11 U.S.C. § 362

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay a retirement fund’s offset against an ERISA-qualified retirement account excluded from the bankruptcy estate.

In Re Herndon · filed 2003-03-17(a)(3)

Because the funds remaining in the Debtor’s retirement account are not included in property of the estate, they are without the protection of the automatic stay and therefore remain subject to the Retirement Fund’s contractual right to offset.

The automatic stay does not attach to land contract property when the debtor’s redemption rights expired before the bankruptcy filing.

In Re Horton · filed 2003-11-24(a)

Therefore, this Court need not lift the automatic stay because the stay only applies to property of the bankruptcy estate and, in this case, the land contract is no longer property of the Debtor or her estate.

Section 362(a)(3) does not make a sheriff’s continued custody of seized estate property an exercise of control when the sheriff can act only at the direction of a creditor, trustee, or court.

Westman v. Andersohn (In Re Westman) · filed 2003-10-24(a)(3)

Under these circumstances, I find that the defendants did not exercise control over property of the estate since the Sheriff could only act at the direction of others, and not of his own accord, except to the extent that as a custodian the Sheriff attempted, although unsuccessfully, to turnover the property to the Trustee.

Section 362(a)(3) bars anyone, including the debtor, from exercising control over property of the estate belonging to the trustee.

Cheng v. K & S Diversified Investments, Inc. (In Re An-Tze Cheng) · filed 2004-03-31(a)(3)

Moreover, the automatic stay bars any act by anybody, including the debtor, to “exercise control over property of the estate” that belongs to the trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).

Abandonment of property ends the automatic stay as to the estate’s interest in the property, but the stay remains in effect as to the debtor’s interest.

Gioia v. Gioia · filed 2004-06-09(c)(1)

When the estate abandoned its interest in the Coffman Drive residence, the automatic stay was no longer in effect as to the estate’s interest in the property, but remained in effect as to the debtor’s (Frank’s) interest in the property.

Section 362 does not protect a debtor’s interest in property under an executory land sale contract terminated before the bankruptcy filing.

In Re Brettschneider · filed 2005-02-11(a)

Therefore, as the Agreement between the parties at the time of filing is an executory contract; as the debtor, at the time of filing, is in default; and as the creditor’s termination of the Agreement is evidenced by prepetition commencement of eviction proceedings, I conclude that the Agreement was terminated by the creditor prior to the debtor’s filing of his Petition for Relief in bankruptcy on December 31, 2004, and that the subject property was therefore not property of the estate. Therefore, the debtor’s interest in it was not protected by the automatic stay. However, to remove any cloud which may exist on this real property as a result of the debtor’s filing the Petition for Relief, I order that any stay under Section 362(a) should be lifted for cause.

Post-petition receipt of military retirement benefits does not violate the automatic stay when a pre-petition state court order deprived the debtor of any interest in those benefits, leaving them outside the bankruptcy estate.

Ziemski v. Ziemski (In Re Ziemski) · filed 2006-03-10

Likewise, Mr. Ziemski did not violate the automatic stay because the stay did not apply to the military retirement benefits. Mr. Ziemski therefore could not have willfully violated the stay. Without a willful violation of the automatic stay, the award of attorneys fees for violation of the automatic stay must be reversed.

Removing fixtures that are property of the estate violates the automatic stay, but recovery requires proof of their value or the resulting loss in property value.

Estrada v. Estrada (In Re Estrada) · filed 2006-09-07(a)

The original sink, though purchased by the Defendant, became a fixture and part of the house, which was property of the estate. ... Removal of the sink, and possibly the stove, were a violation of the automatic stay and an unlawful appropriation of property of the estate. However, no evidence was provided regarding the sink’s value, or credible evidence of the stove’s value, or the loss in value suffered by the house as a result of their removal.

A creditor’s letter asserting a mortgage balance when no debt remains under either the plan or the contract can violate the automatic stay by unlawfully controlling estate property through interference with the debtor’s ability to refinance.

Pyott v. Fairbanks Capitol Corp. (In Re Pyott) · filed 2006-10-04(a)(3)

If the debtors owed nothing, could the letter have violated the automatic stay? Yes. The letter would have hindered the debtors’ ability to deal with the property before they completed the plan and obtained a release of the second mortgage without a good legal reason for doing so. The letter might be treated as a violation of the automatic stay because it was an unlawful method of controlling property of the bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).

Under § 362(c)(1), discharge does not terminate the automatic stay as to a counterclaim that remains property of the estate.

Superior Bank v. Hilsman (In Re Hilsman) · filed 2006-10-02(c)(1)

The stay remains in effect as to estate property until it ceases to be property of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1). Subsection (2) of that section goes on to provide where the stay otherwise ends. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2). In this case, the Trustee is pursuing the Counterclaim, he has not abandoned it and that asset continues to be property of the estate. Until the case is closed, property of the estate, including this Counterclaim which arose prior to filing the Petition, remains subject to the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) permits creditors to transfer claims against the estate but prohibits selling estate property without relief from the automatic stay.

Paloian v. Grupo Serla S.A. De C v. (In Re GGSI Liquidation Inc.) · filed 2006-09-07(a)(3)

While creditors are permitted to transfer a claim or interest against a debtors’ estate to a third party without violating the stay, they are not permitted to sell property of the estate without seeking relief from the automatic stay.

Exercising control over estate-owned litigation and disposing of it to the estate's detriment may violate the automatic stay.

In Re Grotjohn · filed 2006-11-15(a)(3)

The court thus believes that the appropriate issue to be tried in this matter, if any, is whether the Defendants exercised control over property of the estate in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) and, through that exercise of control, effected a disposition of that property to the detriment of the estate.

Section 362(a)(3) and (6) prohibit postpetition sales of estate vehicles by either the debtor or the auto auction holding their title certificates.

Huisinga v. Greater Quad City Auto Auction (In Re Hocken) · filed 2007-02-22(a)(3), (a)(6)

The Court must decide whether the three cars became property of the estate on the day that Debtor filed bankruptcy. If they did, then Debtor’s sale of the first two vehicles, and the Auction’s sale of the third, violated the automatic stay. ... Therefore, the only result which can be reached under these facts is that the cars belonged to Debtor and became part of Debtor’s estate on the day he filed bankruptcy.

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay a creditor’s repossession or sale of a vehicle that is not property of the bankruptcy estate.

In Re Trammell · filed 2007-11-09(a)(3)

For the reasons set forth below, the Amended Motion is denied, as the Court concludes that the vehicle subject to Honda’s lien is not property of the estate and the stay does not prevent Honda’s acts to obtain possession of the vehicle or to exercise control over the vehicle.

The automatic stay does not bar a motion enforcing rights to property already determined to belong to the movant when the motion neither asserts a right to payment against the debtor's estate nor seeks control over estate property.

In Re Blast Energy Services, Inc. · filed 2008-09-24(a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(6)

Here, EDDO is not asserting a “right to payment” against Eagle’s bankruptcy estate; rather, EDDO is attempting to enforce rights to property that this Court has already determined that it owns. EDDO is not, therefore, attempting to do anything with regards to property in Eagle’s estate.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits an unauthorized postpetition settlement of an estate-owned claim by the debtor’s attorney, and such a settlement is void ab initio.

Nickless v. McGrail (In Re Dooley) · filed 2009-01-13(a)(3)

Trustee Nickless here takes the position that settlement of a claim for relief which constituted property of the estate — by an attorney not authorized to do so and without court approval of the settlement — was an act to obtain possession or exercise control over property of the estate. This Court can not quarrel with that statement. McGrail completed negotiations for and finalized a settlement regarding an asset of the bankruptcy estate. It had no authority to do so. ... Because the settlement of the third-party claim is void ab initio and without effect as a violation of the automatic stay, there exists no valid settlement.

Section 362(a)(3) does not protect fraudulently sheltered property merely because the estate holds the debtor’s equitable claims to it; the property must first be recovered into the estate.

Titan Real Estate Ventures, LLC v. MJCC Realty LP (In Re Flanagan) · filed 2009-03-31(a)(3)

The fundamental point is that the MJCC assets were not automatically considered part of the bankruptcy estate under section 541, and they were never brought into the estate under section 544 within the requisite timeframe under section 546(a). Therefore, MJCC and its assets are not subject to the automatic stay provision. Because MJCC is not subject to the automatic stay provision, the estate has no basis for pursuing a motion for contempt against MJCC for selling off its assets without the Bankruptcy Court’s or the estate’s permission.

The automatic stay does not prohibit debiting a separate corporation’s bank account merely because the debtor is a signatory on the account or liable for the debt.

In Re Moore · filed 2009-03-24(a)(3)

Thus, the debiting of the account was not a violation of the automatic stay in the debtor’s case even if the debtor was liable for the debt. Accordingly, the motion, to the extent it seeks damages under § 362(k), Bankruptcy Code, for willful violation of the automatic stay, must be denied.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits a creditor from repossessing estate property without relief from the automatic stay.

In Re Davis · filed 2009-04-10(a)(3)

It is also worth noting that San Antonio FCU’s repossession of the Impala violated the automatic stay. ... This violation provides another reason why equity favors reconsideration of San Antonio FCU's secured claim in this case.

Section 362(a)(4) applies to prepetition equitable lien claims asserted against a postpetition asset of the bankruptcy estate.

Cooper v. BB Syndication Services, Inc. (In Re 222 South Caldwell Street, Ltd. Partnership) · filed 2009-06-22(a)(4)

Second, the earnest money deposit is a post-petition asset. The automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4) would protect the assertion of any such pre-petition equitable claims against this post-petition asset.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits acts to obtain possession of or exercise control over estate property without court approval.

Jubber v. Search Market Direct, Inc. (In Re Paige) · filed 2009-08-19(a)(3)

As previously stated, section 362(a)(3) expressly prohibits any act to obtain possession of or to exercise control over property of the estate absent court approval.

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay an auction of property in which the debtor had no legal or equitable interest when the bankruptcy case began.

Martyak v. Tioga County (In Re Martyak) · filed 2010-02-05(a)(3)

Since Debtor had no legal or equitable interest in the property as of the commencement of the case, the property did not become property of the estate and the auction held on August 7, 2008, did not violate the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) bars interference with the debtor’s management of estate property, including interference with the estate’s rental income or its tenants.

Taub v. Taub (In Re Taub) · filed 2010-04-09(a)(3)

As a result, the automatic stay prevents any party from interfering with or attempting to control property of the estate, and from collecting or interfering with the estate’s collection or possession of rental income from that property.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits a bank from freezing estate account funds and retaining control over them while awaiting trustee instructions when it has no setoff right to protect.

Mwangi v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In Re Mwangi) · filed 2010-06-30(a)(3)

When Wells Fargo took no action after receiving no instructions from the trustee as to how to disburse the account funds, which were indisputably estate property, Wells Fargo “exercised control” over those funds, and it violated the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) does not protect collateral owned by a debtor-owned LLC when the debtor has no legal or equitable interest in the collateral.

In Re Brittain · filed 2010-08-16(a)(3)

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the Debtors had asserted no legal or equitable interest in the Collateral nor sufficiently asserted or exercised a claim of redemptive rights as secondary obligors as of the hearing on the Motion, and that therefore the Collateral is not property of the Debtors or their Estate. As a result, TCB’s Motion is granted to the extent it requests relief from the automatic stay.

Section 362(a) does not bar postpetition completion and recordation of a tax sale deed after a prepetition final judgment extinguished the debtor’s redemption rights, where the debtor retained only bare legal title subject to divestment.

Foskey v. PLUS PROPERTIES, LLC · filed 2010-09-29(a)

Accordingly, while actions taken against that limited interest may have violated the automatic stay, the postpetition actions at issue here were taken consistent with the estate’s limited property rights and were not in violation of the automatic stay provisions.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a postnuptial agreement from giving a spouse possession or control of Chapter 13 estate property, including post-confirmation earnings.

In Re Clouse · filed 2010-12-28(a)(3)

If a provision of the Agreement allows Spouse to obtain possession or exercise control over property of the estate, that provision violates the automatic stay of Section 362(a)(3).

The automatic stay does not bar a creditor’s alter ego action against a bankrupt corporation’s principal when the creditor asserts its own claim rather than a claim belonging to the corporation’s estate.

Shaoxing County Huayue Import & Export v. Bhaumik · filed 2011-01-18(a)(3)

We hold that Shaoxing’s claims based on alter ego liability were not the property of ITC’s bankruptcy estate and, therefore, the action was not subject to the automatic stay of the bankruptcy proceedings.

Section 362(a)'s automatic stay applies to real property only if it is property of the bankruptcy estate.

Crafted Homes, Inc. v. Burnett (In Re Burnett) · filed 2011-04-28(a)

With respect to real property the automatic stay only applies to property of the estate.

Section 362(a)(4) prevents a judgment lien from attaching to estate funds in the trustee’s hands after the bankruptcy petition.

In re Vance · filed 2011-05-24(a)(4)

United Bank makes an alternative argument, that even if its lien did not attach to funds in the bank account, it subsequently attached to the funds in the hands of the Trustee. ... United Bank’s argument flies in the face of § 362(a)(4) and is without merit.

Section 362(a) bars anyone other than the trustee from possessing or exercising control over claims that belong to the bankruptcy estate.

In Re Salander · filed 2011-06-02(a)

The Bankruptcy Code prohibits any other person from possessing or “exercising control over” the Debtors’ claims.

Section 362(a)(3) does not bar continued possession when a final prebankruptcy judgment terminated the debtor’s possessory interest before that interest could become property of the estate.

In RE DiGREGORIO · filed 2011-09-28(a)(3)

Where, as here, the property right in question is not property of the estate, because Debtor’s right thereto was terminated pre-bankruptcy, the automatic stay does not apply.

Section 362 keeps estate property under the automatic stay while the estate is being administered, so dismantling and selling that property during administration violates the stay.

Cox v. Andrews (In re Andrews) · filed 2011-12-20(c)(1)

There is no question that the stay was violated when Brian and Greg dismantled and sold the Race Car while administration of the Debtors’ case was ongoing.

Sections 362(a)(3) and (a)(4) apply only to acts affecting property of the bankruptcy estate.

Xtra Petroleum Transport, Inc. v. Brad Hall & Associates, Inc. (Xtra Petroleum Transport, Inc.) · filed 2012-05-17(a)(3), (a)(4)

Sections 362(a)(3) and (a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code apply only to acts affecting property of the estate.

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay repossession of a nondebtor corporation’s property merely because the debtor has a right to redeem it, when repossession does not control that right.

In re Williams · filed 2012-07-11(a)(3)

Accordingly, the bank’s repossession efforts do not violate § 362. These efforts are directed against property of Spirit, not property of Williams, and these efforts do not involve any attempt to control Williams’ right of redemption.

Section 362(a)(3) does not void the loss of a debtor subsidiary’s QSub tax status when that status is neither property nor property of the subsidiary’s bankruptcy estate.

Majestic Star Casino, LLC v. Barden Development, Inc. · filed 2013-05-21(a)(3)

Even if QSub status were property, it would still have to be property “of the estate” for a transfer of that status to be void under Code § 362 or avoidable under § 549. ... Based on the foregoing, we conclude that, even if MSC II‟s QSub status were “property,” it is not properly seen as property of MSC II‟s bankruptcy estate, and the contrary conclusion of the Bankruptcy Court cannot stand.

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay actions concerning property that was excluded from the bankruptcy estate because its foreclosure sale was completed before the petition was filed.

Carbonneau v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n (In re Carbonneau) · filed 2013-09-17(a)(3)

Thus, under New Hampshire Law, the foreclosure sale process was completed before the Debtor filed his bankruptcy petition, and the Property did not become part of the bankruptcy estate. Because the Property was not bankruptcy estate property, FNMA’s post-petition actions did not violate the automatic stay.

Section 362’s automatic stay is violated when a creditor continues to retain estate property after the petition, even if its possession began before filing.

Harbans v. Santa Cruz County Bank (In re Grewal) · filed 2013-09-30

SCCB’s possession of the refrigerator and water cooler commenced prior to the filing of the petition, and is ongoing. This post-petition retention of the estate’s property clearly violated the automatic stay, and possibly also the discharge injunction.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not protect a residence sold at a valid foreclosure sale before the bankruptcy petition when the debtors retained no legal or equitable interest in it at filing.

Cook v. Huey · filed 2013-10-04(a)(3), (a)(5)

There was no error in finding that the valid foreclosure sale which occurred prior to the filling of the Cooks’ bankruptcy petition divested the debtors of any legal or equitable interests in the property. Therefore, their residence did not become property of the bankruptcy estate subject to the protections of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay acts concerning property in which the debtor had no legal or equitable interest when the bankruptcy petition was filed.

In re Varquez · filed 2013-12-13(a)(3)

First, Sparrow is correct that as of the date of the filing of the petition, the automatic stay was not in effect as to the property in question, because the debtors’ interest in their former residence had been extinguished prior to the filing. Section 362(a)(3) proscribes any post-petition act “to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) bars an attorney from retaining settlement proceeds that belong to the bankruptcy estate, including proceeds claimed as fees and costs.

In re Grant · filed 2014-03-10(a)(3)

By its actions, moreover, in retaining both the full amount of the settlement proceeds at first and then later only its fee and costs, Wild Carter exercised control over and acted to obtain possession of property of the estate in violation of the stay.

Section 362 applies the automatic stay to property of the estate, so deciding whether the stay was violated requires determining whether the affected property belongs to the estate.

Mulligan Mint, Inc. v. Republic Metals Corp. (In re Mulligan Mint, Inc.) · filed 2014-08-27

In general, the automatic stay applies to “property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 362. In any stay proceeding, the Bankruptcy Court is forced to answer the threshold question of whether the affected property belongs to the estate.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits a party other than the trustee from asserting a prepetition claim that belongs to the bankruptcy estate.

In re Nicole Gas Production, Ltd. · filed 2014-09-26(a)(3)

And because the claims were property of NGP’s estate, § 362(a)(3) prohibited the Fulson Parties from asserting them.

Section 362(a)(4) stays enforcement of a lien against a tenant’s leasehold interest after the tenant files for bankruptcy, even when another party owns the property.

HERKIMER COUNTY INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPM v. VILLAGE OF HERKIMER · filed 2015-01-02(a)(4)

Thus, the tenant’s petition operated as a stay to “enforce any lien against property of the estate” (11 USC § 362 [a] [4]).

Section 362(a)(4) stays an in rem foreclosure against property in which a debtor tenant has a leasehold interest because the leasehold is property of the bankruptcy estate.

Herkimer County Industrial Development Agency v. Village of Herkimer · filed 2015-01-02(a)(4)

Thus, the tenant’s petition operated as a stay to “enforce any lien against property of the estate” (11 USC § 362 [a] [4]).

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief to let state court litigation over property outside the debtor’s bankruptcy estate proceed because the automatic stay does not apply to that property.

In re Domum Locis LLC · filed 2014-12-05(d)(1)

Moreover, Lloyds’s motion for relief from stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) should be granted to allow the nonbankruptcy litigation in the actions before the Los Angeles and Riverside Superior Courts with respect to the Properties to proceed since the automatic stay does not apply to the Properties, which are not assets of Debtor’s bankruptcy estate.

Section 362(a)(3) bars moving estate property after the trustee’s appointment without the trustee’s knowledge or consent.

Metal Foundations Acquisition, LLC v. Reinert (In Re Reinert) · filed 2015-02-20(a)(3)

But the problem for Reinert is that, even if the tooling was moved before the sale, it was indisputably moved after the Trustee’s appointment and without the knowledge or consent of the Trustee in violation of the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).

Section 362 does not stay a fraudulent-transfer suit concerning property transferred before bankruptcy that the trustee has not yet recovered for the estate.

In re Rosenblum · filed 2016-02-29

Following this precedent, this Court concludes that the filing of the State Litigation therefore does not implicate the automatic stay under § 362.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits debiting a Chapter 13 debtor’s bank account to gain control of estate property, even if the debit leaves the account with a negative balance.

Campbell v. Carruthers (In re Campbell) · filed 2016-06-14(a)(3)

The money in Campbell’s bank account was property of the estate, and Carruthers’s conduct in debiting her account was an act to gain control of it. ... The fact that it had a negative balance when the February 15 debit occurred does not negate this conclusion because it merely increased the debt Campbell owed to the bank, thereby increasing the bank’s claim against Campbell and- forcing Campbell to deposit more money to bring her account current.

Section 362 does not bar a tenant from removing its own personal property from a debtor’s leased land.

North Central Pennsylvania Regional Planning & Development Commission v. Eckert (In re Watson) · filed 2016-08-19

In simple terms, if this was personalty owned by the tenant, Defendant, then there is no violation due to its removal by the tenant.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits obtaining a deed to property of the bankruptcy estate after the automatic stay takes effect, even when a trust trustee conveys the deed.

White v. Gordon · filed 2016-09-27(a)(3)

Second, White argues that because Se-kulic conveyed the deed to her, White did not violate the stay by receiving it. On its face, however, the statute prohibits “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). The court cannot conclude that the Bankruptcy Court clearly erred in determining that obtaining a deed to property that is part of the bankruptcy estate constituted such an act.

Section 362(a)(3) and (4) stay acts against property of the bankruptcy estate; they do not apply to property that revested in a Chapter 13 debtor upon plan confirmation.

Woodard v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2016-10-11(a)(3)-(4)

Subsections (3) and (4) of § 362(a) are limited to acts taken against “property of the estate.” ... At that time, the Property had revested in the Debtor. As such, subsections (3) and (4) of § 362(a) also do not apply.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits continued control over estate property through occupancy and business operations when the occupants are required to turn it over.

Scarver v. Ellis (In re McKeever) · filed 2017-02-14(a)(3)

This continued control over property of the estate constitutes a violation of the stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits affirmative acts to gain possession of or exercise control over estate property; passive retention alone does not violate the automatic stay.

WD Equipment, LLC v. Cowen · filed 2017-02-27(a)(3)

And so, adhering to the text of the statute, as we must, we adopt the minority rule: only affirmative acts to gain possession of, or to exercise control over, property of the estate violate § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits a creditor from directing a sheriff to hold levied funds after a bankruptcy filing because doing so exercises control over estate property.

The Best Service Co. v. Bayley · filed 2017-02-27(a)(3)

However, by directing the Sheriff to hold the levied funds, Best Service both “enforce[d]” its pre-petition judgment, see 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2), and “exercise[d] control over property of the estate,” see id. § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(4) stays perfection of a construction lien against estate property when payment of the lien would reduce the debtor’s accounts receivable.

Linear Electric Co Inc v. · filed 2017-03-30(a)(4)

Where, as here, a lien will be paid by transferring part or all of an asset from the bankruptcy estate to the lienholder, the lien is against the property of the bankruptcy estate. Thus, Cooper and Samson’s filing to perfect their liens violated the automatic stay.

Allegations that a party threatened estate collectors and sent correspondence to hamper collection of estate receivables plausibly state a violation of § 362(a)(3).

Arrowsmith v. Lemberg Law, LLC (In re Health Diagnostics Laboratory, Inc.) · filed 2017-03-30(a)(3)

The Liquidating Trustee alleges that additional collusive acts include threatening to sue the Collectors and demanding that they cease and desist their collection efforts, and dispatching correspondence, designed to hamper the Plaintiffs efforts to collect property of the estate. These alleged facts, which the Court must accept as true, are sufficient to allege a violation of section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay collection of a nondebtor’s debt from property that belongs individually to that nondebtor rather than to the bankruptcy estate.

Gral v. Estate of Margolis (In re Gral) · filed 2017-03-31(a)(3)

For these reasons, Margolis’s acts to collect non-debtor Julia Gral’s debt from her interest in Margolis Gral does not offend 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).

Section 362(a)(3) and (4) do not stay acts concerning property that has left the bankruptcy estate through a sale.

Heaney v. Lamento (In re Whiz Kids Development, LLC) · filed 2017-11-17(a)(3), (4)

The Court finds that § 362(a)(3) and (4), which relate primarily to actions concerning property of the estate, are inapplicable here because the property was no longer property of the estate on the date Lamento commenced the Land Court action (November 23, 2015) as a result of the Sale to Heaney.

Section 362(a)(3) does not bar actions involving property of a nondebtor company when that property is not property of the bankruptcy estate.

Geltzer v. Soshkin (In re Brizinova) · filed 2018-07-20(a)(3)

But here too, because ENSI is not a debtor, and because the Trustee does not adequately allege that the Post-Petition Sale Proceeds are "proceeds of or from property of the estate," he does not adequately allege the third element of his claim under Bankruptcy Code Section 362 for a stay violation, that the conduct in question violates the automatic stay, because actions with respect to property that is not property of the estate simply do not violate the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) stays an alter ego claim when that claim is property of the bankruptcy estate.

Harrison v. Soroof Int'l, Inc. · filed 2018-07-27(a)(3)

Having found that Harrison's alter ego claim is property of the bankruptcy estate under Section 541(a)(1), the automatic stay of Section 362(a)(3) is clearly implicated.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a creditor from foreclosing on property of a bankruptcy estate while the automatic stay is in force, unless the creditor obtains relief from the stay.

Wa Federal, National Assoc., V, Pacific Coast Construction, Llc. · filed 2018-07-31(a)(3)

Automatic stays imposed during bankruptcy prohibit a creditor from bringing a foreclosure action against the property of the bankruptcy estate, unless the plaintiff obtains relief from the stay.

Section 362(a)(3) does not bar an LLC from requesting reimbursement for the costs of a debtor’s records inspection when the request neither strips the estate of an interest nor attempts to control it.

Siegal v. Everett (In re Siegal) · filed 2018-08-08(a)(3)

Based on this record, section 8.1.2 of the Operating Agreement, as drafted or as implemented, did not violate the automatic stay; neither did the Defendants' conduct under that provision. ... But here, the Defendants asserted their rights under the agreement in a way that neither stripped the estate of an interest nor attempted to control the interest.

Section 362(a)(3) requires the targeted asset to be property of the bankruptcy estate for an act concerning that asset to violate the automatic stay.

Chenault v. The University of Kentucky (UK) · filed 2019-07-31(a)(3)

To be a violation of the automatic stay, here, the targeted asset must be property of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). Chenault’s alleged automatic stay violation is implausible and thus fails (without reaching the scienter or damages requirements) because the at-issue insurance proceeds were not property of the estate.

Section 362(a) does not stay action against property held by a nondebtor when the debtor had no legal or equitable interest in it at filing.

Marietta Cheeks · filed 2019-08-13(a)

The Court finds that the Debtor’s evidence falls short of establishinga claim for equitable title and that reformationof the Deed is not available in this case. The automatic stay, therefore, did not come into effect with respect to theProperty whenthe case was filed.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits a creditor from retaining control of garnished funds that are property of the bankruptcy estate.

Carla Matthews Baldwin · filed 2019-08-26(a)(3)

PBK Bank violated the stay because it retained and controlled property of the estate.

Section 362 bars a creditor from repossessing estate property based on its own belief that insurance lapsed; the creditor must first obtain court permission under subsection (d).

Chambers, Sr. v. Auto Brokers · filed 2019-09-10(a)

There is no exception in § 362 for property that a creditor unilaterally decides to exclude from protection of the automatic stay or for a creditor that decides to repossess property because it believes (correctly or incorrectly) that the insurance has lapsed. A creditor must seek the Court’s permission pursuant to § 362(d) before taking any action prohibited by § 362(a).

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits a creditor from repossessing or retaining estate property after a bankruptcy filing without relief from the automatic stay.

Edwards v. B&E TRANSPORT, LLC · filed 2019-09-25(a)(3)

Absent relief from the automatic stay, a creditor may not repossess, threaten to repossess, or in any other way, exercise control of property of the debtor or property of the estate.

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay acts concerning property sold at a valid foreclosure sale before the bankruptcy petition when that property is outside the bankruptcy estate.

Ray Artis Russell · filed 2019-10-11(a)(3)

Accordingly, this Court hereby finds that the foreclosed Property is not part of the Debtor’s bankruptcy estate. There is no dispute that the foreclosure sale was conducted on May 3, 2019 and the bankruptcy petition was not filed until May 7, 2019. Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the automatic stay of 11 U.S. C. $362 is not applicable to the foreclosed Property.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a creditor from repossessing estate property after a bankruptcy petition and from retaining it after a request for its return.

Edwards v. B&E TRANSPORT, LLC · filed 2019-10-25(a)(3)

Section 362 prohibits acts to exercise control over property of the estate. By refusing to return the motorcycle to Ms. Edwards (or the bankruptcy trustee), after unlawfully repossessing it post-petition, B&E is exercising control over property of the estate.

Section 362(a)(3)'s automatic stay bars creditor claims that duplicate a trustee's avoidance actions and attempt to control those actions as estate property.

Darr v. Plaintiffs' Interim Executive · filed 2019-10-29(a)(3)

Because we reject the PIEC Defendants' argument that the unjust enrichment claims are not derivative of Darr's Avoidance Actions, we reject their challenge to the bankruptcy court's conclusion that their attempt to assert unjust enrichment claims is an attempt to exercise "control" over the Avoidance Actions, and thus property of the estate, in violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) does not bar completion of a prepetition foreclosure sale when the debtor retains only bare legal title subject to divestment and completion is not an act against estate property.

Wilson v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA · filed 2020-02-14(a)(3)

On the petition date, Wilson’s bare legal title remained subject to divestment, and the postpetition completion of the contract of sale was not an act against property of the estate.

The automatic stay remains effective as to a debtor’s estate property, including a vessel in which the debtor holds an interest as a tenant by the entirety, even after the stay ends as to the debtor personally.

Howard Bank v. M/V "Mothership" · filed 2020-03-03(c)(4)(A)(i)

Because Ms. Horan owns an interest as a tenant in the entirety in the Vessel, a stay remained in effect as to the Vessel.

Section 362(a)(3) stays a debtor from prosecuting a prepetition claim that remains property of the Chapter 7 estate.

Malloch v. Newmark Homes Of Michigan, Inc. · filed 2020-03-17(a)(3)

As matters currently stand, only the Chapter 7 Trustee may prosecute the claim, and the filing of this claim by the Plaintiff, and any continued prosecution of this claim by the Plaintiff, is a violation of the automatic stay, under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) stays an action seeking coverage under a debtor's insurance policies when the policies are property of the bankruptcy estate, including when the claimant is an additional named insured.

TransCanada USA Services, Inc. v. Zurich American Insurance Company · filed 2020-03-20(a)(3)

Therefore, the Court finds that the insurance policies at issue are part of the bankruptcy estate and the automatic stay provision under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) is applicable.

Section 362(a) protects trustee-held funds from garnishment when the debtor retains an interest in them and they become property of a new bankruptcy estate.

Calamity M. Johnson · filed 2020-04-22(a)

Because Debtor filed the pending Chapter 13 within the garnishment-objection period, the remaining funds are property of the pending bankruptcy estate, subject to the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(4) does not stay enforcement of an attorney’s lien on a creditor’s judgment and its proceeds because that lien is not against property of the bankruptcy estate.

Kay Bee Kay Properties, LLC · filed 2020-07-27(a)(4)

Under Michigan law, the charging lien operated as a lien on the judgment received by Taleb in the state court lawsuit and its proceeds. Dunn, 846 N.W.2d at 81. It is not a lien against property of the bankruptcy estate. Accordingly, § 362(a)(4) does not apply.

Section 362(a)(3) does not protect a debtor’s postpetition property that is not property of the bankruptcy estate.

Rajesh C Patel · filed 2020-09-16(a)(3)

Even if the claims belonged to Debtor himself, or their resolution extinguished Debtor’s claim for punitive damages for violation of the automatic stay, any such claims arose post-petition, and post-petition property of a debtor is not property of the estate protected by § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay actions against property that is not part of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.

Gilliam v. Robinson · filed 2020-10-01(a)(3)

Given that the condominium is not property of Gilliam’s bankruptcy estate, the conclusion that the automatic stay does not apply to the condominium was also correct.

Section 362(a)(4) makes a lien recorded against estate property while the automatic stay is in effect void from the outset.

Glen E Pyle · filed 2020-10-27(a)(4)

The law is quite clear that a lien or act taken when the automatic stay is in effect is void ab initio.

Section 362(a)(3) stays a suit to nullify a final judgment owned by the bankruptcy estate because the suit would exercise control over an estate asset.

Pentecost v. Louisiana Safety Association of Timbermen · filed 2021-01-26(a)(3)

Pentecost’s attempt to nullify the state court judgment is an attempt to exercise control over an estate asset and as such is a violation of Section 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) bars an unauthorized person from pursuing claims belonging to a bankruptcy estate because doing so exercises control over estate property.

Smith v. Edwards · filed 2021-02-04(a)(3)

The unauthorized pursuit of the Whistleblower Complaint by Bishop Edwards on behalf of Heritage and AL-MS Farm demonstrates a willful violation of the automatic stay and disregard for the orders of this Court.

Section 362(a)(3) stays payment of D&O insurance proceeds to officers when payment would exercise control over the estate’s rights to coverage under the policy.

National Fish and Seafood Inc. · filed 2021-02-26(a)(3)

On these facts, | conclude that movant’s receipt of proceeds on their A-side claims under the policy would exercise control over rights under the policy that belong to the estate. The distribution is therefore subject to the stays in subsection (a)(3) of acts to exercise control over property of the estate.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits an attorney from taking estate property to pay postpetition fees without relief from the automatic stay.

Michael Miszko, Jr. · filed 2021-04-22(a)(3)

The Court finds that Debtor’s Counsel willfully took property of the estate in violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) stays a nondebtor from exercising control over claims arguably belonging to the bankruptcy estate until their ownership is determined or the bankruptcy court enters another appropriate order.

Ward v. Cross Keys Bank · filed 2021-04-29(a)(3)

Thus, the stay applies to prevent non-debtor parties from exercising control over the claims and causes of action until such a determination is made or another appropriate order is entered by the Bankruptcy Court.

Section 362(a)(3) stays a creditor from pursuing claims that are property of the bankruptcy estate.

GIGA WATT INC · filed 2021-09-27(a)(3)

Because these causes of action are estate property, the automatic stay applies to them and thus Mr. Dam and the proposed class must not pursue Class Complaint Counts I, II and III.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a creditor from repossessing estate property and refusing to return it because those acts exercise control over property of the estate.

Miller v. European Connection, LLC · filed 2021-09-28(a)(3)

Defendant’s acts in repossessing the Automobile and failing to return it were clearly acts to exercise control over property of the estate and to collect or recover a claim. Thus, Defendant violated the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(4) prohibits recording a notice of delinquent assessment lien or default against property of the bankruptcy estate.

Citimortgage, Inc. v. Corte Madera Homeowners Assoc. · filed 2021-11-24(a)(4)

The recording of the notice of delinquent assessment lien and notice of default violated the automatic stay because the automatic stay prohibits “any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4).

Section 362(a)(4) bars recording a condominium common charge lien for postpetition arrears against estate property, and such a lien is void ab initio.

Shanta K Sukhu · filed 2022-03-01(a)(4)

A postpetition recording of this common charge lien for postpetition arrears would make this lien violate § 362(a)(4), and this lien would not be protected by § 362(b)(3). If the facts meet the assertions, this 2021 lien is void ab initio.

Section 362’s automatic stay applies to property that arguably belongs to the bankruptcy estate, so a creditor must seek relief from the bankruptcy court before foreclosing on it.

Giles-Flores v. Braeburn Plaza, Inc. · filed 2022-10-20

Because the home was arguably estate property on the foreclosure date, the automatic stay applied.

Section 362(a)(3) does not bar control over an insurance policy or its proceeds when they are not property of the bankruptcy estate.

McDavid v. McDavid · filed 2022-11-29(a)(3)

Simply put, the complaint does not state a plausible claim for violation of the automatic stay because the property at issue – the insurance policy and its proceeds – is not property of the estate.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits a creditor from leasing estate property after the bankruptcy petition and retaining the lease proceeds.

Smith v. Race Engines Plus, LLC · filed 2022-12-28(a)(3)

The Post-Petition Leasing Transactions are violations of the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. §362.

Section 362(a)(3) does not bar disbursement of interpleaded funds whose ownership was disputed when the debtor filed bankruptcy because the funds are not property of the estate.

McIntyre v. Fangman · filed 2022-12-30(a)(3)

A synthesis of the authority leads this Court to conclude the Funds are not property of the estate and disbursement of the Funds did not violate the automatic stay under § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(4) automatically stays acts to create, perfect, or enforce liens against property of the bankruptcy estate.

Wellington v. MTGLQ Investors, LP · filed 2023-03-01(a)(4)

A bankruptcy claim operates as an automatic stay of any “act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4). ... To avoid entering any decisions which will be rendered void by the automatic stay, the Court will enter a stay in this action, inclusive of MTGLQ’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 14).

The automatic stay bars a creditor’s fraudulent-transfer claim seeking property of the debtor.

Overland Direct, Inc. v. Aframian · filed 2023-03-07

A creditor’s claim attempting to seek property of the debtor through a fraudulent transfer claim is an automatic stay violation.

Section 362(a)(3) and (4) do not stay litigation over proceeds that are neither property of the bankruptcy estate nor under its control or possession.

Indigo Marketplace LLC v. Farmop Capital LLC · filed 2023-05-26(a)(3)–(4)

The proceeds are not property of the bankruptcy estate and subsections (3) and (4) do not apply.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits a creditor from repossessing a debtor’s vehicle during a pending bankruptcy case.

Davis v. JL Auto Sales · filed 2023-05-30(a)(3)

Here, the automatic stay unequivocally prohibited Defendant’s actions.

Section 362 stays a tax sale of estate property while the bankruptcy case is pending, and a sale conducted in violation of the stay is void and must be set aside.

McGee v. Ma My Dung · filed 2023-06-07

The tax sale violated the automatic stay and must be set aside.

Section 362 does not require a maritime lienholder already in possession of a debtor’s vessel to surrender it when the debtor files for bankruptcy.

Baird Stokes · filed 2023-06-09(a)

Because the Shipyard possessed the Sailboat when Stokes filed for bankruptcy, the Shipyard’s possession did not disturb the “status quo of estate property.”

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay a shareholder's suit asserting a personal claim that belongs to the shareholder rather than the bankruptcy estate.

Midwest M & D Services, Inc. · filed 2023-07-17(a)(3)

That cause of action belonged to him, not the corporation, so he did not violate the automatic stay of §362(a)(3) by exercising control over a cause of action that was property of the estate.

Section 362(a) bars a debtor from exercising control over an estate-owned lawsuit during the bankruptcy case without relief from the stay under § 362(d).

Mary Ann Roberts · filed 2024-05-08(a)

Because the AMA Action is property of the estate, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) prohibited Ms. Roberts from exercising control over it during the pendency of the bankruptcy case absent leave of this Court pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d).

Section 362(a)(3) bars individuals from asserting a personal right to recover on trade secret claims that remain property of the bankruptcy estate.

Wireless Systems Solutions, LLC · filed 2024-06-21(a)(3)

Therefore, and independent of the two categories of the “debtor” stay violations discussed above, the assertions of Mr. and Mrs. Gross of a personal right of recovery in Counts One, Four, Six and Seven in the Complaint for WSS’s trade secret claims violate the automatic stay. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) prevents a party from using or disposing of the debtor’s collateral.

Mullin v. Eventide Credit Acquisitions, LLC · filed 2024-06-27(a)(3)

The automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) prevents BPL from using or disposing of Eventide’s collateral.

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay an action to recover possession that the debtor ceded before filing for bankruptcy, even if the debtor’s ownership interest remains in the estate.

Rivera Bonilla, Digna v. Burgos Negron, Jose · filed 2024-12-20(a)(3)

Aunque el interés propietario del Esposo en la Residencia sí es parte del caudal, por medio de la Demanda no se pretende privar al Esposo de dicho interés. Por tanto, la acción de referencia no puede considerarse como una dirigida a privar al Esposo de la posesión de parte de su caudal y, por tanto, la Paralización no impedía al TPI adjudicar la Demanda.

Section 362(a)(3) prevents a court from exercising control over collateral that includes property of debtors who have filed bankruptcy petitions.

Porter Capital Corporation v. Sunset Logistics Inc · filed 2025-01-29(a)(3)

Thus, because several of the debtors on the UCC financing statement have filed bankruptcy petitions, and the description of collateral covers their property, the court finds that it may not exercise control over such collateral in light of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a) does not stay foreclosure of real property owned by a debtor’s LLC when the property is not part of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate, even if the LLC has been administratively dissolved.

Randall E Kimball · filed 2025-02-07(a)

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that none of the assets of the LLC, including the Property, were as of the Filing Date property of the Debtor’s bankruptcy estate, and thus the Foreclosure Sale was not stayed by the automatic stay of Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.

A complaint alleging a postpetition home sale fails to state an automatic-stay claim when it is unclear whether the home was part of the bankruptcy estate.

(PS) Robinson v. Bettencourt · filed 2025-02-11

As it stands, it is unclear whether plaintiff’s home was part of her bankruptcy estate. At present, the complaint does not state a claim for violation of the automatic bankruptcy stay.

Section 362(a) does not stay efforts to obtain funds that are not property of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.

Alexander Schachl · filed 2025-09-25(a)

Therefore, the Surplus Funds are not property of the Debtor’s bankruptcy estate and efforts by Ms. Roche and Mr. Reilly to seek disbursement of these funds in the Second Mortgagee’s Foreclosure Case are not subject to the automatic stay.

Section 362(a) does not stay actions against property that was transferred before the debtor filed for bankruptcy and never became property of the estate.

Jan N. Evola · filed 2025-12-17(a)

The Stay Relief Order did not violate an order of the Ditech court because the mortgage was not property of the Ditech estate. ... Any property falling outside the property of estate is not covered by the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) bars filing lawsuits over causes of action belonging to the bankruptcy estate without relief from the automatic stay.

Seidel · filed 2026-01-02(a)(3)

Accordingly, the Court finds, pursuant to Counts 20 and 21 of the Complaint, that the actions taken by the Collateral Agent and the Neugebauer Parties relative to filing of the DEGA Complaints to be in violation of the automatic stay imposed by Section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, entitling the Trustee to damages.

Section 362’s automatic stay applies to foreclosure proceedings only if the property being foreclosed is property of the bankruptcy estate.

Phifer · filed 2026-01-05

The automatic stay would apply to the foreclosure proceedings only if the Endover property were property of the bankruptcy estate.

Section 362(a)(4) prohibits filing construction liens against property of the bankruptcy estate after the petition.

Richard N. Berkshire · filed 2026-03-12(a)(4)

Moreover, the filings of the construction liens violate the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362. The stay prohibits “any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate.” § 362(a)(4).

Section 362 stays a creditor’s state court action against a debtor’s interest in property that remains part of the bankruptcy estate.

Michael L Watson · filed 2026-04-08

If the state court finds the debtor’s interest is more than 50%, the complaint in intervention is barred as to the first 50% under 11 U.S.C. § 524. It is stayed as to any amount over 50% by the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362. Any interest of the debtor over 50% was not scheduled in his bankruptcy case and remains property of the bankruptcy estate.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a chapter 7 debtor from filing or continuing a lawsuit asserting estate claims without the trustee’s approval or relief from the stay.

Jason Rudolph Stanford · filed 2026-04-17(a)(3)

As such, since the Petition Date, the Automatic Stay provisions of § 362(a)(3) have enjoined all other parties in interest, including, without limitation, the Debtor, from exercising any control over the Estate Claims in the absence of having first obtained either the Trustee’s approval or the Court’s entry of an order modifying the Automatic Stay to permit the exercise of such control. The enjoined conduct includes, without limitation, the commencement or continuation of any lawsuit that includes one or more Estate Claims.

Section 362(a)(4) prevents a lien from attaching to property of the estate after the bankruptcy petition is filed.

In Re Benefield · filed 1989-07-13(a)(4)

11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4) stays “any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate.” Any act against property of the estate committed in violation of the automatic stay is simply void.

Section 362 protects an IRA that remains property of the estate after a prepetition IRS levy.

Boutilier v. United States (In Re Boutilier) · filed 1996-03-14

Boutilier’s IRA is property of the estate and is protected by 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not cover property traceable to embezzled funds that the debtor held in trust or as an agent and that are outside the bankruptcy estate.

Kitchen v. Boyd (In Re Newpower) · filed 1999-01-22

For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that the bankruptcy court erred in concluding that any funds expended and property purchased by Newpower which are traceable to the embezzled funds of appellants are property of the estate and therefore subject to the automatic stay provided in 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362(a) stays the sale of a debtor’s store and its contents after a bankruptcy petition is filed.

Chaudhry v. Usoskin (In Re Usoskin) · filed 1985-11-27(a)

Until the trial the Court never learned that the plaintiffs had proceeded with the sale of the debtor’s store and its contents, in violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits exercising control over estate property; returning the property later does not erase the stay violation.

In re Arthur B. Adler & Assocs., Ltd. · filed 2018-08-20(a)(3)

That is the situation here: although Adler may have returned most or all of the funds in question to Trustee, it is the act of exercising control over property of the estate, in particular after the September 8, 2017 Turnover Order was entered, that gave rise to this finding of civil contempt.

Section 362(a)(4) bars the creation of a judicial lien against estate property after a bankruptcy case begins.

Turner v. Emmons & Wilson, Inc. (In Re Minton Group, Inc.) · filed 1983-03-15(a)(4)

Accordingly, the judicial lien that the defendant, Emmons & Wilson, Inc., obtained against the debtor’s real estate after the commencement of this case violates Code § 362(a)(4) which proscribes “any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate”.

Section 362(a)(3) does not bar an IRS levy on funds held by a Chapter 13 trustee for distribution under a confirmed plan because those funds are not property of the estate.

Matter of Rutt · filed 1988-06-22(a)(3)

If the funds being held by the Trustee are not property of the estate, it follows that a levy by the IRS on such funds is not ... a violation of the automatic stay of Section 362.

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay litigation over a cause of action the bankruptcy estate does not own, even if a recovery could reduce a claim against the estate.

Gyncor, Inc. v. Healthshield Capital Corp. (In Re Gyncor, Inc.) · filed 2000-07-27(a)(3)

Because the bankruptcy estate does not have an interest in the Commitment, it has no ownership of the cause of action against Healthshield under the Commitment and it can not be said that the cause of action for a breach of the Commitment is part of the bankruptcy estate. Therefore there can be no violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) applies when a bona fide ownership dispute gives the estate a sufficient interest in the property.

In re Pichel · filed 2013-02-25(a)(3)

Since there is a bona fide dispute about the effectiveness of Boehm’s attempted termination of the Agreement, and/or the results thereof, the Court finds that the estate, post-transfer, has a sufficient interest in the Shares for the automatic stay to apply.

Section 362 protected the property as estate property during the debtors’ earlier bankruptcy cases.

Paula Sue Wenstrom · filed 2023-01-27(a)

The Property at issue was indisputably protected as property of the estate throughout Debtors’ prior bankruptcy cases.

Section 362(a)(3) does not treat union efforts to encourage a boycott during a labor dispute as obtaining possession or control of estate property when the union’s protected labor interests outweigh the estate’s interests.

In re Trump Entertainment Resorts, Inc. · filed 2015-07-21(a)(3)

Accordingly, the Court finds that, based on the Union’s superior competing legal interest, as embodied by the NLA and its underlying policy against court interference with labor relations, the Union has not acted to obtain possession or exercise control over property of the Debtors’ bankruptcy estate. Thus, Section 362(a)(3) is inapplicable to the Union’s conduct.

Section 362’s automatic stay cannot be applied to a collective bargaining agreement dispute when it would let the debtor unilaterally terminate or alter the agreement without complying with § 1113.

In Re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc. · filed 1990-12-21(a)

We hold, therefore, that Sec. 1113(f) precludes application of the automatic stay to disputes involving a collective bargaining agreement only when its application allows a debtor unilaterally to terminate or alter any provision of a collective bargaining agreement.

Section 362’s automatic stay cannot be applied to let a debtor unilaterally terminate or alter a collective bargaining agreement, but it may stay a separate judicial enforcement action if the union can present the dispute to a bankruptcy court with jurisdiction to resolve it.

Shugrue v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n (In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.) · filed 1990-12-21(a)

We hold that application of the automatic stay provisions of § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code is precluded by § 1113(f) only to the extent that they permit a debtor unilaterally to terminate or alter a collective bargaining agreement. With respect to the LPP decision, we hold that application of the automatic stay to the arbitration brought pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement violated § 1113(f) since it allowed Eastern unilaterally to avoid its obligation to arbitrate. We hold that the bankruptcy court may stay a non-bankruptcy judicial proceeding to enforce a collective bargaining agreement if the union can bring the dispute before the bankruptcy court and the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to resolve it.

Section 362 does not stay arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement or enforcement of its nonmonetary award when the debtor has not sought to alter or reject the agreement under § 1113.

In Re Bob's Supermarket's, Inc. · filed 1990-11-25(a)

Since § 362 does not apply to the arbitration award, I conclude the Union has the right to enforce the arbitration award in the Frye case and to proceed to arbitration in the Schlecht case.

Section 362(a) does not stay proceedings to enforce a collective bargaining agreement against a debtor before the agreement is modified or rejected under § 1113.

Air Line Pilots Ass'n International v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. (In Re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.) · filed 1990-04-10(a)

All of the reasons above support the conclusion reached in Marine Pollution that the automatic stay’s application to labor proceedings does not survive the passage of section 1113.

Section 362(a) does not supersede the Norris-La Guardia Act’s prohibition on federal injunctions against labor picketing.

In Re Petrusch · filed 1981-12-15(a)

Nowhere in the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, H.R.Rep.No.95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 1977; Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, Sen.Rep.No.989, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 54 reprinted in (1978) U.S.Cong. and Ad.News 5788, 5840-41) or in the Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States (H.R.Doc.No.93-137, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1973) is any reference made to the Norris-La Guardia Act. Such omissions are to us self-evident proof that Congress never intended to supersede or transcend it, since we cannot believe the Norris-La Guardia Act was to superseded, sub silentio.

Section 362 does not supersede the Norris-La Guardia Act’s bar on federal injunctions against union picketing in a labor dispute.

Petrusch v. Teamsters Local 317 · filed 1981-12-15

Labor disputes or picketing are not mentioned in either subsection. ... Such omissions are to us self-evident proof that Congress never intended to supersede or transcend it, since we cannot believe the Norris-La Guardia Act was to superseded, sub silentio.

Section 362(a)(6) does not supersede the Norris-LaGuardia Act’s bar on federal injunctions against strikes arising from labor disputes.

Crowe & Assoc., Inc. v. Bricklayers and Masons Union Local No. 2 of Detroit, Michigan · filed 1982-05-17(a)(6)

We agree with the second circuit’s conclusion that § 362(a)(6) was not intended to supersede the well-established anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.

Section 362(a)(6) does not supersede the Norris-LaGuardia Act's restrictions on enjoining a union strike.

In The Matter Of Crowe & Associates, Inc. · filed 1983-08-08(a)(6)

Congress' mere adoption of § 362(a)(6) in 1978, therefore, does not provide sufficient evidence of a congressional intent to supersede the anti-injunction provisions.

Section 362’s automatic stay yields to § 1113 when payment of a prepetition obligation is required by a collective bargaining agreement.

In Re Arlene's Sportswear, Inc. · filed 1992-05-27

In any event, absent any effect of § 1113, payment of the prepetition claim would be subject to the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362. ... The Court believes that the better view is that adopted by the sixth and second circuits. While this approach does dilute the power of the automatic stay in the area of collective bargaining agreements, and may at times lead to odd results, Congress certainly intended to do something when it adopted § 1113. ... Debtor’s motion to make the requested payments to the holiday trust fund is granted.

Section 362(a)(6)’s automatic stay does not authorize a bankruptcy court to enjoin picketing in a labor dispute where the Norris-LaGuardia Act bars that injunction.

Petrusch v. Teamsters Local 317 (In Re Petrusch) · filed 1981-10-06(a)(6)

For the following reasons, this Court holds that the later codification of the Bankruptcy Court’s power in this regard does not nullify the Norris-LaGuardia Act’s jurisdictional limits on the power of the federal courts to enjoin picketing in a labor dispute.

Section 362(g)(2) places on the debtor the burden to prove that collateral is necessary to an effective reorganization when a creditor seeks relief from the automatic stay.

In Re Burrell · filed 1999-01-21(g)(2)

In the absence of the protections provided by the Act, the Court finds that the Debtor has wholly failed to present any evidence to sustain the burden of proof imposed upon him by 11 U.S.C. § 362(g)(2) with regard to the Motion for Relief from Stay brought by Volvo. The Court finds that, based upon the stipulation of the parties, the Debtor does not have an equity in the subject vehicle and the Court further finds that, based upon the Debtor’s failure to sustain his burden to prove otherwise, the vehicle is not necessary to an effective reorganization of this Debtor.

Section 362(g)(2) places on the debtor the burden of showing that property is necessary to an effective reorganization when a creditor seeks relief from the automatic stay.

In Re McPherson · filed 1998-09-10(g)(2)

In addition to questions over whether or not this particular property is “necessary” to reorganization is the related question of whether or not there is, in sight, a possibility of an “effective reorganization”. The Debtor, under § 362(g)(2), has the burden on this issue. While this doesn’t necessarily require the same quantum of evidence needed to establish feasibility under § 1325(a)(6), I still find that the Debtor has failed to carry the burden.

A plaintiff alleging a willful violation of the automatic stay under § 362(h) must prove the claim by a preponderance of the evidence.

Hanna Coal Co. v. Internal Revenue Service · filed 1997-11-06(h)

While courts are in agreement that the burden rests with Hanna to prove the willful violation of the automatic stay by the IRS, there is a split among the bankruptcy courts as to the weight of the burden a plaintiff in Hanna’s position must carry. ... For this reason, the court requires Hanna to prove its claim by a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 362(g) places the burden of proving the debtor’s equity in the property on the party seeking adequate protection payments and the burden on all other issues on the opposing party.

Southerland v. Troy & Nichols, Inc. · filed 1994-10-24(g)

The party seeking adequate protection payments has the burden of proof to show the debtor’s equity in the property, the party opposing such relief has the burden on all other issues.

Section 362(g)(1) places the burden on a party seeking relief from the automatic stay to prove that the debtor has no equity in the property.

Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. J.B.S. Management Corp. (In re J.B.S. Management Corp.) · filed 1994-03-14(g)(1)

11 U.S.C. § 362 requires the movant show that J.B.S. Management Corp. (the “debtor”) has no equity in the property. 11 U.S.C. § 362(g)(1). The evidence adduced was not of such quality that the court could determine the current value of the real estate and decide whether the debtor lacks equity.

Section 362(g)(1) places the burden of proving lack of equity on the party seeking relief from the automatic stay.

In re Mullins · filed 1990-12-13(g)(1)

The party seeking relief from stay to proceed against property of the estate on the basis of lack of equity therein has the burden of proof on that issue.

Under § 362(d)(1) and (g), a debtor opposing relief from the automatic stay bears the burden on matters raised or implied by the record in deciding cause, but need not disprove speculative grounds.

Layne v. Omni/Co. (In re Omni/Co.) · filed 1981-12-31(d)(1), (g)

The Court further notes that Debtor’s burden of proof under 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d)(1) and (g) does not require Debtor to make an affirmative showing of a lack of cause, but places the burden on Debtor regarding only those matters placed in issue to enable determination of the question of cause. In other words, Debtor is not responsible to rebut potential straw issues which are neither raised in the parties’ pleadings nor implied in the Court record.

A party seeking relief from the automatic stay bears the burden of proving that the debtor lacks equity in the property.

Citizens State Bank v. McIntyre (In re McIntyre) · filed 1982-03-12(g)(1)

At that hearing, the Bank had the burden of proof as to debtor’s lack of equity in the automobile pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(g). There was no evidence submitted to the Court at that hearing which would support a finding that the debtor lacked equity in the property in question.

Section 362(g) places the burden on a creditor seeking relief from the automatic stay to prove that the debtor has no equity in the pledged collateral.

Peninsula International Corp. v. Citizens & Southern International Bank (In Re Peninsula International Corp.) · filed 1982-04-01(g)

The bank has not proved that the debtor has no equity in the pledged collateral. The burden is on the bank to do so. § 362(g). Relief from the stay is denied.

Section 362(g) places the burden of proving the debtor’s equity in collateral on the party seeking relief from the automatic stay, and the burden on all other issues on the party opposing relief.

First Valley Bank v. Brown (In Re Brown) · filed 1982-04-30(g)

In an action to lift the automatic stay, the party seeking such relief has the burden of proof on the issue of the debtor’s equity in the collateral, while the party opposing such relief has the burden of proof on all other issues.

Section 362(g)(2) places the burden of showing that crops fall outside land covered by a creditor’s perfected security interest on the party opposing stay relief.

Willamette Production Credit Ass'n v. Lovelady (In Re Lovelady) · filed 1982-06-18(g)(2)

Defendants, in any event, have not satisfied their burden under 11 U.S.C. § 362(g)(2) and § 544(a)(2) of showing that any crops were not grown on land which was included in the description which I find is sufficient.

Section 362(g) places the burden on the debtor to prove lack of cause for relief from the stay under § 362(d)(1), even when the debtor claims equity in the property provides adequate protection.

Gauvin v. Wagner (In Re Gauvin) · filed 1982-10-01(g)

Rather, we read the reference in § 362(g) to be limited to the issue of equity expressed in § 362(d)(2)(B) and conclude that the debtor retains the burden of proving lack of cause under § 362(d)(1) even where the debtor asserts that equity furnishes adequate protection.

When the debtor’s equity in property is not at issue, § 362(g) places the burden of proving lack of cause for stay relief on the party opposing relief.

Bosben v. J. H. Olsen Construction, Inc. (In Re Rapco Foam, Inc.) · filed 1982-10-14(g)(2)

Rapco Foam, Inc.’s equity in property is not at issue; therefore, the defendants have the burden of proving there is not cause to lift the stay.

A creditor seeking to modify the automatic stay bears the burden of proving that the debtor has no equity in the property.

City National Bank of Miami v. Sunrise Club, Inc. (In Re Sundale Associates, Ltd.) · filed 1982-09-27(g)(1)

Where a plaintiff in an adversary proceeding seeks to obtain a modification of the automatic stay, said plaintiff is burdened to prove that the debtor has no equity in the property (11 U.S.C. Sec. 362(g)(1)). The Plaintiff in this instant case has failed to discharge this burden of proof.