11 U.S.C. § 362

Section 362 permits conditional relief from the automatic stay to arbitrate a labor grievance under an approved contract, while enforcement of any award requires further court approval.

Sterling Mining Co. v. Kilgore (In Re Sterling Mining Co.) · filed 1982-03-23

2) contingent upon the Court’s approval of the subject contract, that the agreement of the parties therein to submit labor disputes to arbitration be upheld, that the temporary injunction entered on February 9, be lifted, and that the defendants’ request for relief from the automatic stay be granted to allow arbitration to settle the dispute, but that the defendants may not proceed to enforce any award except with further approval of this Court; and, ... There being no further issues to resolve, this proceeding is closed and removed from the docket of the Court.

Relief from the automatic stay serves no purpose when the creditor’s proposed state-court action would produce a judicial lien avoidable under Section 522(f).

Builders and Remodelers, Inc. v. Hanson · filed 1982-05-25

By the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and on the advent of the Bankruptcy Code, such a lien right or prospect would result in a “judicial lien” and avoidable by the debtor under the expressed terms of Section 522(f). Accordingly no purpose is served in granting relief from the automatic stay.

Section 362(d)(1) permits a bankruptcy court to lift the automatic stay for cause to allow a state court action to proceed when doing so serves efficient administration and does not unduly burden the debtor.

Gray v. Rounseville (In Re Rounseville) · filed 1982-06-11(d)(1)

The bankruptcy court clearly has the authority to modify the automatic stay for cause, 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1), ... and based upon the arguments of counsel, I am satisfied that permitting the state action to proceed at this time is in the best interest of the efficient administration of this case.

Section 362 permits a court to modify the automatic stay for the limited purpose of determining a claimant’s interest in the debtor’s property in state court.

Matter of Colby · filed 1982-09-15

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362 upon Robert D. Copas shall be modified to permit the continuation of his law suit against Timothy A. and Linda D. Colby in the circuit court for Dane County Wisconsin for the following single limited purpose: to determine what interest, if any, Robert D. Copas has in the real estate owned by Timothy A. Colby and Linda D. Colby at 5950 Mayhill Drive, Madison, Wisconsin, more particularly described as Lot 454, Eighth (8th) Addition to Meado-wood, City of Madison, Dane County, Wisconsin.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause so a state court can resolve the merits of a contract dispute.

Belles Construction Co. v. Biller (In Re Biller) · filed 1982-09-16(d)(1)

Since the merits of this contract action must necessarily be determined, the Court will grant relief from the stay “for cause” ... under § 362(d)(1) and allow Belles to pursue the contract action in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County.

Section 362(d)(1) allows relief from the automatic stay for cause when an action is better heard in another tribunal.

Peabody International Corp. v. KSH, Inc. (In re KSH, Inc.) · filed 1982-11-05(d)(1)

The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code provides that “cause” for relief from the stay under § 362(d)(1) is found, inter alia, when it is advantageous for an adversary proceeding to continue in a tribunal other than bankruptcy court. ... Since we find it would be more advantageous for Peabody’s action to continue in county court, we will grant the relief requested.

Section 362’s automatic stay protects a debtor against a creditor’s pursuit of possession in state court after the debtor files for bankruptcy.

Gibbs v. Housing Authority of City of New Haven · filed 1983-08-17

Analysis of the Authority’s appeal begins with the determination that a violation of the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 362, undoubtedly occurred. It is precisely the point of that provision to protect the debtor from proceedings outside the bankruptcy court. “Proceeding in the wrong court” is the essence of a violation of § 362; it is exactly the evil that that section was intended to curb.

Section 362(d)(1) permits modifying the automatic stay so a creditor can establish the debtor’s liability to recover on an indemnity bond, while barring collection from the debtor or the estate.

In Re Turner · filed 1985-11-13(d)(1)

Any prejudice to the debtor and his estate by a finding of liability in the district court action may be obviated by this court’s order limiting relief from stay for the sole purpose of obtaining a finding of liability, and prohibiting any act of the Banks to collect, recover, or offset any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor, or from property of the debtor.

A bankruptcy court order modifying the automatic stay to permit a pending state-court action to proceed to final judgment allows the state court to retain jurisdiction over that action.

Bryant v. Edwards · filed 1986-03-31

The defendant also asserts that the judgment in favor of the plaintiff in this case was voided by reason of the defendant’s filing a petition in bankruptcy on June 4, 1984. We find no merit in this contention because the record shows that before this worker’s compensation judgment became final the bankruptcy court entered an order as follows: ... Giving effect to this order of the bankruptcy court, the state court was not deprived of jurisdiction in this case.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for a state court trial when that litigation will not delay or harm administration of the bankruptcy estate.

Mattingly v. Newport Offshore, Ltd. (In Re Newport Offshore, Ltd.) · filed 1986-04-09(d)(1)

To the contrary, all present indications are that the litigation of this dispute in the state court will not delay administration of the estate or have any other detrimental impact on this Chapter 11 case. ... Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, the automatic stay is modified to allow Mattingly to petition the Superior Court for a special assignment and early trial, and to proceed with trial if his petition is granted.

Section 362(d) permits modification of the automatic stay to allow parties to litigate severed state-law claims in state court while the bankruptcy court retains jurisdiction over enforcement of any resulting judgment.

Manufacturers Acceptance Corp. v. Caribank Corp. (In Re Manufacturers Acceptance Corp.) · filed 1988-01-27(d)

In addition, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d), the automatic stay is modified to permit either party to present those issues in the appropriate State court and to permit both parties to litigate those issues to conclusion in that court, retaining jurisdiction in this court solely with respect to the enforcement of any judgment or decree thus obtained, pending further proceedings in the debtor’s pending chapter 11 reorganization.

Section 362(d)(1) does not require lifting the automatic stay to join a debtor in another lawsuit merely to use its documents when the documents are preserved and usable without joining the debtor, and defending the suit would burden the debtor.

In re Howard P. Foley Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1988-06-21(d)(1)

The district court concluded that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief from the automatic stay. Similarly, we conclude that the district court reached the correct result. ... Since the existence of the documents has been protected, and because those documents can be used in the Louisiana district court either with or without Foley's presence in the suit, there is no need to grant Cajun's motion.

Section 362(d)(1) permits a court to modify the automatic stay for cause so a state action may proceed to final judgment while barring collection from the debtor’s property without further order.

Murray v. On-Line Business Systems, Inc. (In Re Revco D.S., Inc.) · filed 1989-03-21(d)(1)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the motion for relief from stay filed by Plaintiffs is granted and the automatic stay is modified solely to permit the case to proceed to final judgment and Plaintiffs are prohibited from commencing any action to collect from the property of Debtor on any liability resulting from said final judgment without further order of the Bankruptcy Court.

Section 362(a)(1) bars a creditor from pursuing claims adjudication in state court unless the creditor obtains relief from the automatic stay.

McKesson Corp. v. El Paso Pharm, Inc. (In Re El Paso Pharm, Inc.) · filed 1991-07-29(a)(1)

Does this mean that parties are free to pursue their claims adjudication in state court? Certainly not. Such a pursuit would of course violate the automatic stay. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1). In the usual case, the claimant seeking to pursue such a state court adjudication seeks relief from the stay.

Section 362(d)(1) permits modification of the automatic stay to allow state-court adjudication of claims against a debtor while barring collection from the debtor’s property until the bankruptcy court authorizes it.

Burke v. Donington, Karcher, Salmond, Ronan & Rainone, P.A. (In Re Donington, Karcher, Salmond, Ronan & Rainone, P.A.) · filed 1996-04-16(d)(1)

The Court grants Burke’s motion to modify the stay to permit him to adjudicate his state-law claims against Donington, Kareher in state court. ... The Court orders that recovery of any judgment from these claims will be prohibited until a further order of the bankruptcy court permits Burke to pursue an action to collect from the property of Donington, Kareher.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief for cause to continue prepetition state litigation over property ownership when it is ready for trial and the state court, unlike the bankruptcy court, has personal jurisdiction over all parties.

Power Equipment Co. v. Case Credit Corp. (In Re Power Equipment Co.) · filed 2004-05-14(d)(1)

The state court litigation concerned the right, title and interest of one or more of the debtors in the real estate in question. The state court litigation was ready for and scheduled for trial within weeks of the date the bankruptcy petitions were filed. The state court had personal jurisdiction over all parties to the case. The bankruptcy court did not have personal jurisdiction over all parties to the case. ... All of those factors support the granting of relief from the automatic stay to permit the case to proceed in the state court.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief for cause to continue prepetition state-court title litigation ready for trial when that court has jurisdiction over all parties and ownership must be resolved before reorganization.

Power Equipment Co. v. Case Credit Corp. · filed 2004-05-14(d)(1)

The state court litigation was ready for and scheduled for trial within weeks of the date the bankruptcy petitions were filed. The state court had personal jurisdiction over all parties to the case. The bankruptcy court did not have personal jurisdiction over all parties to the case. The issue of right, title or interest of the debtors in the property in question needed to be decided prior to preparing, filing and balloting on any proposed plan of reorganization by the debtors. All of these factors are subsumed in both the oral order and the written order entered by the bankruptcy judge. All of those factors support the granting of relief from the automatic stay to permit the case to proceed in the state court.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the stay for pending state-court lien-priority litigation when abstention is warranted and severance will not require significant duplication of effort or risk inconsistent judgments.

Kesar Enterprises, Inc. v. State Bank of Texas (In Re Kesar Enterprises Inc.) · filed 2005-09-28(d)(1)

Finally, if this Court felt that abstention as to Count I with retention of the additional counts now contained in the Complaint would require significant duplication of effort on the part of the parties or result in potentially inconsistent judgments, it would deny the motion to abstain and the motion for relief from stay and retain jurisdiction of all the claims asserted in the Complaint. Because the Court has concluded that that is not the case, it will, for the reasons cited and explained below, grant both motions. ... For all the reasons cited above, State Bank’s Abstention Motion is granted as to Count I of the Complaint and denied as to Counts II, III and IV and State Bank’s Lift Stay Motion is granted as to Count I of the State Court Action and denied as to Count II.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief for cause to allow prepetition litigation to proceed in its original forum when judicial economy and related claims against nondebtor parties favor abstention, while requiring further court authorization to enforce any resulting judgment.

Allied Capital, Inc. v. Gibson (In Re Gibson) · filed 2006-03-14(d)(1)

In this case, cause for relief from the automatic stay exists. For the same reasons discussed in relation to abstention, Creditor should be granted relief from the stay to pursue the New Mexico action. ... For the reasons discussed above, and in the exercise of its discretion, the Court will abstain from consideration of the adversary proceeding and grant stay relief so that Creditor may proceed to judgment in the New Mexico litigation. However, Creditor may take no action to enforce any judgment obtained in New Mexico against Defendant without further order from this Court.

A debtor's voluntary Chapter 11 petition automatically stays pending claims against the debtor.

Apace Communications, Ltd. v. Burke · filed 2007-11-16(a)

On September 6, 2007, Empire filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of New York. Empire's filing of that petition automatically stayed plaintiffs’ claims against Empire.

Section 362(d)(1) permits stay relief to continue state-court litigation when the claimant’s hardship outweighs prejudice to the debtor or estate, conditioned on continued insurer-funded defense and recovery limited to insurance coverage.

Karp v. R.J. Groover Construction, L.L.C. (In re R.J. Groover Construction, L.L.C.) · filed 2008-07-01(d)(1)

In light of the previous discussion, and focusing on this broad test adopted by Judge Drake, I conclude that no great prejudice will befall debtor or debtor’s estate if this limited relief is granted. As of this time, the case is being defended by the insurer, and the relief sought is limited to the proceeds of any applicable coverage. ... This hardship outweighs any inconvenience that Debtor may suffer as a result of having to cooperate with the insurer in the defense of this case. ... Annette Karp is permitted to enforce any judgment only to the extent of applicable insurance coverage of the Debtors in these cases. ... This authority is granted only for so long as a defense is provided to Debtors by Builders or other insurance, if any.

Relief from the automatic stay to litigate in another forum requires balancing the movant’s hardship against potential prejudice to the debtor, the estate, and other creditors, regardless of whether anyone objects.

Builders Insurance Group, Inc. v. R.J. Groover Construction, LLC (In Re R.J. Groover Construction, LLC) · filed 2008-12-22(d)(1)

Second, in determining whether to lift the automatic stay so a party may commence or continue litigation in another forum, most courts “balance the hardship to the [movant], if he is not allowed to proceed with his lawsuit, against potential prejudice to the debtor, debtor’s estate and other creditors.” ... As a result, in the previous order, this Court had to balance the hardship to the debtor, the debtors’ estates and other creditors regardless of whether a third party, or no party, files an objection.

Section 362(d)(1) permits denial of stay relief when allowing a creditor to resume litigation would unduly burden the debtor by duplicating a pending bankruptcy adversary proceeding.

In re Bell · filed 2012-07-30(d)(1)

However, granting relief from the automatic stay to permit resolution of those two (2) threshold issues also could open the door to NWI’s prosecution of its entire claim, resulting in the unduly burdensome duplication of the Adversary Proceeding litigation. In these circumstances, I conclude that the balance tips in favor of denying the request for relief from the automatic stay.

Section 362(d)(1) permits modification of the automatic stay to let a state court resolve claims against the debtor when judicial economy and the needs of the bankruptcy case justify it.

Drauschak v. VMP Holdings Ass'n (In re Drauschak) · filed 2012-11-01(d)(1)

The factors supporting mandatory abstention, mentioned above, including judicial economy, would also justify applying the aforementioned exception to modify the automatic stay to permit the state court to adjudicate the entire dispute, including the unsecured counterclaims raised by the Piazza defendants.

Section 362(d)(1) permits a bankruptcy court to deny relief from the automatic stay for litigation in another forum after considering the circumstances and the competing hardships.

In re Living Hope Southeast, LLC · filed 2014-01-29(d)(1)

Having studied the record in this case, and taking into account the long litigious history of these parties, the Court denies relief from stay to allow the Miller County Case to proceed against the Debtor based on its analysis of the circumstances of this case and its current posture in addition to the Blan factors, as described below.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay to obtain a judgment against the debtor when that judgment is needed to recover from the debtor’s insurer.

In re Podmostka · filed 2015-03-10(d)(1)

Unless that occurs, relief from stay to pursue a judgment against the Debtor is warranted as a prerequisite to a recovery against the Carrier.

Section 362(a) automatically stays a pending lawsuit against a debtor upon its bankruptcy filing.

Walter Auto Loan Trust v. Posh Automotive LLC · filed 2025-08-26(a)

The Court recetved a suggestion of bankruptcy as to Defendant Posh Automotive LLC. Dkt. No. 54. As a result, this case is automatically STAYED.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause when resuming advanced, multiparty state court litigation will promote judicial economy and resolve the parties’ claims, despite limited estate funds to satisfy a possible judgment.

Syed Naqvi · filed 2026-03-13(d)(1)

In short, continuation of the State Court Action, where all parties are present and all claims have been asserted, will promote the interests of judicial economy and the expeditious and economical resolution of the litigation. Therefore, Sonnax factors 1, 4, 6, 7, 10, 11, and 12 weigh in favor of lifting the automatic stay. There are no contrary considerations that outweigh the reasons to lift the say. Although Debtor may be right that ultimately the estate will have limited funds to satisfy any judgment against him, Ms. Gannon’s action will fix her entitlements against both Debtor and the contractor, which may benefit estate administration.

Section 362(b)(4) excepts litigation to enforce governmental police powers from the automatic stay.

ITUAH v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA · filed 2023-11-06(b)(4)

Contrary to Ituah’s suggestion that the demolition occurred shortly after the New York bankruptcy case’s dismissal because the bankruptcy stayed the demolition, there is an exception to bankruptcy stays for litigation to enforce police powers—as was the case here.

Section 362(b) exempts governmental actions enforcing regulatory power from the automatic bankruptcy stay.

Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Financial Tree · filed 2021-02-16(b)

Actions filed by governmental agencies in which they enforce their regulatory power, as here, are exempt from the automatic stay provision that applies in some bankruptcy cases.

Section 362 permits the U.S. trustee to continue an action enforcing bankruptcy petition preparer consumer protections under the governmental unit exception to the automatic stay.

Chrystal Jean Bennett · filed 2019-09-25(b)(4)

Here, the UST Motion fits squarely within the governmental unit exception as enforcing the consumer protections set forth in § 110. Accordingly, the Court finds that continuation of this matter under the UST’s enforcement powers is not stayed by § 362.

Section 362(b)(4) permits a governmental law-enforcement proceeding to continue despite the automatic stay when the defendant files for bankruptcy.

United States v. Midwest Generation, LLC · filed 2013-07-08(b)(4)

The parties have agreed that the law-enforcement exception to the automatic stay in bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C. §362(b)(4), applies to these proceedings, which therefore need not be consigned to limbo.

Section 362(b)(4) does not exempt a False Claims Act qui tam action from the automatic stay when the government declines to intervene and the relator alone conducts the action.

United States Ex Rel. Kolbeck v. Point Blank Solutions, Inc. · filed 2011-02-01(b)(4)

In that narrow context, the action does not constitute “an action or proceeding by a governmental unit” within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code and does not fall within the § 362(b)(4) exception to the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(4) excepts a governmental action enforcing consumer protection laws under its police or regulatory power from the automatic stay.

In Re Horne · filed 2002-03-12(b)(4)

The automatic stay did not apply to the cause of action insofar as it was filed by a governmental unit to enforce its police or regulatory power including matters of the violation of consumer protection laws.

Section 362(b)(4) excludes state law-enforcement actions from the automatic stay, so the state need not seek relief from the stay to pursue them.

In the Matter of James Towers, Debtor-Appellant. State of Illinois · filed 1999-01-12(b)(4)

That request was unnecessary; state law-enforcement actions are outside the scope of the stay to begin with.

Section 362(b)(4) excepts state court sanctions for frivolous litigation from the automatic stay when they enforce the court’s regulatory power.

Janis v. Janis · filed 1998-11-24(b)(4)

Thus viewed, whether the sanctions imposed upon plaintiff by this court under 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 (a) are evaluated under the “pecuniary purpose” test or the “public policy” test, it is clear that they come within the exception of 11 USC § 362 (b) (4).

Section 362(b)(4) and (5) allow an SEC contempt proceeding to identify assets and obtain an accounting despite the automatic stay, while execution on a money judgment requires action by the bankruptcy court.

Securities & Exchange Commission v. Kenton Capital, Ltd. · filed 1997-11-06(b)(4), (b)(5)

This contempt proceeding also falls within the exceptions of 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(4) & (5) as it relates to assets and income identification and an accounting to mitigate any arm done to the Commission by the non-payment, and so is not subject to the automatic stay, although execution on the money judgment will require action by the Bankruptcy Court.

Section 362(b)(4) permits a state to pursue a CERCLA cost-recovery motion under its police or regulatory power despite the debtor’s bankruptcy, without first obtaining relief from the automatic stay.

State of NY v. N. Storonske Cooperage Co., Inc. · filed 1994-11-01(b)(4)

Consequently, with that caveat, the court finds that the present motion falls squarely within section 362(b)(4)’s exception to the Code’s automatic stay provision, and so there is no impediment under the Code to considering the State’s motion for partial summary judgment. Moreover, there is no need, as CMC urges, for the State to seek to have the automatic stay lifted in the bankruptcy court.

Section 362 does not stay the government’s seizure of a debtor’s records in an ongoing investigation of its billing practices.

Medicar Ambulance Co. v. Kramer (In Re Medicar Ambulance Co.) · filed 1994-10-25

However, the Court finds that Section 362 does not impose a stay in this instance since such section is not applicable to the seizure of Plaintiff’s records.

Section 362(b)(4) and (5) do not authorize payment of regulatory settlement refunds when the agency approved the settlement rates but did not order payment.

Matter of Columbia Gas System, Inc. · filed 1994-08-09(b)(4), (b)(5)

The problem with this argument, as the objectors point out, is that there is no FERC order or judgment in the RP-90 case requiring TCo to pay the refund monies. The FERC issued an order finding that the settlement rates were just and reasonable. The FERC recognized that the settlement contemplated the refund of about $58 million; however, the FERC did not order payment of the refund monies. Thus, the asserted “independent basis” for approval of the settlement motion is without merit.

Section 362(a)(6) stays proceedings to obtain an environmental cleanup injunction when the injunction is a prepetition claim because the government has an alternative right to payment.

In Re Goodwin · filed 1993-12-22(a)(6)

Since the right to injunctive relief is a “claim,” actions taken to obtain the injunction are acts to collect, assess, or recover on the claim.

Section 362(b) exempts proceedings by governmental units to enforce their police or regulatory powers from the automatic bankruptcy stay.

People v. New Woman, Inc. · filed 1993-10-04(b)

Bald assertions of law office failure will not serve to routinely excuse defaults, and Fleet National Bank’s claim that it reasonably believed that it was prohibited from answering the petition pursuant to the automatic bankruptcy stay provisions of 11 USC § 362 is meritless in light of subdivision (b) of that section, which expressly exempts from its coverage proceedings by governmental units to enforce their police or regulatory powers (see also, Ohio v Kovacs, 469 US 274, 283-284, n 11).

Section 362(b)(4) excepts governmental police or regulatory proceedings from the automatic stay, so an injunction cannot categorically extend the stay to all future agency proceedings.

Whitaker v. Interstate Commerce Commission (In Re Olympia Holding Corp.) · filed 1993-09-10(b)(4)

The practical effect of this portion of the Bankruptcy Court’s order is to extend the automatic stay to all ICC proceedings involving the Plaintiffs/Appellees. Such a blanket extension would render the exception found in 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) meaningless.

Section 362(b)(4) does not exempt a private citizens group’s Clean Water Act citizen suit from the automatic stay under the governmental unit exception.

In Re Chateaugay Corp. · filed 1990-11-12(b)(4)

This Court agrees with In re Revere Copper and Brass, Inc. and holds that to the extent Sportfishing relies on the Code § 362(b)(4) governmental unit exception, that section is not applicable, and therefore, it is barred by the automatic stay imposed by § 362(a) from filing suit against the Debtors.

Section 362(b)(4) and (5) permit a National Labor Relations Board enforcement proceeding to continue after the respondent files a bankruptcy petition.

National Labor Relations Board v. Twin Cities Electric Big G Electric & Engineering, Inc. · filed 1990-07-02(b)(4), (b)(5)

However, the filing of a bankruptcy petition does not bar or stay an enforcement proceeding instituted by the National Labor Relations Board.

Section 362 does not stay orders requiring affirmative action to reclaim land damaged by surface mining.

United States v. Hubler · filed 1990-06-08

First, the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. § 362, does not apply to orders such as the CO which require affirmative action to reclaim lands scarred by surface mining.

Section 362(b)(4) exempts a governmental CERCLA action seeking to fix damages from the automatic stay.

City of New York v. Exxon Corp. · filed 1990-03-30(b)(4)

The language of the exception to the stay and the legislative history lead us to agree with other courts who have held that, when a governmental plaintiff in a CERCLA action is attempting to fix damages, the automatic stay does not apply.

Section 362(b)(4) does not exempt a state agency’s determination that a debtor hospital forfeited its certificate of need exemption when the determination does not exercise police power to protect public health and safety.

Schatzman v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services, Florida (In Re King Memorial Hospital, Inc.) · filed 1980-06-24(b)(4)

Following the guidelines of the narrow interpretation as laid down by Congress and in accord with the interpretation given in the Saugus General Hospital case, the determination by the defendant, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, State of Florida, that the debtor-hospital, King Memorial Hospital, Inc., has forfeited its exemption from Certificate of Need law, is subject to the automatic stay provision of Section 362 and is not the exercise of a governmental unit’s police power to protect the public health and safety.

Section 362(b)(4) excepts a governmental enforcement action to exercise police or regulatory power from the automatic stay.

In Re Co Petro Marketing Group, Inc. · filed 1980-09-10(b)(4)

The Commission’s injunctive action would seem to be an action “by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit’s police or regulatory power” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4); consequently, the filing of Co Petro’s Chapter 11 petition did not operate as an automatic stay of that action.

Section 362(b)(4) does not exempt a governmental action aimed solely at protecting depositors’ pecuniary interests in property from the automatic stay.

In Re State of Missouri · filed 1980-12-02(b)(4)

It is plain Petitioners are not endeavoring to prevent a violation of consumer protection, environmental protection, fraud or a similar police or regulatory law involving the safety, health, morals and the general welfare of society, but on the contrary, Petitioners’ sole objective is to protect the pecuniary interests in property of purported depositors. Consequently, Petitioners’ action does not fall within the exception to the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court where a governmental unit is enforcing a police or regulatory power.

Section 362(b)(4) exempts NLRB unfair labor practice proceedings from the automatic stay as exercises of governmental police or regulatory power.

National Labor Relations Board v. Evans Plumbing Company · filed 1981-03-13(b)(4)

This action was undertaken to enforce the federal law regulating the relationship between employer and employee. We can safely conclude therefore that this is an exercise of police or regulatory powers which places it within the § 362(b)(4) exemption to the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(4) exempts governmental actions to enforce police or regulatory powers from the automatic stay.

Bankr. L. Rep. P 68,455 Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Incomco, Inc., Philip M. Smith, Lincolnwood, Inc., Rober · filed 1981-05-12(b)(4)

The commencement or continuation of actions brought by governmental agencies to enforce regulatory or police powers is specifically exempted from the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (Supp. Ill, 1979). See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a) and 362(b)(4) (Supp. Ill, 1979).

Section 362(b)(4) permits a town to continue a zoning enforcement action against a Chapter 11 debtor under the governmental police or regulatory power exception to the automatic stay.

In Re Cousins Restaurants, Inc. · filed 1981-06-15(b)(4)

But 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code exempts from the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) “the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental units police or regulatory power.” ... Therefore, debtor’s motion for a stay should be denied and the Town is permitted to continue its action in the Town Justice Court and it is so ordered.

Section 362’s automatic stay applies to governmental units, except for state criminal actions and proceedings to enforce governmental police or regulatory powers.

Campbell v. Gerace · filed 1981-07-28

11 U.S.C. § 362 operates as a stay, applicable to all entities. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14) includes governmental units as an “entity”. § 362(b)(1) and (b)(4) excepts only state criminal actions and proceedings by a governmental unit to enforce the unit’s police or regulatory powers.

Section 362(b)(4) does not exempt a tribal government’s eviction of a debtor for lease default from the automatic stay.

In Re Sandmar Corp. · filed 1981-07-31(b)(4)

The Navajo Nation claims that the tribe is exempt from the operation of 11 U.S.C. § 362 by virtue of their status as a governmental entity. While we may grant that the Tribe is a governmental entity, section 362 provides no such blanket exemption. Presumably, the Tribe is relying on sub-section (b)(4) of 11 U.S.C. § 362 which exempts governmental units exercising their police powers as regulatory power. The eviction of a Debtor in default of a lease is not the exercise of the tribe’s police or regulatory power.

Section 362(b)(4) does not exempt an agency proceeding from the automatic stay when the agency is adjudicating private rights between the immediately affected parties rather than enforcing public policy.

Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Dan Hixson Chevrolet Co. (In Re Dan Hixson Chevrolet Co.) · filed 1981-07-31(b)(4)

However where the administrative agency is acting in a quasi-judicial capacity seeking to adjudicate private rights rather than effectuate public policy as defined by regulatory law the (b)(4) exception is inapplicable. Where the agency’s action concerns only the parties who are immediately affected the debtor is entitled to the same protection it would receive under the automatic stay if the proceeding were pending instead in a judicial forum.

Section 362(b)(4) permits the National Labor Relations Board to continue proceedings that fix a debtor’s liability for unfair labor practices because that step exercises its police and regulatory power.

D. M. Barber, Inc. v. Valverde (In Re D. M. Barber, Inc.) · filed 1981-09-11(b)(4)

As the Board’s authority to fix liability for violation is incident to the exercise of its police and regulatory power, the Board’s “compliance” stage in the proceedings against the debtor also falls within the § 362(b)(4) exception.

Section 362(b)(4) excepts a state agency’s administration of workers’ compensation claims from the automatic stay as an exercise of governmental police or regulatory power.

In Re Mansfield Tire And Rubber Company · filed 1981-09-29(b)(4)

In view of the guidelines provided by these cases and the language and legislative history of the Bankruptcy Act, we find that the administration of workers' compensation claims by the State of Ohio and the agencies created for that purpose is a valid exercise of the police or regulatory power of a governmental unit. The activity thus falls within the exception of 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) and the Bankruptcy Court erred in refusing to vacate the automatic stay of § 362(a)(1).

Section 362(b)(4) excepts a state agency’s administration of workers’ compensation claims from the automatic stay as an exercise of governmental police or regulatory power.

Ohio v. Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co. · filed 1981-09-29(b)(4)

In view of the guidelines provided by these cases and the language and legislative history of the Bankruptcy Act, we find that the administration of workers’ compensation claims by the State of Ohio and the agencies created for that purpose is a valid exercise of the police or regulatory power of a governmental unit. The activity thus falls within the exception of 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) and the Bankruptcy Court erred in refusing to vacate the automatic stay of § 362(a)(1).

Section 362(b)(4) does not except a municipality’s proposed revocation of a debtor’s liquor license for failure to stay open when the inactivity poses no public health, safety, consumer protection, or environmental concern.

Industrial National Bank of Rhode Island v. Miceli (In Re Gencarelli) · filed 1981-10-20(b)(4)

Since the enforcement of R.I. Gen Laws 3-7-7 is not the type of regulatory activity intended to be excepted under § 362, and since the prejudice to the secured creditor would be significant if the license were revoked, the Westerly Town Council is enjoined from revoking or suspending the Debtor’s liquor license until further order of the Court.

Section 362(b)(4) permits the United States to continue an action to collect a civil penalty when the action enforces its regulatory power.

United States v. Energy International, Inc. · filed 1981-11-16(b)(4)

Nevertheless, § 362(b)(4) exempts from the automatic stay of subsection (a)(1) “an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce [its] police or regulatory power.” Because this action by the United States to collect a civil penalty is one to enforce its regulatory power, it is not stayed.

Section 362(b)(4) excepts FLSA enforcement proceedings from the automatic stay as an exercise of governmental police or regulatory power.

Donovan v. Timbers of Woodstock Restaurant, Inc. · filed 1981-11-26(b)(4)

This Court finds FLSA enforcement proceedings plainly constitute an exercise of “police or regulatory power” and are therefore within the exception to the automatic stay provision.

Section 362(b)(4) excepts state medical license disciplinary proceedings based on professional misconduct and public safety from the automatic stay.

Thomassen v. Division of Medical Quality Assurance, Department of Consumer Affairs (In Re Thomassen) · filed 1981-12-01(b)(4)

The trial court correctly held that 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) excepted the actions of the California Board of Medical Quality Assurance in the present case from the effect of the automatic stay provided by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1).

Section 362(b)(4) does not exempt a municipality’s postpetition zoning reclassification when the abandonment period had not expired and the municipality had no enforceable right at the bankruptcy filing.

Eisenberg v. Incorporated Village of Mineola (In Re IDH Realty Inc.) · filed 1981-12-03(b)(4)

In the case at bar only two months on the abandonment period had run by the date of the debtor’s filing. At that point, the village had no enforceable rights against the debtor. The running of the abandonment period for four more months was the necessary contingent event to the creation of such a right. Accordingly, the post filing administrative reclassification is not an act of enforcement, and is subject to the stay.

Section 362(b)(4) does not exempt a governmental action to collect a prepetition debt from the automatic stay.

Heckler Land Development Corp. v. Township of Montgomery (In Re Heckler Land Development Corp.) · filed 1981-12-18(b)(4)

When the goal of the government action is to enforce the collection of a pre-petition indebtedness, however, the automatic stay will be imposed.

Section 362(b)(4) does not except enforcement of a financial responsibility law aimed at protecting judgment creditors’ pecuniary interests from the automatic stay.

Muzio v. Sampson (In Re Sampson) · filed 1982-01-15(b)(4)

I conclude that the Connecticut financial responsibility law, Conn.Gen.Stat. § 14-117, is not excepted under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) from the automatic stay provided by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) and that the plaintiff is barred from enforcing his September 9, 1981 order, requiring the defendant to post financial security or face suspension of his operator’s license, motor vehicle registration or both.

Section 362(b)(4) permits the government to seek an FLSA injunction against shipment of goods produced in violation of wage laws despite the employer’s bankruptcy.

Donovan v. TMC Industries, Ltd. · filed 1982-05-25(b)(4)

However, it ignores the thrust of the (b)(4) exception which was intended to give the government a super-priority, not a priority to proceeds from the estate, but a priority in terms of having access to any proper court to enforce laws which promote public health and welfare. ... The Fair Labor Standards Act is just such a law.

Section 362(b)(5) permits governmental units to enforce their police powers through mandatory injunctions, but does not except efforts to collect money from the automatic stay.

Ohio v. Kovacs · filed 1982-06-16(b)(5)

We concur with the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that § 362 indicates a clear intent to permit governmental units to continue to enforce their police power through mandatory injunctions despite the filing of a bankruptcy petition, but to deny those units the power to collect money in their enforcement efforts. We further concur with the conclusion of the bankruptcy court and the district court that the state of Ohio in its state court proceedings was seeking what in essence amounted to a money judgment against Kovacs, which was properly subject to the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(4) excepts governmental police or regulatory actions from the § 362(a)(1) stay, but does not permit seizure of estate property barred by § 362(a)(3).

Dallas-Fort Worth Regional Airport Board v. Braniff Airways, Inc. (In Re Braniff Airways, Inc.) · filed 1982-06-18(b)(4)

The precise wording of § 362(b)(4) explicitly creates an exception to the stay imposed under § 362(a)(1). Plaintiff is still subject to § 362(a)(3) which stays “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate”.

Section 362(b)(4) permits a state agency to continue proceedings to sanction unemployment-benefit fraud under its police power, while any resulting claim for overpayment is administered in bankruptcy.

Herr v. Maine (In Re Herr) · filed 1983-03-01(b)(4)

Section 362(b)(4) excepts the Bureau’s proceedings against Herr from the operation of the automatic stay. ... It is not attempting to interfere with property of the estate; its claim for overpayment will be administered by the court like any other claim.

Section 362(b)(5) allows enforcement of a governmental regulatory injunction directing return of debtor assets to a receiver when the assets will pass to the bankruptcy trustee for distribution.

Commodity Futures Trading Com'n v. Co Petro Marketing Group, Inc. · filed 1983-03-11(b)(5)

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the district court's order directing return of the $60,000 comes within the "police or regulatory exception" to the automatic stay set forth in section 362(b)(5). The district court's order enforced an injunction obtained by the CFTC in an action to enforce its police or regulatory power.

Section 362(b)(4) and (5) except NLRB regulatory proceedings and enforcement of its order from the automatic stay under § 362(a)(1) and (2).

Ahrens Aircraft, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board · filed 1983-03-28(b)(4), (b)(5)

It is also clear that 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) and (5) ... prevents the application of the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) and (2).

Section 362(b)(4) excepts a government proceeding to enforce petroleum price regulations that protect the public from the automatic stay.

In Re County Fuel Co., Inc. · filed 1983-04-12(b)(4)

Accordingly, enforcement of the Department’s regulation falls within the section 362(b)(4) exception.

Section 362(b)(4) exempts actions enforcing governmental police or regulatory powers from the automatic stay only when a governmental unit brings them; private attorney general suits are not exempt.

Revere Copper Products, Inc. v. Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. (In Re Revere Copper & Brass, Inc.) · filed 1983-04-22(b)(4)

Absent a clear intent to the contrary this court must presume that Congress intended to exclude from the automatic stay actions to enforce governmental police and regulatory powers only when such actions were brought by a governmental unit.

Section 362(b)(4) and (5) allow governmental units to pursue and enforce an injunction against a debtor to stop violations of environmental protection laws despite the automatic stay.

Fan-Reed, Inc. v. Upper Neches River Municipal Water Authority · filed 1983-04-28(b)(4), (b)(5)

Both Upper Neches River Municipal Water Authority and the Texas Department of Water Resources were proceeding against the debtor (Fan Reed) to stop violations of environmental protection laws, thus bringing the present action squarely within the letter and spirit of the above-quoted exceptions to the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362 does not stay Federal Communications Commission proceedings concerning approval of a transfer of a debtor’s radio broadcast license.

SSS of Kentucky, Inc. v. Lawrence Picus Pos of Kentucky, Inc. (In Re SSS of Kentucky, Inc.) · filed 1983-03-28(b)(4)

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362 do not apply to the proceedings presently pending before the Federal Communications Commission, and the complaint for injunctive relief be and is dismissed.

Section 362(b)(4) does not exempt a state liquor license revocation proceeding based on unpaid taxes from the automatic stay when the proceeding does not affect public health, welfare, morals or safety.

William Tell II, Inc. v. Illinois Liquor Control Commission (In Re William Tell II, Inc.) · filed 1983-05-26(b)(4)

Since that was the basis of the revocation proceeding which was pending in the Circuit Court of Cook County when Tell’s petition was filed, that proceeding was automatically stayed because the Commission’s enforcement of the Act in this case did not affect the public health, welfare, morals or safety.

Section 362(b)(4) permits a government agency to commence an administrative proceeding to establish a debtor’s liability under the Davis-Bacon Act as an exercise of its police or regulatory power.

Donovan v. Quinta Contractors, Inc. (In Re Quinta Contractors, Inc.) · filed 1983-06-10(b)(4)

Consequently, the Secretary’s commencement of an administrative proceeding to establish the debtor’s liability under the Act is not stayed by § 362(a).

Section 362(b)(4) can except state action addressing financial mismanagement that threatens a nursing home’s viability and its residents’ welfare from the automatic stay.

Lawson Burich Associates, Inc. v. Axelrod (In Re Lawson Burich Associates, Inc.) · filed 1983-06-29(b)(4)

Certainly, there are circumstances under which improvident financial management impacts the general welfare of a facility, and in turn, its residents. In light of this, I cannot conclude that Judge Babitt abused his discretion in finding the section 362(b)(4) exemption applicable, and his second order of June 2, 1982 is affirmed.

Section 362(b)(4) excepts NLRB unfair labor practice proceedings from the automatic stay.

GHR Energy Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board (In Re GHR Energy Corp.) · filed 1983-05-17(b)(4)

All parties agree, as does the Court, that 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) excepts the proceedings from the automatic stay.

Section 362(b) permits a state builder’s board to enter consumer-protection orders against a debtor under its regulatory authority when the orders cannot diminish the bankruptcy estate.

Apache Construction, Inc. v. Oregon (In Re Apache Construction, Inc.) · filed 1983-07-27(b)

Orders by the Oregon Builder’s Board, similar to those involved in the case at bar, were held to be within the scope of the Builder’s Board’s legislatively mandated purpose of consumer protection and thus, a governmental unit’s exercise of police or regulatory power within the ambit of 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) in Dependable Insurance Company v. The Builder’s Board, No. 81-1088 (D.Or.1982). This Court is disposed to follow these decisions in cases where, as here, no diminution of the bankruptcy estate can result from the Builder’s Board orders.

Section 362(b)(4) exempts government actions enforcing police or regulatory powers from the automatic stay.

Office of Surface Mining, United States Department of Interior v. Sewanee Land, Coal & Cattle, Inc. (In Re Sewanee Land, · filed 1983-08-04(b)(4)

Yet § 362(b)(4) exempts from the automatic stay provisions of subsection (a) actions by a governmental unit to enforce its police or regulatory powers.

Section 362(b)(4) does not exempt a county’s attempted withdrawal of an estate asset’s building permit from the automatic stay without a showing that the county acted within its police or regulatory powers.

Island Club Marina, Ltd. v. Lee County, Fla. · filed 1983-08-17(b)(4)

In the case at bar, Lee County attempted to withdraw a building permit that was granted at a prior hearing. This action was taken without first seeking permission from this court to lift the automatic stay. Nor does the record show that Lee County was acting within its prescribed police or regulatory powers in acting to impair the debtor’s rights to the building permit. Consequently, this court finds that Lee County is in violation of Section 362.

The governmental-unit exception to Section 362’s automatic stay applies only to actual governmental entities, not private organizations acting in a governmental capacity.

Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Revere Copper Products, Inc. (In Re Revere Copper & Brass, Inc.) · filed 1983-08-22(b)(4)

Clearly, both the statutory language and the legislative history demonstrate that the term “governmental unit” in the bankruptcy code refers exclusively to actual governmental groups and not to organizations acting in a governmental capacity. The exception to the automatic stay for governmental units was intended to allow state, federal or foreign entities to continue to proceed or to commence actions against debtors.

Section 362(b)(4) does not except a governmental unit’s effort to collect pre-petition debt from the automatic stay.

Island Aviation, Inc. v. Mariana Islands Airport Authority · filed 1983-09-07(b)(4)

This interpretation is reinforced by case law, which holds generally that when the object of the government action is to enforce collection of pre-petition indebtedness it is not an action to enforce appropriate police or regulatory interests of the governmental unit, and che automatic stay will be imposed. ... Subsection (b)(4) provides a specific limitation on the applicability of subsection (a)(1), and defendant has not shown that its motion for summary judgment is contemplated by this exception.

Section 362(b)(4) does not exempt a governmental proceeding aimed at recovering money from the debtor when no public health or safety interest is at stake.

Greenwald v. Axelrod (In Re Greenwald) · filed 1983-11-25(b)(4)

Manifestly, the Commissioner seeks to protect a pecuniary interest in property of the debtor to the extent of a claim for medicaid overpayments. Accordingly, the Commissioner may not proceed under the police or governmental regulatory exception in 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).

Section 362(b)(4) does not exempt National Mediation Board representation investigations and elections from the automatic stay because the Board does not exercise police or regulatory enforcement authority in those proceedings.

TXIA Holdings Corp. v. National Mediation Board (In Re Continental Airlines Corp.) · filed 1984-01-06(b)(4)

The Court herein is compelled by the plain language of 45 U.S.C. Sec. 152, Ninth and the authorities presented to it to find that the present investigation and election are administrative proceedings and do not constitute the exercise of police or regulatory authority and therefore does not come within the (b)(4) exception to 11 U.S.C. 362(a)(1).

Section 362(b)(4) permits a governmental unit to continue an enforcement action through entry of judgment under its police or regulatory power.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Rath Packing Co. · filed 1984-01-11(b)(4)

In summary the Court concludes that proceedings in this action up to entry of judgment are excepted from the automatic stay by § 362(b)(4).

Section 362(a)(1) stays a licensing board’s refusal to renew a debtor’s licenses when the sole basis is unpaid pre-petition taxes.

Aegean Fare, Inc. v. Licensing Board (In Re Aegean Fare, Inc.) · filed 1983-12-22(a)(1)

This finding is made notwithstanding paragraph eighteen of the Board’s decision, as I find that the sole basis for the Board’s decision was the Debtor’s non-payment of pre-petition taxes and thus the non-renewal of the Debtor’s licenses was prohibited by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1).

Section 362(b)(4) does not except a state consumer protection action seeking restitution for private citizens from the automatic stay when it would adjudicate their claims against the debtor’s estate.

In Re Charter First Mortgage, Inc. · filed 1984-02-06(b)(4)

Any state court ordering restitution for certain citizens from the debtor is certainly creating for those few citizens an advantage over other potential creditors of the debtor’s estate. The court will have made a binding judicial determination as to both the existence and legitimacy of those claims without having had to consider and apply the many technical conditions created by the Bankruptcy Code which test the validity of claims against the debtor’s estate. Any court action to enforce this statute does not fall within the language of § 362(b)(4) and thus is stayed.

Section 362(b)(4) does not except a state action from the automatic stay when its purpose is to collect delinquent taxes rather than protect public health or welfare.

In Re Farmers Markets, Inc. · filed 1984-02-08(b)(4)

Instead, the purpose of the law is to ensure that delinquent taxes are paid by the transferor of a liquor license. Since this purpose is pecuniary, the court finds that the § 362(b)(4) exception does not apply.

Section 362(b)(4) does not except a tax board’s suspension of corporate powers to collect unpaid taxes from the automatic stay.

Coben v. Lebrun (In Re Golden Plan of California, Inc.) · filed 1984-02-21(b)(4)

The Board’s actions are not excepted by § 362(b)(4) of the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(4) permits a state to pursue an action enforcing its police and regulatory powers against a debtor at least through judgment despite the automatic stay.

Kelley v. Sclater (In Re Sclater) · filed 1984-03-22(b)(4)

The automatic stay would not have been effective to enjoin the litigation at least through the judgment stage because the state would have been enforcing the exercise of its police and regulatory powers, an exception to the stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).

Section 362(b)(4) does not except a county’s postpetition zoning change from the automatic stay when the county fails to show that the change protects residents’ health and safety.

Island Club Marina, Ltd. v. Lee County (In Re Island Club Marina, Ltd.) · filed 1984-03-27(b)(4)

In the instant case, the automatic stay provisions of the Code prevent Lee County from changing the debtor’s density zoning under the County’s November 1982 Developmental Standards Ordinance (DSO), which was enacted four months after the debtor filed its Chapter 11 petition. Section 362(b)(4) of the Code, which allows governmental units to avoid the automatic stay in certain situations is inapplicable in the instant case. Lee County has failed to prove to this court that the exceptions which would justify the lifting of the stay are present in this case. More important, Lee County has not established that the DSO protects the health and safety of Lee County residents.

Section 362(b)(4) exempts an NLRB unfair labor practice hearing from the automatic stay as an exercise of governmental police or regulatory power.

Rath Packing Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers International Union (In Re Rath Packing Co.) · filed 1984-03-28(b)(4)

Assuming, without deciding, ... that the Norris-Laguardia Act does not preempt 11 U.S.C. § 362 and further assuming that the automatic stay thus applies, this Court concludes that 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) exempts the Board hearing from the operation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(4) permits a governmental action to enforce ERISA and assess a penalty for violations to proceed despite the automatic stay.

Donovan v. Porter · filed 1984-03-30(b)(4)

However, here, the government seeks only to enforce the provisions of ER-ISA and to assess a penalty for the violation of those provisions. This is clearly the type of regulatory action Congress had in mind when it developed the exceptions to the automatic stay provision. Accordingly, the defendant’s suggestion of stay will be denied.

Section 362(b)(4) permits a state to continue a federal environmental suit against a debtor when the suit exercises the state’s police power to protect the public.

People of State of Ill. v. Electrical Utilities · filed 1984-04-23(b)(4)

One tool that the attorney general and the State have at their disposal to promote a healthy environment is a suit under TSCA. This action is such a suit and, therefore, within the exception found in section 362(b)(4).

Section 362 stays a government administrative proceeding that is not commenced or continued to enforce police or regulatory power.

Compton Corp. ex rel. Kellogg v. United States Department of Energy (In re Compton Corporation) · filed 1984-06-27(b)(4)

It is this Court’s opinion that the continuation of the DOE proceedings under the circumstances of this case is contrary to the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362, since such proceedings were not commenced and are not continued to enforce police or regulatory power.

Section 362(b)(4) exempts governmental actions seeking to protect public health and safety from the automatic stay when they do not protect a state pecuniary interest.

Virginia v. First Federal Corp. (In Re First Federal Corp.) · filed 1984-07-09(b)(4)

Therefore, if in fact the injunctive and declaratory relief which the appellants would pursue is sought to protect the public health and safety, and its effect is not to protect some pecuniary interest on the Commonwealth’s part, then the appellants are exempt from the provisions of the automatic stay under section 362(b)(4).

Section 362(b)(4) does not exempt a private securities exchange’s investigation from the automatic stay merely because the exchange has statutory regulatory duties.

In Re Colin, Hochstin Co. · filed 1984-07-27(b)(4)

Given the clearly expressed intentions of Congress to interpret § 362(b)(4) narrowly and the recent opinions of this Circuit affirming those Congressional directives, it is thus apparent that the NYSE does not qualify for the § 362(b)(4) exemption from the automatic stay, and we so conclude.

Section 362(b)(4) exempts state police and regulatory action against a nursing home with health care deficiencies from the automatic stay.

In Re 30 Hill Top Street Corp. · filed 1984-08-30(b)(4)

There is ample authority that a state’s action against a nursing home in the exercise of its police and regulatory power is exempt from the automatic stay. ... Here, the existence of numerous health care deficiencies would bring this case within the exemption.

Section 362(b)(4) exempts actions brought by the Secretary of Labor under FLSA § 17 to enforce wage and hour requirements from the automatic stay.

Donovan v. Health Care Resources, Inc. · filed 1984-08-31(b)(4)

Based upon the foregoing sections, the courts have clearly held that proceedings instituted by the Secretary of Labor under § 17 of the FLSA constitute an exercise of police or regulatory powers, and, as such, are exempt from the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). ... The court therefore concludes that defendant’s request that this action be dismissed or stayed must be denied because the automatic stay provisions do not apply to the present proceeding.

Section 362(b)(4) exempts a municipality’s zoning ordinance enacted under its police or regulatory power from the automatic stay.

Lacoquille Investment Co. v. Town of Manalapan (In Re Lacoquille Investment Co.) · filed 1984-11-07(b)(4)

If it was an action or proceeding subject to the automatic stay, it was necessarily an action or proceeding to enforce the town’s police or regulatory power, and, therefore, expressly exempt under § 362(b)(4).

Section 362(b)(4) excepts a governmental agency’s regulatory investigations and proposed administrative proceedings from the automatic stay.

Davis v. United States (In Re Farmers & Ranchers Livestock Auction, Inc.) · filed 1984-12-10(b)(4)

The Court is convinced based upon the record evidence, that the nature and scope of the continuing investigations and the proposed administrative proceedings fall within the exception to the automatic stay created by 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).

Section 362(b)(4) excepts a governmental unit’s enforcement of its police or regulatory power from the automatic stay.

Hildemann Industries, Inc. v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (In Re Hildemann Industries, Inc.) · filed 1984-12-17(b)(4)

The actions taken by N.J.D.E.P. fall squarely within the enforcement by a governmental unit of such governmental unit’s police or regulatory power exception contained in Subsection [b][4].

Section 362(b)(5) allows a governmental agency to continue a civil enforcement proceeding despite the filing of a Chapter 11 petition.

Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. FITC, Inc. · filed 1985-03-13(b)(5)

The Court denies this motion. It is unequivocally the law in the Ninth Circuit that a filing of a Chapter 11 petition does not stay a continuing civil enforcement proceeding brought by a governmental agency.

Section 362(b)(4) and (b)(5) do not except a Service Contract Act enforcement proceeding to determine and collect employees’ unpaid wages and benefits from the automatic stay, even if the proceeding may also result in debarment.

Organized Maintenance, Inc. v. Ford (In Re Organized Maintenance, Inc.) · filed 1985-03-22(b)(4), (b)(5)

An enforcement proceeding under the Service Contract Act of 1965 is not an action to enforce the police or regulatory power of the United States, but to determine and collect ordinary obligations incurred by a contracting employer to his employees. It is a proceeding which squarely involves a pecuniary interest of the employees and the employer, and as such, it is not excepted from the § 362 stay by § 362(b)(4) or § 362(b)(5).

Section 362 stays the debt-collection aspect of a government proceeding when it seeks payment of prepetition obligations rather than enforcement of health or public safety laws, even if the proceeding is styled as criminal.

In Re Jerzak · filed 1985-03-21(b)(4)

Under 11 U.S.C. sec. 362 most acts to collect pre-petition debts are automatically stayed. Not statutorily enjoined are criminal actions against a debtor or actions by governmental units to enforce police or regulatory powers. ... To the extent that Mr. Hogan sues to recover pre-petition wages and increased wages for DILHR’s beneficiary, Mr. White, it is clear that this nominally criminal matter is not distinguishable from instances where a state agency attempts to enforce a statute directed at a debtor’s financial obligations rather than the state s health and public safety concerns. ... The civil aspect of the state court proceeding should be enjoined.

Section 362 does not automatically stay enforcement of environmental protection laws against a debtor.

Global International Airways Corp. v. Engen (In Re Global International Airways Corporation, ) · filed 1985-04-18(b)(4)

The automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Act are not applicable, because this ease involves the enforcement of environmental protection laws.

Section 362 permits a government to obtain and enforce an environmental cleanup injunction aimed at preventing future harm, even if compliance costs the debtor money.

United States v. ILCO, Inc. (In Re ILCO, Inc.) · filed 1985-05-10(b)(4), (b)(5)

This court concludes that the complaint filed by the U.S., which seeks a court order compelling ILCO as well as other named defendants to remedy environmental hazards, constitutes an equitable action to prevent future harm, rather than an action to enforce a money judgment. The automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362 are therefore inapplicable.

Section 362(b)(4) permits the Department of Agriculture to pursue regulatory proceedings under PACA despite a debtor’s bankruptcy filing.

Fresh Approach, Inc. v. United States · filed 1985-05-17(b)(4)

As this Court has noted, the Secretary is essentially attempting to enforce his regulatory authority. Such actions are permitted by § 362(b)(4) and beyond the scope of this Court’s injunctive powers.

Section 362(b)(4) exempts an environmental agency’s action to enforce hazardous waste regulations from the automatic stay.

In Re Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., Inc. · filed 1985-05-17(b)(4)

EPA’s potential enforcement action, however, is designed to obtain COR-CO’s compliance with hazardous waste, storage and disposal regulations and falls squarely within the exception to the automatic stay codified at 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).

Section 362(b)(4) permits a government action to fix damages for violations of environmental protection laws to proceed despite the automatic stay.

United States v. Standard Metals Corp. · filed 1985-05-23(b)(4)

This is an action to fix damages for violation of environmental protection laws and thus clearly falls within the ambit of § 362(b)(4).

Section 362(a)(1) stays a governmental proceeding to deny renewal of a debtor’s licenses for unpaid taxes when the action protects the state’s financial interests and thus falls outside the police or regulatory power exception in § 362(b)(4).

Blarney, Inc. v. City of Saint Paul (In Re Blarney, Inc.) · filed 1985-06-26(a)(1), (b)(4)

Therefore, whether the proceeding for nonrenewal of the Plaintiff's licenses is stayed by section 362(a)(1) depends on whether the action taken by the Defendants was to enforce the state’s police or regulatory power. ... I am sufficiently persuaded, based upon the facts, that Minn.Stat. § 270.72 was enacted for the primary purpose of protecting the state’s pecuniary interests, and not its health, welfare, morals, or safety concerns.

Section 362(b)(4) excepts government actions from the automatic stay only when they enforce police or regulatory power; an agency’s effort to recover unpaid wages for employees does not qualify.

Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relations v. Ludwig (In Re Napco Graphic Arts, Inc.) · filed 1985-07-16(b)(4)

For that reason, DILHR is precluded from relying on § 362(b)(4) which only excepts a governmental action from the automatic stay where it is an attempt to enforce a police or regulatory power.

Section 362(b)(4) does not exempt a government civil action seeking money damages when its primary purpose is pecuniary rather than enforcement of police or regulatory powers.

United States v. Wellham (In Re Wellham) · filed 1985-07-22(b)(4)

The court holds that the civil action cannot, under either the pecuniary purpose test or the public policy test, properly be characterized as an enforcement of police or regulatory powers but is merely an action for damages.

Section 362(b)(4) exempts an SEC regulatory enforcement action, including a motion to add an entity to its receivership, from the automatic stay.

Securities & Exchange Commission v. Elmas Trading Corp. · filed 1985-09-03(b)(4)

As noted above, the SEC brought this case in its regulatory capacity. Thus, the exception to the automatic stay provisions found in U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) enables this Court to properly rule on the Receiver’s motion to include Gold Equities in the Receivership.

Section 362(b)(4) does not except government debt collection for a pecuniary purpose from the automatic stay.

In Re Hoffman · filed 1985-10-17(b)(4)

It is fundamental that government action with a pecuniary purpose (debt collection) does not fall within the exception to 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) allowing regulatory action against debtors or their estates in order to protect the public health and safety.

Section 362(b)(4) permits governmental enforcement of police or regulatory power to proceed despite the automatic stay, but the stay applies when the government seeks relief to protect a pecuniary interest in the debtor’s property.

In Re Bennett Paper Corp. · filed 1985-12-13(b)(4)

That being the case, the Court further concludes that insofar as the Commission is seeking in-junctive relief in its district court complaint, its action is one to enforce its Con-gressionally mandated police or regulatory power and that, accordingly, the stay does not apply. ... Insofar as the Commission is seeking to make whole all persons adversely affected by the Debtor’s employment practices, to obtain a judgment for back pay, liquidated damages, interest or costs, the Court concludes that the Commission’s action is one to protect a pecuniary interest in the Debt- or’s property. ... Thus, as to the relief requested by the Commission in sections C-F of its complaint, the stay does apply.

Section 362(b)(5) stays a regulator’s efforts to compel payment of a fine for prepetition violations, even when the fine was imposed after the bankruptcy petition.

Sam Daily Realty, Inc. v. Department of Commerce & Consumer Affairs (In Re Sam Daily Realty, Inc.) · filed 1985-12-10(b)(5)

DCCA’s attempt to compel payment through further disciplinary action is an attempt to enforce a money judgment and is stayed under § 362(b)(5). ... Overall legislative intent supports the application of § 362(b)(5) where post-petition judgments are rendered as a result of pre-petition violations.

Section 362(b)(4) exempts governmental land use proceedings regulating a debtor’s use of property from the automatic stay when they enforce police or regulatory powers.

Beker Industries Corp. v. Florida Land & Water Adjudicatory Commission (In Re Beker Industries Corp.) · filed 1986-02-13(b)(4)

But it is the nature of the current Proceeding itself which is determinative of whether its continuation by the Commission and County fits within the exemption. Section 362(b)(4) so states on its face. Concomittantly, it is the nature of the regulatory act itself which should determine whether the control provision of § 362(a)(3) applies. Zoning and land use planning are exemplary of police and regulatory powers.

Section 362(b)(4) allows a state to obtain a civil penalty judgment in a regulatory action, but § 362(b)(5) keeps enforcement of that judgment stayed.

In Re Liss · filed 1986-02-19(b)(4), (b)(5)

Movant’s request to proceed in state court to seek civil penalties and costs among other relief in the exercise of police power is not stayed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4). ... However, the state is limited to obtaining judgment for a fixed penalty amount but may not proceed to enforce the judgment (§ 362(b)(5)) because that would be a preference over other creditors.

Section 362(b)(4) permits a state transportation agency to enforce traffic laws through license suspension despite the automatic stay, even when a fine is the usual sanction for the underlying violation.

Smith v. Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (In Re Smith) · filed 1986-02-20(b)(4)

PennDOT’s actions are likewise the efforts of a governmental unit to enforce that unit’s police or regulatory powers which have been authorized under a reciprocal agreement between sister states for the enforcement of traffic laws. The fact that a fine is the only criminal sanction typically imposed for a minor violation of traffic laws does not transform the criminal action under scrutiny into a civil proceeding beyond the scope of a government’s police or regulatory power. Thus, PennDOT has not violated the automatic stay of § 362(a).

Section 362(b)(5) permits a governmental unit to obtain injunctive relief and a backpay judgment while barring enforcement of the backpay judgment.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. The Rath Packing Company · filed 1986-03-20(b)(5)

The entry of a judgment for injunctive relief and backpay is permitted under Sec. 362(b)(5), but the actual enforcement of the backpay judgment is not permitted.

Section 362(b)(5) permits entry of an injunctive and backpay judgment in a government enforcement action but bars enforcement of the backpay award.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Rath Packing Co. · filed 1986-03-20(b)(5)

The entry of a judgment for injunctive relief and backpay is permitted under § 362(b)(5), but the actual enforcement of the backpay judgment is not permitted.

Section 362(b)(4) permits governmental administrative proceedings to assess civil money penalties despite the automatic stay, while leaving dischargeability and collection of those penalties for later determination.

United States Ex Rel. Brock v. Perez (In Re Perez) · filed 1986-04-09(b)(4)

Both of the Secretary’s pending administrative MSPA proceedings are in the nature of governmental police or regulatory actions within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) and thus are not subject to the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) to the extent civil money penalties may be assessed in those proceedings; provided, however, that the determination of whether any such civil money penalties are nondischargeable or may be collected outside these bankruptcy proceedings shall be subject to further order of this Court.

Section 362(b)(4) and (b)(5) require a genuine exercise of governmental police or regulatory power; a government contract termination action does not qualify merely because a health department brings it.

Corporacion De Servicios Medicos Hospitalarios De Fajardo v. Izquierdo Mora (In Re Corporacion De Servicios Medicos Hosp · filed 1986-04-15(b)(4), (b)(5)

It follows that the Department’s claim of the benefits of 11 U.S.C. 362(b)(4) and (b)(5) is unfounded for its failure to even meet the threshold prima facie demonstration of a police/regulatory case.

Section 362(b)(4) exempts EEOC proceedings to enforce employment discrimination law from the automatic stay.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Hall's Motor Transit Company and General Teamsters Chauffeurs, Warehousemen a · filed 1986-05-01(b)(4)

We agree with the Eighth Circuit that proceedings brought by the EEOC fall within the exception to the automatic stay defined by § 362(b)(4).

Section 362(b)(4) permits a governmental unit to continue a regulatory investigation into potential fraud despite the automatic stay.

United States Department of Housing & Urban Development v. Sutton · filed 1986-05-29(b)(4)

The Court concludes that petitioner’s investigation relates to potential fraud and is, therefore, not subject to the stay provision of § 362.

Section 362(b)(4) does not except a state agency’s suit to recover benefit overpayments from the automatic stay when the alleged fraud ended before the suit.

Illinois Department of Public Aid v. Ellis (In Re Ellis) · filed 1986-08-04(b)(4)

Thus, the Department cannot fit its state court suit into Section 362(b)(4)’s exception for actions to stop continuing fraudulent activities.

Sections 362(b)(4) and (b)(5) permit government agencies exercising police powers to obtain back pay judgments and enforce back to work orders, but enforcement of back pay awards remains stayed.

Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (In Re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp.) · filed 1986-09-02(b)(4), (b)(5)

However, with regard to the Debtor’s instant Complaint under § 362, we are constrained to hold that the automatic stay does not prevent the Agencies from obtaining judgments against the Debtor for back pay and back benefits owed to discriminatees, and does not bar the enforcement of back to work orders. The enforcement of any back pay and back benefit awards, of course, remains subject to the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(4) and (5) let a state enforce its environmental cleanup powers during Chapter 11, including ordering cleanup or doing the cleanup and obtaining a lien when applicable law allows it.

In Re Distrigas Corp. · filed 1986-09-26(b)(4), (b)(5)

New Jersey is not bound by the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) & (5), and can proceed regardless of the debtor’s Chapter 11 to order the debtor to clean up the property or clean it itself and obtain a lien on the debtor’s property to reimburse itself, provided it could do so under appropriate law had there been no bankruptcy.

Section 362(b)(4) does not except a state tax collection measure conditioning transfer of a debtor’s liquor license on payment of delinquent taxes from the automatic stay.

In Re Hoffman · filed 1986-10-22(b)(4)

The court holds that R.I.Gen.Laws § 3-7-24 does not constitute regulatory legislation of the sort which Congress meant to except from the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay. Rather, the state law appears in all material respects to be a statutory mechanism enlisted in the service of the collection of delinquent taxes. As such, the statute cannot avoid the effect of the automatic stay under the exemption limned in 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).

Section 362(b)(4) allows an environmental regulatory appeal to proceed despite bankruptcy when it only determines who receives a civil penalty held in escrow and does not affect the debtor’s assets or creditors.

United States v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation · filed 1986-11-03(b)(4)

The resolution of this question will neither increase nor decrease J & L's assets nor affect its other creditors; it will merely determine the appropriate recipients of a civil penalty held in escrow and designated as belonging to the United States. The determination of proper parties to this settlement agreement arising from a violation of the Clean Air Act is based on the policies and procedures set out in environmental pollution legislation. This proceeding therefore falls under the rubric of the governmental regulatory power exception to the automatic stay in bankruptcy.

Section 362(b)(4) does not exempt a governmental unit’s action to enforce contractual rights from the automatic stay.

In Re Corporacion Servicios Medicos Hospitalarios Fajardo · filed 1986-11-10(b)(4)

Because we cannot conceive of any situation in which an action for contractual relief would be the only avenue available for the enforcement of generally applicable regulatory laws, we choose to follow the congressional directive to give section 362(b)(4) a "narrow construction," 124 Cong.Rec. H11089 (statement of Rep. Edwards), reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 6436, 6444, and hold that an action by a governmental unit to enforce contractual rights is not exempt from the provisions of the automatic stay by virtue of section 362(b)(4).

Section 362(b)(4) does not exempt a governmental unit’s action to enforce contractual rights from the automatic stay.

Corporacion de Servicios Medicos Hospitalarios de Fajardo v. Mora · filed 1986-11-10(b)(4)

In reaching this decision we hold that the Department’s contract termination action before the Commonwealth Superior Court was not exempt from the automatic stay under section 362(b)(4), that the Commonwealth court violated the stay by purporting to terminate the contract, and that ap-pellee has satisfied all the requirements of section 365(b)(1) regarding the assumption of a contract in default.

Section 362 exempts EPA actions to enforce environmental laws from the automatic stay, even when compliance requires the debtor to spend money.

Commonwealth Oil Refining Co. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency · filed 1986-11-25(b)(4), (b)(5)

The enforcement actions of the EPA in this case do not come within the ambit of Sec. 362(a)(1) because they are actions to enforce police and regulatory powers, thus falling within the Sec. 362(b)(4) exception to the automatic stay. The EPA's actions are not an attempt to enforce a money judgment, proscribed by Sec. 362(b)(5), notwithstanding the fact that CORCO will be forced to expend funds in order to comply.

Section 362(b)(4) excepts NLRB unfair labor practice proceedings from the automatic stay as exercises of governmental police or regulatory power.

National Labor Relations Board v. Edward Cooper Painting, Inc., and Cooper & Cooper Painting, an Alter Ego · filed 1986-11-06(b)(4)

We agree with the Evans Plumbing court, and hold that the NLRB’s unfair labor practice complaint against respondent was excepted from the automatic stay under § 362(b)(4).

Section 362(b)(4) and (5) except governmental actions enforcing police or regulatory powers from the automatic stay.

Brock v. Arlmont Services, Inc. · filed 1986-11-12(b)(4), (b)(5)

I find that the above-styled action is a proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce that unit’s police and regulatory powers and as such, is excepted from the “automatic stay” provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) and (5).

Section 362(b)(4) permits state proceedings enforcing rent regulations to continue after a landlord files for bankruptcy when the proceedings exercise governmental police or regulatory power and harm no other creditors.

Berry Estates, Inc. v. New York · filed 1987-02-19(b)(4)

We hold at the outset that section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362, which mandates a broad stay of litigation against the debtor, did not invalidate any of the State court proceedings that followed Berry's Chapter 11 petition. Section 362(b)(4) specifically excepts from an automatic stay "the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory power." Inasmuch as there are no other creditors to be harmed by the State courts' orders, those orders appear to fall within this exception.

Section 362(b)(5) permits a state to compel a debtor to clean up abandoned wells when the action seeks to prevent future environmental harm rather than recover money for past harm.

Walsh v. West Virginia (In Re Security Gas & Oil, Inc.) · filed 1987-03-11(b)(5)

I therefore conclude that West Virginia’s action is not one for money damages under the Penn Terra test, and is excepted from the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4), -(5).

Section 362(b)(4) excepts a state’s criminal bail enforcement from the automatic stay when the state acts to secure a defendant’s return and protect public safety.

Bean v. PEOPLE OF STATE OF COLO. · filed 1987-04-17(b)(4)

Few proceedings could possibly occupy a more central role in the operation of the state’s traditional police power than the enforcement of criminal bail proceedings as part of a criminal prosecution. ... The state’s motivation falls squarely within the parameters of the police power contemplated by § 362(b)(4).

Section 362(b)(4) exempts certain governmental regulatory actions from the automatic stay, but the bankruptcy court may still enjoin such an action under § 105.

Garrity v. Leffler (In Re Neuman) · filed 1987-03-18(b)(4)

Section 362(b)(4) provides that the filing of a bankruptcy petition does not operate as a stay of the commencement of an action by a governmental unit against the debtor to enforce the unit’s police or regulatory power. Even if this section does apply to Neuman’s state court action against Garrity and the Department of Health, the Bankruptcy Court’s broader equitable powers under § 105 permit it to enjoin the state proceeding.

Section 362(b)(4) permits a government CERCLA action seeking cleanup costs or punitive damages to proceed despite the automatic stay when the relief deters environmental harm and protects public health and welfare.

United States v. Mattiace Industries, Inc. · filed 1987-05-15(b)(4)

Even where the United States seeks punitive damages or reimbursement of Superfund cleanup costs in addition to or in lieu of injunctive relief, thereby arguably protecting its own pecuniary interest, the deterrence function of the relief sought will render the action one to protect the public health, safety, and welfare.

Section 362(b)(4) permits a court to impose Rule 11 sanctions despite the automatic stay because the sanction proceeding enforces the judiciary’s regulatory power.

O'Brien v. Fischel · filed 1987-06-09(b)(4)

Given the underlying concerns, this court believes imposition of sanctions under Rule 11 is a direct application of the district court’s regulatory powers, which serve to protect the general public from needless, harassing, and abusive litigation. We therefore find that under the “pecuniary purpose” test, proceedings to impose sanctions on authority of Rule 11 are not automatically stayed by the filing of a petition in Bankruptcy.

Section 362(b)(4) exempts State Bar attorney disciplinary proceedings from the automatic stay as exercises of governmental police or regulatory power.

Cooper v. State Bar · filed 1987-09-10(b)(4)

We do not agree that attorney disciplinary proceedings fall within the purview of section 362(a)(1). Subsection (b)(4) of the same statute excepts from the automatic stay provision “the commencement or continuation of ... an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit’s police or regulatory power.” That exemption is clearly applicable to State Bar disciplinary proceedings.

Section 362(b)(4) permits enforcement of a prospective workplace safety abatement order against a debtor, but the automatic stay bars enforcement of the accompanying monetary penalty.

William E. Brock, Secretary of Labor v. Morysville Body Works, Inc. · filed 1987-10-19(b)(4)

We conclude that, although the stay prevents us from enforcing the petition with regard to the fine required by the citation, it does not extend to that portion of the citation that orders abatement of health and safety violations, and for that portion of the citation, we grant the Secretary's petition for enforcement.

Section 362(b)(4) permits a township to continue an ordinance enforcement proceeding against a debtor to address rubbish that may threaten public health or safety.

In Re Rabzak · filed 1987-11-19(b)(4)

Third, this is clearly the type of action that is not proscribed by the automatic stay. Although a determination that the automatic stay applies would not, in and of itself, require us to enjoin the Supervisors, we think that it is significant that the automatic stay would not be applied to prohibit continuation of this proceeding. The automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362 reflect Congresses’ intent that certain state court matters continue in spite of the pend-ency of a bankruptcy. The Code contains a series of exceptions to the stay, including “... the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit’s police or regulatory power ...” 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).

Section 362(b)(4) does not except purely pecuniary government actions from the automatic stay.

Matter of Commonwealth Cos., Inc. · filed 1987-12-02(b)(4)

From the decisional law and the legislative passages quoted above, the Court is convinced that Congress did not intend to include purely pecuniary actions in the exception from the automatic stay provided by Section 362(b)(4).