11 U.S.C. § 362

Section 362 permits in rem relief from the automatic stay when a debtor repeatedly files bankruptcy cases to stop foreclosure sales and then dismisses them.

Ronald Joseph Smith · filed 2020-01-29(d)(4)

Regardless of whether or not the right is absolute, Debtor’s conduct in this case, and his previous cases, support the imposition of the in rem relief sanction. Debtor commenced this case with the bare minimum necessary for filing. He used the automatic stay to stop the foreclosure sale and six days later, dismissed his case.

Section 362(d)(4)(B) permits in rem relief from the automatic stay when multiple bankruptcy filings affecting real property are part of a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud a secured creditor.

Johnny Ray Moore · filed 2020-03-10(d)(4)(B)

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Debtor’s multiple bankruptcy cases were filed as part of a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud JP Morgan.

Section 362(d)(4)(B) permits in rem relief from the automatic stay when multiple bankruptcy filings affecting real property are part of a scheme to delay a secured creditor.

Elizabeth Penelope Conrad · filed 2020-04-16(d)(4)(B)

As the record demonstrates, the Debtor and Mr. Conrad engaged in a scheme to delay U.S. Bank’s rights in the State Court Foreclosure Action by filing multiple bankruptcy cases to stay the Foreclosure by Sale. Most of the cases, including the Debtor’s 2020 Bankruptcy Case, were filed with no bankruptcy purpose other than to stay the Foreclosure by Sale that would have occurred but for the filing of the petition. For these reasons, and under the specific facts and circumstances surrounding the multiple bankruptcy filings, in rem relief is granted under section 362(d)(4).

Section 362(d)(4)(B) permits in rem stay relief when a petition is part of a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors involving multiple bankruptcy filings affecting real property.

Linda A. Pellechia · filed 2020-06-24(d)(4)(B)

Furthermore, in rem relief is available pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 362(d) when, among other things, “a creditor has demonstrated that the bankruptcy petition was filed as part of a scheme to delay, hinder, and defraud creditors,” In re O’Farrill, 569 B.R. 586, 591 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017), and involves multiple bankruptcy filings affecting real property, In re Muhaimin, 343 B.R. 159, 167 (Bankr.D. Md. 2006).

Section 362(d)(4) permits in rem relief from the automatic stay when the volume and timing of repeat bankruptcy filings support an inference of a scheme to hinder or delay a secured creditor’s foreclosure.

In re: Porzio · filed 2020-09-18(d)(4)

In this case, I conclude that the Bankruptcy Court properly granted JPMorgan’s motion for in rem relief based on the Porzios’ pattern of repeat bankruptcy filings to delay foreclosure proceedings against the Property.

Section 362(d)(4) allows relief from the automatic stay when multiple bankruptcy filings affecting real property are part of a scheme to delay or hinder a secured creditor.

Kajla v. US Bank NA as Trustee for Cred · filed 2020-10-02(d)(4)

We agree with the District Court that “[t]hese repeated actions demonstrate an intent to delay or hinder creditors with valid claims,” and we determine that the Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion in granting U.S. Bank relief from the automatic stay.

Section 362(d)(4)(B) permits in rem relief only if multiple bankruptcy filings affecting the property form a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud a creditor.

David Lynn Reckart and Carolyn Anne Reckart · filed 2021-01-14(d)(4)(B)

By the terms of the statute, the factors in considering whether in rem relief under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4)(B) is appropriate include: (1) whether the debtor was engaged in a “scheme,” (2) to delay, hinder, or defraud a creditor, (3) that involves multiple bankruptcy filings affecting the real property.

Section 362(d)(4)(B) permits in rem stay relief when serial bankruptcy filings affecting real property are timed to delay foreclosure and the debtor fails to prosecute the cases.

Heather Jeanne Lindsay · filed 2021-01-27(d)(4)(B)

The evidence demonstrates that each of the Debtor’s multiple bankruptcy petitions was filed in order to delay the Movant’s enforcement of the Foreclosure Judgment since she filed each petition either on or just prior to a Law Date or in a way that interfered with the Movant’s scheduling a Law Date. The evidence also demonstrates that the Debtor did not prosecute any of the prior petitions. On those facts, there are ample grounds for granting the Movant relief under section 362(d)(4).

Section 362(d)(4)(B) permits in rem relief from the automatic stay when multiple bankruptcy filings affecting real property are part of a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud a secured creditor.

Adam C. Shack · filed 2021-03-08(d)(4)(B)

The Court finds the Debtor engaged in a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud JPMorgan in the exercise of its applicable non-bankruptcy rights. For these reasons, and under the specific facts and circumstances present in this case, in rem relief is granted under section 362(d)(4).

Section 362(d)(4) permits in rem stay relief when the pattern and timing of spouses’ serial bankruptcy filings affecting real property show a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud a creditor.

Gary F. Kurimsky · filed 2021-06-24(d)(4)

The pattern and timing of the bankruptcy filings by the Debtor and his wife enable the Court to infer an intent to delay, hinder, or defraud the Movant from completing the State Court Action and the Summary Process Action. ... For these reasons, and under the specific facts and circumstances surrounding the multiple bankruptcy filings, in rem relief is granted under section 362(d)(4).

Multiple bankruptcy filings that delay foreclosure do not warrant in rem stay relief under § 362(d)(4) without evidence of a scheme to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor.

Kathryn D. Lovato · filed 2021-08-04(d)(4)

Multiple bankruptcy filings alone, even if they have the effect of delaying a creditor’s foreclosure efforts, will not satisfy § 362(d)(4)’s requirement of a scheme to hinder, delay or defraud for in rem stay relief.

Section 362(d)(4) permits in rem stay relief when multiple bankruptcy filings affecting real property, including their timing around foreclosure events, show a scheme to hinder or delay a creditor.

Heather Marie Bliss · filed 2021-08-16(d)(4)

The timing of these filings in relation to significant events in the State Court Foreclosure Action permits an inference that the Debtor is attempting to hinder, delay, or defraud U.S. Bank from completing the foreclosure action. ... Therefore, under the specific facts and circumstances surrounding the multiple bankruptcy filings, U.S. Bank is also granted in rem relief under section 362(d)(4).

Section 362(d)(4) permits in rem stay relief when serial bankruptcy filings affecting real property form a scheme to hinder, delay, or defraud a secured creditor; the timing of filings and the debtor’s failure to pursue the cases can establish that scheme.

Christine Marie Morello · filed 2021-10-08(d)(4)

The timing of these filings, in addition to the dismissal of the second and third bankruptcy cases due to the Debtor’s failure to file required documents, and the Debtor’s non-payment to the Trustee throughout the six (6) months that her second bankruptcy case was pending, demonstrates that the Debtor has engaged in a scheme to hinder, delay, and defraud the Bank by continuously forestalling the foreclosure of the property in the Connecticut Superior Court.

Section 362(d)(4)(B) permits relief from a stay against real property for a secured creditor when the petition was part of a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors involving multiple bankruptcy filings affecting that property.

In Re: Ahmed Husain Zubair · filed 2021-10-26(d)(4)(B)

As relevant to the instant appeal, when the automatic stay is in effect against real property, Section 362(d)(4)(B) permits a court to grant relief from the automatic stay on request of “a creditor whose claim is secured by an interest in such real property, if the court finds that the filing of the petition was part of a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors that involved . . . multiple bankruptcy filings affecting such real property.”

Section 362(d)(4)(B) allows in rem stay relief when a petition is part of a scheme to delay or hinder creditors involving two bankruptcy filings affecting the same property, even if different debtors filed them.

Gloria Cristina Machado · filed 2022-01-27(d)(4)(B)

The statute does not impose a condition that the filings must be by the same debtor. Rather, by the plain meaning of its terms, the statute is only concerned with whether the real property at issue has been involved in multiple filings.

Section 362(d)(4) authorizes relief from the automatic stay when a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud a creditor involves multiple bankruptcy filings affecting the real property.

Haffey v. Deutsche Bank Company Americas · filed 2022-03-30(d)(4)

Because this scheme involved multiple bankruptcy filings, § 362(d)(4) authorized relief from the automatic stay.

Section 362(d)(4)(B) permits a presumption of a scheme to hinder or delay a secured creditor from multiple bankruptcy filings on the eve of foreclosure, subject to the debtor’s challenge.

Michael J Merlo · filed 2022-11-10(d)(4)(B)

The existence of multiple filings on the eve of foreclosure alone, in this Court’s view, is sufficient to establish a presumption of a scheme to hinder or delay the creditor, subject to the debtor’s right to challenge this presumption.

Section 362(d)(4) permits in rem relief from the automatic stay when multiple bankruptcy filings affecting real property are part of a scheme to delay or hinder a secured creditor.

Paul R. Koch · filed 2023-06-06(d)(4)

The Debtor filed this case on the heels of state action to take possession of the Property. The evidence demonstrates that the Debtor is not prosecuting this case and has not successfully prosecuted any of its previous filings. On those facts, there are ample grounds for granting the Movant relief under section 362(d)(4).

Section 362(d)(4) permits in rem stay relief only when the creditor proves a scheme to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors involving an unauthorized property transfer or multiple bankruptcy filings.

Kenneth W Worden and Patricia M Worden · filed 2023-07-11(d)(4)

To obtain stay relief under section 362(d)(4), the creditor must prove that (1) the Debtor engaged in a scheme, (2) the object of the scheme is to delay, hinder or defraud the creditor, and (3) the scheme involved either a transfer of property without Movant’s consent or court approval, or multiple filings affecting the Premises.

Section 362(d)(4)(B) permits relief from the automatic stay when successive bankruptcy filings and failures to prosecute them support a finding of a scheme to delay foreclosure; multiple filings alone are insufficient.

MAZZA · filed 2024-05-10(d)(4)(B)

While “[m]ultiple bankruptcy filings do not alone justify relief under [Section] 362(d)(4)(B),” Gray, 558 F. App’x at 166, the Bankruptcy Court relied on more than that. ... Here, the Bankruptcy Court concluded Mazza’s failure to prosecute several bankruptcy proceedings, filed in quick succession, indicated an intent to delay foreclosure proceedings. (Hr’g Tr. 11:23-12:25.) In short, the Bankruptcy Court’s conclusions were reasonable and factually supported.

Section 362(d)(4)(B) requires evidence that multiple bankruptcy filings affecting real property were part of a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors; the filings alone do not establish a scheme.

Kwame Cinque Nkrumah · filed 2024-11-21(d)(4)(B)

However, the mere existence of seven bankruptcy filings across four individuals, over 12 years, is not clearly indicative of a scheme to hinder or delay Movant without more. Bankruptcy Code § 362(d)(4) requires both that there are multiple bankruptcy filings affecting real property and that the court find there is evidence the bankruptcy filings were part of a “scheme.”

Section 362(d)(4) permits in rem relief from the automatic stay when repeated bankruptcy filings affecting real property, together with a lack of genuine effort to prosecute the cases, show a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors.

Myra Denise Butler · filed 2024-11-21(d)(4)

This lack of any real effort to pursue the cases in good faith, combined with the timing of the filing of each petition, supports a conclusion the Debtor has engaged in a “scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors that involved … multiple bankruptcy filings affecting [the Property]” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. §362(d)(4).

Section 362(d)(4) permits in rem relief from the automatic stay when serial bankruptcy filings timed to stop foreclosure establish a scheme to hinder, delay, or defraud a secured creditor.

Garrett Bernard Tupper, Jr. · filed 2024-12-10(d)(4)

Based on the record placed before the Court, and consideration of Debtor’s prior two bankruptcy filings, it is evident that the timing and sequence of Debtor’s three chapter 13 cases are part of a scheme to hinder, delay or defraud the Mortgagee and prevent the Mortgagee from exercising its rights and remedies with respect to the Property. To deny in rem relief under such facts and circumstances would sanction a continued abuse by Debtor of the bankruptcy process. Accordingly, the Court finds in rem relief under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4) to be warranted.

Section 362(d)(4) permits in rem relief from the automatic stay when multiple bankruptcy filings affecting real property are part of a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud a creditor.

Eloise Marinos · filed 2025-08-06(d)(4)

There is no dispute that there have been multiple bankruptcy filings that have affected the property, so the only question is whether the filing was part of a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud.

Section 362(d)(4)(B) requires a secured creditor seeking stay relief based on multiple bankruptcy filings to prove that the filings were part of a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors.

Hyun Jeong Han · filed 2026-01-23(d)(4)(B)

The Court concludes that WSFS has not met its burden to demonstrate the Debtor’s “scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors that involved . . . multiple bankruptcy filings.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4)(B).

Under § 362(d)(4)(B), strategically timed serial bankruptcy filings may support an inference that a petition was part of a scheme to hinder or delay a creditor, warranting relief from the stay as to real property.

Tanya Allison Gassmann · filed 2026-03-13(d)(4)(B)

The Court may infer an intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors from serial bankruptcy filings, particularly when they appear to be strategically timed to protect the property at issue.

Section 362(d)(4) permits in rem relief from the automatic stay when multiple bankruptcy filings form a scheme to delay or hinder a secured creditor.

Troylond Malon Wise · filed 2026-04-09(d)(4)

The Debtor’s scheme obviously employed multiple bankruptcy filings over a course of ten years which had the effect of stopping the Lender’s collection efforts for nearly eleven years. Accordingly, the Court finds the Lender has established grounds for relief under § 362(d)(4).

Section 362(d)(4)(B) permits in rem stay relief when multiple bankruptcy filings affecting real property are part of a scheme to hinder, delay, and defraud creditors.

Mary Marjorie Atkinson · filed 2019-09-16(d)(4)(B)

The Court has concluded that U.S. Bank has met its burden of proof pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4)(B) for in rem relief.

Section 362(d)(4) permits two years of prospective in rem stay relief when multiple bankruptcy filings affecting real property are part of a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors.

Stacey Joy Grant · filed 2025-03-13(d)(4)

This lack of any real effort to pursue the cases in good faith, combined with the timing of the filing of each petition, supports a conclusion the Debtor has engaged in a “scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors that involved … multiple bankruptcy filings affecting [the Property]” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. §362(d)(4).

Section 362(d)(4) permits two years of in rem stay relief when a bankruptcy petition is part of a scheme to hinder or delay creditors involving multiple filings affecting the property.

Deborah Ann Mitchell · filed 2025-11-05(d)(4)

Based on this record the court concludes the Debtor filed this petition as part of a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors involving either a transfer of ownership of the Property or multiple bankruptcy filings affecting the Property, within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4). Accordingly, the Movant is entitled to in rem relief regarding the Property for a period of two years.

A stay imposed under § 362(c)(4) takes effect when the court enters the order imposing it.

Marcello Philip Gasperini and Andrea Lynn Gasperini · filed 2025-05-29(c)(4)(C)

The automatic stay imposed under § 362(c)(4)(B) shall be effective on the date of the entry of this Order.

A stay imposed under § 362(c)(4) takes effect when the court enters the order allowing it and has no retroactive effect.

Pamela Williams · filed 2025-10-30(c)(4)(C)

Further, the statute is clear that a stay imposed under § 362(c)(4) is not retroactive.

Section 362(a)(6) does not bar campaign statements about a debtor’s financial responsibility when the statements do not seek to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor.

Sabrina Berry · filed 2025-08-08(a)(6)

Looking at the evidence before the Court, Dr. Galloway “toed the line” with the Facebook posts but ultimately did not act in a way to collect, assess, or recover her claim against the Debtor. Therefore, the Court finds that the Facebook posts do not constitute an act in violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(1)’s automatic stay does not prevent a court from dismissing a case on the jurisdictional ground of mootness.

Wynn v. AC Rochester General Motors Corp. · filed 2008-12-17(a)(1)

However, ... because we decide this case on the jurisdictional ground of mootness, we are obliged to dismiss the case, notwithstanding § 362(a)(l)’s stay.

Section 362(a) does not stay the postpetition assignment of an existing mortgage and related note from one creditor to another, because the assignment transfers no estate property and is not an act to collect a debt.

In Re Samuels · filed 2009-07-06(a)

I find no merit in this argument or any of its parts. The postpetition assignment of a mortgage and the related note from one holder to another is not a transfer of property of the estate. The mortgage and note are assets of the creditor mortgagee, not of the Debtor. Nor is the postpetition assignment of a mortgage and the related note an act to collect a debt; the assignment merely transfers the claim from one entity to another. The Debtor cites no particular subsection of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), the automatic stay, that she contends such an assignment violates, and the court is aware of none.

Section 362 does not bar assignment of an already perfected deed of trust after bankruptcy when the assignment does not perfect a lien or act against the debtor or the debtor’s property.

In Re Tucker · filed 2010-09-20

Assignment of the accompanying Deed of Trust did not violate the stay because it did not result in perfection of a lien—the lien was already perfected.

Section 362(a)(4) and (5) do not prohibit a postpetition assignment of a mortgage and related note from one holder to another because that assignment does not create, perfect, or enforce a lien against estate or debtor property.

Ahmadi v. CitiMortgage, Inc. (In Re Ahmadi) · filed 2012-04-06(a)(4), (a)(5)

I agree with the other courts that have spoken on this point. The assignment of a mortgage and the related note from one holder to another is not a transfer of property of the estate. Accordingly, an assignment of a mortgage and note is not an act to create, perfect, or enforce a lien against property of the estate or property of the debtor.

Section 362(a)(3) and (a)(4) do not bar assignment of a preexisting mortgage because the assignment neither perfects a lien nor changes possession.

Embrace Home Loans, Inc. v. Serda · filed 2020-08-18(a)(3), (a)(4)

The assignment of a preexisting mortgage does not entail the creation, perfection, or enforcement of a lien. ... The transfer of such a security interest, in and of itself, does not affect possession; it is the initiation of the process of foreclosure and sale which alters the right of possession.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a debtor from pursuing equitable subordination of a creditor in bankruptcy's secured claim and transfer of its liens to the debtor's estate without first obtaining relief from the creditor's automatic stay.

Lehman Commercial Paper, Inc. v. Palmdale Hills Property, LLC (In Re Palmdale Hills Property, LLC) · filed 2009-12-15(a)(3)

For the forgoing reasons, we REVERSE and void those provisions of the Denial Orders that find Debtors may prosecute an adversary proceeding, or propose a reorganization plan, seeking to equitably subordinate Lehman Commercial's claim and transfer its liens to the estate in the California bankruptcy case without first obtaining relief from the automatic stay in the New York bankruptcy case.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits a debtor from continuing to indemnify its officers and directors after filing for bankruptcy.

In Re Downey Financial Corp. · filed 2010-05-07(a)(3)

Once an organization files for bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy Code prohibits the debtor from indemnifying the officers and directors on an ongoing basis.

Section 362(b)(3) excepts postpetition enforcement of a garagekeeper’s statutory lien from the automatic stay.

In Re Crisp · filed 2010-06-17(b)(3)

Because McDaniels was enforcing its garagekeeper’s lien pursuant to T.C.A. § 66-9-103 and because 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(3) specifically excludes this type of lien enforcement from the automatic stay’s reach, McDaniels’s postpetition enforcement of its lien did not violate the automatic stay in this case.

Section 362's automatic stay does not apply when its application would let a debtor unilaterally terminate or modify a collective bargaining agreement without complying with § 1113.

In Re Pearl Companies, Inc. · filed 2010-09-02(a)(1)-(3), (6)

Section 1113(f) prohibits application of the automatic stay when such application would permit a debtor to achieve a unilateral termination or modification of a collective bargaining agreement without meeting the requirements of § 1113.

Section 362 may bar a landlord with notice of bankruptcy from disposing of a debtor’s property after the petition if the property remained the debtor’s.

Moore v. Lalone (In re Moore) · filed 2015-06-30(a)(6)

There also is no dispute that Mr. Lalone received actual notice of Ms. Moore’s bankruptcy. Despite such notice, Mr. Lalone acknowledged at trial that he disposed of Ms. Moore’s property without leave of the Court. This is important as Mr. Lalone may very well have violated the automatic stay in bankruptcy if, and to the extent, the personal property at issue was property of the Debtor from and after the petition date.

Section 362(a)(3) does not prohibit a creditor from receiving confirmed-plan payments and applying them to a debt merely because its proof of claim overstates the debt.

Bateman v. Southern Development Corp. (In Re Bateman) · filed 2010-09-02(a)(3)

The fact that the debtor objected to SDC’s claim years later is a credit to her persistence; however, it is not a basis for asserting that SDC’s continued receipt of payments under the plan and application of those payments to her debt is somehow an effort to control her property either expressly or within the generally understood meaning of the automatic stay and violations thereof.

Section 362(a)(3) does not treat a bank’s refusal to honor checks on a debtor’s account as exercising control over estate property, even if the bank imposes the debit restraint because of the bankruptcy.

In Re Randolph Towers Cooperative, Inc. · filed 2011-07-19(a)(3)

If a party to a contract with a debtor refuses to perform the contract because the debtor is in bankruptcy, that may be a breach of contract but it is not an exercise of control over property of the estate.

Section 362(a)(3) does not prohibit an act solely because it might diminish the value of property belonging to the bankruptcy estate.

Renier v. Merrell · filed 2011-07-22(a)(3)

Nor is § 362(a)(3) an outright prohibition on activities that might diminish the value of property belonging to the estate.

Section 362(a)(3) stays equitable subordination of a debtor’s secured claim when the proceeding could transfer its lien from that debtor’s estate.

Palmdale Hills Property, LLC v. Lehman Commercial Paper, Inc. · filed 2011-08-03(a)(3)

The bankruptcy court’s ability, in equitably subordinating a secured claim, to transfer prop- erty from the bankruptcy estate, means that a claim for equita- ble subordination of a secured claim is an “act to . . . exercise control over property of the estate” subject to stay.

Section 362(a)(3) stays a foreign declaratory action that attempts to exercise control over an avoidance claim belonging to the bankruptcy estate.

Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, LLC · filed 2011-10-12(a)(3)

Maxam Limited therefore violated the stay by usurping causes of action belonging to the estate under sections 362(a)(3) and 541 of the Code.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a nondebtor from revoking a parent corporation’s S corporation status when the revocation terminates a debtor subsidiary’s QSub status and thereby exercises control over estate property.

Majestic Star Casino, LLC v. Barden Development, Inc. (In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC) · filed 2012-01-24(a)(3)

The Defendants’ revocation of BDI’s “S” corporation status which automatically terminated the Debtors’ QSub status was an exercise of control over the Debtors’ property in violation of § 362.

Section 362(a)(3) does not treat a bank’s refusal to pay a depositor as exercising control over estate property when the bank is declining to perform its contractual promise to pay.

Mwangi v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re Mwangi) · filed 2012-04-06(a)(3)

A bank does not exercise control over property of the estate within the meaning of § 362(a)(3) when it refuses or fails to perform on its contractual obligation to pay the owner of the account.

Section 362(a)(3) does not bar the IRS from holding a Chapter 13 debtor’s tax refund while pursuing a reasonable motion to modify the plan, if it issues the refund promptly once the motion will not succeed.

Harchar v. United States (In Re Harchar) · filed 2012-09-12(a)(3)

Because there was a reasonable basis for the IRS’s motion, and because the IRS issued the refund immediately after it became clear that its motion would not succeed, we hold that the IRS did not exercise control over the refund by refusing to moot its motion by issuing the refund sooner.

Section 362(a)(3) bars postpetition disassociation of a debtor from an LLC when it strips noneconomic participation rights that are property of the estate; the disassociation is void.

Sheehan v. Warner (In re Warner) · filed 2012-09-27(a)(3)

Because non-economic rights are property of the estate and fit under the canopy of § 362(a)(3), the provision in the Defendants’ Resolution that disassociates the Debtor is void.

Section 362(a)(3) stays a lawsuit seeking to control how a Chapter 9 debtor operates its property, including a county hospital.

In re Jefferson County · filed 2012-12-19(a)(3)

Thus, the proposed Alabama court lawsuit by the City Parties is stayed under the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) as an attempt to exercise control over the County’s hospital property.

Section 362(a)(3) stays litigation against nondebtors when the suit seeks to control the debtor’s property.

In re City of Detroit · filed 2013-12-05(a)(3)

It does not matter that neither the City nor its officers were defendants. The suit was clearly an act to exercise control over the City’s property.

Section 362(a)(3) stays a suit that seeks to control a debtor’s property even when neither the debtor nor its officers are defendants.

In re City of Detroit · filed 2013-12-20(a)(3)

It does not matter that neither the City nor its officers were defendants. The suit was clearly an act to exercise control over the City’s property. Accordingly, it was stayed under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) and the state court’s “Order of Declaratory Relief’ was entered in violation of the stay.

Section 362(a)(3) bars acts to obtain or exercise control over estate property, and an agreement to purchase that property sufficiently alleges a stay violation.

Milbank v. Philips Lighting Electronics North America (In re Elcoteq, Inc.) · filed 2014-10-31(a)(3)

Surely executing a promissory agreement to purchase property of the estate sufficiently alleges an act in violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits a bank from freezing deposit accounts containing property of the estate because the freeze exercises control over that property.

In re Weidenbenner · filed 2014-12-12(a)(3)

It is not disputed that the balances in each of the Debtors’ bank accounts at the time of filing became property of the estate. JS ¶ 44. Thus by placing an administrative pledge on the Debtors’ accounts, Wells Fargo necessarily exercised control over property of the estate.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits terminating a debtor’s LLC membership and voting rights after a bankruptcy filing when those rights belong to the estate; such actions are invalid.

Walro v. Lee Group Holding Co. (In re Lee) · filed 2014-12-18(a)(3)

More specifically, the Court holds that Debtor was a member of the Lee Group as of the Petition Date; that as a member, he had voting rights pursuant to the Operating Agreement; that the Family Defendants’ actions to terminate Debtor’s membership and his voting rights violated 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3); and that such actions are invalid and without legal effect.

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay a suit based on speculative harm to the debtor’s contract interests.

Merchants Automotive Grp v. Advantage Opco, LLC · filed 2015-02-19(a)(3)

At this stage, Advantage’s theories about the possible harm to Wheelz’s contract interests are too hypothetical and speculative to support imposition of an automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits a creditor from pressuring Chapter 13 debtors to make a lump-sum payment outside their plan when that pressure would exercise control over estate property.

Trevino v. HSBC Mortgage Services, Inc. (In re Trevino) · filed 2015-06-19(a)(3)

HSBC’s attempts to force payment in a lump sum would have dismembered the estate and endangered the ability of the Trevinos to successfully reorganize. This is precisely the type of activity that § 362(a)(3) is designed to curtail. The complaint plausibly sets forth a scenario where HSBC attempted to exercise control over property of the estate. Accordingly, the Trevinos have stated a claim for violations of § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) stays an action seeking an injunction that would control a Chapter 9 debtor city’s property, including its equipment and fire station.

San Bernardino City Professional Firefighters Local 891 v. City of San Bernardino (In re City of San Bernardino) · filed 2015-05-07(a)(3)

The Union wanted to control City property such as the equipment taken out of service and the closed fire house. The Union’s Motion for Relief sought the exact type of conduct stayed under sections 362(a)(3) and 902(2) — control over the City’s property.

Section 362(a)(3) can reach a creditor’s demand for lump-sum payment from estate property while the claim is being paid through a Chapter 13 plan.

Trevino v. HSBC Mortgage Services, Inc. (In re Trevino) · filed 2015-07-31(a)(3)

HSBC’s attempts to force payment in a lump sum would have dismembered the estate and endangered the ability of the Trevinos to successfully reorganize. This is precisely the type of activity that § 362(a)(3) is designed to curtail. The complaint plausibly sets forth a scenario where HSBC attempted to exercise control over property of the estate. Accordingly, the Trevinos have stated a claim for violations of § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) prevents a state court from directing a Chapter 13 debtor to sell property of the estate, even when the court may decide the validity of the underlying postpetition contract.

In re Engels · filed 2015-09-03(a)(3)

Thus, while the state court appropriately decided the validity of the post-petition APÁ, this Court cannot ignore the state court’s failure to consider the implications of § 362(a)(3) in directing Debtor to sell property of the estate. ... Accordingly, this Court is not bound by the Judgment as it applies to Debtor’s bankruptcy proceedings herein.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a creditor from obtaining estate distributions through a wrongful claim transfer and retaining those payments.

In re Mocella · filed 2016-06-15(a)(3)

1. Finds that Nationstar committed willful violations of the automatic stay in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) when it (i) filed the Claim Transfer; and (ii) retained the Claim Payments.

Section 362(a)(3) bars attempts to obtain assignments of estate-owned intellectual property from a debtor’s principals when those efforts adversely affect the debtor’s property rights.

In re Daya Medicals, Inc. · filed 2016-11-14(a)(3)

Even if all that was requested after the petition date was that the Debtor’s principals execute formal assignments of whatever right they might have in any of such intellectual property, that effort, coupled with continued claims that all such intellectual property was not in fact owned by the Debtor, had a negative impact on the Debtor’s property rights and such attempts constitute violations of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) bars debtors from filing and prosecuting a second bankruptcy case to exercise control over property in their pending Chapter 7 estate.

In re Munroe · filed 2017-06-01(a)(3)

The Debtors’ actions in filing and prosecuting this Chapter 13 case are a violation of the automatic stay that remains in effect, as against the Debtors, as to the property of (he Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate, including the Covington Lane property.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a third party from maintaining even an unlocked gate across an estate easement when the gate restrains access to estate property.

Colonial Penniman, LLC v. Williams (In re Colonial Penniman, LLC) · filed 2017-08-18(a)(3)

Accordingly, even if the Gate remains unlocked, its presence on the Easement nevertheless imposes a barrier to entry and restrains access to the Easement, thereby exerting control over estate property in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) is willfully violated when someone aware of the automatic stay intentionally exercises control over estate property, including by retaining estate funds.

Wright v. Csabi (In re Wright) · filed 2017-12-01(a)(3)

Accordingly, this Court finds that Csabi’s and Rodriguez’s actions were willful violations of the automatic stay because the two lawyers were not only aware of the automatic stay, their actions in exercising control over estate property were intentional.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits efforts to control estate property, including retaining the debtor’s data, even when no estate funds are collected.

Johnson v. Edwards Family P'ship, LP (In re Cmty. Home Fin. Servs., Inc.) · filed 2018-02-27(a)(3)

Although Dr. Edwards may not have succeeded in collecting any estate funds, the Court finds that his concerted efforts to do so, while keeping the Trustee unaware of his communications with Meehan from September of 2014, to February of 2015, his trip to Costa Rica, and his receipt and retention of the original CDs, constitute violations of the automatic stay and an attempt to circumvent the bankruptcy process.

Section 362(a)(3) bars filing a state court suit to pursue claims that belong to the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.

Lowe v. Bowers (In Re Nicole Gas Prod., Ltd.) · filed 2019-02-22(a)(3)

To the contrary, because the Corrupt Practices Act claims were property of the estate, filing the state court complaint was an impermissible “act to obtain possession of the property of the estate . . . or to exercise control over property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) bars acts to exercise control over estate property, including causes of action, even when the debtor is not named as a defendant.

In re Spiech Farms, LLC · filed 2019-07-03(a)(3)

It therefore does not matter whether the Debtor is named as a defendant for purposes of section 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) bars a debtor from pursuing claims that belong to the bankruptcy estate because doing so exercises control over estate property.

Cochran v. Carroll · filed 2019-07-24(a)(3)

Moreover, the plaintiff’s pursuit of the claims would violate 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (as constituting an exercise of control over property of the estate).

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits filing a suit that seeks to exercise control over property of the bankruptcy estate.

Qarni v. Vahora · filed 2019-12-11(a)(3)

The act of filing suit, which includes causes of action that seek to exercise control over property of the estate, is itself a violation of § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) does not make an obligor’s failure to perform a contract with the debtor an act to exercise control over property of the estate.

Norman A Duff · filed 2020-01-09(a)(3)

Nor is such failure to perform a violation of the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. §362(a)(3), regarding acts to exercise ... control over property of the estate.

Section 362(a)(3) stays a debtor’s filing of a second bankruptcy case when the filing attempts to exercise control over property of the estate in a pending case, and a filing that violates the stay is void.

In re: Miguel Benitez v. n · filed 2020-02-04(a)(3)

Based on the facts of this case, we agree with the bankruptcy court that the filing of the Debtor’s Chapter 13 case violated the automatic stay in his Chapter 7 case and was void.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a debtor or anyone else from exercising control over estate property that must be turned over to a chapter 11 trustee.

Bronx Miracle Gospel Tabernacle Word of Faith Mini · filed 2020-03-24(a)(3)

Thus, although the debtor contends that Newell’s mortgage is invalid for the reasons discussed below, that does not affect the debtor’s statutory duty to turn over the Property to the Trustee, and any effort by the debtor or anyone else to exercise control over the Property violates the automatic stay. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits a creditor from retaining a vehicle seized before bankruptcy after the debtor files and demands its return.

Dionna D Rice · filed 2020-04-21(a)(3)

The City’s refusal to release Debtor’s vehicle, once Debtor filed bankruptcy and made a demand for the vehicle, was undoubtedly a violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) bars affirmative acts to exercise control over post-petition estate property, including withholding payments for services the debtor performed after filing.

THDL Liquidating LLC v. Azar, II · filed 2020-07-07(a)(3)

Rather, by withholding Medicare payments for services performed post-petition, the Defendants engaged in affirmative acts to exercise control over post-petition property of the estate in violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) does not prohibit notifying a state court that a bankruptcy stay is in place, even if that assertion is incorrect.

In re: Mark E. Stuart · filed 2020-07-28(a)(3)

The bankruptcy court correctly found that there was no legal basis for concluding that notifying a state court that a bankruptcy stay is in place constitutes an act of control, even if that assertion is incorrect.

Section 362(a)(3) bars litigation against third parties and settlements that control estate property by interfering with a debtor’s contractual and business relationships.

Extraction Oil & Gas, Inc. · filed 2020-12-03(a)(3)

Rather, the Debtors seek to stop Platte River from controlling estate property, i.e., the Debtors’ contractual and business relationships with the Alternative Providers. This is not an extension of the automatic stay. ... Thus, the Court finds that the commencement and prosecution of the Colorado Litigation, including the request for and issuance of the ex parte temporary restraining order, violated the automatic stay. In addition, the entry into the Settlement Agreement in the face of the temporary restraining order and under the threat of continuing, impermissible litigation was, in and of itself, a violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits affirmative acts that disturb the status quo of estate property; mere retention of property after a bankruptcy filing does not violate it.

Chicago v. Fulton · filed 2021-01-14(a)(3)

We hold that mere retention of property does not violate §362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) bars an unauthorized person from pursuing claims owned by a bankruptcy estate because doing so exercises control over estate property.

Smith v. Edwards · filed 2021-02-04(a)(3)

The Court agrees with the Trustee that Bishop Edwards’s actions are an unauthorized attempt “to exercise control over property of the estate” in violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) bars debtors from prosecuting counterclaims that remain property of the bankruptcy estate.

Wattley v. Wortham-Thomas, IV · filed 2021-03-04(a)(3)

Under these circumstances, the Defendants’ continuing prosecution of the counterclaims would violate the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3), which, among other things, stays “any act . . . to...exercise control over property of the [bankruptcy] estate.”

Section 362(a)(3) bars an act that divests the bankruptcy estate of a debtor’s vested remainder interest by exercising control over that interest.

Helena Chemical Company v. Hood · filed 2022-06-01(a)(3)

Here, the act of executing and recording the quitclaim deed was an attempt, at a minimum, to exercise control over bankruptcy estate property but only to the extent that it divested the Debtor’s vested remainder interest and, therefore, the bankruptcy estate of that interest.

Section 362(a)(3) can apply to a creditor’s suit against a nondebtor when the creditor seeks funds that would belong to the debtor’s estate.

Moon Group, Inc. · filed 2022-09-30(a)(3)

However, it is plausible that Kore’s pursuit of the Excess Estate Funds is a violation of the automatic stay because Kore is exercising rights over estate property.

Section 362(a)(3) does not prohibit a competitor’s advertising that influences a debtor’s customers to switch providers without exercising control over estate property.

In Re: Windstream Holdings, Inc. · filed 2022-10-06(a)(3)

In short, Charter’s advertisements cannot reasonably be seen as an act to exercise control over property of Windstream’s estate. Accordingly, this conduct did not violate the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) can cover a mortgage creditor’s unrequested forbearance and false notices as control over Chapter 13 estate property, but § 362(a)(6) does not cover forbearance notices that do not attempt to collect a debt.

Harlow v. Wells Fargo & Co. · filed 2022-12-12(a)(3), (a)(6)

The Court finds that the Plaintiffs allege sufficient facts to support a plausible claim the Defendants acted to exercise control over bankruptcy estate property in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). ... Thus, the Plaintiffs do not establish a claim for a violation of the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6).

Section 362(a)(3) may bar a debtor from filing and pursuing a second bankruptcy case to exempt property still protected by the stay in a pending Chapter 7 case.

Carmela E Wood · filed 2023-03-09(a)(3)

A second reason for dismissing this case, related to the first reason, is that if the Roundup Claim is an asset of the bankruptcy estate in the Debtor’s pending Chapter 7 Case, then the Debtor’s actions in filing this Chapter 13 case, and seeking to exempt the Roundup Claim in this ... case, may be a violation of the automatic stay that still protects this asset in the Chapter 7 Case, under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) bars acts to remove a debtor from a contractual management role when that right is property of the bankruptcy estate.

Healthcare Real Estate Partners, LLC. v. Summit Healthcare REIT, Inc. · filed 2023-05-12(a)(3)

The defendants’ actions, after the entry of the order for relief, to terminate the debtor’s role as manager and dissolve the funds therefore sought to exercise control over property of the estate, and thus violated § 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a creditor from pursuing an estate-owned successor liability claim in its own name because doing so exerts control over estate property.

Pa Co-Man, Inc. · filed 2023-08-11(a)(3)

This conclusion is consistent with 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3), which enjoins actions by creditors and other parties to exert control over property of the bankruptcy estate.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a postpetition amendment to an LLC agreement that strips the debtor of voting and managerial rights held by its bankruptcy estate.

Envision Healthcare Corporation and The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Docket only in Re · filed 2023-12-12(a)(3)

The August 2023 attempt to amend the LLC Agreement without AmSure’s affiliated board members violated the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a Chapter 7 debtor from filing a suit concerning an estate asset that the trustee controls, and a complaint filed in violation of the stay is void.

Villagomez v. Hernanado County Circuit Court · filed 2024-03-08(a)(3)

Nonetheless, it appears to the Court, as it noted in the Order, that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Complaint, primarily because Plaintiff filed the Complaint in violation of the automatic stay provided by § 362(a)(3), such that the filing of the Complaint was void, see In re McConathy, 2022 WL 1612447, at *9 (Bankr. W.D. La. May 20, 2022) (“When someone other than the estate's sole representative files a suit to adjudicate the rights of parties with respect to an asset of the estate, such action violates the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).” (citing In re Tamarack Development Associates, LLC, 611 B.R. 286 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2020) (filing and pursuit of causes of action belonging to the estate by an entity other than the trustee has the potential to adversely affect the estate and constitutes an improper exercise of control over property of the estate in violation of section 362(a)(3)); In re Garak, 569 B.R. 684 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2017) (holding that chapter 7 debtors' continuing prosecution of counterclaims that they asserted against credit union, which were property of the bankruptcy estate, violated section 362(a)(3))”); Borg–Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Hall, 685 F.2d 1306 (11th Cir.1982) (“Actions taken in violation of the automatic stay are void and without effect.”); Est. of Horner v. Bailor, 2019 WL 1299046, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2019) (holding that suit filed in violation of the automatic stay “must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction”), and “[m]oreover, even if there were subject matter jurisdiction, the action is frivolous,” as “[i]t is based on the indisputably meritless legal theory that an individual can fabricate an arbitration award and then enforce it in federal district court.” John v. Cent. Loan Admin. & Reporting, 2021 WL 1845913, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2021).

A public claim of ownership over estate property can plausibly amount to an act to exercise control prohibited by § 362(a)(3).

Mining Project Wind Down Holdings Inc. (f/k/a Compute North Holdings, Inc.) · filed 2024-04-08(a)(3)

It is a reasonable inference that Bootstrap’s claim of ownership over the Debtors’ property was an act to exercise control over property of the estate.

A public claim of ownership over estate property can plausibly be an act to exercise control prohibited by the automatic stay under § 362(a)(3).

Tribolet Advisors LLC v. Corpus Christi Energy Park, LLC · filed 2024-04-08(a)(3)

It is a reasonable inference that Bootstrap’s claim of ownership over the Debtors’ property was an act to exercise control over property of the estate. The stay violation claim has facial plausibility (although not yet much meat or damages).

Section 362(a)(3) does not clearly prohibit a competitor’s advertisements that may influence customers but do not take possession of or exercise control over the debtor’s contracts or goodwill.

In Re: Windstream Holdings, Inc. · filed 2024-06-24(a)(3)

Because we are skeptical that by its actions, Charter “exercised control” over Windstream’s estate property under the Bankruptcy Code, we hold that there is, at least, a “fair ground of doubt” that Charter violated the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) bars recording a lis pendens that clouds title to estate property and interferes with its sale, even if the recording did not comply with state law.

In re: Maria Elizabeth Montero Leon · filed 2025-03-19(a)(3)

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate . . . or to exercise control over property of the estate,” not merely acts which are legally valid. Whether Montero technically complied with state law, he created a cloud on title of the Property which interfered with Debtor’s attempt to sell the Property.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a request for a hearing outside bankruptcy court to determine a debtor’s claimed interest in funds held in trust.

Yokubaitis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co · filed 2025-04-09(a)(3)

As such, Cox’s motion appears to be a “prohibited effort” in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) bars a nontrustee from asserting or seeking leave to assert causes of action belonging to the bankruptcy estate because doing so exercises control over estate property.

Tommy's Fort Worth, LLC · filed 2025-05-22(a)(3)

Section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code precludes Borisch from taking any act to exercise control over property of the Estates.134 Borisch has violated that automatic stay protection by asserting the Estate Malibu Party Claims within the Amended Borisch Malibu Complaint and attempt to assert the Estate M&T Claims by requesting leave of court to file the Proposed Counterclaim.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a chapter 7 debtor from pursuing a prepetition litigation claim belonging to the bankruptcy estate because doing so exercises control over estate property.

Divya Khullar · filed 2025-10-29(a)(3)

When the debtor – after he has filed for bankruptcy – pursues or continues to pursue a claim that existed as of his petition date, he lacks standing to do so and his action violates the automatic stay as an act to exercise control over property of the estate.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a creditor from exercising control over estate property by rejecting postpetition demands to return a repossessed vehicle and taking steps to transfer its title after the petition.

Martinez · filed 2026-03-04(a)(3)

Therefore, it is undisputed that (a) the repossession occurred prior to the petition date, (b) Plaintiff made demands for the Vehicle’s return post-petition, (c) Garcia Auto rejected those demands, and (d) Garcia Auto took steps to transfer title to the Vehicle away from Plaintiff post-petition. Plaintiff established Defendant engaged in acts to exercise control over property of the estate in violation of § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits a creditor from disabling a leased car after the bankruptcy petition when the debtor’s right to use it is property of the estate.

Roy A. Glenn · filed 2026-04-09(a)(3)

First, by activating the Kill Switch on the Car post-petition, Ed’s “exercise[d] control over property of the estate” in violation of 11 U.S.C. §362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) bars continued control over estate property during the automatic stay; the debtor need not obtain a court order for its return.

Ricks v. C. Whitney J. Long Carl Callahan L. Minder United States of America · filed 1996-03-14(a)(3)

Ricks's bankruptcy petition operated as an automatic stay of "any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). ... The IRS now concedes that it did in fact exercise control over the property while the stay was in effect. The IRS further concedes that Ricks was not required to obtain an order for the return of his property. Accordingly, we reverse the grant of summary judgment on this claim.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits exercising control over estate property, and allegations that a debtor retained or transferred that property can state a stay violation.

Geltzer v. Brizinova (In re Brizinova) · filed 2016-07-20(a)(3)

That is, the Trustee alleges that the Defendants have retained or transferred property that is property of the estate, and as such, that they have exercised control over property of the estate, in violation of Section 362(a)(3). For these reasons, and based on the entire record, the Court concludes that the Trustee adequately alleges the third element of a claim under Section 362 for a stay violation, that the conduct in question violates the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) bars an adversary proceeding that seeks to control estate claims held by a litigation trust when a confirmation order preserves the automatic stay; filing in bankruptcy court does not itself create an exception.

Kreit v. Quinn · filed 2022-02-11(a)(3)

The doctors haven’t cited a comparable textual exception for their adversary proceeding, which—unlike a proof of claim—undermined the “orderly liquidation [and] administration of the estate.” Cowin, 864 F.3d at 352 (quoting Prewitt v. N. Coast Vill., Ltd. (In re N. Coast Vill., Ltd.), 135 B.R. 641, 643 (9th Cir. BAP 1992)). Campbell thus doesn’t show that the bankruptcy court erred in concluding that the doctors violated its confirmation order.

Section 362(a)(3) does not prohibit a telephone company from preserving the status quo by refusing to transfer a debtor’s telephone number pending a court order when it receives conflicting instructions.

Connecticut Pizza, Inc. v. Bell Atlantic-Washington, D.C., Inc. (In Re Connecticut Pizza, Inc.) · filed 1996-02-28(a)(3)

Bell Atlantic acted in good faith and attempted to maintain the status quo in the face of conflicting instructions concerning the transfer of the telephone number. Bell Atlantic’s refusal to transfer the telephone number in the absence of a court order approving the transfer was reasonable under the circumstances. Moreover, Bell Atlantic demonstrated a willingness to transfer the number upon authorization by the court that the proposed transfer was lawful. Under these circumstances, the court cannot find that Bell Atlantic’s refusal to transfer the telephone number constituted a violation of the automatic stay warranting sanctions under section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a creditor from removing or retaining estate property after a bankruptcy petition is filed.

A & J Auto Sales, Inc. v. United States (In Re a & J Auto Sales, Inc.) · filed 1997-04-15(a)(3)

Section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a bankruptcy petition “operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of ... any action to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate.” The IRS’s actions in removing the cars from the Debtor’s premises and retaining them postpetition were actions “to obtain possession of property of the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate.”

Section 362(a)(3) stays regulations that exercise immediate control over estate property; the regulatory exception in subsection (b)(4) does not apply to that stay.

Cooper v. Interstate Commerce Commission (In Re Bulldog Trucking, Inc.) · filed 1992-10-22(a)(3)

The Commission also relies on the exception to the automatic stay set forth at 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4). This exception, however, only applies to the stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1); it does not apply to the stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). The MC-208 Regulations are subject to the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) because they purport to exercise immediate and complete control over the property of the estate. The Court, therefore, finds that the exception for regulatory acts does not apply to the regulations at issue.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits seeking a state court order that substantively alters an interest in estate property, even if the request is presented as a clerical correction.

Nickless v. Kessler (In Re Berman) · filed 2006-09-28(a)(3)

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Attorney Dougherty, ... and Kessler willfully violated Section 362(a)(3) and will schedule an evidentiary hearing with regard to the appropriate sanctions.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits seeking dismissal of a claim belonging to the bankruptcy estate without notice to the trustee when the dismissal would extinguish the estate’s claim.

In re Muhlig · filed 2013-06-26(a)(3)

A defendant’s efforts in seeking dismissal of estate actions brought by debtors lacking standing violate the automatic stay when done without notice to the bankruptcy trustee.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a shareholder from pursuing claims owned by a debtor’s estate without court permission because doing so exercises control over estate property.

In re: Nicole Gas Prod. · filed 2018-03-13(a)(3)

According to 11 U.S.C. §362(a)(3), a party violates the automatic stay by obtaining possession of or exercising control over property of a bankruptcy estate. ... Thus, Fulson’s efforts to recover for the damages Debtor suffered constituted an act to exercise control over estate property.

Section 362(n)(1)(B) makes the automatic stay inapplicable to a new small business case when the debtor’s earlier small business case was dismissed within the preceding two years.

Palmer v. Bank of the West · filed 2010-10-15(n)(1)(B)

Therefore, § 362(n)(l)(B) applies to Palmer’s second bankruptcy petition, rendering the automatic stay inapplicable.

Section 362(n) does not prevent the automatic stay from arising in a single asset real estate case because a single asset real estate debtor is excluded from the definition of small business debtor.

In re PM Cross, LLC · filed 2013-06-21(n)

Accordingly, since the Debtor is not a small business Debtor and this case is not a small business case, the automatic stay of section 362(a) arose from the instant the bankruptcy petition was filed.

Section 362(a)(1) does not bar enforcement of an equitable environmental cleanup obligation that is not a bankruptcy claim.

Mark IV Industries, Inc. v. New Mexico Environment Department · filed 2010-10-21(a)(1)

In conclusion, Mark IV’s equitable obligation to cleanup the Site is not a “claim.” Hence, it was not discharged, and § 362(a)(1) does not apply.

Section 362(b)(2)(A)(v) excepts civil actions regarding domestic violence from the automatic stay even when they seek damages for past abuse rather than relief from imminent harm.

George E. Robb, jr · filed 2025-04-25(b)(2)(A)(v)

There is no language in the text that limits the phrase “civil action or proceeding . . . regarding domestic violence” to cases involving imminent harm or to cases only seeking injunctive relief.

Section 362(b)(2)(A)(v) does not except a purported domestic-violence action from the automatic stay when it rests on frivolous accusations and false assertions rather than domestic violence or abuse.

Riley N Craig · filed 2023-10-23(b)(2)(A)(v)

But actions purported to be brought under the Act based not on domestic violence or abuse but rather on frivolous accusations and false assertions are not excepted from the protections of the stay.

Section 362(b)(2)(A)(v) exempts a domestic violence injunction from the automatic stay when the injunction functions as a domestic abuse restraining order.

Ballstaedt v. Curtis (In re Ballstaedt) · filed 2013-10-21(b)(2)(A)(v)

Given all of the factors involved in this case, the Court finds the Iowa District Court order here was a domestic violence injunction which is specifically exempted from the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(A)(v).

Section 362(b)(2)(A)(v) excepts civil proceedings regarding domestic violence, including petitions for protection under the Minnesota Domestic Abuse Act, from the automatic stay.

Marino v. Seeley · filed 2010-10-25(b)(2)(A)(v)

In seeking an order for protection under the Minnesota Domestic Abuse Act, Seeley was therefore commencing a civil action regarding domestic violence. That civil action was not stayed by the filing of Marino's chapter 7 petition. Thus, Seeley did not violate the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(17) does not exempt a proposed swap-related setoff from the automatic stay when the debts to be offset do not arise under the swap agreement.

In Re Lehman Bros. Inc. · filed 2011-10-04(b)(17)

Because it is undisputed that the debts allegedly owed by LBI to UBS and UBS Securities do not arise under the Agreement, section 362(b)(17) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides a limited exception to the automatic stay for the exercise of setoffs of termination values, payment amounts or other transfer obligations arising under or in connection with one or more swap agreements does not apply and does not excuse the failure of UBS to seek relief from the Stays.

Section 362(b)(17) does not exempt the taking of collateral pledged for overdraft risk to offset unrelated swap exposure from the automatic stay.

Bank of America, N.A. v. Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc. (In Re Lehman Bros. Holding Inc.) · filed 2010-11-16(b)(17)

The undisputed facts make clear that this particular exception to the automatic stay, even when interpreted in the broad manner urged by BOA, does not authorize a taking of a specially-designated fund of collateral to offset unrelated swap exposure.

Section 362(b)(17) does not exempt a post-termination assignee of a right to collect swap termination damages from the automatic stay merely because the assignor was a swap participant.

A62 Equities LLC v. Chohan (In re Chohan) · filed 2015-05-28(b)(17)

As discussed below, the Court finds as a matter of law that even if the Bank had a right to institute a foreclosure sale on the subject properties irrespective of the automatic stay, it could not assign to A62 its right to be considered a “swap participant”... for purposes of §§ 560 or 362(b)(17).

Section 362(a) stays further action in a state receivership proceeding and against a municipal debtor’s property by the indenture trustee and receiver after the chapter 9 filing.

In re Jefferson County · filed 2012-01-19(a)

With one exception, the automatic stays of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) and 11 U.S.C. § 922(a) prevent the Indenture Trustee and the Receiver from taking further actions in the Alabama receivership case and with respect to the County’s sewer system properties.

Section 362(a)(1) stays damages claims flowing from rejection of an executory contract because the resulting breach is treated as occurring before the bankruptcy petition.

Grocery Haulers, Inc. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. (In re Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.) · filed 2012-01-30(a)(1)

Because, as stated above, a rejected executory contract is deemed breached immediately before the filing of the bankruptcy petition, it follows that, because of Section 362, damages claims that flow from the rejection of an executo-ry contract are stayed by the automatic stay.

Section 362(c)(1) keeps the stay of acts against estate property in effect until that property leaves the estate, even after the debtor receives a discharge.

In re Killmer · filed 2013-11-15(c)(1)

Thus, the controlling section of the Bankruptcy Code is not § 362(c)(2); rather, § 362(c)(1) controls and explains that “the stay of an act against property of the estate ... continues until such property is no longer property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1).

Section 362(c)(1) ends the stay of acts against estate property when that property leaves the bankruptcy estate.

Michael Field, Jr. v. Berman · filed 2013-06-03(c)(1)

The actions taken by Appellees in settling (or purporting to settle) derivative claims on behalf of AutoMall Online, Inc. against Allen Outlaw took place prior to AutoMall Online, Inc. filing for bankruptcy and any actions taken after that time relating to settling with Allen Outlaw took place after Field had purchased the derivative claims in bankruptcy from the bankruptcy estate, thus making such claims no longer subject to the automatic stay.

Section 362(c) ends the stay protecting a Chapter 7 debtor’s possessory interest upon discharge when the occupied home was never estate property.

Evans v. Bank of New York Trust Co. (In Re Evans) · filed 2012-02-24(c)(1), (c)(2)(C)

Consequently, the stay protected only any possessory interest Ms. Evans held by virtue of her occupancy. And when her discharge was granted, the stay protecting that interest terminated, thus mooting any appeal of that issue.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) limits the automatic stay to 30 days when a debtor files a new bankruptcy petition within one year after dismissal of a previous bankruptcy case.

In re the Foreclosure of Tax Liens · filed 2012-04-05(c)(3)(A)

Although the commencement of such a proceeding typically results in a stay of other proceedings against a tax debtor (see RPTL 1140 [1]; 11 USC § 362 [a]), where a debtor files a new bankruptcy petition within one year of the dismissal of a previous bankruptcy case, the automatic stay is limited to 30 days (see 11 USC § 362 [c] [3] [A]).

Section 362(c) keeps a bankruptcy stay in effect until the bankruptcy case is closed or dismissed, among other possible endpoints.

Linowiecki v. Nichols · filed 2013-02-01(c)

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(c), a bankruptcy stay remains in effect until the case in bankruptcy is closed or dismissed, among other things.

In an individual Chapter 7 case, the automatic stay ends when discharge is granted or denied, so it does not bar a later mortgage foreclosure.

In re Wilson · filed 2013-06-25(c)(2)(C)

Therefore, after Wilson received her discharge on September 24, 2011, the automatic stay no longer barred foreclosure of a lien on her property.

Section 362(c)(2)(C) ends the automatic stay for an individual Chapter 7 debtor when a discharge is granted, making a later motion for relief from the stay moot.

In re Philpott · filed 2014-03-11(c)(2)(C)

Since the automatic stay is no longer in effect upon the entering of a discharge, bankruptcy courts routinely deny post-discharge motions to terminate the stay as moot.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not apply to an action involving no property owned by the debtor and ends when the property is no longer part of the bankruptcy estate.

527 S. Clinton, LLC v. Westloop Equities, LLC · filed 2014-05-01(a), (c)

First, the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code did not apply to the termination of the easement provision for two reasons: (1) the plaintiff’s action did not involve any property owned by the debtor (see 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (no section applies to easement rights)); and (2) the bankruptcy of the defendant’s predecessor-in-interest had ended by the time the defendant purchased the property and, therefore, the property was no longer part of any bankruptcy estate (see 11 U.S.C. § 362(c) (2006)).

Section 362(c)(2) ends the stay of actions against a Chapter 7 debtor or the debtor’s property when discharge is granted, if the case has not already been closed or dismissed.

Flanders v. Lawrence (In re Flanders) · filed 2014-09-16(c)(2)

The automatic stay of any action other than an action against property of the estate terminates upon the earliest of (a) the time the case is closed; (b) the time the case is dismissed; or (c) in a individual Chapter 7 case, the time a discharge is granted or denied. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2). Here, Debtor’s Chapter 7 discharge was granted on September 4, 2002, more than four years prior to the entry of the Bankruptcy Surplus Order. The entry of the Bankruptcy Surplus Order did not violate the stay of any acts against the Debtor or his property.

A Chapter 7 discharge renders moot whether § 362’s automatic stay prevents a court from acting on a pending motion.

VIEIRA v. GE MONEY BANK Et Al. · filed 2014-09-25

The Court had then recently received notice of the plaintiff’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing and a question arose as to whether the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362 precluded action on the dismissal motion at that time. ... However, though plaintiff’s counsel was subsequently granted a 30-day extension of this filing period, he failed to comply with the Court’s directive, and he also neglected to inform this Court that on June 17, 2014, his client received a discharge in bankruptcy pursuant to Title 11, Section 727, of the Bankruptcy Code, thus rendering the automatic stay issue moot.

Section 362(a)’s automatic stay applies during a bankruptcy case and does not govern conduct after discharge.

Garfield v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC · filed 2015-01-23(a)

Therefore, a closer examination of Plaintiff's complaint reveals that the automatic stay provision is not in play in this case, as the alleged violations by Defendant occurred after Plaintiff's debt was discharged, and not during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding.

Section 362(c)(2) ends the automatic stay when the bankruptcy case is closed, so a later action does not violate that stay.

Washington v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC (In re Washington) · filed 2015-02-24(c)(2)

The closing of the First Case caused the automatic stay to expire as a matter of law. See § 362(c)(2).

Section 362(c)(2)(A) ends the automatic stay when entry of the final Chapter 11 decree closes the bankruptcy case.

Schmeglar v. PHM Financial, Inc. (In re Schmeglar) · filed 2015-05-26(c)(2)(A)

The automatic bankruptcy stay has expired by operation of law as a result of the entry of the final Chapter 11 decree.

Section 362(b)(3)’s exception for continuing liens does not apply after a debtor’s discharge terminates the automatic stay.

Botson v. Citizens Banking Co. (In re Botson) · filed 2015-06-01(b)(3)

CBC’s citation to § 362(b)(3) as authority allowing renewal of its lien is not persuasive. Upon the granting of the Debtors' discharge on August 2, 2012, the automatic stay terminated, and it was immediately replaced by the injunction against the collection of discharged debts. ... However, because the automatic stay was previously terminated by- operation of law, § 362(b)(3) is not controlling on these issues.

Section 362(c)(2) ends the stay as to the debtor when the bankruptcy case is closed or dismissed, or when discharge is entered.

In re Rich · filed 2016-01-15(c)(2)

As to the debtor, the stay evaporates when the case is closed, the case is dismissed, or the discharge is entered, §§ 362(c)(2), 727(a).

Section 362’s automatic stay pauses state court proceedings without removing the state court’s jurisdiction, and it expires when the debtor receives a discharge.

Donald and Rita Hymes v. L. DeRamus and M. Pomeroy · filed 2016-02-03(c)(2)

But the automatic stay “does not deprive the state court of jurisdiction over the matter.”29 And the automatic stay expires when the debtor is discharged,30 which in the Hymeses’ 2012 bankruptcy case occurred on February 22, 2013.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not apply after the debtor’s discharge supersedes the stay.

In re Slater · filed 2017-06-20

The automatic stay provisions of § 362 do not apply because the Debtors’ discharge supersedes any automatic stay.

Section 362(c)(2) ends the automatic stay when the bankruptcy case is closed, dismissed, or discharged, whichever happens first.

D’antignac v. Deere & Company · filed 2017-08-16(c)(2)

An automatic stay only continues until the bankruptcy case is closed, the case is dismissed, or the case is discharged, whichever occurs first.

Section 362(c)(2) ends the automatic stay when a Chapter 11 plan is confirmed, allowing an abated appeal to resume.

Donelson v. United States · filed 2018-04-05(c)(2)

Because Linn’s plan is now confirmed, the automatic bankruptcy stay is no longer in effect, and we lift the abatement. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2).

Section 362(c) ends the stay as to estate property when that property leaves the estate and ends the stay as to other acts upon case closure, dismissal, or an individual debtor’s discharge being granted or denied, whichever occurs first.

Lundes Garrett v. · filed 2018-08-29(c)

With respect to acts against estate property, the automatic stay “continues until such property is no longer property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1). For all other acts, the automatic stay persists until the earliest of: the case being closed; the case being dismissed; or a discharge being granted or denied (to an individual debtor). See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2). ... Thus, with respect to the Saylorsburg property, the automatic stay, even in the absence of the stay order giving Chase permission to proceed with foreclosure, would have been lifted long before the Garretts even filed their motion to vacate in March 2017.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not bar a foreclosure sale that occurs after the bankruptcy case has closed.

U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC · filed 2019-03-27

Nguyen's bankruptcy records supplied by the bank reflect that the final decree in his bankruptcy case was entered, and that case was closed, on September 13, 2012-four months before the January 25, 2013, foreclosure sale. ... So the record does not support the bank's contention that the foreclosure sale violated a bankruptcy stay.

Section 362(c) continues the automatic stay against bankruptcy estate property until the property is no longer part of the estate.

The Bank of New York Mellon Fka the Bank of New York, as Trustee v. Oldemeyer · filed 2019-10-09(c)

While the trial court stated, without authority, that such stay “lasts for the duration of the bankruptcy proceeding absent modification by the bankruptcy court[,]” the statute actually provides that the duration of a “stay of an act against property [24] of the [bankruptcy] estate . . . continues until such property is no longer property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(c).

Section 362(c) keeps civil litigation against a bankruptcy debtor stayed until the bankruptcy proceedings end or the stay is lifted.

Michigan Electrical Employees' Pension Fund v. Markee Electric, Inc. · filed 2019-11-07(c)

In accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 362, this civil action is automatically stayed as to the alleged debtor, Markee, until the Bankruptcy proceedings in question are terminated or the stay is lifted. 11 U.S.C. §362(c).

The automatic stay prevents enforcement of a debt from the petition date until discharge and closing of the case.

Gerard v. United States Department of Education · filed 2020-01-17(a), (c)

The automatic stay prevented enforcement of the debt from the petition date until entry of the discharge and closing of the case on January 21, 2019.

The automatic stay ends when a discharge is entered, so later collection actions do not violate the stay.

Linda Trenett McCoy · filed 2020-02-03(c)(2)

As the MDOR points out, however, the automatic stay under § 362(a) in the Current Case terminated on August 8, 2018 when the Court entered the discharge order. (Current Case Dkt. 19; Current Adv. Dkt. 39 at 5). For that reason, MDOR’s actions in May and June of 2019 after entry of the discharge could not have violated the automatic stay and the Court’s analysis need not proceed any further.

Section 362 stays continuation of a prepetition action against a Chapter 7 debtor from the filing of the petition until the stay terminates upon entry of the discharge.

Alarid, Jr. v. Pacheco · filed 2020-02-13(c)(2)

The automatic stay applied to the State Court Foreclosure Action upon the commencement of Mr. Pacheco’s chapter 7 case on March 29, 2019 and remained in effect until the automatic stay terminated upon the entry of the discharge on August 14, 2019.