11 U.S.C. § 101

Section 101(4) treats a claim as arising when the act triggering potential liability occurs.

In Re Storage Technology Corp. · filed 1990-07-18(4)

Thus, this Court concludes that the "claims" (as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)) are barred by their failure to file timely proofs of claim for all pre-petition claims. "Pre-petition claims" are defined as those claims for which the triggering act, i.e. the "gas emission," occurred prior to October 31, 1984.

Section 101(4) treats a right to indemnification under a pre-petition agreement as a pre-petition claim, even if the claimant is sued after the bankruptcy filing.

In Re Philadelphia Mortgage Trust · filed 1990-08-22(4)

In such a case, the claim for contribution or indemnity did not arise post-petition, even though Sarp was not joined in any of the three lawsuits for services in which he claims contribution until the day after the Debtor’s bankruptcy filing.

A mandatory redemption provision in preferred stock is an equity interest, not a claim that makes its holder a creditor under § 101(9)(A).

In Re Revco D.S., Inc. · filed 1990-07-24(9)(A)

Generally, the rights of shareholders to redeem stock are not guaranteed but are dependent on the financial solvency of the corporation. Accordingly, the mandatory redemption provision of convertible preferred stock is an interest and not a claim as New York Life asserts.

Section 101(9)(A) treats a loan guarantor with a right to reimbursement from the debtor as a creditor.

In Re Marlene M. Finn, Debtor. Daniel F. Gosch, Trustee of the Estate of Marlene M. Finn v. Burns · filed 1990-07-31(9)(A)

Burns, as guarantor of Finn’s loan, is a "creditor" by virtue of his right to reimbursement from Finn.

Under § 101’s definitions of claim and debt, a former spouse’s share of a pension payment becomes a debt when the payment is due and unpaid.

Cleda D. Bush v. Alvin G. Taylor and Barbara F. Taylor · filed 1990-08-30(4), (11)

Not until after the fifteenth of each month when a payment was due but unpaid did that portion of Taylor's obligation become a debt. Accordingly, Bush's share of the post-petition pension payments were not pre-petition debts dischargeable in bankruptcy.

Section 101(11) defines “debt” as liability on a claim, including liability for punitive damages.

Brill v. Dvorak (In Re Dvorak) · filed 1990-09-07(11)

A “debt” is defined in the Bankruptcy Code as being a “liability on a claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(11). Nothing in the wording of the statute or its history would warrant treating liability for punitive damages any differently than liability for compensatory damages, given the breath of the definition of “debt.”

Section 101(4)(A) includes contingent and unmatured rights to payment within the definition of a claim.

Teates v. Kuranda (In Re Kuranda) · filed 1990-09-28(4)(A)

All that is necessary is that a “right to payment” may arise. It makes no difference that the claim is presently unmatured, contingent, or disputed.

An equitable remedy is a claim under § 101(4)(B) only if it gives rise to a right to payment.

Norris Square Civic Ass'n v. St. Mary Hospital (In Re St. Mary Hospital) · filed 1990-10-04(4)(B)

As section 101(4)(B) states, a claim will not lie where the right to an equitable remedy does not give rise to a right to payment.

Section 101(4)’s definition of “claim” does not include a trustee’s cause of action against a former trustee and counsel for breaches of their duties in administering the estate.

Baskin v. Wade (In Re Brenner) · filed 1990-10-16(4)

Where this reasoning fails is in identifying the Trustee’s cause of action as a “claim” within the scope of 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(4) and 502. Patently, it is not.

Section 101(4)(A) defines a claim as a right to payment; a CERCLA response-cost claim does not arise before the government incurs response costs.

United States v. Union Scrap Iron & Metal · filed 1990-12-26(4)(A)

A claim under the bankruptcy code is defined as a “right to payment.” ... Because the EPA had incurred no response costs at the time of Taracorp’s confirmation, the EPA could have no claim in the bankruptcy proceedings — there was no legal obligation under CERCLA.

Section 101(4)(A) defines a claim broadly to include contingent and unliquidated rights to payment.

Waterville Industries, Inc. v. First Hartford Corp. · filed 1991-01-28(4)(A)

The definition of “claim” under the Code is very broad. Specifically, it includes: "right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured ...”. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A).

Section 101 treats an obligation to pay future homeowners’ assessments as a contingent claim and debt when the owners agreed to pay them before bankruptcy.

Cohen v. North Park Parkside Community Ass'n (In Re Cohen) · filed 1991-01-11(4)(A), (11)

The Bankruptcy Code defines a debt as “liability on a claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(11). A claim is defined, in part, as “the right to payment, whether ... such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A). ... Because the Cohens’ liability for the unmatured, contingent homeowner’s assessments existed when they filed their chapter 7 petition, the obligation falls within the category of their pre-petition debts.

Section 101 defines debt as liability on a claim and includes contingent rights to payment, so conditions on payment do not by themselves make an obligation post-petition.

In Re Affiliated Food Stores, Inc. · filed 1991-01-24(4), (11)

A “debt” is defined as “a liability on a claim”. 11 U.S.C. § 101(11). A “claim” is defined as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, natural, unnatural, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured ...”. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4). ... The fact that a debt owed to Debtor is subject to conditions precedent or subsequent, appears to not transform a pre-petition obligation into a post-petition obligation.

Section 101(4)(A)’s definition of a claim does not include an ownership interest in a debtor partnership.

In Re Riverside-Linden Investment Co., Debtor. Estes & Hoyt, a Professional Corporation Ralph O. Boldt, Trustee v. Kathr · filed 1991-02-05(4)(A)

We have already indicated that the partnership interests were not “claims” against the partnership.

Section 101(11) includes unauthorized loans created by check kiting as debts.

McLemore v. Third National Bank (In Re Montgomery) · filed 1991-02-08(11)

Unauthorized loans created through the fraud of a check kiting scheme constitute “debts” for bankruptcy purposes.

Section 101(9)(A) defines a creditor by its claim against the debtor; failing to file a proof of claim does not end creditor status.

In Re B. Cohen & Sons Caterers, Inc. · filed 1991-02-13(9)(A)

This Court notes that New Plan’s failure to file a proof of claim in this proceeding does not extinguish its status as a creditor.

Section 101(9) requires a creditor to have a claim against the debtor or its estate; employees owed payment by a separate trust do not qualify.

In re Mansfield Ferrous Castings, Inc. · filed 1991-03-06(9)

Consequently, the Employees cannot to be said to have a claim against Mansfield or its estate, in that any right to payment flowed from the Trust by virtue of the notes.

Section 101(9) treats a party with a valid claim to payment from the debtor as a creditor.

Jonas v. Farmer Bros. (In Re Comark) · filed 1991-03-07(9)

FBC asserted that it was not a “creditor,” as that term is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(9) and as the term is used in section 547(b)(1); but FBC clearly had a valid “claim” to the funds which Comark paid it on June 9, 1982, ... therefore, at that time, FBC was Comark’s “creditor.”

Section 101(4) broadly defines a claim as a right to payment, allowing accrued interest to be included when calculating a creditor’s insufficiency.

Madcat Two, Inc. v. Commercial National Bank of Shreveport (In Re Madcat Two, Inc.) · filed 1991-02-25(4)

In fact, “insufficiency” is defined in terms of the creditor’s “claim,” and “claim” is very broadly defined as a “right to payment.” ... The Court finds that the Bank is entitled to include accrued interest in the insufficiency calculation for the purpose of determining the extent of the improvement of the Bank’s position.

Section 101(4) does not treat allocated but unretired patronage capital as a claim when payment requires a directors’ vote that has not occurred and their refusal was not an abuse of discretion.

In Re Eastern Maine Electric Cooperative, Inc. · filed 1991-03-25(4)

Allocated patronage capital need not be paid unless EMEC’s directors affirmatively vote to do so. As to the pre-bankruptcy allocations in Class 6, the cooperative made no election to pay. In the absence of that election, and in the absence of an abuse of discretion in not so electing, the right to payment did not arise.

Section 101(9)(A) treats an entity with a claim against the debtor as a creditor, even if the claim is ultimately disallowed.

In Re Thomson McKinnon Securities Inc. · filed 1991-03-07(9)(A)

An entity that has a claim against a debtor qualifies as a creditor, as defined under 11 U.S.C. § 101(9)(A).

Section 101(9) includes a mortgage holder as a creditor when its lien gives it a claim against the debtor’s property, even if the debtor has no personal liability for the debt.

In Re Wells · filed 1991-03-28(9)

The threshold question is whether Creditor is a creditor within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(9). ... By the express language of the Code, Creditor in this case has a “claim” against the Debtors by reason of the mortgage it holds against the Debtors’ inherited property.

Section 101(9) does not treat a junior mortgage holder as a creditor of the debtor when the property has no value above the senior mortgage and the underlying debt is owed by another entity.

In Re Oak Brook Apartments of Henrico County, Ltd. · filed 1991-04-05(9)

Mill and L.P. have not presented enough evidence to demonstrate that there is value in the Debtor's property above the amount of the first mortgage. Without such value, Mill and L.P. do not have even a secured claim against this estate, and are thus not creditors under 11 U.S.C. § 101(9).

Section 101 defines a claim as a right to payment and a debt as liability on a claim; that distinction does not change the Chapter 13 eligibility calculation.

In Re Rifkin · filed 1991-03-15(4), (11)

Although the terms “claim” and “debt” are defined in different terms, the distinction is not meaningful in this context. ... Debt and claim are flip sides to the same coin.

Section 101 defines a claim as a right to payment and a debt as liability on a claim, encompassing an allowed claim for unpaid unemployment taxes.

Michigan Employment Security Commission v. Wolverine Radio Co. (In re Wolverine Radio Co.) · filed 1991-04-08(5), (12)

Further, confirmation of a plan “discharges the debtor from any debt that arose before the date of such confirmation,” 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d), and MESC’s allowed claim is certainly a “debt” in that it is a “liability” on a “right to payment.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5), (12).

Section 101 defines a debt as liability on a claim, encompassing nearly any monetary obligation of the debtor.

Merrill Lynch Business Financial Services, Inc. v. Kim (In Re Kim) · filed 1991-04-09(11)

The first question is whether the balance owed Merrill Lynch is a “debt.” The term “debt” is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(11) as “liability on a claim.” ... It is clearly the intent of the Bankruptcy Code that almost any type of monetary obligation of the debtor should be considered a “debt.” The Court finds that Kim’s obligation to Merrill Lynch is a debt.

An unliquidated right to equitable distribution of marital property is a general unsecured claim, and liability on that claim is a debt.

Perlow v. Perlow · filed 1991-04-17(5)(A), (12)

Such a “right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured” qualifies as a “claim” against the estate pursuant to the Code definition of that term. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). Therefore, Ms. Perlow’s right to equitable distribution is a general unsecured claim and Mr. Perlow properly listed it as a debt against the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (“ ‘debt’ means liability on a claim”).

Section 101 treats a seller’s contingent or unmatured right to payment as a claim and the buyer’s corresponding liability as a debt.

UIC, Inc. v. Committee of Creditors Holding Unsecured Claims of Powerine Oil Co. (In Re Powerine Oil Co.) · filed 1991-04-30(4), (11)

A debt means liability on a claim. Section 101(11). A claim means any right to payment or right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance, whether or not such right is fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed or undisputed. Section 101(4). ... Although these rights may have been contingent or unmatured prior to any acceptance, in either event, UIC had a claim against the debtor and the debtor owed a debt to UIC upon the debtor’s receipt of the equipment.

Section 101 defines a claim as a right to payment and a debt as liability on a claim.

In Re Wolverine Radio Company · filed 1991-06-25(5), (12)

Further, confirmation of a plan "discharges the debtor from any debt that arose before the date of such confirmation," 11 U.S.C. Sec. 1141(d), and MESC's allowed claim is certainly a "debt" in that it is a "liability" on a "right to payment." 11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(5), (12).

Sections 101(12) and (5) define debt and claim without requiring the debtor to list the creditor in the bankruptcy schedules.

In Re Musgraves · filed 1991-07-02(12), (5)

That section extends the discharge to all pre-petition debts, a term which itself applies without regard to whether the debt is listed in the debtor’s schedules.

Section 101(10) treats the holder of a prepetition claim as a creditor, including the holder of an oil production payment payable from the debtor’s property.

Banc One, Texas, N.A. v. Braymer (In Re Braymer) · filed 1991-05-03(10)

Under § 101(10) a creditor means an entity that has a claim against the Debtor that arose at the time of or before the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Clearly the Debtor’s mother has a claim against the Debtor’s property and she should have been listed as a creditor in the schedules.

Section 101(4)’s definition of a claim requires a right to payment under nonbankruptcy law; that law determines when the right arose.

AL Tech Specialty Steel Corp. v. Allegheny International, Inc. (In Re Allegheny International, Inc.) · filed 1991-05-06(4)

The timing of the existence of a right to payment is determined in accordance with the substantive law creating the obligation.

A restitution obligation is a claim under § 101(4) and is subject to the automatic stay’s bar on actions to collect claims.

Hucke v. Oregon Ex Rel. Division of Corrections, Department of Human Resources (In Re Hucke) · filed 1991-05-07(4)

It therefore follows that restitution is a “claim” under § 101(4). Since a restitution obligation is a “claim,” it is subject to the provisions of § 362(a) which prohibit commencing or continuing actions to collect a “claim”.

Section 101(4) defines a claim as a right to payment, which can arise separately under different contracts.

Matter of Castle Mall, Inc. · filed 1991-05-07(4)

A claim is a right to payment. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4). The assignment of rents provides the basis for a contractual right to payment separate from the right to payment on the note.

Section 101(5)(A) defines a claim as the full right to payment on an obligation, even when a Chapter 13 plan would pay less.

In Re Gordon · filed 1991-05-23(5)(A)

A “claim” is the entire amount which a creditor contends is due and owing to it on an obligation, and not the amount payable to it on the claim over the course of a Chapter 13 plan.

Section 101(4) includes a right to payment within the definition of a claim even if it is contingent, disputed, or not reduced to judgment.

Gilbert v. Palmer Manufacturing & Supply, Inc. (In Re Winkle) · filed 1991-05-28(4)

These allegations and requests for relief go beyond those necessary for the imposition of a constructive trust for the benefit of Palmer; they assert a right to payment against Kenneth Winkle and as such constitute a “claim” against him. The fact that such antecedent debt was not reduced to judgment prior to the transfer of the 1934 automobile is, of course, irrelevant. It is sufficient that the claim was contingent or disputed. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4).

Section 101(4) defines a claim to include post-petition obligations incurred by a trustee or debtor-in-possession.

In Re MacDonald · filed 1991-05-31(4)

The broad definition of claim in Section 101(4) includes of necessity post-petition obligations incurred by the trustee or debtor-in-possession.

Section 101(4) defines a claim as a right to payment; enforcing a pledge of nondebtors’ property is a claim against the pledgors, even when the debtor owes the underlying debt.

In Re Torrez · filed 1991-06-12(4)

Reviewing the definition of “claim” indicates that under the plain and literal language of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6), the action was not on a claim against Debtors.

Section 101(5)(A)’s definition of “claim” includes both secured and unsecured portions of a creditor’s claim and applies to § 1322(b)(2).

Etchin v. Star Services, Inc. (In Re Etchin) · filed 1991-06-20(5)(A)

This reinforces the conclusion that § 101(5)(A)’s definition of “claim,” which is broad enough to include both secured and unsecured portions held by a single creditor, should be applied to § 1322(b)(2).

Section 101(5) defines a claim as a right to payment, whether secured or not.

Nobelman v. American Savings Bank (In Re Nobelman) · filed 1991-06-24(5)

Although the Hougland court purported to discern the plain meaning of section 1322(b)(2), it ignored the congressionally dictated definition of the term “claim”, which is a “right to payment”, whether secured or not.

Section 101(4)(A)’s definition of a claim includes a right to payment for replevin costs that arose before bankruptcy, even if the creditor incurred the costs later.

In Re McNeil · filed 1991-06-24(4)(A)

Nevertheless, despite the relatively narrow interpretation of “claim” in Frenville, GECC’s claim was a pre-petition liability of the Debtor under even this interpretation because GECC could have sought its “special damages” prior to the Debtor’s bankruptcy filing had GECC chosen to pursue its right to replevin at that time.

Section 101(4)(A) defines a claim as a right to payment against the prepetition debtor; failing to file a claim against the estate does not extinguish the underlying cause of action.

Borsdorf v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp. (In Re Fairchild Aircraft Corp.) · filed 1991-06-27(4)(A)

A “claim” against this estate is a “right to payment whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured” against the pre-petition debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A). ... A claim against the estate is thus not the same as the cause of action against the pre-bankruptcy debtor entity.

Section 101(5)(A) includes a contingent, unliquidated tax liability within the definition of a claim even before the IRS assesses it.

Kilen v. United States (In Re Kilen) · filed 1991-06-28(5)(A)

The Court concludes that the United States has a contingent, unliquidated right to payment, i.e., a “claim”, against Kilen’s bankruptcy estate pursuant to § 6672 of the Internal Revenue Code.

Section 101(4) treats an environmental cleanup claim as arising when the debtor’s conduct causes an actual or threatened release of hazardous waste, even if cleanup costs are incurred later.

Jensen v. California Department of Health Services (In Re Jensen) · filed 1991-05-15(4)

Following the foregoing examination of each theory, we hold the DHS’s claim arose for purposes of the Jen-sens’ bankruptcy at the time of actual or threatened release of the hazardous waste, or based upon the debtors’ conduct.

Section 101's definition of debt includes an enforceable contractual obligation to pay a creditor's attorney's fees.

Transouth Financial Corporation of Florida v. Ralph Jennings Johnson, Vera Johnson · filed 1991-05-29(11)

The Bankruptcy Code defines "debt" as "liability on a claim." 11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(11). "Claim" is defined as "right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured." 11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(4)(A). "It is established that 'debt' is to be given a broad and expansive reading for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code." In re Chase & Sanborn Corp. (Nordberg v. Arab Banking Corp.), 904 F.2d 588, 595 (11th Cir.1990). Therefore, the "debt" excused from discharge in a successful Section 523 action would appear to include a debtor's contractual obligation to pay a creditor's attorney's fees.

Section 101(5) includes a mortgage lien that survives discharge of the debtor’s personal liability within the definition of a claim.

Johnson v. Home State Bank · filed 1991-06-10(5)

Applying the teachings of Davenport, we have no trouble concluding that a mortgage interest that survives the discharge of a debtor’s personal liability is a "claim” within the terms of § 101(5).

Section 101(12) includes punitive damages within the definition of a debt.

Placer U.S., Inc. v. Dahlstrom (In Re Dahlstrom) · filed 1991-07-03(12)

Following this analysis, the court concludes that punitive damages are clearly “debts” within the meaning of § 101(12).

Section 101 defines a creditor as an entity with a claim against the debtor and a claim as a right to payment.

District 5, United Mine Workers v. Weiss (In re Weiss) · filed 1991-07-09(9)(A), (4)(A)

“Creditor” is defined as including any entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the entry of the order for relief. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(9)(A). “Claim” is defined as a right to payment. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A). Thus, plaintiffs have standing to object to debtor’s discharge only if they had a right to payment by debtor that arose at or prior to the entry of the order for relief.

Section 101 defines “debt” as liability on a claim, which includes an unmatured obligation.

Express Freight Lines, Inc. v. Kelly (In Re Express Freight Lines, Inc.) · filed 1991-07-15(11)

“Debt” is defined at § 101(11) as “liability on a claim.” Since the definition of “debt” is just as expansive as the definition of “claim,” it follows that the debt owed by the creditor to the debtor can also be an unmatured liability.

Section 101(12) includes noncontractual liabilities within the definition of debt, including claims for rescission and restitution arising from fraud.

Wyle v. C.H. Rider & Family (In re United Energy Corp.) · filed 1991-09-13(12)

The Code does not require that a "debt" be a contractual liability. ... These claims fit within the Code's broad definition of "debt."

A debt includes liability on a defrauded investor’s claim for rescission and restitution, even without a contractual right to repayment.

Wyle v. C.H. Rider & Family (In re United Energy Corp.) · filed 1991-09-13(12)

The Code does not require that a “debt” be a contractual liability. ... They clearly had claims for rescission and restitution which arose when they bought the modules, regardless of whether there existed a contractual right to the return of principal. ... These claims fit within the Code’s broad definition of “debt.”

Sections 101(5)(A) and 101(10)(A) include a vessel owner with a contingent indemnity claim against the debtor within the definition of a creditor.

In Re H & S Transportation Company, Inc. · filed 1991-07-18(5)(A), (10)(A)

Further, United was also a "creditor" as defined under section 101(5)(A) & (10)(A) with regard to each fuel purchase between debtor and the fuel suppliers, since each transaction gave rise to the following contingent indemnity claim against the debtor: if the debtor failed to pay its fuel debt, the fuel supplier had a right to execute its statutory liens on United's towboat, the M/V VOLUNTEER STATE; and if any fuel supplier had executed on such a lien, United would have had a right of indemnity from debtor.

A vessel owner with a contingent right to indemnity from the debtor has a claim and is a creditor under § 101.

Harrison v. Brent Towing Co. (In re H & S Transportation Co.) · filed 1991-07-18(5)(A), (10)(A)

Further, United was also a “creditor” as defined under section 101(5)(A) & (10)(A) with regard to each fuel purchase between debtor and the fuel suppliers, since each transaction gave rise to the following contingent indemnity claim against the debtor: if the debtor failed to pay its fuel debt, the fuel supplier had a right to execute its statutory liens on United’s towboat, the M/Y VOLUNTEER STATE; and if any fuel supplier had executed on such a lien, United would have had a right of indemnity from debtor.

A garnishment writ that creates no lien or enforceable debt against a garnishee does not create a claim under Section 101(5)(A) or (B).

In Re Moserbeth Associates, I, L.P. · filed 1991-07-19(5)(A) and (B)

Therefore, the writ of execution served upon the limited partnerships was ineffective under Pa.R. Civ.P. Nos. 3101(b), 3111(b) or 3147 to create a lien of garnishment, and was also ineffective to create a claim against the limited partnerships within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) and (B).

Section 101(4) includes interest owed on a tax deficiency in the definition of a claim when it gives the government a right to payment.

Hopkins v. United States (Internal Revenue Service) (In Re Hopkins) · filed 1991-07-24(4)

Consequently, the interest constitutes a claim, for it represents Defendant's right to payment for that amount of interest owing on the tax deficiency, until such deficiency was eliminated, and the compounded interest assessed pre-petition.

Section 101(4) gives “claim” a broad definition.

In Re Magras · filed 1991-07-30(4)

In determining that the surviving mortgage interest is a claim, Justice Marshall stated that “[w]e have previously explained that Congress intended by th[e] language [of 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)] to adopt the broadest available definition of ‘claim’.” Id. at -, III S.Ct. at 2154. Consequently, this court must also adopt a broad construction of that term.

Section 101(5)(A) defines a claim as a right to payment even if it is unliquidated, contingent, unmatured, or disputed.

In Re Metropolitan Hospital · filed 1991-08-23(5)(A)

The Bankruptcy Code defines “claim” as the “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment,liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). ... Given these principles, the malpractice settlement and the debt due under the promissory note meet the prepetition mutuality requirement for setoff.

Section 101(4)(A) defines a claim to include a right to payment whether liquidated or unliquidated.

United States Customs Service v. Apex Oil Co. (In Re Apex Oil Co.) · filed 1991-08-27(4)(A)

Moreover, the Bankruptcy Code contains a broad definition of “claim”. A "claim” includes any right to payment whether liquidated or unliquidated.

Section 101(4) includes unincurred CERCLA response costs arising from pre-petition releases as contingent claims.

In re Chateaugay Corp. · filed 1991-09-06(4)

But the location of these sites, the determination of their coverage by CERCLA, and the incurring of response costs by EPA are all steps that may fairly be viewed, in the regulatory context, as rendering EPA's claim "contingent," rather than as placing it outside the Code's definition of "claim."

Section 101(5)(B) does not treat a spouse’s contingent right to a divorce property award as a claim when the right does not arise from a breach of performance.

In Re Perry · filed 1991-09-18(5)(B)

Mrs. Perry’s rights fall outside the equitable remedy described in subparagraph (B). They do not arise “for breach of performance” of any obligation, whether contractual, statutory or otherwise. ... I therefore conclude that Mrs. Perry’s rights under the statute do not constitute a claim.

Section 101’s definitions of debt and claim include pre-petition obligations even when the creditor is omitted from the debtor’s schedules.

In Re Guzman · filed 1991-07-24(12), (5)

That section extends the discharge to all pre-petition debts, a term which itself applies without regard to whether the debt is listed in the debtor’s schedules.

Section 101 defines a debt as liability on a claim, which includes a right to payment for damages from a lease breach.

Mintz v. Carlton House Partners, Ltd. · filed 1991-08-07(11), (4)

A debt, as that term is used in the Bankruptcy Code, includes the damages which the Mintzes seek to recover.

Section 101(9)(A) includes a holder of a disputed right to payment as a creditor even before the claim is allowed.

In Re Abijoe Realty Corporation, Debtor, in Re Abijoe Realty Corporation, Debtor, Aleli Corporation, Creditors · filed 1991-08-29(9)(A)

Liquidadora plainly qualified as a “creditor” under Bankruptcy Code § 101(9)(A), as the holder of a “right to payment” from Abijoe, albeit disputed, in the form of a final judgment entered April 24, 1984, in the amount of $524,170.30.

Section 101(9)(A) defines a creditor as an entity with a claim against the debtor arising at or before the order for relief.

Bash v. Schwartz (In Re B. Schwartz Furniture Co.) · filed 1991-09-13(9)(A)

“Creditor” is defined as “an entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor ...” 11 U.S.C. § 101(9)(A). ... The three Defendants were clearly creditors of the Debtor-corporation according to corporate records which reflect outstanding debt.

Section 101(4)(A) includes contingent rights to payment within the definition of a claim, including pension obligations arising from prepetition labor.

LTV Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. (In Re Chateaugay Corp.) · filed 1991-09-13(4)(A)

Under the Bankruptcy Code, a claim is defined as any “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal equitable, secured, or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A). PBGC and the DOL have stated claims here.

An owner who pledges property to secure a debtor’s debt is a creditor under § 101(10)(A) because the owner has a contingent claim against the debtor if the collateral satisfies the debt.

Cambridge Meridian Group, Inc. v. Connecticut National Bank (In Re Erin Food Services, Inc.) · filed 1991-09-18(10)(A)

The term “creditor” is defined for the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code at 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A) (Supp.1991) as an “entity that has a claim against the debtor.” The term “claim” is defined at 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) to include the contingent right to payment. As the owner of property pledged to secure Erin’s debt, Murray held a contingent claim against Erin should the collateral be required to satisfy the debt, and was therefore a “creditor” within the meaning of the statute.

Section 101 defines a claim as a right to payment and a debt as liability on a claim; an obligation to pay severance under an employment contract can therefore be a debt.

Intercontinental Publications, Inc. v. Perry (In Re Intercontinental Publications, Inc.) · filed 1991-09-25(5), (12)

A debt is defined as a “liability on a claim”. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12). A claim is defined as a “right to payment”. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). The plaintiff was obligated under Perry’s employment contract to create the escrow, as that was included to help induce him to accept the job, so that Perry had a right to have the escrow created from the time he started employment. When Perry was fired, pursuant to the employment contract the plaintiff immediately became liable to pay Perry the $20,-000.00. Thus, the transfer of the $20,-000.00 was made in satisfaction of a debt of the plaintiff, so that the plaintiff received value.

Section 101(11) defines a debt as liability on a claim.

Tague & Beem, P.C. v. Tague (In Re Tague) · filed 1991-09-26(11)

A "debt” for purposes of Section 523(a) means liability on a claim.

Section 101(12) treats a demand note as a debt when it gives the holder an immediate right to payment, even if a mortgage secures the note.

Drewes v. Vatnsdal (In Re Vatnsdal) · filed 1991-09-27(12)

A “debt” is defined by section 101(12) as a liability on a claim-, while a “claim”, in turn, is defined by section 101(5)(A) as a right to payment whether liquidated or unliquidated. The note, as a demand note, constituted an immediate right to payment irrespective of the mortgage given as security and as such, must be regarded as an antecedent debt.

Section 101 defines a debt as liability on a claim, which includes a right to payment.

Discount Home Center, Inc. v. Turner (In Re Turner) · filed 1991-12-04(5), (12)

The statute requires, first, that there be a “debt,” which in turn means liability on a claim of right to payment, 11 U.S.C. § 101(5), (12). The parties stipulate that “Turner incurred the sum of $6,604.47, plus interest and appear to assume without expressly stating that such “sum” remains due and owing and is claimed by Discount. Thus there is a “debt” owed by Turner to Discount.

Section 101(11) defines debt broadly as a liability on a claim, without distinguishing between short-term and long-term debt.

Union Bank v. Wolas · filed 1991-12-11(11)

Nor does the definitional section of the Bankruptcy Code, which defines the term “debt” broadly as a “liability on a claim,” 11 U. S. C. § 101(11), distinguish between short-term debt and long-term debt.

Section 101(4) includes unpaid commissions for prepetition services within the definition of a claim.

Express America, Inc. v. Pierce (In Re Express America, Inc.) · filed 1991-10-10(4)

Defendant is entitled to these commissions and has a claim for them against debtor’s estate.

Section 101(5)(A) includes a shipper’s contingent, unliquidated, disputed right to reparations for an unreasonable tariff rate within the definition of a claim.

Cooper v. Delaware Valley Shippers (In re Carolina Motor Express, Inc.) · filed 1991-11-07(5)(A)

The right to reparation for payments under an unreasonably high tariff rate, see 49 U.S.C. §§ 11705(b)(3), 10701(a), would constitute a pre-petition contingent, un-liquidated, and disputed claim against the bankruptcy estate.

Section 101(5)(A) includes a shipper’s contingent, unliquidated, disputed right to reparations for an unreasonably high tariff rate within the definition of a claim.

Cooper v. Delaware Valley Shippers (In re Carolina Motor Express · filed 1991-11-22(5)(A)

The Bankruptcy Code defines a claim to include any "right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed [or] undisputed." 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). ... The right to reparation for payments under an unreasonably high tariff rate, see 49 U.S.C. §§ 11705(b)(3), 10701(a), would constitute a pre-petition contingent, unliquidated, and disputed claim against the bankruptcy estate.

Section 101(5) includes an unmatured right to payment within the definition of a claim.

In Re Brentwood Outpatient Ltd. · filed 1991-12-13(5)

That the County’s right to payment of penalties was unmatured does not defeat its status as a claim in bankruptcy.

Section 101(5)(B) excludes an equitable remedy from the definition of a claim when breach of the underlying obligation does not give rise to a right to payment.

Oseen v. Walker (In Re Oseen) · filed 1991-11-13(5)(B)

Therefore, under the facts presented here and in light of the state court’s judicial determination, it is clear that the equitable remedy (i.e., the injunction) provided in Defendant’s favor in the contract did not give rise to a right to payment, and Plaintiff’s obligation to refrain from competing with Defendant is not a claim that may be discharged.

Section 101(5)’s definition of a claim distinguishes future claimants by whether they had a right to payment when the bankruptcy cases were filed.

In Re Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. · filed 1991-11-25(5)

This definition suggests that future claimants ought to be those who will have a right to payment in the future, but do not have one now.

Section 101’s definitions of claim and debt exclude a retirement plan loan when the plan administrator has no right to repayment and can offset the balance against future benefits.

In Re Jones · filed 1991-12-13(4), (11)

Thus, the TSP administrator has no right to repayment, and the loan does not constitute a “claim” under 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) nor a “debt” under 11 U.S.C. § 101(11); and the loan is not dis-chargeable in bankruptcy.

Section 101 treats a contingent right to payment as a claim even when no payment is currently due, and its holder may qualify as a creditor.

In Re Chandler Airpark Joint Venture I · filed 1992-01-09(5), (10)

A creditor for bankruptcy law purposes is an entity that holds a claim against a debtor’s estate as of the bankruptcy filing date. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10). The definition of the term “claim” is also intended to be an extremely broad one, encompassing any right to payment or to an equitable remedy as against a debtor or its property, regardless of the status of that claim. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). ... Patterson holds a right to payment, albeit contingent upon Debtor’s request for release of a parcel of the property for resale. ... The fact that Debtor technically owed no current payment to Patterson when it filed its petition is without con sequence to his status as a creditor, or at least as an interested party.

Section 101(5)(A) includes contingent claims in the definition of “claim.”

Leber v. Illinois Department of Revenue (In Re Leber) · filed 1991-12-20(5)(A)

The definition of “claim” under 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) includes such contingent claims.

Section 101(4) includes a contingent right to payment under a prepetition indemnification agreement, even if the event triggering payment occurs after the bankruptcy petition.

Woburn Associates v. Kahn · filed 1992-01-16(4)

Given the great breadth of the term "claim" as defined under the Bankruptcy Code, we conclude that Woburn held a prepetition claim against Hemingway at the time of the chapter 11 petition in 1982, albeit a right to payment contingent on a future occurrence reasonably within the contemplation of the parties as evidenced by the terms of the indemnification agreement.

Section 101(5)(A) includes a contingent right to damages under an employment agreement as a claim even if the breach occurs after the bankruptcy petition.

May v. Charles Booher & Associates, Inc. (In Re May) · filed 1992-02-03(5)(A)

Accordingly, based upon the reasoning of Peltz and Baldwin-United, the Court finds that if a state court determines that May breached any of the “no compete” provisions in the employment agreements with Booher, either pre or postpetition, any resulting damages are “claims” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A).

Section 101(10)(A) includes an entity with a claim against the debtor that arose by the order for relief in the definition of creditor.

State Street Mortgage Co. v. Palmer (In Re Palmer) · filed 1991-12-23(10)(A)

A creditor is defined to include an “entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor". 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A). ... Even if State Street’s proof of claim was arguably defective because it was not supported by a statement setting forth the terms of the assignment of the Mortgage, State Street is the holder of the Mortgage and Note and has filed a timely proof of claim, and those facts are sufficient to give State Street the status of a creditor and a party in interest.

Section 101(10) treats a person with a pre-bankruptcy claim against the debtor as a creditor.

Emerson v. Marty (In re Mark Benskin & Co.) · filed 1991-12-23(10)

There is no factual dispute that the transfer was from the debtor’s account to Marty, who was a creditor, or one who had a pre-bankruptcy claim against the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10).

Section 101(10)(A) defines a creditor as an entity with a claim against the debtor arising at or before the order for relief, excluding state abandoned-property claims that arise after the petition.

In re Federated Department Stores, Inc. · filed 1992-01-08(10)(A)

State claimants with abandoned property claims arising after the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition violate the definition of creditor as set forth in the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(10)’s definition of “creditor” does not make a bar date for creditors’ proofs of claim apply to requests for postpetition administrative expenses.

In Re K-Fabricators, Inc. · filed 1992-01-16(10)

The Order which set the 24 June 1991 bar date calls for “creditors” to file proofs of claim, but does not purport to deal with requests for payment of administrative expenses: 11 U.S.C. § 101(10) defines “creditor” as an entity having one of several types of claim arising at or before the entry of an order for relief, or treated that way by operation of other sections. Since an entity need not be a creditor to be entitled to administrative expenses, and that entitlement, by definition, arises after filing of the case, the bar date order is inapplicable to the Port’s motion.

Section 101(10) excludes an entity from the definition of creditor when it has no claim against the debtor or a qualifying claim against the estate.

Washington v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (In Re Washington) · filed 1992-01-31(10)

GMAC is not a “creditor” within the meaning of the bankruptcy code because it does not have a claim against the debtor. In addition, GMAC does not have a claim against the estate of the kinds specified in Bankruptcy Code section 101(10).

Section 101(5) defines a claim broadly enough to include a right to repayment when a creditor advances money to and for a debtor’s benefit, even if another entity signed the note.

In Re Virginia-Carolina Financial Corporation · filed 1992-01-13(5)

Given this definition, one can hardly argue that Creative would not, absent the May 19 repayment, have had a claim against the bankruptcy estate when, as the bankruptcy court found, Creative paid money to and for the benefit of the Debtors and with the intent that the money be returned by them with interest.

Section 101(5) defines a claim broadly enough to include a lender’s right to repayment from debtors who received the loan proceeds and were expected to repay them, even when another entity signed the note.

Smith v. Creative Financial Management, Inc. (In re Virginia-Carolina Financial Corp.) · filed 1992-01-13(5)

A common sense approach for determining whether a loan repayment is “for or on account of [a] ... debt owed by the debtor” is to consider whether the creditor would be able to assert a claim against the estate, absent the repayment. ... Given this definition, one can hardly argue that Creative would not, absent the May 19 repayment, have had a claim against the bankruptcy estate when, as the bankruptcy court found, Creative paid money to and for the benefit of the Debtors and with the intent that the money be returned by them with interest.

Section 101(5)’s definition of claim covers asbestos claimants who had a right to payment from the debtors when the bankruptcy cases were filed.

In Re Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. · filed 1992-01-14(5)

Utilizing the same basis here to define the class of present asbestos claimants, the definition of “claim” to be found at 11 U.S.C. § 101(5), that we did in the said prior Order, we hold that class to be: Those persons or entities who have been exposed to asbestos or asbestos containing products, mined, fabricated, supplied or sold by debtors who as of the filing date of these bankruptcy cases, January 7, 1991, had a right to payment from debtors on account of such exposure.

Section 101(5)(A) includes disputed rights to payment within the definition of a claim.

Weiner v. Clement (In Re Clement) · filed 1992-02-05(5)(A)

Although disputed, Alway Financial’s claim falls under 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A).

Section 101(4) includes contingent environmental rights to payment as claims even when they are not yet ripe for suit under CERCLA.

In Re National Gypsum Co. · filed 1992-02-12(4)

While non-bankruptcy law governs the existence of a claim under the Code, it is not dispositive of the time at which a claim arises under the Code. It is immaterial for the purpose of bankruptcy, whether EPA’s claims against the Debtors are ripe for adjudication under CERCLA, as long as all the elements that can give rise to liability under CERCLA have occurred pre-petition.

Section 101(5)'s definition of a claim includes a judgment lien that survives a debtor's discharge.

In Re Bursee · filed 1992-02-27(5)

Although Johnson concerned itself with a mortgage rather than a judgment lien, it relied on the definition of “claim” embodied in 11 U.S.C. § 101(5), a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment ...” By the same definition, obviously, a judgment lien is a claim.

Section 101(4)(A) defines a claim as a right to payment, including one that is disputed, contingent, or unmatured.

Vaughan v. Resolution Trust Corp. (In re Lease-Sea, Inc.) · filed 1992-04-07(4)(A)

Section 101 of the Bankruptcy Code defines claim as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A). ... In the present situation, it is undisputed that Lease-Sea was indebted to RTC in the amount of Eight Million Three Hundred Seventy-nine Thousand Four Hundred Forty-nine Dollars and Ninety-four Cents ($8,379,449.94), at the time the Bankruptcy petition was filed. ... Therefore, RTC had a claim against Lease-Sea prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy case.

Section 101(12)’s definition of debt includes a family court obligation to pay money entrusted to the debtor.

Boudakian v. Boudakian (In Re Boudakian) · filed 1992-02-07(12)

Under the Code, a debt is defined as a liability or a claim. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12). ... In this case, we see no reason to treat the Family Court instruction to pay Mr. Khajadourian as anything other than a “debt” within the Code’s broad definition thereof.

Section 101 treats an obligation as a debt even when a colorable state-law defense may exist to its collection.

Perniciaro v. Natale (In Re Natale) · filed 1992-02-07(12)

Even assuming the availability of colorable state law defenses, the listed debts constitute debts under the Bankruptcy Code and the Debtor cannot be faulted for exercising his legal right to list them so as to preserve their discharge. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12), § 101(5)(A) and § 523(a)(3).

A driver's license restoration fee is a debt when the state conditions restoration on its payment, regardless of whether the fee covers administrative costs.

In Re Geiger · filed 1992-03-04(11)

On the strength of the decision in Lugo v. Paulsen, 886 F.2d 602, 604-07 (3d Cir. 1989), we hold that the restoration fee is a "debt" and that therefore the Co-Plaintiff and Wife-Debtor in this proceeding, MICHELE GEIGER ("the Plaintiff"), cannot be deprived of her driver's license on the basis of non-payment of such a fee in light of 11 U.S.C. § 525(a).

Section 101 defines a creditor by its claim against the debtor, and in a preference action that claim must underlie the challenged transfer.

Southmark Corp. v. Southmark Personal Storage, Inc. (In Re Southmark Corp.) · filed 1992-02-11(5), (10)

Although § 547(b)(1) provides that the transfer must be “to or for the benefit of a creditor,” the definition of a creditor under § 101(5) and (10) must be read in the context of the specific provisions of § 547. As a creditor, SPS must have a right to payment from Southmark in bankruptcy.

Section 101(10) treats the FTC as a creditor when it has a right to receive payment on a debtor’s judgment, even if the money will be used for consumer restitution.

Federal Trade Commission v. Austin (In Re Austin) · filed 1992-04-07(10)

The FTC meets this requirement. Pursuant to the District Court’s judgment on January 25, 1991, and the Consent Decree between Austin and the FTC, the FTC has a right to receive payment on Austin’s $1.5 million judgment debt. The FTC therefore holds a claim against the debtor, is a creditor within the meaning of § 101(10), and has standing to bring a claim under § 523(a)(2)(A).

Section 101(5)(A) includes unmatured rights to payment in the definition of a claim, so future homeowners association fees can be a prepetition debt.

Matter of Wasp · filed 1992-02-18(5)(A)

A “debt” is “liability on a claim” (11 U.S.C. § 101(12)), and a “claim” is a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured ...” (11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A)). Under these broad definitions, Debtors had a debt for future Association fees when they filed their bankruptcy petition.

Section 101(4)(A) includes a contingent right to indemnification within the definition of a claim.

In Re New York Trap Rock Corp. · filed 1992-03-06(4)(A)

Nonetheless, a contingent claim for indemnification constitutes a right to payment under 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A) and is allowable as a claim.

Section 101(5)(A) includes contingent rights to payment in the definition of a claim.

In Re Consolidated Capital Equities Corp. · filed 1992-04-21(5)(A)

At that date, Watergate held a contingent claim. A contingent claim may be allowable under the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A).

Section 101(5)(A) includes unliquidated, contingent, unmatured, disputed, and unsecured rights to payment within the definition of a claim.

McFee v. Kelly (In Re Kelly) · filed 1992-05-01(5)(A)

“Claim” is defined, under 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) as any “right to payment, whether or not reduced to judgment, ... unliquidated, ... contingent, ... unma-tured, disputed ... or unsecured;” The Plaintiff’s claim for $250,000.00 would be included in the quoted definition as of the date the Debtor filed his bankruptcy petition. Therefore, the type of claim Plaintiff holds is unliquidated, contingent, unma-tured, disputed and unsecured.

Section 101(4) defines a claim to include both its secured and unsecured portions when applying § 1322(b)(2).

In Re Doss · filed 1992-05-01(4)

Given the United States Supreme Court’s proclivity to give a different meaning to the term “secured claim” in the various provisions of the Bankruptcy Code as set forth in the case of Dewsnup v. Timm, et al., — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 773, 116 L.Ed.2d 903 (1992), we are of the opinion that authority now exists to find that the term “claim” as used under § 1322(b)(2) should be afforded the definition provided at 11 U.S.C. § 101(4), which includes both secured and unsecured portions of a claim and not necessarily as contemplated under § 506.

Section 101(5) includes a right to back pay and an equitable reinstatement remedy that gives rise to back pay within the definition of a claim.

In Re Creative Restaurant Management, Inc. · filed 1992-05-20(5)

Obviously, any back pay claim in favor of the NLRB creates a right to payment, which is therefore an interest in property of the estate. The same is true for any reinstatement claim. Reinstatement is an equitable remedy. It is the NLRB’s position that the affected employees should be reinstated, and that, as each day passes in which they are not so reinstated, they should receive back pay. Therefore, the twin remedies of reinstatement and back pay are rights to payment which give the NLRB an interest in property of CROC.

Section 101(5)(A) treats a right to payment from minerals owned and produced by a debtor as a claim.

Matter of Senior-G & A Operating Co., Inc. · filed 1992-05-20(5)(A)

First, PSI has a "claim" against the property of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) ("claim" defined as "right to payment"). As noted above, PSI has a right to payment from the minerals owned and produced by the debtor. Consequently, PSI has a claim against the debtor, Senior, within the meaning of the bankruptcy act.

Section 101(5)(A)’s definition of claim determines whether an exposure claimant belongs to the present or future claimant class based on whether the claim existed on the bankruptcy filing date.

In Re Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. · filed 1992-06-08(5)(A)

Particularly does the amendment have to do with making it clearer that we incorporate the statutory definition of claim into our definition. We thus replace “right to payment” with “having a claim as defined at 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A).”

Section 101(10)(A) defines a creditor as an entity with a claim against the debtor arising at or before the order for relief, including a principal owed funds collected by its debtor agent.

Pioneer Commercial Funding Corp. v. Apple Bank for Savings (In Re Pioneer Commercial Funding Corp.) · filed 1992-06-05(10)(A)

In short, as in the case of unrestricted bank accounts, a debtor-creditor relationship was created; Pioneer was obligated as a debtor to remit the funds to Apple, which could assert a claim against Pioneer for the proceeds received by Pioneer as Apple’s agent. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A), a “creditor” is defined as an “entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor.” Therefore, when Pioneer caused the three wire payments to be paid to Apple in satisfaction of WestAir’s loan obligation, it also satisfied its own coexisting antecedent debt to Apple.

Section 101(5) treats a claim as arising when the acts giving rise to liability occur, even if the injury has not yet manifested.

Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Aguiar (In Re Waterman Steamship Corp.) · filed 1992-06-10(5)

We agree with the Manville Court and hold that a claim arises at the moment when acts giving rise to the alleged liability are performed.

An advance from a debtor’s own retirement account is not a claim or debt when the plan cannot demand repayment and can only deduct the unpaid amount from future benefits.

In Re Scott · filed 1992-06-23(5), (12)

The withdrawal in the case at bar created no right to repayment that the ERISA plan can assert against the debtor. The debtor can terminate the wage assignment on his salary at any time and the ERISA Pension Plan would have no recourse against him. The ERISA Pension Plan could not sue the debtor for the unpaid loan because its remedy is to deduct the unpaid portion of the amount advanced from any benefits the debtor was to receive in the future. The obligation on the note is not a debt in that the debtor merely withdrew money from his own account and substituted a note for the money taken.

Section 101(5) includes an equitable claim that gives rise to a disputed right to payment within the definition of a bankruptcy claim.

In Re Realty Trust Corp. · filed 1992-06-30(5)

These claims of right to an equitable remedy for “breach of performance” (non-compliance with Article XII) give rise to a disputed “right to payment" as explained by Bank of Commerce and Kovacs, bringing them within the definition of “claim” set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) and thus within the ambit of bankruptcy law.

Section 101(5)'s definition of claim covers a county's remaining tax collection rights while the debtor can still redeem the property, even though the debtor has no personal liability for the taxes.

In Re O'Neal · filed 1992-07-10(5)

The United States Supreme Court recently instructed, in the case of Johnson v. Home State Bank, — U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2150, 115 L.Ed.2d 66 (1991), that a lien on a debtor’s property is a “claim” under 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) that can be dealt with in a chapter 13 plan even though the debtor has no personal liability to the lienholder. ... Thus, the prepetition foreclosure did not complete the tax collection process and the County still had a “right to payment” or, at least, a contingent right to permanently foreclose the debtor’s interest in the property.

Section 101(5) does not treat a fee payable only if a debtor voluntarily seeks license restoration as a claim.

Geiger v. Pennsylvania (In Re Geiger) · filed 1992-07-17(5)

While the terms “debt” and “claim” must be broadly construed under the Bankruptcy Code, it does not follow that there is an “enforceable obligation” or “legal obligation” within the meaning of § 101(5) merely because a debtor might ultimately be required to make a payment to the Commonwealth if she desires, without compulsion, to obtain a particular service or privilege, such as a license reinstatement.

Section 101(4) broadly defines a claim to include a contingent right to payment even when a settlement judgment is filed after the bankruptcy petition.

Simpson v. Phalen (In Re Phalen) · filed 1992-07-23(4)

The definition of “claim” is broadly defined by the Code as a: ... (A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, dispute, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; ... This Court finds that the actual filing of the Judgment Entry merely memorialized a pre-petition settlement agreement and is not a post-petition debt and would be subject to discharge.

Section 101(11) defines a debt as liability on a claim; an assumed lease that gives rise to no claim creates no debt to discharge.

Wainer v. A.J. Equities, Ltd. · filed 1992-07-07(11)

Section 101(11) defines “debt” as “liability on a claim.” ... Absent a claim, there can be no liability on a claim and, thus, no debt.

Section 101(5) treats a spouse’s equitable distribution award involving bankruptcy estate property as a claim for its monetary value.

Hohenberg v. Hohenberg (In Re Hohenberg) · filed 1992-07-10(5)

However, for property awarded that constitutes the bankruptcy estate, she may file a proof of claim for the monetary value of her unsecured claim.

A right to payment remains a claim under § 101(5) after it is reduced to judgment.

LHI Holding, Inc. v. Levinson (In Re LHI Holding, Inc.) · filed 1992-07-13(5)

The character of the claim is not altered simply because it has been reduced to judgment.

Section 101(10)(A) excludes holders of claims arising after the bankruptcy petition from the definition of creditor.

Drimmel v. Moran (In re Drimmel) · filed 1992-07-23(10)(A)

“Creditor” is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A) as an entity that has a claim against the debt- or that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor. ... The restitution condition was not imposed until well after the petition date, and well after the Debtor’s Plan was confirmed. Therefore, this Court finds that they were not “creditors” as defined by the Code.

Section 101(5)(A) includes contingent and unmatured rights to payment within the definition of a claim; a guarantor acquires such a claim against the debtor when it signs the guaranty.

Matter of Corland Corp. · filed 1992-08-05(5)(A)

A "claim," in turn, is defined as a "right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured." ... When Stephenson signed the guaranty on the Corland Note, he immediately incurred a contingent liability to the Bank and gained a contingent claim against Corland in the event he paid on the guaranty. His claim was simply unmatured at the time of the petition.

Section 101(5)’s definition of claim includes a nonrecourse claim enforceable against the debtor’s property.

In Re Sundown Associates · filed 1992-08-18(5)

I conclude from these authorities that the nonrecourse nature of Almist’s claim, in itself, is not a basis to grant the motion to dismiss the petition provided Al-mist waives a requisite portion of its secured claim.

A right to payment can be a contingent, unmatured claim before a tax is assessed or due.

Matter of Columbia Gas System, Inc. · filed 1992-08-19(4)(A)

The assessment procedure is an administrative procedure for fixing the amount of the tax owed, Western Md. Ry. v. Board of Pub. Works, 141 W.Va. 413, 90 S.E.2d 438, 445 (1955), and the tax is not “due” until the completion of this process. § 11-6-18. However, as discussed in Remington, this is not required for an unmatured, contingent claim for taxes to exist.

Section 101 defines a creditor to include an entity with a right to payment even when that right is disputed, contingent, or unliquidated.

In Re Laclede Cab Co. · filed 1992-09-29(5)(A), (10)(A)

A creditor is defined as an “entity that has a claim against the debtor”. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A). A claim is defined as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is ... unliquidated ... contingent ... disputed”. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). Section 1102(b)(1) says that the creditors committee is to consist of “persons, willing to serve, that hold the seven largest claims against the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1). According to the bankruptcy schedules, Gateway meets the statutory requirements to serve on the Committee.

Section 101(5)(A) includes contingent rights to indemnification in the definition of a claim, even if another Bankruptcy Code provision disallows them.

Sorenson v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. (In Re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc.) · filed 1992-10-19(5)(A)

The fact that contingent claims are nevertheless “claims” under § 101(5)(A) does not mean that they cannot be disallowed under another specific subsection of the Code partly as a result of their contingency.

Section 101(10) treats a party with a prepetition right to payment on dishonored checks as a creditor, even when the debtor is also ordered to pay restitution.

Zimmerman v. Itano Farms, Inc. (In Re Currey) · filed 1992-08-31(10)

The term “creditor” is defined by the Code as including any “entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor_” 11 U.S.C. § 101(10). The filing of a joint petition commencing this Chapter 7 case constitutes an order for relief as to these Debtors. 11 U.S.C. § 302(a). A “claim” as defined by Section 101(5) of the Code means a. “right to payment.” Davenport holds that the broad definition of “claim” includes a right to payment under a restitution order. 495 U.S. at 559-60, 110 S.Ct. at 2130-32. Therefore, on the date of the filing of the petition, as well as the date of receipt of the payments, Defendant Itano Farms had a right to payment from Debtor under the restitution order, and was accordingly a creditor as to Fred Currey.

Section 101(10) does not treat an attorney as a creditor merely because the attorney represented a judgment creditor; the attorney must have a claim against the debtor.

In re Tardo · filed 1992-09-11(10)

However, under the facts and the law applicable to this case, the Court finds that Bernstein was not a creditor of the estate and therefore was not entitled to notice under the Act. The mere fact that he was Dixie’s counsel in the state court proceeding did not make him a creditor of the estate.

Section 101(10)(A) includes an entity with a prepetition claim against the debtor in the definition of creditor.

Cole Taylor Bank v. Ratner (In Re Ratner) · filed 1992-09-30(10)(A)

... holders qualify as “creditors” having pre-petition claims against the Debtor, as well as FCC.

Section 101(10)(A) does not treat a state as a creditor for property presumed abandoned after the bankruptcy petition when the debtor’s obligation to turn it over arises only after the dormancy period expires.

Arkansas v. Federated Department Stores, Inc. · filed 1992-10-20(10)(A)

The States are not creditors with respect to property presumed abandoned post-petition because the Debtors do not have a legal obligation to turn the property over under the States’ unclaimed property statutes until the dormancy period expires.

Section 101(5)(B) treats an equitable remedy as a claim only when the breach gives rise to a right to payment under state law.

Matter of Udell · filed 1992-09-17(5)(B)

It is more appropriate to look to state law to determine if an equitable remedy can give rise to a “right to payment.” ... Where an injunction is the proper remedy under this standard, then it does not give rise to an alternative right to payment and cannot be discharged in bankruptcy.

Section 101(5)(B) treats a right to specific performance of an option agreement as a claim for damages when the remedy gives rise to a right to payment.

Calumet Farm, Inc. v. Northern Equine Thoroughbred Productions, Ltd. (In Re Calumet Farm, Inc.) · filed 1992-10-20(5)(B)

This claim for ... specific performance likewise is provable as an unsecured claim for damages. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(B).

Section 101(5)(A) defines a claim as a right to payment, including a disputed right that has not been reduced to judgment.

Rakozy v. Diversified Turnkey Construction Co. (In Re Western States Drywall, Inc.) · filed 1992-09-29(5)(A)

The United States has asserted, and continues to assert, that it is entitled to retain these funds for the benefit of the allegedly unpaid employees, and due to the debtor’s alleged breach of contract by violating the Davis-Bacon Act. The United States has more than an alleged right to payment; it has actively, affirmatively, and successfully collected on the asserted obligation.

Section 101 defines a creditor to include an entity with a prepetition right to payment even when that right is disputed.

In Re East Coast Airways, Ltd. · filed 1992-09-30(5)(A), (10)(A)

DOT was scheduled as a creditor by the Debtor itself, albeit a disputed one. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A) defines a creditor to mean an “entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) defines claim to mean “right to payment whether or not such right is ... disputed.” 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) states that “a party in interest, including ... a creditor ... may appear and be heard on any issue in a case under this chapter.” DOT has filed a claim for over $300,000, to which East Coast has never objected; it has standing to make this motion.

Section 101(4)(A) requires a right to payment for a bankruptcy claim; an avoidable tax liability is too contingent to qualify.

LTV Corp. v. Internal Revenue Service (In Re Chateaugay Corp.) · filed 1992-10-19(4)(A)

In such an instance, as in this case, the contingency is too removed to give rise to a "right to payment." When the party can avert a tax by prompt payment or compliance with their legal obligations, the IRS cannot assert a “right to payment.”

Section 101(5) treats an environmental cleanup obligation as a claim when it can be satisfied by payment, even if the creditor seeks an injunction.

In Re Cottonwood Canyon Land Co. · filed 1992-10-29(5)

This argument of CSI similarly is without merit. If and to the extent RCRA does give rise to a right to an equitable remedy “for breach of performance” (which is doubtful), that breach of performance is certainly subject to satisfaction by the payment of money to fund the remediation of the CSI property. Thus, it is a “claim” which was discharged upon the entry of the order of confirmation.

Section 101(4) includes contingent rights to contribution, reimbursement, or indemnification in its definition of a claim.

Travelers Insurance Co. v. Cambridge Meridian Group · filed 1992-11-23(4)

The greatly broadened definition of "claim" under Bankruptcy Code § 101(4), as any "right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, ... legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured," 11 U.S.C. § 101(4), unquestionably encompasses contingent claims for contribution, reimbursement or indemnification.

Section 101(5) defines a claim as a right to payment, even if no proof of claim has been filed.

Taylor v. United States (In Re Taylor) · filed 1992-12-01(5)

Therefore, because the IRS withheld a portion of Taylor’s tax refund after she filed her Chapter 13 petition, the IRS had a “claim” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101, and that claim triggered a waiver of sovereign immunity under 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) even though the IRS filed no proof of claim.

Section 101(5)(A) includes a contingent right to payment in the definition of a claim, even when the creditor calls its proof of claim protective.

Travellers International Ag. v. Sue L. Robinson, United States District Judge Trans World Airlines, Inc. Official Unsecu · filed 1992-12-28(5)(A)

In the absence of any qualifying language to the contrary in Langenkamp, there can be no question that the Supreme Court’s definition of “claim” is the same as the one found in the bar notice and in the Bankruptcy Code and includes Travellers’ “protective” claim.

A nonrecourse claim against a debtor’s property counts as a debt when calculating aggregate debts for Chapter 12 eligibility.

Lindsey v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. · filed 1992-10-29(12)

Following the Supreme Court’s rationale that a claim and a debt are coextensive, the FDIC’s claim is a debt for the purpose of determining Debtor’s aggregate debts.

Section 101(10) defines creditor status, which the affiliates satisfied by filing proofs of claim.

In Re Brown · filed 1992-11-05(10)

Various Palandjian Affiliates filed proofs of claim, thus satisfying the requirement that the expenditures be made by a creditor. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10).

Section 101(5)(A) defines “claim” broadly as a right to payment, including a right to statutory punitive damages.

Stokes v. Ferris · filed 1992-11-23(5)(A)

The definition of “claim” is obviously broad and has accordingly been interpreted quite expansively.

A holder of a disputed right to payment is a creditor under § 101(10)(A).

Johnston v. JEM Development Co. (In Re Johnston) · filed 1992-12-16(10)(A)

Here, the purchasers are creditors pursuant to § 101(10)(A) because they are the holders of a right to payment. This right, although in dispute, is nevertheless a claim. Accordingly, the holder of this claim is a creditor of the debtor.

A former spouse’s right to obtain a QDRO for a pension interest already awarded by a divorce decree is not a debt when it creates no enforceable right to payment.

Long v. Donahue (In Re Long) · filed 1992-12-21(12)

As discussed above, a domestic relations order not in the form of a QDRO does not create an enforceable right to benefits against an ERISA-qualified pension; therefore, Ms. Donahue’s right to obtain a QDRO can not be classified as a debt.

Section 101’s definitions of debt and claim encompass a property owner’s obligation under a deed of trust securing another party’s loan, at least to the value of the security.

In Re Perma Pacific Properties, a General Partnership, Debtor. David A. Gill, Trustee v. Eustace H. Winn, Jr. · filed 1992-12-22(5)(A), (12)

Because the Code defines a debt as a “liability on a claim,” we conclude that the bankruptcy court was correct in determining that the debtor’s “liability” on Winn’s claim creates a right to payment and therefore a debt.

Section 101(5)(A) defines a contingent right to payment as a claim.

Goldberg v. Torell (In Re Rundlett) · filed 1993-01-07(5)(A)

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A), a right to payment, even if contingent, constitutes a claim.

Section 101(4) defines a claim broadly enough to include an obligation for future condominium assessments existing when the debtor files for bankruptcy.

Matter of Pratola · filed 1993-01-12(4)

Legislative history underlying the passage of § 101(4) demonstrates that Congress intended the broadest possible definition for the term “claim” so that all of the debtor’s legal obligations, no matter how remote or contingent, could be dealt with in the bankruptcy proceeding. ... Under such a broad definition, the debtor clearly had a debt for future condominium common expense assessments when she filed her bankruptcy petition.

Section 101(5)(A) defines a claim broadly enough to include a contingent or unmatured right to payment, including a right to litigation costs that arose before a bankruptcy petition.

Franklin Savings Ass'n v. Office of Thrift Supervision · filed 1993-01-21(5)(A)

A claim under the Bankruptcy Code is to be construed very broadly and includes any right to payment “whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured....” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A); Matter of M. Frenville Co., Inc., 744 F.2d 332, 336 (3rd Cir.1984) (citing the legislative history showing the intent of Congress that “claim” be liberally construed).

Section 101(5)(A) defines a claim to include both secured and unsecured rights to payment.

In Re Alderman · filed 1993-01-28(5)(A)

This Court finds no ambiguity in § 101(5)(A)’s provision that “claim” includes both secured and unsecured claims.

Section 101 treats a right to payment as a claim; when that right against the debtor is extinguished, the debtor has no debt to the claimant.

Fristoe v. Fristoe (In re Fristoe) · filed 1993-02-05(5)

Thereafter, Mrs. Fristoe’s right to payment came from the Army and any claim which Mrs. Fristoe had against Mr. Fristoe was extinguished. ... Given the Code definitions of “claim” and “debt” supra, as a matter of law, when Mr. Fris-toe filed his bankruptcy petition on September 8, 1992, Mr. Fristoe had no debt owing to Mrs. Fristoe.

Section 101(4)'s definition of a claim includes a right to prepetition interest on a tax debt.

Olson v. United States (In Re Olson) · filed 1993-02-17(4)

A claim under 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) is defined as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” ... The prepetition interest for the remaining years, 1977 through 1980, are subject to tax liens and therefore will be deemed nondischargeable since a claim includes the right to interest.

A state’s right to payment for abandoned property is a prepetition claim when its right to delivery arose before the bankruptcy filing; a right arising afterward is not.

In Re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group Inc. · filed 1993-02-19(5)(A)

With respect to the property that was deemed abandoned in 1990 or 1991, and required to be delivered to Comptroller in March 1991 and March 1992, respectively, inasmuch as Comptroller’s right to the property occurred after the filing of DBL Inc.’s petition, Comptroller would not have a claim “as of the filing of the petition.” Thus, to the extent that Comptroller’s proof of claim relates to property to which Comptroller asserts a right post-petition, it is disallowed.

Section 101(5)(A) includes rights to payment that are not yet due in its definition of a claim.

Atlas MacHine & Iron Works, Incorporated v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation, Bethlehem Steel Corporation v. Atlas MacHine & · filed 1993-02-22(5)(A)

It reasoned that there could be no “claim” against Atlas short of default on an undisputed debt. We agree with the bankruptcy and district courts that the definition on which Bethlehem relied finds no support in either the Bankruptcy Code or precedent.