11 U.S.C. § 101

Section 101(5) treats a claim as liquidated when its value is readily ascertainable, even if liability is disputed.

In Re Dow Corning Corp. · filed 1997-11-20(5)

Fourth, if the definition of “liquidated debt” were to be read so broadly as to subsume debts absolute in amount but questionable as to validity, the term “undisputed” would become meaningless within the context of § 101(5). ... We adhere to these distinctions, and hold that a claim is liquidated when its value is capable of ready ascertainment, irrespective of whether the validity of the claim is in dispute.

Section 101(5)(A) defines a claim broadly enough to include any possible right to payment.

Mazzeo v. United States · filed 1997-12-03(5)(A)

We agree that the term “claim” is sufficiently broad to encompass any possible right to payment.

Section 101(5)(A) includes disputed rights to payment in the definition of a claim; a dispute alone does not make the corresponding debt unliquidated.

Mazzeo v. United States · filed 1997-12-03(5)(A)

The Code uses both "unliquidated" and "disputed" in its definition of "claim"; to rule that a claim (and hence the debt with which it is coextensive) is unliquidated whenever it is disputed would be to render the term "unliquidated" mere surplusage.

Section 101(5) includes a right to payment in the definition of a claim; applicable nonbankruptcy law determines when that right arises.

Securities and Exch v. Dahlstrom · filed 1997-12-24(5)

Since the Bankruptcy Code does not define “right to payment”, when such rights arise is determined by non-bankruptcy state or federal substantive law.

Section 101(10) does not require an entity to file a proof of claim to qualify as a creditor.

In Re Turpen · filed 1998-01-21(10)

A creditor is an entity that has a claim against the debtor or the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10). ... I find no requirement in the Code that status as a creditor depends on the filing of a claim.

An agency that can enforce a disgorgement judgment holds a claim and qualifies as a creditor even when a receiver holds the funds.

Securities Exchange Commission v. Cross (In Re Cross) · filed 1998-02-23(5), (10)(A)

Accordingly, the Panel finds that the Commission, as the appointed statutory enforcer of the federal securities laws, holds a claim — or enforceable obligation — against the Debtor. The , Commission therefore has standing as a creditor for purposes of § 523(a)(2)(A).

Section 101(5)’s definition of a claim requires a right to payment; a secured creditor’s duty to notify a bank that its security interest has expired is not such a right.

Biggs v. Stovin (In Re Luz International, Ltd.) · filed 1998-02-25(5)

A “claim” is defined as “a right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured. ...” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (1994). ... After consideration of the respective arguments, we hold that the Appellees “duty” to notify Security Trust of the expiration of their security interest is not a “right to payment” owing to the Debtor under § 553.

Section 101 defines debt and claim coextensively, so a debt can include an unmatured, contingent, or unliquidated obligation.

Farmers Home Administration v. Buckner (In Re Buckner) · filed 1998-03-05(12)

We conclude that the interpretation recited in the Judgment that "debt" is not "coextensive" with "claim" is incorrect, and thus the underpinning of the decision on setoff is in error.

A later sanctions award is not a preconfirmation claim under § 101(5) when the parties could not have anticipated it before confirmation.

In Re Water Valley Finishing, Inc., Debtor. Big Yank Corporation v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company · filed 1998-03-13(5)

right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured. ... We conclude from the record that the parties could not have anticipated these sanctions prior to confirmation.

Section 101(5) broadly defines a claim to include a nondebtor party’s right to payment under an executory contract as of the debtor’s bankruptcy petition.

In Re El Paso Refinery, L.P. · filed 1998-04-15(5)

Code § 101(5) defines as a claim any “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (1994). The purpose of this broad definition is to ensure that the full range of the debtor’s obligations are resolved in the bankruptcy proceeding.

Section 101 defines a claim to include an unmatured right to payment and a debt as liability on a claim.

Great Lakes Higher Education Corp. v. Pardee (In Re Pardee) · filed 1998-03-31(5)(A), (12)

Additionally, Wasson overlooked the distinction between "claims" and "allowed claims." Under §§ 523(a)(8) and 1328(a)(2), student loan "debts" are excepted from discharge. Debt is defined as "liability on a claim," 11 U.S.C. § 101(12), and "claim" is defined as a "right to payment, whether or not such right is . . . matured [or] unmatured." Id. § 101(5)(A) (emphasis added).

Section 101(5)'s definition of a claim includes pre-petition interest, allowing that interest to share the priority of an underlying tax claim.

In Re Mosbrucker · filed 1998-04-17(5)

Under one rationale, to which this Court adheres, application of the rule turns on the term “claim” as it is defined and applied under the Code. ... The term “claim” finds definition, in pertinent part, in Code § 101(5) ... This definition has been widely interpreted to include pre-petition interest.

Section 101(10) defines a creditor to include a holder of a prepetition claim; the court applied that definition to determine who may vote on a Chapter 11 plan.

In Re Julian Services Industries, Inc. · filed 1998-05-01(10)

The word "creditor” is defined as the holder of a pre-petition claim and certain other claims, not relevant here. § 101(10) Therefore, only holders of claims that arose pre-petition may accept or reject chapter 11 plans.

Section 101(5)(A) includes contingent rights to payment in the definition of a claim, but a debtor’s voluntary lawsuit after discharge does not make the resulting contractual attorney’s fees a pre-discharge contingent claim.

Larry M. Siegel Selwyn Gerber v. The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation J.I. Kislak Mortgage Corporation Gunther Tor · filed 1998-05-05(5)(A)

Pursuant to section 101(5)(A), a claim is a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliqui-dated, fixed, contingent, matured, unma-tured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured.” (emphasis added). ... Thus, we must ask whether the claim for attorney’s fees was contingent and therefore discharged in its entirety. We think not.

Section 101(5) defines a claim by a right to payment; an entity with no right to payment from the debtor has no claim against that debtor.

Kish v. Verniero (In Re Kish) · filed 1998-05-22(5)

Because the JUA and MTF have no right to payment from the debtor, they have no claim against the debtor.

Section 101(5)(A) limits bankruptcy claims to obligations that give rise to a right to payment; a duty to perform cleanup without monetary relief is not discharged.

Davenport v. Neely · filed 1998-05-29(5)(A)

Defendants contend, however, that “[o]nly orders which can be turned into a ‘right to payment’ are considered disc-hargable ‘claims’ for bankruptcy purposes.” (Defs.’ Supp. at 12 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A)).) Defendants argument has merit, particularly because 11 U .S.C. § 105(12) defines “debt” as “liability on a claim.” For § 1141 to apply, the “debt” would have to be some sort of monetary liability. ... Because no monetary relief is sought from AER or Dyess, (as opposed to the Governmental proposed third-party defendants), the court finds that the bankruptcy proceedings at issue did not discharge AER or Dyess’ agreements to clean-up the Facility.

Section 101(5) requires a right to payment for a bankruptcy claim; projected reimbursement for workers’ compensation awards not yet made is not a claim when state law gives no current right to reimbursement.

In Re Farley, Inc. · filed 1998-06-11(5)

Moreover, under the Bankruptcy Code, even where pre-petition conduct causes an injury, until that injury has manifested itself and ripens into a state law claim, there is no “right to payment” that allows a “claim”. ... Since, under Ohio Rev. Code § 4123.75, the State has no right to be reimbursed for projected future worker’s compensation not yet awarded, Ohio has no right to payment and therefore has no claim under the Bankruptcy Code for the “reserve” for possible future claims.

Section 101(5) includes unliquidated, contingent, unmatured, or disputed products liability claims within the definition of a claim.

In Re Jason Pharmaceuticals, Inc. · filed 1998-07-06(5)

Under instant facts, the Skees’ causes of action against Jason constitute “claims” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(5); that their “right to payment” against Jason may be unliquidated, contingent, unmatured, or disputed does not alter this fact.

Section 101(5) includes a right to current reimbursements within the definition of a claim, regardless of disputed past overpayments.

In Re Healthback, L.L.C. · filed 1998-07-31(5)

11 U.S.C. § 101(5) defines a bankruptcy claim as either a right to payment or a right to an equitable remedy for a breach of performance. Thus, it clearly appears that the amounts currently being withheld from the debtor for the current reimbursements, by themselves and without regard to any past overpayments, are within the definition of a claim.

Section 101(10) excludes an assignor from the definition of creditor after the assignor transfers its claim against the debtor.

In Re JMP-Newcor International, Inc. · filed 1998-06-16(10)

It is undisputed that Mills assigned his claims against the Debtor to Patra. Therefore, he is no longer a creditor in this bankruptcy and he does not have creditor standing to challenge the Debtor’s motion.

Section 101(12) defines a debt as liability on a claim, including liability arising from a contractual claim.

Corporate Food Management, Inc. v. Suffolk Community College (In Re Corporate Food Management, Inc.) · filed 1998-07-09(12)

Although “antecedent debt” is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, the term “debt” is defined as “liability on a claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(12). ... It is clear that SCC had a claim against the Debtor in connection with the contract.

Section 101 defines a claim as a right to payment and a debt as liability on a claim.

King v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP (In Re Koch) · filed 1998-07-22(5), (12)

A claim is defined in section 101 as “any right to payment-” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). Second, the creditor must also owe a debt to the debtor that also arose prepetition. A debt is defined in section 101 as “liability on a claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(12). Generally, anything that would be a prepetition claim, if asserted by a creditor against a debtor, would properly be a debt owed by a creditor to the debtor. ... Applying the elements of setoff, we find that a right to setoff has been met by Fulbright.

Section 101(5) treats a guarantor’s contingent, unliquidated right to payment from the estate as a claim.

DiStefano v. Stern (In Re J.F.D. Enterprises, Inc.) · filed 1998-08-06(5)

By virtue of Mr. DiStefano’s guaranty of the Debtor’s obligation to Park West, he held on the date of case commencement a "contingent, unliquidated right to payment” from the estate— that is, a claim under 11 U.S.C. § 101(5).

A claim can arise before a bankruptcy petition even when the right to payment is contingent and the amount is unliquidated.

Hobson v. Travelstead (In Re Travelstead) · filed 1998-08-21(5)(A)

Ms. Hobson’s buyout claim arose under Dutch law when Mr. Travelstead unilaterally extended the maturity date of the Loans from Blockless. That the claim was contingent (because Ms. Hobson had to institute and be successful in a buyout proceeding under Dutch law) and unliquidated (because the value of her 20% interest has yet to be determined) is irrelevant to the question of when the claim arose. Ms. Hobson is thus a creditor with a pre-petition buyout claim, and the bankruptcy court accordingly was correct in holding that the claim would be discharged upon confirmation of the a plan.

Section 101(5)(A) includes contingent and unmatured rights to payment, so a fee for pre-petition services is a claim even if payment is conditional.

In Re Jastrem · filed 1998-08-25(5)(A)

Given the broad definition of “claim” at 11 U.S.C. § 101(5), the court must conclude a fee for services rendered pre-petition is a claim subject to discharge even if the obligation to pay the fee is conditional. Pursuant to section 101(5)(A), a claim includes any right to payment whether unliquidated, contingent, or unmatured.

Section 101(5)(A) defines a claim broadly enough to include a right to payment before statutory prerequisites permit a civil action.

Kresmery v. Service America Corp. · filed 1998-09-30(5)(A)

The definition of “claim” in the Bankruptcy Code is broad enough to include an obligation for which a civil action would be premature due to statutory prerequisites such as the right to sue letter.

Section 101(5) broadly defines a claim to include an obligation documented as a loan, even when the debtor calls the contribution an investment.

Liebersohn v. Zisholtz (In Re Martin's Aquarium, Inc.) · filed 1998-10-16(5)

Given the broad definition of the term “claim,” ... we find that the Goldsteins have established that they have a claim against MAI.

A debt is a liability on a claim, and a claim can exist without a judgment; a pre-petition state-court judgment is unnecessary to establish a debt.

Gill Distribution Centers, Inc. v. Banks (In Re Banks) · filed 1998-10-07(5), (12)

Section 101 of the Bankruptcy Code defines the term “debt” to mean “liability on a claim,” 11 U.S.C. § 101(12), and “claim” is defined as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment_” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). Thus, a debt does not require a pre-petition state-court judgment to exist in bankruptcy court.

Section 101(5)(A) includes a contingent right to payment under a prepetition indemnity agreement, even when the event triggering payment occurs after the bankruptcy petition.

Riverwood International Corp. v. Olin Corp. (In Re Manville Forest Products Corp.) · filed 1998-10-13(5)(A)

Because contingent and unmatured rights of payment are “claims” under the Code, it is possible that a right to payment that is not yet enforceable at the time of the filing of the petition under non-bankruptcy law, may be defined as a claim within section 101(5)(A) of the Code. ... Olin’s right to indemnity was contingent at the time the Indemnity Agreements were executed with respect to all liabilities. It is irrelevant whether the event triggering the Debtor’s liability under the Indemnity Agreements occurred before or after the petition was filed.

Section 101(5) includes contingent and unmatured claims, including claims for indemnity or contribution arising from a prepetition tort.

In Re Union Hosp. Ass'n of Bronx · filed 1998-10-19(5)

Congress intended the definition of a “claim” for bankruptcy administration to be extremely broad, including contingent and unmatured claims. ... Thus, a third party’s claim for indemnity and contribution against a debtor arising from a pre-bankruptcy tort is a prepetition claim against the bankruptcy estate, subject to the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction.

A right to payment can be a claim even if it has not been reduced to judgment.

Grange Mutual Casualty Co. v. Chapman (In Re Chapman) · filed 1998-11-25(5)

The Court has no evidence before it which would demonstrate that the Plaintiffs have obtained a civil judgment against the Debtor for the automobile accident. However, this does not affect their claim against the Debtor for purposes of a nondischargeability proceeding under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) states, that a claim is any "right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unma-tured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured."

Under § 101(4)(A), a pension plan has no claim for withdrawal liability before the employer withdraws and the plan has a right to payment.

Cpt Holdings, Inc. v. Industrial & Allied Employees Union Pension Plan, Local 73 · filed 1999-01-21(4)(A)

Withdrawal liability is not a “claim” prior to confirmation. Although the Bankruptcy Code defines “claim” broadly, the relevant non-bankruptcy law must be examined to see whether a right to payment, even a contingent right, exists. It is possible that an employer could fail to make every required contribution to a multiemployer pension plan, eventually withdraw from the plan, and still be assessed no withdrawal liability. Withdrawal liability is based on an employer’s share of unfunded vested benefits at withdrawal, not on failure to make required contributions. As a result, there can be no pre-withdrawal breach of ERISA giving rise to a “right to payment” by a plan. Upon the facts at issue, a “claim” cannot exist prior to withdrawal.

An entity with only a derivative, indirect claim against the estate is not a creditor under § 101(10)(A).

Lampl v. No (In re W/B Associates) · filed 1998-11-23(10)(A)

Thus, neither Vincler & Knoll nor Charles Knoll as Trustee for the Judgment of Ted Paul is a creditor of this estate.

Section 101 treats a court-ordered equalizing payment to a former spouse as a claim and debt; a right to receive community property or sale proceeds remains a property interest.

Smith v. Smith (In re Smith) · filed 1998-12-30(5), (12)

The superior court’s judgment converted the plaintiffs interest in the residence and the other community property into a $58,-058.19 claim against the debtor. ... Therefore, if the superior court alters its present division of community property and eliminates any requirement that the debtor pay money to the plaintiff, there will be no debt to be discharged. The plaintiffs right to receive community property or her share of the net proceeds from a court ordered sale is an interest in property that is not capable of discharge.

A claim arises when the right to payment accrues; later administrative approval may validate that right.

Gullett v. Continental Casualty Co. (In Re Gullett) · filed 1999-01-06(5)(A)

Here, CCC’s overpayments happened between July 1996 and November 1996. CCC’s “right to payment”, if any, arose then. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). Later approval by the TWCC hearing officers simply validated that right.

A debt requires a right to payment; an insurance broker has none for services it has not yet rendered.

Rosenberg v. Rollins, Burdick, Hunter Co. (In Re Presidential Airways, Inc.) · filed 1999-01-13(12)

A “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code is a right to payment or a right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12). In the case at bar, if the debtor had not made the payments in dispute, RHH would have no claim against the debtor because RHH had not rendered services to the debtor at the time the payments were made.

Section 101(5)(A) defines a bankruptcy claim broadly enough to include a spouse’s right to equitable distribution.

Hearndon v. Hearndon · filed 1999-01-19(5)(A)

A “claim” is defined, under the bankruptcy section of the United States Code, as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (1996). Accordingly, an equitable distribution action can be a “claim” under the bankruptcy code.

Section 101(5) defines a claim as a right to payment, including a right enforceable against the debtor’s property.

Professional Investors Insurance Group, Inc. v. United Overseas Bank (Luxembourg), S.A. (In Re Professional Investors In · filed 1999-02-04(5)

But the Code defines a claim as a “right to payment,” whether secured or unsecured. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). ... Thus, the bank retains a claim, a right to payment, enforceable against “property of the debt- or,” pursuant to the parties’ contract and applicable non-bankruptcy law.

Under § 101(5), a claim for a share of monthly pension payments arises when the debtor receives a payment and fails to pay the share owed.

Zeitler v. Martel · filed 1999-02-05(5)

The conduct necessary under Grady was appellant’s failure to pay appellee upon receipt of his monthly pension payments.

Section 101(5)(A) defines a claim as a right to payment; a lender that has not advanced the funds under a promissory note has no claim against the borrower.

In Re Smith · filed 1999-02-25(5)(A)

“Claim” is broadly defined as a “right to payment.” See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). As of April 8th, Stonewood Investments could not have possibly had a “right to payment” against Smith since it had failed to perform under the note.

Section 101(10) defines a creditor as an entity with a claim against the debtor that arose at or before the order for relief.

Casarow v. Chomenko (In Re Cobb) · filed 1999-03-03(10)

On this record, I conclude that the defendants were “creditors” of the debtor, ... that the payment of $20,000 constituted a transfer of debtor’s interest in property to a creditor, and that the transfer was on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made. ... Under 11 U.S.C. § 101(10), "creditor” means an "entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor.”

Section 101’s definition of creditor includes guarantors when applying the preference avoidance period.

Mendelsohn v. Sequa Financial Corp. (In Re Frank Santora Equipment Corp.) · filed 1999-03-23(9)

The term “creditor,” as applied in this context, includes guarantors.

Section 101(10) defines a creditor as an entity with a claim against the debtor, even if the entity is not owed money directly.

Herman v. Egea (In Re Egea) · filed 1999-03-24(10)

The definition of “creditor” found in 11 U.S.C. § 101(10) — “entity that has a claim against the debtor” — requires that the entity possess some bankruptcy claim, not that it be owed money.

Section 101 defines a debt as liability on a claim, which is a right to payment.

Burford v. District Director (In Re Burford) · filed 1999-03-24(12)

The Bankruptcy Code defines a “debt” as “liability on a claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(12). A claim is a right to payment. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). Accordingly, a discharge relieves the debtor, in effect, of his liability on a claim.

A creditors’ committee whose members are creditors is not itself a creditor if it holds no claim against the debtor.

Committee of Junior Mortgage Note Holders in Organic Conversion Corp. v. Dygert (In Re Dygert) · filed 1999-04-20(5), (10)

Although its members, including Gere, are creditors of Debtor who have standing to sue, the Committee is not itself a creditor.

A party holding an enforceable prepetition guaranty claim is a creditor under § 101(10).

PhyMatrix Management Co. v. Voltarel (In Re Voltarel) · filed 1999-06-07(10)

It follows that the Guarantees of AMC’s obligations under the Practice Management Agreement are enforceable and PhyMatrix is a creditor of each of the Debtors with standing to maintain these adversary proceedings. ... "Creditor” is defined in Section 101(10) of the Bankruptcy Code as an "entity that has a claim against the debt- or” that arose prepetition. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10).

Section 101(5) defines a claim as a right to payment, so a creditor whose debt has been paid has no claim.

In Re McCready · filed 1999-04-21(5)

11 U.S.C. § 101(5) defines “claim” as a “right to payment.” Under this clear and simple definition, the IRS has no “right to payment” because it has already been paid.

Section 101(5)(A) treats each separate right to payment as a claim, even when the creditors obtain a single judgment.

In Re Mid-America Industrial, Inc. · filed 1999-05-27(5)(A)

A claim is defined as “a right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured....” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(a). ... The document in this case contains separate provisions creating separate obligations for different sums to the Pension Fund, the Welfare Fund, and the Trainee Program Fund. Thus, each of the Petitioning Creditors holds a unique claim for the amount it is owed under the CBA. The presence of a single judgment recognizing these obligations does not alter the result.

Section 101(5) does not treat a spouse’s right to equitable distribution as a bankruptcy claim before an agreement or distribution order creates an enforceable right to payment.

Scholl v. Scholl (In Re Scholl) · filed 1999-06-04(5)

Stated another way, absent an enforceable agreement or the entry of an equitable distribution award and order, neither party has a cause of action against the other with respect to marital property. Without a cause of action, no bankruptcy claim arises. Without a claim, there is no debt to be discharged.

Section 101(5)(A) broadly defines a claim as a right to payment, including a claim for damages from patent infringement.

In Re Cambridge Biotech Corporation Institut Pasteur and Genetic Systems Corporation v. Cambridge Biotech Corporation, D · filed 1999-07-07(5)(A)

Under the broad definition of “claim” provided for in § 101(5), and in view of Congress’s intent that the term “claim” should be construed liberally, we are persuaded that appellants’ allegations were clearly “claims.”

Section 101 treats post-petition interest on an unsecured co-signed note as part of a creditor’s claim.

In Re Campbell · filed 1999-07-09(5)

Post-petition interest on an unsecured co-signed note is a valid claim under 11 U.S.C. § 101 of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(5)(B) excludes an injunction from the definition of a claim when it does not give rise to a right to payment.

Dent Wizard International Corp. v. Brown (In Re Brown) · filed 1999-04-27(5)(B)

Inasmuch as Dent Wizard’s remedy at law has specifically been found to be inadequate, and any future harm irreparable, the injunction cannot be said to give rise to a right to payment. Thus, the injunction does not constitute a claim under Section 101(5)(B).

Section 101(5) includes a contingent indemnity claim that arises when the debtor signs the agreement, even if payment depends on a later event.

In Re Wilbur · filed 1999-05-07(5)

Accordingly, Gulf had a contingent claim prior to the Debtor’s bankruptcy. The Debtor and Gulf had an agreement under which the Debtor would become liable to Gulf upon the happening of a future event and this event was contemplated by the parties at the time they made the Agreement. Section 101(5)’s definition of claim specifically includes contingent claims.

Section 101’s definitions of “claim” and “debt” mean that a debtor who made no tax payments before filing has no claim for a refund at filing.

Christie v. Royal (In Re Christie) · filed 1999-05-13(5), (12)

Instead, as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) and(12), when the Debtors filed for bankruptcy, they owed a “debt” to the IRS for 1997 income taxes and the IRS had a “claim” against them and their bankruptcy estate for those taxes. Since they had made no payments on those taxes, though — and certainly had not overpaid them — the converse was not true. The IRS owed no “debt” to them, and they had no “claim” against the IRS for a refund.

Section 101 defines a debt as liability on a claim and includes an unliquidated right to payment within the definition of a claim.

Simek v. Erdman (In Re Erdman) · filed 1999-05-25(5)(A), (12)

A “debt,” for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, is simply defined as a liability on a claim, 11 U.S.C. § 101(12), and a “claim” is, in turn, defined as any right to payment whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, ... 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). ... This Court concludes that in § 523 actions where a specific sum has been determined to be nondischargeable, the claim thereby becomes liquidated to that extent, and a monetary judgment should be entered.

Section 101 defines a debt as liability on a claim and treats a right to payment as a claim even when it is unliquidated, contingent, or unmatured.

United States Trustee v. First Jersey Securities, Inc. · filed 1999-06-10(5), (12)

The Bankruptcy Code defines a debt as a "liability on a claim." 11 U.S.C.S 101(12). In turn, the Code defines a claim broadly. ... In addition, as debt is defined as a liability on a claim, it is coextensive with the definition of a claim, and both are construed broadly.

Section 101(5)(A) does not treat demolition costs as a pre-petition claim when the city had not completed the procedures required to obtain a right to payment before the petition was filed.

In Re Flood · filed 1999-06-07(5)(A)

Therefore, the City of Rochester did not have a pre-petition claim for the cost of demolition within the meaning and intent of Section 101(5)(a), and its actions pursuant to Section 47 did not violate the discharge injunction set forth in Section 524(a)(2).

Section 101 distinguishes a claim, which is a right to payment, from a debt, which is liability on a claim; reducing an allowed claim does not eliminate liability for the remaining debt.

Bell v. Educational Credit Management Corp. (In Re Bell) · filed 1999-06-28(5), (12)

There is a fundamental difference between the “debt” and the “claim.” Claim allowance and debt liability are different concepts.

Section 101(5)(A) includes contingent and unmatured rights to payment within the definition of a claim.

Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Wongco (In Re R.H. MacY & Co.) · filed 1999-07-14(5)(A)

Under section 101(5)(A) and the applicable case law, each of Wongco’s Third, Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action constitute contingent, unmatured rights to payment and, thus, are claims discharged by the Plan and Confirmation Order.

Section 101(5)(A) includes a final judgment as a claim even when the debtor disputes it.

In Re Miloszar · filed 1999-07-27(5)(A)

Since Congress intended a claim to be defined broadly, any judgment that is final, disputed or not, is included in this broad definition.

Section 101(5)(A) includes a nondebtor spouse’s equitable-distribution interest as a monetary claim against the bankruptcy estate when the property cannot be transferred to that spouse.

Lawrence v. Lawrence (In Re Lawrence) · filed 1999-08-04(5)(A)

The nondebtor spouse’s equitable interest in property titled in the debtor gives rise to a monetary claim against the bankruptcy estate.

Section 101(5)(A) excludes a future claim that the parties could not reasonably have contemplated before bankruptcy, even if the debtor’s conduct occurred before the petition.

Hexcel Corp. v. Stepan Co. (In Re Hexcel Corp.) · filed 1999-08-19(5)(A)

Under this definition, a claim cannot fall within the purview of section 101(5) — and thus cannot be discharged as a pre-petition claim — unless that claim could have been contemplated by the parties prior to the bankruptcy proceedings.

Section 101(5)’s definition of a claim includes unmatured interest.

First Franklin Financial Corp. v. Alls (In Re Alls) · filed 1999-09-02(5)

Such a “claim” can include unmatured interest. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5).

An equitable remedy for breach of performance is a claim when the breach also gives rise to a right to payment, even if the claimant seeks equitable relief.

Glass v. Prcin · filed 1999-09-08(5)(B)

Given these incontestable circumstances, the action he pursued and the rights he endeavored to redress satisfied the elements of a claim as defined in § 101(5)(B) supra.

Section 101(5)(B) does not treat potential equitable rights in a pending divorce as a claim when they do not arise from a breach of performance.

Compagnone v. Compagnone (In Re Compagnone) · filed 1999-09-21(5)(B)

Whatever equitable rights the Plaintiff may have at this early stage of the proceedings, they do not arise from a breach of performance by the debtor as required by 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(B). Lacking a claim, she is not a creditor.

Tort liability is a debt under the Bankruptcy Code because a debt is liability on a claim.

Haemonetics Corp. v. Dupre · filed 1999-07-23(12), (5)(A)

A “debt” is defined by the Code as a “liability on a claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(12). A "claim” is a "right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. § 101 (5)(A). Tort liability is a debt within the definition of the Code.

A person with a separate right to payment is a creditor, and the corresponding obligation is a debt, even if similar conduct gave rise to other claims.

In Re Harman · filed 1999-09-22(5), (10), (12)

Although similar circumstances may have given rise to the same causes of action, each petitioner holds separate rights to payment under non-bankruptcy law. Each therefore constitutes a creditor under the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5), (10). Harman, by virtue of the federal court judgments, is indebted to each of them. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12). Thus, under the Bankruptcy Code Harman has 16 debts owed to 8 holders of claims that he did not pay as of the petition date. The causes of action having been reduced to judgment, the pending appeals to the Fifth Circuit do not alter the analysis of debts at the petition date.

Section 101(5)(B) treats an equitable remedy as a claim when monetary damages are a viable alternative to that remedy.

In Re: Ben Franklin Hotel Associates, Debtor Ben Franklin Hotel Associates · filed 1999-08-09(5)(B)

Interpreting § 101(5)(B) in light of Kovacs, this court has stated that an equitable remedy will "give rise to a right of payment," and therefore be deemed a "claim," when the payment of monetary damages is an alternative to the equitable remedy. ... We therefore conclude that monetary damages are not an alternative to BFG's proposed equitable remedy, and that BFG's state court action against debtor, to the extent that it seeks such equitable relief, does not constitute a "claim" that was discharged in debtor's bankruptcy proceedings.

Section 101(5) does not treat a covenant not to compete as a claim when breach gives rise only to equitable relief and no right to payment.

In Re Reppond · filed 1999-08-19(5)

This Court agrees with the-majority of the cases and holds that the covenant not to compete clause in the agreement is not a claim subject to discharge in this bankruptcy case.

Section 101 treats a person with a right to payment from the debtor as a creditor.

Daly v. Radulesco (In Re Carrozzella & Richardson) · filed 1999-08-18(5), (10)

The Court concludes that at all relevant times Christina was a “creditor” of the Debtor, in that she had a “right to payment” of the Deposited Funds.

Section 101(10) includes a person with a contingent claim within the definition of creditor.

Mills v. Solomon (In re Mills) · filed 1999-09-23(10)

Solomon is therefore a creditor of this estate. She may be holding a contingent claim, but the definitions of creditor and claim under the Bankruptcy Code are broad enough to encompass even this contingent, ephemeral claim.

Section 101 treats a person with a right to payment from the debtor as a creditor.

Daly v. Biafore (In Re Carrozzella & Richardson) · filed 1999-08-18(10)

The Court concludes that at all relevant times the Defendant was a “creditor” of the Debtor, in that he had a “right to payment” of his Account Balance.

Borrowing from a debtor’s pension account does not create a secured debt when it creates no debtor-creditor relationship.

In Re Esquivel · filed 1999-09-23(12)

Accordingly, this Court holds that the Debtor’s pension-account loan is not a secured “debt” under the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101 defines “claim” and “debt” broadly enough to include contingent and unmatured obligations under a lease.

AERFI Group Plc v. Barstow (In Re MarkAir, Inc.) · filed 1999-09-24(5), (12)

Likewise, the definition sections of §§ 101(5, 12) defining “claims” and “debt” preempt the narrow definition proposed by GPA.

Section 101 defines a debt as liability on a claim and a claim as a broadly defined right to payment.

Howell v. Bank of Newnan (In Re Summit Financial Services, Inc.) · filed 1999-10-05(5)(A), (12)

“Debt” is defined in the Bankruptcy Code as a “liability on a claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (1996). The Code defines the term “claim” as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (1996). In a bankruptcy proceeding, the definition of the term “debt” is the same as the definition of the term “claim.”

Section 101’s definitions of “claim” and “debt” exclude rights to payment arising from capital contributions that constitute equity interests.

Citicorp Real Estate, Inc. v. PWA, Inc. (In Re Georgetown Building Associates, Ltd. Partnership) · filed 1999-10-15(5), (12)

Although 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(5) and 101(12) define “claim” as a right to payment and “debt” as liability on a claim, these definitions obviously do not include a right to payment based on an equity security or other interest in the debtor arising from capital contributions. That the interest in the debtor gives rise to a right to payment does not make that interest a claim.

Section 101(5)(A) treats a contingent right to payment for breach of contract as a claim arising when the parties enter the contract, even if the right is not yet enforceable.

In Re Caldor, Inc.-NY · filed 1999-10-22(5)(A)

In light of our finding that a “claim” for damages arising from the breach of a contract arises at the time the parties enter into the contract, we need not address Pearl’s alternative argument that its claim arose during the Wind-Down Period because Caldor “induced” Pearl to produce goods at that time.

Section 101(5) defines a claim to include unmatured post-petition interest.

In Re Butler · filed 1999-11-23(5)

Thus, as I construe it, what must be paid to avoid granting co-debtor stay relief is the “claim” as defined in Section 101 which includes unmatured, post-petition interest, not the lesser, allowable claim which would exclude unmatured interest.

Section 101(5) defines a claim as a right to payment arising from an enforceable legal obligation.

Antonino v. Kenny (In Re Antonino) · filed 1999-12-09(5)

A “claim” exists for bankruptcy purposes only if the relationship between debtor and creditor contains all of the elements necessary to give rise to a legal obligation under relevant non-bankruptcy law. ... This Court, however, clearly views the debt as a liability on a claim for purposes of 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(5) and 101(12), which arose and originated post-petition, post-conversion and post-discharge.

Section 101(10)(A) includes an administrator authorized by state law to pursue a claim against the debtor as a creditor, even when others ultimately receive the payment.

Fezler v. Davis · filed 1999-10-27(10)(A)

A creditor is an “entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A). ... For the reasons hereinafter assigned, we conclude that Ms. Fezler is a creditor with standing to object to the discharge of the Texas wrongful death claim.

Section 101(5)(B) does not treat a division of marital property under a noncollusive Oregon divorce decree as a claim for breach of performance.

Roost v. Wilber (In Re Parker) · filed 1999-11-03(5)(B)

Property division does not give rise to a claim under Code § 101(5)(B), and parties to whom property is awarded are not creditors under Code § 101(10).

Section 101’s definition of a claim includes contingent, unliquidated obligations to pay future condominium assessments under a prepetition contract.

Stone v. Rubidell Resort Condominium (In Re Stone) · filed 1999-12-06(4)

In reaching its decision, the Seventh Circuit relied on the definitions of “debt” and “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code: ... This reasoning of the Seventh Circuit controls our analysis. ... The condominium maintenance fees that accrued post-petition were discharged in the debtors’ Chapter 7 bankruptcy because under the contract, the debt was incurred pre-petition, although contingent and un-liquidated at the time of filing.

Section 101 defines a debt as liability on a claim, so debt and claim have the same scope in bankruptcy.

Bailey v. Hazen (In Re Ogden) · filed 2000-01-14(12)

The Bankruptcy Code defines “debt” as “liability on a claim.” ... On this basis, in bankruptcy, the definition of the term “debt” is the same as the definition of the term “claim.”

Under the 1988 version of § 101, a former spouse's separate property interest in pension benefits is not a debt of the debtor spouse.

Brogan v. Brogan · filed 2000-03-14(4), (11)

We hold that husband's obligation to wife was not a debt within the meaning of the bankruptcy code. The bankruptcy code defines the term "debt" broadly to include a liability on a "right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, . . . fixed, contingent, matured, [or] unmatured." 11 U.S.C. § 101(4), (11) (1988).

Section 101(5)(A) defines a claim as a right to payment; the VA had no claim against the debtor because it could not recover the separation benefit from him.

Snodgrass v. Department of Veterans Affairs (In Re Snodgrass) · filed 2000-01-19(5)(A)

In the case at bar, there is no agreement between the VA and Snodgrass for the repayment of the SSB. Further, all parties agree that Snodgrass cannot be sued by the VA for recovery of the SSB. Therefore, no matter how broadly you read 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A), the VA has no claim against Snodgrass.

Section 101(5) does not treat a debtor’s request to discharge student loans as a claim when the debtor asserts neither a right to payment nor an equitable remedy for breach of performance.

Seay v. Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. (In Re Seay) · filed 2000-01-19(5)

The debtor does not have a claim against the governmental unit in this case because she asserts no “right to payment” when she asks that her student loan debts be discharged, ... nor does she assert a “right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance,” for nowhere is it alleged that TSAC has breached any duty of performance.

A professional’s fee application is a claim against the debtor under § 101(5).

Osherow v. Ernst & Young, LLP (In Re Intelogic Trace, Inc.) · filed 2000-01-25(5)

Although the fee hearing was a contested matter, Ernst & Young’s fee application was a claim against IT.

Section 101(5)(A) includes an asserted right to payment within the definition of a claim, including a demand for post-confirmation U.S. Trustee fees.

In Re Pettibone Corp. · filed 2000-02-16(5)(A)

First, the dispute over the UST fees is certainly over a “claim” (i.e. an asserted “right to payment” under 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A)) filed post-confirmation against the reorganized debtor.

Section 101(5)(A) defines a claim by a right to payment, which need not be reduced to a fixed dollar amount.

Buglione v. Berlingeri (In Re Berlingeri) · filed 2000-02-24(5)(A)

The key phrase in § 101(5) is “right to payment.” The balance of the language of subsection (A) simply provides that to constitute a claim, the right to payment need not be reduced to an established dollar figure.

Section 101(5) does not treat a defense that reduces or defeats recovery as a claim.

Folger Adam Security, Inc. v. DeMatteis/MacGregor, JV · filed 2000-03-20(5)

We find, however, that a defense is not the same as a claim. ... Although the Bankruptcy Code's definition of claim is broad, a claim requires an enforceable obligation of the debtor to pay the claimant.

Section 101(5) defines a claim as a right to payment or a right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance; a tax purchaser with neither has no claim against the property owner or the owner's property.

Blue v. Town of Lake Building Corp. (In Re Blue) · filed 2000-03-29(5)

Nevertheless, a claim against property of the debtor must still be a “claim” as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(5), which is either a “right to payment” or a “right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance.” Here, there is neither, against Debtor or against her property.

Section 101(5)(A) includes an obligation to repay money paid under a later-vacated court order within the definition of a claim.

Cox v. Cox (In Re Cox) · filed 2000-03-31(5)(A)

The Bankruptcy Code defines a claim as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). The Probate Court ordered the Plaintiff to pay certain sums to the Debtor. He did so. That order was later nullified by the Appeals Court. The obligation to repay those sums constitutes a claim under the Bankruptcy Code.

A bond’s beneficial holder has the claim under § 101(5)(A) because the beneficial holder has the right to payment.

In Re Pioneer Finance Corp. · filed 2000-01-21(5)(A)

Under the Code, a holder of a “claim” is one who has a “right to payment.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). Plainly, it is the beneficial holder, not a holder of record, who has the “claim” and the “right to payment.”

Section 101(10)(A) includes a person owed prepetition attorney’s fees within the definition of a creditor.

Lauria v. Titan Security Ltd. (In Re Lauria) · filed 2000-01-26(10)(A)

According to the Code, a creditor is an “entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A). ... Even had this not been included in the Pretrial Statement, it is clear that Daday is a creditor.

An entity claiming a prepetition right to payment is a creditor even if the debtor disputes the claim.

Solomon v. Barman (In Re Barman) · filed 2000-02-14(10)(A)

Thus, an entity claiming a right to payment that arose pre-petition is a creditor even if the debtor disputes the claim.

Section 101(5)(A) does not recognize a contingent claim when the contingency can no longer occur.

Foothill Capital Corp. v. Official Unsecured Creditors' Committee of Midcom Communications, Inc. · filed 2000-03-10(5)(A)

In summary, where a contingency cannot occur (despite whether it could have transpired at an earlier time), a contingent claim will not lie.

A creditor’s contract right to payment is a claim, and the debtor may list the corresponding debt in bankruptcy schedules.

Comerica Bank v. Johnson (In Re Johnson) · filed 2000-04-06(5), (12)

When defendant subsequently filed bankruptcy, she had the right to include the debt on a contract owing to plaintiff in her schedules. ... Because plaintiff holds nothing more than a contract right to payment, it is dischargeable in the present bankruptcy.

Section 101(5)(A) includes a contingent contractual indemnification right within the definition of a claim when the parties contemplated future liability, even if its scope was unknown.

Olin Corp. v. Riverwood International Corp. · filed 2000-04-07(5)(A)

Thus, the fact that Olin did not know the specific parameters of its liability does not place that liability outside of the definition of “claim” but rather is precisely what made the claim contingent. Under this specific combination of circumstances, we find that future environmental liability was actually or presumedly contemplated by the parties upon their signing of the indemnification agreements and constitutes a valid contingent claim.

Section 101(5) includes contingent rights to payment in the definition of a claim, including claims asserted for setoff.

Commercial Financial Services, Inc. v. Jones (In Re Commercial Financial Services, Inc.) · filed 2000-04-21(5)

Under Sections 101(5) and 553 of the Bankruptcy Code, mutual debts/claims sought to be setoff may be contingent. ... The contingency of a claim against the estate does not affect its status as a claim.

Section 101(5) includes a contingent right to payment based on pre-petition conduct when the creditor knew of the conduct and could fairly contemplate a claim.

In Re: Cool Fuel,incorporated,debtor. Cool Fuel, Incorporated, a California Corporation v. Board of Equalization of the · filed 2000-04-21(5)

Furthermore, we hold that the Board’s claim is an allowable contingent claim under 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(5), 502 because it is based on Cool Fuel’s pre-petition conduct of which the Board had knowledge and could fairly contemplate would lead to a cause of action under § 8971.

Section 101(5) defines a claim as a right to payment, even when that right does not entitle its holder to a distribution.

In Re Citi-Toledo Partners II · filed 2000-04-11(5)

Notwithstanding, merely because an entity holds a “right to payment,” and thus a claim for purposes of § 101(5), does not thereby denote that such an entity is entitled to a distribution under the Bankruptcy Code.

A lease reimbursement obligation that accrued before bankruptcy is a claim even if payment becomes due after the petition.

In Re Learningsmith, Inc. · filed 2000-04-14(5)(A)

Without question, the portion of the Debt- or’s obligation to the Lessor that accrued pre-petition is a "claim” and, unless § 365(d)(3) required otherwise, would be treated as such.

Section 101(5) defines a claim as a right to payment, which includes a creditor's lien securing payment from the debtor's property.

Jewell v. Beeler (In Re Stanton) · filed 2000-05-03(5)

As a result of IFI's lien, IFI had a claim against Debtors and Debtors' estate. A "claim" is a "right to payment[.]" 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). A lien is a "charge against property to secure payment of a debt, which is a right to payment." Colvin v. Petree (In re Dan Hixson Chevrolet Co.), 20 B.R. 108, 110 (Bankr.N.D.Tex. 1982). Section 102(2) provides that a "`claim against the debtor' includes claim against property of the debtor[.]" 11 U.S.C. § 102(2). Thus, IFI's lien against the Property was a claim against Debtors.

Section 101(5)(A) defines a claim as a right to payment; two people with a joint right to payment hold a single claim.

In Re Moss · filed 2000-05-15(5)(A)

A claim is defined as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.... ” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). Thus, while Small and Braithwaite are separate “entities” as defined by the Bankruptcy Code, the issue is whether Small and Braithwaite each have a right to payment from Moss separate from the other under applicable non-bankruptcy law. ... In light of the terms of the agreement, Moss’s uncontradicted testimony that she considered her obligation to Small and Braithwaite to be a joint one, and the cancelled checks made payable to Small and Braithwaite jointly, this Court concludes that Small and Braithwaite hold a single claim against Moss for purposes of § 303(b).

A conditional right to payment is a claim under § 101(5)(A), even if payment depends on a later event.

In re Phones for All, Inc. · filed 2000-05-24(5)(A)

Thus, upon entry of the contract, Lasky obtained a conditional right to payment. A conditional right to payment constitutes a claim under the Code. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A).

Section 101(5) includes postpetition and postconfirmation interest in a claim when the creditor had a right to that interest before the bankruptcy filing, even if payment was not yet due.

In Re Monclova Care Center, Inc. · filed 2000-05-25(5)

Thus, given this fact, it seems evident that Congress meant to include within the framework of a claim under § 101(5) those interest payments, whether postpetition or postconfirmation, that would accrue after a debtor filed for bankruptcy as long as the creditor had a right (although not necessarily a present right) to that interest payment prior to the debtor filing for bankruptcy.

Section 101(5)(A) includes contingent or unliquidated rights to payment, so an administrative compensation claim can exist before the court awards compensation.

In Re Vogt · filed 2000-06-09(5)(A)

Technically, then, if we can borrow the bankruptcy view of “claim” (the issue before us is, rather integrally, a bankruptcy question), there is a claim for administrative expense prior to the order awarding compensation; the claim is simply not made the subject of an award.

Section 101(12) includes an obligation to repay deposited funds as a debt despite a claimed depositor-depositee or beneficiary-trustee relationship.

In Re Carrozzella & Richardson · filed 2000-04-21(12)

The Defendants argue that because their relationship with the Debtor was in the nature of depositor-depositee or beneficiary-trustee no debt was owed. This unsupported argument is uncompelling and contrary to accepted precedent. See In re Schick, 234 B.R. at 347. Thus, it too must be rejected.

Section 101 treats a court-ordered right to payment for a spouse’s business interest as a claim, and liability on that claim as a debt.

Brugger v. Brugger (In Re Brugger) · filed 2000-05-15(5)(A), (12)

Following a broad interpretation of 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) & (12), as instructed by the Supreme Court in Cohen, this Debtor’s obligation fits within the Bankruptcy Code. Creditor Spouse gained a right to payment when Judge Miller ordered Debtor to purchase her 50% interest in XICIS Corporation for $585,000.

Section 101 defines a debt as liability on a claim and a claim as a right to payment; a debt can arise from fraud without a loan.

Cantrell, Bobbie D. v. McClellan, Harold W. · filed 2000-07-05(5), (12)

The Bankruptcy Code defines "debt" very broadly, as "liability on a claim," 11 U.S.C. sec. 101(12), and "claim" very broadly, as any "right to payment," whether liquidated or unliquidated, disputed or undisputed, legal or equitable. sec. 101(5); see generally Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 83-84 and n. 5 (1991). A debt need not, therefore, arise from a loan.

Section 101 defines debt broadly as liability on a claim and claim as a right to payment; a debt need not arise from a loan.

McClellan v. Cantrell · filed 2000-07-05(5), (12)

The Bankruptcy Code defines "debt" very broadly, as "liability on a claim," 11 U.S.C. sec. 101(12), and "claim" very broadly, as any "right to payment," whether liquidated or unliquidated, disputed or undisputed, legal or equitable. sec. 101(5); see generally Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 83-84 and n. 5 (1991). A debt need not, therefore, arise from a loan.

Section 101(5)(B) treats an equitable remedy for breach as a claim when payment is an adequate alternative to that remedy.

Creator's Way Associated Labels, Inc. v. Mitchell (In Re Mitchell) · filed 2000-05-24(5)(B)

An equitable remedy, such as an injunction, will “give rise to a right to payment,” and therefore be discharged, if payment of a monetary remedy is an alternative to the equitable remedy.

Section 101(12) defines a debt as liability on a claim; a former spouse’s direct ownership interest in pension funds is not the debtor’s debt when the debtor owes no payment.

Brown v. Pitzer (In Re Brown) · filed 2000-06-02(12)

Whether Pitzer has some right to payment from Brown naturally depends on the language of the state divorce decree itself, so we begin with an analysis of Indiana law to determine the nature of Pitzer’s interest in the marital pension. ... Appellee Pitzer owned an independent, direct property interest in $55,770.33 of the pension fund that neither constituted Brown’s dischargeable “debt” nor became a part of Brown’s subsequent bankruptcy estate.

Section 101(12) defines debt as liability on a claim, encompassing the debtor’s full liability for fraud.

Roussos v. Michaelides (In Re Roussos) · filed 2000-07-07(12)

The definition of “debt” as “liability on a claim,” means that the nondischargeable debt must be the total liability of that perpetrator for the fraud.

Section 101 defines a debt as liability on a claim; an obligation the creditor cannot enforce is not a debt.

In Re: Kimball Trdg · filed 2000-07-07(12)

Engage correctly states that in De La Cruz the Supreme Court stated that a “debt” is defined as a “liability on a claim” and a “claim” in turn is defined as a “right to payment”, which is “nothing more nor less than an enforceable obligation.” De La Cruz, 523 U.S. at 217. However, Engage has failed to demonstrate that its Redelivery Obligation to Kimball was an enforceable obligation.

Section 101(12) treats an obligation as a debt when a creditor has a right to payment for which the debtor is liable.

Beyer v. Beyer, No. Fa98 0075862 (Jul. 11, 2000) · filed 2000-07-11(12)

The Bankruptcy Code defines a debt as "liability on a claim". ... This court finds that the plaintiff has a right to payment for which the defendant is liable and that the debt requirement of the Bankruptcy Code is satisfied.

Sections 101(5)(A) and 101(10)(A) require an enforceable right to payment against the debtor for a claimant to be a creditor; the definitions do not create that right.

In Re Okura & Co. (America), Inc. · filed 2000-06-15(5)(A), (10)(A)

These provisions do not create substantive rights, instead they set the context for the exercise of rights that may already exist.

Section 101(5) includes a contingent right to a property equalization payment as a claim when the parties could fairly contemplate it before bankruptcy, even if payment was ordered later.

In Re Emelity · filed 2000-07-05(5)

The Code includes a right to payment that is both contingent and disputed within the definition of claim. ... Michelle’s right to payment, albeit contingent, disputed and unliquidated, arose prepetition. The debt arising from the equalization payment was therefore discharged.

Section 101(12A)’s definition of a debt for child support can include court-ordered reimbursement to a county for aid provided to a debtor’s children, even when the debt is no longer owed to the family.

In Re: Paul Alan Leibowitz, Debtor. Paul Alan Leibowitz v. County of Orange Tony Rackauckas, 1 District Attorney of Coun · filed 2000-07-06(12A)

However, the definition section of the Bankruptcy Code defines “debt for child support” as “a debt of a kind specified in section 523(a)(5) of this title for maintenance or support of a child of the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(12A). ... Under this definition, Leibowitz’s debt to the County qualifies as one “in the nature of support.”

Section 101(5) includes a right to payment from a debtor’s property even when the debtor’s personal liability has been discharged.

In re Boylan · filed 2000-07-26(5)

That review and a reading of the statutes cause the Court to find that Peoples is an entity with a “right to payment” from property of the debtors or their bankruptcy estate which arose prepetition. Accordingly, Peoples has a “claim” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(5), as amplified by 11 U.S.C. § 102(2).

A servicing agent with no right to payment or equitable remedy against the debtor does not hold a claim under § 101(5) and is not a creditor under § 101(10).

In Re O'Dell · filed 2000-08-02(5), (10)

Therefore, this Court finds and concludes that Max Flow does not possess a claim against the estate and thereby cannot be a creditor of these Debtors.

Section 101(5) defines a claim to include a right to payment from the bankruptcy estate, even when payment is sought as an administrative expense for a postpetition obligation.

Snider v. Commercial Financial Services, Inc. (In Re Commercial Financial Services, Inc.) · filed 2000-08-21(5)

Plaintiffs have asserted a “right to payment” from the estate and thus a “claim” against the estate.

Section 101(5) includes a right to payment for pre-discharge conduct within the definition of a claim even if the claimant receives a right-to-sue letter after discharge.

O'LOghLin v. County of Orange · filed 2000-10-06(5)

Insofar as O’Loghlin’s ADA claim against the County is based on predischarge violations of the ADA, we agree with the district court that it is a “claim” within the definition of § 101(5), even though O’Loghlin did not receive her right-to-sue letter until after the County’s debts had been discharged.

Section 101 treats an entity with a disputed right to payment against the debtor as a creditor.

In Re O'Shaughnessy · filed 2000-08-22(5)(A), (10)(A)

Under 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A), a creditor is defined as an “entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor.” Further, 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) defines claim as including a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, mature, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” Based on this statutory language and the allegations in the draft complaint, the Court finds that Ovid is a creditor of the Debtor.

Section 101(10) does not treat an administrative expense claimant as a creditor.

Camelot Music, Inc. v. MHW Advertising & Public Relations, Inc. (In Re CM Holdings, Inc.) · filed 2000-08-28(10)

Thus, by definition, an administrative expense claimant is not considered a “creditor” pursuant to § 101(10).

Section 101(5)(A) defines a claim to include a right to payment, including future payments owed under an agreement.

AGV Productions, Inc. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. · filed 2000-09-15(5)(A)

The Distribution Agreements gave rise to "claims” under the Code and the Orion Plan, because they triggered a "right to payment” on behalf of Hemdale for an indefinite period in the future.

Section 101(12)’s definition of debt does not include a former spouse’s ownership interest in a portion of the debtor’s military pension.

Baker v. Baker (In Re Baker) · filed 2000-10-13(12)

Because of the express language in the order of the Family Court as well as the fact that in this case the payments are being paid directly by the DFSA, the Court finds that Ms. Baker has an ownership interest in the portion of Defendant’s military pay that was awarded to her pursuant to the divorce decree, and no debt exists for future payments by Debtor to be discharged through bankruptcy.

A county’s statutory bad-check processing fee is a claim because it is a right to payment, making the county a creditor.

Movitz v. Maricopa County (In Re Ball) · filed 2001-01-09(5), (10)

Regardless of what the fee may be called, it is a “right to payment,” which makes it a claim pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). ... Because the County is an entity that has a claim, it is a creditor by virtue of the plain language of § 101(10), and therefore payment of that fee satisfies the first element of a preference pursuant to § 547(b)(1).

Sections 101(5) and (12) define “claim” and “debt” as coextensive: a debt is liability on a claim.

McAlpin v. Educational Credit Management Corp. (In Re McAlpin) · filed 2000-10-26(5), (12)

Perhaps the court’s confusion arose from its premise that “claim allowance and debt liability are different concepts.” ... However, this premise is contrary to the cases discussed above, and to the interpretation of “debt” and “claim” by the United States Supreme Court.

Section 101(10)(A) includes a person whose right to payment depends on a surplus, even if that person cannot collect the claim directly.

Callihan v. Costello (In Re Costello) · filed 2000-11-13(10)(A)

It therefore follows that Callihan, notwithstanding her inability to sue on the claim, is a “creditor” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(9)(A).

A judgment pending appeal remains a debt because it is a liability on a claim, even if state law denies it res judicata effect.

In Re Mitchell · filed 2000-11-15(12)

The term “debt” is defined in the Bankruptcy Code as “liability on a claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(12). ... Accordingly, the California judgment, regardless of how the Debtors may view it, is entitled to recognition as a final judgment for purposes of § 109(e) and must be listed as a debt or liability on claim in a bankruptcy case.

Section 101(5)(B) does not treat a right to enforce a noncompetition provision as a claim when its breach gives rise to no right to payment.

Sir Speedy, Inc. v. Morse · filed 2000-12-29(5)(B)

This Court has already held that Sir Speedy’s right to enforce the non-competition provision of its Franchise Agreement is not a “claim” under § 101(5)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code.

A creditor's claim arises when the acts giving rise to it occur, even if judgment is entered after the bankruptcy petition.

In Re McGee · filed 2001-01-12(10)(A)

The Bankruptcy Code defines a “creditor” partly as an “entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor.” § 101(10)(A). ... The claims in this case arose prepetition, when the acts giving rise to the claim occurred.

Section 101(10) treats a government agency pursuing a claim against a bankruptcy estate as a creditor.

Ultimate Sportsbar, Inc. v. United States · filed 2001-01-31(10)

EPA sought to vindicate a claim as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(5), and it was thus a creditor under 11 U.S.C. § 101(10).

Section 101(5)(A) treats a contingent right to payment under a pre-petition contract as a claim, even when a later event supports another theory for the same payment.

In Re Pinnacle Brands, Inc. · filed 2001-02-06(5)(A)

It is significant that Huhtamaki does not have two separate claims, one pre-petition and one post-petition. Rather it has one claim, with two separate legal theories. Since Huhtamaki could have asserted its claim pre-petition (under its contractual indemnification theory), we find that it had a “right of payment” pre-petition for that claim and, therefore, its entire claim is a pre-petition claim.

Section 101(5)(A) defines a claim broadly enough to include a disputed right to payment.

In Re Segre's Iron Works, Inc. · filed 2001-03-02(5)(A)

In bankruptcy, the term “claim” means “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, ... [or] disputed....” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (1996). ... Hence this Court concludes that, at the very least, Emmerich holds a disputed claim against the Debtor.

A pawn broker has a contingent claim when a debtor may pay to redeem pledged property, even if the debtor has no obligation to pay.

In Re Young · filed 2001-03-08(5)

Even though the Debtors have no obligation to redeem the property or make a payment pursuant to the statute, the very fact that they may do so gives Cash America at least a contingent right to payment. Therefore, Cash America has a claim, and as such, is considered a creditor within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(5)(A) includes a right to payment as a claim even before a judgment makes it enforceable through the courts.

United States v. Westley · filed 2001-03-21(5)(A)

The obligation to return the property arose when the fraudulent transfer occurred; the district court’s order of June 17, 1998, merely made that obligation enforceable through the courts. ... Because the claim existed prior to the Westleys filing for bankruptcy, it was subject to discharge in the 1994 bankruptcy action.

Section 101(5)(B) treats a remedy that is simply an alternative to payment as a bankruptcy claim.

In Re Storm Technology, Inc. · filed 2001-03-27(5)(B)

"Where a party has a remedy that is simply an alternative to a right to payment, that party merely has a claim in the bankruptcy case.

Section 101(5) includes a right to payment as a claim even when it is not yet enforceable.

Pearl-Phil GMT (Far East) Ltd. v. Caldor Corp. · filed 2001-03-30(5)

Thus, under the Code, a right to payment need not be currently enforceable in order to constitute a claim.

Section 101(5) includes contingent and unmatured rights within the definition of a claim, even when they are not yet ripe for suit.

Stone Street Services, Inc. v. Granati (In Re Granati) · filed 2001-04-09(5)

11 U.S.C. § 101(5). Thus, causes of action which are contingent or unmatured under state law are nevertheless “claims,” and hence dischargeable, even though not yet ripe for suit.

Section 101(12) includes unpaid insurance premiums within the definition of debt because they are contingent liabilities on claims.

Green v. LifeUSA Insurance · filed 2001-02-20(12)

Unpaid insurance premiums constitute “debt” for purposes of bankruptcy because they are contingent liabilities.

Section 101(12) defines a debt as liability on a claim, determined from the claim’s factual and legal basis immediately before bankruptcy.

Andre Emmerich Gallery, Inc. v. Segretario (In Re Segretario) · filed 2001-03-02(12)

A debtor’s liability on a pre-petition claim must be determined on the strength of the claim’s factual and legal underpinnings as they existed immediately prior to the order for relief in bankruptcy.

Section 101(12) defines a debt as liability on a claim; the liability need not have been reduced to judgment.

Clemens v. West Milton State Bank (In Re Clemens) · filed 2001-03-09(12)

The Bankruptcy Code defined “debts” as a “liability on a claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(12). ... It is coextensive with the definition of claim and, therefore, need not be reduced to judgment. ... The Debtor, indeed, is owed a debt from the Bank as of the filing date.

A depositor with a right to repayment is a creditor, and the debtor’s obligation to repay the deposit is a debt.

Daly v. Crandall (In Re Carrozzella & Richardson) · filed 2001-02-28(5), (10), (12)

The Court concludes that at all relevant times the Defendants were “creditors” of the Debtor, in that they had a “right to payment” of their Deposited Funds. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5), (10) (1995). The Court further concludes that the Debtor was hable for the repayment of such funds, and therefore, the Transfers were made on account of antecedent “debts.” See 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (1995).

Section 101(5)(A) includes a contingent right to payment within the definition of a claim, even when payment becomes due after the bankruptcy petition.

Lightowler v. Continental Insurance · filed 2001-04-10(5)(A)

In other words, Continental’s right to recover against Brayton pursuant to the deductible provision in the policy constitutes a dis-chargeable claim for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code because Brayton’s obligation under the deductible provision of the policy existed prepetition and, although his payment obligation thereunder was contingent on the occurrence of an event in the future, that future occurrence—the filing of a legal malpractice action against Brayton—was within the contemplation of Brayton and Continental when the policy was issued.

A disputed right to payment is a claim, and an entity holding that claim qualifies as a creditor.

Korte v. United States Internal Revenue Service (In Re Korte) · filed 2001-05-07(5)(A), (10)(A)

Moreover, though Debtor may dispute the amount or nature of the IRS’s claim or that claim may ultimately be reduced or disallowed, the IRS nevertheless holds a “claim,” thereby qualifying it as a “creditor” under § 727(c)(1) with standing to object to Debtor’s discharge.

Section 101(5)(A) includes a disputed right to payment within the definition of a claim.

United States v. Korte · filed 2001-05-07(5)(A)

Moreover, though Debtor may dispute the amount or nature of the IRS's claim or that claim may ultimately be reduced or disallowed, the IRS nevertheless holds a “claim,” thereby qualifying it as a “creditor” under § 727(c)(1) with standing to object to Debtor's discharge.

Section 101(5) excludes an equitable remedy from the definition of a claim when the breach gives rise to no right to payment.

In Re Willets · filed 2001-05-10(5)

Nonetheless, the non-monetary nature of the remedy leads to the same conclusion: the injunction is not a “claim” and the judgment ordering it is not a “judgment lien” avoidable in bankruptcy.

The definitions of claim and debt bear on when a debt arises, but do not determine when value is conveyed.

Gray v. Oppenheimer & Co. (In Re Molten Metal Technology, Inc.) · filed 2001-05-11(5), (12)

The Trustee's reliance on the definition of claim is misplaced. The definition of claim is relevant to the issue of when a debt is deemed to have arisen, 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) ("debt” means liability on a claim), but not to when value should be deemed to have been conveyed.