11 U.S.C. § 362

Section 362(a)(3) bars a mortgagee from taking possession of estate property to collect rents until it obtains relief from the stay or the property is abandoned.

In Re Engstrom · filed 1983-10-07(a)(3)

Until the FmHA obtains relief from the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. § 362(d), or the trustee abandons the property, 11 U.S.C. § 554, the trustee stands in the shoes of the debtor and, having possession of the property, is entitled to the lease proceeds.

Section 362(a) stays the distribution of real property in a divorce case after a party files for bankruptcy because a spouse may stand as a creditor.

Boschee v. Boschee · filed 1983-11-22(a)

The automatic stay, however, applies to the distribution of realty because one of the parties may be comparable to a creditor.

Section 362(a)(3) may prohibit a committee from filing a preference action when the filing seeks to obtain property of or from the estate.

Unsecured Noteholders' Committee v. First National Bank & Trust Co. of Oklahoma City (In Re Amarex, Inc.) · filed 1984-01-16(a)(3)

Finally, there is an additional reason why the plaintiffs action may not be proper. The filing of such a complaint could be deemed to violate the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) in that it could be an effort to obtain property of or from the estate. As has already been stated, this is the valuable right of the trustee. For this reason as well as those previously noted above we find good grounds for refusing to permit the action brought by the plaintiffs.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits a mortgagee from changing locks or otherwise interfering with a debtor’s possession of property during the automatic stay.

Wyatt v. MELLON MORTG., INC.,-EAST · filed 1984-01-26(a)(3)

I am satisfied that Mellon’s actions were in direct violation of the automatic stay provisions of § 362. Changing the locks and otherwise interfering with Wyatt’s possession constituted an act to obtain possession of the property, making Mellon liable for damages caused by its violation of the stay.

Section 362 bars postpetition appropriation of property of the bankruptcy estate.

Hassett v. Far West Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n (In Re O.P.M. Leasing Services, Inc.) · filed 1984-05-18(a)(3)

In addition, Far West and Bauer’s post-petition appropriations violated the automatic stay embodied within Code § 362.

Section 362(a)(3) requires an act to acquire an interest in estate property; a suit seeking forfeiture of a debtor’s license does not seek to obtain possession of that property.

In Re Kish · filed 1984-07-24(a)(3)

The word “obtain”, for purposes of § 362, includes within it not only the loss of the interest by the estate, but the acquisition of that interest by the interested party. If Congress had intended the result urged by the trustee, it would have used the words “deprive the estate of” in place of the word “obtain”. The necessary element of acquisition does not exist in this case. Therefore the lawsuit is not an act to obtain possession of property of the estate, and the arguably more inclusive sweep of the Code’s stay is immaterial.

Section 362(a)(5) protects property that has passed from the estate to the debtor, preventing lien enforcement until the case is closed, dismissed, or discharge is granted.

In Re Cassell · filed 1984-08-13(a)(5)

The automobile was still protected by the automatic stay, however, under section 362(a)(5) which protects “property of the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(5). Thus, Riggs would have been prevented from enforcing its lien until such time as the case was closed, the case was dismissed or a discharge was granted. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2).

Section 362(a)(3) stays affirmative acts to obtain possession of estate property, and a sheriff’s deed issued without relief from the stay is void.

In Re Rice · filed 1984-08-31(a)(3)

Affirmative acts to obtain possession of property of the estate are stayed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). Thus, even if the debtors did not redeem the disputed real property, it may remain property of the estate until relief from the automatic stay is granted and a sheriff’s deed is properly issued. The sheriff’s deed, recorded May 23, 1983, conveying title to Home Federal, is null and void.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a landlord from taking extrajudicial steps to repossess estate property or secure crops the debtor may harvest; acts violating the stay are void.

Allis-Chalmers Credit Corp. v. Nordyke (In Re Nordyke) · filed 1984-10-04(a)(3)

This right is independent of the lease and any extrajudicial action taken by the landlords to terminate the debtors’ rights or to secure the crop violated the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). Specifically, Gylan Mulkey’s nonjudicial efforts to secure possession and the crops after expiration of the lease were void.

Section 362 stays a creditor from asserting rights over a cause of action that belongs to the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.

Club Assistance Program, Inc. v. Zukerman · filed 1984-09-10

Because Count IV represents a cause of action belonging to Genesis, it is really property of Genesis’ bankrupt estate. Any attempt by CAP to obtain rights over it in this Court would undoubtedly violate the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362(a)(3) stays an application for a widow’s allowance when it seeks possession of property belonging to a bankruptcy estate.

In Re the Estate of Barefoot · filed 1984-10-18(a)(3)

The filing of a petition also “operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of ... any act to obtain possession of property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). When Mrs. Barefoot applied for her statutory widow’s allowance she sought to obtain possession of property belonging to her husband’s bankruptcy estate in violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362 does not bar a stop payment order on a check held by the debtor when the check has not been honored and the funds have not become property of the bankruptcy estate.

In Re Bowen Industries, Inc. · filed 1984-11-13(a)(3)

Until a check is honored by the drawer bank there can be no transfer of property to the bankruptcy estate. Therefore, cessation of payment on an instrument which has not become property of the bankruptcy estate does not violate the automatic stay provisions of Section 362.

Section 362(a)(4) does not stay perfection of a lien on partnership real property when the debtor general partner has only the limited property rights of a tenant in partnership under New York law.

Turner v. Lee (In Re Minton Group, Inc.) · filed 1985-01-29(a)(4)

The interest under New York law of a general partner in property of the partnership is not sufficient to cause the property to be classified as property of the debtor or its estate for purposes of 11 U.S.C. §§ 544 and 362. Thus the trustee had no power to avoid perfection of liens affecting the property under § 544, nor would the automatic stay of § 362 have affected the perfection.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a bank from redirecting payments that a debtor has a contractual right to receive under a lockbox agreement, and the bank’s mistaken belief in its right to the payments does not excuse the violation.

AM International, Inc. v. Tennessee Valley Authority (In Re AM International, Inc.) · filed 1985-02-14(a)(3)

CUB’s mistaken belief in its right to redirect and dispose of the lockbox payments does not provide the bank with a defense to AMI’s assertions that the bank violated the stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362. The action taken by CUB in causing the redirection of the TVA payments was a blatant violation of the automatic stay for which sanctions should be imposed.

Section 362 bars a secured creditor from seizing insurance proceeds of estate property after the debtor files a bankruptcy petition.

In Re Ronald A. Bradt, Debtor and Towne Lincoln-Mercury v. Woodlawn Auto Workers, F.C.U. · filed 1985-03-14(a)(3)–(4)

Under the automatic stay provision of § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362, which provides that filing a petition stays any act to obtain possession of estate property or to enforce a lien against it, Woodlawn was prohibited from seizing the proceeds of the insurance draft after Bradt declared bankruptcy.

Section 362(a)(3) stays a public utilities commission from considering a debtor’s post-petition non-use of an estate-owned operating certificate to determine that the certificate is dormant.

Bernstein v. R.C. Williams, Inc. (In Re Rocky Mountain Trucking Co.) · filed 1985-04-02(a)(3)

Consideration of post-petition non-use of the Certificate in the determination of whether the Certificate is now dormant is an act to obtain property of the estate, and is therefore stayed.

Section 362(a) does not stay the exercise of rights over property that is outside the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.

In Re Shamrock Coal Co., Inc. · filed 1985-04-04(a)

The threshold, and potentially disposi-tive, issue in this case is whether the flocculation equipment is property of the debt- or’s bankruptcy estate. If not, the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) does not apply to such property and the movants would be free to pursue any non-bankruptcy rights and remedies which they may have with respect to the property.

Section 362(a) does not stay proceedings concerning property in which the debtor had no interest when the bankruptcy petition was filed.

Striegel v. Dakota Hills, Inc. · filed 1985-03-20(a)

We conclude that Biby had no interest in the campground property at the time he filed for bankruptcy because he had conveyed his interest to Hillside in April 1980. He cannot claim otherwise at this point in the proceedings. As a result, the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) had no effect on the district court’s ruling in this case.

Section 362(a) protects even a debtor’s mere possessory interest in property from creditor action.

Mercer v. D.E.F., Inc. · filed 1985-04-16(a)

Furthermore, even a mere posses-sory interest in property is protected by the automatic stay. ... Accordingly, Color Tyme’s action against the Debtor’s home and her property violated the stay.

Section 362(a)(3) requires a party seeking to recover property in the debtor’s possession to obtain stay relief even when the debtor has no legal or equitable interest in the property.

In Re Dascoli's, Inc. · filed 1985-05-24(a)(3)

Nevertheless, we do not find that the automatic stay is inapplicable here. Pursuant to § 362(a)(3), the stay applies against “any act to obtain possession ... of property from the estate”. Since movant here attempts to regain possession of property currently in the use and possession of the debtor, he is required to seek relief from the stay.

Section 362(a) stops protecting property as estate property once that property leaves the bankruptcy estate.

Johnson v. Johnson (In Re Johnson) · filed 1985-07-26(a)

Under the third point, as a general rule a violation of the stay is committed if a creditor takes action against property of the estate whether the debt arose before or after the filing of the petition. § 362(a)(2), (a)(3) and (a)(4). Once property ceases being property of the estate, this aspect of the stay is vitiated as to that property.

Section 362(a)(4) treats a consensual security interest in personal property as a lien subject to the automatic stay.

Beatrice National Bank & Trust Co. v. Mid-America Dairymen, Inc. · filed 1985-08-16(a)(4)

The term “lien” in § 362(a)(4) above is used to include any consensual security interest in personal property.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not apply to the withholding of funds that are not property of the bankruptcy estate.

In Re Frank Mossa Trucking, Inc. · filed 1985-11-27

As a consequence of this Court’s conclusion that the monies withheld are not property of the estate, the automatic stay provisions are inapplicable.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not protect corporate funds that are not property of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.

Vocque v. Internal Revenue Service (In re Vocque) · filed 1986-01-15(a)

Accordingly, the IRS made an appropriate determination of its right to proceed against the funds at issue here; the funds were not property of the estate as defined in section 1306 and section 541 and the automatic stay of section 362 was not applicable.

Section 362(a)(3) stays a motion seeking to divert proceeds of a note that is property of the bankruptcy estate.

In Re Stewart Energy Systems of Idaho, Inc. · filed 1986-05-05(a)(3)

Based upon these facts, I conclude that the motion filed in the Eastern District of the State of Washington was a deliberate and willful attempt by the SEC to obtain possession of the proceeds of the Ni-barger note, an asset of the bankruptcy estate, in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a) bars a landlord from removing a debtor’s personal property while it is property of the bankruptcy estate.

Davis v. Washington (In Re Davis) · filed 1986-06-05(a)

Defendant’s removal of debtor’s property, which was at that time property of the bankruptcy estate, was a violation of the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).

Section 362 protects property and earnings dedicated to a confirmed Chapter 13 plan from levy, but does not bar a levy on the debtor’s property outside the estate.

In Re Root · filed 1986-07-01

There was no evidence that the IRS was specifically seeking to levy on that portion of the property and earnings which remained “property of the estate” post-confirmation. Had that evidence been forthcoming, the IRS would have been in violation of § 362.

Section 362(a) prevents a seller from pursuing a state-law action to reclaim goods after the buyer files a bankruptcy petition.

Griffin Retreading Co. v. Oliver Rubber Co. · filed 1986-07-17(a)(3)

11 U.S.C. Sec. 362(a) 4 effectively prevented Oliver from proceeding with any state action at law based upon its reclamation rights.

Section 362(a) does not stay recovery of funds withheld under a final state wage-payment order before bankruptcy when those funds are not property of the estate.

In Re Pelham Fence Co., Inc. · filed 1986-10-10(a)

The withheld funds covered by the Commissioner’s “Notice to Release Withheld Money,” dated July 11, 1984, do not constitute property of this estate within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 541 and are not subject to the automatic stay imposed under 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay enforcement of a district court injunction that affects only the venue of bankruptcy proceedings and allows those proceedings to continue.

Hunt v. Bankers Trust Co. · filed 1986-09-15(a)(1)

The injunction here affects only the venue of the bankruptcy proceeding, that is, which bankruptcy court decides whether it will hear the pre-petition claims — and does not determine whether the pre-bankruptcy actions brought by the Hunt interests will be heard in a bankruptcy court or a nonbankruptcy court. For this reason, the automatic stay is inapplicable to the district court’s injunction.

Section 362 stays a lender from having a receiver appointed over the debtor’s property.

Chaussee v. Morning Star Ranch Resorts Co. (In Re Morning Star Ranch Resorts) · filed 1986-09-17

When bankruptcy intervenes the property of the debtor becomes subject to the jurisdiction of this Court and the rights of the lender are at least suspended by reason of the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362. The stay deprives the lender of the right to have a receiver appointed and, but for the operation of 11 U.S.C. § 546(b), would deprive the lender of the opportunity to perfect his inchoate interest in the rents and profits of the real property.

Section 362(a)(1) automatically stays proceedings against a debtor but does not extend the stay to nondebtor defendants.

Morgan v. Kobrin Securities, Inc. · filed 1986-11-04(a)(1)

The automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code apply only to debtors and not non-debtor defendants.

Section 362 stays actions against the debtor, but does not stay an action between other parties when the debtor is not a party and its trustee is not bound by the outcome.

Whiteley Construction Co. v. Bethlehem Mines Corp. · filed 1986-11-06(a)(1)

However, the language of the statute, 11 U.S.C. §362 extends, stay proceedings only to actions “against the debtor.” Fortier v. Dona Anna Plaza Partners, 747 F.2d 1324 at 1330 (10th Cir. 1984). The debtor, Ram, is not a party to the case at bar, and its trustee is not bound by the outcome of the action in this court. Pacor, supra, 745 F.2d at 995.

An inadvertent lapse of the automatic stay under § 362(e) may be cured by a bankruptcy court injunction under § 105.

Shawmut Bank of Boston, N.A. v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. (In Re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp.) · filed 1986-11-26(e)

Therefore, the bankruptcy court has the power to issue an injunction to cure this lapse.

Section 362(a)(3) bars obtaining possession of estate property without relief from the automatic stay, but stay relief is unnecessary to pursue post-petition rental payments.

BISC v. Beker Industries Corp. (In Re Beker Industries Corp.) · filed 1987-02-11(a)(3)

Section 362(a)(3) of the Code’s automatic stay provision, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3), bars acts to obtain ownership, possession or control of property of the estate. As a defense, the Debtor asserts that plaintiff has failed to seek relief from the stay, with respect to its request for immediate possession of the equipment. Therefore, that remedy may not be granted. Plaintiff, however, need not request relief from the stay here to pursue its request for post-petition rental payments.

Section 362(a) does not stay actions concerning property in which the debtor had no interest when the bankruptcy petition was filed.

Associates v. Cohoes Industrial Terminal, Inc. (In Re Cohoes Industrial Terminal, Inc.) · filed 1987-02-18(a)

Thus, the automatic stay does not operate to enjoin actions respecting property in which the debtor no longer has an interest at the time of the filing of the petition.

Section 362(a) prevents a creditor from taking possession of estate property until the court grants relief from the automatic stay or the property leaves the estate.

Leben v. Rabin (In re A.W.H. of Wisconsin, Inc.) · filed 1987-02-23(a)

Furthermore, the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) precluded the Lebens from taking possession of the property until relief from the automatic stay was granted by the court or the property was no longer part of the estate.

Section 362(a)(3) applies only to acts involving property of the estate; after confirmation vests all estate property in the debtor, it does not bar a claim against that property.

Skies Unlimited, Inc. of Colorado v. King · filed 1987-04-22(a)(3)

Even more basic is the fact that by its express terms, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) applies only as to “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate.” By both the express terms of 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d) and the language of the Plan, the order confirming the Plan had the effect of vesting all of the property of the “estate” in the Debtor. The “estate” no longer existed, and the allegation of the complaint to the effect that King filed a lis pendens against “property of the estate” is a non sequitur.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a creditor from collecting proceeds of an insurance policy owned by the debtor because the policy is part of the bankruptcy estate.

Zuppas v. General Electric Credit Corp., Matthew N. Zuppas v. General Electric Credit Corp. · filed 1987-03-27(a)(3)

The district court's determination that the insurance policy was part of Zuppas' estate was not clearly erroneous. Zuppas purchased the policy and was listed as the owner of the policy in the correspondence between GECC and Great American. Further, the purpose of the policy was to protect Zuppas from liability under the guaranty should the property be lost. We agree therefore with the district court's conclusion that a "technical" violation of the stay occurred when GECC attempted to collect the proceeds.

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay collection on a surety bond in which the debtor’s estate has no legal or equitable interest.

McLean Trucking Co. v. Department of Industrial Relations (In Re McLean Trucking Co.) · filed 1987-06-03(a)(3)

Third, whatever may have been true of the insurance policy in Robins, the surety bond in this case is simply not property of the estate within the scope of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) stays a creditor’s alter ego action against nondebtors when that cause of action belongs to the debtor’s estate.

In the Matter of S.I. Acquisition, Inc., Debtor. S.I. Acquisition, Inc. v. Eastway Delivery Service, Inc. · filed 1987-05-29(a)(3)

We, therefore, conclude that East-way’s alter ego action is a right of action belonging to S.I.A. and, as such, is “property of the estate” within the meaning of section 541(a)(1). Accordingly, the automatic stay of section 362(a)(3) applies to Eastway’s state action.

Section 362(a)(3) bars recording a deed after bankruptcy to perfect a claimed pre-bankruptcy transfer of estate property because that act exercises control over the estate’s interest.

Harris v. Ramel (In re Allen) · filed 1987-06-29(a)(3)

That the action by H.M. Ramel to perfect the purported pre-bankruptcy transfer by quit claim deed, on a date after commencement of this case was an attempt to affect and exercise control over the bankruptcy estate’s interest in the Debtor’s real property, contrary to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3); and ... That H.M. Ramel’s post-bankruptcy recordation was in violation of the automatic stay of Section 362; and ... That by separate order, judgment is being entered in favor of the Plaintiffs and against the Defendants in that the Trustee’s transfer of title to this real property was free and clear of any claim of the Debtor or H.M. Ramel or Harvey F. Euge.

Section 362(a) does not protect land owned by individuals when the debtor is not a partnership and, even if it were, the land is not partnership property.

Belle Isle Co. v. Belle Isle Farm (In Re Belle Isle Farm) · filed 1987-06-23(a)

Therefore, the Court finding that the debtor in this proceeding is not a partnership under Virginia law, and secondly, assuming ar-guendo that it is, the 450-acre tract of land at issue is not partnership property, it is the opinion of this Court that the debtor, Belle Isle Farm, is not entitled to the protection afforded by the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) and that the relief requested by Belle Isle Company, Inc. should be granted.

Section 362(a) protects property from creditor action only if the debtor had an interest in that property when the bankruptcy case began.

In Re Bigalk · filed 1987-06-29(a)

However, in order for property to pass into a bankruptcy estate — and then to be subject to the protections of the automatic stay against creditor action — the debtor must have had an interest in that property as of the commencement of the bankruptcy case.

Section 362(a)(3) stays acts by any entity to take possession of or exercise control over estate property, including alleged wrongful control by the government.

Inslaw, Inc. v. United States (In Re Inslaw, Inc.) · filed 1987-07-31(a)(3)

Among the acts stayed by the commencement of a case by operation of Section 362 is “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or property from the estate or to exercise control of property of the estate ...” (Section 362(a)(3).) This section protects the debtor and all legitimate creditors by preventing dismemberment of the estate by the acts of any entity seeking possession of, or control over, property of the estate. ... It is this section which would be violated by the DOJ’s wrongful exercise of control over IN-SLAW’s property, as alleged in INSLAW’s Complaint.

The automatic stay protects a debtor’s interest in real property retained when an unfinished foreclosure sale precedes the bankruptcy petition.

Bradley v. United States Ex Rel. Farmers Home Administration, U.S. Department of Agriculture (In Re Bradley) · filed 1987-07-25

This interest is protected by the stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362 that became operative at the time the petition was filed.

Section 362(a)(4) does not invalidate a surety’s equitable lien created before the bankruptcy petition, even when the surety pays claims after the petition; the stay also does not apply to funds outside the estate.

Tri-City Service District v. Pacific Marine Dredging & Construction (In Re Pacific Marine Dredging & Construction) · filed 1987-10-09(a)(4)

Key Bank and debtor maintain, however, that International’s equitable lien was created upon International’s post-petition payments to the various unpaid sub-contractors thus, its lien is void under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4) which prohibits the creation of post-petition liens against property of the estate. ... International’s claim to the fund prevails on two alternative grounds. First, that the fund is not property of the estate. Second, in the alternative, if the fund is property of the estate, International’s lien was created pre-petition.

Section 362(a) stays a creditor’s suit to recover a claim belonging to the debtor corporation, but does not stay a suit on a claim belonging to the creditor personally.

Supertrans v. O.C.C. Shipping, Inc. · filed 1987-11-06(a)

If plaintiff is suing to recover on a right of action belonging to the debtor corporation, the automatic stay would operate, whereas if plaintiff is suing to recover on a right of action belonging to the plaintiff personally, the stay would not operate.

Section 362 bars postpetition acts to create, perfect, or enforce liens against estate property, so a later state court action cannot create a lis pendens interest in that property.

Matter of Goldman · filed 1988-01-21

As a result, any act by any entity to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of Debtor’s estate was prohibited by the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362. Actions in violation of the stay are traditionally considered a nullity. Therefore, whatever the effect of lis pendens might normally be in Ohio, Spencer’s state court action did not create by lis pendens an interest in the real estate because of its status as estate property.

Section 362 stays collection of royalties held by the debtor when those funds are property of the bankruptcy estate.

Henderson v. Stein & Day Inc. (In Re Stein & Day Inc.) · filed 1987-12-15

Royalties owed to plaintiff, in the possession of the debtor, are property of the estate as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 541 and are subject to the automatic stay provisions under 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits continued use of a debtor’s trade secret software when that software is property of the bankruptcy estate.

INSLAW, Inc. v. United States (In Re INSLAW, Inc.) · filed 1988-01-25(a)(3)

The DOJ has continued over a long period of time to use INSLAW’s trade secret enhancements despite the fact that they are property of the estate, while refusing to pay for them. These acts constitute the willful exercise of control over the property of the estate, and thus violate the automatic stay under the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3), the violation of which is actionable pursuant to the remedies provided under § 362 generally and especially § 362(h).

Section 362’s automatic stay does not halt completion of a foreclosure sale held before the bankruptcy filing when the debtor had no interest in the property at filing.

Abdelhaq v. Pflug · filed 1988-02-22(a)(3)

Thus, because the Abdelhaqs possessed no interest in the condominium units at the time they filed their petition, the property never became part of their estate under section 541. From this it follows, of course, that no automatic stay ever attached to the property to halt consummation of the foreclosure sale.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits a creditor with notice of the bankruptcy from attempting to repossess vehicles that remain property of the estate while the stay is in effect.

In Re Grace · filed 1988-02-25(a)(3)

Rockwell received actual notice of the debtors’ case. As a result, the stay of Section 362(a) was effective against Rockwell and prohibited certain actions. Rockwell’s attempted repossession of the vehicles was an action included within the scope of the prohibition.

Section 362(a)(3) stays recovery of personal property from a debtor’s possession even when another party owns it.

In Re Moore & White Co., Inc. · filed 1988-03-02(a)(3)

Therefore, “a mere possessory interest in real property, without any accompanying legal interest, is sufficient to trigger the protection of the automatic stay.” ... The same principle applies to personal property. ... As a result, Loyola must obtain relief from the automatic stay in order to recover possession of its machine.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a shareholder from asserting derivative rights to redress injuries to the debtor because those rights are property of the estate.

In Re Interpictures, Inc. · filed 1988-03-22(a)(3)

In an insolvency situation, however, the right to redress wrongs inflicted upon the debtor is property of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 541. Any attempt therefore to exercise derivatively those rights which belong exclusively to the corporate debtor would run afoul of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) which prohibits “any act to ... exercise control over property of the estate.”

Section 362 does not protect property owned by a third party merely because the debtor formerly had an interest in it, so a foreclosure of that property is not void under the automatic stay.

Swift v. Appleson (In Re Swift) · filed 1988-04-21

However, if debtor was not the owner of the property being foreclosed, then the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362 does not protect the property belonging to a third party even though at one time the debtor had an interest in said property. Thus the Court has no power to declare this foreclosure void and declines to do so.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits withholding mortgage assistance benefits that are property of the debtor’s estate.

In Re Watts · filed 1988-11-30(a)(3)

As such, when HEMAP benefits were withheld by PHFA, the automatic stay provision of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) was violated.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not enjoin actions concerning property in which the debtor had no interest when it filed its bankruptcy petition.

Beaver Street Associates v. Lady Liberty Tavern Corp. (In Re Lady Liberty Tavern Corp.) · filed 1988-12-27

Accordingly Lady Liberty’s leasehold interest in the premises had terminated before it filed its bankruptcy petition. It follows, in Chief Judge Brieant’s words in Cohoes, supra, that “the automatic stay does not operate to enjoin actions respecting property in which the debtor no longer has an interest at the time of the filing of the petition.” 70 B.R. at 218.

Section 362(a) does not stay a state court’s postpetition payment of wages to a garnishing creditor when the debtor had no interest in those wages under state law.

In Re Frizzell · filed 1989-01-03(a)

The money transferred, under state law, belonged to Barclays. The automatic stay did not prohibit the small claims court’s transfer of Barclays’ money to Barclays.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits a mortgagee from charging a Chapter 13 debtor’s tax-and-insurance escrow account for its attorney’s fees without prior notice, because the estate retains an interest in the funds’ intended use.

Fessenden v. Maine Savings Bank (In re Nield) · filed 1989-01-25(a)(3)

The estate retained an important interest in that escrow account: that the funds be used for the purpose that they were intended, which was payment of taxes and insurance for the protection of the debtors and the bank. Any other use, without prior notice to the debtors, the standing Chapter 13 trustee, and, if necessary, approval of the court, was not only a violation of the automatic stay but probably also a violation of the bank’s duty as escrow agent.

Section 362(a) does not bar a creditor from collecting garnished funds when the debtor’s rights to the funds were extinguished before the bankruptcy petition was filed.

In Re Seay · filed 1989-02-16(a)

This threshold determination necessarily leads to the conclusion that since the garnisheed funds were not property of the estate or of the Debtor after May 18,1988, in this case, the Creditor’s acts to receive the funds on May 20, 1988 were not a violation of the Bankruptcy Code. Creditor’s collection efforts against third parties, or against property not of the Debtor’s estate, is not a violation of the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362(a)(4) stays enforcement proceedings against property only while it belongs to the bankruptcy estate.

Alternate Energy Management Corp. v. Goodman · filed 1989-06-05(a)(4)

The petitioner properly sought relief in State court, as the automatic stay of enforcement proceedings available under the Federal bankruptcy law applies only to property of the bankrupt’s estate (11 USC § 362 [a] [4]). Once Goodman and Fontana purchased the leasehold from the interim trustee in bankruptcy, it no longer belonged to the estate.

Section 362(a)(2) does not stay enforcement of a prepetition judgment against property outside the debtor’s estate.

In re Meybin · filed 1989-07-24(a)(2)

If they are not “property of the estate”, § 362(a)(2) does not apply and their sale by the Sheriff is not automatically stayed by the filing of a Chapter 11 petition.

Section 362(a) does not stay enforcement of a right to possession under a lease terminated before the bankruptcy petition, because the lease is not property of the estate.

In Re Cohoes Industrial Terminal, Inc. · filed 1989-08-11(a)

Therefore, the automatic stay imposed under Title 11 U.S.C. Section 362(a) did not bar LSA from enforcing its right to possession because the Sparrowbush lease was not property of the estate when the Chapter 11 petition was filed.

Section 362(a) does not protect a real property agreement terminated before the debtor filed for bankruptcy; the court may lift any stay for cause to clear a cloud on the property.

In Re Jones · filed 1989-08-08(a)

Because this court has found that the agreement was terminated prior to the debtor’s filing, the subject real property agreement was not protected by the automatic stay. Nevertheless, in order to remove any cloud which may exist on this real property as a result of the debtor’s filing the petition for relief, this court orders that any stay under Section 362(a) should be lifted for cause.

Section 362(a)(3) does not protect an automobile owned by a nondebtor because it is not property of the bankruptcy estate.

In Re Jones · filed 1989-10-17(a)(3)

The debtor’s allegation that GMAC’s repossession violated the automatic stay of § 362 is without merit. The automobile, owned by Jennesee Jones, is not property of the bankruptcy estate and does not receive the protection of such property provided by § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits a creditor from retaining estate property after a bankruptcy filing, even if the creditor lawfully seized it before the filing.

In Re John Rothwell Knaus, Debtor. John Rothwell Knaus v. Concordia Lumber Company, Inc. · filed 1989-11-13(a)(3)

The failure to fulfill this duty, regardless of whether the original seizure was lawful, constitutes a prohibited attempt to “exercise control over the property of the estate” in violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay a regulator’s withdrawal and reallocation of airport slots after the debtor’s interest in them expires automatically under a mandatory nonuse rule.

In Re Gull Air, Inc., Debtor. Federal Aviation Administration v. Gull Air, Inc. · filed 1989-12-07(a)(3)

Moreover, because Gull Air lost its proprietary interest in the slots without any affirmative act of withdrawal by the FAA, the FAA’s withdrawal and reallocation of the slots do not constitute acts to obtain possession of property of the estate under section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code. We conclude, therefore, that the automatic stay of section 362(a)(3) does not prevent the FAA from reallocating the four LaGuardia slots.

Section 362 does not stay actions concerning property in which the debtor had no interest when the bankruptcy petition was filed.

Sanwa Bank California v. Caldwell (In Re Caldwell) · filed 1990-02-16

Section 362 has no application to property that debtors ceased to have an interest in prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition.

Section 362(a)(3) stays shareholders from prosecuting a debtor corporation’s derivative claims but does not prevent the trustee from pursuing those claims for the estate.

Doan v. Loomis (In re Fort Dodge Creamery Co.) · filed 1990-05-11(a)(3)

However, as previously stated, the § 362(a)(3) stay applied only against Doan and Ambrose and not against the trustee.

Section 362(a)(4) prohibits a creditor from creating a lien on estate property without court approval, and a court cannot later validate a lien created in violation of the automatic stay.

In Re Lite Coal Mining Co. · filed 1990-07-13(a)(4)

11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4) prohibits a creditor from engaging in any act to create, enforce or perfect a lien against property of the estate. The Bank thus acted improperly in taking security interests in the property of the estate without court approval. This Court cannot validate security interests after the fact when such transfers were originally made in violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(4) does not stay a lien claim against a nondebtor for funds the nondebtor received before bankruptcy, because the claim does not seek to enforce a lien against estate property.

Pioneer Commercial Funding Corp. v. United Airlines, Inc. · filed 1991-01-11(a)(4)

Once again, however, there is no authority supporting the proposition that the funds already received by United, a non-bankrupt third-party, are property of Presidential’s estate. Thus, the Bank Group’s action is not an attempt to enforce a lien against property of the estate.

Section 362(a)(3) bars creditors from freezing estate assets to secure payment ahead of other creditors.

Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Rolleston (In Re Ionosphere Clubs Inc.) · filed 1991-02-14(a)(3)

Any attempt to freeze Eastern’s assets and to obtain an order requiring Eastern to transfer cash from its estate to the pilot pension plans is an attempt to assert control over Eastern’s assets to the detriment of other creditors.

Section 362(a)(3) and (4) bar a prepetition creditor, including the IRS, from levying on a Chapter 13 debtor’s nondebtor spouse’s post-petition community income when that income is property of the estate.

In Re Reiter · filed 1991-04-23(a)(3), (a)(4)

For these reasons, this court now concludes that the nondebtor spouse’s post-petition income, to the extent of the allowable claim of the Internal Revenue Service, is property of the estate acquired by the debt- or, making it property of this chapter 13 estate under Section 1306(a)(1). By virtue of subsections (3) and (4) of Section 362(a), a prepetition creditor may not seek to obtain possession of such property, nor may it seek to create, perfect, or enforce a lien against such property.

Section 362(a)(3) does not prohibit continued use of property possessed under a claim of right when the bankruptcy petition was filed, even if that use later proves to violate the debtor’s rights.

United States v. Inslaw, Inc. · filed 1991-05-07(a)(3)

Because we find that the automatic stay does not reach the Department’s use of property in its possession under a claim of right at the time of the bankruptcy filing, even if that use may ultimately prove to violate the bankrupt’s rights, we reverse.

Section 362 stays enforcement of a judgment against a debtor’s supersedeas bond while the underlying appeal remains pending because the bond is property of the estate.

Matter of Celotex Corp. · filed 1991-06-13(a)(3)

The supersedeas bond is property of the estate as long as the appellate process upon which it is based is proceeding, and the automatic stay of Section 362 applies to any action to enforce a judgment against the supersedeas bond.

Section 362(a)(3) does not bar a party from using property it possessed under a claim of right when the bankruptcy petition was filed, even if that use later proves to violate the debtor’s rights.

United States v. Inslaw · filed 1991-07-12(a)(3)

Because we find that the automatic stay does not reach the Department's use of property in its possession under a claim of right at the time of the bankruptcy filing, even if that use may ultimately prove to violate the bankrupt's rights, we reverse.

Section 362(a)(3) does not prevent a foreclosure purchaser from obtaining possession of a residence when the foreclosure occurred before the bankruptcy filing and the residence is not property of the estate.

In Re Detter · filed 1991-12-13(a)(3)

The bank is not prohibited by the automatic stay from engaging in “any act to obtain possession” of the property. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) prevents the bank from obtaining possession of property of the estate. However, the residence is not property of the estate.

Section 362(a)(3) and (4) protect property of the bankruptcy estate, so they do not bar recording a lis pendens against property vested in the debtor after plan confirmation.

Lombardo v. Gerard · filed 1992-05-27(a)(3), (a)(4)

Thus, the lis pendens, recorded after confirmation of the plan, affected only Jason’s property, not property of the bankruptcy estate, and subsections (3) and (4) have no application to the facts of this case.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits a creditor from unilaterally setting off a certificate of deposit that belongs to the bankruptcy estate against the debtor’s postpetition debt.

Michaels v. National Bank of Sussex County (In Re E-Tron Corp.) · filed 1992-06-04(a)(3)

The $200,000. certificate of deposit which E-Tron purchased from NBSC with part of the proceeds from the unauthorized postpetition loan was property of the estate. NBSC’s setoff of the certificate of deposit against E-Tron’s debt to NBSC from the unauthorized postpetition loan therefore violated the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay a suit seeking to stop a debtor’s tortious use of its property when the suit does not seek control over an interest in estate property.

Amplifier Research Corp. v. Hart · filed 1992-08-20(a)(3)

But the fact that EMCO owns its report does not make Amplifier’s effort to stop its tortious circulation an “act ... to exercise control over property of the estate” for purposes of the bankruptcy stay.

Section 362 automatically stays judicial proceedings against a debtor’s interest in community property that is part of the bankruptcy estate, and a judgment entered in violation of the stay is voidable.

Flexmaster Aluminum Awning Co., Inc. v. Hirschberg · filed 1992-09-29(a)

Because the husband’s contribution to the community comprised part of the bankruptcy estate, any judicial proceeding against that interest should have been automatically stayed. As a result, any judgment rendered in violation of the automatic bankruptcy stay would be voidable.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits foreclosure of estate property while the automatic stay is in effect.

In Re Burke · filed 1992-12-11(a)(3)

Therefor, the stay was in effect at the time Defendants carried out the foreclosure on the Keystone Drive property and Defendants violated the stay because their act of foreclosure was manifestly an act to exercise control over estate property.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a third party from asserting possession of, control over, or an interest in corporate shares the debtor held when the bankruptcy petition was filed.

In re Winer · filed 1993-01-15(a)(3)

There can be no serious question but that the shares Winer held on the day the petition was filed constitute property of the estate. If E F & G is seeking to assert possession of, control over, or an interest in those shares, then its actions in so doing violate § 362.

Section 362(a)(2) does not stay proceedings concerning settlement proceeds that are outside the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.

In Re the One Bancorp Securities Litigation · filed 1993-02-12(a)(2)

Since the Committee cannot establish that a fraudulent transfer took place, it cannot establish that the monies paid in settlement of these claims are part of The One Ban-corp’s bankruptcy estate. Thus, the automatic stay does not operate with respect to these proceedings regarding the settlement proceeds.

Section 362(a)(3) stays a state agency’s involuntary dissolution of a debtor corporation when dissolution exercises control over property that remains in the bankruptcy estate, rendering the dissolution void.

Hillis Motors, Inc. v. Hawaii Automobile Dealers' Ass'n · filed 1993-06-28(a)(3)

Because the DCCA's dissolution action resulted in its exercising control over property of the estate, the automatic stay renders Hillis' dissolution void ab initio.

Section 362 protects an entire marital property asset in which the debtor has an undivided interest from postpetition collection, even when the creditor seeks to satisfy an independent claim against the nondebtor spouse.

In Re Passmore · filed 1993-07-19(a)(5)

Therefore, this court holds that all funds or assets classified as marital property in which the debtor has an interest are protected by the automatic stay, even though the creditors are attempting to recover those funds or assets to satisfy a completely independent claim against the nondebtor spouse.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a limited partner from asserting a debtor partnership’s defense to a foreclosure through a derivative action without first obtaining relief from the automatic stay.

Gainesville Venture, Ltd. v. C & R Trust (In Re Gainesville Venture, Ltd.) · filed 1993-08-30(a)(3)

Under the reasoning of Griffin, C & R’s exercise of control over that right without first seeking relief from the automatic stay constitutes a violation of the stay.

Section 362(a)(3) stays requests to appoint a receiver over a corporation controlled by the debtor or to deny the debtor its share of a derivative recovery, because those requests would exercise control over estate property.

Edisto Resources Corp. v. McConkey (In Re Edisto Resources Corp.) · filed 1993-09-09(a)(3)

In summary, paragraph 23 and the requested receivership relief of the complaint attempt to exercise control over property of the estates of Edisto and NRM. These provisions of the complaint violate the automatic stay.

Section 362 does not stay enforcement of final judgments against appeal bonds or escrows in which the debtor has no remaining estate interest, or a surety’s draw on the proceeds of a letter of credit.

Keene Corp. v. Acstar Insurance (In Re Keene Corp.) · filed 1994-01-04(a)(3)

The automatic stay does not prevent, and this Court will not stay, final judgment creditors from enforcing their judgments against the appeal bonds or escrows, or the sureties from drawing the proceeds of the letters of credit in accordance with their terms.

Section 362(a)(3) stays an effort to compel payment on a debtor’s right to collect from a third party because that effort exercises control over property of the estate.

National Tax Credit Partners, L.P., and National Tax Credit, Inc. v. Edward F. Havlik, Virgil W. Owings, and United Deve · filed 1994-03-28(a)(3)

Section 362(a)(3), however, reaches farther, encompassing every effort to “exercise control over property of the estate”. The right to collect from the general partners is “property of the estate”.

Section 362(a)(4) stays acts to create, perfect, or enforce a lien against property of the estate after the bankruptcy petition is filed.

Rajala v. Kelly (In re Kelly) · filed 1994-06-30(a)(4)

In addition, from the filing of the petition, the property has remained property of the estate and 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4) stays any act to create, perfect, or enforce any hen against property of the estate.

Section 362(a)(3) stays a creditor’s alter ego action when the debtor could bring the claim under state law and the claim is therefore property of the bankruptcy estate.

Realmark Investment Co. v. American Financial Corp. · filed 1994-08-09(a)(3)

Because the debtor may bring its own alter ego claim, the alter ego claim is property of the bankruptcy estate. ... Accordingly, the automatic stay of section 362(a)(3) applies to plaintiff Realmark’s action.

Section 362(a) bars a mortgagee from taking possession of a debtor’s property after the bankruptcy petition is filed, and possessory acts that violate the stay are void from the outset.

Charlestown Holdings, Inc. v. Federal Deposit Insurance (In re Competrol Acquisition Partnership, L.P.) · filed 1994-08-12(a)

Since I conclude that FDIC did not have possession of Pier 8 or Pier 6 prior to the filing of the petitions, FDIC’s post petition possessory activities violated the automatic stay of § 362(a) and are void ab initio.

Section 362(a)(3) prevents a shipper or regulator from invoking the Negotiated Rates Act to control freight undercharge claims that belong to a bankruptcy estate.

E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Cooper · filed 1994-10-13(a)(3)

Section 362(a)(3) of the Code, therefore prevents any entity — including the ICC or the Defendant/Appellant — from invoking the provisions of Section 2 of the NRA against the Plaintiff/Appellee to control property of the estate.

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay a vessel owner’s limitation action merely because it indirectly limits the value of a debtor’s potential recovery.

Corso v. DeWitt · filed 1994-10-14(a)(3)

Appellant’s limitation action would limit the amount of recovery in any action against the vessel due to the voyage of October 4, 1992. Therefore, in a sense, by filing his limitation action, Appellant has exercised indirect control over Appellee’s estate. The Court concludes, however, that section 362(a)(3) does not apply to such an indirect exercise of control.

Section 362 bars payment of support from Chapter 13 estate property while the stay is in force, even when a prepetition order requires payment and the support debt is nondischargeable.

Debolt v. Comerica Bank (In Re Debolt) · filed 1994-12-23

Therefore, the Pension Trustee is in violation of the stay in paying the support to Mrs. Debolt, notwithstanding the fact that it is doing so in compliance with a prepetition state court order and that the obligation is nondischargeable.

Section 362(a)(3) stays postpetition seizure of estate property and subsequent forfeiture efforts to obtain title to it.

Weaver v. City of Knoxville (In re Thomas) · filed 1995-03-20(a)(3)

The court agrees with the Trustee’s assertion that the Defendant’s postpetition seizure of the 1981 Mack Truck and subsequent actions to obtain title to the truck violated the automatic stay provisions as set forth in § 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay collection of rents from property owned by a corporation solely because the debtor owns the corporation’s stock; the debtor must have a legal or equitable interest in the property or rents.

In re McGregor · filed 1995-05-05(a)(3)

Because debtor has not shown that he has either a legal or equitable interest in the U-Ton and Realty Buildings, or the rents generated from the operation of those buildings, he has not established a right to the relief sought in the motion.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a debtor’s postpetition attempt to authorize a creditor to apply estate property to settle a prepetition claim.

Affiliated Computer Systems, Inc. v. Sherman (In re Kemp) · filed 1995-05-18(a)(3)

Kemp had no legal power to transfer the funds; in fact, his effort to do so was a technical violation of the automatic stay affecting all estate property.

Section 362(a)(3) permits an owner to reclaim its property after a bankruptcy filing in limited circumstances when the debtor has no legal or equitable interest in it.

In Re Munroe · filed 1995-06-30(a)(3)

Although it certainly is risky business to reclaim one’s own property post-petition, in certain limited circumstances it is possible to do so without running afoul of § 362.

Section 362(a) does not bar a postpetition transfer of bank funds to the IRS when a prepetition levy left the debtor with no interest in the funds and they did not enter the estate.

In Re Smiley · filed 1995-12-05(a)

Since the funds did not become property of the estate, the postpetition demand of the IRS that Sharon Savings Bank transfer Debtor’s funds to the IRS pursuant to a prepetition notice of levy does not violate the provisions of the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).

Section 362(a) does not protect property revested in debtors by a fraudulent conveyance decree after their bankruptcy case closed, because that property is after-acquired rather than property of the estate.

In Re Kampen · filed 1995-12-14(a)(2), (a)(4)

I conclude, therefore, that the effect of the decree is to revest title after the filing and closing dates of the Kampens’ case. The property is, therefore, after-acquired and not property of the estate subject to protection of the stay.

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay a creditor’s conversion claim against a third party for receivables that are not yet property of the debtor’s estate.

Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse) S.A. · filed 1996-01-30(a)(3)

The consequence of applying the reasoning of the Colonial Realty Court (relying on Saunders) is that the accounts receivable cannot, at this time, be considered property of Debtors’ estate, and that 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) does not apply.

Section 362(a)(3) and (4) do not stay foreclosure of property a Chapter 13 debtor acquires after plan confirmation when the property does not become property of the estate.

Oliver v. Toth (In Re Toth) · filed 1996-03-19(a)(3), (a)(4)

In conclusion, the Property which Debtors acquired posteonfirmation did not become property of the estate and is not protected by the automatic stay of § 362.

Section 362’s automatic stay protects a debtor’s bare legal title in real property, so recording a deed to that property after the bankruptcy filing violates the stay.

Mock v. Hannet, Inc. (In Re Mock) · filed 1996-04-19

Even if the Debtor’s interest in the real property as of the date of the commencement of his second bankruptcy case in fact consisted of no more than bare legal title, that interest constituted property of the bankruptcy estate, such that O’Hanlon’s post bankruptcy actions in recording the deed marked P-3 contravened the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits knowing retention of estate property; the possessor must return it without waiting for a demand from the trustee.

State of California Employment Development Department v. Taxel (In re Del Mission Ltd.) · filed 1996-10-23(a)(3)

To effectuate the purpose of the automatic stay, the onus to return estate property is placed upon the possessor; it does not fall on the debtor to pursue the possessor. ... Under this line of authority, we conclude that the State’s knowing retention of the disputed taxes violated the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits knowing retention of estate property as an exercise of control over it.

In Re Del Mission Limited · filed 1996-10-23(a)(3)

We now adopt the reasoning of Abrams and Chugach, and hold that the knowing retention of estate property violates the automatic stay of § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) stays state court partition and sale actions against estate property upon the bankruptcy filing, and the sale cannot proceed until relief from the stay is obtained.

In re Lowery · filed 1996-12-20(a)(3)

However, upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition, partition and sale actions against the Property are stayed by § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code. ... Until or unless relief from stay is obtained, the state court ordered sale action cannot proceed.

Section 362(a)(3) bars exercising control over estate property even temporarily.

Bankr. L. Rep. P 77,500 · filed 1996-12-27(a)(3)

The exercise of control over the packing line violated the automatic stay. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). ... The fact that Beard exercised only temporary control over property of the estate does not negate a finding that he violated the automatic stay.

Section 362’s automatic stay bars third parties from placing liens on estate collateral during Chapter 7 and 11 proceedings.

In Re Waste Conversion Technologies, Inc. · filed 1997-01-24(a)(1)

As a threshold matter, the automatic stay provisions apphcable to Chapter 7 and 11 proceedings bar a third party from placing a hen against the debtor estate’s collateral during the bankruptcy proceedings.

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay a creditor’s retention of a repossessed vehicle when the creditor held title and the right to possession before bankruptcy and the debtor retained only a right of redemption.

In Re Lewis · filed 1997-01-31(a)(3)

The court concludes, therefore, that the automobile in question was not property of the appellees' estate. As a result, appellant was not required to return the property under § 542, nor was the automobile subject to the automatic stay provision of § 362.

Section 362(a)(3) stays enforcement of both prepetition and postpetition claims against property of the estate until the stay ends.

In Re Cowen · filed 1997-04-09(a)(3)

No claim, whether pre-petition or post-petition, may be enforced against property of the estate until the automatic stay terminates or expires.

Section 362(a)(4) bars postpetition acts to create, perfect or enforce a lien against property of the bankruptcy estate.

In Re Printcrafters, Inc. · filed 1997-05-05(a)(4)

The automatic stay proscribes postpetition acts to create, perfect or enforce any lien against property of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4).

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay a proceeding concerning a separate trust rather than the debtor or a claim against the debtor, and § 362(a)(3) does not stay it when the disputed funds would become estate property only if the trustee prevails on claims to recover them.

Pappas v. Freund · filed 1997-04-30(a)(1), (a)(3)

However, 11 USC § 362 (a) (1) does not stay the instant proceeding because it is not one "against the debtor”, nor one in which a party has interposed a fraudulent conveyance or alter ego claim "to recover a claim against the debtor”. Rather, as Ms. Pappas correctly asserts, the Turnover and CPLR 5239 proceedings concern the Trust, which is a separate entity. ... Similarly, the provisions of 11 USC § 362 (a) (3) are inapplicable. ... Only in the event that the bankruptcy trustee prevails on such claims could the escrowed funds be considered property of the estate.

Section 362(a) stays proceedings against bankrupt parties but does not prevent an otherwise proper appeal against nonbankrupt defendants.

Prelude, Inc. v. Jorcyk · filed 1997-06-06(a)

Bankruptcy, of course, triggers an automatic stay of proceedings against the bankrupt, 11 U.S.C.A § 362(a). However, we have permitted otherwise proper appeal proceedings to go forward against non-bankrupt defendants. ... We conclude that there is no stay impediment to our proceeding with this appeal including consideration of the jurisdictional issue.

Section 362(a)(3) does not require a secured creditor that repossessed a Chapter 13 debtor’s vehicle before the petition to return it before the debtor provides adequate protection of the creditor’s interest.

Massey v. Chrysler Financial Corp. (In Re Massey) · filed 1997-07-08(a)(3)

Accordingly, this Court holds that where a secured creditor repossesses a Chapter 13 debtor’s vehicle prior to the petition date, that creditor does not violate § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code by refusing to return the vehicle to the debtor’s possession, and is not obligated to return the vehicle to the debtor until such time as the debtor provides adequate protection of the creditor’s interest in the vehicle.

Section 362(a) protects a debtor’s ownership interest in property under the automatic stay even if the debtor omitted the property from bankruptcy schedules.

D'Alfonso v. A.R.E.I. Investment Corp. (In Re D'Alfonso) · filed 1997-08-04(a)

We find that the Debtor, as the heir of her late husband, has an ownership interest in the Property protected by the automatic stay, even though she failed to list it on her bankruptcy schedules.

Section 362(a)(3) bars repossession of property a Chapter 13 debtor acquires after plan confirmation while that property remains part of the bankruptcy estate.

Annese v. Kolenda (In Re Kolenda) · filed 1997-08-18(a)(3)

As a result, the car at issue, which was acquired post-confirmation, was property of the estate at the time appellant repossessed it. Accordingly, appellant’s actions violated the automatic stay provision and subjected appellant to the sanctions of the bankruptcy court.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a debtor from usurping the bankruptcy estate's right to challenge forfeiture of estate assets by filing a section 853(n) petition.

In re Mizuno · filed 1997-09-17(a)(3)

The property of the bankruptcy estate includes the right to challenge the forfeiture of these pre-partition assets by filing a section 853(n) petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). Mizuno violated the automatic stay by usurping this right of the estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).

Section 362 protects property subject to retained liens from collection by pre-petition creditors even after the property leaves the bankruptcy estate.

United States v. Richman · filed 1997-08-26(a)(5), (c)(2)

Property subject to retained liens need not remain in the bankruptcy estate to remain protected against collection activities of pre-petition creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(5)& (c)(2).

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay an insurer’s coverage action concerning directors and officers merely because denying coverage might make it harder for a creditors’ trust to collect damages from them.

Pintlar Corp. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. · filed 1997-09-26(a)(3)

That it might have difficulty in collecting damages from those defendants does not warrant interfering with Insurer’s right to pursue legal remedies in the forum of its choice.

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay litigation over third parties’ insurance coverage merely because the resulting judgment could have persuasive value in a later dispute over the debtor’s coverage.

In Re: Pintlar Corporation · filed 1997-09-26(a)(3)

We hold that the persuasive effect of a judgment involving third parties does not have a sufficient potential impact on the value of the estate to fall under the Bankruptcy Code's stay provision.

Section 362(a)(3) stays an insurer’s suit to rescind a debtor’s insurance policy because the policy is property of the estate.

Island Ins. Co., Inc. v. Santos · filed 1997-11-28(a)(3)

Therefore, we conclude that the insurance contract is “property of the estate” and the commencement of the Suit by Island Insurance violated the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits a creditor from continuing to hold property of the bankruptcy estate after the petition, even if its initial possession was lawful.

In Re Carrigg · filed 1998-01-09(a)(3)

Also, and totally consistent with the bankruptcy judge's rulings, a violation of the automatic stay, § 362(a)(3), [3] occurs when a creditor continues to hold property of the estate post-petition, even where the initial pre-petition retention was lawful.

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay actions concerning property that never became part of the bankruptcy estate.

In Re Miller · filed 1998-09-17(a)(3)

Where property, such as that at issue in the instant matter, is not, and never has been, property of the estate, it is removed entirely from any interplay or association with the automatic stay. Thus, in short, the automatic stay has no application in relation to Plans, or the debtor’s interest therein.

Under § 362(d)(2)(A), equity is calculated only in property of the estate; collateral owned by a debtor’s guarantors may be considered for adequate protection under § 362(d)(1) but cannot count toward that equity.

In Re KRC, Inc. · filed 1998-10-20(d)(2)(A)

The real estate securing the Card-wells’ guarantee of the KRC debt is relevant to the issue of adequate protection under § 362(d)(1). While its value can be considered for this purpose, as was done above, it is not “property” in the sense of § 362(d)(2)(A), which concerns only “property of the estate” protected by the § 362(a) stay. It would therefore be inappropriate to include this real estate in calculating “equity” under § 362(d)(2)(A).

Section 362(a) permits foreclosure on property outside the bankruptcy estate, but stays an attempt to collect a resulting deficiency from the debtor.

Everchanged, Inc. v. First Nationwide Mortgage Corp. (In Re Everchanged, Inc.) · filed 1999-02-03(a)

Thus, while an attempt to collect a deficiency violates the stay, the act of foreclosing against property outside of the bankruptcy estate does not.

Section 362(a)(3) bars an employer from withholding payroll processing fees from a Chapter 13 debtor’s gross earnings when those earnings are property of the bankruptcy estate.

United States Postal Service v. Hudson · filed 1999-02-25(a)(3)

The court finds that the fifty dollar fees deducted from Hudson’s wages represent “earnings from services performed by the debtor,” and were therefore property of the bankruptcy estate. Hence, exercising control over those earnings violated the automatic stay.

Section 362 does not require a creditor to release a garnishment of annuity payments that the debtor effectively assigned before bankruptcy, because those payments are not property of the estate.

In Re Freeman · filed 1999-03-29(a)(3)

Thus, the Court holds that Debtor no longer has a right to receive these payments, and thus, the payment stream is not property of the estate. Therefore, Wentworth’s failure to release the Writ of Garnishment issued to Life Colony did not violate the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)'s automatic stay does not apply to property in which the debtor had no interest when the bankruptcy petition was filed because the property did not enter the bankruptcy estate.

United States v. Pelullo · filed 1999-05-25(a)

Since, after the Forfeiture Order was entered, Pelullo had no remaining interest in the Miami property, it did not become part of the bankruptcy estate. Therefore, neither the automatic stay provision nor the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction more generally applied to the property, and the District Court's Protective Orders could not conflict with Pelullo's bankruptcy proceeding and thus were not erroneous.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a creditor from withholding a Chapter 13 debtor’s repossessed car after demand and tender of adequate protection because retaining it exercises control over estate property.

TranSouth Financial Corp. v. Sharon (In Re Sharon) · filed 1999-06-04(a)(3)

This Panel aligns itself with the many courts that have held that a creditor violates the automatic stay by withholding possession of a Chapter 13 debtor's car after demand and tender of adequate protection.

Section 362(a)(3) likely bars using funds in which debtors have an estate interest to pay their subcontractors, because that exercises control over estate property.

Technologies International Holdings Inc. v. Kentucky (In Re Technologies International Holdings Inc.) · filed 1999-06-11(a)(3)

The debtor appears to have a property interest in the funds committed to approved projects for which work has been completed (and possibly other funds as well) and the use of these funds to pay debtors’ subcontractors clearly is an exercise of control over the interest of the debtors’ estates in these funds which appears to violate the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) does not make passive retention of estate property after notice of bankruptcy a violation of the automatic stay.

In Re U.S. Physicians, Inc. · filed 1999-06-30(a)(3)

Under this interpretation of the language of § 362(a)(3), the Doctors’ actions in merely retaining control over the Receivables after learning of the bankruptcy filings would not appear to constitute a stay violation. ... We therefore hold that the Doctors’ actions, while violative of their employment agreements, fail to constitute stay violations.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits postpetition acts to release estate-owned listing contracts or obtain replacement listings without stay relief.

Wallach v. Nowak (In Re Sherlock Homes of W.N.Y., Inc.) · filed 2000-02-22(a)(3)

The filing of a bankruptcy petition imposes an automatic stay that extends broadly to “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). ... With the exception of Joni Korus, each of the defendants participated either in the procurement of releases or in the execution of new listing agreements with Allstar. To the extent that such conduct occurred post petition, the defendants violated the automatic stay, as alleged in the fourth cause of action, and further interfered willfully with the contract rights of the debtor, as alleged in the second cause of action.

Section 362(a)(4) bars acts to create, perfect, or enforce liens against property of the estate; perfecting a lien against property outside the estate does not violate the stay.

Farmers v. Autorics, Inc. (In Re Branam) · filed 2000-03-22(a)(4)

Autorics’s perfection of its security interest in the truck could not have violated § 362(a)(4) because the truck is not property of the estate.

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay a suit by minority shareholders against nondebtors to enforce their fiduciary rights merely because the suit may indirectly affect the bankruptcy estate.

Levitz Furniture Inc. v. T. Rowe Price Recovery Fund, L.P. (In Re Levitz Furniture Inc.) · filed 2000-06-14(a)(3)

In contrast, the Defendants are seeking to enforce their own rights vis a vis those with a fiduciary duty to them, all non-debtors. While the result of their suit may indirectly affect the estate, it is not an action against property of the estate or to exercise control of property of the estate.

Section 362(a)(3) prevents a creditor from selling a repossessed leased vehicle only if the debtor retained an interest in it that became property of the bankruptcy estate at filing.

Lamar v. Mitsubishi Motors Credit of America, Inc. (In Re Lamar) · filed 2000-06-16(a)(3)

The automatic stay would prevent Mitsubishi from selling the Vehicle only if an interest in the Vehicle became property of the Debtors’ bankruptcy estate at filing.

Section 362(a) does not bar a creditor from applying post-confirmation payments made outside a Chapter 13 plan to attorney’s fees when those payments are no longer property of the estate.

Telfair v. First Union Mortgage Corp · filed 2000-07-07(a)

In this case, after confirmation, only the amount required for the plan payments remained property of the estate. Telfair's regular loan payments, made outside of the plan, were therefore no longer property ... of the estate and First Union's application of a portion of those payments to attorney's fees pursuant to the Deed did not violate section 362(a).

Section 362(a)(3) stays acts to obtain property from the estate only when the trustee or debtor in possession has a good-faith, colorable claim to possess or control it.

St. Clair v. Beneficial Mortgage Co. (In Re St. Clair) · filed 2000-07-25(a)(3)

Therefore, we hold that “property from the estate” encompasses property in the possession or control of the trustee or the debtor-in-possession, but only to the extent the trustee or debtor-in-possession has a good-faith, colorable claim to possession or control of the property.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits a creditor from exercising control over a Chapter 13 estate’s postconfirmation tax refund through an administrative freeze.

United States v. Holden · filed 2000-07-25(a)(3)

Therefore, the Bankruptcy Court correctly concluded that the Holdens’ refund was property of the estate and the unauthorized control the IRS exercised over the property by virtue of placing its V-freeze violated 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a) makes a tax sale of estate property during the automatic stay void when the stay has not been lifted; redemptions of those sales are void as well.

Key v. Cannon (In Re Key) · filed 2000-08-18(a)

Based on the foregoing analysis, the court concludes that the tax sales in question were conducted by the Clay County officials in violation of the automatic stay. ... As such, the sales to Elijah Cannon, Helen Gibson, and S.W. Gibson on August 28, 1995, August 26, 1996, and August 25, 1997, respectively, are void, as- are the redemptions of the 1995 and 1996 sales by Cannon.

Section 362(a)(4) prevents a lien against estate property from being imposed after a Chapter 11 filing, including an ERISA minimum funding lien that would otherwise arise later.

Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. Belfance · filed 2000-11-17(a)(4)

According to facts stipulated by the parties, the lien imposed by section 412(n)(4) would have arisen 60 days following January 15, 1994 (the date upon which missed minimum funding contributions exceeded $1 million). However, Copperweld had already filed for Chapter 11 reorganization on November 22, 1993, triggering an automatic stay which prevented “any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4).

Section 362’s automatic stay prevents a postpetition tax sale from transferring estate property to collect tax obligations.

Szybist v. McKean County Tax Claim Bureau & Young Family Interests, Inc. (In Re Taft) · filed 2001-01-04(a)(3)

Thus, the automatic stay of § 362 prevents the tax sale from effecting a transfer of the real estate as a method of collecting the tax obligations which encumber the Debtor’s property.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a debtor and attorney from exercising control over estate property by settling a prepetition personal injury claim without court or trustee approval.

Doucet v. Cooper (In Re Cooper) · filed 2001-01-22(a)(3)

By settling the personal injury claim without the Court’s or the trustee’s approval, the debtor and defendant Irwin interfered with this Court’s exclusive jurisdiction over property of the estate; violated the automatic stay by exercising control over the property for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3); ... denied interested parties their right to be heard concerning the reasonableness of the settlement.

Section 362(a)(4) prevents a creditor from enforcing or perfecting a lien for postpetition loans against property of the bankruptcy estate while the automatic stay is in effect.

Stogsdill v. Stogsdill · filed 2002-02-27(a)(4)

Pursuant to § 362(a)(4), Mrs. Stogsdill was precluded from enforcing or perfecting these post-petition loans, which were secured by property included in the bankruptcy estate.

Section 362 stays a creditor’s attempt to possess or control property of the bankruptcy estate after the petition is filed.

In Re Fox · filed 2002-03-06(a)(3)

The automatic stay operates to enjoin a creditor from attempting to possess or to exercise control over property of a bankruptcy estate once a petition has been filed. 11 U.S.C. Section 362 (1998).

Section 362(c)(1) does not establish that property subject to a stay must be property of the bankruptcy estate.

In re Linsenmeyer · filed 2002-03-06(c)(1)

They cite 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1), which states that “the stay of an act against property of the estate ... continues until such property is no longer property of the estate.” However, this statute does not say that a stay cannot apply to property that is not part of a bankruptcy estate.

Section 362(a) stays acts against property of the estate; it does not appear to reach a debtor’s interest in insurance proceeds after that interest revests in the debtor under a confirmed plan.

Executive Risk Indemnity, Inc. v. Boston Regional Medical Center, Inc. (In Re Boston Regional Medical Center, Inc.) · filed 2002-04-02(a)

The plan and confirmation order expressly extend the automatic stay into the postconfirmation period, and the automatic stay (11 U.S.C. § 362(a)) enjoins acts against “property of the estate,” but here the property at issue— BRMC’s right as an insured to a pro rata share of the policy proceeds — has been revested by the plan in BRMC and no longer belongs to the bankruptcy estate; therefore, the automatic stay would appear not to apply.

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay pursuit of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance proceeds before the policy terms give the debtor an interest in those proceeds.

Maxwell v. Megliola (In Re Marchfirst, Inc.) · filed 2002-12-16(a)(3)

The Debtors had and the Trustee has contractual rights governed by the terms of the insurance policies. Unless and until the terms are met, which they may never be, the proceeds are not property of the estate. Without Fisher, no injunction would issue here.