11 U.S.C. § 362

Section 362(b)(4) permits the EEOC to pursue discrimination suits seeking injunctive relief and back pay against a bankrupt employer until its monetary claims are reduced to judgment.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. McLean Trucking Company · filed 1987-12-02(b)(4)

We have no doubt that when EEOC sues to enjoin violations of Title VII or ADEA and seeks reinstatement of the victims of alleged discrimination and adoption of an affirmative action plan in a Title VII case, and couples these prayers for relief with a claim for back pay, EEOC is suing in exercise of its police or regulatory power and is not subject to the automatic stay until its monetary claims are reduced to judgment.

Section 362(b)(4) exempts a government action to recover CERCLA response costs from the automatic stay as an exercise of police or regulatory power.

United States v. Nicolet, Inc. · filed 1988-01-12(b)(4)

By filing its cost recovery action, the United States is, within the meaning of Section 362(b)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, enforcing its police or regulatory power.

Section 362(b)(4) does not exempt a state agency’s pursuit of employees’ wage claims against an insolvent employer from the automatic stay.

Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relations v. Ludwig (In Re Napco Graphic Arts, Inc.) · filed 1988-03-09(b)(4)

In the wage claim matter, DILHR is not pursuing the debtor because of a violation of law, but because an employer has become insolvent. This is not a violation of state law. ... The bankruptcy court did not err in its analysis of the automatic stay issue.

Section 362(b)(4) does not exempt a state agency’s collection of a prepetition unemployment-benefit overpayment from the automatic stay merely because the debt arose from a material misrepresentation.

Ross v. Division of Employment Security (In Re Ross) · filed 1988-03-15(b)(4)

While the receipt of an overpayment of unemployment compensation benefits received as a result of a misrepresentation of a material fact is a serious matter, the collection of the debt arising therefrom does not rise to the level of an exercise of the State’s police or regulatory power.

Section 362 permits the government to continue and enforce an injunction against a bankrupt debtor when the suit exercises its police or regulatory power to prevent violations of federal labor law.

William E. Brock, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor v. Rusco Industries, Inc. · filed 1988-04-11(b)(4), (b)(5)

Therefore, section 362 does not bar either the continuation or enforcement of an injunctive action under section 17 of the FLSA.

Section 362(b)(4) permits a state regulatory board to continue proceedings to fix civil liability for environmental law violations despite the automatic stay.

In Re Commerce Oil Company · filed 1988-05-23(b)(4)

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the Tennessee Water Quality Control Board's proceedings to fix civil liability under the Tennessee Water Quality Control Act of 1977 are within the Sec. 362(b)(4) exception to the automatic stay in bankruptcy.

Section 362(b)(4) permits a state agency to assess civil liability for environmental violations in an exercise of its police or regulatory power.

Word v. Commerce Oil Co. · filed 1988-05-23(b)(4)

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the Tennessee Water Quality Control Board’s proceedings to fix civil liability under the Tennessee Water Quality Control Act of 1977 are within the § 362(b)(4) exception to the automatic stay in bankruptcy.

Section 362(b)(4) exempts a government agency’s restoration of pension plans to protect public health and welfare from the automatic stay.

Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV Corp. (In Re Chateaugay Corp.) · filed 1988-06-22(b)(4)

Even if restoration could be deemed to constitute a violation of the automatic stay, the PBGC’s decision to restore the Plans falls within the exemption from the automatic stay found in section 362(b)(4) of the Code for police or regulatory actions taken to protect the public health and welfare.

Section 362(b)(4) allows a state regulator to cite a debtor and assess civil penalties for misconduct, but the automatic stay bars an order requiring payment to a private complainant.

Poule v. Registrar of Contractors of California (In Re Poule) · filed 1988-07-05(b)(4)

We conclude (1) that the Registrar’s issuance of the citation and assessment of civil penalties did not violate the automatic stay; (2) that the Registrar’s assessment of the order of corrections in favor of Mr. Paolercio did violate the automatic stay; and (3) that the Registrar’s revocation of the Debtor’s contractor’s license did not violate the permanent injunction of section 524(a) because the penalties were excepted from discharge by section 523(a)(7).

Section 362(b)(4) allows a state to commence environmental enforcement proceedings under its police and regulatory powers without violating the automatic stay.

Utah Division of Oil & Mining v. Kaiser Steel Corp. (In Re Kaiser Steel Corp.) · filed 1988-07-12(b)(4)

It is clear, however, that Utah’s enforcement of its environmental laws constitutes the exercise by the state of its regulatory or police powers. ... In its application filed in this Court, Utah seeks precisely what the Bankruptcy Code in 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) says it may seek without violating the stay mandated by Section 362(a)(1).

Section 362(b)(4) exempts a state suit enforcing consumer protection and usury laws through its police or regulatory power from the automatic stay.

In re Asset Control Co. of North Carolina · filed 1988-08-10(b)(4)

Accordingly, the state’s suit to enforce, against the debtor, its police or regulatory power, is, pursuant to § 362(b)(4), exempt from the provisions of the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(4) does not except agency proceedings pursuing a pecuniary interest from the automatic stay; such proceedings remain stayed under § 362(a)(1).

Apex Oil Co. v. United States Department of Energy (In Re Apex Oil Co.) · filed 1988-09-16(b)(4)

Due to the pecuniary rather than protective nature of the regulations underlying these procedures, this Court finds the DOE administrative actions to be outside the scope of the § 362(b)(4) exception and therefore subject to the automatic stay of § 362(a)(1).

Section 362(b)(4) permits a governmental unit to assess civil penalties for violations of regulatory laws while the automatic stay is in effect.

United States v. Armory Hotel Associates · filed 1988-11-17(b)(4)

INS’s attempt to fix damages for violations of the law therefore falls within the exception to the automatic stay set forth in subsection 362(b)(4).

Section 362(b)(4) permits a state to commence an administrative proceeding under its police power unless the proceeding serves the state’s pecuniary interest rather than public health and safety.

Adkins v. Oregon Department of Workers Compensation (In re Adkins) · filed 1988-11-23(b)(4)

The issuance after chapter 11 of a proposed final order by the State declaring the debtors to be a non-complying employer was the commencement of a State administrative proceeding which is authorized under the police power provision of 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4), except to the extent that the order served a pecuniary purpose of the State rather than public health and safety.

Section 362(b)(4) permits a government regulator to assess civil monetary penalties for regulatory violations, while collection of those penalties remains stayed.

Hunt v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (In Re Hunt) · filed 1988-12-08(b)(4)

For these reasons, we hold that the CFTC Action is exempt from the automatic stay to the extent the CFTC seeks to assess civil monetary damages, yet actions to collect would be stayed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5).

Section 362(b)(4) does not except a private rent claim from the automatic stay merely because a government agency adjudicates it.

Goldsten Real Estate v. Rent Administrator Rental Accommodations (In Re 1736 18th Street, N.W., Ltd. Partnership) · filed 1989-02-17(b)(4)

The rent case is not, within the meaning of § 362(b)(4), ah “action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce” the rental laws but, rather, is a proceeding brought by private individuals before a governmental unit to enforce private rights arising under the rental laws. Therefore, the tenants’ rent case against the Debtor does not come within the exception of 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) to the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).

Section 362(b)(4) exempts PBGC’s restoration of terminated pension plans from the automatic stay as an exercise of its regulatory authority.

Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV Corp. · filed 1989-05-12(b)(4)

However, we need not decide this question for we agree with the district court’s alternative theory that restoration is exempt from the automatic stay. This holding is consistent with Congress’ purpose in enacting ERISA — protecting the public welfare and the “continued well-being and security of millions of employees” who participate in pension plans.

Section 362(b)(4) exempts PBGC’s restoration of terminated pension plans from the automatic stay as an exercise of regulatory authority in furtherance of public welfare.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit · filed 1989-05-12(b)(4)

The district court concluded that restoration did not implicate the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, but that if it did, restoration would be exempt from the automatic stay under section 362(b)(4) of the Code, 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362(b)(4), as an act to enforce PBGC's regulatory authority in furtherance of the public health and welfare. We are less convinced than the district court that the automatic stay provisions are not implicated. However, we need not decide this question for we agree with the district court's alternative theory that restoration is exempt from the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(4) permits a state to revoke drivers’ licenses under its financial responsibility law as an exercise of regulatory power, absent proof of a contrary purpose or effect.

Norton v. Tennessee Department of Safety (In Re Norton) · filed 1987-08-10(b)(4)

Debtors’ claim that revocation of their drivers’ licenses after the filing of these bankruptcy cases violated the automatic stay is refuted by 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (1980 ed. & Supp. Ill 1986). ... Revocation of drivers’ licenses by the Department under TFRA, absent proof of contrary purpose or effect, is enforcement of the State’s regulatory power within the quoted exception to the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(4) excepts a state proceeding to revoke a professional license from the automatic stay when the proceeding protects the public rather than a pecuniary interest or private rights.

Westlund v. Department of Licensing · filed 1989-07-31(b)(4)

Thus, applying either the pecuniary purpose or public policy test, we conclude that the proceeding to revoke Westlund's real estate broker's license is excepted from the automatic stay provision pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).

Section 362(b)(4) does not exempt a government False Claims Act damages suit from the automatic stay when the suit seeks recovery for completed fraud and addresses no continuing threat to public health or safety.

United States v. Seitles · filed 1989-09-11(b)(4)

This civil action thus does not serve to stop any continuing misconduct by the debtor. Because the harm caused by Sei-tles and Westbrook is neither continuing nor health-related, the government may not obtain an exception to the automatic stay in this case under the pecuniary interest test.

Section 362(b)(4) allows an SEC action to enforce its police and regulatory powers to continue despite the automatic stay.

SEC v. Long · filed 1989-10-06(b)(4)

This automatic stay, however, does not operate to stay the continuation of an action by a governmental agency to enforce its police or regulatory powers. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4). The court finds that the present action is one brought by the SEC to enforce its police and regulatory powers. Thus, this litigation is not subject to the automatic stay under section 362(a).

Section 362(b)(4) exempts a Secretary of Labor ERISA enforcement action from the automatic stay because it exercises governmental police or regulatory power.

Dole v. Hansbrough · filed 1990-01-23(b)(4)

The Court concludes that the Secretary in this case is exercising her “police or regulatory power,” thereby exempting this case from the automatic stay imposed by § 362(a).

Section 362(b)(4) does not exempt a state agency’s postpetition forfeiture of a debtor’s certificate of need from the automatic stay when the agency is not enforcing a regulation with an overriding protective purpose.

St. Louis South Park II, Inc. v. Missouri Health Facilities Review Committee (In Re St. Louis South Park II, Inc.) · filed 1990-02-23(b)(4)

The MHFRC was not engaged in enforcing a regulation with an overriding protective purpose. Therefore, the exemption from automatic stay under § 362(b)(4) for governmental unit’s enforcing police or regulatory power in inapplicable, the action by the state was a postpetition and prohibited act that must be declared void.

Section 362(b)(4) does not exempt a state civil forfeiture action from the automatic stay when the action serves no identified public health, safety, or policy purpose; a postpetition default judgment in that action is void.

James v. Draper (In Re James) · filed 1990-05-01(b)(4)

We thus conclude that the Forfeiture Action is not excepted from the automatic stay by force of § 362(b)(4). Therefore, the Default Judgment obtained in that Action is null and void because it was obtained in violation of the automatic stay, and future proceedings in the Forfeiture Action must be stayed.

Section 362(b)(4) exempts governmental action from the automatic stay only when its primary purpose is to protect the public interest.

Rent-A-Tainment, Inc./Mail N' Things v. United States Ex Rel. United States Postal Service · filed 1990-05-23(b)(4)

Under both the pecuniary purpose test and the public policy test, the bankruptcy court had to find that the Postal Service was acting primarily to protect the public interest in order to exempt it from the automatic stay pursuant to Section 362(b)(4).

Section 362(b)(4) does not except eminent domain actions to acquire debtor property from the automatic stay because eminent domain is distinct from police or regulatory power.

Redevelopment Agency of Long Beach v. Altamirco (In Re Altamirco) · filed 1990-05-25(b)(4)

Therefore, I conclude that eminent domain power is different from police or regulatory power, and actions to acquire property by eminent domain are not excepted from the automatic stay under § 362(b)(4).

Section 362(b)(4) excepts attorney disciplinary proceedings by a state bar acting as a governmental unit to enforce its regulatory power from the automatic stay.

Wade v. State Bar of Arizona (In Re Wade) · filed 1990-06-18(b)(4)

Continuation of the proceeding, therefore, falls within the scope of the “police or regulatory power” exception of section 362(b)(4).

Section 362(b)(4) does not exempt a state agency’s suspension of a debtor’s driving privileges for failure to file an accident report when the agency’s demand for the report no longer serves a public-safety purpose.

Kuck v. Alabama Department of Public Safety (In Re Kuck) · filed 1990-06-29(b)(4)

Thus, although the ADPS was enforcing the AMVSRA in effectuating the respective suspensions, the facts of this case reveal the ADPS’ actions were not primarily related to public safety. Accordingly, because Kuck’s driver’s license and her husband’s automobile tag were suspended for Kuck’s alleged failure to file an SR-13, the ADPS was not exercising a police power protected by § 362(b)(4). Therefore, the ADPS acted in contravention of the automatic stay imposed by § 362(a).

Section 362(b)(4) does not except a government suit seeking money damages for alleged fraud from the automatic stay as an exercise of police or regulatory power.

In Re Bicoastal Corp. · filed 1990-08-01(b)(4)

This Court is satisfied that the claim asserted under the False Claims Act is not a procedure to enforce the Government’s police or regulatory powers and, therefore, the automatic stay provided by the Bankruptcy Code applies to the Government’s suit against the Debtor.

Section 362(b)(4) exempts a state forfeiture proceeding from the automatic stay only when the state has a factual basis under its forfeiture law for exercising police or regulatory power.

In Re James · filed 1990-10-25(b)(4)

Section 362(b)(4) exempts from the automatic stay “the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit’s police or regulatory power.” Yet the State must have some fact basis consistent with the authorizing power of the forfeiture statute for claiming that it is enforcing its police or regulatory power. It cannot merely act at will and claim the protection of the police/regulatory power exemption. It cannot, as in this case, seize, retain, and claim ownership of property with no basis in fact for claiming that the property is subject to forfeiture under state law.

Section 362(b)(4) permits a state savings and loan receiver to continue a suit to collect and distribute a failed institution’s assets when the receiver is enforcing the state’s regulatory power and protecting depositors.

In Re Piperi · filed 1990-11-28(b)(4)

This court finds that the state court suit is not subject to the automatic stay under 11 USC § 362(b)(4). The filing of a bankruptcy petition does not operate as a stay of the continuation of an action by a “governmental unit” to enforce its police or regulatory power. This court finds that the movant, as a receiver pursuant to state statute, of a state savings and loan association, falls within the category of a governmental unit as that term is defined at 11 USC § 101(26). The state court suit is an action by a governmental unit wherein the receiver is enforcing the state’s regulatory power to collect and distribute the assets of the failed institution. Further, this court finds that the movant’s actions are not solely for pecuniary purposes but also further the state’s goals in the regulation of the public welfare, and are an attempt to minimize the injury to the depositors.

Section 362(b)(4) exempts a government agency’s regulatory enforcement proceeding from the automatic stay when it seeks to liquidate employees’ back-pay claims, although collection of those claims proceeds through bankruptcy.

Eddleman v. United States Department Of Labor · filed 1991-01-15(b)(4)

Despite the fact that DOL sought liquidation of back-pay claims for specific individuals, we do not characterize the use of that remedy as an assertion of private rights. We conclude instead that the request for liquidation of back-pay claims was but another method of enforcing the policies underlying the SCA. Our conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the back-pay claimants would not receive any extra priority by virtue of the DOL action. Actual collection of the back-pay claims must proceed according to normal bankruptcy procedures. Accordingly, we hold that DOL's enforcement proceedings in this case were exempt from the automatic stay under section 362(b)(4).

Section 362(b)(4) does not except a professional license suspension intended to collect prepetition taxes from the automatic stay.

In Re North · filed 1991-03-08(b)(4)

We will not grant a § 362(b)(4) stay exception to a creditor to enhance its pecuniary interest indirectly that it is forbidden to accomplish directly. Board’s Order is not excepted from the § 362(a)(1) stay under § 362(b)(4).

Section 362(b)(4) does not exempt FCC license cancellation from the automatic stay when the cancellation does not protect public health or safety; the FCC must first seek stay relief.

Shimer v. Fugazy (In Re Fugazy Express, Inc.) · filed 1991-02-25(b)(4)

The revocation of a license by the FCC does not affect the health or safety of the public, so there is no exemption to the stay under this section of the Code. The FCC was therefore stayed from cancelling the License without first requesting from the Bankruptcy Court relief from the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(4) permits a governmental CERCLA action to recover cleanup costs for completed environmental violations to proceed despite the defendant’s bankruptcy filing.

The City Of New York v. Exxon Corporation · filed 1991-05-02(b)(4)

We therefore hold that governmental actions under CERCLA to recover costs expended in response to completed environmental violations are not stayed by the violator's filing for bankruptcy.

Section 362(b)(4) excepts a state environmental agency’s air emission licensing action from the automatic stay as an exercise of governmental police or regulatory power.

Wilner Wood Products Co. v. Maine, Department of Environmental Protection · filed 1991-05-10(b)(4)

The automatic stay provision, 11 U.S.C. § 362, does not give the bankruptcy court authority to issue a stay in this case because it explicitly excepts a “proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit’s police or regulatory power,” 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4), an exception that clearly applies here.

Section 362(b)(5) permits entry of a judgment on an NLRB backpay order during bankruptcy, while collection of the judgment must proceed through the bankruptcy court.

National Labor Relations Board v. Continental Hagen Corporation · filed 1991-05-10(b)(5)

We agree with the reasoning of the courts which have drawn a distinction between the entry of judgment and the enforcement of judgment with respect to a backpay provision. We further agree that § 362(b) permits us to enforce the NLRB backpay provision by an entry of judgment.

Section 362(b)(4) excepts a government action enforcing ERISA fiduciary duties from the automatic stay when the action serves a public regulatory purpose rather than a pecuniary governmental interest.

Martin v. Friedman · filed 1991-06-27(b)(4)

The Secretary’s action here is exempt from the automatic stay under either test. The government is claiming no pecuniary interest in Jay Friedman’s property. Rather, the Secretary seeks to enforce Friedman’s fiduciary duties to the employee benefit plan under ERISA, a manifestly public purpose.

Section 362(b)(4) exempts a governmental civil forfeiture action to combat illicit drugs from the automatic stay.

James v. Draper · filed 1991-08-01(b)(4)

A civil forfeiture action is an action by a governmental unit to enforce its police or regulatory power to combat the problem of illicit drugs.

Section 362(b)(4) and (5) permit review of a safety abatement order and determination and entry of a monetary penalty under the government’s police or regulatory power.

Lynn Martin, Secretary of Labor v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, Cf & I Steel Corporation, Interveno · filed 1991-08-05(b)(4), (b)(5)

Given that possibility, review is appropriate because worker safety is implicated. And we may review proceedings involving the determination and entry of a monetary penalty because the government’s police or regulatory power is involved.

Section 362(b)(4) does not exempt a private citizens group’s effort to enforce governmental regulations from the automatic stay.

United States v. Environmental Waste Control, Inc. · filed 1991-08-06(b)(4)

Moreover, STOP’s efforts as a private citizens group to achieve enforcement of governmental regulations would not fall into the police or regulatory exception to the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(4) excepts a state civil forfeiture action to combat illicit drugs from the automatic stay as an exercise of governmental police or regulatory power.

In Re James, James · filed 1991-08-07(b)(4)

A civil forfeiture action is an action by a governmental unit to enforce its police or regulatory power to combat the problem of illicit drugs.

Section 362(b)(4) does not exempt DOL enforcement of pension funding obligations from the automatic stay when the action protects a purely pecuniary interest.

LTV Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. (In Re Chateaugay Corp.) · filed 1991-09-13(b)(4)

Indeed, actions undertaken by the DOL to maintain funding obligations of the plans protect a purely pecuniary interest. Policy concerns as delineated by ERISA may not serve as a blanket protection circumventing stay provisions under the Bankruptcy Code where a purely pecuniary interest is at issue.

Section 362(b)(4) excepts a government False Claims Act suit from the automatic stay when it furthers substantial police and regulatory interests, even if the government primarily seeks compensation for its loss.

United States v. Burton (In Re Selma Apparel Corp.) · filed 1991-09-27(b)(4)

Even if the government’s primary purpose was compensation for pecuniary loss, the substantial and legitimate police and regulatory interests furthered by the FCA are of sufficient weight so as to qualify for the § 362(b)(4) exemption from the stay.

Section 362(b)(5) permits a city to pursue police and regulatory enforcement activities despite the automatic stay.

560 Ocean Club, L.P. v. Ocean Club Condominium Ass'n (In Re 560 Ocean Club, L.P.) · filed 1991-10-24(b)(5)

Because the City may pursue its enforcement activities without the impediment of the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5), debtor’s contest with the City of Atlantic City need not be resolved in this forum.

Section 362(b)(4) excepts attorney disciplinary proceedings from the automatic stay when a state bar acts as an instrumentality of a state supreme court to enforce its police or regulatory power.

In Re E. Gene Wade Joyzelle I. Wade, Debtors. E. Gene Wade Joyzelle I. Wade v. State Bar of Arizona · filed 1991-11-08(b)(4)

Accordingly, the BAP correctly held that with respect to disciplinary proceedings, the Bar acts as an instrumentality of the Arizona Supreme Court enforcing its police or regulatory power, and therefore the disciplinary proceedings against Wade are excepted from the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).

Section 362(b)(4) keeps the automatic stay from halting ongoing regulatory enforcement proceedings merely because a resulting order might later affect estate property.

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. MCorp Financial, Inc. · filed 1991-12-03(b)(4)

It is possible, of course, that the Board proceedings, like many other enforcement actions, may conclude with the entry of an order that will affect the Bankruptcy Court’s control over the property of the estate, but that possibility cannot be sufficient to justify the operation of the stay against an enforcement proceeding that is expressly exempted by § 362(b)(4).

Section 362(b)(4) excepts a private qui tam relator’s fee application from the automatic stay when the application continues and is integral to an exempt governmental enforcement proceeding.

United States Ex Rel. Marcus v. NBI, Inc. · filed 1992-05-12(b)(4)

In addition, when an action is brought by a private plaintiff, the action is excepted from the automatic stay so long as the action is a “continuation” of and integral to a proceeding that is excepted from the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(4) permits NLRB unfair labor practice and enforcement proceedings to continue despite the debtor’s bankruptcy filing because they enforce a governmental unit’s police or regulatory power.

National Labor Relations Board v. 15th Avenue Iron Works, Inc. · filed 1992-06-01(b)(4)

Although this circuit has not previously addressed the issue, we agree with the first, fifth, sixth, seventh and ninth circuits, each of which has concluded (1) that the NLRB is a “governmental unit”, and (2) that NLRB unfair labor practice proceedings and enforcement proceedings are proceedings to enforce the NLRB’s police or regulatory powers.

Section 362(b)(4) excepts a state action enforcing a health club bond requirement to protect future consumers from the automatic stay.

In Re Synergy Development Corp. · filed 1992-06-08(b)(4)

The automatic stay does not apply to the State’s action brought to enforce section 622-a of the New York General Business Law, which requires health clubs post a $50,000.00 bond in order to sell memberships of a certain duration. The State’s action was brought to protect future consumers and is within the State’s police or regulatory powers pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).

Section 362(b)(4) exempts a liquor license suspension issued under a licensing board’s statutory regulatory authority from the automatic stay.

Newport Assembly Restaurant, Inc. v. Edwards (In Re Newport Assembly Restaurant, Inc.) · filed 1992-06-12(b)(4)

Based upon the Court’s review of the pleadings and supporting documents, we find that the Board’s suspension of the Debtor’s liquor license was clearly issued pursuant to its statutory authority to regulate the use and sale of intoxicating liquor in the City of Newport. Accordingly, we rule that the suspension order is exempt from the application of the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).

Section 362(b)(4) does not exempt a governmental lender’s foreclosure actions from the automatic stay because lending is not an exercise of police or regulatory power.

In Re Thane Development Associates L.P. · filed 1992-07-16(b)(4)

The Court does not agree with MHFA that its actions, as a foreclosing mortgagee, are exempt from the stay by virtue of § 362(b)(4). When a governmental unit acts as a lender, it is not exercising police or regulatory powers.

Section 362(b)(4)-(5) excepts a state utility commission’s ordinary ratemaking proceeding from the automatic stay as an exercise of police or regulatory power.

Behles v. New Mexico Public Service Commission · filed 1992-08-05(b)(4)-(5)

The Commission’s action falls squarely within the definition of “police or regulatory” and thus within the exception to the § 362 stay.

Section 362(b)(4) permits the SEC to obtain an order fixing a disgorgement award in a securities enforcement action, but the automatic stay bars enforcement of that award.

Bilzerian v. Securities & Exchange Commission (In Re Bilzerian) · filed 1992-10-22(b)(4)

While there is no question that the automatic stay provisions prevent the SEC from attempting to enforce any disgorgement award, this Court is satisfied that the mere fixing of the award is well within the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).

Section 362(b)(4) permits a governmental unit to enforce health and safety regulations during the automatic stay, including disconnecting an unapproved water source.

Lux v. County of Spotsylvania Board of Supervisors (In Re Lux) · filed 1992-10-27(b)(4)

Therefore, the court concludes the county was acting pursuant to its valid police and regulatory powers in disconnecting the debtors from the water source and was exempt from the stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).

Section 362(b)(4) excepts a state banking regulator’s liquidation and claims resolution activities from the automatic stay when the regulator acts as a governmental receiver in the public interest.

In Re Interchemicals Co., Inc. · filed 1992-11-25(b)(4)

Here the Superintendent of Banking of the state of New York seeks to enforce its regulatory scheme to provide a claims mechanism for litigants so as to liquidate and distribute the assets in its custody for the benefit of all claimants. While it is a successor to the rights of the defunct banking institution and thereby steps into the shoes of a civil litigant, it is participating in its capacity as governmental receiver or liquidator of the institution. If a private court-appointed receiver such as in Piperi is deemed to be performing a government function, then surely the state banking regulator participating in the state liquidation in whatever forum acts in the public interest.

Sections 362(b)(4) and (5) do not limit the governmental police and regulatory power exceptions to cleanups of imminent hazards.

Hagaman v. New Jersey, Department of Environmental Protection & Energy · filed 1993-01-15(b)(4) and (5)

We disagree with the view expressed by the bankruptcy court that the State’s police power is limited to “imminent hazards.” No such limitation exists in sections 362(b)(4) and (5), either explicitly or implicitly.

Section 362(b)(4) exempts a Department of Labor FLSA enforcement proceeding seeking an injunction, unpaid wages, and liquidated damages from the automatic stay, but collection of monetary claims follows normal bankruptcy procedures.

Martin v. Safety Electric Construction, Co. · filed 1993-01-25(b)(4)

Accordingly, the court holds that this enforcement proceeding is exempt from automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4). The court notes that the individuals claiming unpaid wages will not receive any extra priority by virtue of this action. Actual collection of the back pay and liquidated damages claims must proceed according to normal bankruptcy procedures.

Section 362(b)(4) excepts a city’s condemnation and demolition of an unsafe structure from the automatic stay as an exercise of governmental police or regulatory power.

Matter of Catalano · filed 1993-02-19(b)(4)

A condemnation proceeding by a city to rid the city of a structure deemed unsafe is certainly the exercise of a police or regulatory power by a governmental unit and is thereby excepted from the automatic stay of Section 362(a).

Section 362(b)(4) exempts a governmental unit's action to enforce its regulatory power from the automatic stay.

Interstate Commerce Commission v. Lifschultz Fast Freight Corp. · filed 1993-02-09(b)(4)

Although Lifschultz has filed for protection under federal bankruptcy law, the automatic stay provision, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) does not apply since this action is based on an action by a governmental unit to enforce its regulatory power. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).

Section 362(b)(4) permits governmental CERCLA actions to recover response costs for completed environmental violations to proceed despite the automatic stay.

Lone Star Industries, Inc. v. Rankin County, Mississippi Board of Supervisors (In Re New York Trap Rock Corp.) · filed 1993-04-05(b)(4)

Initially, it should be noted that the automatic stay imposed under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) is not implicated because governmental actions under CERCLA to recover costs in response to completed environmental violations are not stayed when an alleged responsible party files a bankruptcy case. ... Such actions are regarded as subject to the exception to the automatic stay set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).

Section 362(b)(4) excepts state bar disciplinary proceedings from the automatic stay when the bar enforces professional practice rules as a governmental unit exercising police or regulatory power.

In Re Williams · filed 1993-04-06(b)(4)

More importantly, it would appear the Bar’s actions are excepted from the scope of the automatic stay by virtue of Section 362(b)(4) which allows “continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit’s police or regulatory power.” As indicated above, the Bar is a governmental unit for bankruptcy law purposes, and its conduct in enforcement of the Idaho rules of professional practice are classic police or regulatory functions.

Section 362(b)(4) exempts a government action to recover environmental response costs from the automatic stay because seeking those costs exercises police and regulatory powers.

United States v. Acme Solvents Reclaiming, Inc. · filed 1993-04-08(b)(4)

Both the legislative history of § 362(b)(4) and the persuasive reasoning of other courts who have faced this question prompt a finding that in seeking to recover its response costs incurred in reacting to the environmental hazards presented at the Acme site, the government exercised its police and regulatory powers.

Section 362(a)(3) stays pursuit of an alter ego claim belonging to the bankruptcy estate, and the governmental police powers exceptions in § 362(b)(4) and (5) do not apply to that stay.

Wharton v. Commonwealth of Virginia · filed 1993-06-08(a)(3)

In the instant case the Commonwealth cannot maintain its action. The Commonwealth's claim is premised on the assumption that the claim is part of its police powers that the bankruptcy code did not intend to abrogate. The action does not fit within the police powers exception to the statute. Sections 362(b)(4) and (5) of the bankruptcy code, the police powers exceptions, do not provide a blanket exception for all bankruptcy stays. The police powers exception on which the Commonwealth relies does not apply to section 362(a)(3), the provision on which the instant stay was granted. The police powers exception of 362(b)(4) and (5), clearly states that it is only applicable to sections 362(a)(1) and (a)(2).

Section 362(a)(3) has no governmental powers exception to its stay of acts exercising control over property of the bankruptcy estate.

Hillis Motors, Inc. v. Hawaii Automobile Dealers' Ass'n · filed 1993-06-28(a)(3)

There is no governmental powers exception to section 362(a)(3), the provision at issue here.

Section 362(b)(4) permits an NLRB contempt proceeding to continue despite a bankruptcy filing when the agency seeks to enforce federal labor law through its regulatory power.

National Labor Relations Board v. Sawulski · filed 1993-09-13(b)(4)

Therefore, under both the language and intent , of § 362(b)(4), as well as under either of the two tests outlined by the Sixth Circuit, I conclude that the automatic stay is not applicable to this contempt proceeding.

Section 362(b)(4) permits a state securities regulator to investigate possible securities-law violations under its police and regulatory power despite the automatic stay.

Arizona Corp. Commission v. Knoell (In Re Knoell) · filed 1993-09-16(b)(4)

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court finds that the Commission’s investigation does fall within the exemption to the automatic stay, because it is pursuant to the Commission’s police and regulatory power.

Section 362(b)(4) exempts a state action to compel cleanup of hazardous waste under environmental laws from the automatic stay.

New Jersey, Department of Environmental Protection & Energy v. Madison Industries, Inc. (In Re Madison Industries, Inc.) · filed 1993-09-22(b)(4)

Based on a strict statutory reading of section 362 and its accompanying legislative history, one can ascertain that the DEPE, to effectuate its police powers, was exempt from the automatic stay. Specifically, the DEPE was warranted in going to state court to compel Madison to clean-up its hazardous waste pile.

Section 362(b)(4) does not except a civil forfeiture from the automatic stay when it is aimed at punishment or revenue rather than remedying an ongoing public threat.

Goff v. Oklahoma Ex Rel. Means (In Re Goff) · filed 1993-09-28(b)(4)

This forfeiture action can only be intended to punish Goff and/or to make money for the Bureau. Since this forfeiture action is not an exercise of “police or regulatory power,” it is not excepted from the automatic stay under § 362(b)(4).

Section 362(b)(4) and (5) do not stay an NLRB prejudgment garnishment proceeding to protect a backpay award where the Board acts under its police or regulatory powers.

National Labor Relations Board v. E.D.P. Medical Computer Systems, Inc. · filed 1993-10-08(b)(4), (b)(5)

Moreover, the automatic stay provision allows governmental units to enforce their police or regulatory powers, 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4), and permits the entry of money judgments to enforce their police or regulatory powers, id. § 362(b)(5). ... Therefore, the automatic stay provision does not apply to this proceeding.

Section 362(b)(4) allows a municipality to enforce a public safety repair order against a debtor and allows the debtor’s appeal from that order to proceed despite the automatic stay.

McCarthy v. Town of Fairfield, No. Cv91 28 57 13 (Oct. 19, 1993) · filed 1993-10-19(b)(4)

Proceedings of the Condemnation Board under Chapter 100 of the Fairfield Code results in orders to make repairs or alterations or to demolish buildings if the Board determines that a building is a menace to public safety but is not an action to collect a money judgment. The order of the Condemnation Board to the plaintiff is under the exemption provision in 362(b)(4). The plaintiff's appeal from that order falls in the same category, and his voluntary bankruptcy petition does not result in a stay of this appeal.

Section 362(b)(4) exempts an Arkansas Board of Review hearing on eligibility for unemployment benefits from the automatic stay as an exercise of the state’s police power.

Razorback Vacuum v. Director · filed 1993-11-17(b)(4)

The narrow question presented by this appeal is whether an administrative hearing by the Arkansas Board of Review to determine if a claimant is qualified to draw unemployment benefits is exempt from the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code as an exercise of the State’s police power pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4). We hold that such a hearing is exempt from the automatic stay, and we affirm.

Section 362(b)(4) exempts proceedings to impose Rule 11 sanctions from the automatic stay as exercises of governmental regulatory power.

Alpern v. Phillip S. Lieb, Allen S. Gabe, and Phyllis Alpern · filed 1993-12-07(b)(4)

But we agree with the defendants that a proceeding to impose sanctions under Rule 11 is exempt from the automatic stay, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4), which exempts actions brought pursuant to governmental police or regulatory powers.

Section 362(b)(4) excepts a governmental consumer-protection action from the automatic stay when the action enforces regulatory power rather than collects a debt.

Georgia Ex Rel. Administrator of the Fair Business Practices Act v. Family Vending, Inc. (In Re Family Vending, Inc.) · filed 1994-01-14(b)(4)

The Complaint shows that Movant’s purpose in filing the state court proceeding was to enforce governmental regulatory powers, not to collect a debt. Therefore, § 362(b)(4) is applicable to except Movant’s lawsuit from the operation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(4) excepts state probate citation proceedings and resulting show cause orders enforcing the state court’s authority from the automatic stay.

In Re Betts · filed 1994-01-18(b)(4)

The Court finds and concludes that the probate citation proceedings in the state court concerning the Serby estate, which led to the orders entered against the Debtor, were excepted from the stay of section 362(a) by section 362(b)(4).

Section 362(b)(4) does not exempt a government board proceeding that adjudicates private claims to recover a debtor’s pre-petition obligation.

In Re Christensen · filed 1994-04-29(b)(4)

Respondent was adjudicating private rights (a dispute between a supplier and contractor) and its immediate purpose was to assist a private citizen recover a pre-petition obligation of the debtor. I hold that § 362(b)(4) does not exempt proceedings before the Contractors Board under ORS Chapter 701 from the automatic stay of the Bankruptcy Act.

Section 362(b)(4) excepts the continuation of a governmental action enforcing police or regulatory power from the automatic stay.

Office of Thrift Supervision v. Hooper · filed 1994-06-22(b)(4)

IT FURTHER APPEARING that this matter is not subject to the Automatic Stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) by virtue of the exception provided under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) in that this is “the continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit’s police or regulatory power,” and ... The Receiver shall transfer the 59,370 shares of First Federal stock held by him to Bernard R. Corbett, Trustee for the benefit of First Federal.

Section 362(b)(4) excepts a governmental action to punish and deter fraudulent land sales from the automatic stay as an exercise of police or regulatory power.

Cisneros v. Cost Control Marketing & Sales Management · filed 1994-09-15(b)(4)

The automatic stay imposed by § 362(a)(1) does not apply to “the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit’s police or regulatory power.” ... As a result, this action is excepted from the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).

Section 362(b)(4) excepts a government action to obtain a monetary judgment for environmental response costs from the automatic stay when the government does not seek to enforce that judgment.

United States v. Oil Transport Co., Inc. · filed 1994-09-20(b)(4)

Inasmuch as the Government in this case seeks only the entry of a monetary judgment and not the enforcement thereof, its action is exempted from the automatic stay provision by Section 362(b)(4), and is not prohibited by Section 362(b)(5).

Section 362(b)(4) permits a state to proceed with a drug-related property forfeiture action under the police power exception to the automatic stay.

Smith v. Alabama Ex Rel. Littrell (In Re Smith) · filed 1995-01-09(b)(4)

In In re James, 940 F.2d 46 (3rd Cir.1991), the court held that a state forfeiture action involving alleged proceeds of criminal activity comes within the police power exception set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4). It is the opinion of this Court that this case is well reasoned, and that the automatic stay does not prohibit the State of Alabama from proceeding in state court with its forfeiture action.

Section 362(b)’s government regulatory exceptions do not limit the stay against acts to control estate property under § 362(a)(3).

Gumport v. Interstate Commerce Commission (In re Transcon Lines) · filed 1995-02-01(a)(3)

At issue here is section 362(a)(3) which is not the subject of limitation under section 362(b).

Section 362(b)(4) and (5) except enforcement of a governmental environmental cleanup order from the automatic stay when the government seeks compliance rather than payment of money.

Commonwealth, Department of Environmental Resources v. Ingram · filed 1995-03-02(b)(4), (b)(5)

Because DER does not seek payment of money to the state in this case, we conclude that § 362(b)(4) and (5) of the Bankruptcy Code apply here and that the automatic stay is inapplicable to this case.

Section 362(b)(4) excepts a state attorney general’s action to enjoin labor law violations and liquidate employees’ unpaid wage and tip claims from the automatic stay when the action enforces state police or regulatory policy.

Ngan Gung Restaurant, Inc. v. New York (In Re Ngan Gung Restaurant, Inc.) · filed 1995-06-29(b)(4)

Moreover, that the government seeks to liquidate employee wage claims or to compel employers to make restitution of unpaid funds, does not alter the fact that it is acting pursuant to its police and regulatory authority. Those enforcement measures further public policy by protecting employees and the markets from the harmful effects of unfair labor practices. ... Based on the foregoing, we find that the Action is excepted from the automatic stay pursuant to § 362(b)(4) of the Code.

Section 362(b)(4) does not exempt a government agency’s exclusion of a debtor from Medicare when the exclusion serves to collect defaulted loans rather than protect public health or safety.

In Re Rusnak · filed 1995-07-25(b)(4)

Under the pecuniary interest test, the Court believes it apparent that both the purpose and effect of the statutes in question is to protect the government’s pecuniary interest, and not to promote the public’s health and safety. Reliance on these collection statutes to exclude the Debtor from participation in the Medicare programs is, therefore, not a proper exercise of the government’s police and regulatory power and does not fall within the governmental statutory exception to the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(4) exempts a state attorney disciplinary proceeding brought by a government regulatory body from the automatic bankruptcy stay.

Departmental Disciplinary Committee for the First Judicial Department v. Shapiro (In Re Friedman & Shapiro, P.C.) · filed 1995-08-08(b)(4)

Removal of the state disciplinary proceeding to this Court was completely improper because both the removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1452, and the bankruptcy code, 11 U.S.C. § 362(B)(4), clearly exempt from removal and from the automatic bankruptcy stay provision, “... a civil action by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit’s police or regulatory power....” The Appellate Division which is authorized under the New York Judiciary Law § 90(2) to regulate the professional conduct of attorneys has authorized the Committee to do so. The Committee’s action as a regulatory agency thus falls squarely into the exemption provided in both statutes.

Section 362(b)(4) permits a governmental unit to continue an action enforcing its police or regulatory power despite the debtor’s bankruptcy filing, including HUD’s action to enforce the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act.

U.S. Department Of Housing & Urban Development v. Cost Control Marketing & Sales Management Of Virginia, Incorporated · filed 1995-09-08(b)(4)

In short, though the filing of a bankruptcy petition ordinarily acts as a stay of pending judicial proceedings, 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362(a)(1), the stay does not apply to "the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory power[.]" Sec. 362(b)(4). This exception to the stay precisely fits this case.

Section 362(b)(4) allows a governmental unit to continue a proceeding enforcing its police or regulatory power despite the automatic stay.

U.S. Department of Housing & Urban Development v. Cost Control Marketing & Sales Management of Virginia, Inc. · filed 1995-09-08(b)(4)

In short, though the filing of a bankruptcy petition ordinarily acts as a stay of pending judicial proceedings, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1), the stay does not apply to “the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit’s police or regulatory power[.]” § 362(b)(4). This exception to the stay precisely fits this ease.

Section 362(b)(4) excepts the IRS’s revocation of a debtor’s tax-exempt status from the automatic stay when the revocation enforces charitable-purpose requirements as a police power function.

Universal Life Church, Inc. v. United States (In Re Universal Life Church, Inc.) · filed 1995-11-06(b)(4)

Revocation of tax-exempt status implements a police power function regulating the government’s interest in advancing the policies underlying the charitable purposes exemptions provided by Congress. ... The revocation is excepted from the automatic stay under § 362(b)(4).

Section 362(b)(4) excepts governmental police or regulatory actions, including proceedings to impose forfeitures and penalties through entry of a money judgment, from the automatic stay.

Wisconsin v. Weller (In Re Weller) · filed 1995-12-11(b)(4)

The State’s action against Weller constituted an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce its police or regulatory power, and section 362(b)(4) excepts such actions from the stay of § 362(a). Under the § 362(b)(4) exception, proceedings to enforce forfeitures and penalties are free to proceed to judgment, including the entry of a money judgment.

Section 362(b)(4) excepts governmental police and regulatory actions from the stay under subsection (a)(1), but does not except acts to control estate property stayed under subsection (a)(3).

In Re National Environmental Waste Corp. · filed 1996-01-25(b)(4)

While Section 362(b)(4) provides for a police and regulatory power exception to the automatic stay imposed by Section 362(a)(1), there is no such exception to the automatic stay imposed by Section 362(a)(3).

Section 362(b)(4) permits a government agency to continue regulatory proceedings to reallocate unused international air route authority when doing so is critical public business protecting public welfare.

United States Department of Transportation v. USAfrica Airways, Inc. (In Re USAfrica Airways Holdings, Inc.) · filed 1996-02-02(b)(4)

Therefore, given the specific facts involved in the instant case, the Court concludes that DOT’s administrative hearings concerning USAfrica’s South Africa frequencies constitute critical public business that falls within the police and regulatory power exception of § 362(b)(4).

Section 362(b)(4) exempts state police and regulatory actions from the automatic stay, so a debtor’s need for a breathing spell alone cannot justify enjoining such an action under § 105.

Brennan v. Poritz (In Re Brennan) · filed 1996-02-08(b)(4)

Because Congress explicitly exempted state police and regulatory power actions from the “breathing spell,” we cannot say that denying the debtor a “breathing spell” from' the State Action seriously conflicts with fundamental bankruptcy policies.

Section 362(b)(4) can except government action aimed at effectuating public policy from the automatic stay; a utilities commission’s restriction on transferring taxi operating authority raised a substantial question under that exception.

Colorado Public Utilities Commission v. Yellow Cab Cooperative Ass'n (In Re Yellow Cab Cooperative Ass'n) · filed 1996-02-23(b)(4)

Actions taken for pecuniary or private interests are not excepted from the stay. ... The PUC action at issue in this ease appears clearly to have been aimed at effectuating public policy.

Section 362(b)(4) does not except a government action that uses exclusion from a program to gain a pecuniary advantage by pressuring a debtor to pay a prepetition debt; exclusion on independent regulatory grounds may qualify.

In Re Psychotherapy and Counseling Center, Inc. · filed 1996-05-15(b)(4)

Accordingly, the court will deny HHS’s motion for a declaration that its proposed action to exclude the debtor from the program is excepted, on this record, from the stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4). This does not preclude HHS from proceeding pursuant to § 362(b)(4) to bar the debtor from the program on grounds independent of the breach of the settlement agreement.

Section 362(b)(4) exempts FDIC enforcement of employee competence, integrity, and fitness standards from the automatic stay as an exercise of police or regulatory power.

Asquino v. Federal Deposit Insurance · filed 1996-05-16(b)(4)

First, the police/regulatory exemption set forth at 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) that the Colonial Realty court concluded was central to the holding in MCorp is also implicated in this case. ... The Court disagrees. Section 1822(f)(4) is a conflict of interest provision that requires FDIC employees and contractors to meet “minimum standards of competence, experience, integrity, and fitness.” Because this provision governs standards of conduct, it has obvious public policy ramifications, irrespective of any pecuniary interest. Accordingly, the enforcement of this provision constitutes an exercise of FDIC’s police or regulatory power.

Section 362(b)(4) does not except a state agency’s effort to collect a debt from the automatic stay merely because the agency invokes a public policy interest.

Matter of Gaither · filed 1996-08-23(b)(4)

In the instant case, the OBES action is nothing more than an effort to collect a debt, which is not excepted from the automatic stay by § 362(b)(4).

Section 362(b)(4) exempts government action enforcing police or regulatory power from the automatic stay when it serves public policy rather than pecuniary or private interests.

Colorado Public Utilities Commission v. Yellow Cab Cooperative Ass'n (In Re Yellow Cab Cooperative Ass'n) · filed 1996-09-12(b)(4)

Under either Eddleman test, PUC’s actions were exempt from the automatic stay under § 362(b)(4).

Section 362(b)(4) exempts a government action enforcing public safety regulations from the automatic stay even when it seeks an injunction, civil penalties, and costs.

Holbrook v. Huntington Kildare, Inc., No. Cv 950548320 (Sep. 17, 1996) · filed 1996-09-17(b)(4)

To remedy all proven violations of that order, and thus to promote full compliance with the order in the future, he seeks an injunction, the imposition of civil penalties, and the assessment of costs and expenses. This, then, is an "action . . . by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory power," which is exempted from the automatic stay by Section 362(b)(4).

Section 362(b)(4) permits a federal civil forfeiture action exercising the government’s police power to continue despite the automatic stay.

Brewer v. United States (In Re Brewer) · filed 1996-10-09(b)(4)

The forfeiture action in this case is a federal civil action pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7), it is an exercise of the federal government’s police power, and, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4), is not stayed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).

Section 362(b)(4) permits a governmental unit to continue an action enforcing its police or regulatory power despite the automatic stay.

Lower Mount Bethel Township v. Stine · filed 1996-11-15(b)(4)

Under Section 362(b)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, governmental units’ “commencement or continuance of an action or proceeding ... to enforce such governmental unit’s police or regulatory power” is exempted from the automatic stay provision.

Section 362(a)(3) bars governmental legislation that exercises control over estate property, even when enacted for public purposes.

Slater v. Town of Albion (In Re Albion Disposal, Inc.) · filed 1996-12-12(a)(3)

Nothing in the statute permits the governmental unit to exercise control over property of the estate with impunity. Legislative action that violates § 362(a)(3) is violative of the automatic stay, no matter how public-minded and well-intentioned.

Section 362(b)(4) allows an appeal over Rule 11-type sanctions to proceed despite the automatic stay because imposing those sanctions exercises the judiciary’s regulatory power.

Maritan v. Todd · filed 1996-12-30(b)(4)

This appeal is not stayed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)’s automatic stay. This is because the imposition of Rule 11-type sanctions falls within the “governmental unit police or regulatory power” exception to § 362(a)’s automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(4) exempts an SEC enforcement action seeking injunctive relief and disgorgement from the automatic stay, even if the SEC seeks only disgorgement.

Securities & Exchange Commission v. Towers Financial Corp. · filed 1997-01-22(b)(4)

Even if the SEC only were seeking disgorgement, therefore, the action would not be stayed. Here, of course, the SEC also is seeking injunctive relief to prevent Brater from future violations of the securities laws. The SEC’s action is not stayed.

Section 362(b)(4) allows a government administrative proceeding to determine labor law civil penalties to continue despite the automatic stay when it enforces police or regulatory powers.

In Re Crockett · filed 1997-01-27(b)(4)

This Court can safely conclude, therefore, that this administrative proceeding is an exercise of police or regulatory powers which places it within the § 362(b)(4) exemption to the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(4) excepts municipal building-code enforcement proceedings, including demolition of unsafe buildings, from the automatic stay.

In Re Harry Javens and Joyce Javens, Debtors. Harry Javens and Joyce Javens v. City of Hazel Park and City of Royal Oak · filed 1997-02-19(b)(4)

The Royal Oak and first Hazel Park demolition orders, and the continuing Hazel Park litigation over 422 East George Street, all fit well within the language of § 362(a)(1). That provision is then subject to the exception provision of § 362(b)(4). As we concluded above, the cities’ actions were exercises of their police power within the meaning of (b)(4). Therefore, the cities’ actions enjoyed an exception to the stay, which the bankrupts ey court and district court correctly recognized.

Section 362(b)(4) allows a state to continue environmental enforcement litigation against a debtor as an exercise of its police or regulatory power.

In Re Mateer · filed 1997-03-06(b)(4)

The action was exempted, however, by § 362(b)(4) which permits the commencement or continuation of a judicial proceeding to enforce a governmental unit’s police or regulatory power.

Section 362(b)(4) allows a governmental unit to order the plugging and abandonment of wells during bankruptcy as an exercise of its regulatory power.

Wells Fargo Bank v. Goldzband · filed 1997-03-14(b)(4)

Had the Division done further investigation, it would also have learned that OPMI’s institution of chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings did not operate ... as a stay “of the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit’s police or regulatory power.” (11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).) Consequently, there was no impediment to ordering OPMI to plug and abandon the wells while the bankruptcy proceeding was pending.

Section 362(b)(4) excepts a municipality’s demolition of an unsafe building from the automatic stay when the municipality is enforcing its police powers.

Manuel v. City of Jacksonville (In Re Blunt) · filed 1997-07-28(b)(4)

The Defendant’s action is an exception to the automatic stay pursuant to subsection 362(b)(4) because Defendant was enforcing its police powers when it demolished the Grothe Gardens complex.

Section 362(b)(4) allows a state consumer protection agency to pursue restitution for consumers when its enforcement action exercises police or regulatory power, even if it seeks to reduce a monetary claim to judgment.

Consumer Protection Division, Office of the Attorney General v. Luskin's, Inc. (In Re Luskin's, Inc.) · filed 1997-08-25(b)(4)

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Bankruptcy Judge abused his discretion when he found that the Consumer Protection Division’s attempt to obtain restitution (free airfare tickets or the cash equivalent) for the consumers who relied upon and made qualifying purchases pursuant to Luskin’s ad campaign was solely an attempt to protect a pecuniary interest in Luskin’s property for the benefit of Maryland consumers. Therefore, the Court finds that the Consumer Protection Division is entitled to have the automatic stay relating to its monetary claim lifted pursuant to § 362(b)(4).

Section 362(b)(4) permits the IRS to revoke an organization’s tax-exempt status despite the automatic stay because revocation serves a public welfare purpose.

Universal Life Church, Inc. v. United States · filed 1997-10-06(b)(4)

The question in this case is whether an IRS letter revoking the tax exempt status of a religious corporation meets either test. We hold it meets both. The district court found, and we agree, that the revocation was an exercise of the IRS’s police or regulatory power because revocation promotes public welfare by assuring the public and potential donors that contributions will be used for legitimate charitable purposes.

Section 362(b)(4)’s police and regulatory power exception does not reach an in rem civil forfeiture of estate property, because that action is stayed under § 362(a)(3), rather than § 362(a)(1).

Georgia v. Bell (In Re Bell) · filed 1997-11-13(b)(4)

Rather, civil forfeiture becomes stayed by operation of Code section 362(a)(3) as an “act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate,” such that it falls beyond the scope of section 362(b)(4)’s exception.

Section 362(b)(4) exempts governmental police or regulatory actions from the automatic stay even when the action would otherwise be stayed under § 362(a)(3).

Yellow Cab Cooperative Ass'n v. Metro Taxi, Inc. (In Re Yellow Cab Cooperative Ass'n) · filed 1997-12-23(b)(4)

We agree with those courts which have held that the governmental regulatory or police power exception of § 362(b)(4) applies to actions stayed under § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(b)(4) permits a state to enforce automobile dealer licensing regulations despite the automatic stay.

Krystal Jeep Eagle, Inc. v. Bureau of Professional & Occupational Affairs · filed 1999-01-22(b)(4)

As such, we conclude that the Commonwealth’s action to enforce its automobile dealer license regulation qualifies within the § 362(b)(4) exception to the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay provision.

Section 362(b)(4) exempts a state attorney general’s proceeding to protect charitable organizations’ assets and missions under parens patriae authority from the automatic stay.

In Re Bankruptcy Appeal of Allegheny Health, Education & Research Foundation · filed 1999-02-01(b)(4)

In light of the foregoing discussion, the police powers exception of section 362(b)(4), as amended, clearly is applicable in this case and exempts the Commonwealth from section 362(a)’s automatic stay of the Orphans’ Court litigation.

Section 362(b)(4) allows a court to enter a regulatory workers’ compensation order and money judgment despite the automatic stay, although enforcement of the money judgment may be stayed.

ANR Freight System v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board · filed 1999-04-16(b)(4)

Therefore, even though the equitable portion of this opinion and order is unaffected by the automatic stay provisions of the federal Bankruptcy Code, the enforcement of the money judgment portion may be stayed at some time in the future. However, until such time as it is proven that the Employer in this case, as listed on the dockets of this Court is within the jurisdiction of a bankruptcy court of competent jurisdiction and is affected by the stay provisions of that court, the judgment shall remain enforceable.

Section 362(b)(4) permits a governmental unit to inspect vacant property for unsafe conditions under its police and regulatory power despite the automatic stay.

In Re Flood · filed 1999-06-07(b)(4)

However, in this Court’s view, conducting a structural inspection of a vacant structure to determine whether it is unsafe or dangerous is an action by a governmental unit to enforce its police and regulatory power within the meaning and intent of Section 362(b)(4), and, therefore, is not a violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(4) does not except a state agency proceeding to obtain restitution for private parties from the automatic stay.

In Re Dunbar · filed 1999-06-16(b)(4)

To the extent the state agency instituted proceedings to seek restitution on behalf of the Martins for Dunbar’s violations of the Business and Professions Code in that amount, such state actions are not excepted from the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(4) exempts a state’s exercise of police powers from the automatic stay imposed by section 362(a).

In Re Bankruptcy Appeal of Allegheny Health, Education & Research Foundation · filed 1999-05-19(b)(4)

In light of the foregoing discussion, the police powers exception of section 362(b)(4), as amended, clearly is applicable in this case and exempts the Commonwealth from section 362(a)’s automatic stay of the Orphans’ Court litigation.

Section 362(b)(4) exempts a Department of Labor action enforcing the FLSA’s public regulatory purposes from the automatic stay.

Herman v. Hospital Staffing Services, Inc. · filed 1999-07-27(b)(4)

The Secretary has filed the instant action seeking to enforce or exercise the regulatory power pursuant to the FLSA and therefore would be exempted from the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(4) exempts a district court’s Rule 16(f) sanctions order from the automatic stay as an exercise of governmental police or regulatory power.

Sabre Group Inc v. Trvl · filed 1999-08-09(b)(4)

The district court’s sanctions order pursuant to Rule 16(f) ... was “the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit’s police or regulatory power.” ... As such, it was exempt from the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(4) does not except a county’s eminent domain proceeding to realign a road from the automatic stay without a showing that the taking exercises a valid police or regulatory power.

Maricopa County v. PMI-DVW Real Estate Holdings, L.L.P. (In Re PMI-DVW Real Estate Holdings, L.L.P.) · filed 1999-08-27(b)(4)

The Court also finds and concludes that the County’s efforts to condemn the subject property by eminent domain are prohibited by the automatic stay and that there has been no showing of a valid exception to the automatic stay under the County’s police or regulatory power.

Section 362(b)(4) permits a state discrimination agency acting under its police and regulatory power to enter a monetary judgment against a debtor.

In Re Mohawk Greenfield Motel Corp. · filed 1999-08-31(b)(4)

This Court holds that § 362(b)(4) excepts from the automatic stay the entry by the MCAD of monetary judgments under M.G.L. Ch. 151B.

Section 362(b)(4) permits a state to continue a consumer-protection enforcement action seeking injunctive relief, civil penalties, and restitution despite the debtor’s Chapter 13 filing.

In Re Nelson · filed 1999-11-12(b)(4)

For the reasons set forth above, I conclude that the State of Maine’s pending civil lawsuit against the debtor is within § 362(b)(4)’s exception to the automatic stay and, therefore, may proceed without further order of this court.

Section 362(b)(4) exempts a False Claims Act qui tam action from the automatic stay as an action brought by a governmental unit to enforce its police or regulatory power, even before the government decides whether to intervene.

United States Ex Rel. Jane Doe 1 v. X, Inc. · filed 2000-03-23(b)(4)

Given this, it follows that the instant qui tam suit is “brought by a governmental unit” for the purposes of § 362(b)(4)’s police powers exception, even though the United States has not yet made its intervention election.

Section 362(b)(4) exempts the FCC’s regulatory decisions enforcing spectrum-license payment conditions from the automatic stay.

In Re Federal Communications Commission · filed 2000-05-25(b)(4)

Though, we hold that the FCC's regulatory decisions fall within § 362(b)(4), we have no occasion to opine on whether the Public Notice is valid or whether the Licenses automatically canceled at some prior date.

Section 362(b)(4) allows a local government to enforce zoning ordinances against property in bankruptcy as an exercise of its police or regulatory power.

Concord Township Trustees v. Gibbs, Unpublished Decision (7-21-2000) · filed 2000-07-21(b)(4)

With regard to the bankruptcy petition issue, the mere filing of such a petition, or even the granting of it, will not preclude a state governmental unit from enforcing its police or regulatory power over a piece of property. ... Accordingly, even if the bankruptcy petition in this matter had been granted when the contempt order was issued by the lower court, appellees could properly have sought enforcement of the zoning ordinance which appellant had violated.

Section 362(b)(4) permits governmental employment-discrimination proceedings to continue through entry of a money judgment, but does not permit action beyond that point.

In Re Pincombe · filed 2000-12-07(b)(4)

As discussed above, the case law is clear that proceedings on a charge of employment discrimination fall within the exception under Code § 362(b)(4) provided that no action is taken beyond entry of a money judgment. Since proceedings to date have not reached the point where judgment is entered, the IDHR has not violated the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(4) exempts an award of attorneys’ fees imposed under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 for unprofessional litigation conduct from the automatic stay because the sanction serves public policy.

In Re: Jerome Berg, Debtor. Jerome Berg v. Good Samaritan Hospital · filed 2000-10-23(b)(4)

We adopt the reasoning of these cases and hold that § 362(b) (4)’s government regulatory exemption exempts from the automatic stay an award of attorneys’ fees imposed under Rule 38 as a sanction for unprofessional conduct in litigation. We do so because it is clear that the purpose of such sanctions is to effectuate public policy, not to protect private rights or the government’s interest in the sanctioned person’s property.

Section 362(b)(4) permits a state banking regulator to pursue license suspension or revocation for fraudulent consumer practices or inadequate capital, even after the licensee files for bankruptcy, because the proceeding enforces the state’s police and regulatory powers.

Opn. No. · filed 2000-12-28(b)(4)

We conclude that a proceeding by the NYSBD pursuant to Banking Law § 595 to suspend or revoke a license of a mortgage banker or to suspend or delete the name of a mortgage broker from the mortgage broker roll on the grounds of fraudulent consumer practices or failure to maintain adequate capital, whether commenced prior or subsequent to the mortgage banker's or mortgage broker's filing for bankruptcy under the Code, would fall within the police or regulatory power exception to the automatic stay in 11 U.S.C. § 362 (b)(4) and thus would not be stayed by the bankruptcy filing.

Section 362(b)(4) permits a governmental civil contempt proceeding to require an accounting of assets because that requirement does not enforce a money judgment.

Securities & Exchange Commission v. Bilzerian · filed 2001-01-12(b)(4)

The Court is not, by this Opinion and its accompanying Order, requiring payment of the disgorgement or seizing assets. Rather, the Court is addressing whether Bilzerian has complied with the temporary purgation conditions insofar as they require an accounting of his assets in the contempt context. Requiring an accounting of assets does not violate the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(4) allows governmental police and regulatory actions to proceed to judgment against a debtor, but money judgments must be enforced through the bankruptcy proceeding.

Federal Trade Commission v. First Alliance Mortgage Co. (In Re First Alliance Mortgage Co.) · filed 2001-04-19(b)(4)

In actuality there is little or no risk of unequal treatment of creditors, because, as the governmental units agree, while they are allowed by the regulatory and police powers exception to proceed to judgment against the debtor in other forums, they are not allowed to enforce any money judgments against the debtor in any proceeding other than the bankruptcy proceeding.

Section 362(b)(4) permits a state attorney general to pursue consumer protection claims for restitution, civil penalties, and attorneys’ fees to judgment, while enforcement of the monetary claims remains stayed.

Massachusetts v. First Alliance Mortgage Co. (In Re First Alliance Mortgage Co.) · filed 2001-05-09(b)(4)

The Commonwealth’s state court action for alleged violations of the consumer protection laws was exempt in its entirety from the automatic stay. Therefore, we REVERSE that portion of the judgment which denied relief to the Commonwealth on its restitution, civil penalties and attorneys’ fees claims, for purposes of obtaining judgment, but not enforcement of such claims.

Section 362(b)(4) does not except a criminal proceeding pursued against a debtor to collect a debt from the automatic stay.

Emberton v. Lobb (In Re Emberton) · filed 2001-05-22(b)(4)

However, this Court has repeatedly held that this exception does not apply where a criminal action is pursued and initiated against the debtor for the purpose of debt collection.

Section 362(b)(4) permits a state utility regulator to implement and enforce public utility rate decisions under its police and regulatory power despite the automatic stay.

Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. California Public Utilities Commission (In Re Pacific Gas & Electric Co.) · filed 2001-06-01(b)(4)

The “police and regulatory” exception to the automatic stay applies to implementation and enforcement of the Accounting Decision, including the Ordering Paragraphs.

Section 362(b)(4)'s regulatory power exception does not apply to the stays of lien enforcement under subsections 362(a)(4) and (5).

NextWave Prsnal Comm v. FCC · filed 2001-06-22(b)(4)

Even if the Commission were correct that section 525 should be read to permit all actions exempted from the automatic stay by subsection 362(b)(4), that argument would be inapplicable to this case because subsection 362(b)(4) does not apply to the stay of acts to "create, perfect, or enforce" liens against property of the estate or of the debtor imposed by subsections 362(a)(4) and (5).

Section 362(b)(4)’s regulatory power exception does not apply to the stays of acts to create, perfect, or enforce liens under § 362(a)(4) and (5).

NextWave Personal Communications Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission · filed 2001-06-22(b)(4)

Even if the Commission were correct that section 525 should be read to permit all actions exempted from the automatic stay by subsection 362(b)(4), that argument would be inapplicable to this case because subsection 362(b)(4) does not apply to the stay of acts to “create, perfect, or enforce” liens against property of the estate or of the debtor imposed by subsections 362(a)(4) and (5).

Section 362(b)(4) does not exempt a government agency’s effort to freeze postpetition income unrelated to the alleged misconduct; the agency must obtain relief from the stay to enforce such a freeze.

In Re Dolen · filed 2001-07-17(b)(4)

This mechanism does not overcome the fact that the automatic stay precludes the Commission from taking any act to enjoin the debtor’s post-petition income unrelated to the illegal acts at issue in the district court action. It is the Commission that must take affirmative steps to seek relief from stay to enforce the preliminary injunction in this narrow context.

Section 362(b)(4) excepts a governmental unit’s good faith enforcement of public safety laws through its police power from the automatic stay.

Spookyworld, Inc. v. Town of Berlin (In Re Spookyworld, Inc.) · filed 2001-08-02(b)(4)

Section § 362(b)(4) was crafted to preclude the application of the automatic stay to an exercise of police power in the service of public safety and welfare.

Section 362(b)(4) permits a governmental unit to proceed with a consumer protection enforcement action, including a claim for damages, despite the automatic stay.

Texas v. American Blastfax, Inc. · filed 2001-08-17(b)(4)

Because a lawsuit filed by a governmental unit to enforce and seek damages under its consumer protection laws is not subject to the bankruptcy code’s automatic stay, this case proceeded to trial on March 16, 2001.

Section 362(b)(4) does not except a governmental enforcement action from the automatic stay when the action principally adjudicates private rights rather than enforcing the government’s police or regulatory power.

Chao v. Hospital Staffing Services Inc. · filed 2001-10-31(b)(4)

Under whichever authority the Secretary brought this suit, it fails the “public policy” test of whether a governmental unit brought suit “to enforce such governmental unit’s ... police and regulatory power,” so the § 362(b)(4) exception to the automatic stay does not apply to the instant action.

Section 362(b)(4) does not exempt a government enforcement suit from the automatic stay when the suit primarily advances private creditors’ rights over those of other creditors rather than enforcing public policy.

Chao v. Hospital Staffing Services · filed 2001-10-31(b)(4)

Viewed in light of the particular facts of this case, the Secretary's suit is not in furtherance of her statutory powers to regulate and enforce labor standards, but rather is designed to and would, if allowed to proceed, promote the private rights of unpaid workers vis-a-vis other creditors of the debtor's estate. Such a suit does not fall within the Bankruptcy Code's § 362(b)(4) exception to the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(4) permits a government environmental enforcement action to obtain a civil penalty judgment for past violations, while enforcement of the money judgment remains stayed.

United States v. LTV Steel Co., Inc. · filed 2001-11-07(b)(4)

In language that is clear and unambiguous, therefore, Section 362(b)(4) only limits the government’s police and regulatory power to enforce a money judgment outside of the bankruptcy. The government’s power to seek entry of a civil penalty judgment for violations of the environmental laws is not precluded.

Section 362(b)(4) permits a state to enforce environmental financial assurance regulations despite the automatic stay when their primary purpose is to deter environmental misconduct and promote safe facility operation.

Safety Kleen Inc v. State of SC · filed 2001-12-19(b)(4)

Accordingly, we hold that the regulatory exception applies to DHEC’s issuance and enforcement of the bond order. The bankruptcy stay does not apply to these efforts.

Section 362(b)(4)'s police and regulatory power exception permits a state to issue and enforce a hazardous-waste financial assurance bond order when the regulations primarily deter environmental misconduct and encourage safe facility operations.

Safety-Kleen, Inc. (Pinewood) v. Wyche · filed 2001-12-19(b)(4)

As we see it, the primary purpose of South Carolina's financial assurance regulations is to deter environmental misconduct and to encourage the safe design and operation of hazardous waste facilities. This is a clear exercise of the state's regulatory power. Accordingly, we hold that the regulatory exception applies to DHEC's issuance and enforcement of the bond order. The bankruptcy stay does not apply to these efforts.

Section 362(b)(4) excepts attorney disciplinary proceedings enforcing a state supreme court’s regulatory power over licensed attorneys from the automatic bankruptcy stay.

Risker v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline · filed 2002-02-21(b)(4)

The Commission argues that this disciplinary proceeding falls under the “police and regulatory power” exception in subsection 362(b)(4), and therefore is not subject to the automatic stay. ... We agree with these decisions and conclude that this disciplinary proceeding was for the purpose of enforcing the Supreme Court’s regulatory power over attorneys licensed by the State.

Section 362(b)(4) permits the EEOC to continue a Title VII action against a debtor to the extent it exercises its police and regulatory powers.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Le Bar Bat, Inc. · filed 2002-02-26(b)(4)

For these reasons, and in light of the authorities cited above, the EEOC qualifies for the exception to Die Fliedermaus’ bankruptcy stay under § 362(b)(4) to the extent that it continues to exercise its police and regulatory powers.

Section 362(b)(4) permits a court to impose sanctions for abuse of the appellate process despite the automatic stay arising from a participant’s bankruptcy filing.

Keitel v. Heubel · filed 2002-07-17(b)(4)

Our government regulatory power, which is expressly excepted from the reach of the automatic stay, includes the authority to impose sanctions in order to punish and deter abuses of the appellate process.

Section 362(b)(4) does not exempt a private creditor’s civil contempt proceeding to enforce a judgment from the automatic stay.

In Re Benalcazar · filed 2002-08-15(b)(4)

In sum, Brookfield, in pursuing civil contempt proceedings against Benalcazar, was a private litigant pursuing its individual interests in enforcing a court order to assist in collecting a judgment — not a governmental unit enforcing the governmental unit’s police or regulatory power. Accordingly, the police power exception of § 362(b)(4) does not apply, and Brook-field’s actions were subject to the automatic stay.

Section 362 permits a government regulator to declare a performance bond forfeited in exercising its police or regulatory power, but stays collection of the forfeited proceeds as enforcement of a money judgment.

Graham v. West Virginia (In Re War Eagle Construction Co.) · filed 2002-09-18(b)(4)

For all these reasons, the Court FINDS and CONCLUDES that DEP’s action in declaring War Eagle’s performance bond forfeited did not violate the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362. The declaration of forfeit is analogous to the entry of judgment or the declaration of default. None of these constitutes the collection of a money judgment, an activity that is automatically stayed upon the filing of bankruptcy.