11 U.S.C. § 362

Section 362(b)(4) lifts the automatic stay for governmental proceedings that serve public policy and public health rather than primarily protecting the government’s pecuniary interest in the debtor’s property.

United States v. Ships Int'l Inc · filed 2025-09-18(b)(4)

In determining whether the automatic stay of § 362(a) is rendered inoperative by the “governmental police and regulatory power” exception of § 362(b)(4), the Court must evaluate (i) whether the proceedings at issue “effectuate public policy” or merely “adjudicate private rights,” and (ii) whether the proceedings at issue relate to “a matter of public safety and health” or “primarily to the protection of the government’s pecuniary interest in the debtor’s property.”

Section 362(b)(4) exempts governmental enforcement of consumer protection laws from the automatic stay when the proceeding furthers public policy.

State of Tennessee v. Ideal Horizon Benefits, LLC · filed 2025-09-19(b)(4)

Therefore, as this proceeding is enforcing consumer protection laws which further public policy, it is exempted from the automatic stay under § 362(b)(4).

Section 362(b)(4) excepts a governmental raze order from the automatic stay when the conditions prompting it pose a serious risk to public health and safety.

In re Gary C. Sukowatey and Nancy A. Sukowatey · filed 2025-11-21(b)(4)

And so, a raze order arising from circumstances that pose a serious risk to public health and safety would fall within such powers.

Section 362(b)(4) turns on which interest a government action primarily protects when both regulatory and pecuniary interests are present.

Prospect CCMC, LLC v. Kennedy · filed 2025-12-19(b)(4)

But these cases are inapposite and distinguishable from the two Fifth Circuit cases, FiberTower and Halo Wireless, for one main reason: they do not apply the test in the Fifth Circuit— which is to ask, not whether the governmental entity clearly has a pecuniary interest that it is protecting in addition to having a public policy interest, but which interest the governmental entity’s actions seemed aimed to primarily protect.

Section 362(b)(4) permits a regulator to keep a debtor’s wells sealed to compel a bond securing future compliance with regulatory rules when its purpose is regulatory rather than collection of a prepetition fine.

Black Diamond Energy of Delaware, Inc. v. Wyoming Oil · filed 2025-12-31(b)(4)

Accordingly, the Commission’s post-petition efforts to compel Black Diamond to post the $25,000 bond, and its related decision to keep the wells sealed until that compliance assurance was provided, were valid exercises of police and regulatory power and are not stayed by § 362(a).

Section 362(b)(4) excepts a state agency’s revocation and refusal to reinstate a vehicle registration from the automatic stay when the agency enforces a law aimed at public safety and welfare.

Patricia Bell Muhammad · filed 2026-03-19(b)(4)

Therefore, NCDMV’s enforcement of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-311 by revoking, and refusing to reinstate, the Debtor’s registration is excepted from the automatic stay as action taken to enforce a governmental unit’s “police or regulatory power.”

Section 362(b)(4) permits a state racing commission to suspend a debtor’s trainer’s license when enforcing financial responsibility rules under its police and regulatory power.

Christmas v. Maryland Racing Commission (In Re Christmas) · filed 1989-06-15(b)(4)

This Court holds the actions of the Maryland Racing Commission in the enforcement of its rules of financial responsibility by suspending the debtor’s license as a horse trainer in the instant case to have been a valid exercise of the state’s police and. regulatory power to which the automatic stay of section 362 does not apply.

Section 362(b)(4) permits a governmental unit to enforce its police power even when doing so may incidentally pressure a debtor to pay.

In Re Jennings · filed 1989-06-28(b)(4)

This Court after considering the mechanism and procedure which the Prosecuting Attorney has set up and after hearing the evidence as to how that system operates, finds that Mr. Moseley was indeed “enforcing such governmental unit’s police or regulatory power.” The Court further finds that while Mr. Moseley’s system might sometimes have the effect of coercing payment from a party in bankruptcy, it was designed actually to make painful the violation of the laws of the Sovereign State of Missouri, a purpose for which Mr. Moseley must be commended.

Section 362(b)(4) exempts an agency’s revocation of hazardous waste operating authority to protect public health and safety from the automatic stay.

United States v. Professional Sales Corp. (In Re Professional Sales Corp.) · filed 1985-12-16(b)(4)

In this case, PSC properly conceded that the EPA’s revocation of interim status, as an action to protect the public health and safety, was entitled to the § 362(b)(4) exemption.

Section 362(b)(4) excepts proceedings by a governmental unit to enforce its police or regulatory power from the automatic stay.

In Re S.R.R. Corp. · filed 1986-10-08(b)(4)

The automatic stay provision of section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 362) provides for a stay of all actions, including judicial and administrative, against the estate of a debtor, but section 362(b)(4) excepts from the automatic stay provision the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit’s police or regulatory power.

Section 362’s police and regulatory exceptions allow EPA to pursue compliance with federal environmental laws against a Chapter 11 debtor despite the automatic stay.

United States v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corporation · filed 1987-05-18(b)(4) and (b)(5)

The same statutory construction is a fortiori applicable to EPA's regulatory actions to force compliance by a debtor with federal environmental laws.

Section 362 exempts government actions to enforce environmental laws through its police or regulatory power from the automatic stay.

United States v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. · filed 1987-05-18(b)(4), (b)(5)

Congress expressly provided that the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code do not apply when the government is seeking to enforce its police or regulatory power.

Section 362(b)(4) permits an EEOC enforcement action to proceed despite the debtor’s bankruptcy filing under the police or regulatory power exception.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. · filed 2004-07-14(b)(4)

In this case, the parties agree that the underlying lawsuit brought by EEOC fits within the police or regulatory power exception to the automatic stay provision. Accordingly, litigation of this action can progress in spite of the pending bankruptcy proceeding.

Section 362(b)(4)’s police and regulatory power exception covers state liquor license regulation and is not limited to health and safety enforcement.

In Re Arnage, Inc. · filed 1983-10-05(b)(4)

The language of the exception is very comprehensive — the exercise of “regulatory or police powers.” Some courts have found a narrower scope to that exception — limiting the exception to the enforcement of health and safety laws, including consumer protection and environmental protection. As a method of statutory construction, this Court does not believe it proper to look to the legislative history when the language of the statute is not ambiguous. And even if recourse is had to the legislative history, that limiting construction is not compelling. The legislative history simply gives examples of types of exercises of the police power — it is illustrative not exhaustive.

Section 362(b)(4)’s police or regulatory power exception does not cover revocation of a debtor’s self-insurance exemption when the action primarily protects pecuniary interests.

In Re the Rath Packing Co. · filed 1983-12-08(b)(4)

The revocation of Rath Packing Company’s Iowa Code § 87.11 (1983) status by the Iowa Insurance Commissioner on November 2,1983, is null and void as being not excepted under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) and thus violative of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1).

Section 362(b)(4)’s governmental police or regulatory exception does not permit an agency to withhold payments to recover a debt.

Advanced Professional Home Health Care, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield (In Re Advanced Professional Home Health Care, · filed 1988-01-24(b)(4)

This court finds that Congress did not intend § 362 (b)(4) to apply to a governmental action such as that of the Secretary’s withholding funds from Advanced’s weekly interim payments.

Section 362(b)(4) excepts the Secretary of Labor’s enforcement of the Service Contract Act from the automatic stay when the action protects a public interest.

Brock v. Career Consultants, Inc. (In Re Career Consultants, Inc.) · filed 1988-03-17(b)(4)

Because the Secretary is proceeding to preserve and protect a valid public interest, this Court finds the action falls within the exception to the automatic stay granted by section 362(b)(4).

Section 362(b)(4) permits a governmental agency to continue a regulatory proceeding to liquidate damages for past violations, even after the debtor has stopped the regulated activity.

Compton Corp. Ex Rel. Kellogg v. United States Department of Energy (In Re Compton Corp.) · filed 1988-08-09(b)(4)

It is apparent, however, that Congress’ intent in enacting section 362(b)(4) effectively vitiates Appellee’s argument in this regard since the DOE is attempting to proceed with an activity expressly envisioned by Congress, to-wit, liquidating damages for activity over which the DOE indisputably has police and regulatory authority.

Section 362(b)(4) does not except a governmental unit’s action to enforce contractual rights from the automatic stay, even when those rights relate to its police powers.

Board of County Commissioners v. Fairfield Communities, Inc. · filed 1990-12-12(b)(4)

Therefore, I conclude that because this action, in essence, is an attempt to enforce contractual rights, § 362(b)(4) is inapplicable and the action must be stayed.

Section 362(b)(4) permits a governmental unit to continue proceedings primarily aimed at public safety or public policy, even when compliance requires monetary payments.

McAtee v. Florida Bar (In Re McAtee) · filed 1993-03-04(b)(4)

Since the debtor has petitioned the Supreme Court of Florida for reinstatement he has subjected himself to the exercise of the defendants’ police power and cannot utilize the automatic stay as a sword against the defendants to dictate the terms of his reinstatement to the practice of law.

Section 362(b)(4)'s police or regulatory power exception does not permit a governmental unit to liquidate a tax claim to protect its pecuniary interest in the debtor's estate.

National Labor Relations Board v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. (In Re Eagle Bus Manufacturing, Inc.) · filed 1993-05-10(b)(4)

Pursuant to Congress’ intent that the exception under § 362(b)(4) and (5) be narrowly construed, this Court is of the opinion that Ohio Bureau’s claim does not fall within the ambit of exception § 362(b)(4) and as such the Ohio Bureau was not entitled to seek the entry of a monetary judgment against Greyhound.

Section 362(b)(4) excepts a state civil forfeiture action from the automatic stay as an exercise of governmental police power, including when the action concerns estate property.

Boricua Motors Leasing Corp. v. Commonwealth · filed 1993-06-02(b)(4)

The issue presented in this appeal is whether the bankruptcy court erred in adopting the rationale of In re James and concluding thereby that a state civil forfeiture action comes within the police power exception to the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4). ... In conclusion, the bankruptcy court did not err in adopting the legal analysis and rationale of In re James in dismissing Bori-cua’s complaint.

Section 362(b)(4) permits a governmental unit to enforce health and safety ordinances during the automatic stay, but not to protect its financial interests.

Herbert W. Lux, Jr. v. County of Spotsylvania · filed 1995-08-01(b)(4)

Section 362(b)(4) lifts the restraints of the automatic stay and permits governmental action to protect the public health and safety but not to protect a pecuniary interest of the governmental unit. ... Therefore, the County was not in violation of the automatic stay when it cut off appellant's water.

Section 362(b)(4) permits the government to suspend Medicare reimbursement payments on suspicion of fraud under the police or regulatory power exception to the automatic stay.

New York Therapeutic Technologies, Inc. v. Shalala (In Re Orthotic Center, Inc.) · filed 1996-01-30(b)(4)

The narrow issue in this appeal is the following: Does the Secretary’s suspension of Medicare reimbursement payments come within the automatic stay exception for a governmental unit’s police or regulatory power? The bankruptcy court held that it did not. I respectfully disagree.

Section 362(b)(4) excepts a governmental unit’s enforcement of local health and safety laws through a property inspection order from the automatic stay.

In Re Herrera · filed 1996-03-28(b)(4)

The Court denies the motion of the Debtors and holds that the Town of Cicero’s actions are excepted from the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).

Section 362(b)(4) allows the IRS to revoke an organization's tax-exempt status during the automatic stay when the revocation serves a public welfare purpose, even if the IRS also has a financial interest.

In re Universal Life Church, Inc. · filed 1997-12-30(b)(4)

Because the issuance of a letter revoking tax exempt status falls within the section 362(b)(4) exception, the district court's affirmation of the bankruptcy court on this issue was appropriate.

Section 362(b)(4) permits government action that enforces generally applicable regulatory standards and advances a public policy interest despite the automatic stay.

Parkview Adventist Medical Center v. United States Ex Rel. Department of Health & Human Services · filed 2016-11-29(b)(4)

Without reaching the other arguments, we agree that the police and regulatory power exception to the stay applies to CMS's termination of the Provider Agreement.

Section 362(b)(4) excepts an FDA action seeking to enjoin alleged drug safety violations from the automatic stay.

In-Possession, Cantrell Drug Co. v. United States (In re Cantrell Drug Co.) · filed 2018-04-04(b)(4)

The action clearly seeks to enjoin alleged violations of the FDCA and is an action that falls within the FDA's police and regulatory powers. For these reasons, the Court finds the government's commencement of the District Court Action was excepted from the automatic stay by Section 362(b)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362(b)(4) excepts a state’s license revocation proceeding that enforces its regulatory power and serves a public policy of deterrence from the automatic stay.

Express Grain Terminals, LLC · filed 2022-04-07(b)(4)

Based on the analysis above, the Court finds there is no need to lift the automatic stay in this bankruptcy case because the State of Mississippi’s administrative proceedings, and the issuance of an order by the Commissioner revoking the Business Debtors’ licenses is excepted from the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).

Section 362(b)(4) permitted the agency’s proposed auction of the debtor’s milk quota under the police power exception.

Milk Indus. Regulatory Office v. Ruiz · filed 2024-11-21(b)(4)

We find, however, that the agency's plan to auction the debtor's milk quota falls squarely within the police power exception in § 362(b)(4).

Section 362(b)(4) excepts a government proceeding to enforce public policy from the automatic stay when it serves a regulatory purpose rather than a pecuniary one.

FTC v. Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. · filed 2023-08-25(b)(4)

Based on the Commission’s express purpose for this ... litigation, we conclude that the regulatory power exception to the automatic stay is applicable to this proceeding.

Section 362(b)(5) does not exempt a governmental unit’s enforcement of a prepetition money judgment from the automatic stay.

Woodside v. County of Williamson (In Re Woodside) · filed 1994-01-10(b)(5)

Since the judgment was for monetary relief rather than injunctive or declaratory relief, the County’s enforcement did not come within the exception to stay of § 362(b)(5) for governmental creditors.

Section 362 permits a government agency to adjudicate a regulatory claim for prepetition violations, but stays collection of any resulting money judgment without bankruptcy court leave.

Hudtwalker v. United States Department of Energy (In Re Vantage Petroleum Corp.) · filed 1982-12-07(b)(4) and (b)(5)

Accordingly, it would appear that this is the type of regulation that falls into the exception created by section 362(b)(4); and that therefore, absent an injunction, the DOE is not stayed from liquidating their claim against the debtor. ... It should be noted, however, that the DOE is stayed by section 362 from collecting on any judgment it obtains — such as by ordering the debtor to pay the proposed fine — without leave of this Court.

Section 362(b)(5) keeps the automatic stay in place when a governmental unit seeks to enforce a money judgment obtained through its regulatory power, including a civil penalty.

Pennsylvania Ex Rel. Bartle v. Flick (In Re Flick) · filed 1981-10-29(b)(5)

We rely upon 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5) (1979), ... which states that the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2) (1979) remains in effect against the enforcement of a money judgment. ... We conclude that the automatic stay imposed by Section 362(a) shall remain in force against the Commonwealth.

Section 362(b)(4) permits a governmental unit to pursue police or regulatory enforcement seeking injunctive relief, but the stay applies to requests for restitution or a money judgment.

Cannon v. Missouri (In re Cannon) · filed 1983-02-28(b)(4)

To the extent that this possibility exists, a lawsuit requesting restoration of monies or property to those parties who may have suffered an ascertainable loss as the result of unlawful merchandising practices is stayed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) and (b). ... Therefore,- the State of Missouri is not prohibited by 11 U.S.C. § 362 from commencing or continuing 'an action under Missouri Sections 407.100 and 407.020 if the relief requested does not include restitution or a money judgment.

Section 362(b)(5) permits enforcement of a governmental regulatory injunction, including an order to return transferred assets to a receiver, when the order does not enforce a money judgment or give the government priority over other creditors.

Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Co Petro Marketing Group, Inc. · filed 1983-03-11(b)(5)

The district court’s order was not automatically stayed under section 362(a)(2) of the Act. It was entered to enforce an injunction obtained by the CFTC in an action to enforce police and regulatory powers and therefore the order was excepted from the automatic stay under the “police or regulatory exception” set forth in section 362(b)(5) of the Act.

Section 362(b)(5) permits a district court to enforce an asset freeze in a government regulatory action so long as the freeze does not enforce a money judgment.

FTC v. RA Walker & Associates, Inc. · filed 1983-10-27(b)(5)

Thus, Co Petro establishes the rule that section 362(b)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code permits a district court to enter an injunction against the transfer of assets and to enforce that injunction so long as it does not amount to the enforcement of a money judgment. [4] This describes almost exactly the action taken by this Court in the present case.

Section 362(b)(4)-(5) permits a government to enforce an environmental injunction aimed at preventing future harm despite the automatic stay when the injunction does not enforce a money judgment.

Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Environmental Resources · filed 1984-04-30(b)(4)-(5)

We therefore conclude that the suit brought by DER to compel Penn Terra to remedy environmental hazards was properly brought as an equitable action to prevent future harm, and did not constitute an action to enforce a money judgment.

Section 362(b)(5) permits enforcement of a state nuisance-abatement injunction that closes premises unless a compliance bond is posted, because the order enforces police powers rather than a money judgment.

In Re Porter · filed 1984-06-11(b)(5)

Rather, Art. 4666 is designed to enforce the injunctive relief granted in state court, after full notice and hearing, and as allowed under § 362(b)(5). Its effect is not to enforce a money judgment, but to ensure abatement of a public nuisance, in this case, prostitution.

Section 362(b)(4) and (5) permit a state to bring an environmental enforcement action seeking an injunction and to enforce a resulting judgment that is not a money judgment despite the automatic stay.

In Re Laurinburg Oil Co., Inc. · filed 1984-09-14(b)(4), (b)(5)

(1) Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(4) and (5), the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) and (2) will not operate to stay the State from commencing a civil injunctive action and enforcing a judgment obtained therein against Laurinburg Oil Company, Inc. and Maxton Oil and Fertilizer Company in State court to abate violations of the State water pollution laws at Maxton Oil and Fertilizer Company’s disposal site in Scotland County, North Carolina.

Sections 362(b)(4) and (5) permit government zoning enforcement despite the automatic stay when it exercises police or regulatory power and does not enforce a money judgment.

Cournoyer v. Town of Lincoln (In Re Cournoyer) · filed 1984-10-12(b)(4), (b)(5)

The two-step test, then, is to first determine whether the government’s action is a valid exercise of its police or regulatory power, and if so, whether said action is an attempt to enforce a money judgment. ... Based upon these considerations, we conclude that the enforcement action by the Town of Lincoln comes within the § 362(b)(4) and (5) exceptions to the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(5) permits a governmental unit to enforce a nonmonetary judgment arising from its police or regulatory power, including an order restricting use of property until a certificate of occupancy is obtained.

In Re Historic Lower Mill Associates · filed 1985-05-20(b)(5)

The Village is not seeking the property but merely attempting to enforce a non-monetary judgment in the State Court. Therefore, the stay was never in place as regards the Village’s current action.

Section 362(b)(4) permits an N.L.R.B. unfair labor practice hearing to proceed as an exercise of governmental police or regulatory power, so long as the proceeding has not reached enforcement of a money judgment.

Nicholas, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board (In Re Nicholas, Inc.) · filed 1985-11-20(b)(4)

Considering the foregoing, this Court necessarily reaches the conclusion that the automatic stay is inapplicable herein. The N.L.R.B. is a governmental unit exercising its police or regulatory powers. By the prevailing interpretations of the exceptions to the automatic stay, injunctive relief is unavailable against the Board on that ground. Moreover, the Court notes that the complained of proceedings have not yet reached the stage of enforcing a money judgment. Falling short of such prohibited activity, there is no basis to deny the exception to the stay.

Section 362(b)(4)-(5) permits a government suit to compel environmental reclamation despite the automatic stay when the suit seeks cleanup rather than a money judgment.

United States v. F.E. Gregory & Sons, Inc. · filed 1986-02-27(b)(4)-(5)

The present action seeks an order directing defendant to reclaim its abandoned mine site, not a money judgment. Our previous order granting the stay must be reversed because this action falls within the exceptions to the automatic stay set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4)-(5).

Section 362(b)(4) and (5) exempt a town’s enforcement of its zoning ordinance from the automatic stay when the town exercises its regulatory power and enforces a nonmoney judgment.

Arthur J. COURNOYER, D/B/A Cournoyer’s Used Truck Parts, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. TOWN OF LINCOLN, Defendant, Appellee · filed 1986-05-14(b)(4), (b)(5)

We hold that, under the wording of the statute, its intent and policy, and the pertinent case law, the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) and (5) exempt the Town’s enforcement of its zoning ordinance from the automatic stay provision of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).

Section 362(b)(4) excepts a city’s revocation of a building permit from the automatic stay when the city acts within its regulatory powers and does not seek to enforce a money judgment.

1600 Pasadena Offices, Ltd. v. City of South Pasadena (In Re 1600 Pasadena Offices, Ltd.) · filed 1986-07-24(b)(4)

Applying this two step test to the facts of this case, it is clear that the City of South Pasadena is entitled to be excepted from the operation of the stay because the revocation of the building permit is an exercise of its regulatory powers and is not an action to enforce a money judgment. Clearly, the automatic stay provision of § 362 does not apply in this instance to the City.

Section 362(b)(4) and (5) exclude state police power orders from the automatic stay, except orders enforcing money judgments.

Norwesco Development Corp. v. Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources (In Re Norwesco Development Corp.) · filed 1986-10-17(b)(4), (b)(5)

State police power orders (except for money judgments) are excluded from the automatic stay under Sections 362(b)(4) and (5).

Section 362(b)(5) keeps enforcement of governmental money judgments subject to the automatic stay, even when environmental regulation otherwise falls within the governmental enforcement exception.

In Re Pierce Coal & Construction, Inc. · filed 1986-09-15(b)(5)

The Congressional intent to allow enforcement of environmental regulations is clear in 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4). But to preclude governmental units from gaining a favored position as creditors while acting under the umbrella of their enforcement powers, Congress also set forth within 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5) that money judgments are the exception to the exception and are subject to the automatic stay.

Section 362 permits government regulatory actions seeking injunctions and entry of fines or penalties, but stays enforcement of a money judgment.

In Re Lenz Oil Service, Inc. · filed 1986-09-30(b)(4), (b)(5)

From a reading of the relevant Code sections and their corresponding legislative history, it is evident that the automatic stay does not prohibit regulatory actions seeking injunctions and fixing fines and penalties for violations of regulatory statutes. However, the stay is operative where the state attempts to enforce a money judgment.

Section 362(b)(4) and (b)(5) exempt an EPA action compelling compliance with environmental laws from the automatic stay when the action does not seek to enforce a money judgment.

Commonwealth Oil Refining Co. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency · filed 1986-11-25(b)(4), (b)(5)

Therefore, the EPA’s enforcement action requiring CORCO to comply with federal and state environmental laws is a proper exercise of its regulatory power and is not an attempt to enforce a money judgment. It is exempt from the automatic stay by virtue of §§ 362(b)(4) and 362(b)(5).

Sections 362(b)(4) and (b)(5) allow a state to pursue a consumer protection action and fix damages under its police power, but do not allow it to enforce a resulting money judgment against the debtor.

Ohio v. Hughes (In Re Hughes) · filed 1988-06-16(b)(4)-(5)

Congress has specifically indicated that actions concerning “consumer protection” law and attempts to “fix damages for violations of such a law” are exceptions to the automatic stay. On the basis of this clear disclosure of congressional intent, there is a sufficient basis to find that the State of Ohio may proceed in state court against the debtor. ... Although the State of Ohio will be permitted to proceed to judgment in this matter, it is obviously not permitted to enforce any money judgment it may obtain against the debtor.

Section 362(b)(4) permits an EPA action to recover CERCLA cleanup costs to proceed through entry of a money judgment as an exercise of regulatory power.

United States v. Nicolet, Inc. And Turner and Newall, Plc v. Turner & Newall Plc. Appeal of Nicolet, Inc. Appeal of Turn · filed 1988-09-16(b)(4)

We are persuaded that the Environmental Protection Agency is acting in this suit pursuant to its regulatory authority. We find further that it was Congress’ intent that proceedings such as this be exempt from the automatic stay up to and including entry of a monetary judgment.

Section 362(b)(5) stays a government action for disgorgement or restitution that would require the debtor to surrender estate property, because that relief amounts to enforcing a money judgment.

Matter of FD Roberts Securities, Inc. · filed 1990-06-15(b)(5)

It is the opinion of the Court that an action for an order of disgorgment or restitution is tantamount to the enforcement of a money judgment. Pursuant to the clear language of § 362(b)(5), such an action is stayed.

Section 362(b)(4) excepts a government False Claims Act suit from the automatic stay through entry of a money judgment.

In Re Commonwealth Companies, Inc. · filed 1990-09-06(b)(4)

In conclusion, we hold that the government's proposed FCA action against the debtors is excepted from the automatic stay under Sec. 362(b)(4) up through the entry of a money judgment.

Section 362(b)(4) permits a government action to enforce a fraud or other police or regulatory law through entry of a money judgment, even when that is the only remedy sought.

United States v. Commonwealth Companies (In re Commonwealth Companies) · filed 1990-09-06(b)(4)

This legislative history makes it plain that § 362(b)(4) permits the government to seek the entry of a money judgment as its sole remedy for the violation of a fraud or other police or regulatory law.

Section 362(b)(4) and (5) allow the NLRB to continue an unfair labor practice proceeding against a debtor and obtain a money judgment, but not to seize the debtor’s property to satisfy that judgment.

National Labor Relations Board v. PIE Nationwide, Inc. · filed 1991-01-17(b)(4), (b)(5)

The analysis is basic: section 362(b)(4) excepts a governmental unit enforcing a police or regulatory power and section 362(b)(5) excepts a governmental unit enforcing a judgment other than a money judgment. ... Additionally, the Board does not run afoul of section 362(b)(5) by attempting to reduce a claim to judgment: the Board is merely seeking entry of judgment and is not trying to seize P*I*E’s property to satisfy a money judgment.

Section 362(b)(4)-(5) permits a town to pursue zoning enforcement contempt and assess fines for violations despite the automatic stay, so long as it is not enforcing an existing money judgment.

Kulas v. Arrington, No. 342624 (Jul. 11, 1991) · filed 1991-07-11(b)(4)-(5)

Enforcement of this contempt motion is not enforcement of a money judgment but merely the assessment of fines that will then become a money judgment related to the state's police powers. That is an exception to the automatic stay provision of the bankruptcy code.

Section 362(b)(5) permits enforcement of a governmental police power injunction even when compliance requires the debtor to spend money; that expense alone does not make the action one to enforce a money judgment.

Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union · filed 1992-03-18(b)(5)

The mere fact that this provision of the Consent Decree requires the debtor to spend money does not render any action to collect that contribution one to “enforce a money judgment.”

Sections 362(b)(4) and (b)(5) allow a government fraud action to proceed to trial to stop fraud and fix damages despite the debtor’s bankruptcy, but stay execution on any resulting money judgment.

United States v. Mickman (In Re Mickman) · filed 1992-08-04(b)(4), (b)(5)

The intent of the statute is clear: where the government has brought suit to stop fraud and to fix damages for the commission of fraud, the action may proceed to trial, despite a defendant’s bankruptcy filing, so that the Government’s claim may be liquidated. In the interests of protecting other creditors through an orderly reorganization or liquidation, however, the Government is stayed from executing on any money judgment entered.

Section 362 permits a government agency to adjudicate its wage enforcement action and back wage claims despite the automatic stay, but stays enforcement of an adverse money judgment against the debtor.

Martin v. Chambers · filed 1992-11-13(b)(4), (b)(5)

As to Plaintiffs action seeking back wages for Defendant’s present and former employees, this Court is not stayed from adjudicating Defendant’s liability for back wages and the amount of such wages for present and former employees. However, as to an adverse money judgment against Defendant, this Court must stay enforcement of such a judgment pending the outcome of Defendant’s Chapter 7 Petition filed in the United States Bankruptcy Court.

Section 362 permits a governmental agency to determine a debtor’s monetary liability in a regulatory proceeding, but the automatic stay bars enforcement of a resulting money judgment.

Rakozy v. Diversified Turnkey Construction Co. (In Re Western States Drywall, Inc.) · filed 1993-01-25(b)(5)

Thus the Department of Labor is free through its administrative proceedings to determine both the debtor’s liabilities for back wages in addition to determining whether the debtor should be debarred from government contract practice. It is prohibited, however, by the automatic stay from issuing any order to enforce any resulting monetary judgment.

Section 362(b)(4) exempts a governmental action enforcing police or regulatory powers from the automatic stay even when it seeks a money judgment, although the judgment cannot be enforced during the stay.

Herman v. Brown · filed 1993-10-05(b)(4)

The language of § 362(b)(4) and (5), as supported by the relevant legislative history exempts a governmental action seeking a money judgment from the automatic stay, but prevents any money judgment from being enforced.

Section 362(b)(4) permits a governmental unit enforcing environmental law to obtain a money judgment for civil penalties despite the automatic stay.

United States v. Sugarhouse Realty, Inc. · filed 1993-11-12(b)(4)

The weight of precedent, however, supports the Government’s contention that § 362(b)(4) permits the mere entry of judgment.

Section 362(b)(4) does not exempt a government order to bring a debtor’s assets into court to satisfy an existing money judgment from the automatic stay, even when the government claims no exclusive right to the assets.

Securities and Exchange Commission v. Brennan · filed 2000-10-26(b)(4)

In short, the SEC may purport not to claim an entitlement to the full Cardinal Trust, but it is plainly seeking through the Repatriation Order to satisfy at least part of the July 1995 Judgment from the assets of the Cardinal Trust. Accordingly, under the plain terms of §362(b)(4), the Repatriation Order violates the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(4) does not exempt enforcement of an environmental consent decree from the automatic stay when a non-owner/operator’s remaining obligation is solely to contribute money for monitoring after the bulk of remediation is complete, because that enforcement collects a money judgment.

In Re FV Steel and Wire Co. · filed 2005-04-27(b)(4)

While a PRP could be required to perform cleanup activities at a site, once the bulk of the remediation is complete, and only monitoring remains, enforcement action against the PRP is, in effect, collection of a money judgment. ... This collection effort is stayed by § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code, and is excepted from the § 362(b)(4) exception for enforcement of the EPA’s police and regulatory powers.

Section 362's automatic stay does not apply to a distribution of disgorgement funds outside the Bankruptcy Code after dismissal of the bankruptcy proceeding.

Securities & Exchange Commission v. Great White Marine & Recreation, Inc. · filed 2005-10-14(b)(4)

Since the Distribution Award is not governed by the Bankruptcy Code, the automatic stay provision does not apply.

Section 362(b)(4) does not allow a governmental unit to obtain a contempt order whose sole purpose is to enforce an existing money judgment while the automatic stay is in effect.

Federal Trade Commission v. Rensin · filed 2019-06-26(b)(4)

For that reason, the district court’s conclusion that it could, and indeed did, decide the contempt issue under the governmental unit exception was erroneous because the contempt proceeding was an attempt to enforce the money judgment.

Section 362(b)(5) allows a governmental unit to continue a civil contempt proceeding and obtain a money judgment, but stays enforcement of that judgment against a Chapter 7 debtor.

Asseo Ex Rel. National Labor Relations Board v. Bultman Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1996-11-07(b)(5)

Pursuant to Respondent’s Filing of Chapter 7 liquidation proceedings, the enforcement of this money judgment against such Respondent is stayed, under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5). However, this statute does not proscribe the NLRB as a governmental unit from continuing this contempt proceeding and seeking the entry of a money judgment as penalty for civil contempt.

Section 362(a)(3) and (4) do not stay a beneficiary from cashing a letter of credit funded from the issuing bank’s own assets, even when the bank holds prepetition liens securing the debtor’s reimbursement obligation.

Page v. First National Bank of MaryLand (In Re Page) · filed 1982-03-30(a)(3), (a)(4)

The Court concludes that cashing the letter of credit under the circumstances of this case is not the type of “act” contemplated by these provisions and therefore WCC was not automatically stayed from cashing the letter of credit.

Section 362(a)(3) does not prevent a bank from honoring a letter of credit with its own funds, because the letter of credit and its proceeds are not property of the debtor’s estate.

In Re MJ Sales & Distributing Co., Inc. · filed 1982-12-16(a)(3)

It is clear that the funds from which Republic National must honor the letter of credit do not constitute property of the estate. ... Hence, there are no provisions under the Bankruptcy Code that would prevent payment to Aetna pursuant to the letter of credit in question.

Section 362 does not stay a draw on a letter of credit when the draw creates no new lien against the debtor’s property.

Planes, Inc. v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp. (In Re Planes, Inc.) · filed 1983-05-05

The automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362 is not violated since no new liens are created when the letter of credit is drawn upon.

Section 362 does not prevent a beneficiary from drawing on a letter of credit issued for a debtor when the letter of credit is not property of the debtor’s estate.

North Shore & Central Illinois Freight Co. v. American National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago (In Re North Shore & Central · filed 1983-06-08

Consequently, this court holds that the letter of credit is not property of the debtor’s estate within the meaning of Section 541. ... Recognizing the important function that letters of credit play in the commercial marketplace, this court holds that Protective is entitled to draw upon the letter of credit held by “ANB” despite the bankrupt status of the debtor.

Calling a letter of credit to enforce the issuing bank’s independent obligation does not violate the stay against collecting a claim from the debtor or taking estate property when payment comes from bank funds.

Sawyer v. E.A. Gralia Construction Co. (In Re Pine Tree Electric Co.) · filed 1983-10-05(a)(3), (a)(6)

In calling the letter of credit Gra-lia is not acting to “collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case” in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6). Rather, Gralia, in calling the letter of credit, seeks to enforce an independent, primary and direct obligation of the bank to it, the beneficiary of the letter of credit. ... Nor does the calling of the letter of credit constitute “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate”, as proscribed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3), because if the letter of credit is honored by the bank it will be honored with bank funds and not with property of the estate.

Section 362 does not bar a bank from honoring its letters of credit after a bankruptcy petition because the bank’s payment does not involve property of the estate.

Braucher v. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. (In Re Illinois-California Express, Inc.) · filed 1985-06-18

Therefore, the Banks’ advancement of monies, whether pre-petition or post-petition does not violate Section 362 because it does not involve property of the estate.

Section 362(a)(6) and (a)(7) prohibit a creditor’s postpetition collection efforts, including an attempted draw on a letter of credit to collect a claim against the debtor.

Arrow Air, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc. (In re Arrow Air, Inc.) · filed 1987-01-13(a)(6), (a)(7)

However, the actions by United were violative of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6) and (a)(7), and so were of such a nature as to be properly enjoined by this Court under its powers pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).

Section 362(a) does not bar a bank from honoring a letter of credit when the bank has no right to reimbursement from the debtor.

Guy C. Long, Inc. v. Dependable Insurance Co. (In Re Guy C. Long, Inc.) · filed 1987-06-19(a)

Therefore, I conclude that Provident’s honoring of its letter of credit would not violate the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay payment under a letter of credit whose proceeds are not property of the debtor’s estate.

Lower Brule Construction Co. v. Sheesley's Plumbing & Heating Co. · filed 1988-03-30(a)(3)

As the automatic stay operates to stay actions for possession of property of the estate, see 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3), the automatic stay does not operate to stay payment under a letter of credit.

Section 362 does not require a letter-of-credit beneficiary to obtain court authorization before drawing on the credit because the payment does not violate the automatic stay.

In Re San Jacinto Glass Industries, Inc. · filed 1988-12-07

The procedure involved would not require any resort to the court for prior authorization since the payment is not deemed to be a transfer of assets in violation of the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362 does not bar payment under a letter of credit when the payment transfers no assets of the debtor.

A.J. Lane & Co. v. BSC Group (In Re A.J. Lane & Co.) · filed 1990-06-13(a)

Although payment would certainly amount to BSC realizing upon its security, payment under the letter would involve no transfer of assets of the Debtor protected by § 362.

Section 362(a) does not bar a beneficiary from redeeming a letter of credit posted by the debtor because the issuing bank pays with its own funds rather than the debtor’s assets.

In Re Skylark Travel, Inc. · filed 1990-10-25(a)

The second point raised by the debt- or that ARC violated the automatic stay imposed under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) when it redeemed the letter of credit posted by the debtor is also without weight because when a bank honors a letter of credit it pays the beneficiary with its own funds and not with assets belonging to the debtor who caused the letter of credit to be issued.

Section 362(a) does not stay a beneficiary’s draw on a letter of credit outside the debtor’s estate based on the debtor’s failure to make required payments.

In Re Delaware River Stevedores, Inc. · filed 1991-07-16(a)

We hold that the automatic stay arising from 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) does not apply to the DOL’s attempt to draw upon the L/C.

Section 362 makes a separate application for a stay unnecessary when its automatic stay already applies.

Gianniny v. Gianniny · filed 1994-04-15

Because there is an automatic stay (see, 11 USC § 362), plaintiffs application for a stay is unnecessary.

Termination of the automatic stay under § 362(e) does not permit possession of property when a valid preliminary injunction independently bars its removal.

Waldschmidt v. Ranier (In Re Fulghum Construction Corp.) · filed 1980-05-14(e)

If that order— which became final before the defendants made their request for relief from the stay — is valid, termination of the stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(e) would not benefit the defendants.

Section 362 does not stay enforcement of a prepetition injunction enforcing a covenant not to compete when compliance requires no payment and money damages are not a viable alternative.

In Re Stone Resources, Inc. · filed 2011-09-09

The Court concludes that the preliminary injunction is not subject to the automatic stay and will therefore reverse the Bankruptcy Decision to the extent that it denied Appellant’s motion for relief from the automatic stay.

Section 362(k) requires no particular form of notice; actual notice of a bankruptcy petition can support a claim that a stay violation was willful.

Houck v. Substitute Trustee Services · filed 2015-07-01(k)

This argument, however, distorts the requirements of § 362(k), which does not include any provision that a particular form of notice be given. Rather, it imposes liability for a willful violation of the automatic stay. We agree with Houck that, because the complaint alleges that the Substitute Trustee had actual notice of her December 16, 2011 bankruptcy petition when it sold her homestead, it sufficiently alleges that the Substitute Trustee’s sale of her homestead on December 20 with such notice was willful.

The automatic stay applies even when a party lacks actual notice of the bankruptcy case.

Odion v. Varon · filed 2011-09-29(a)(1)

These arguments fail as well, because the automatic stay is effective whether or not a party has actual notice of a bankruptcy case.

Oral notice of a bankruptcy filing is sufficient to require a creditor to observe the automatic stay.

In Re Freemyer Industrial Pressure, Inc. · filed 2002-06-24(a)

Oral notice of a filing is sufficient to require a party to observe the stay.

Section 362(a) imposes an automatic stay when a bankruptcy case begins, and creditors are bound even without notice of the filing.

In Re Jones · filed 1999-03-12(a)

Binding Eleventh Circuit precedent has established that an automatic stay arises upon the commencement of a Title 11 case which is binding upon creditors even if they do not have notice. ... Debtor and bankruptcy counsel, thus, wil-fully induced Debtor’s Superior Court counsel and plaintiff in that action to unwittingly violate the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a postpetition foreclosure sale of estate property even when the creditor lacked notice of the bankruptcy filing.

Smith v. London (In Re Smith) · filed 1998-09-01(a)(3)

Because the foreclosure sale was conducted after Smith filed her second chapter 13 petition, it violated § 362(a)(3), which stays any act to obtain possession of property of the estate. That Mellon Mortgage was not given notice of Smith’s bankruptcy filing is irrelevant in determining whether the stay was violated.

Section 362’s automatic stay takes effect when a bankruptcy petition is filed, even if a creditor has no notice of the filing, and a subsequent foreclosure sale violates the stay.

National Mortgage Co. v. Brengettcy · filed 1998-08-14(a)

As the bankruptcy court correctly found, it is clear that the foreclosure sale took place in violation of the automatic stay. Although National Mortgage did not have notice of debtor’s new filing, notice is not necessary for the automatic stay to take effect.

A creditor must have notice of the bankruptcy filing before its violation of the automatic stay can be willful.

Nationsbank, N.A. v. Bush (In Re Bush) · filed 1994-06-29

It is essential that Nationsbank have notice of the bankruptcy filing before it could willfully violate the automatic stay.

The automatic stay binds a creditor when the bankruptcy petition is filed, whether or not the creditor knows of the filing.

Rolen v. Southwest Virginia National Bank (In Re Rolen) · filed 1983-01-20

There is no dispute that the trustee and Bank had full knowledge of the Debtors’ intention; that the petition was filed on the day following the sale invoking the 11 U.S.C. § 362 stay which was binding upon the Bank, whether it knew of the filing or not; that the extreme haste in the foreclosure process and the making and recording of the trustee deed spoke louder than words; that the purpose was to finalize the foreclosure to avoid Chapter 13 provisions of the federal Act; and the hasty resale the next day after approving a loan to the purchaser, are all indicative of the purpose of the parties.

The automatic stay under § 362(a) depends on an active bankruptcy proceeding; after dismissal, the bankruptcy court cannot order the stay or award damages for its vacation.

In Re Income Property Builders, Inc., Debtor. Armel Laminates, Inc. v. The Lomas & Nettleton Company · filed 1983-01-24(a)

Obviously the automatic stay provided in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) was dependent upon the operation of the bankruptcy law, and that law was pertinent only because of the existence of the proceeding in bankruptcy. ... Once the bankruptcy was dismissed, a bankruptcy court no longer had power to order the stay or to award damages allegedly attributable to its vacation.

Section 362(c)(2) keeps the automatic stay in effect for property abandoned by the trustee and returned to the debtor until a specified terminating event occurs.

Gassaway v. Federal Land Bank of New Orleans (In Re Gassaway) · filed 1983-04-01(c)(2)

Under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code the abandonment of the real estate by the trustee removes such realty from the bankruptcy estate, but upon removal from the bankruptcy estate it continues as property of the debtor plaintiff, and the stay continues in effect until the occurrence of events mentioned in 11 U.S.C. section 362(c)(2). None of those events mentioned in section 362(c)(2) having occurred herein, the automatic stay in the case sub judice remains in effect at this writing.

Section 362(c) does not end the automatic stay merely because property has been abandoned; a foreclosure sale conducted while the stay remains in effect is void.

First Magnolia Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Baker (In Re Baker) · filed 1983-04-05(c)

Inasmuch as the automatic stay provided by 11 U.S.C. section 362 became effective upon the filing of said petition on October 22, 1982, and inasmuch as said automatic stay has not been lifted or terminated on any basis provided by 11 U.S.C. section 362(c), a foreclosure sale conducted as to said deed of trust since October 22, 1982, the date of filing of the debtors’ petition herein would be void even if there had been a valid abandonment of said real estate herein.

Section 362(a)(5) continues to stay lien enforcement against a debtor’s property after the Chapter 7 trustee abandons it, until the stay ends or relief is granted.

Associates Financial Services Corp. v. Cowen (In Re Cowen) · filed 1983-05-06(a)(5)

In this regard, the Court specifically notes that abandonment of property by the Trustee does not constitute a lifting of the automatic stay on such property.

The automatic stay’s applicability does not depend on whether a defendant in the debtor’s state-court suit intervenes in the bankruptcy case.

G. Harold King, Jr., and Shirley G. King v. Fidelity National Bank of Baton Rouge, Capital Investment Inc. And Louisiana · filed 1983-08-15(a)

The automatic stay would apply, if at all, without regard to the defendants’ status as intervenors in the bankruptcy, and summary judgment procedures are available in both state court and bankruptcy court.

Section 362(a)(1) stays a postpetition judgment against the debtor and prevents its use to support otherwise deficient claims.

First National Bank of Boston v. Overmyer (In Re Overmyer) · filed 1983-08-25(a)(1)

Because the Ohio court’s judgment and decision were automatically stayed as to the debtor, Daniel H. Over-myer, they may not be used to resurrect the plaintiffs’ otherwise deficient claims.

Section 362 does not let a creditor named in a foreclosure action void the resulting judgment by relying on the automatic stay while failing to protect its lien.

In Re CCL Const., Inc. · filed 1983-09-12

However, even if the debtor had an interest in the property, the automatic stay could not be asserted to void the state court action. While the automatic stay was intended to prevent creditors from obtaining superior interests in property of the debtor to the detriment of other creditors, it was not designed to permit creditors named as defendants in a state court action to sit idly by and allow that action to proceed to completion without taking appropriate action to protect their interest.

Section 362(a) does not void a postpetition foreclosure sale when the transfer satisfies § 549(c)’s protection for a good faith purchaser of real property.

Matter of King · filed 1983-11-22(a)

Ordinarily, any action taken in derogation of the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. § 362 of the Code, is avoidable and may even justify an order for contempt. When all the requirements exist which trigger the applicability of § 549(c), however, the debtor’s automatic stay protection is limited.

Section 362(a)(1) postpones adjudication of claims against a debtor but does not eliminate liability for underlying tortious conduct.

Gold v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. · filed 1983-12-07(a)(1)

The automatic stay, grounded in statute, does not preclude or absolve liability for otherwise tortious conduct.

Section 362(a) continues to stay actions affecting property of the estate when the court has not lifted the stay.

In Re Southern of Rocky Mount, Inc. · filed 1983-12-21(a)

The automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) shall remain in full force and effect with respect to property of the estate.

Section 362 stays foreclosure but does not prevent a lender from accelerating a loan during Chapter 11, subject to reversal under section 1124.

In the Matter of Lhd Realty Corporation, Debtor. Appeal of National Life Insurance Company · filed 1984-02-01

But we think that, although section 362 stays foreclosure, it need not be read to preclude acceleration.

Section 362(a) prevents a creditor’s garnishment lien from attaching to estate property when a previously unliquidated claim settles after the bankruptcy filing.

London Grove Contractors, Inc. v. J. Robert Pierson, Inc. · filed 1984-02-14(a)

When the action was no longer inchoate due to the culmination of settlement negotiations, the trustee was deemed to have a lien on the action under § 544(a) but London Grove’s lien did not attach due to the automatic stay imposed by § 362(a).

Once the automatic stay is lifted for admiralty proceedings against specified vessels, it no longer bars pending in rem actions against those vessels.

Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hellenic Lines Ltd. · filed 1984-02-23

To the extent, if any, the automatic stay applied to the pending in rem actions by CTI and ICS against these vessels, it is no longer a bar.

The automatic stay under § 362 supersedes and preempts a state court stay granted before the bankruptcy filing.

Taneytown Tires, Inc. v. J & D Trucking Co. (In re Great Eastern Express, Inc.) · filed 1984-03-13

We also think that the automatic stay which arose on the filing of the debtor’s petition under section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code supersedes and preempts the stay granted by the York court.

Section 362(a)(1) renders a judgment entered against a debtor after its bankruptcy petition in violation of the automatic stay void.

In Re Kiki, Ltd. · filed 1984-05-14(a)(1)

Claim number four by the Trust, i.e. its judgment on its third-party complaint against KIKI for $3,297.69 plus interest of $434.16, was awarded after the Debtor filed its Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition on April 1, 1975. Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) this judgment is in violation of the automatic stay provision and is consequently held void.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not prevent a complaint filed in violation of the stay from serving as an amendable informal proof of claim.

In Re Sambo's Restaurants, Inc., a California Corporation, Debtor. Sambo's Restaurants, Inc., a California Corporation v · filed 1985-02-13(a)

No case has been cited to us nor are we aware of any case that has discussed whether the automatic stay precludes such a complaint from being an amendable informal proof of claim. Logically it should not, and we hold that it does not, because such a rule would lead to absurd results.

Section 362(a)(1) holds a pending landlord-tenant proceeding in abeyance, so a possession judgment subject to a pending motion to vacate does not become final during the stay.

In Re D.C. Diamond Head, Inc. · filed 1985-04-22(a)(1)

As an alternative ground for decision in this matter I hold that the landlord’s contention that the judgment for possession was final is erroneous. Since the tenant’s motion to vacate the default judgment was pending when the bankruptcy petition was filed, the decision of the Landlord-Tenant Court has remained in abeyance since the bankruptcy filing and hence never became final.

Section 362(a) does not toll or extend a state statutory redemption period after a foreclosure sale.

Federal Land Bank of Louisville v. Glenn · filed 1985-06-03(a)

We also hold that the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362(a) do not toll or extend the running of state statutory periods of redemption following foreclosure sales.

Section 362(a) does not prevent a landlord from recovering possession when a nonresidential lease is deemed rejected and the debtor fails to surrender the premises.

In Re Flexipak, Inc. · filed 1985-06-07(a)

In the event that the debtor fails to surrender the premises as required, the lessor may recover possession unimpaired by the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).

Section 362 does not extend the time to exercise an option to extend a lease.

In Re Dulan · filed 1985-09-05

Although the authorities on this issue in analagous situations are in conflict, this court is of the view that while Section 108(b) extends the time to exercise the option, Section 362 does not.

Section 362(a) makes a post-petition judgment against a debtor void as against the bankruptcy estate.

In Re Wlodarski · filed 1985-09-13(a)

Accordingly, the Minton Group’s trustee’s post-petition judgment violates the automatic stay and is void as against the estate of Walter E. Wlodarski.

Section 362 requires no modification after a debtor’s interest in the property has been forfeited, because the stay has no interest in that property to protect.

In Re Byker · filed 1986-08-06

Consequently, an order modifying the automatic stay is not necessary, since the Debtors retain no interest in the property against which the stay would operate.

An order lifting the automatic stay restores the parties to their prior legal relationship and allows other courts to exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the bankruptcy court.

First National Bank of Minneapolis v. Kehn Ranch, Inc. · filed 1986-10-01

Furthermore, an order of the bankruptcy court lifting the stay returns the parties to the legal relationships that existed before the stay, thereby allowing other courts to exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the bankruptcy court.

Section 362(a) requires state court proceedings to stop when a bankruptcy petition is filed and requires the state court to rescind later actions, even without notice of the filing.

Butzloff v. Quandt · filed 1986-12-17(a)

The fact that the creditor or the state court has not received notice of the filing is irrelevant, and the state court must rescind actions taken subsequent to the effective date of the automatic stay. ... We agree that this is the intent of section 362(a).

Section 362 makes a state court order entered while the automatic stay remains in effect voidable.

In re Velazquez · filed 1987-01-09

Moreover, creditor Rebeca Ojeda moved the Superior Court of Carolina before the case was closed, and thus while the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362 was still in effect. Therefore, the order entered on August 13, 1986 is voidable.

Section 362(a) prevents a creditor from prosecuting an action against a debtor individually to collect a claim arising during Chapter 11 before conversion to Chapter 7; the claim must be asserted against the Chapter 7 estate.

Stinehart v. Mid-American Bank & Trust Co. (In re Firsdon) · filed 1987-01-21(a)

That claim must be asserted against the Debtor’s Chapter 7 estate and cannot be prosecuted as an action against the Debtor individually.

The automatic stay suspends proceedings against a debtor but does not dismiss the debtor as a party.

Stewart v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. · filed 1987-04-10(a)

While Meadows’ bankruptcy petition operates as a stay of the “commencement or continuation ... of a judicial ... action or proceeding against the debtor,” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), it is not tantamount to a dismissal of Meadows as a party defendant in this action but merely suspends the proceedings.

Section 362(a)(1) suspends an action against a debtor on a preexisting debt without depriving the court of jurisdiction over the action.

International Fidelity Insurance v. European American Bank · filed 1987-04-20(a)(1)

However, the stay did not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the action commenced but merely suspended the proceedings (see, David v Hooker, Ltd., 560 F2d 412; Matter of Lahman Mfg. Co., 31 Bankr 195).

Section 362 makes state-court actions concerning a debtor’s assets after its bankruptcy filing void, including an order appointing a conservator.

Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Debtor v. Provident National Bank (In Re United Church of the Ministers of · filed 1987-05-19

We hold that the automatic stay rendered void all actions by the state court subsequent to the Church’s filing, including the Order appointing the conservator.

Section 362(a)(1) stays a debtor’s appeal of an action originally brought against it, but generally does not stay a nonbankrupt guarantor’s appeal absent special circumstances.

INGERSOLL-RAND FINANCIAL CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MILLER MINING COMPANY, INC.; Michael Miller, Esq., Defendan · filed 1987-05-26(a)(1)

We agree, however, with the decisions of other circuits which have stayed appeals by the debtor when the original proceeding was brought against the debtor. ... Therefore, Miller Mining is prevented from proceeding with this appeal. ... The stay of the appeal, however, does not extend to Michael Miller as guarantor. In the absence of special circumstances, stays pursuant to section 362(a) are limited to debtors and do not include non-bankrupt co-defendants.

Section 362 makes postpetition notice of an alleged assignment void and ineffective if the notice would terminate the debtor’s power to deal with the assigned claim.

In the Matter of Modern Settings, Inc. · filed 1987-05-28

Any notice of the alleged assignment given subsequent to the filing of the assignor’s petition having or seeking to have the effect of terminating the debtor’s power to deal with the claim would be in violation of the automatic stay contained in 11 U.S.C. § 362 and would therefore be void and ineffective.

Section 362(a)(1) creates an automatic stay, and actions taken in violation of it are void unless the bankruptcy court annuls, lifts, or otherwise acts to recognize the stay’s invalidity.

Southern County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Powell · filed 1987-06-11(a)(1)

We agree with Relators that the stay created by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) is an automatic stay. Unless the bankruptcy court annuls, lifts or otherwise takes some action to recognize the invalidity of a stay order, actions taken in violation of the stay are void and without legal effect.

Section 362 does not stop a debt from accelerating automatically when no further act is required to cause the acceleration.

Neusteter Realty Co. v. Holzman-Demuth Noteholders (In Re Neusteter Realty Co.) · filed 1987-06-23

Section 362 had no effect on the acceleration of the debts in question because no further affirmative acts which could be stayed were required to cause that acceleration.

Section 362 permits retroactive relief from an automatic stay, but does not authorize a bankruptcy court to retroactively impose a stay to invalidate a completed foreclosure sale.

In Re Thomas H. Lashley and Jean H. Lashley, Debtors. Thomas H. Lashley, Jean H. Lashley v. First National Bank of Live · filed 1987-08-24(d)

While the Bankruptcy Code grants the bankruptcy court the power to retroactively grant relief from a stay, 11 U.S.C. § 362(d); In Re Albany Partners Ltd., 749 F.2d 670, 675 (11th Cir.1984), this court is unaware of any authority that grants the bankruptcy court power to retroactively impose a stay.

Section 362(a) does not toll a state law redemption period after a foreclosure sale.

In the Matter of Benny L. ROACH and Edith Roach, Appellants · filed 1987-08-25(a)

Finally, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) does not toll the running of the state law redemption period.

Section 362(c)(2) ends the automatic stay when a discharge is entered, and reopening the bankruptcy case does not reinstate the stay.

In Re Trevino · filed 1987-09-29(c)(2)

More importantly, debtor asks that we disregard the above mentioned statutory authority and case law which clearly implies that upon the reopening of the present case, the automatic stay was not reinstated. Because we find that the automatic stay was not reinstated upon the reopening of the present case, we need not determine whether an alleged deficiency in the notice of a hearing for relief from the automatic stay or an alleged deficiency in the order resulting from said hearing violated the provisions of § 362.

Section 362’s automatic stay prevents a creditor’s right to attorney’s fees from vesting when the creditor gave the required notice before bankruptcy but the notice period expired after the petition was filed.

Bargas v. Rice (In Re Rice) · filed 1987-12-14

The automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. Section 362 constitutes such an injunction and is sufficient to prevent the right to collect attorney’s fees from vesting.

Section 362(a)(3)-(4) stays acts to obtain possession or control of estate property and acts to create, perfect, or enforce liens against it, requiring an attorney claiming a retaining lien to have possessed the property before the bankruptcy filing.

Brake v. Tavormina (In re Beverly Manufacturing Corp.) · filed 1988-03-28(a)(3)-(4)

Brake had to have the stock in his possession prior to the filing of the Chapter 11 petition because such a petition acted as a stay of any act to obtain possession or control of property of the estate or to create, perfect or enforce any lien against the property of the estate.

The automatic stay does not bar collection of post-petition condominium fees against a residence that revested in the debtor upon confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan.

In Re Walker · filed 1988-04-22(a)

Accordingly, the residence is no longer property of the estate and the automatic stay does not apply.

Section 362 bars an appellate court from entering a dispositive order against a party protected by the automatic stay while the stay is in effect.

Phoenix Canada Oil Company Limited v. Texaco, Inc. · filed 1988-04-26

Because of the automatic stay under the Bankruptcy Code, we will not enter any dispositive order as to Texaco, Inc. at this time.

The automatic stay does not bar withdrawal of reference of an adversary proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) or prevent the related action from proceeding in district court.

Anthony v. Baker (In Re Baker) · filed 1988-04-27

Notably, § 157(d), like § 157(b)(5), does not mention the automatic stay provision of 11 U.S.C. § 362. I conclude that the reasoning of the court in UNR Industries also applies to claims withdrawn pursuant to § 157(d), and is persuasive in this case. Thus the stay imposed in Civil Action No. 82-C-1025 does not prohibit withdrawal of reference of the plaintiffs adversary action. Nor does it prevent the plaintiff from proceeding with his action against the defendant in this court.

Section 362(a)(1) automatically halts a pending state court action against a debtor upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, regardless of notice, and a default judgment entered afterward is void.

Townsend v. Magic Graphics, Inc. · filed 1988-05-04(a)(1)

Here, it is not disputed that on April 1, 1987, six days prior to the entry of the default judgment, defendant filed a petition in bankruptcy. At that moment, the State court proceedings were automatically halted pursuant to section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code. Although plaintiff and the court were not apprised of this fact until after entry of the order of default, the defendant’s failure to notify either plaintiff or the court was irrelevant. The mere filing of the bankruptcy petition precluded the trial court from proceeding any further on the matter. Therefore, the default judgment entered by the trial court after the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings was void and should have been vacated.

Section 362(e) ends the automatic stay 30 days after a request for relief if the court has not ordered it continued; that lapse alone does not decide the parties’ underlying rights.

Thomas v. Southtrust Bank of Alabama, N.A. (In Re Thomas) · filed 1988-05-16(e)

The lifting of this stay by virtue of the provisions of this 30-day rule, without something more, does not prove anything between the parties and cannot be res judicata of their relationship.

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay a creditor’s pursuit of a cause of action against third parties after the bankruptcy trustee abandons that claim and it is no longer property of the estate.

Unisys Corporation v. Dataware Products, Inc. And William J. Cunningham · filed 1988-06-06(a)(3)

It is clear to us that the right of action to sue DPI and its principal officers, once abandonment by the trustee took place, reposed in Unisys free of any stay.

Section 362(a) makes a sheriff’s sale conducted in violation of the automatic stay void regardless of whether the judgment creditor knew of the stay.

Burch v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n (In Re Burch) · filed 1988-07-08(a)

A sheriff’s sale in violation of the automatic stay, irrespective of the judgment creditor’s knowledge of the stay, is void.

A foreclosure sale conducted during the automatic stay is void, and dismissal of the bankruptcy case does not validate it unless the bankruptcy court annuls the stay.

Huddleston v. Texas Commerce Bank-Dallas, N.A. · filed 1988-07-12(a)(4)

In this case, the May 6th foreclosure sale occurred during the pendency of the automatic stay. When the bankruptcy court dismissed Trebla’s case, it took no action to annul or otherwise recognize the invalidity of the stay. Therefore, the May 6th sale was void and of no legal effect.

Section 362(a) takes effect when the bankruptcy petition is filed, without formal service of process on a creditor.

In Re Wood · filed 1988-06-16(a)

The automatic stay is effective upon the date of the filing of the petition, and formal service of process is not required. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).

Section 362(a)(3) tolls a zoning ordinance’s six-month discontinuance period for a nonconforming use because enforcing its expiration would exercise control over estate property.

Walker v. Maury County (In Re Scott Housing Systems, Inc.) · filed 1988-07-22(a)(3)

I therefore conclude that the effect of Section 362(a)(3) is to toll the six month discontinuance period, which would otherwise run and unduly compromise the Trustee’s opportunity to familiarize himself with and administer the assets of the estate at the maximum possible price.

Relief from the automatic stay granted to one creditor does not terminate the stay as to other creditors.

Depner Architects & Planners, Inc. v. Nevada National Bank · filed 1988-10-26

The termination of a stay on the motion of one creditor does not similarly terminate the stay as to other creditors; the bankruptcy courts make individualized determinations when considering multiple requests for relief.

Section 362(a) makes a postpetition collateral agreement affecting the debtor’s property or property interest void or voidable if relief from the automatic stay was not obtained before the agreement.

T.G. Motors, Inc. of Houston v. C.M. Turtur Investments, Inc. (In Re C.M. Turtur Investments, Inc.) · filed 1988-11-07(a)

The collateral agreement of T.G. Motors and Bellfort is void or voidable under the automatic stay provision of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) as affecting Turtur’s property or Turtur’s interest in property since relief from the automatic stay was not sought prior to the agreement.

Section 362 automatically stays proceedings against a bankruptcy debtor, so counsel may not withdraw from representing the debtor while the stay remains in effect.

Tremont Electric, Inc. v. Rampinelli Electric Co. · filed 1988-12-16(a)

Pursuant to 11 USC § 362, all proceedings are automatically stayed from being commenced or continued against the debtor, Rampinelli Electric (see, Robins Co. v Piccinin, 788 F2d 994 [4th Cir 1986]; Matter of Baldwin-United Corp. v Named Defendants, 48 Bankr 901 [SD Ohio 1985]). ... The motion to be relieved as counsel for defendant Rampinelli Electric is denied without prejudice to a further application after dissolution of the bankruptcy stay.

Section 362(a)(1) does not require withdrawal of an appellate opinion holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction when the opinion does not affect a claim against the debtor.

Air Line Pilots Association, International v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. · filed 1989-04-04(a)(1)

Our decision in no way affects any claim against the debtor,” as contemplated by the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1984). Our judgment was that the District Court had no jurisdiction in the first place even to entertain appellee’s suit.

Section 362 stays a nonpayment proceeding against a tenant who has filed for bankruptcy, making a judgment entered against that tenant invalid.

Saxon Associates v. Barton · filed 1989-05-17

The proceeding against him was therefore subject to the automatic stay under section 362 of the Bankruptcy Act (11 USC § 362), and the judgment against him invalid.

Section 362(a) imposes an automatic stay when a bankruptcy petition is filed, but conversion from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7 does not trigger a new stay.

British Aviation Insurance v. Menut (In re State Airlines, Inc.) · filed 1989-05-17(a)

The filing of a petition operates as an automatic stay. A conversion order is not the filing of a petition. A conversion order does not trigger section 362.

Section 362(a) generally voids actions taken in violation of the automatic stay even when the creditor had no notice of it.

In Re Nita B. Smith, Debtor. Nita B. Smith, Cross-Appellant v. First America Bank, N.A., Cross-Appellee · filed 1989-05-26(a)

Actions taken in violation of the automatic stay generally are void, even if the creditor had no notice of the stay.