11 U.S.C. § 101

Section 101 treats a pension payment obligation as a debt when the payment comes due, so payments due after the bankruptcy petition are not discharged.

Zrubek v. Zrubek (In Re Zrubek) · filed 1993-01-14(11)

The husband is under no obligation to pay his former wife until the Air Force pays him; therefore, a debt does not arise under the Code until each payment is due. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(4), (11). Since the post-petition and prospective payments are not debts under the Code, they are not subject to discharge in this bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 727(b). ... By like token, the post-petition Marine pension payments due the Debtor are still subject to the state court divorce decree providing the Debtor shall pay to Yiann 13.6% of each monthly payment. Such sum is not dischargeable.

Section 101(5)(A) defines a claim broadly enough to include a contingent right to payment.

Babitzke v. Mantelli (In Re Mantelli) · filed 1993-01-19(5)(A)

From the exhaustive definition above it is clear that the intent of Congress was that a “claim” should be defined broadly, encompassing even a contingent right to payment.

Section 101(5)(B) treats a right to an equitable remedy for breach as a claim when the breach also gives rise to a right to payment.

Udell v. Standard Carpetland USA, Inc. · filed 1993-01-20(5)(B)

Therefore, the court finds that Udell’s breach does give rise to a right to payment, and accordingly, is a claim, as defined at 11 USC § 101(5).

Section 101(10) defines a creditor as an entity with a claim against the debtor; a person whose account was charged without permission is not the creditor when the suppliers hold the right to payment.

McMillen v. Jarmul (In Re Jarmul) · filed 1993-01-29(10)

“Creditor” is defined as an entity having a claim against the debtor that arose at or before entry of the order for relief or a specified type of claim against the bankruptcy estate. ... “Claim” is defined as a right to payment or to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if the breach gives rise to a right to payment. ... The right to receive payment resides in Leggett and Wallman, not in plaintiff.

An entity that has sold its claim against the debtor is no longer a creditor under § 101(10).

In Re Ellington · filed 1993-01-29(10)

The Bankruptcy Code defines a “creditor” as any entity that has a claim against the estate. ... The defunct First Republic was not a “creditor” of the Debtor on August 16, 1988, and therefore the First Republic Proof of Claim was not “properly filed,” as First Republic could not legitimately even sign a proof of claim representing that it owned a claim against the estate (for it did not).

A person who pledges property to secure a debtor’s loan can have a contingent claim against the debtor before the property is lost to foreclosure.

Miller v. Boles (In Re Boles) · filed 1993-02-16(4)(A)

Plaintiff has a contingent claim against debtor under 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A). Plaintiff asserts, and the court finds, that the pledged property will, in all likelihood, be lost through foreclosure. Plaintiff received no benefit from the loan proceeds and her contingent liability as a pledgor on the consolidation loan arises directly from debtor’s written misrepresentations. Therefore, plaintiff has standing to raise objections to discharge under both § 727(a)(4)(A) and § 523(a)(2)(B).

Section 101(5) and (10) treat a right to payment under an unconditional guaranty as a contingent claim held by a creditor.

In Re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group Inc. · filed 1993-02-19(5), (10)

We hold that under the specific facts of this case and the broad definitions of “claim” and “creditor” provided in 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) and (10), Claimant was a known creditor and therefore was entitled to actual notice of the bar date.

Section 101 defines a debt as liability on a claim, which requires a right to payment from the debtor.

Wisely v. Beattie (In Re Beattie) · filed 1993-02-17(12), (5)(A)

Because the debtor had no interest in the proceeds awarded to the plaintiff, his obligation to deliver these proceeds was not a “debt” or obligation to pay that could be discharged in bankruptcy. A “debt,” defined under the Bankruptcy Code as “liability on a claim”, requires that there be a “right to payment” from the debtor.

Section 101(11) defines debt as liability on a claim; without a claim, there is no debt to discharge.

Wainer v. A.J. Equities, Ltd. · filed 1993-03-01(11)

Section 101(11) defines "debt" as "liability on a claim." 11 U.S.C. § 101(11). ... Absent a claim, there can be no liability on a claim and, thus, no debt.

Section 101(12) defines a debt as liability on a claim, without distinguishing personal liability from other forms of liability.

In Re Lundberg · filed 1993-03-12(12)

A “debt” is simply “liability on a claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(12). Under this definition and the broad language of the discharge, no distinction is made between “personal liability” and any other type.

Section 101(12) defines a debt as liability on a claim; the creditor’s right to payment is measured by its actual loss.

Western Surety Co. v. Dauterman (In Re Dauterman) · filed 1993-04-06(12)

The statute refers to the debt and not a portion of the debt. Debt is defined under 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) as a liability on a claim. ... Plaintiff’s right to payment should be measured by the actual damage suffered.

A lender with an unperfected security interest remains a creditor under Section 101 if it has a right to payment from the debtor.

General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Dotson · filed 1993-03-04(4)(A), (9)(A)

This Court holds that GMAC has standing to seek determination of the discharge-ability of the Dotsons’ debt under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) and Bankruptcy Rule 4007(a) despite the unperfected nature of its claim. GMAC’s standing derives from its status as a “creditor” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(4)(A) and (9)(A).

Section 101(5) includes liability for unlawful prepetition rent increases within the definition of a claim.

In re Luna · filed 1993-03-08(5)

Any liability of Debtor to Athanus or other tenants relating to unlawful pre-petition rent increases was a “claim” within the broad language of 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). It was discharged.

Section 101(5) requires a right to payment for a person to have a claim.

In Re KTMA Acquisition Corp. · filed 1993-03-16(5)

Simply stated, to have claim you must have a right to payment.

Section 101(5) broadly defines a claim to include virtually any right to payment.

In Re Terranova · filed 1993-03-26(5)

The word “claim” is broadly defined to include virtually any right to payment.

Section 101(5) defines a claim as a right to payment; the EPA has no claim for response costs incurred by another potentially responsible party.

Matter of Harvard Industries, Inc. · filed 1993-04-12(5)

The EPA has no “claim,” or right to payment, 11 U.S.C. § 101(5), for response costs a PRP incurs to clean up the Vega Alta site.

A prayer for alimony in a divorce complaint is not a bankruptcy claim until a judgment creates a right to payment.

Harding v. Murray · filed 1993-04-13(5)(A)

We disagree with Murray’s contention that Harding’s prayer for alimony in the divorce complaint constituted a “claim” as defined by the Bankruptcy Code and, accordingly, we need not address the other errors in Murray’s analysis.

Section 101 excludes a recoupment defense from “claim” because it carries no right to payment, and excludes its potential assertion from “debt” because there is no liability on a claim.

Brown v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1993-03-25(5), (12)

Because of its unique nature as a limited equitable defense the right of re-coupment does not constitute a claim within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) which defines a claim as follows: ... Since the right of recoupment carries with it no right to payment, it is not a claim. ... It naturally follows that the potential assertion of recoupment against a claim by the debtor does not constitute a “debt” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(12), which defines debt as “liability on a claim.”

Section 101(5) treats a right to payment under a prepetition guarantee as a contingent claim, even before the creditor demands payment.

Stucker v. Cardinal Building Materials, Inc. (In Re Stucker) · filed 1993-04-08(5)

The Debtor’s pre-petition guarantee gave rise to a contingent claim as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) and buttressed by 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A). Thus, at the time the petition was filed, the Creditor had a claim, even though not fixed or liquidated, as to any final balance due, even if the Creditor had never called on the Debtor pre-petition to honor the guarantee.

Section 101(10) excludes administrative claimants from the definition of “creditor,” so they need not file proofs of claim under Rules 3002 or 3003.

Polysat, Inc. v. Union Tank Car Co. (In Re Polysat, Inc.) · filed 1993-04-15(10)

An administrative claimant technically is not a “creditor” as defined by the bankruptcy code, and, therefore, is not required to file a proof of claim by virtue of Rules 3002 or 3003. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10) (defining “creditor” as, inter alia, an “entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief”).

Section 101(4) treats a right to payment as a claim even when its amount is contingent on a later tax rate.

Burns v. City of Winston-Salem (In re Members Warehouse · filed 1993-04-19(4)

Although the precise amount of the claim was contingent on the tax rate set on July 1, 1987, the contingency would not have affected the tax claim's status as a "right to payment."

Section 101(5)(B) treats a right to an equitable remedy as a claim when breach also gives rise to a right to payment.

In Re Kilpatrick · filed 1993-05-03(5)(B)

Whether the injunction created a claim pursuant to § 101(5)(A) and/or (B) therefore depends on whether these monetary damages, which are theoretically available in any contempt proceeding, would actually be available to Pollard given the facts of this case. Because Pollard failed to prove that it would not be entitled to money damages, I conclude that its right to enforce the injunction via contempt proceedings is itself a claim subject to discharge.

Section 101(5)(A) defines a claim broadly enough to include a right to setoff, even when setoff is asserted only as a defense.

Styler v. Jean Bob Inc. (In Re Concept Clubs, Inc.) · filed 1993-05-10(5)(A)

Although setoff provides the basis for a claim under section 101(5)(A), the Tenth Circuit has also explained that “[s]etoff must be distinguished from a claim requesting a distribution from the liquidation of an estate.”

Section 101(4)(A) defines a claim to include a disputed or unliquidated right to payment.

McKinney v. Unger · filed 1993-05-10(4)(A)

The Estate is correct that a provable claim must exist, but “claim” in relevant part is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A) (1988) to mean the following: ... Here, a legal, disputed and unliquidated claim existed between Unger and the Estate, and that being so, the Estate, having knowledge of such claim and Unger’s bankruptcy petition, was required to file a proof of claim and ask any debt Unger owed the Estate to be excepted from discharge.

Section 101(5) includes contingent, unliquidated rights to payment in the definition of a claim, so a tax obligation can be a pre-petition claim even if assessed later.

In Re T & T Roofing and Sheet Metal, Inc. · filed 1993-05-12(5)

By statutory definition, before the creation of a bankruptcy estate to be administered, the city held a contingent, unliquidated right to payment, a claim.

Section 101(5)(A) includes due and owing taxes within the definition of a claim even if they have not been assessed.

In Re Davison · filed 1993-06-02(5)(A)

A claim under the Bankruptcy Code is a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). The unassessed taxes, due and owing, fall within the concept of a claim in bankruptcy.

Section 101(5) defines a claim broadly enough to include a mortgage holder’s right against property even when the debtor has no personal obligation to pay.

680 Fifth Avenue Associates v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co. in Rehabilitation (In Re 680 Fifth Avenue Associates) · filed 1993-06-17(5)

The broad definition of claims in bankruptcy also supports MBLI’s position. ... Accordingly, a court must allow the claim if it is enforceable against either the debtor or his property.

Section 101 includes contingent and unmatured rights to payment within the definition of claim and defines debt as liability on a claim.

United States of America, Acting Through the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service v. Gerth · filed 1993-04-29(5)(A), (12)

Under the Bankruptcy Code, “debt” is defined as “a liability on a claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(12). “Claim” is defined as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured....” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). “Debt” should be read as being coextensive with the term “claim.”

Section 101(9) defines a creditor as an entity whose claim arose by the order for relief; a postpetition claim falls outside that definition.

Juniper Development Group v. Kahn (In re Hemingway Transport · filed 1993-05-04(9)

Since Juniper undeniably holds a postpetition "claim," Bankruptcy Code §§ 101(9), 301, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(9), 301, its "proof of claim" under Bankruptcy Code §§ 501 and 502 is no less readily--and presumably even more accurately--characterized as "a request for payment of an administrative expense" under Bankruptcy Code § 503(a).

Section 101(5)(A) requires an existing legal right to payment; liability created by legislation enacted after a bankruptcy petition is not a prepetition claim.

LTV Steel Co. v. Shalala (In Re Chateaugay Corp.) · filed 1993-05-07(5)(A)

However, where there is no legal relationship defined at the time of petition, it would be impossible to find even the remotest “right to payment.”

Section 101(12) defines debt as liability on a claim, broad enough to include punitive damages arising from the same fraud as compensatory damages.

St. Laurent v. Ambrose (In re St. Laurent) · filed 1993-05-20(12)

The Bankruptcy Code defines “debt” as “liability on a claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(12). ... Given its “broadest possible definition,” the term “debt” encompasses an award for punitive damages arising from the same conduct as necessitated an award of compensatory damages, notwithstanding the 1984 amendment to § 523(a)(2)(A).

Section 101(12) defines debt broadly enough to include a punitive damages award as liability on a claim.

Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance v. Hale (In Re Hale) · filed 1993-06-01(12)

Section 101(12) defines “debt” as a “liability on a claim.” ... Considering the broad definition of “debt” and the plain meaning of the language contained in § 523(a)(6), this court concludes that a “debt” held to be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6) includes punitive damage awards.

Section 101(12) defines debt broadly enough to include punitive damages arising from the same fraudulent conduct as compensatory damages.

In Re Louis S. St. Laurent, Ii, Debtors. Louis S. St. Laurent, II v. William J. Ambrose and Patty A. Ambrose · filed 1993-06-22(12)

The Bankruptcy Code defines “debt” as “liability on a claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(12). ... Given its “broadest possible definition,” the term “debt” encompasses an award for punitive damages arising from the same conduct as necessitated an award of compensatory damages, notwithstanding the 1984 amendment to § 523(a)(2)(A).

Section 101 treats a disputed, contingent, unliquidated right to payment as a claim and the corresponding liability as a debt, even before judgment.

Bioplasty Inc. v. First Trust National Ass'n (In Re Bioplasty Inc.) · filed 1993-06-11(5)(A), (12)

The Bankruptcy Code defines a debt as a “liability on a claim,” and defines a claim as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(12), 101(5)(A). The actions that gave rise to the class action suit gave the class action plaintiffs a right to pursue damages against Bioplasty. Even though any ultimate right to payment was disputed, contingent, unliquidated, and not reduced to judgment, such right still constitutes a claim under the Bankruptcy Code, and “[wjhere a claim exists, so does a debt.”

Section 101 treats a guarantor with a contingent right to payment from the debtor as a creditor.

In Re Sufolla, Inc. · filed 1993-08-23(10)

The guarantors are also "creditors" within the meaning of Sec. 547(b)(1) because they have a contingent right to payment from the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(10), (5) (Supp. III 1991).

Section 101 treats a contingent right to payment under a settlement agreement as a claim, and liability on that claim as a debt.

Agristor Credit Corp. v. Boyd · filed 1993-06-30(4)(A)

In this case, no matter when the settlement amount was due, AgriStor had a claim: a right to payment, either fixed or contingent, depending on the subsequent judgment or settlement. Therefore, the Boyds owed a debt to Agristor, and the debt was certainly discharged in the bankruptcy.

Section 101(5) treats a right to payment that arose before the bankruptcy petition as a prepetition claim even if damages continued afterward.

Trump Taj Mahal Associates v. Alibraham (In Re Trump Taj Mahal Associates) · filed 1993-07-01(5)

Although the damages arising from this cause of action may have continued postpe-tition, the Court finds that the defendants’ claims arose prepetition pursuant to § 101.

Section 101(5) includes a guarantor’s contingent right of subrogation within the definition of a claim.

Hostmann v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, N.A. (In Re XTI Xonix Technologies, Inc.) · filed 1993-07-19(5)

This court finds that the right of subrogation constitutes a right to payment which is a “claim” under § 101(5). Under the facts of this case this right to payment is equitable, unmatured, unliquidated and contingent.

Section 101(5)(A) defines a claim broadly, but a claim still requires a right to payment.

In Re Rh MacY & Co. Inc. · filed 1993-08-19(5)(A)

However broad the modifying phrases in the definition may be, a “claim” must be a “right to payment.”

Section 101(12) defines debt as liability on a claim and includes an obligation fixed by a settlement agreement.

United States v. Spicer (In Re Spicer) · filed 1993-07-02(12)

For the settlement debt attributable to the debtor’s fraud falls within the language of § 523(a)(2)(A). First, it is a “debt” as defined in the Code. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (debt means “liability on a claim”).

Section 101(12) defines a debt as liability on a claim, which includes assessed attorney disciplinary costs and expenses.

In re Williams · filed 1993-07-02(12)

The assessment of costs and expenses is a debt. Williams, supra, at 490 (holding that the costs and expenses were a “claim” potentially subject to discharge); 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (“debt” is a “liability on a claim”).

Section 101’s definition of debt includes a nonrecourse note secured by the debtor’s property, so the note counts toward Chapter 12’s aggregate debt limit.

Lindsey, Stephenson & Lindsey v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. · filed 1993-07-15(12)

We disagree with the argument that, by definition, nonrecourse notes do not constitute "debt."

Section 101(12) treats an enforceable nonrecourse note executed by the debtor as debt, even though the debtor has no personal liability.

In The Matter Of Lindsey · filed 1993-08-23(12)

Because FDIC undeniably has a "claim" against Lindsey, as established above, the FDIC note constitutes part of Lindsey's "debt." We agree with both the bankruptcy court and the district court that the note should be included in Lindsey's aggregate debt.

A right to payment from a debtor’s own assets is a claim and therefore a debt, even when the recipient separately owns an interest in the debtor’s retirement fund.

Wilson v. Wilson (In Re Wilson) · filed 1993-08-09(5), (12)

Under either analysis, the court finds that as decreed by the state court the $100/month constitutes a “right to payment” from assets of the debtor and is therefore a “debt” within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code and not subject to the exception of § 523(a)(5).

An insurer’s claim for deductible reimbursement arises at or after the underlying plaintiff’s injury, when the insurer has a right to payment.

West Virginia Hospital Insurance Corp. v. Broaddus Hospital Ass'n · filed 1993-09-02(5)

At the time the parties entered into the insurance contract, no claim arose under 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (defining “claim”). There was no “right to payment.” ... Accordingly, this Court finds that WVHIC’s claims for deductible reimbursements arose, at the time, or after, the plaintiffs in the underlying actions sustained their respective injuries.

Section 101(5) includes contingent rights to payment as claims; a later triggering event does not make such a claim post-petition.

Lousberg, Kopp, Kutsunis & Weng, P.C. v. Bonnett (In Re Bonnett) · filed 1993-09-09(5)

Just because a claim is contingent does not transform it from a pre-petition claim to a post-petition claim.

Section 101’s definitions of claim and creditor encompass a contingent obligation arising from a guaranty.

Memory v. Alfa Mutual Fire Insurance (In re Martin) · filed 1993-10-01(5), (10)

We find that there was a transfer of the debtor’s property to Alfa when the November 3,1989 check was delivered and honored. Debtor was a contingent debtor to Alfa. Title 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) and (10).

Section 101(5)(B) covers an equitable remedy when an alternative right to payment exists; it does not require a creditor to choose money damages when they are not an alternative.

Sheerin v. Davis · filed 1993-09-14(5)(B)

While section 101(5)(B) encourages creditors to select money damages among from alternative remedies, it does not require creditors entitled to an equitable remedy to select a suboptimal remedy of money damages.

A party with no right to payment from the debtor or the debtor’s property is not a creditor.

In Re SM 104 Ltd. · filed 1993-09-15(10)

Since Capital Bank has no right to payment from the Debtor or the Debtor’s property, it is not a creditor of the Debtor.

States with claims for property deemed abandoned before the bankruptcy petition are creditors under § 101(10)(A).

Matter of Continental Airlines, Inc. · filed 1993-10-07(10)(A)

Thus, with respect to the property deemed abandoned pre-petition, the States were creditors within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(5)(A) treats a contingent right to payment from credit card chargebacks as a claim.

Moratzka v. Visa U.S.A. (In Re Calstar, Inc.) · filed 1993-09-30(5)(A)

Here, the defendant, upon crediting the debtor for credit card sales, obtained a contingent claim dependent on later events to become non-contingent.

Section 101(5) includes a mortgagee’s right to foreclose within the definition of a claim, even when the debtors have no personal liability on the mortgage note.

In Re Threats · filed 1993-10-05(5)

Notwithstanding that Fleet has no right to any payment from the Debtors personally, its ability to foreclose on the property in the event the note is not paid gives it a “right to payment” against property of the estate.

Section 101’s definitions of debt and claim encompass a condominium owner’s prepetition obligation to pay assessments that become due after filing.

Matter of Garcia · filed 1993-10-08

The Code defines “debt” as liability on a claim. ... Accordingly, the legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended the broadest possible definition for the term claim so that “all of the Debtor’s legal obligations, no matter how remote or contingent, can be dealt with in the bankruptcy case.” ... Accordingly, this Court finds that the condominium fees are pre-petition obligations and are therefore discharged.

Section 101(5) treats a depositor’s right to repayment as a claim from the time the debtor receives the funds, even before the depositor demands repayment.

Milwaukee Cheese Wisconsin, Inc. v. Bukowski (In Re Milwaukee Cheese Wisconsin, Inc.) · filed 1993-10-14(5)

Although the Bankruptcy Code does not state when a debt is incurred, under the above definitions, it is clear that the defendants became creditors when they turned over funds to MCWI. At that moment, they were entitled to demand the return of their deposits. This right constituted a claim under the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(4)(A) defines a claim as a right to payment, including contingent and unmatured rights; a right vested before bankruptcy remains a pre-petition claim even if payment is triggered later.

Chiasson v. J. Louis Matherne & Associates · filed 1993-10-27(4)(A)

A "claim" is defined under 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A) (Law.Co-op.Supp.1993) as a "right to payment" and includes those rights that are unliquidated, contingent, and unmatured. If a right to payment becomes vested prior to commencement of the bankruptcy case, the claim becomes a pre-petition claim. A claim is not rendered a post-petition claim simply by the fact that time for payment is triggered by an event that happens after the filing of the petition.

Section 101(5) includes contingent pension funding claims arising before bankruptcy even when payment comes due afterward.

In Re Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine · filed 1993-10-29(5)

Here, the Minimum Funding Claim springs from the creation of Debtor’s Pension Plan in 1985. As of the petition date, Pension Trustee’s claim for minimum funding contributions is the paradigmatic prepetition contingent claim. The postpetition termination of the Pension Plan, if and when it is terminated, does not transform this contingent claim into a postpetition claim worthy of an administrative priority.

Section 101 treats an unpaid bill for prepetition services as a claim and the entity owed payment as a creditor.

In Re Kellogg Square Partnership · filed 1993-10-22(5), (10)

District Energy had a right to payment from the Debtor on account of an unpaid pre-petition bill for service. This gave rise to an allowable unsecured claim ... in its favor, and made it a creditor ... of the debtor.

Section 101(5) does not treat an order to clean up hazardous waste posing an ongoing threat as a claim when the state seeks compliance rather than payment.

In Re Torwico Electronics, Inc., Debtor. Torwico Electronics, Inc. v. State of New Jersey, Department of Environmental P · filed 1993-10-25(5)

In conclusion, we hold that the state’s attempt in this ease to force a party to clean up a waste site which poses an ongoing hazard is not a “claim” as defined by the Bankruptcy Code. This is not a situation where the state is attempting to get money from the debtor but rather, it is an exercise of the state’s inherent regulatory and police powers.

Section 101(5) defines a claim as a right to payment, even when no proof of claim has been filed.

Mims v. United States (Department of Veterans Affairs) (In Re Craftsmen, Inc.) · filed 1993-11-22(5)

The government’s allegation in its letter to the trustee asserts a right to payment, and thus constitutes a claim.

A claim includes an unliquidated right to payment, so a court may decide whether a potential deficiency debt is dischargeable before its amount is determined.

First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n of Rochester v. Kelley (In Re Kelley) · filed 1993-12-06(5)(A)

The term “debt” is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) as “liability on a claim.” “Claim” means “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). Thus, bankruptcy courts may determine whether unliquidated debts are dischargeable.

Section 101(5) includes contingent or unliquidated rights to payment within the definition of a claim; that status does not make a claim arising from prepetition earnings postpetition.

In Re Cost · filed 1993-12-14(5)

A claim, as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(5), includes a contingent or un-liquidated right to payment. All or virtually all of the Debtor’s 1990 earnings were earned prior to the October 15, 1990 filing of her chapter 7 petition. Since the government’s claim arose from prepetition earnings of the Debtor, the claim is a prepetition claim. The contingent or unliquidated nature of the claim at the time of filing does not convert it from prepetition to postpetition status.

Section 101(5) includes a foreclosure remedy that gives a creditor a right to payment within the definition of a claim.

Heritage Federal Credit Union v. Cox (In Re Cox) · filed 1993-12-29(5)

In this case, the CREDITOR has a claim against the DEBTORS as it has a claim against their property, their residence. The CREDITOR has available to it the remedy of foreclosure which develops into a right of payment because if the DEBTORS do not pay they will lose their residence through the foreclosure. Therefore, the CREDITOR can be included in their Chapter 13 proceeding.

Section 101(5)(A) includes an employee’s right to workers’ compensation benefits within the definition of a claim.

In Re Lull Corp. · filed 1993-12-30(5)(A)

The Code defines “claim” as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidat-ed, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). In the present ease, “the claim” is the workers’ compensation benefits that the employees are legally entitled to pursuant to Minnesota’s workers’ compensation laws.

Section 101(5) includes an unliquidated right to payment within the definition of a claim.

In Re McCoy · filed 1994-01-03(5)

Section § 101(5) of the code defines “claim” as “a right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated ...” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). Thus, whether a claim is liquidated or not does not affect the validity of the claim.

Section 101(5) includes a buyer’s contingent right to payment or an equitable remedy when the seller accepts a down payment and becomes obligated to perform or refund it.

In Re Cybermech, Incorporated · filed 1994-01-12(5)

Royal's rights against Cybermech, albeit contingent and remote, fell within the Bankruptcy Code's definition of "claim" and thereby rendered Royal a "creditor" of Cybermech as of August 3, 1987.

Section 101(5) includes contingent rights to payment or equitable remedies for breach within the definition of a claim, even before a cause of action accrues.

Sigmon v. Royal Cake Co. · filed 1994-01-12(5)

Royal’s rights against Cybermech, albeit contingent and remote, fell within the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of “claim” and thereby rendered Royal a “creditor” of Cybermech as of August 3, 1987.

Section 101(5) defines a claim as a right to payment; a tax debt can remain a claim when the deadline for a civil collection suit has expired but other collection remedies remain available.

In re Jansen · filed 1994-01-12(5)

Thus, while the IDR is barred by the statute of limitations from filing a civil lawsuit to collect the delinquent taxes, the taxes remain collectible under the specific statutory remedies set forth above. Accordingly, the IDR is entitled to pursue its claim in the instant bankruptcy proceeding. ... In this regard, it is important to note the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of "claim." A claim is defined as a "right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unma-tured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured....” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5).

Section 101 defines a debt as liability on a claim and includes an unliquidated right to payment, such as statutory interest on a criminal fine.

In Re Hubbard · filed 1993-11-23(5)(A), (12)

Section 101(12) defines the term “debt” as “liability on a claim.” The term “claim” is defined in § 101(5)(A) as “a right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” The United States’ right to payment includes not only the $10,000 fine in the criminal judgment, but also the statutory interest on that judgment. Admittedly, the total interest owed is not liquidated because it is calculated on a monthly basis, but it is nonetheless a right to payment.

Sections 101(5)(A) and 101(10)(A) include holders of contingent, unliquidated, or disputed rights to payment among creditors.

In Re Zaleha · filed 1993-11-29(5)(A), (10)(A)

As already discussed, the term “party in interest” includes “creditors;” it therefore includes parties holding contingent, unliquidated, disputed claims. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A) (“creditor” is an entity with a “claim”); 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (“claim” includes rights to payment that are unliquidat-ed, contingent, and disputed).

Section 101(5)(B) treats an environmental cleanup injunction as a claim when the government can instead recover the cleanup cost as a payment.

In Re Goodwin · filed 1993-12-22(5)(B)

The equitable right to an injunction cannot be distinguished from the equally available right to money damages; the injunction provides no additional relief for which money damages are an inadequate substitute. The Bankruptcy Code’s definition of “claim” encompasses such a situation.

An insider is a creditor under § 101(10)(A) only if the insider has a claim against the debtor; personal liability to a third party does not suffice.

Leitch v. Marjorie M. Jelsema Ten Year Irrevocable Trust Dated January 2, 1982 (In re Square Real Estate, Inc.) · filed 1994-01-10(10)(A)

If Steed did breach his fiduciary duty, he is not a creditor of the Debtor because his liability is personal and is not the same liability Square had to the Trusts. If Steed did not breach his fiduciary duty, he would have no liability to the Trusts and therefore would not be a creditor of the Debtor.

Section 101(5)(A) requires a right to payment for a claim; a negative partnership capital account alone does not give the partnership that right.

Marshack v. Wells Fargo Bank (In Re Walters) · filed 1994-01-11(5)(A)

Claim is defined broadly as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (1988). In this ease, WI simply had no “right to payment” until (1) after the distributions were made, and only if (2) Debtor then had a deficit balance in his capital account.

A future claimant must have a prepetition relationship connecting the debtor’s conduct to the claimant to hold a claim under § 101(5).

In Re Piper Aircraft Corp. · filed 1994-01-14(5)

The theories advanced by prior cases exploring the outer limits of the concept of claim, when thus reconciled, lead to the conclusion that in order for a future claimant to have a “claim” under § 101(5), there must be some prepetition relationship, such as contact, exposure, impact, or privity, between the debtor’s prepetition conduct and the claimant.

Section 101(4) includes contingent obligations in the definition of claims.

Penrod v. Arone (In Re Arone) · filed 1994-01-21(4)

However, the Bankruptcy Code clearly states that even contingent obligations are claims. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4).

Section 101(5) includes a right to payment under a prepetition contract as a contingent, unmatured claim even when payment comes due after the petition.

Affeldt v. Westbrooke Condominium Ass'n (In Re Affeldt) · filed 1994-03-07(5)

Once the Debtor became personally obligated to pay the assessments, regardless of when the actual payment was due, Westbrooke was a holder of a contingent, unmatured claim under § 101(5).

Section 101(5)(A) includes contingent rights to payment as claims; a surety’s claim ceases to be contingent when the principal obligor defaults.

In Re F.B.F. Industries, Inc. · filed 1994-03-08(5)(A)

The Code defines a “claim” to include any “right to payment ... whether or not such right is ... contingent ... ”. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). ... This is so because default is the sole extrinsic event which triggers liability of the debtor to the creditor.

Section 101 treats an obligation to pay under a contract as a debt even before payment is due because a claim includes an unmatured right to payment.

Beeche Systems Corp. v. D.A. Elia Construction Corp. (In Re Beeche Systems Corp.) · filed 1994-01-24(5)(A), (14)

Elia became obligated to pay the purchase price of the scaffolding equipment upon entering into the subject contract, therefore this debt arose pre-petition.

Section 101(5) defines a claim as a right to payment or an equitable remedy for breach of performance that gives rise to payment; listing a homestead exemption is not a claim.

Garcia v. Garcia (In Re Garcia) · filed 1994-01-25(5)

The term “claim” as used in the Bankruptcy Code, however, means a “right to payment” or a “right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to payment.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). Thus, the bankruptcy court was correct in its conclusion that the act of listing a homestead exemption cannot be a “false claim” within the meaning of section 727(a)(4)(B).

Section 101(5)(A), read with the Code’s priority provisions, does not treat post-petition professional fees as claims sufficient to submit the professional to the bankruptcy court’s equitable jurisdiction.

Bowers v. McGladrey (In Re Florida Hotel Properties Ltd. Partnership) · filed 1994-02-04(5)(A)

While the broadest definition of a claim within the Code may encompass reasonable attorney and accountant expenses, the Code goes further and narrows the meaning of a claim and segregates professional “claims” out, designating them as expenses. Thus, the Court believes the “claims” made by McGladrey were not the sort of claims contemplated by the Code which are sufficient to invoke the equitable jurisdiction over a claimant like McGladrey.

Section 101(5)(A) includes a contingent right to payment in the definition of a claim.

Multnomah County v. Rudolph (In Re Rudolph) · filed 1994-02-07(5)(A)

A “claim” for purposes of the code includes a “right to payment, whether or not such right is ... contingent_” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). ... Appellant’s right to such a payment, although contingent on the redemption of the property, must nevertheless be considered a claim within the meaning of the code.

Section 101(5)(B) treats an equitable remedy as a claim when the same breach also creates a right to payment tied to that remedy.

In the Matter of Barry Stuart Udell, Debtor-Appellee. Appeal of the Standard Carpetland Usa, Inc. · filed 1994-03-03(5)(B)

In light of Kovacs, Home State Bank and the legislative history of § 101(5)(B), we hold that a right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance is a “claim” if the same breach also gives rise to a right to a payment “with respect to” the equitable remedy.

Section 101’s definitions of “creditor” and “entity” support allowing class proofs of claim in bankruptcy.

In Re Wang Laboratories, Inc. · filed 1994-01-26(9), (15)

In bankruptcy, “a creditor” may file a proof of claim. 11 U.S.C. § 501(a). A “creditor” is an “entity”. 11 U.S.C. § 101(9). “ ‘Entity’ includes person.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(15). The Bankruptcy Code formulation is' somewhat more convoluted in this regard than the Social Security Act, but I believe that the same result should follow.

Section 101’s definitions of claim and creditor include holders of potential equitable claims, whether secured or unsecured.

In Re Argonaut Financial Services, Inc. · filed 1994-01-26(5), (10)

Under these broad definitions, it is clear therefore that Investors — holders of either secured or unsecured potential equitable claims against property of Argonaut — qualify as creditors deserving of notice under the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(10) generally defines a creditor as the holder of a claim arising at or before the order for relief, excluding the administrative claim asserted here.

In Re Delta Underground Storage Co., Inc. · filed 1994-02-16(10)

However, the definition of "creditor” under 11 U.S.C. § 101(10) generally includes the holder of a claim that arose at or before the order for relief and would not include the claim asserted here as an administrative claim.

Section 101(10) does not classify an accountant with a postpetition administrative claim as a creditor when the claim fits none of its listed categories.

Williams v. Bank One Cleveland, NA (In Re Dyac Corp.) · filed 1994-02-25(10)

11 U.S.C. § 101(10). Williams does not fit within any of the definitions of creditor provided in this section.

Section 101(12) defines a debt as liability on a claim, including a disputed claim.

In Re Jordan · filed 1994-02-14(12)

The terms “debt” and “claim” are synonymous and refer to a single obligation as seen from the point of view of the debtor and creditor; a debtor has “debts” and a creditor has “claims.”

Debt includes a debtor’s personal liability on a tort claim, independent of a corporation’s liability on a contract claim.

Hemelt v. Pontier (In Re Pontier) · filed 1994-02-28(12)

The Bankruptcy Code defines debt as “liability on a claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(12). The debtor’s liability on the claim in the instant case is independent of the corporation’s liabihty on its contract with the plaintiffs. The debtor’s liability is based solely upon principles of tort law, and therefore arises in addition to any claim for breach of contract the plaintiffs may have against the corporation.

Section 101(12) defines a debt as liability on a claim, even when the claim has not been reduced to judgment.

Florida v. Ticor Title Insurance Co. of California (In Re Florida) · filed 1994-03-03(12)

Section 101(12) defines debt as “liability on a claim.” Bankruptcy courts routinely determine a debtor’s liability on a claim as a necessary prelude to determination of dis-chargeability under § 523.

Section 101 defines a debt as liability on a claim, which includes a right to payment for unmatured interest.

In Re Shelbayah · filed 1994-03-15(5), (12)

The term “debt” is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) as a “liability on a claim.” Section 101(5) defines “claim” as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, a liability on a claim for unmatured interest is a debt.

Section 101(12) treats a buyer’s payment obligation under a retail installment contract as a debt despite an erroneous vehicle identification number.

Waldschmidt v. Chrysler Credit Corp. (In Re Messenger) · filed 1994-04-08(12)

The retail installment contract of May 5, 1993 created a debt between the debtor and the car dealer. “Debt” for bankruptcy purposes is defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) to mean “liability on a claim.” ... As between the debtor and the car dealer, the May 5 contract gave the car dealer a right to 60 monthly payments of $368.

A claim includes a disputed right to payment, and a debt is liability on a claim.

In Re Randolph Douglas Sloan, Debtor. Randolph Douglas Sloan v. United States · filed 1994-03-16(5)(A), (12)

Sloan's contention that the IRS's Proof of Claim does not constitute a "debt" owed by him also lacks merit. The terms "debt" and "claim" were intended by Congress to be coextensive. Quintana v. Commissioner (In re Quintana), 915 F.2d 513, 517 (9th Cir.1990) (citing Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 557-58 (1990)). At the time Sloan filed his petition, the IRS had a secured "claim" against Sloan for over $2.3 million in unpaid taxes, penalties, and interest. See 11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(5)(A) (defining a "claim" as a "right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured"); In re Quintana, 915 F.2d at 516-17. Sloan had a "debt" for the same amount. See 11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(12) (defining "debt" as "liability on a claim"); In re Quintana, 915 F.2d at 517.

Section 101 defines debt as liability on a claim and includes disputed, unliquidated, and contingent rights to payment within the definition of claim.

In Re Solomon · filed 1994-04-20(5)(A), (12)

A debt is defined as liability on a claim, and claim is broadly defined to include rights to payment that are disputed, unliqui-dated or contingent. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(5)(A), (12). Therefore, whether Debtor disputes the claim and asserts it is worthless or acknowledges the amount of the claim and asserts it is disputed is not material to the issue of Debtor’s eligibility to file Chapter 13.

Section 101(5) treats a party seeking recoupment as having a claim.

Anthem Life Insurance v. Izaguirre (In Re Izaguirre) · filed 1994-03-22(5)

A party seeking recoupment has a claim within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(5).

Section 101(5)'s definition of a claim does not include unidentified future tort victims whose rights depend entirely on future events when the debtor had no relationship enabling it to identify and notify them during bankruptcy.

Lemelle v. Universal Mfg. Corp. · filed 1994-04-14(5)(A)

In our view, however, even the broad definition of "claim" cannot be extended to include Forbes or the decedents as claimants whom the record indicates were completely unknown and unidentified at the time Winston filed its petition and whose rights depended entirely on the fortuity of future occurrences.

Section 101(5)(B) treats an equitable remedy for breach as a claim if the breach gives rise to a right to payment.

In Re Hughes · filed 1994-03-30(5)(B)

A “debt” is a “liability on a claim,” 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) and a “claim” is defined as: ... (B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured. ... Based on In re May, this court finds that the Movant should be permitted to pursue an injunction against Debtor with respect to breaches of the covenant not to compete.

Section 101(5) requires some prepetition connection between the debtor and a claimant seeking allowance of a general unsecured claim.

In Re Correct Manufacturing Corp. · filed 1994-03-30(5)

This independent requirement of prepetition relationship applies whatever particular test is used to define liability on a claim in the context of 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). Even if the earliest point of contact (the “exposure” test) is adopted as the analytical framework for determining when a claim arises, some prepetition connection between the debtor and the “claimant” is essential.

Section 101(5)(A) includes contingent and unmatured rights to payment within the definition of a claim, allowing a prepetition guarantor to qualify as a creditor.

Huennekens v. Walker (In Re Southern International Co.) · filed 1994-04-06(5)(A)

Even though Walker appears not to have been called upon to honor his guaranty, the generous definition of a “claim” allows contingent or unmatured liabilities to be considered claims. Accordingly, a guarantor who has not been called upon to honor his guaranty, may nevertheless still file a claim. Because Walker has a claim that arose pre-petition he may be classified as a creditor.

Section 101(10)(A) includes a person whose contingent indemnification claim arose before the bankruptcy petition within the definition of creditor.

Koppel v. Koppel (In Re Koppel) · filed 1994-04-06(10)(A)

Plaintiff is accordingly a creditor as defined in the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A) (1994).

Section 101(5)(A) treats withdrawal liability as a claim when an employer withdraws from an underfunded multiemployer pension plan, creating the fund’s right to payment.

In Re United Merchants & Manufacturers, Inc. · filed 1994-04-18(5)(A)

For all of these reasons, the court holds that the Fund did not possess a bankruptcy claim for withdrawal liability pre-con-firmation. Withdrawal liability requires both an unfunded vested benefit amount and a withdrawal. Only a withdrawal can trigger the contingent right to payment for withdrawal liability. It is this withdrawal that first creates the legal relationship which gives rise to the asserted right to payment.

Section 101(5)(A)’s definition of “claim” does not include an unknown future tort victim whose rights depend entirely on events occurring after the debtor files for bankruptcy.

Rose Ana Forbes Lemelle, Rose Ana Forbes Lemelle v. Universal Mfg. Corp., Universal Mfg. Corp., Werts Novelty Co., Inc., · filed 1994-05-27(5)(A)

In our view, however, even the broad definition of “claim” cannot be extended to include Forbes or the decedents as claimants whom the record indicates were completely unknown and unidentified at the time Winston filed its petition and whose rights depended entirely on the fortuity of future occurrences.

Section 101(5) requires a prepetition relationship between a debtor and a future tort claimant for a potential liability to qualify as a bankruptcy claim.

Epstein v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of the Estate of Piper Aircraft Corp. (In Re Piper Aircraft Corp.) · filed 1994-06-06(5)

Notwithstanding the lack of a definition, the lower court’s analysis and reasoning that resulted in the application of the “pre-petition relationship” test is sound and is adopted by this Court. Where, as here, there is no known defective product, no known prepetition exposure, contact or impact and no known prepetition injury, the circumstances simply are too attenuated to find a prepetition relationship between Piper and the Future Claimants so as to obligate Piper today to satisfy potential future claims out of existing assets.

Section 101(5)(A) encompasses claims arising from past asbestos exposure even when illness will manifest only in the future.

In the Matter Of: Unr Industries, Inc., Debtors. Appeals of Unarco Bloomington Factory Workers · filed 1994-05-27(5)(A)

As for the contention that the statute does not contemplate such a step: 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) defines as a “claim” every “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidat-ed, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured”. The definition is capacious, to say the least. Attaching labels such as “contingent” and “unmatured” and “disputed” to the interests of persons who will become sick in the future because of exposure to UNR’s asbestos therefore does not put those interests beyond the power of the bankruptcy court.

Section 101(5)’s definition of a claim excludes recoupment because recoupment gives no right to payment.

Mercy Hospital of Watertown v. New York State Department of Social Services · filed 1994-07-27(5)

Since the right to recoupment gives no right to actual payment, it is not a claim.

Section 101(5)(A) includes a right to payment for litigation costs as a claim even when the right remains contingent and disputed.

Franklin Savings Association v. Office Of Thrift Supervision · filed 1994-08-02(5)(A)

With our judgment in favor of the Director in May 1991, the Director had sufficient grounds to claim its bill of costs, regardless that the right was tolled by and contingent on the denial of rehearing by this court and the denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court, and regardless that the right continues to be disputed by Franklin.

A guarantor of a debtor’s loan is a creditor under Section 101(9)(A).

Gass v. Friedman (In re Martec Corp.) · filed 1994-06-02(9)(A)

The lower court was entirely correct in finding that Gass, as a guarantor of Martec’s $4.5 million loans from FNB, was a “creditor” of Martee as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(9)(A).

Section 101(12) defines a debt as liability on a claim; a lease can create that liability when the parties enter it, even if payments are due later.

Upstairs Gallery, Inc. v. MacKlowe West Development Co. (In Re Upstairs Gallery, Inc.) · filed 1994-06-07(12)

We hold that the lease agreement between the parties gave rise to a liability on a claim, or in other words, a debt. Because the debt arose on April 29, 1988, it was antecedent to the later compromise and the bankruptcy court should have allowed the debtor in possession to avoid it.

Section 101’s definitions of claim and debt encompass a contingent, unmatured connection fee for anticipated sewer use.

In Re Demenno/kerdoon, Inc., Debtor. County Sanitation District No. 1 of Los Angeles County v. Demenno/kerdoon, Inc. · filed 1994-06-20(5)(a), (12)

We reject the District's argument that its $856,300.50 prepetition claim was unenforceable because it was unmatured and contingent. Creditors cannot decide, postpetition, which claims are or are not enforceable. The expansive definitions of "debt" and "claim" clearly encompass the District's connection fee claim.

Section 101(5)(A) defines “claim” broadly enough to include pre-petition interest owed on a tax debt.

Leahey v. United States, Internal Revenue Service (In Re Leahey) · filed 1994-06-23(5)(A)

“Claim” in turn, is broadly defined as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, un-matured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). ... Having established that “claim” and “debt” include interest, this court determines that the pre-petition interest associated with an underlying tax debt that is non-discharge-able under § 523(a)(1)(C) is also non-dis-ehargeable.

Section 101(10) excludes an entity whose claim arises after a Chapter 11 petition from the estate’s creditors.

Laurelton Electric & Mechanical Corp. v. Battinelli (In re Battinelli) · filed 1994-07-19(10)

An entity with a claim which arises subsequent to the chapter 11 petition is not a creditor of the chapter 11 debtor’s estate.

Section 101(5)(A) requires a right to payment for an advance to qualify as a claim; a retirement system’s right to offset future benefits does not suffice.

In Re Schleifer · filed 1994-07-26(5)(A)

Consequently, as in Villarie, the statutory provisions governing the loan do not give the System a “right to payment”. Without such a right, the System cannot hold a valid claim in the debtor’s bankruptcy estate as defined in Section 101(5)(A). Without an enforceable claim, the advance from the System is not properly dischargeable in bankruptcy.

Under § 101(5) and (12), a former spouse’s vested pension share is not a claim or debt when the debtor has no obligation to pay for it.

Wisniewski v. Piasecki (In Re Piasecki) · filed 1994-07-29(5), (12)

“Debt” under the Bankruptcy Code is defined as a “liability on a claim”. BANKRUPTCY Code § 101(12). “Claim” means “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secure, or unsecured”. Bankruptcy Code § 101(5). Without Defendant’s election to pay Plaintiff in lieu of taking under the pension plan, there is no liability on a claim. The payment obligation is strictly between Plaintiff and the GMC pension plan administrator.

Section 101(10)(A) does not treat an attorney as a creditor merely because the attorney holds a mortgage securing future fees when no obligation yet exists.

In Re Escalera · filed 1994-07-29(10)(A)

Holding a mortgage that secures no existing obligation does not make Mr. O’Rourke a creditor.

Section 101(10) includes members of a certified securities purchaser class with claims against the debtor in the definition of creditors.

Jones v. Amdura Corp. (In Re Amdura Corp.) · filed 1994-08-03(10)

There is no question the members of the class certified in the class litigation were “creditors” under 11 U.S.C. § 101(10).

Section 101(12) defines a debt as liability on a claim; an obligation to deliver property already belonging to another person is not a debt.

In Re Purpura · filed 1994-08-10(12)

Because Purpura, at the time of his Chapter 11 filing, had no interest in the property awarded Maida, his obligation to deliver such property to her was not a “debt” or obligation to pay that could be discharged in bankruptcy. A “debt” is defined by the Bankruptcy Code as “liability on a claim” and requires that there be a “right to payment” from the debtor.

Section 101 treats a judgment for compensatory or punitive damages as a debt because it creates a right to payment.

In Re Randolph C. Bugna, Debtor. Randolph C. Bugna v. McArthur · filed 1994-08-16(5)(A), (12)

A state court judgment, whether for punitive or compensatory damages, clearly represents a debt within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code. The Code defines “debt” as “liability on a claim,” 11 U.S.C. § 101(12), and a “claim” as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). Whether for compensatory or punitive damages, a state court judgment is a “right to payment,” and thus a “debt” within the meaning of section 523(a)(4).

Section 101 defines a claim to include an unliquidated right to payment and a debt as liability on a claim, so a court can decide dischargeability before fixing the debt’s amount.

New York v. Sokol (In Re Sokol) · filed 1994-08-11(5), (12)

Section 523 governs the dischargeability of a "debt,” and “debt” is broadly defined to include, inter alia, unliquidated debts. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (“claim” includes an unliquidated right to payment); 101(12) (" 'debt' means liability on a claim”).

Section 101’s broad definitions of “claim” and “debt” include contingent obligations for future condominium assessments arising from a prepetition agreement.

In Re Lamb · filed 1994-08-11(5)(A)

This contingent obligation for future assessments falls within the parameters of the Bankruptcy Code’s broad definition of “debt” and “claim.”

Section 101 includes the IRS as a creditor when it holds a prepetition tax claim, even if that claim has priority in payment.

In Re Gray · filed 1994-08-16(10)

The IRS is an unsecured creditor of the debtor. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(5), 101(10), 101(12), 506. The fact that an unsecured claim of the IRS may enjoy priority in payment under 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7) does not alter the fact that the IRS is an unsecured creditor of the debtor.

Section 101(5) excludes equitable remedies that do not arise from a breach of performance and do not give rise to a right to payment.

Irizarry v. Schmidt (In Re Irizarry) · filed 1994-08-23(5)

Because the equitable remedies in question do not constitute a claim, as defined in § 101(5), or a debt, as defined in § 101(12), they are not affected by the discharge of all debts granted by the bankruptcy court.

Section 101(5) includes contingent rights to payment arising from prepetition conduct, even when the right to sue has not yet matured.

Phillips v. Phillips (In Re Phillips) · filed 1994-09-08(5)

As long as all the elements that can give rise to liability have occurred pre-petition, other than the right to proceed to adjudication, a claim exists.

Section 101(5)(A) defines a claim broadly enough to include a right to payment that has not been reduced to judgment.

Waugh v. Eldridge (In Re Waugh) · filed 1994-09-09(5)(A)

Debtor argues that the Eldridges do not in fact have a claim against the debtor. Claim means "right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured." 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). The breadth of this definition indicates that the Eldridges did in fact have a claim against Waugh in his bankruptcy case.

A contractual promise to indemnify creates a contingent claim when the agreement is signed, even if payment becomes due later.

Metco Mining & Minerals, Inc. v. PBS Coals, Inc. (In Re Metco Mining & Minerals, Inc.) · filed 1994-08-31(5)(A)

When parties agree in advance that one party will indemnify the other in the event of a certain occurrence, there exists a “right to payment”, albeit contingent, upon the signing of the agreement. ... Accordingly, PBS’s “right to payment” for reclamation and restoration of the two sites arose pre-petition.

Section 101(5) excludes postpetition condominium assessments tied to continued ownership under a covenant running with the land from dischargeable claims.

Beeter v. Tri-City Property Management Services, Inc. (In Re Beeter) · filed 1994-09-12(5)

It is that relationship, with all its attendent consequences, that removes the post petition assessments from the category of dischargeable “claims.”

Section 101(5) does not treat an obligation to pay upon a future home sale as a claim when the sale might never occur.

In Re Beck · filed 1994-10-07(5)

Such an argument requires scrutiny of the term “claim” as defined by § 101(5). ... Further, had Beck never sold the house, his obligation to Horne would never have arisen. Thus, the obligation was not a claim that could be dischargeable under § 727(b).

Section 101’s definition of “claim” applies for purposes of title 11 and does not make every creditor claim a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157.

Benedor Corp. v. Conejo Enterprises, Inc. (In Re Conejo Enterprises, Inc.) · filed 1994-11-16(5)(A)

First, 11 U.S.C. § 101 states that the definitions therein are for purposes of title 11. Section 157, the jurisdictional provision, is found under title 28. The Court may, consistent with principles of statutory interpretation, look to the manner in which the term “claim” is used in other statutory provisions. But, a finding that the title 11 definition of “claim” applies in title 28 would eliminate the distinction between core and non-core proceedings and would erase the constitutionally mandated jurisdictional boundaries.

Section 101(5) defines “claim” broadly enough to include a claim arising from a debtor’s guaranty of a corporate debt in a commercial transaction.

In Re French · filed 1994-11-17(5)

The Bankruptcy Code provides a broad definition of “claim” under the general provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). ... Therefore, although G.L.B.’s claim arose out of Debtors’ guaranty through a so-called “commercial” transaction, it still qualifies as a “claim” within the meaning of the Code.

Section 101(5) does not treat a Pennsylvania spouse’s vested equitable distribution interest in a pension as a claim when it gives the spouse no right to payment from the debtor.

Bennett v. Bennett (In Re Bennett) · filed 1994-12-13(5)

We do not believe that Plaintiffs right to seek equitable distribution of the Pension Plan gives her a claim. By initiating the divorce proceeding, Plaintiff did not obtain a right to monetary payments from the Debtor with respect to the Pension Plan.

Section 101(5)(A) includes a contingent right to payment under a prepetition attorney fee agreement, even when payment depends on filing the petition.

In Re Symes · filed 1994-10-20(5)(A)

The fact creditor may hold a contingent right to payment until filing the petition does not mean counsel holds a post-petition claim. Holding otherwise undercuts the fresh start provided in section 727(b) and ignores the plain meaning of the statutory definition of claim and debt. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(5)(A), 101(12).

A landlord has a claim when a lease payment falls due, and the debtor’s corresponding liability is a debt even if the lease limits when the landlord may seek damages.

First Trust National Ass'n v. American National Bank & Trust Co. (In Re Adventist Living Centers, Inc.) · filed 1994-11-01(5)(A), (12)

In this case, a debt arose on the part of the Debtor when the lease payments fell due. Conversely, the Landlord had a right to payment and had a claim for each month’s obligation on the date each payment fell due.

Under § 101(12), a signed financing agreement creates a debt when it gives rise to liability on a claim.

Terpstra v. Michelosen (In Re Product Design & Fabrication, Inc.) · filed 1994-11-21(12)

Debt was created at the time each Financing Agreement was executed by PDF. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(12) (“debt” means liability on a claim) and 101(5) (defining “claim”).

Section 101’s definitions of debt and claim exclude deductions that recoup a veteran’s disability severance payment from future benefits.

United States, Department of Veterans Affairs v. Keisler (In Re Keisler) · filed 1994-11-22(11), (4)

11 U.S.C. § 101(11) defines “debt” as liability on a “claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) defines “claim” as a “right to payment.” ... Based upon the foregoing, this Court is satisfied that the deductions represent a recoupment to the VA and as such are not a debt.

Section 101(12) defines a debt as liability on a claim; an employer’s past payment record used to calculate future unemployment taxes is not a debt.

Hollytex Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Oklahoma Employment Security Commission (In Re Hollytex Carpet Mills, Inc.) · filed 1994-11-22(12)

Debt is defined as “liability on a claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(12). Claim is defined as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). Here, no debt exists because no liability is established where there is no right to payment. Rather I am presented with a statistical analysis of an employer’s prior experience to establish future tax rates.

Section 101(10) treats an entity authorized to assert others’ bankruptcy claims as a creditor even if the entity is not owed money itself.

Illinois Ex Rel. Ryan v. Volpert (In Re Volpert) · filed 1994-11-23(10)

The definition of “creditor” found in § 101(10) only requires that the entity “possess” some bankruptcy claim, not that it be owed money.

Section 101’s definition of debt includes state criminal fines.

In Re Hardenberg · filed 1994-12-09(11)

Thus, although contrary case law does exist, we believe that Congress, through the plain language of the applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, has indicated that state criminal fines are "debts," which cannot be discharged in a Chapter 7 proceeding, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Sec. 523(a)(7), but which can be discharged in a Chapter 13 proceeding, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Sec. 1328(a).

Section 101(5)(A) includes contingent rights to payment in the definition of a claim, so an indemnification claim can arise before payment is made.

In Re Food Barn Stores, Inc. · filed 1994-12-15(5)(A)

Clearly, section 101(5)(A) provides for a right to payment whether or not such right is contingent.

Section 101(5) treats a child's right to support payments as a claim even when the child has no separate judgment against the debtor.

In Re Hopkins · filed 1995-01-04(5)

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 101(5), one has a “claim” if one has “a right to payment.” In the instant case, the Children whether through Cady, or through another third party, have a right to payment ... for their support from Hopkins.

Section 101 treats an obligation to return capital as a debt when it creates a right to payment.

Benjelloun v. Robbins (In Re Robbins) · filed 1995-01-09(5), (12)

The Debtor’s obligation is a debt notwithstanding its relationship to capital. As an obligation to return capital, it creates a “debt” which is merely a “right to payment.” See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(5), (12) (1988).

Section 101(12) defines a debt as liability on a claim, which under section 101(5) includes a right to payment reduced to judgment.

McCarthy v. McCarthy (In Re McCarthy) · filed 1995-01-26(12)

The Bankruptcy Code defines a “debt” as a “liability on a claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(12). Among other things, a “claim” includes a right to payment that has been reduced to judgment. ... Thus, Grayce McCarthy’s “debt” to Denis McCarthy is a debt as that term is defined by the Bankruptcy Code in the amount of some $47,000.

Section 101(10) includes a tax certificate purchaser as a creditor when the certificate creates a lien securing a claim against the debtor.

In Re Milne · filed 1995-02-03(10)

The characterization of a Certificate of Sale as a lien, combined with the Code’s definition of claim, leaves no doubt that the tax purchaser, Johnson, is in fact a creditor in bankruptcy.

An employee benefit trust with a right to collect an employer’s required contributions has a right to payment and qualifies as a creditor.

Braunstein v. UIU Health & Welfare Fund (In Re Broderick Co.) · filed 1995-02-09(5)(A), (10)(A)

For purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, including § 547, “creditor” is defined as including any “entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A). And “claim” is defined as including any “right to payment.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). ... Therefore, by virtue of its power to collect these payments, the Fund itself had a “right to payment” and is a creditor for purposes of § 547.

Under § 101(5)(A) and (12), an obligation barred by the statute of limitations is neither a claim nor a debt when the creditor has no enforceable right to payment.

Illinois Department of Public Aid v. Wilder (In Re Wilder) · filed 1995-02-15(5)(A), (12)

The expiration of the statute of limitations extinguished the IDPA’s right to enforce this obligation owed to it by the Debtor. Absent an enforceable obligation, there is no right to payment. Absent a right to payment, the IDPA possesses no claim against the Debtor. Therefore, no debt existed as of the commencement of the case.

Section 101(5) defines a claim as a right to payment, and § 101(10) defines a creditor as an entity with a claim that arose by the order for relief.

Floyd v. Shindler (In re Rodriguez) · filed 1995-02-16(5), (10)

A creditor is an entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10). A claim is a right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). ... It is clear that Shindler became a creditor of debtors when funds were transferred under the Base Participation Contracts between the dates of December 15, 1992 and February 4, 1993.

Section 101 defines claim and debt broadly enough to include a right to payment that has not been reduced to judgment.

Riddle v. Knapp (In Re Knapp) · filed 1995-03-17(5)(A), (12)

Thus, “claim” and, by implication, “debt” are defined expansively by the Bankruptcy Code to include the broadest possible range of obligations of whatever character against a debtor or its property. ... The statute clearly provides that a debt need not be reduced to judgment to be held nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6), and defendant’s argument to the contrary has no merit.

An heir’s interest in a decedent’s probate estate is not a “claim” under § 101(5)(A) because it is not a right to payment.

In Re Marra · filed 1995-03-30(5)(A)

An heir does not have a “claim” against the decedent’s property as that term is defined in the Bankruptcy Code, i.e., a “right to payment.”

Section 101(5)(A) includes contingent rights to payment within the definition of a claim.

Sticka v. Bestline, Inc. (In re Attaway, Inc.) · filed 1995-04-03(5)(A)

The fact that this claim was contingent does not make it any the less a claim under § 101(5), which explicitly includes contingent debts within its definition.

A right to payment arising from completed prepetition transactions can be a claim even if its amount is calculated and liquidated after filing.

United States Ex Rel. Farmers Home Administration v. Reed (In Re Reed) · filed 1995-03-30(5)(A)

That the tasks of calculation and liquidation of the claim remained to be effected post-petition does not defeat this debt from falling within the definitions of “debt” held by Mr. Reed against the CCC at the time of filing.

Under § 101(5) and (12), a person with no enforceable right to payment has no claim and therefore no debt.

Steed v. Shapiro (In Re Shapiro) · filed 1995-03-31(5), (12)

The term “debt” is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) as “liability on a claim”. “Claim” is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) in pertinent part as a “right to payment ... ”. ... No longer having any “right to payment”, the Plaintiff does not have a “claim” enforceable against the Debt- or-Defendant, and thus, there exists no “debt” to except from the Debtor-Defendant’s discharge.

Section 101(5) includes environmental cleanup costs as a claim when the creditor could fairly contemplate them before bankruptcy, even if the costs had not yet been incurred.

Reynolds Bros. v. Texaco, Inc. · filed 1995-04-14(5)

We prefer the fair contemplation-foreseeability approach as the means to determine when a cause of action under c. 21E becomes a claim for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.

A statutory obligation enacted after a bankruptcy petition is not a prepetition claim when no right to payment existed at the time of filing.

In Re Chateaugay Corporation · filed 1995-04-17(5)(A)

No right to payment on the part of the Combined Fund existed until the enactment of the Coal Act six years after the filing of LTV's petition. Our conclusion in no way narrows the definition of the term "claim," but rather represents a common sense recognition that its reach is not infinite.

Section 101(5)(A) requires a right to payment that arose before the bankruptcy petition for an obligation to be a pre-petition claim.

LTV Steel Co. v. Shalala · filed 1995-04-17(5)(A)

However broadly “claim” is understood, it is clear that the existence of a valid bankruptcy claim depends on (1) whether the claimant possessed a right to payment, and (2) whether that right arose before the filing of the petition.