11 U.S.C. § 362

Section 362 stays a pending appeal when the appellants file a suggestion of bankruptcy.

Brigitte Starkey and David Starkey v. Hiebler · filed 2026-06-19

Accordingly, this appeal is stayed. See 11 U.S.C. § 362; Tex. R. App. P. 8.2.

Section 362’s automatic stay applies to an appeal when the court determines that a party’s bankruptcy petition has triggered the stay.

Pixton v. B & B Plastics, Inc. · filed 2005-08-31

On January 5, 2005 we stayed briefing after being notified that B & B Plastics had filed a petition in bankruptcy and thus the automatic stay provision of 11 U.S.C. § 362 was applicable.

Section 362(a)'s automatic stay does not bar an award of appellate costs when the appeal functioned as an adversary proceeding to determine the validity of a lien.

Bankr. L. Rep. P 74,624 in Re Jack J. Grynberg, Celeste C. Grynberg, Debtors. Jack J. Grynberg, Celeste C. Grynberg v. D · filed 1992-06-03(a)

Although our reasoning differs from that of the district court, we agree with that court’s conclusion that the automatic stay did not bar the award of these costs, and affirm. ... Thus the award of appellate costs by the California court was tantamount to an order of a bankruptcy court awarding costs after an action to determine the validity of a lien, all as allowed by Rule 7054(b).

Section 362(a)(1) stays an appeal filed by a debtor after seeking bankruptcy protection until the bankruptcy proceedings end or the bankruptcy court lifts the stay.

Kerr v. England · filed 2001-09-07(a)(1)

We therefore reject the minority analysis employed in the Tenth Circuit decisions and follow the interpretation of federal law earlier adopted by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Bailey. Accordingly, this appeal is stayed pending completion of the bankruptcy proceedings or receipt of an order from the United States Bankruptcy Court lifting the stay.

Section 362(a)(1) stays appeals in proceedings originally brought against the debtor, even when the debtor is the appellant.

Way Architects, P.C. v. Rockrimmon Elderly Housing Ltd. Partnership · filed 2005-06-16(a)(1)

We are persuaded by this analysis, and we conclude that In re Lyngholm, supra, is not persuasive and decline to follow it. Thus, we conclude that these proceedings must be stayed under § 362.

Section 362(a)'s automatic stay prevents reinstatement of an appeal while claims for monetary damages against the debtor remain stayed, unless the bankruptcy court authorizes reinstatement or lifts the stay.

Joseph Mills and Katy Mills v. GMAC, LLC, US Bank National Association, as Trustee of the RASC 2006KS5 Trust · filed 2014-04-17(a)

Accordingly, if appellees desire reinstatement of this appeal, they must either obtain clarification from the bankruptcy court stating that its July 13, 2012 order authorized reinstatement of this appeal or they must obtain an order of the bankruptcy court lifting the automatic stay in this case.

Section 362(a)(1) automatically stays an appeal when the debtor was a defendant in the trial court.

Johnson v. Putze · filed 2019-03-08(a)(1)

An appeal, for purposes of the automatic stay, is considered a continuation of the action in the trial court. ... It appears that appellants were defendants below. Therefore, this appeal is stayed pursuant to the automatic stay provisions of federal bankruptcy law.

Section 362(a) stays an appeal in a proceeding originally brought against the debtor, even when the debtor files the appeal.

Winslett v. Guthrie · filed 2013-01-24(a)

All proceedings against Winslett are automatically stayed pursuant to 11 U. S. C. § 362.

Section 362(a) automatically stays a creditor’s foreclosure sale when the debtor files a bankruptcy petition.

In Re Pickeral · filed 2001-01-25(a)

Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), the filing of the petition itself gave rise to an automatic stay barring the creditor from pursuing a foreclosure sale.

Section 362’s automatic stay binds the FDIC acting as a receiver like any other creditor and bars foreclosure on estate property until relief from the stay is granted.

Sunshine Development, Inc. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as Liquidating Agent for First Service Bank for Sav · filed 1994-08-22(a)(1), (a)(3)

While the legislatively mandated stay is in place, the FDIC, like any other creditor, is fully subject to it.

Section 362(a) stays a sheriff’s foreclosure sale of mortgaged property after a foreclosure judgment when the debtor files a bankruptcy petition before the sale.

In re Bunke · filed 1994-04-11(a)

Based upon the applicable statutes and case law, this Court concludes that a sheriffs sale of mortgaged land on which a foreclosure judgment has been entered is stayed under § 362(a) by the filing of a bankruptcy petition.

Section 362(a)(3) stays foreclosure of a nondebtor joint tenant’s interest when the foreclosure would extinguish the debtor estate’s right of survivorship.

Matter of Cameron · filed 1994-02-22(a)(3)

The completed foreclosure will destroy the right of survivorship held by the debtor’s estate. ... The foreclosure, accordingly, affects property of the estate, an act that the automatic stay prohibits.

Section 362(a) stays a secured creditor’s postpetition election to take title to estate collateral, including an election by a government agency.

Commodity Credit Corp. v. Marlow (In Re Julien Co.) · filed 1990-08-16(a)

Whatever an election may be, CCC’s election to cause title to the stored cotton to vest in CCC is subject to the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), just as any other foreclosing creditor’s action would be.

Section 362(a)(4) protects a debtor’s pre-foreclosure right to redeem collateral when a foreclosure sale of other owners’ interests would destroy that right.

In Re Bialac · filed 1982-02-09(a)(4)

In particular we feel that the consequential destruction of James Bialac’s right to redeem constitutes an act in contravention of Section 362(a)(4).

Section 362 does not stay confirmation of a prepetition foreclosure sale when the debtor had no interest in the property when the petition was filed.

State Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Kealia Beach Village, Inc. (In Re Kealia Beach Village, Inc.) · filed 1982-02-24

Thus, at the time of the filing of the petition on October 29, 1981, the Debtor had no interest in the property that passed into the bankruptcy estate. It only follows then that the automatic stay provided by 11 U.S.C. Section 362 should not operate to prevent confirmation of the pre-petition commissioner’s sale.

Section 362(a)(1) tolls a foreclosure redemption period that remains open when the bankruptcy petition is filed, and § 362(a)(4) bars a lienholder from applying for a public trustee’s deed.

Jenkins v. Peet (In Re Jenkins) · filed 1982-04-15(a)(1), (a)(4)

Accordingly, I hold that the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) tolls the redemption period on those two parcels as to which the redemption period had not yet expired when the bankruptcy petition was filed, and I hold that the automatic stay provision of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4) prohibits application for public trustee’s deeds on all three of the parcels involved in this appeal.

Section 362(a)(2), (3), and (4) tolls an Arizona debtor’s statutory redemption period after mortgage foreclosure in chapter 11, and section 108(b)(2) does not limit that stay.

Sapphire Investments v. Stewart Title & Trust of Tucson (In Re Sapphire Investments) · filed 1982-04-15(a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(4)

In conclusion, this Court holds that the right of redemption under the Arizona statute is a matter of state law and is property of the estate under § 541 of the Bankruptcy Code until the sheriff’s deed is delivered to the purchaser of the foreclosed property, and that 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2), (3), (4) tolls the running of a debtor’s statutory right of redemption in Arizona. Further, § 108(b)(2) in chapter 11 proceedings is not a limitation on the automatic stay provided for in § 362 of the tolling of the right of a redemption by a debtor.

Section 362(a) suspends the running of a state law period to redeem foreclosed real property when the debtor files a bankruptcy petition; the suspension is subject to termination under § 362(d).

In Re H & W Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1982-04-26(a)

The Debtor, however, will be directed to amend its Amended Disclosure Statement to reflect that its interest in the aforementioned real property is limited to a state law right of redemption, that the running of the state law redemption period was suspended upon the filing of its bankruptcy petition by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), and that such suspension is subject to termination pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d).

Section 362(a) stays completion of a mortgage foreclosure while the debtor retains an equity of redemption, and § 108(b) does not shorten that stay.

In Re Shea Realty, Inc. · filed 1982-07-08(a)

Accordingly, this Court concludes that Sec. 108(b) has no effect on the automatic stay prescribed by Sec. 362(a) and the petitioner may not proceed with completion of foreclosure of its mortgage until the stay is lifted in accordance with Sec. 362(d)(2) of the Code.

Section 362 stays efforts to enforce a mortgage upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, and attorney’s fees for foreclosure work performed in violation of that stay are not recoverable even if the creditor had not received notice.

In Re Roberts · filed 1982-06-14

As soon as the petition was filed, Ninth Federal was stayed from doing anything whatsoever to enforce its mortgage. It is regrettable that notice of the stay was not received by Ninth Federal until after the foreclosure proceedings had begun. But these hard-pressed debtors should not be compelled to pay for proceedings which should never have been started. Thus, even if Ninth Federal’s contract covered foreclosure proceedings, its attorneys’ fees would not be allowed because performed in violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362 does not toll a junior lienholder’s period to reinstate a deed-of-trust loan as against a senior lienholder.

Triangle Management Services v. Allstate Savings & Loan Ass'n · filed 1982-07-14

Plaintiff’s Application for a Preliminary Injunction is denied because in the opinion of the Court the stay of proceedings provided in 11 U.S.C. § 362, does not toll the reinstatement period of a loan secured by deed of trust provided by Civ.C. § 2924, in favor of a junior lien holder-creditor.

Section 362(a) does not toll a contractual grace period for curing a payment default.

In Re Boca Development Associates · filed 1982-07-14(a)

There is nothing in Code § 362(a) that tolls the running of time limitations or grace periods allowed to the debtor to cure defaults in payment.

Section 362 does not toll or suspend Colorado’s foreclosure redemption period.

In Re Murphy · filed 1982-08-20

And I so hold that 11 U.S.C. § 362 does not “toll” or “suspend” the running of the redemption period in Colorado as provided for in § 38-39-102, C.R.S.1973, as amended.

Section 362(a) renders an order confirming a foreclosure sale void when the order is entered after the debtor files a Chapter 13 petition.

In Re McCann · filed 1982-12-07(a)

In response to Manufacturers’ assertion that it would be inequitable to delay completion of the Licking County foreclosure sale by allowing confirmation of the proposed amended Chapter 13 plan, the record is clear that the order confirming the foreclosure sale was entered after the date of the filing of the Chapter 13 petition. The order is, therefore, void and is without effect.

Section 362(a) does not toll or suspend a statutory mortgage foreclosure redemption period; section 108 governs any extension.

Martinson v. First National Bank of Oakes (In Re Martinson) · filed 1983-01-17(a)

It is the opinion of this court that section 108 and not section 362 governs the tolling or suspension of a statutory redemption period.

Section 362(a) does not explicitly address the running of a statutory redemption period; § 108(b) governs the trustee’s time to redeem.

In Re Owens · filed 1983-03-08(a)

The language of Section 108 explicitly addresses the running of time periods while Section 362(a) does not.

Section 362 stays a seller from commencing foreclosure of a debtor’s equitable mortgage interest in property during the bankruptcy case.

In re Tremblay · filed 1983-03-16

The Lyons are presently prevented from initiating or commencing such a foreclosure by the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362(a)(1) tolls the running of a statutory foreclosure redemption period when the debtor files for bankruptcy before that period expires.

Eaton Land & Cattle Co. II v. Rocky Mountain Investments · filed 1983-04-06(a)(1)

Thus, applying In re Jenkins, supra, it is my determination that the automatic stay provision of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) tolls the redemption period on the two parcels of real estate in this action.

Section 362(a) does not prohibit merely postponing a non-judicial foreclosure sale by public announcement when the postponement preserves the status quo.

United Mutual Savings Bank v. Doud (In Re Doud) · filed 1983-06-16(a)

The reasoning stated in Matter of Roach, supra, that a mere postponement of sale is not in and of itself adversarial and does not disrupt the status quo — is equally applicable in the instant case. Therefore, the court finds that the plaintiff’s action did not violate the provisions of § 362(a).

Section 362(a)'s automatic stay protects a debtor's right to redeem collateral even when foreclosure is directed at co-debtors' interests, if the sale would extinguish that right.

Harsh Investment Corp. and Harsh Building Co. v. Bialac · filed 1983-08-04(a)

Second, the redemption right was entirely cut off. Where prior to the foreclosure James could have paid $450,000 for a lien against the entire note, he now must pay $300,000 to protect just his one-sixth interest in it. ... Neither of these interests are within protections afforded by a literal interpretation of section 362, yet they should be protected by the stay if the purposes of the Act, the orderly disposition of all property in which the debtor has some interest, are to be achieved.

Section 362(a) does not toll a state foreclosure redemption period; the passage of time is not a creditor act stayed by the section.

Westergaard v. Cucumber Creek Development, Inc. (In Re Cucumber Creek Development, Inc.) · filed 1983-09-27(a)

Given an opportunity to consider the question here and to review the body of case law which has developed, I now conclude that § 362(a) is inapplicable, and that state redemptive rights may be preserved and extended only to the extent provided by § 108.

Section 362’s automatic stay prevents a mortgagee from recovering possession during a Chapter 13 case but does not toll the statutory redemption period.

Federal National Ass'n v. Wallace (In Re Wallace) · filed 1983-08-29(a)

Therefore, I would hold that upon filing the petition, the automatic stay would only prevent action to recover possession and upon completion of the plan, the default would be cured and the position of the debtor and creditor would be the same as though the foreclosure had never occurred. ... The statutory redemption period continued to run during the term of Wallace’s Chapter 13 plan and expired on December 11, 1981.

Section 362(a) does not toll or suspend a statutory mortgage redemption period that expires without further action by the creditor.

Johnson v. First National Bank Of Montevideo · filed 1983-10-11(a)

We conclude, therefore, that Sec. 362(a) does not operate to toll or suspend the running of the one-year statutory period of redemption created by Minn.Stat. Sec. 580.23(2).

Section 362(a) does not toll a statutory redemption period that expires without further creditor action.

Johnson v. First National Bank · filed 1983-10-11(a)

We conclude, therefore, that § 362(a) does not operate to toll or suspend the running of the one-year statutory period of redemption created by Minn.Stat. § 580.23(2).

Section 362(a) stays a secured creditor from terminating a collateral assignment when the debtor retains a valuable right to cure on the petition date.

In Re Taslis · filed 1984-04-09(a)

Because Christy’s did not terminate the assignment in accordance with the contractual terms the April 5 notice was ineffective to terminate the debt- or’s right to cure his defaults. Since this was valuable equitable interest of the debt- or which he possessed on the date of the filing, the automatic stay was applicable to prevent Christy’s from further proceeding to terminate the collateral assignment.

Section 362 does not toll the redemption period for real property sold at foreclosure under Iowa law.

In Re Lally · filed 1984-04-09

11 U.S.C. § 362 does not toll the running of the redemption period under Iowa Code § 628.3 (1983).

Section 362(a) stays the running of a Connecticut strict foreclosure law day when a bankruptcy petition is filed during the redemption period, leaving ownership of the property in the estate.

Matter of St. Amant · filed 1984-06-07(a)

Consequently, § 362(a) has stayed the running of the law day since the filing of the petition and the automatic entry of the order for relief, see 11 U.S.C. § 301, and the property remains as part of the estate.

Section 362(a)(4) stays a post-petition foreclosure sale that eliminates an equitable interest of the estate in a junior deed of trust.

Coben v. Hahn (In Re Golden Plan of California, Inc.) · filed 1984-05-08(a)(4)

The trustee’s sale in the present case occurred after the petition was filed and had the effect of eliminating the interests held by the junior deed of trust holders. Additionally, the sale eliminated the equitable interest of the estate in the junior deed of trust. The defendants’ actions do fall within the broad scope of the automatic stay. Since the trustee’s sale was precluded by § 362 itself, the court need not decide whether the April 26, 1982 court order is applicable to the defendants’ actions.

Section 362(a) stays a foreclosure sale of property in the bankruptcy estate after the debtor files a petition.

In Re Ellis · filed 1984-06-05(a)

When the debtor filed, the Queens property was property of his estate. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). Therefore, its subsequent sale violated Section 362(a).

Section 362(a) does not stop an Iowa real estate contract forfeiture cure period from running after a bankruptcy petition is filed.

In Re Vacation Village Ltd. Partnership · filed 1984-06-07(a)

In sum, nothing in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) stayed the running of a cure period under a contract.

Section 362 does not toll the running of a state-law foreclosure redemption period.

In Re Smith · filed 1984-10-09(a)(3)

This court following Johnson, supra, holds that the period of redemption is not tolled by Section 362.

Section 362(a)(1) stays a debtor’s petition to set aside a sheriff’s sale when that petition continues a foreclosure proceeding originally brought against the debtor.

In Re Augustus Court Associates · filed 1984-10-12(a)(1)

We fail to envision why a debtor’s filing of a petition in state court to set aside a sheriff’s sale should be treated any differently and, therefore, reject the mortgagee’s assertion that the automatic stay is not applicable to the debtor’s position in the instant case.

Section 362(a) does not stop the statutory period for redeeming foreclosed property from running after a bankruptcy petition is filed.

J.I. Case Credit Corp. v. Kangas (In Re Kangas) · filed 1985-01-30(a)

Filing a petition in bankruptcy does not automatically stay the running of the statutory redemption time under § 362(a).

Section 362(a) does not itself suspend a statutory foreclosure redemption period beyond the extension allowed by § 108(b).

Kjeldahl v. United States (In Re Kjeldahl) · filed 1985-02-15(a)

Applying the reasoning of Johnson to this case, the redemption period expired on October 29, 1982, 60 days from the entry of the automatic stay. ... In the absence of these factors, listed in Johnson, the bankruptcy court should not have extended the period of redemption. At the very most, the redemption period could have been extended to October 29, 1982 under 11 U.S.C. § 108(b).

Section 362’s automatic stay takes effect when a bankruptcy petition is filed, and a foreclosure conducted afterward violates the stay and may be voided.

Lagniappe Inn of Nashville, Ltd. v. Washington National Insurance (In Re Lagniappe Inn of Nashville, Ltd.) · filed 1985-03-19

Since the automatic stay went into effect upon the filing of the petition at 11:23 on February 15, 1985, the foreclosure sale at noon on that day was in violation of the stay. The Court finds that the appropriate sanction is to return the parties to the status that existed at the time the petition was filed. It is therefore ordered that the foreclosure sale be voided and that Washington National reconvey the property to Lagniappe subject to the deed of trust securing Lagniappe’s debt to Washington National.

Section 362(a) does not stay delivery of a foreclosure deed after the petition when the foreclosure sale occurred before the petition and left the debtor with no interest in the property.

In Re Upham · filed 1985-04-30(a)

Thus, the real property which was sold at the foreclosure sale is not property of the estate under § 541, because as of the commencement of the case the debtor had no legal or equitable interests in it under New York law. As a result, the automatic stay under § 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code does not apply and the foreclosure sale purchaser is free to accept delivery of the referee’s deed and complete the sale.

Section 362(a) tolls a court-created redemption period in an Oregon strict foreclosure when the vendor must obtain a final decree to terminate the debtor’s property interest.

In Re McCallen · filed 1985-06-11(a)

In light of my conclusion that the automatic stay of § 362(a) has in this context tolled the redemption period provided in the interlocutory decree of strict foreclosure, I need not and do not reach the question whether the Debtors are entitled to an extension of the redemption period under § 105 of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362(a) does not stay a sheriff’s actions to issue a deed after an Iowa foreclosure sale when those actions do not affect property of the bankruptcy estate.

In Re Lally · filed 1985-06-17(a)

Debtors’ next argument is that § 362(a) prohibits the affirmative actions which, under Iowa law, a purchaser at a foreclosure sale must take in order to obtain a deed from the sheriff. This argument fails because, as seen above, the actions taken by the sheriff do not affect property of the estate.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not toll the running of a statutory redemption period after a foreclosure sale.

Goldberg v. Tynan · filed 1985-09-19

We adopt also the Eighth Circuit’s position that § 362 of the. Bankruptcy Code, the automatic stay provision, does not toll the running of the redemption peri...od.

Section 362(a) does not toll or suspend the running of a state-law foreclosure reinstatement period, although the automatic stay prevents a foreclosure sale while it applies.

Napue v. Gor-Mey West, Inc. · filed 1985-12-13(a)

For the reasons which follow, we conclude that the better view is that the automatic stay provisions of section 362(a) do not toll or suspend the running of the reinstatement period provided for in Civil Code section 2924.

Section 362(a) tolls the statutory foreclosure redemption period when the debtor files for bankruptcy before that period expires.

First National Bank of Vermont v. L.H. & A. Realty Co. (In Re L.H. & A. Realty Co.) · filed 1986-01-28(a)

With our holding that section 362(a) tolls the statutory period of redemption we are not enlarging or diminishing property rights created by state law.

Section 362(a) stays a land installment contract foreclosure when the debtor retains equitable title and the foreclosure still requires the clerk’s certification after a judicially decreed redemption period begins.

In Re Carver · filed 1986-06-04(a)(1)-(3)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds: 1) the clerk of court’s certification constitutes a continuation of judicial proceedings within the scope of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1); 2) a transfer of the debtor’s equitable property interest constitutes an enforcement of a pre-petition judgment against the debtor or his property within the scope of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2); and 3) the clerk of court’s certification constitutes an act to obtain property of the estate within the scope of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(1)–(3) does not stay the expiration of a foreclosure redemption period or the clerk’s mandatory certification of noncompliance with the foreclosure judgment.

Heikkila v. Carver (In Re Carver) · filed 1986-11-20(a)(1)–(3)

In this Court’s view, no judicial proceeding of any variety is required for the Clerk’s action to take place. Instead, the simple passage of time without compliance with the judgment triggers the requirement that the Clerk act. Therefore, Section 362(a)(1) does not apply. ... Once again, this Court does not agree that the running of the redemption time set forth in a pre-petition judgment of foreclosure constitutes a transfer which is violative of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2). ... Finally, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that the Clerk of Court’s certification process constitutes an act to obtain property of the estate within the scope of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). For all the reasons previously specified, the clerical and mandatory act of the Clerk of Court cannot be so characterized.

Section 362(b)(12) automatically lifts the stay after 90 days for qualifying maritime foreclosure actions without a separate petition for relief and permits interlocutory vessel sales when admiralty law allows them.

In Re Prudential Lines, Inc. · filed 1987-01-22(b)(12)

In making the exception automatic upon the expiration of the ninety-day period, the statute is plain on its face. ... A petition with the bankruptcy court for relief from the automatic stay is not required. ... The amendment is thus to be interpreted to permit an interlocutory sale when such a sale is permissible under the principles of admiralty law.

Section 362(a) does not extend a statutory period for redeeming property after a foreclosure sale; once that period expires under § 108(b), the purchaser may obtain relief from the stay to finish foreclosure.

In Re Liddle · filed 1987-04-21(a)

Section 108 specifically addresses the limitations of the Debtors’ rights to the Montana statutory redemption period, and its operation controls. To hold otherwise, would render § 108(b) superfluous. ... Accordingly, the FLB is entitled to relief from the automatic stay to conclude the foreclosure process.

Section 362(a) does not stay the running of a statutory period to cure a contract for deed default.

Maanum v. Rieffer · filed 1987-09-08(a)

We hold that the running of this statutory time period is not automatically stayed under section 362(a), but rather is temporarily stayed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 108(b) (Supp. II 1984).

Section 362(a) does not toll a judicially decreed redemption period when property rights expire automatically; later ministerial certification is not a stayed proceeding or act to obtain possession.

Heikkila v. Carver · filed 1987-09-08(a)(1), (a)(3)

This ministerial certification requirement can therefore never prevent the otherwise valid transfer of rights that occurs at the expiration of the judicially decreed redemption period. We thus reject the Carvers’ contention that this routine certification constitutes a judicial proceeding or act to obtain possession of property under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) or (a)(3).

Section 362’s automatic stay applies to recording a foreclosure deed while the debtor still has a right of redemption.

Federal Land Bank v. Heiserman (In Re Heiserman) · filed 1987-10-08

The Court agrees with the Debtors that the recording of the Deed on December 9, 1986, violated the automatic stay. The Debtors still had their right of redemption at this time. Therefore, the Debtors had an identifiable interest in the property to which the automatic stay applied, and the Land Bank violated the stay when it recorded its Deed to the property.

Section 362's automatic stay bars filing an upset bid in a North Carolina foreclosure, which also suspends the debtor's redemption period tied to the upset bid period.

In Re DiCello · filed 1987-12-28(a)(3), (a)(4)

Although the stay created by the filing of a bankruptcy petition is not the same as an injunction granted pursuant to N.C.GEN. STAT. § 45-21.34, the court is of the opinion that the filing of an upset bid in North Carolina is prohibited by the automatic stay of § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code. Since the running of the period during which a debtor may redeem her property in North Carolina is tied to the running of the upset bid period, the automatic stay prevents the running of the redemption period as well.

Section 362(a) does not toll or extend a state statutory period for redeeming foreclosed property.

In Re Campbell · filed 1988-01-27(a)

Furthermore, the automatic stay does not toll or extend the running of the state statutory period of redemption.

Section 362(a) stays enforcement of prepetition judgments and liens, including foreclosure judgments, without a foreclosure exception.

Matter of Brunson · filed 1988-01-28(a)

The imposition of the stay against enforcement of judgments and liens is not qualified by an exception for judgments of foreclosure. The express provisions enjoin all holders of claims, whether or not those claims have been reduced to judgment, from enforcing their state law rights.

Section 362 stays a foreclosure sale initiated by a creditor that has not obtained relief from the automatic stay, even if a different creditor with stay relief conducts the sale.

Carroll v. Citizens Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n (In re Carroll) · filed 1988-03-22

The sale which Beneficial had the Sheriff conduct was not its sale, but rather, Citizens’ sale. Thus, the sale the Sheriff conducted was stayed by § 362, improper, and should be set aside.

Section 362(a)(6) bars a foreclosure trustee from granting a deed after the debtor files a bankruptcy petition, even when the foreclosure auction concluded before the filing.

Flowers v. Washington Federal Savings Bank (In Re Flowers) · filed 1988-10-03(a)(6)

Despite the arguments to the contrary, in the Court’s view, the Debtor retains a shadow of title and the granting of the deed interferes with that title and constitutes a step, albeit minor and perfunctory, in the completion of the collection process. Although the purchaser is not barred from depositing payment, the trustee is barred by the automatic stay from granting a deed.

Section 362(a) bars recording a deed in lieu of foreclosure after the bankruptcy petition while the debtor still holds the property interest, and a later order lifting the stay does not validate that recording.

Sapp v. Wilson (In Re Sapp) · filed 1988-10-07(a)

The filing of the warranty deed in lieu of foreclosure was clearly in violation of the automatic stay. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). The Wilson motion for relief from the automatic stay neither addressed this violation nor requested retroactive relief which might have corrected the violation. The Court’s order granting relief from the automatic stay to the Defendants can neither validate nor approve the unlawful post-petition action.

Section 362(a) does not toll a debtor’s statutory redemption period after a foreclosure sale.

Hawkeye Bank & Trust N.A. v. Milburn · filed 1989-03-22(a)

Although section 362(a) would not toll the statutory redemption, section 108 of the Bankruptcy Act would assure a minimum redemption period of sixty days for the estate.

Section 362(a)(6) stays foreclosure against property in which the debtor has a leasehold or possessory interest when the foreclosure seeks to satisfy the debtor’s debt, even if someone else owns the fee interest.

Valley Transit Mix of Ruidoso, Inc. v. Miller · filed 1991-03-19(a)(6)

Bankruptcy courts, construing section 362, have held that it precludes foreclosure of property when a debtor has a "leasehold" or "possessory" interest in the property and the debt sought to be satisfied out of the property is that of the debtor. In re Pioneer Valley Indoor Tennis Center, Inc., 20 B.R. 884, 885 (Bankr.D.Mass.1982); In re Barksdale, 15 B.R. 731, 732 (Bankr.W.D.Va.1981). Here, B.C.R.'s foreclosure claim was based upon a debt incurred by Ruidoso. Therefore, B.C.R.'s foreclosure claim was stayed by section 362, and the tolling provisions of section 108(c) applied to the claim.

Section 362(a)(6) does not stay foreclosure of a nondebtor’s stock pledged to secure the debtor’s obligation, even when the stock owner has no personal liability.

Advanced Ribbons & Office Products, Inc. v. U.S. Interstate Distributing, Inc. (In Re Advanced Ribbons & Office Products · filed 1991-03-29(a)(6)

Thus the foreclosure sale could properly be viewed as an act to collect a claim against Teuber and not within the scope of section 362(a)(6).

Section 362(a)(6) bars collection of a claim against the debtor, but does not bar foreclosure on a nondebtor’s property pledged to secure the debtor’s debt.

In Re Torrez · filed 1991-06-12(a)(6)

The only interpretation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6) warranted is that it precludes acts to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor only.

Section 362’s automatic stay prevents the FDIC from foreclosing on a debtor’s property while the stay is in effect.

In Re Lane · filed 1992-01-14

Thus, an order that the bankruptcy stay remain in place pending resolution of debtor’s appeal will not restrain the FDIC’s exercise of its power because the FDIC does not have any power to foreclose on property when a § 362 stay is in effect.

Section 362(a) does not stay a senior lienholder’s nonjudicial foreclosure on property owned by a nondebtor merely because the debtor holds a junior lien on that property.

Farmers Bank v. March (In Re March) · filed 1992-05-29(a)

Although the Bankruptcy Code does not specifically address this situation, the language of the relevant provisions and the authorities interpreting the Code and addressing the issue persuade this court that a debtor’s junior lien interest does not convert the underlying secured property owned by another into property of the bankrupt estate, subject to the provisions of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a) bars a county from executing and recording a tax foreclosure deed when the debtor’s redemption interest remains property of the estate until that deed is executed.

Roost v. Douglas County (In re Southern Oregon Mortgage, Inc.) · filed 1992-07-28(a)(2), (a)(3)

Accordingly, the automatic stay provided in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) prohibits Douglas County and the tax collector from taking an affirmative act to obtain possession of property of the estate or the enforcement against property of the estate of a judgment obtained before the bankruptcy, by executing and recording the tax collector’s deed to Douglas County.

Section 362 does not bar continuing notices that postpone a trustee’s sale to new dates during the automatic stay.

BAM Investments, Inc. v. Roberts · filed 1992-09-24

In considering the validity of the sale, the Ninth Circuit held that the automatic stay does not bar continuing postponements of sale indicating new dates. ... We adopt this holding, and affirm the trial court’s decision that the notice of trustee’s sale was valid under the relevant statutes and did not violate the automatic stay provision.

Section 362(a) does not prohibit a creditor from rescheduling a foreclosure sale after the debtor files for bankruptcy.

Tellier v. Fleet National Bank (In re Tellier) · filed 1992-10-27(a)

Notwithstanding the foregoing academic discussion, however, we find that Fleet’s action in rescheduling the foreclosure sale and in opposing Tellier’s timely request for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in December 1990, was not made in bad faith, nor did it violate the stay.

Section 362(a)(1) does not prohibit postponing a previously scheduled foreclosure sale to preserve the status quo during the automatic stay.

Zeoli v. RIHT Mortgage Corp. · filed 1993-01-05(a)(1)

The postponement of a foreclosure sale is certainly an “act”. But, it is not an act in “continuation” of a proceeding “against the debtor” prohibited by § 362(a)(1).

Section 362(a)(2) stays the passing of a foreclosure law day assigned to a bankrupt co-signor, obligor, or guarantor, even when the debtor does not own the property.

First Constitution Bank v. Flanders, No. Cv 910310164s (Mar. 22, 1995) · filed 1995-03-22(a)(2)

In the present case, although §§ 362(a)(3) and (4) do not stay the passing of Flanders' law day, the passing of Flanders' law day is "the enforcement against the debtor . . . of a judgment obtained before the commencement" of Flanders' bankruptcy case pursuant to § 362(a)(2). Hence, the passing of Flanders law day was stayed by his chapter 13 bankruptcy petition.

Section 362 does not prohibit foreclosure of property that the debtor no longer owns.

Gerrity Co. v. Riscica · filed 1995-04-20

There is no evidence in the record to establish that Immediato filed for bankruptcy; even if he did, 11 USC § 362 does not prohibit a foreclosure where, as here, the encumbered property is no longer owned by the alleged bankrupt debtor (see, Alternate Energy Mgt. Corp. v Goodman, 151 AD2d 453; see also, Teachers Ins. & Annuity Assn. v Butler, 803 F2d 61, 65).

Section 362(a) does not stay the termination by operation of law of a state-law foreclosure redemption period.

Federal Deposit Insurance v. Howard Shoreline Associates · filed 1995-05-25(a)

First, the Court finds that, in the instant case, the termination by law of the parties’ right to redemption did not constitute an “act” subject to the stay established in § 362(a).

The automatic stay can prevent a secured creditor from enforcing a deed-of-trust provision allowing it to retain insurance proceeds or use them to repair estate property.

First State Bank v. Asay (In Re Asay) · filed 1995-06-08

The Deed of Trust gives the Bank the authority to retain the funds or repair the property. However, under the facts of this case, it appears that the automatic stay prevents the Bank from enforcing this Deed of Trust provision.

Section 362(a)(3) requires a tax purchaser to obtain relief from the automatic stay before applying for a tax deed when the bankruptcy estate still holds legal title to the property after the redemption period expires.

McRoberts v. S.I.V.I. (In Re Bequette) · filed 1995-07-07(a)(3)

Applying this reasoning to the present case, the Court finds that while S.I.V.I. should have sought relief from stay before applying for a tax deed because the estate retained legal title to the subject property, its failure to do so was not sufficiently egregious to warrant the imposition of damages under the Court’s civil contempt power.

Section 362(a)(1) and (3) do not bar foreclosure against a nondebtor who solely owns the land when the action does not affect the debtors’ rights under their lease.

In re Smith · filed 1995-12-04(a)(1), (a)(3)

...but the Court finds that the failure to do so does not merit sanctions for violating the automatic stay. Ms. Gorham is not protected by the eodebtor stay of § 1201, and the Bank is free to pursue its claim against Ms. Gorham. Moreover, the mortgage foreclosure does not affect the Debtors’ rights under their lease with Ms. Gorham.

Section 362 voids an entire foreclosure sale when the debtor has an estate right to redeem the whole property, even if the debtor owns only a fractional interest.

In Re John W. Guthrie, Debtor. John W. Guthrie v. Pacific Security Companies, Inc. · filed 1996-05-29

We agree with the bankruptcy court and the BAP that the entire sale, and not a fraction of it, was void. ... As in Arizona, Washington gives a debtor a pre-foreclosure redemption right to the entire property subject to foreclosure. ... This right of redemption is a property right of the estate. ... The automatic stay therefore voided the 1990 foreclosure sale of the Tacoma fourplexes.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not protect a residence when its foreclosure sale was completed before the bankruptcy petition, even if the foreclosure deed was filed afterward.

Cottrell v. United States (In Re Cottrell) · filed 1996-11-13

Alabama case law and the Bankruptcy Code provide that the court must decide that the foreclosure sale in question was complete on the day of the foreclosure sale, May 9, 1996. Therefore, automatic stay protection of the Bankruptcy Code is not applicable to the Plaintiff. See Title 11 U.S.C., §§ 362, 541 and cf. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1322(c)(1).

The automatic stay tolls the running of a state-law redemption period in a foreclosure action to preserve the status quo.

In Re Driscoll · filed 1998-07-20(a)

In order to preserve the status quo, we hold that the automatic stay tolls the running of the state law redemption period in a foreclosure action.

Section 362(a) stays foreclosure of a debtor’s equity of redemption under Vermont strict foreclosure law when the debtor files for bankruptcy before the redemption period expires.

In Re Frazer · filed 1999-08-30(a)

For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that the debtor’s equity of redemption is property of the bankruptcy estate and is subject to the automatic stay provisions of § 362(a).

Section 362 does not bar issuance of a tax deed following a prebankruptcy tax sale when the debtor’s statutory redemption period has expired.

Hood v. Hall · filed 2001-04-17

Accordingly, we find that the petition for the is- . suance of a tax deed filed by appellee herein was not filed in violation of the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code, and the order entered thereon is not void ab initia.

Section 362(a)(3)-(5) bars a tax sale certificate holder from enforcing its lien by seeking a tax deed after a bankruptcy filing when those acts also take control of estate property.

In Re Donovan · filed 2001-09-11(a)(3)-(5)

The court finds that in taking those actions to acquire a tax deed, OHP was enforcing its lien. Because Debtor scheduled the Real Estate as exempt and indicated equity in the property, the court additionally finds that OHP was attempting to take possession and exert control over property of the bankruptcy estate and Debtor’s property. Such actions constitute a violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362 prevents a creditor from enforcing contract rights through a state court dispossessory order or foreclosure while the automatic stay is in effect.

Adams v. Prescott (In Re Prescott) · filed 2001-09-26

Because Adams may not now, as a result of 11 U.S.C. § 362, enforce his rights in this contract pursuant to the state court dispossessory order or in a foreclosure proceeding, Debtor’s interest in the land remains intact.

Section 362 bars a tax purchaser from seeking a tax deed for property of the bankruptcy estate during the redemption period unless it first obtains relief from the automatic stay.

Davenport v. S.I. Securities (In Re Davenport) · filed 2001-10-01(a)(3)-(4)

Therefore, S.I. was forbidden from attempting to obtain a tax deed on Davenport’s residence without first seeking a modification of the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d).

Section 362(a) does not toll the running of a court-set equitable redemption period in strict foreclosure; § 108(b) governs that period.

Canney v. Merchants Bank (In re Canney) · filed 2002-03-07(a)

We agree with the analysis in Bevan and thus join our sister Circuits in holding that § 108(b), not § 362(a), governs the tolling of a period of equitable redemption. The automatic stay prevents only certain affirmative acts taken by a creditor, and the running of time is not one of those acts.

Section 362 makes a postpetition tax deed issued against property of the estate in violation of the automatic stay void.

Venn v. Bazzel (In Re Lambert) · filed 2002-01-09(a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6)

In this case, the realty was property of the estate. Since the Lamberts’ legal interest in the land spanned the pre-andpost-petition transactions by the county, the actions taken by the county constitute a violation of the automatic stay. Violations of the automatic stay are void. Therefore, the tax deed is avoided.

Section 362(a)(4) bars a postpetition foreclosure resale when a defaulting prepetition buyer leaves the debtor with equitable title that becomes property of the estate.

In Re Cooper · filed 2002-02-05(a)(4)

That interest in the Property became property of the estate, and § 362(a)(4) acted to bar the resale.

Section 362(a) does not toll Iowa’s tax sale redemption period or stay the certificate holder’s return of the certificate and payment of deed and recording fees after that period expires.

Tax 58 v. Froehle · filed 2002-12-06(a)

Particularly, we do not agree that the return of the certificate and the filing of the fees in the redemption context are acts stayed by § 362.

Section 362(a) does not stay the running of the redemption period in a Connecticut strict foreclosure when a chapter 7 petition is filed after judgment but before the law day; section 108(b) instead extends the period by sixty days after filing.

Provident Bank v. Lewitt · filed 2004-07-27(a)

We conclude that the defendant’s period of equitable redemption was not stayed when she filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, although it was extended by sixty days after the filing of the petition.

Section 362(a)(1) protects a debtor’s possessory interest even if redemption rights expired before bankruptcy, requiring a creditor to obtain stay relief before seeking a postpetition tax foreclosure judgment.

In Re Dominguez · filed 2004-08-10(a)(1)

Thus, regardless of whether the Debtor’s right to redeem the property had expired, the Debtor’s posses-sory interest in the property was protected by the automatic stay and the City was required to request relief from the automatic stay prior to seeking and obtaining a judgment of foreclosure in state court based upon the delinquent tax debt.

The automatic stay does not toll a tax-sale redemption period or bar issuance and recording of a deed after that period expires and the debtor’s redemption right ceases to be property of the estate.

Minter v. Prasad (In Re Minter) · filed 2004-09-02(c)(1)

The nature of parties’ state property interests can change while bankruptcy proceedings are pending because the automatic stay does not toll the running of the redemption period. ... In the case at bar, the debtor’s redemption period under T.C.A. § 67-5-2702(a) expired on April 16, 2003. When that occurred, the debtor’s interest in the New Castle property was extinguished and the right of redemption ceased being property of the estate. Consequently, when the Clerk’s deed was issued on May 1, 2003, the automatic stay was not violated.

Section 362(a)(1) does not require a creditor to remove a foreclosure sale notice after cancelling the sale, and leaving the notice posted for a few days does not violate the automatic stay.

L'Heureux v. Homecomings · filed 2005-02-25(a)(1)

The bankruptcy judge correctly determined, as a matter of law, that the appellee had no affirmative duty to remove the foreclosure notice and that such failure to remove the notice was not a violation of the automatic stay.

The automatic stay does not protect a debtor's continued occupation without right after completion of a bankruptcy-court-authorized foreclosure under New Hampshire law extinguishes the debtor's legal and equitable interests.

McAdam v. Raymond Lorden, Individually and as trustee of the REL Revocable Trust · filed 2005-09-26(a)(3), (c)(1)

Thus, I conclude that McAdam's continued occupation of the subject property after the foreclosure sale, without right to do so, does not create a property interest that is entitled to protection by the automatic stay.

Section 362 bars postpetition completion of a foreclosure sale when the debtor retains an equity of redemption at filing and the property becomes part of the bankruptcy estate.

Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Ex Rel. Countrywide Home Loans v. Wolfe (In Re Wolfe) · filed 2006-03-30(a)

Accordingly, the Debtors possessed an interest in the property, the equity of redemption, at the time they filed their bankruptcy petition and the property became part of their bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). From this it follows, that the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362 attached to the property; thus preventing Countrywide from completing the foreclosure sale post-petition.

Section 362(a)(3) stays proceedings to obtain a tax deed to estate property, and a state-court order issuing the deed without relief from the stay is void ab initio.

Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co. v. Mattingly · filed 2006-07-19(a)(3)

Therefore, because Phoenix failed to seek leave of the bankruptcy court for a tax deed during the stay, the circuit court’s order issuing the tax deed was void ab initio.

The automatic stay covers a debtor’s home when a prepetition Tennessee foreclosure auction has not produced a binding sale satisfying the state statute of frauds before the bankruptcy filing.

Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. v. Love (In re Love) · filed 2006-10-31(a)

Accordingly, Mr. Love’s home was property of the section 541(a) estate at the time of the commencement of his chapter 13 case such that the automatic stay was triggered and that he may seek to cure prepetition economic defaults and provide payment of SPS’s prepetition arrearage claim in the manner permitted under section 1322(b)(5) while also maintaining ongoing contractual home mortgage payments.

Section 362(d)(2) requires termination of the automatic stay as to property in which the debtor has no interest and which is unavailable for an effective reorganization following a prepetition foreclosure sale and deed transfer.

In Re Ward · filed 2010-01-12(d)(2)

Here, the Debtor lacks any interest in the Property, and the Property is not available for her to use in connection with her chapter 13 case because all of her rights as an owner with respect to the Property were cut off by the foreclosure sale and subsequent transfer of the Referee’s Deed prior to the commencement of this bankruptcy case. The automatic stay must therefore be terminated pursuant to § 362(d)(2) to permit the Purchaser to exercise its rights with respect to the Property.

Section 362(a) does not toll the Iowa mortgage foreclosure redemption period.

In re Lieber · filed 2019-04-22(a)

For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that the filing of a chapter 13 bankruptcy petition and the applicable § 362 automatic stay does not toll the redemption period on a mortgage foreclosure.

Section 362(a) does not stay the running of the equitable redemption period in a Connecticut strict foreclosure after a bankruptcy petition; section 108(b) extends that period by sixty days.

U.S. Bank, National Assn. v. Mamudi · filed 2020-04-21(a)

Pursuant to Provident Bank and Semi- nole Realty, LLC, we conclude that the period of equitable redemption was not stayed when Wellsville filed its third bankruptcy petition, although it was extended by sixty days after the filing of the petition.

Section 362(a) does not stay actions concerning property sold at a prepetition foreclosure sale when the debtor’s legal and equitable interests were extinguished before filing.

Marie Herisse · filed 2026-05-22(a)

In sum, because the Property was not property of the Debtor’s estate, the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) does not apply to the Property.

Section 362(a) stays foreclosure proceedings, including a lienholder’s redemption, when a bankruptcy petition is filed before redemption.

Kilduff v. Adams, Inc. · filed 1991-06-18(a)

If the plaintiffs had filed a bankruptcy petition prior to the redemption by Adams, Inc., an automatic stay would have been imposed that would have barred temporarily any further proceedings in the foreclosure action, including the defendants’ redemption.

Section 362(a)(3)'s automatic stay applies to claims that are property of the bankruptcy estate, not to a creditor's independent claims.

Hof v. Pride Centric Res., Inc. (In re Foodservicewarehouse.Com, LLC) · filed 2019-04-26(a)(3)

The automatic stay provided by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) only applies to claims that are property of the estate. Neither Pride's § 37:91(B)(1) claims nor its § 37:91(B)(2) claims are property of the estate because the Debtor lacks standing to assert them.

Section 362(a)(3) automatically stays a request for a constructive trust that directly affects property of a debtor’s bankruptcy estate.

PC v. Girardi · filed 2021-07-19(a)(3)

Regarding Lira's assertion that this case must be stayed under section 362(a)(3), only Edelson's request for the remedy of constructive trust must be automatically stayed as that is the only provision that directly touches the Girardi or Girardi Keese bankruptcy estates.

Section 362's automatic stay covers a debtor's reconventional demand and third-party claims when they are property of the bankruptcy estate.

Wolf Plumbing, Inc. v. Matthews · filed 2013-09-25(a)

The reconventional demand and third party claims brought by Matthews were also subject to the automatic stay as property of the estate.

Section 362 does not void a debtor’s voluntary postpetition transfer of estate property; the trustee must seek avoidance under § 549.

Slone v. Anderson (In re Anderson) · filed 2013-09-10(a)

Pursuant to this analysis, a trustee must use 11 U.S.C. § 549, rather than 11 U.S.C. § 362, to recover estate property that the debtor voluntarily transfers after the bankruptcy filing.

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay acts concerning allegedly fraudulently transferred property until the trustee recovers the property into the bankruptcy estate.

Rajala v. Garnder · filed 2013-03-12(a)(3)

Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3), the filing of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition automatically stays “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate . . . or to exercise control over property of the estate.” ... Instead, we adopt the statute’s plain meaning and hold that fraudulently transferred property is not part of the bankruptcy estate until recovered.

Section 362(a) prevents a debtor from withdrawing funds belonging to a Chapter 7 estate, so a bank has no duty to honor checks drawn on those funds.

Love v. Barnes Banking Corporation · filed 2011-03-15(a)

Love had no authority to withdraw funds from the Chapter 7 estate as a matter of law. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). Barnes accordingly had no duty to disburse the funds.

Section 362(a)(3) stays creditors from pursuing causes of action that belong to the bankruptcy estate.

Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (In Re Madoff) · filed 2011-02-09(a)(3)

The Third Party Plaintiffs violated the stay by usurping causes of action belonging to the estate under sections 362(a)(3) and 541 of the Code.

Section 362(a)(1)-(3) stays continuation of prepetition proceedings, enforcement of prepetition judgments, and acts to obtain estate property once a bankruptcy petition is filed.

Busey Bank v. Salyards · filed 1999-04-15(a)(1)-(3)

Once a bankruptcy petition is filed, there is an automatic stay that has a preclusive effect. The stay bars the continuation of a proceeding commenced prepetition, the enforcement of any judgment obtained prepetition, and any act to obtain estate property. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3) (1994).

Section 362(a)(3) applies to a vehicle repossessed before bankruptcy when the vehicle remains property of the estate.

American Honda Finance Corp. v. Littleton (In Re Littleton) · filed 1998-04-20(a)(3)

The court notes, that because Debtors’ car is property of the estate, pursuant to § 362(a)(3) of the Code the automatic stay applies to the vehicle. As a result, Honda was well advised to seek relief from the automatic stay before disposing of the vehicle.

Section 362(a)(3) protects a vehicle from repossession when the debtor has an equitable interest in it, even if someone else holds legal title.

Matter of Sielaff · filed 1994-02-28(a)(3)

To be protected by § 362(a)(3), the vehicle must be property of the Debtor’s estate. ... The court concludes, under the unique facts of this dispute, that the Debtor has shown an equitable interest in the vehicle; thus the vehicle is property of the estate. By repossessing the vehicle, after having received notice of the Debtor’s bankruptcy filing, D & N violated the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) stays a creditor’s alter ego action against a debtor’s parent when the claim belongs to the bankruptcy estate and the trustee has not abandoned it.

Board of Directors of Chestnut Grove Condominium Unit Owners' Ass'n v. Resolution Trust Corp. · filed 1993-12-03(a)(3)

Therefore, the alter ego claim is to be asserted by the bankruptcy trustee and the automatic stay applies.

Section 362(a)(3) stays prosecution of a claim against a nondebtor when that claim belongs to the bankruptcy estate.

In the Matter of Adelle M. Sherk, Debtor. Adelle M. Sherk, and Ted R. Cackowski v. Texas Bankers Life & Loan Insurance C · filed 1990-12-11(a)(3)

The automatic stay protects property of the estate by preventing prosecution of claims against non-debtors when those claims are property of the estate.

Section 362(a)(3) applies to a debtor’s guaranty agreement when the agreement is property of the bankruptcy estate.

Schnippel v. City of Piqua (In Re Schnippel) · filed 1990-11-20(a)(3)

Having determined that the guaranty agreement is property of the estate, the automatic stay is applicable.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a parent company from claiming a worthless stock deduction that would eliminate its debtor subsidiary’s net operating loss carryover, which is property of the bankruptcy estate.

Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. PSS Steamship Co. (In Re Prudential Lines Inc.) · filed 1990-09-27(a)(3)

Similarly, the Bankruptcy Court did not err as a matter of law in ruling that PSS’s claiming a worthless stock deduction would violate the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C: § 362. ... Appellant opposes the Bankruptcy Court ruling under § 362 by arguing that since a NOL. is not property of the estate, a parent corporation’s claiming a worthless stock deduction which thereby eliminates NOLs of its subsidiary is not an act to “exercise .control over property of the estate” under § 362. This argument is without merit given this Court’s ruling on the property issue.

Section 362 does not stay an in rem action against property owned by a partnership when a partner’s bankruptcy estate does not include that property.

Resolution Trust Corp. Ex Rel. Security Homestead Federal Savings Ass'n v. Security Town Co. · filed 1990-08-29

Consequently, Verges’ interests in STC, STC II and STC III are not a part of the bankruptcy estate he created and the § 362 automatic stay that prohibits disturbing any assets of this estate does not preclude this in rem action against these partnership assets.

Section 362(a)(3) does not protect or revive a debtor’s property interest that expired before the bankruptcy petition was filed.

Mann v. Alexander Dawson Inc. (In re Mann) · filed 1990-07-12(a)(3)

The automatic stay does not protect property interests that ceased to be in the debtor’s estate prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy; ... nor can it be used to revive such interests.

Section 362(a)(3) protects a debtor’s postpetition right to possess real property against a landlord’s lockout.

In Re Tulio · filed 1990-06-08(a)(3)

Furthermore, it is clear that the automatic stay, per 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3), protects a debtor’s post-petition right to possession of realty.

Section 362(a)(3) stays acts to obtain possession of or exercise control over property of the bankruptcy estate; an order lifting the stay as to leased premises does not lift it as to the debtor’s trade fixtures.

366-388 Geary Street, L.P. v. Superior Court · filed 1990-04-26(a)(3)

It is silent on Paem’s trade fixtures and does not lift the automatic stay as to those items.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a secured creditor from selling collateral after an involuntary petition when the debtor retains an ownership interest, even if the creditor already has possession.

Mann v. Marine Bank West (In Re Omni Graphics, Inc.) · filed 1990-05-08(a)(3)

The Bank’s action in moving forward with the public sale after the involuntary petition in bankruptcy was filed was an exercise of control over property of the estate which violated § 362(a)(3). The fact that the debtor did not have the right to possession of the property did not mean that the estate did not have a property interest in the assets sold at the public sale.

Section 362(a)(3) protects a debtor’s possession of property at filing, including possession under a tenancy at sufferance, from acts to obtain that property.

Cuffee v. Atlantic Business & Community Development Corp. (In re Atlantic Business & Community Corp.) · filed 1990-04-18(a)(3)

Because ABCD’s possession of property, even under a tenancy at sufferance, is an interest protected by Section 362(a)(3), we agree with the district court that the actions taken by Cuffee violated the automatic stay provisions of Section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362(a)(3) protects a debtor’s possession of property, including possession under a tenancy at sufferance, from acts to take that property.

In Re Atlantic Business and Community Corporation · filed 1990-04-18(a)(3)

Because ABCD's possession of property, even under a tenancy at sufferance, is an interest protected by Section 362(a)(3), we agree with the district court that the actions taken by Cuffee violated the automatic stay provisions of Section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362(a)(4) does not stay a sale of a nondebtor co-owner’s undivided interest in property when the sale does not affect the debtor’s estate interest.

Bennett v. Aviation (In re Bennett) · filed 1982-02-09(a)(4)

This Court finds that the property of the plaintiffs’ estate will not be affected by allowing defendant to proceed with its sale. Therefore, this Court finds that the automatic stay will not be violated if defendant proceeds with its sale.

Section 362(a)'s automatic stay protects a debtor's legal interest in property held as trustee when that interest is property of the estate.

Federal National Mortgage Ass'n v. Foster (In Re Foster) · filed 1982-04-06(a)

The legal interest is, therefore, property of the estate. Furthermore, the Bankruptcy Code is clear that all property of the estate is protected' by the automatic stay. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).

Section 362 does not keep property protected by the automatic stay when neither the bankruptcy estate nor the debtor asserts an interest in it.

Ramco Industries v. Moore (In re Moore) · filed 1982-04-06(c)(1)

Accordingly, Rameo was entitled as a matter of law to relief from stay insofar as it protected the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1). The only other party afforded protection by the automatic stay is Mrs. Moore, the debtor, but she asserted no interest in the property either.

Section 362(a) does not stay foreclosure on property in which the debtor lost all interest before filing the bankruptcy petition.

First National Bank of Louisville v. Fidelity American Mortgage Co. (In Re Fidelity American Mortgage Co.) · filed 1982-04-23(a)

Therefore, since we have found that WBA and FAMCO lost all interest in the property prior to the filing of their respective petitions for reorganization under the Code, we conclude that the automatic stay provisions of § 362(a) of the Code are inapplicable to the property.

Section 362 does not stay actions against property that is not property of the bankruptcy estate.

North American Marketing Corp. v. National Bank of Florida (In Re North American Marketing Corp.) · filed 1982-06-23

The bond is clearly not property of the estate, and since the automatic stay provision of the Code does not stay actions against property which is not property of the estate, the trustees of the bond are at liberty to carry out the Order of the State Court and to pay over to National Bank the Money Market Certificate.

Section 362(a)(3) and (4) prohibit attachment of estate property after the bankruptcy petition is filed.

Air Transport Ass'n of America v. Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (In re Professional Air Traffic Cont · filed 1982-07-14(a)(3), (4)

Further, attachment is not a proper characterization of the action as the intervention of bankruptcy and the effect of the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3), (4), would prohibit such legal action from taking place.

Section 362 does not stay action concerning franchise and sublease agreements terminated before the bankruptcy petition because those agreements never became property of the estate.

Burger King Corp. v. Levine (In Re Levine) · filed 1982-06-10

These agreements never became property of the estate and are therefore not subject to the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362(a) protects a debtor’s remaining interest in property sold at a sheriff’s sale when the deed has not been issued and presented for recording before the bankruptcy filing.

Home Life Insurance Co. v. Jones (In Re Jones) · filed 1982-06-21(a)

We conclude that, because the sheriff’s deed had not been issued and presented for recording before the debtor filed his petition under the Code, the debtor still retained an interest in the property which was, therefore, protected by the automatic stay provisions of the Code.

Section 362(a) does not automatically stay action against a debtor corporation’s officers or their property.

Nevada National Bank v. Casgul of Nevada (In Re Casgul of Nevada) · filed 1982-07-14(a)

We conclude that section 362(a) did not create an automatic stay in favor of the debtor’s officers or their property.

Section 362(a)(5) stays postpetition acts to perfect a lien securing a prepetition claim against a debtor’s property, including property abandoned by the bankruptcy estate.

Matter of Shields · filed 1982-08-27(a)(5)

Looking again, then, to the plain language of the statute at Sec. 362(a)(5), it is clear that the action by creditor of recording its lien after the filing of the bankruptcy petition against the abandoned real estate of debtors was an act in violation of the Code.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a bailor from physically taking bailed property from the bankruptcy estate.

Lindsey v. Cryts (In Re Cox Cotton Co.) · filed 1982-11-17(a)(3)

The Code, however, does not envision bail-ors rushing in and physically removing the bailment property.

Section 362(a)(5) prevents a creditor from repossessing abandoned collateral until the case is closed or dismissed, or discharge is granted or denied under § 362(c)(2).

In Re Thomas Howard Bell and Margaret Louise Bell, Debtors. General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Bell · filed 1983-02-22(a)(5), (c)(2)

The automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(5) continues in effect, and prevents repossession by the creditor until the case is closed, dismissed, or discharge is granted or denied pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2).

Section 362(a) does not stay collection from a corporation merely because its sole shareholder filed an individual bankruptcy petition; the shareholder’s stock interest belongs to the estate, but the corporation itself does not.

In Re Loughnane · filed 1983-04-12(a)

It is my determination that James Loughnane and Jim Dins Foods, Inc. are two separate legal entities. While the ownership interest of the debtor in stock of Jim Dins Foods, Inc. is property of the estate, the corporate entity is not property of the estate. ... Therefore, the Court, finding that the IRS did not act against property of the debtor or the debtor’s estate, orders that the Order to Show Cause be discharged.

Under Eastern District of North Carolina procedures, abandonment of property ends the automatic stay as to that property, allowing a secured creditor to enforce its lien.

Pierce v. Woodard (In Re Pierce) · filed 1983-04-26(a)(5), (a)(6)

Under the local procedures in the Eastern District of North Carolina, when property is abandoned it is no longer subject to the automatic stay of either 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(5) or 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6).

Section 362(a)(3) bars acts to obtain property acquired by the debtor after the bankruptcy petition, including attempts to enforce a judgment against that property.

In Re Dakota Industries, Inc. · filed 1983-05-10(a)(3)

The automatic stay provided under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) prohibits “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate.” This prohibition applies not only to the estate created at the commencement of the case upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition but also any property acquired by the debtor thereafter.

Section 362(a)(3) stays repossession of property in the debtor’s possession even if the debtor lacks a legal, equitable, or leasehold interest in it.

Superior Propane v. Zartun (In Re Zartun) · filed 1983-06-13(a)(3)

The automatic stay does not depend on either a legal or equitable interest (citation of error # 4) or a leasehold interest (citation # 5). ... The Zartuns were in possession of the tank and Superior obtained possession from them. This violated the stay.

Section 362(a) stays actions against property of the estate when the debtor retains a residual interest in that property, including a right to surplus sale proceeds.

Iwakiri v. Ewing (In re El Camino Press) · filed 1983-06-24(a)

Evidence adduced at the trial indicated that Hamilton maintained a residual interest in the property subject to the master agreement for non-recourse assignment of leases. Stopher, the trustee for Hamilton, retained the option to permit a sale of the pockets or to cure any past default. Should a sale be permitted, any surplus generated would inure to the benefit of the Hamilton trustee. Such an interest would become property of the estate and fall within the confines of § 362.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not protect a bank account from a prepetition tax levy when the levy extinguished the debtor’s interest in the account before bankruptcy.

DiFlorio v. United States · filed 1983-06-02(a)(3), (4), (5)

The automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Act stays all entities from performing any act to obtain possession of the property of the estate or to enforce a lien against property of the debtor or the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3), (4), (5). Therefore, in order for the limitation period of 26 U.S.C. § 6532 to be tolled, the monies in Kupper-man’s Chemical Bank account must have been the property of the debtor Kupperman at the time the involuntary petition in bankruptcy was filed against it. ... As the case at bar does not fall within that category, this Court finds Phelps controlling and holds that the pre-petition levy by the government displaced the taxpayer’s interest in the seized bank account.

Section 362(a) does not stay payment on a letter of credit because neither the letter of credit nor the money owed by the issuing bank is property of the estate.

L.B.G. Properties, Inc. v. Chisholm Realty Co. (In Re L.B.G. Properties, Inc.) · filed 1983-08-09(a)

The automatic stay provided by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) protects only “property of the estate”. Neither the letter of credit nor the money owed by the bank are property of the estate.

Section 362(a)(4) bars creating or perfecting a lien against estate property without relief from the stay regardless of the nature of the underlying claim; a lien recorded in violation of the stay is void.

Matter of Associated Real Estate Technicians, Inc. · filed 1983-08-12(a)(4)

The nature of the claim underlying a contemplated lien is irrelevant to a determination of the legality of an action to create or perfect such lien if asserted against property of the estate. ... Unless relief is granted pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d), 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4) does not admit to exception. ... It is therefore the specific determination of the Court that the subject lien should be deemed void and without effect.

Section 362 does not bar eviction of premises in which the debtor has no interest.

Phillips Petroleum Co. v. DeMeo (In Re DeMeo) · filed 1983-07-25

The Court concludes that the Debtor, MICHAEL J. DeMEO, JR., has no interest in the service station premises located at 1480 East Hillsboro Boulevard, Deerfield Beach, Florida, nor in the Renewal Dealer Agreement dated May 19, 1980, and, therefore, the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362 do not bar PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY from proceeding with its eviction action in the state court; the Debtor, under the restrictions of 11 U.S.C. § 522, lacks standing to avoid the assignment of the Renewal Dealer Agreement to his brother, PHILIP J. DeMEO; and, finally, the Debtor failed to sustain his burden with regard to his claim of lost gasoline from the tanks and supply lines located on the service station premises.

Section 362(a)(3) stays a creditor’s actions to recover fraudulently transferred estate property or pursue a corporate cause of action belonging to the debtor, even when the actions are brought against a controlling person.

In Re Mortgageamerica Corporation, Debtor. The American National Bank of Austin v. Mortgageamerica Corporation · filed 1983-09-19(a)(3)

We hold that the bank’s state-law actions against Long under the Texas trust fund (denuding) theory and under the Texas Fraudulent Transfers Act were, as the bankruptcy and district courts held, automatically stayed by section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code immediately upon the filing of the petition for involuntary bankruptcy under section 303 of the Code.

Property listed in a debtor’s asset schedule is not necessarily estate property subject to the automatic stay.

In re C.C.L. Construction, Inc. · filed 1983-09-12

First, property scheduled by the debtor as part of its assets is not conclusive evidence that the property is includable in the debtors’ estate and subject to the automatic stay.

Section 362 does not stay a foreclosure sale that affects none of the debtor’s property.

Ellison Associates v. Eastwood Management Corp. (In Re Ellison Associates) · filed 1983-09-27(a)(2)

Ellison’s adversary suit is therefore without merit, since defendants’ foreclosure sale affected none of debtor’s property. Summary judgment was properly granted.