stays proceedings against a bankrupt party while proceedings against other defendants may continue.

Commonwealth Aluminum Corp. v. Baldwin Corp. · filed 1997-09-16(a)

Upon de novo review this Report and Recommendation is hereby adopted. ... Just prior to oral argument Amsign filed a suggestion of bankruptcy. Accordingly, all actions against Amsign have been stayed, see 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), and the motions were argued only insofar as they related to Jecon and McMahon. This report and recommendation is similarly circumscribed.

Section 362’s automatic stay covers judicial proceedings even when the debtor is only a nominal party.

Shade v. Fasse (In Re Fasse) · filed 1984-06-27

The discharge injunction is narrower in breadth than the automatic stay under Section 362, which stays all judicial proceedings even when the debtor is only a nominal party.

Section 362’s automatic stay as to a bankrupt defendant does not prevent claims against a nonbankrupt codefendant in the same suit.

Sassau v. Louisiana Workover Service, Inc. · filed 1992-10-16

We find further support for our position in the federal jurisprudence which holds that a stay in bankruptcy as to one defendant has no effect on claims pending against a co-defendant in the same suit. ... Accordingly, the plaintiff was never precluded from proceeding in the state action against the remaining defendants.

Section 362(a)'s automatic stay generally applies to actions and proceedings against the debtor and his property.

Babb v. Horry County · filed 2010-02-24(a)

11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2006) (stating the automatic stay of bankruptcy applies generally to actions and proceedings against the debtor and his property).

Section 362’s automatic stay prevents the court from addressing claims against defendants who have filed for bankruptcy while it proceeds with claims against another defendant.

Great American Insurance Co. v. Nelson, Inc. · filed 2017-04-20

This Order does not address claims against Defendants Willie Nelson, Sr. and Hattie Nelson pursuant to an automatic stay under, 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362(a) stays proceedings against a bankrupt defendant while allowing a motion to proceed against individual codefendants.

Caudle v. AAC Holdings, Inc. · filed 2021-04-08(a)

AAC has filed a Suggestion of Bankruptcy in this action (Doc. No. 60), so the Court will proceed with the Motion only as to the individual Defendants.

Section 362(a) bars both new actions against a debtor and the continuation of actions already filed against it.

Westerby v. Johns-Manville Corp. · filed 1982-11-16(a)

Section 362(a) not only precludes plaintiff from commencing any new action against the bankrupt defendants, it also prohibits the continuation of any action which has already been instituted.

Section 362(a)(1) stays proceedings against a debtor but does not prevent a state court from exercising jurisdiction over the divorce proceeding itself.

Taylor v. Taylor · filed 1986-01-17(a)(1)

The bankruptcy court is in a much better position to interpret the meaning of the bankruptcy code than is this court. We find its determination as to its lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the divorce proceedings, within the historical view, persuasive. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err in exercising its jurisdiction over the divorce proceeding below.

The automatic stay bars foreclosure against property in which the debtor has an interest, but the court may modify the stay for cause, including failure to make required secured loan payments.

In Re Black · filed 1986-02-13(a), (d)(1)

The automatic stay of § 362(a) arises on the filing of a petition under the Code, and that stay generally bars various debt collection efforts against the debtor, his property and the property of his bankruptcy estate. ... Applying these few principles to the case before us, it is clear that the automatic stay which arose on the filing of the debtor’s petition, barred continuation of the intended foreclosure. Hence, “cause” is present under § 362(d)(1) for modification of the stay under the authority of Three Tuns.

Section 362(a)(1) generally stays legal proceedings against a Chapter 11 debtor but ordinarily does not stay litigation initiated by the debtor.

McNeil v. Powers · filed 2004-09-21(a)(1)

Generally, a Chapter 11 petition operates as a stay against legal proceedings against the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1). But the stay ordinarily does not apply to litigation initiated by the debtor, such as the tort suit Mr. McNeil filed against Mr. Powers.

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay foreclosure of property outside the bankruptcy estate merely because the sale extinguishes the value of an estate-owned lien.

Invest Vegas, LLC v. 21st Mortgage Corp. (In re Residential Capital, LLC) · filed 2016-08-30(a)(1)

Under Whiting Pools, because the Subject Property itself was not property of the Debtors’ bankruptcy estates, the HOA Lien Sale — despite effectively extinguishing the value of the Real Estate Instruments that were property of the Debtors’, estates — did not violate the automatic stay.

Section 362(a) does not stay an objection to a claim filed by a creditor that later enters bankruptcy.

In re Benyamin · filed 2019-02-13(a)(1), (a)(3)

The automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) does not apply to an objection to a claim for recovery asserted by Ditech.

Section 362(a)(1)’s automatic stay applies only to proceedings against the debtor.

Amrhein v. Prosperity Bank, Jo'el Doe, Keena Clifton, and Naomi Thames · filed 2019-07-03(a)(1)

As appellees note in their response, the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay, upon which appellate rule 8 is based, applies only to proceedings against the debtor.

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay a debtor’s prosecution of claims against others, including an appeal concerning where those claims will proceed.

Burch v. Celtic Pubs CA2/2 · filed 2016-01-07(a)(1)

Because, as we discuss in section II, their appeal involves the venue in which the LLC—that is, the debtor—should prosecute claims brought derivatively on its behalf, the LLC’s derivative ... action and this appeal dealing with the same fall outside the bankruptcy stay.

Section 362(a)(1) stays post-judgment intervention in a prepetition suit against the debtor, even when the intervenor seeks to benefit the debtor.

State Farm Florida Insurance Company v. Dawn Carapella · filed 2021-11-16(a)(1)

Accordingly, we hold that State Farm’s effort to intervene in the Rotells’ wrongful-death action falls within the terms of § 362(a)’s stay provision.

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay an action against nondebtors to set aside an alleged fraudulent transfer before the property is determined to be part of the debtor’s estate.

Everything Yogurt, Inc. v. Toscano · filed 1996-10-28(a)(3)

The appellants’ contention that the entire action was stayed pursuant to 11 USC § 362 (a) (3) is without merit. "Until a judicial determination has been made that the property was, in fact, fraudulently transferred, it is not property of the [debtor’s] estate” (In re Saunders, supra, at 305; see also, In re Colonial Realty, supra, at 130-131). Therefore, the appellants’ time to serve an answer to the amended complaint, or to respond to the interrogatories, was not stayed by the defendant John’s filing in bankruptcy, and the court properly entered a default judgment against them.

Section 362(a)(3) bars parties from filing suit to pursue claims belonging to the bankruptcy estate without authority to do so.

Cline v. Heller Draper & Horn, LLC · filed 2023-07-24(a)(3)

The facts surrounding the actions of Cline, Hardstock LLC, and Palmintier are not in dispute: (i) a court order was in effect (the automatic stay) protecting Dominion at the time Palmintier filed State Court Lawsuit Nos. 1 & 2 on behalf of Cline and Hardstock LLC; (ii) the automatic stay is a definite and specific Order of the Court; and (iii) Cline, Hardstock LLC, and Palmintier failed to comply with the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) stays a Chapter 7 debtor’s filing or continued prosecution of claims that belong to the bankruptcy estate.

Jackson, Jr. v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A. · filed 2022-05-23(a)(3)

As matters currently stand, only the Chapter 7 Trustee may prosecute the claims, and the filing of these claims by the Plaintiff, ...and any continued prosecution of the claims by the Plaintiff, are violations of the automatic stay, under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).2.

Section 362(a)(3) bars an entity other than the trustee from asserting a cause of action that belongs to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate.

In re Nicole Gas Production, Ltd. · filed 2013-09-27(a)(3)

Accordingly, it is a violation of the automatic stay for an entity other than the trustee to assert a claim belonging to a Chapter 7 estate.

Section 362(a)(3) stays a creditor from pursuing claims derivative of the debtor because those claims belong to the bankruptcy estate.

Hof v. Pride Centric Res., Inc. (In re Hof) · filed 2018-08-30(a)(3)

For this reason, the automatic stay prohibits a third party creditor from pursuing causes of action which belong to the estate. ... For the reasons set forth above, all claims derivative of FSW are property of the estate and Pride is enjoined from their pursuit.

Filing the two state court lawsuits violated the automatic stay.

Dominion Group, LLC · filed 2023-07-24(a)(3)

The facts surrounding the actions of Cline, Hardstock LLC, and Palmintier are not in dispute: (i) a court order was in effect (the automatic stay) protecting Dominion at the time Palmintier filed State Court Lawsuit Nos. 1 & 2 on behalf of Cline and Hardstock LLC; (ii) the automatic stay is a definite and specific Order of the Court; and (iii) Cline, Hardstock LLC, and Palmintier failed to comply with the automatic stay.

Section 362(d)(4)(B) permits relief from the automatic stay when multiple bankruptcy filings affecting secured real property are part of a scheme to hinder or delay creditors.

Behrens v. U.S. Bank National Ass'n ex rel. RAMP 2006NC2 (In re Behrens) · filed 2013-11-26(d)(4)(B)

Likewise, we will not second guess the bankruptcy court’s determination that the Debtor’s bankruptcy filing was part of a “scheme” to hinder or delay creditors, and that such scheme was one involving multiple bankruptcy filings that affected the Property.

Section 362(d)(4)(B) permits relief from the automatic stay when multiple bankruptcy filings affecting real property are part of a scheme to delay or hinder creditors; proof of fraud is unnecessary.

Behrens v. U.S. Bank N.A. · filed 2013-11-26(d)(4)(B)

The bankruptcy court did not need to decide whether the filing was made to defraud creditors, and it specifically stated that it did not make such a determination. The statute requires only that the filing of the Debtor’s bankruptcy petition involve “a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors.”

Section 362(d)(4) requires a finding that the debtor filed the bankruptcy case as part of an intentional scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud a creditor.

In re JCP Properties, Ltd. · filed 2015-11-05(d)(4)

For the purpose of § 362(d)(4)’s scheme, a court must clearly find that a bankruptcy case was filed by the debtor with the specific forward purpose of delaying, hindering, or defrauding a creditor through the protections of bankruptcy law.

Section 362(d)(4) permits relief from the automatic stay when the evidence supports an inference that a bankruptcy petition was part of a scheme to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors through a transfer of an interest in real property without the secured creditor’s consent.

In Re: Airlux Aircraft, Inc. · filed 2021-03-09(d)(4)

In this regard, the bankruptcy court’s finding that all three elements for relief under § 362(d)(4) were met is supported by evidence from which the court could reasonably infer that the petition was part of a scheme to defraud, hinder, or delay creditors by transferring an interest in the Property without the consent of the secured creditor.

Section 362(d)(4) permits retroactive and prospective relief from the automatic stay when its requirements are met.

Tabitha Baker v. Bank of America, N.A. · filed 2020-12-29(d)(4)

The bankruptcy court’s analysis satisfied the requirements of § 362(d)(4). Therefore, the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by awarding BANA nunc pro tunc and prospective relief from the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(1) bars initiating or continuing a suit against a bankrupt debtor but does not prevent dismissal of the suit for lack of jurisdiction.

Nora v. Residential Funding Co. · filed 2013-11-26(a)(1)

The automatic stay enjoins the initiation and continuation of a suit against bankrupt debtors, id. § 362(a)(1), not the non-merits termination of one.

Section 362(b)(3) permits a creditor to retain possession of property after a bankruptcy filing when possession is necessary to maintain perfection of a prepetition lien.

In re Ingram · filed 2014-03-27(b)(3)

As the holder of a valid possesso-ry statutory lien on the Debtor’s Vehicle, Jensen Towing did not violate the stay by refusing the release it. ... In other words, a creditor’s post-petition possession of property necessary to the perfection of a pre-petition lien does not violate the stay.

Section 362(b)(3) excepts a distinct, positive act to maintain or continue perfection from the automatic stay; passive retention of estate property does not qualify.

In re Peake · filed 2018-08-15(b)(3)

Thus, the court concludes that the phrase "act ... to continue or maintain the perfection of" in section 362(b)(3) requires a positive, distinct action, such as filing a continuation statement under the U.C.C., and therefore that a passive retention of estate property is not an "act ... to maintain or continue the perfection of an interest in property."

Section 362(a)(1) permits a prepetition collection proceeding to remain pending when the court stays it after bankruptcy notice and no further action is pursued against the debtor.

In re Kuzniewski · filed 2014-03-31(a)(1)

Here, the citation proceeding was commenced pre-petition. The state court was made aware of the bankruptcy quickly— less than an hour after it was filed — and before the state court made any substantive ruling. The state court immediately stayed the citation hearing and the respondents did not request that the court do otherwise. No obligations, deadlines or need to respond were imposed on the Debtor until the stay was lifted or the bankruptcy court ordered otherwise. This was sufficient and did not constitute a commencement or continuation of a judicial proceeding in violation of Section 362(a)(1).

Section 362(a)(1) requires a creditor to stop a pending collection proceeding when its continuation would expose the debtor to harassment or coercion, including a required status hearing.

Skillforce, Inc. v. Hafer · filed 2014-04-25(a)(1)

Thus, the harmonizing principle — that a creditor has an affirmative duty to act to prevent an automatic stay violation where (i) the bankruptcy estate is in jeopardy or (ii) the debtor is exposed to harassment or coercion — compels affirmance of the Bankruptcy Court’s conclusion that appellants’ failure to take action to prevent the May 1 status hearing was an automatic stay violation.

Section 362(a) stays a state court action to confirm an arbitration award against a debtor because obtaining judgment continues a judicial action against the debtor.

Straccia v Menard, et al. · filed 2014-09-02(a)

Further superior court action is thus necessary to produce a final judgment, leaving the Investors’ state court action a “continuation . . . of a judicial . . . action against the debtor” that triggers the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(1) prohibits continuing an action against the debtor to recover a prepetition claim, including a creditor’s postpetition trial and resulting opinion.

Wells v. THB America, LLC (In re Clements Manufacturing Liquidation Co.) · filed 2014-10-17(a)(1)

From the Trustee’s description, it is clear that the Sanilac County action was the continuation of an action by Deckerville Investors against the Debtor to recover a pre-petition claim against the Debtor, within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1), and therefore was prohibited by the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(1) bars continuation of a pre-bankruptcy proceeding while the automatic stay remains in effect, including a court-imposed deadline to refile post-trial motions before the stay lifts.

Walker v. RDR Real Estate · filed 2016-01-12(a)(1)

By continuing the pre-bankruptcy action before the stay was lifted to allow the litigation to proceed, the court inadvertently violated the stay. Because continuation of a pre-bankruptcy proceeding during the pendency of a stay is barred by the Bankruptcy Code, the July 31 deadline is invalid and voidable.

Section 362(a)(1) bars a postpetition order granting a lien in a pending judicial action against the debtor, even when the order acknowledges the automatic stay.

In re Montoya · filed 2016-03-14(a)(1)

Entry of the Tax Lien and Stay Order violated § 362(a)(1) regardless of the language in the Tax Lien and Stay Order recognizing and respecting the existence of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(1) requires dismissal of an action filed against the debtor after the bankruptcy petition in violation of the stay; merely placing that action on hold continues the violation.

Cynthia Leigh Smith · filed 2021-11-19(a)(1)

Further, Mr. Smith’s insistence that the State Court Action be placed on hold rather than dismissed amounted to a “continuation” of the action contrary to Section 362(a)(1).

Section 362(a)(1) bars a creditor from filing and prosecuting a motion to reopen a prepetition foreclosure proceeding; such a filing is not a ministerial act.

HP Bennett, LLC · filed 2023-12-22(a)(1)

The filing of the Motion to Reopen was both an action requiring an overt judicial act and was filed by a third party. Clearly, the filing and prosecution of the Motion to Reopen does not fall within the scope of the ministerial acts exception. As such, the filing and prosecution of the Motion to Reopen violated the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(1) bars a creditor from filing and prosecuting a motion to reopen a prepetition foreclosure action against the debtor; that motion falls outside the ministerial acts exception.

Baltimore Harlem Park Investment LLC · filed 2023-12-22(a)(1)

The filing of the Motion to Reopen was both an action requiring an overt judicial act and was filed by a third party. Clearly, the filing and prosecution of the Motion to Reopen does not fall within the scope of the ministerial acts exception. As such, the filing and prosecution of the Motion to Reopen violated the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(1) is not violated merely by attending or adjourning a pending hearing, or by failing to request that the case be closed.

Sobel · filed 2026-05-12(a)(1)

With respect to the first argument, the Court agrees with the Soble Defendants that allegations regarding the mere attendance at the January 10th and January 24th hearings in the Forfeiture Action, the adjournment of the earlier hearing, and the failure to request administrative closure of the Forfeiture Action at such hearing are not sufficient, if true, to establish a violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(1) automatically stays the continuation of a lawsuit against a debtor that began before its bankruptcy case.

Cesario · filed 2025-12-19(a)(1)

The Bankruptcy Court’s docket reflects that an automatic stay is in effect as to litigation against Biocept.

Section 362(b)(26) excepts a governmental setoff of a tax refund against income tax liability from the automatic stay, but does not except a setoff against housing loan liability.

Wood v. HUD · filed 2021-04-07(b)(26)

In the context of a narrow, specifically articulated exception to a general stay of all setoff actions against property in the bankruptcy estate, a straightforward application of the expressio unius canon makes plain that only setoffs against income tax liability—and not, for example, against housing loan liability—may licitly proceed under the general stay.

Section 362(b)(26) excepts a setoff of an income tax refund against an income tax liability from the automatic stay, but does not except a setoff against non-tax debt.

Addison v. United States Department of Agriculture (In re Addison) · filed 2015-07-13(b)(26)

Notably, Congress worded Section 362(b)(26) to only except a setoff of a debtor’s income tax refund against income tax liability from violating the automatic stay, and did not include language excepting setoffs against non-tax liability.

Section 362(b)(26) does not except postpetition offsets of tax overpayments against nontax governmental debts from the automatic stay.

Sexton v. Department of Treasury (In re Sexton) · filed 2014-04-01(b)(26)

Therefore, the Court concludes the language of 362(b)(26) does not except other, non-tax, governmental debts from the protections of the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(26) excepts income tax setoffs from the automatic stay only when both the tax liability and the overpayment arose before the bankruptcy petition.

In re Pugh · filed 2014-05-27(b)(26)

The proposed action by the IRS does not fall within the exception to the automatic stay in 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(26) because that section relates to the setoff of income tax liabilities and overpayments that are both prepetition. At least some of the overpayment in this case was made by the debtor postpetition.

Section 362(b)(26) excepts the setoff of an income tax refund against an income tax liability from the automatic stay.

Benson v. United States (In re Benson) · filed 2017-04-03(b)(26)

Because this case involves the setoff of a tax refund against an income tax liability, not a setoff against a non-income tax liability, Section 362(b)(26) provides an express exception to the stay of Section 362(a) and operates to allow the setoff.

Section 362(b)(26) excepts income tax refund offsets against income tax liabilities from the automatic stay, but does not except offsets against debts owed to other federal agencies.

In re: Larry Edward Wood · filed 2019-12-16(b)(26)

Because Congress did not choose to omit “the modifier ‘income tax’ before the word ‘liability’” the Court agrees with other decisions within this circuit finding that debts owed to other federal agencies are not exempted from the automatic stay.

Section 362(k) treats attorneys’ fees and costs incurred to vindicate the automatic stay as actual damages recoverable even without any other injury.

Healthcare Real Estate Partners, LLC. · filed 2023-11-14(k)

That is, because the statute makes clear that in the context of the automatic stay, attorneys’ fees and costs are included among the debtor’s “actual damages,” a party that incurred such fees cannot be denied recovery for failing to have suffered actual damages.

Section 362(k)(1) does not permit a debtor to recover attorney’s fees and costs inflated by the debtor’s counsel’s own conduct.

Viola Brittner v. Beach Anesthesia, LLC · filed 2023-06-23(k)(1)

Brittner should not be entitled to a windfall based on her attorney’s actions, whether awarded under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) or 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1).

Section 362(k)(1) permits recovery of attorney fees for a willful stay violation, subject to reduction for unrelated or excessive work.

Paugh, Jr. v. Graham · filed 2023-04-19(k)(1)

Nonetheless, the court will exercise its discretion to eliminate unrelated or excessive fees under § 362(k).

Section 362(k)(1) treats costs and attorney’s fees as actual damages for a willful automatic-stay violation.

George Ryan Campbell · filed 2023-03-13(k)(1)

Under the plain language of the statute, costs and attorney’s fees are actual damages.

Section 362(k)(1) treats attorney’s fees as damages for a willful violation of the automatic stay.

Raeissi v. Burkhart · filed 2022-03-22(k)(1)

11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1) explicitly states that attorney’s fees constitute damages for purposes of an automatic stay violation.

Section 362(k) links an award of attorney’s fees for an automatic stay violation to the actual damages incurred.

Codie B Southworth · filed 2021-11-15(k)

Thus, under § 362(k) an award of attorney’s fees is linked to the actual damages incurred.

Reasonable attorney fees under § 362(k) are calculated by multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by the hours reasonably expended.

Rosche, Kristopher v. Trueaccord Corp. · filed 2020-10-15(k)

Rosche seeks $7,621.25 in attorney fees for 18 hours of work and $485 in costs pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k and 11 U.S.C. § 362(k). ... The parties agree that Rosche is entitled to reasonable fees under both the FDCPA and the Bankruptcy Code. The court uses the lodestar method to determine reasonable attorney fees, multiplying the attorney’s reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours reasonably expended.

Section 362(k)(1) allows a debtor to recover attorneys’ fees incurred defending a creditor’s appeal of a finding that the creditor violated the automatic stay.

America's Servicing Co. v. Schwartz-Tallard (In Re Schwartz-Tallard) · filed 2014-04-16(k)(1)

Where, as here, the debtor is defending an appeal that seeks to eliminate the finding that the stay was violated, we hold that the fees incurred defending such an appeal meet that Congressional purpose and are included in § 362(k)(1)’s definition of actual damages.

Section 362(k)(1) allows a debtor injured by a willful stay violation to recover attorney fees incurred in prosecuting the action to obtain damages and fees, even after the stay violation ends.

Parker v. Credit Central South Inc. (In re Parker) · filed 2014-05-15(k)(1)

Section 362(k) permits Parker to recover attorneys’ fees necessary to recover damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs, including the attorneys’ fees necessary to prosecute the adversary proceeding.

Section 362(k)(1) includes attorneys’ fees incurred defending a creditor’s appeal that challenges a finding of an automatic-stay violation in its definition of actual damages.

America's Servicing Co. v. Schwartz-Tallard (In Re Schwartz-Tallard) · filed 2014-08-29(k)(1)

Where, as here, the debtor is defending an appeal that seeks to eliminate the finding that the stay was violated, we hold that the fees incurred defending such an appeal meet that Congressional purpose and are included in § 362(k)(1)’s definition of actual damages.

Section 362(k)(1) allows recovery of attorney fees incurred to remedy a stay violation after the creditor conditionally offers to return property it wrongfully seized.

Snowden v. Check Into Cash of Washington Inc. (In Re Snowden) · filed 2014-09-12(k)(1)

Permitting the violator to short-circuit the remedies available under § 362(k)(1) by making a conditional offer to return the property wrongfully seized in violation of the automatic stay would undermine the remedial scheme of § 362(k). ... Therefore, we reverse the district court’s determination limiting fees to those incurred before May 20, 2009, and we remand for a recalculation of attorneys’ fees.

Section 362(k)(1) allows attorney’s fees as damages for a willful stay violation only when the fees are reasonable and necessary litigation costs.

In re Hall · filed 2014-09-26(k)(1)

However, to recover attorney’s fees, the court must find the fees to be both reasonable and necessary, which finding is premised upon the fees being necessary litigation costs.

Section 362(k)(1) permits a debtor to recover attorneys’ fees for prosecuting a stay violation claim when the fees were proximately caused by and reasonably incurred as a result of the violation.

Ojiegbe v. Walter (In re Ojiegbe) · filed 2015-09-29(k)(1)

The court therefore rejects the holding of Sternberg and will award fees that “have been proximately caused by and reasonably incurred as a result of the violation of the automatic stay.” In re Grine, 439 B.R. at 471.

Section 362(k)(1) permits recovery of reasonably incurred attorney’s fees for prosecuting a damages action over a stay violation and for successfully defending the resulting judgment on appeal.

America's Servicing Co. v. Schwartz-Tallard (In Re Schwartz-Tallard) · filed 2015-10-14(k)(1)

Having determined that § 362(k) authorizes an award of attorney’s fees incurred in prosecuting an action for damages, we can quickly dispose of this appeal. ... We see no reason why fee awards under § 362(k) should be subject to a different rule. Schwartz-Tallard is therefore entitled to recover the attorney’s fees reasonably incurred in opposing ASC’s appeal in the district court.

Section 362(k)(1) permits reasonable attorney’s fees incurred to address and enforce the automatic stay as actual damages even when the debtor suffered no other injury.

In re: Lavesta M. Locklin · filed 2015-12-07(k)(1)

Second, Reliance and Opperwall argue that the bankruptcy court should not have awarded any attorney’s fees to Locklin because Locklin did not suffer any actual damages as a result of their stay violations. This argument incorrectly assumes that Locklin’s attorney’s fees do not qualify as actual damages and that attorney’s fees are recoverable under § 362(k) only if the debtor suffered another form of injury as a result of the stay violations. Neither of these assumptions can be reconciled with the plain language of § 362(k) or with In re Schwartz-Tallard.

Section 362(k)(1) treats costs and attorney’s fees incurred to stop a willful stay violation and pursue damages as an injury recoverable by the debtor.

Parker v. Credit Central South, Inc. · filed 2015-12-17(k)(1)

Based on a straightforward reading of section 362(k)(l), the costs and attorney’s fees that Parker incurred to halt the violation of the automatic stay and to prosecute his action for damages constitutes an injury.

Section 362(k)(1) allows a debtor who recovers actual damages for an automatic stay violation to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs despite a contingency agreement giving counsel 50% of the recovery.

Collier v. Washington · filed 2016-03-31(k)(1)

Having fully reviewed the arguments and the case law, the Court finds that the Bankruptcy Court did not commit legal error in awarding reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs to Washington, rather than limiting her to a recovery of 50% her actual damages.

Section 362(k)(1) permits recovery of attorneys’ fees incurred in ending a willful stay violation, prosecuting a damages action, and defending the judgment on appeal.

Mantiply v. Horne · filed 2017-12-05(k)(1)

This explicit, specific, and broad language permits the recovery of attorneys’ fees incurred in stopping the stay violation, prosecuting a damages action, and defending those judgments on appeal.

Section 362(k)(1) permits an attorney’s fee award for remedying a willful stay violation when the bankruptcy court can determine a reasonable minimum from its experience, even without an itemized fee total.

DeLay v. Bandy · filed 2019-09-23(k)(1)

The amount of attorney’s fees awarded was not based on speculation, guess, or conjecture. Rather, the Bankruptcy Court, relying on its experience as a lawyer and a judge, found that no attorney could have completed the work necessary to take Bandy’s case to trial to establish the stay violations by Delay and Reid for less than $5,000.

Section 362(k) allows a bankruptcy court to consider reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred defending an appeal of sanctions for an automatic stay violation.

Clark v. Passa · filed 2020-06-23(k)

Given the language of 11 U.S.C. § 362(k), this case will be remanded to the Bankruptcy Court for the limited purpose of determining whether reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs should be awarded to Appellees for defending this appeal.

Section 362(a)(1) can make attorneys liable for continuing a stayed state-court proceeding on a client’s behalf; representing the client does not shield them from liability for their own violations.

Cheryl Cibula Payne · filed 2021-03-22(a)(1)

Nevertheless, it is clear that Goff, PC, and its principal, Goff, proceeded in State Court in direct violation of § 362(a)(1). That they were purportedly acting on behalf of Thomas Payne does not insulate them from liability for their own violations.

Section 362(k)(1) allows recovery of fees and costs reasonably incurred in successfully appealing the denial of damages for an automatic-stay violation.

In re Bradley Edward Koeberer and Nancy Louise Koeberer · filed 2022-12-20(k)(1)

So too for fees and costs reasonably incurred in successfully appealing the denial of a Section 362(k)(1) damages award.

Section 362(k)(1) allows a debtor to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs as actual damages for a willful violation of the automatic stay.

Wingfield · filed 2026-02-26(k)(1)

Furthermore, as specifically provided in § 362(k)(1), a successful plaintiff who brings an action for a willful violation of § 362 is entitled to attorney’s fees and costs as actual damages.

Fees for an automatic-stay violation do not include the cost of opposing a separate, properly requested Rule 2004 examination.

In re Jewelers Shipping Ass'n · filed 1989-04-10

Our prior Order did not contemplate payment for the cost of these services, since Cross Con was properly exercising its right to come before us and request said examination, despite our earlier adverse ruling. Hence, Cross Con is not required to compensate JSA or JSA Services for those services, which the movants say are worth $632.00 and $5,100.00, respectively.

A bankruptcy court may award attorney’s fees against a state for violating the automatic stay when the award is ancillary to prospective relief.

In Re Whitefield · filed 1994-04-07(a)(1), (a)(6)

Under this analysis, a bankruptcy court can award attorney’s fees against a state that violated the automatic stay, as long as the award is ancillary to prospective relief.

Section 362(k) makes attorney’s fees mandatory for an individual injured by a willful violation of the automatic stay.

Mantiply v. Horne · filed 2015-10-28(k)

A problem with that analysis arises, however, due to the fact that the district court cites 11 U.S.C. § 362(k), which provides that “an individual injured by any willful violation of a stay . . . shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees” (emphasis added), which presumably means that an award of attorney’s fees is mandatory for a stay violation, albeit only discretionary for a discharge violation.

Section 362(h) requires an injured individual to receive all reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred from a willful stay violation; the court cannot allocate part of those fees to the bankruptcy estate.

Stainton v. Lee (In Re Stainton) · filed 1992-04-20(h)

It is well established that the bankruptcy court has discretion to determine the reasonableness of the fees and costs and to set the amounts accordingly. Once the court makes such a determination, however, it should award the fees to the injured party. There is nothing in Section 362(h) or in the case law to support the proposition that the bankruptcy court has discretion to allocate payment of reasonable fees between the violating parties and the injured individual.

Section 362(h) permits a bankruptcy court to award attorney fees against the United States for a willful violation of the automatic stay when sovereign immunity is waived.

Taylor v. United States (In Re Taylor) · filed 1992-12-01(h)

Furthermore, the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to award attorney fees against, the United States in accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 362(h).

Section 362(b)(3) permits postpetition perfection of an existing property interest when the other conditions of the stay exception are met.

Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Construction Supervision Services, Inc. · filed 2014-05-22(b)(3)

We, like the bankruptcy court and district court, thus hold that the Section 362(b)(3) exception applies and that the Subcontractors are not barred by the bankruptcy stay from noticing, i.e., perfecting, their extant interest in property post-petition.

Section 362(a)(4) and (a)(5) prevent a creditor from perfecting a lien in property of the estate or debtor after the bankruptcy petition when the lien could not arise before the petition.

Global Injury Funding, LLC v. Knight (In re Knight) · filed 2015-03-31(a)(4), (a)(5)

Since the lien, whether arising against property of the estate or against property of Knight, could not have arisen in this case until after the petition was filed, it cannot become perfected in the future proceeds since for it to do so would violate the automatic stay and ultimately the discharge injunction under Code § 524(a) which has discharged Knight’s underlying debt to Global.

Section 362(b)(3) may except an act to perfect an unrecorded mortgage deed arising from a prepetition transfer because the deed can be an interest in property.

EMI Equity Mortg., Inc. v. Valdés-Morales · filed 2018-07-13(b)(3)

An unrecorded mortgage deed arising from a prepetition transfer may constitute an "interest in property" pursuant to section 362(b)(3).

Section 362(b)(3) permits the holder of a prepetition Illinois tax sale certificate to obtain a tax deed during the automatic stay when state law permits perfection against the debtor and trustee.

Jackson v. Midwest Partnership · filed 1994-12-07(b)(3)

As such, the certificate may be converted to a tax deed in the face of the automatic stay under section 362(b) of the bankruptcy code as a perfection of an interest in property because the debt- or’s rights (and the trustee’s as well) to the property were subject to that perfection under sections 362(b) and 546(b) of the bankruptcy code.

A holder of the debtor’s promissory note can have standing to seek an order under § 362(j) confirming that the automatic stay has terminated.

Thomas v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n (In Re Thomas) · filed 2014-07-29(j)

After holding an evidentiary hearing, the bankruptcy court determined that FNMA had made a sufficient, colorable showing of standing, as the holder of a promissory note signed by Mr. Thomas, to seek § 362(j) relief. The Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) affirmed. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1), we affirm.

A party seeking relief from the automatic stay to foreclose has standing if it shows a colorable claim to the property through the deed of trust or the note.

In re: Cindy Yunkong Ikeoka · filed 2015-06-26(d)

On this record, U.S. Bank established that it had a colorable claim and, thus, standing to seek stay relief, from the standpoint of both the Trust Deed and the Note.

A party seeking relief from the automatic stay under § 362(d) must establish that it is a party in interest with standing to enforce the underlying claim.

In re Garcia · filed 2018-05-08(d)

The Motion fails to establish that U.S. Bank is a "party in interest" under 11 U.S.C. 362(d) and that Rushmore has standing to enforce U.S. Bank's right to foreclose on the Property.

Section 362(c)(1) keeps the automatic stay in effect for property of the bankruptcy estate after the debtor receives a personal discharge.

Nv Eagles, Llc Vs. Nationstar Mortg., Llc · filed 2020-05-15(c)(1)

Consequently, the district court correctly determined that the HONs foreclosure sale was invalid because it violated the automatic bankruptcy stay.

Section 362(c)(1) ends the automatic stay as to property once that property is no longer part of the bankruptcy estate.

QuarterNorth Energy LLC and certain of its affilia v. Atlantic Maritime Services LLC · filed 2021-10-15(c)(1)

The automatic stay ends when property is no longer property of the estate. ... Therefore, seizing any hydrocarbons that otherwise belong to QuarterNorth via its interests in MC- 948 and GC-40 would not violate the automatic stay.

Section 362(c)(1) keeps the automatic stay in effect against enforcement on estate property until the property ceases to be part of the estate.

Thomas v. Causey (In re Causey) · filed 2014-10-01(c)(1)

Nevertheless, the automatic stay remains in effect with respect to the enforcement of the state Court Judgment against property of the estate under 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1), unless and until such property ceases to be property of the estate.

Section 362(c)(1) keeps the automatic stay in effect for property of the estate until that property leaves the estate through an effective abandonment or release.

Hines v. Scottsboro Investment Group, LLC (In re Hines) · filed 2017-01-10(c)(1)

Although the Debtor’s residence remained property of estate when the Defendant served the Writ of Execution, the stay subsequently lifted pursuant to 11 U.S.C.§ 362(c)(1) on May 25, 2016 when the Court entered the Order Approving Trustee’s Final Report.

Section 362(c)(1) ends the automatic stay as to estate property when that property ceases to be property of the estate.

Kellogg v. First Land Dev., LLC (In re Kellogg) · filed 2019-05-08(c)(1)

The automatic stay terminated as to the Debtor's home when that property was no longer property of the bankruptcy estate.

The automatic stay of acts against estate property expires when that property leaves the estate, including when an unopposed exemption takes effect.

Steven B. Watkins · filed 2020-10-05(c)(1)

Because no party timely objected to the Debtor’s claim of exemption, his homestead left the estate on October 20, 2011, and the automatic stay as to acts against the Debtor’s homestead, such as the filing of a tax deed application, expired that day.

Section 362(c)(1) ends the automatic stay as to property when that property is no longer part of the bankruptcy estate.

Parmenter v. Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB · filed 2021-09-20(c)(1)

Because it was no longer property of the bankruptcy estate, the automatic stay terminated with respect to the property. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1).

Section 362(c)(1) ends the automatic stay as to property when that property ceases to be property of the estate.

Fieldwood Energy LLC and The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors · filed 2021-10-15(c)(1)

The automatic stay ends when property is no longer property of the estate.

Section 362(c)(1) keeps the stay against actions on estate property in effect until the property leaves the bankruptcy estate.

Copper Creek Homeowners Association, V. Wilmington Savings Fund Society · filed 2022-04-11(c)(1)

However, a stay remains in effect against actions on the property of the estate until the property leaves the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1).

Denial of a debtor’s discharge does not terminate the automatic stay against acts concerning property of the bankruptcy estate; that stay continues while the property remains in the estate.

Evangelista v. Hutchinson · filed 2025-05-19(c)(1)

The denial of the Debtor’s discharge did not terminate the automatic stay with respect to acts against property of the bankruptcy estate; rather, that stay continued in effect.