Statute Annotations › Federal › 11 U.S.C. § 101

11 U.S.C. § 101

Definitions: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Federal
Case notes
6,417
Cited in passing
6,926
Citing cases indexed
19,103
Case dates
1968–2026
Screened through
2026-06-26
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

13,343 citing cases reviewed of 19,103 in the citation index: 6,417 interpreted the section (annotated below), 6,926 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-06-26 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under 11 U.S.C. § 101?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Later changes in law

Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".

  • 1979-10-01 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 replaced former 11 U.S.C. § 101, which governed bankruptcy depositories, with the definitions section of the new Bankruptcy Code. Source
  • 1982-06-28 The Ninth Circuit reversed the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in In re Co Petro Marketing Group, Inc. and held that Co Petro was not a commodity broker under § 101(5) because its futures contracts were outside any contract market. Source
  • 1984-07-10 The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act renumbered the transfer definition from § 101(40) to § 101(48) and expressly included foreclosure of a debtor’s equity of redemption. Source
  • 1986-10-27 Public Law 99-554 added the family farmer definition at § 101(17) and moved the existing farmer definition to § 101(19). Source
  • 1990-05-29 Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, held that criminal restitution obligations are debts under § 101(11), displacing earlier decisions that excluded them from the definition. Source
  • 1990-08-30 The Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc in Bush v. Taylor, 912 F.2d 989, vacated its January 1990 panel opinion and held that future pension installments became debts only when due and unpaid. Source
  • 2010-06-07 The Supreme Court in Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S. 505, held that a Chapter 13 court may account for income or expense changes known or virtually certain at confirmation when projecting disposable income; § 101(10A) still supplies the historical starting figure. Source
  • 2019-05-20 Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 587 U.S. 370, held that rejecting a trademark license under § 365 breaches the contract but does not rescind the licensee’s surviving rights, overturning the contrary Tempnology ruling. Source
  • 2020-02-19 The Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 narrowed § 101(51D)(A)’s real property exclusion to debtors whose primary activity is single asset real estate; owning or operating other real property no longer excludes a debtor on that ground. Source
  • 2023-06-15 Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Coughlin, 599 U.S. 382, held that federally recognized Indian tribes are governmental units under § 101(27), displacing contrary decisions on tribal sovereign immunity. Source

Former Bankruptcy Act: depository banks

Law changed since The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 replaced former § 101 with the Code’s definitions section, effective October 1, 1979.

Section 101 limits a designated bankruptcy depository’s special duties to accounts of receivers or trustees, excluding an auctioneer’s ordinary accounts.

In re Union National Bank & Trust Co. · filed 1968-08-01

The Court finds, therefore, that the duties of depository banks to the Bankruptcy Court, as covered by the Order of designation, the Bankruptcy Act, and the orders and regulations promulgated thereunder, do not extend beyond the accounts of receivers or trustees in bankruptcy.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Former § 101 did not make a bank liable merely because it accepted bankruptcy funds without being a designated depository.

American Fidelity Fire Insurance v. Joy · filed 1975-07-24

In its memorandum to the Court, plaintiff suggests that the liability of BNS, which all parties agree was not a designated depository in April of 1973, should be based upon its acceptance of the funds alone, on the ground that the bank is imputed with the knowledge of the terms of the Bankruptcy Act and the general orders promulgated thereunder. To begin with, this notion was specifically discredited in the case of Rodgers v. Bankers’ National Bank, 179 Minn. 197, 229 N.W. 90 (1930); and secondly, in light of the Fourth Circuit’s finding in American Surety that the bank’s officers had actual knowledge of the breach of trust of which the trustee was guilty in making the deposit, such notion would be dictum.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 61 requires courts to designate bankruptcy depositories and require them to post a surety bond; a bank that accepts estate funds without designation is absolutely liable if those funds are later misappropriated.

American Fidelity Fire Insurance v. Joy · filed 1976-03-24

The complement to this requirement was found in Section 61 of the Act, 11 U.S.C. § 101, 11 which required that the bankruptcy court designate by order those banking institutions authorized as depositories for the deposit of estate funds. ... Here, however, where the banks accepted bankruptcy funds without court designation, we impose absolute liability solely because of the acceptance of such funds in violation of the Bankruptcy Act.
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Entities and governmental units

Section 101’s definitions of debtors and creditors include governmental entities when assessing a trustee’s avoidance claim against the government.

Zazzali v. United States (In Re DBSI, Inc.) · filed 2017-08-31

Under both the Bankruptcy Code and Idaho’s UFTA, debtors and creditors are defined to include the government. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(10), (13), (15), (41); Idaho Code §§ 55-910(4), (9). In turn, both Section 544(b)(1) and Idaho’s UFTA provide a substantive cause of action against the government—i.e., an avenue for relief.
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Section 101(15) includes governmental units within the definition of “entity.”

In re Odom · filed 2017-08-10(15)

The cited decisions find support in the text of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), which does not limit the statutory injunction to the acts of creditors. The statute states that the bankruptcy filing operates as a stay “applicable to all entities.” The Code defines entity as including “person, estate, trust governmental unit and the United States trustee.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(15). Thus, § 362(a) creates a comprehensive injunction. If an entity acts to collect a prepetition debt not subject to automatic stay exceptions stated in § 362(b), the entity has violated the statutory injunction. It is irrelevant that the entity was collecting the debt on behalf of another.
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Section 101(27) includes the IRS and the United States as governmental units.

Benson v. United States (In re Benson) · filed 2017-04-03(27)

Because the IRS and the United States are governmental units within the meaning of this provision, they have waived immunity as set forth therein.
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Section 101(27) defines “governmental unit” to include a foreign state.

RMS Titanic, Inc. v. French Republic (In re RMS Titanic, Inc.) · filed 2017-04-25(27)

The waiver or abrogation of sovereign immunity under § 106(a) applies to “governmental units,” which is expressly defined in § 101 of the Bankruptcy Code to include foreign states.
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Law changed since Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Coughlin, 599 U.S. 382 (June 15, 2023), held that federally recognized Indian tribes are governmental units under § 101(27), displacing this exclusion.

Section 101(27)'s definition of “governmental unit,” read with § 106(a), does not unequivocally abrogate Indian tribes’ sovereign immunity.

Casino Caribean LLC v. Money Centers of America, Inc. (In re Money Center of America, Inc.) · filed 2017-02-28(27)

The Court finds that, as neither the terms “Indians” nor “Indian tribes” were included in the language of section 101(27) of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress did not unequivocally express an intent to abrogate the sovereign immunity of Indian tribes in section 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.
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Section 101(15) defines “entity” to include a person.

Scarver v. Ellis (In re McKeever) · filed 2017-02-14(15)

Under 11 U.S.C. § 101(15), an entity includes a “person”, therefore section 542(a) includes Mr. McKeever and Ellis in addition to MP & B and Viaduct.
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Section 101(27) includes municipalities in the definition of a governmental unit.

Aviles v. City of Philadelphia Water Revenue Bureau (In re Quiles Aviles) · filed 2015-07-01(27)

Therefore, the court finds that the City of Philadelphia is “government unit” for bankruptcy purposes.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 101(27)’s phrase “other domestic governments” does not clearly and unequivocally include Indian tribes for purposes of abrogating tribal sovereign immunity under § 106(a).

Buchwald Capital Advisors, LLC v. Papas (In re Greektown Holdings, LLC) · filed 2015-06-09(27)

While perhaps it may be said with “perfect confidence” that Indian tribes are both “domestic” in character and function as a “government,” this Court cannot say with “perfect confidence” that Congress combined those terms in a single phrase in § 101(27) to clearly, unequivocally and unmistakably express its intent to include Indian tribes among those sovereign entities specifically mentioned whose immunity was thereby abrogated.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 101(27)’s definition of “governmental unit” excludes Indian tribes from “foreign or domestic governments.”

Bucher v. Dakota Finance Corporation · filed 2012-07-19(27)

Chief Justice Marshall’s conclusion, rather than supporting the trustees’ position here, demonstrates that Indian tribes are neither foreign nor domestic governments within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code definition of “governmental unit.”
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 101(27)’s definition of “governmental unit” does not include Indian tribes.

Bucher v. Dakota Finance Corp. (In re Whitaker) · filed 2012-07-19(27)

Chief Justice Marshall’s conclusion, rather than supporting the trustees’ position here, demonstrates that Indian tribes are neither foreign nor domestic governments within the meaning of the Bankruptcy • Code definition of “governmental unit.”
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Section 101(27) excludes a court-appointed receiver from the definition of governmental unit when the receiver is not a government instrumentality.

In re Jefferson County · filed 2012-01-19(27)

Under § 101(27), the Receiver is not a governmental unit unless it is an instrumentality of the Alabama court. Case law demonstrates the Receiver is not within this definition.
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Section 101 defines an entity to include a governmental unit and a governmental unit to include the United States, so the IRS is subject to turnover under § 542.

In Re Bush Gardens, Inc. v. United States · filed 1979-11-21(14), (21)

An entity under the Code includes any “person, estate, trust, governmental unit”. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14). “Governmental unit” includes the United States. 11 U.S.C. § 101(21). Accordingly, the Internal Revenue Service as a governmental unit comes within the purview of Section 542.
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Section 101 defines an entity to include a governmental unit and a governmental unit to include a state, allowing a state to be subject to turnover under Section 542.

Troy Industrial Catering Service v. State, Department of Treasury, Revenue Division (In Re Troy Industrial Catering Serv · filed 1980-01-18(14), (21)

An entity under the Bankruptcy Code “includes any person, estate, trust, governmental unit.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(14). “Governmental unit” includes the United States or any state. 11 U.S.C. § 101(21). Thus, if the property seized is property of the estate that the debtor may use, sell, or lease under § 363 of the Bankruptcy Code, and if it is property of more than inconsequential value or benefit to the estate, the State may be required to return the property.
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Section 101 defines federal agencies as governmental units and includes governmental units within the definition of entities.

In Re Buren · filed 1980-03-28(14), (21)

The Social Security Administration is a “governmental unit” under § 101(21) and, therefore, is an “entity” under § 101(14).
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A federal department is a governmental unit under § 101(21) and therefore an entity under § 101(14).

In Re Howell · filed 1980-03-28(14)

The Department is a “governmental unit” under § 101(21) and, therefore, is an “entity” under § 101(14).
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Section 101(14) includes a person within the definition of “entity,” so an attorney awarded fees directly is another entity.

Monday v. Allen (In Re Allen) · filed 1980-06-12(14)

The judgment in the State Court directed the defendant to pay the designated sum directly to the attorney, clearly a debt assigned to another entity. ... “Entity” includes person, estate, trust, governmental unit.
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Section 101(14) includes governmental units as entities, making a state subject to turnover under § 542 when its requirements are met.

Meehan v. Commonwealth (In Re Barsky) · filed 1980-10-20(14)

3. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, an entity pursuant to § 101,11 U.S.C. § 101, is required to turn over said property to the trustee and to account for same in accordance with § 542, 11 U.S.C. § 542.
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Section 101 defines an entity to include a governmental unit and a governmental unit to include a state or its instrumentality.

In Re State of Missouri · filed 1980-12-02(14), (21)

An entity includes, by definition, any “person, estate, trust, governmental unit.” 11 U.S.C. 101(14). And governmental unit means” .. . State ... or instrumentality of ... a State.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(21).
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Section 101(14) defines an entity to include a governmental unit, so a city is covered by Code provisions that apply to all entities.

In Re Eisenberg · filed 1980-12-10(14)

The fact that the City of Long Beach is a governmental unit as defined in 11 U.S.C. section 101(21), does not immunize it from the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. section 362(a). The automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. section 362(a) expressly apply to “all entities”. 11 U.S.C. section 101(14) provides that “entity includes person, estate, trust, governmental unit.”
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Section 101’s definitions of “entity” and “governmental unit” include federal agencies, allowing a Chapter 13 income deduction order to reach the Social Security Administration.

In Re Hughes · filed 1980-12-18(14), (21)

That section provides that after confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan, the court may order any “entity” from which the debtor receives income to pay it or part of it to the trustee. “Entity” in-eludes any department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14) (entity) & § 101(21) (governmental unit) (1979).
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Section 101(14) defines “entity” to include private persons and governmental units.

Porter v. Gwinn (In Re Gwinn) · filed 1981-02-03(14)

Its broad wording affects all assignments to “another entity.” “Entity” is defined by the Code as including a “person, estate, trust, [or] governmental unit.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(14) (1978). Although the principal thrust of subsection (A) may have been aimed at state and federal social welfare agencies, the Court believes that it was purposely drafted to include private, as well as public collection entities or assignees.
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Section 101(14) defines “entity” broadly enough to include a bank.

Hickman v. First State Bank of Cordele (In Re Motley) · filed 1981-03-24(14)

Entities is defined at 11 U.S.C. § 101(14) and “person” therein is defined at 11 U.S.C. § 101(30). ... Bank is an “entity” to which the stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) is applicable.
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Section 101(14) includes governmental units within the definition of “entity,” allowing a turnover order against the IRS when the property qualifies.

Alpa Corp. v. Internal Revenue Service (In Re Alpa Corp.) · filed 1981-05-15(14)

Under 11 U.S.C. § 101(14), an “entity” includes a “governmental unit;” therefore, providing the property involved is “property that the trustee may use, sell, or lease under section 363,” the Court may issue a turnover order against the IRS.
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Section 101(14) defines “entity” to include a governmental unit.

Iowa State Department of Social Services v. Morris (In Re Morris) · filed 1981-04-15(14)

Section 101(14) defines “entity” to include a governmental unit.
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Section 101 defines “entity” to include a governmental unit, which includes a state.

In Re George D. Glidden, Debtor. State of Connecticut v. George D. Glidden, United States of America, Intervenor · filed 1981-06-25(14), (21)

The term “entity” is elsewhere defined to include “governmental unit,” see 11 U.S.C. § 101(14), which in turn encompasses “State,” id. § 101(21).
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Section 101(14) includes governmental units within the definition of “entity.”

Campbell v. Gerace · filed 1981-07-28(14)

11 U.S.C. § 362 operates as a stay, applicable to all entities. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14) includes governmental units as an “entity”.
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Section 101(14) defines “entity” to include a governmental unit.

In Re Sandmar Corp. · filed 1981-07-31(14)

The stay provided by 11 U.S.C. § 362 applies to any “entity.” The term entity includes a governmental unit. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14).
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The Social Security Administration is a governmental unit under § 101(21) and therefore an entity under § 101(14).

In Re Craig · filed 1981-10-23(14), (21)

Thus the Social Security Administration is a governmental unit under section 101(21) of the Code, and is an entity under section 101(14) of the Code.
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Section 101 defines an entity to include a governmental unit and a governmental unit to include a state, bringing state pension systems within Chapter 13 income payment orders.

Matter of Ross · filed 1982-02-12(14), (2)

§ 101(14) defines entity to include, “estate, trust, governmental unit ...” § 101(2) defines governmental unit to include a state. Thus, a trustee may order the pension systems, state agencies, to pay the pension benefits (income of the § 541 estate see 11 U.S.C. § 1306) to the trustee to administer the debtor’s plans.
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Section 101(14) defines “entity” broadly enough to include more than welfare agencies.

Dirks v. Dirks (In Re Dirks) · filed 1981-12-04(14)

Likewise, cases which limit the scope of Section 523(a)(5)(A) to assignments to welfare agencies must also be criticized because the term “entity” defined in 11 U.S.C. Section 101(14) includes far more than just welfare agencies.
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Section 101(14) defines “entity” to include persons, trusts, and governmental units.

Willard v. Willard (In Re Willard) · filed 1981-12-17(14)

The term “entity” is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(14) as including persons, trusts and governmental units. Although this definition is not exclusive, ... there is no indication that the automatic stay would act to stay the entry of judgment by a court.
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Section 101(14) includes governmental units within the definition of “entity.”

In Re Mason · filed 1982-03-12(14)

11 U.S.C. Section 101(14) provides that “entity” includes, among others, a governmental unit.
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Section 101(21) defines governmental unit to include a municipal transit authority that is a subdivision of a state agency.

Matter of Marine Elec. Ry. Prods. Div., Inc. · filed 1982-02-26(21)

Based on this description of the composition and responsibilities of the NYCTA and on the fact that it is in essence a municipal entity, the Authority is without doubt a governmental unit covered by Section 525.
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Section 101(21) defines “governmental unit” to include a municipal entity such as the New York City Transit Authority.

Marine Electric Railway Products Division, Inc. v. New York City Transit Authority (In re Marine Electric Railway Produc · filed 1982-02-26(21)

“Governmental unit” is defined in Section 101(21) of the Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101(21), as the following: ... Based on this description of the composition and responsibilities of the NYCTA and on the fact that it is in essence a municipal entity, the Authority is without doubt a governmental unit covered by Section 525.
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Section 101 treats the IRS as a creditor because its definitions include a federal agency as an entity that can hold a claim against a debtor.

In Re Holcomb · filed 1982-03-12(9), (14), (21)

Initially, it is clear that IRS occupies a status of “creditor” in this Chapter 13 proceeding, and in such status possesses no rights greater than any other creditor.
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Section 101(14)’s definition of “entity” includes a bankruptcy trustee.

Zimmerman v. Starnes (In Re Fields) · filed 1982-09-15(14)

We find that the panel trustee, Mr. Zimmerman, is a legal entity. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14) defines entity as including a person, estate, trust or governmental unit.
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Section 101 includes state retirement systems within its definition of entities, making them subject to Chapter 13 income deduction orders.

Regan v. Ross · filed 1982-10-06(14)

Section 101(14) defines "entity" as including both trusts and governmental units. 11 U.S.C. § 101(21) defines "governmental unit" to include a "department, agency, or instrumentality of ... a State, a Commonwealth, a District, a Territory, a municipality, or a foreign state." There is thus little question that the retirement systems are "entities" subject to income deduction orders.
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Section 101(21) does not treat an educational loan trust fund as a governmental unit merely because governmental regents serve as its trustees.

Shore v. Columbus College (In re Shore) · filed 1982-10-13(21)

Governmental unit is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(21), and the lender herein is not included in that definition. ... The fact that the trustees of the trust fund are a governmental unit does not result in a loan “made by” a governmental unit.
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Section 101(14) includes governmental units such as the Social Security Administration within the definition of an entity.

In Re Greene · filed 1983-02-09(14)

11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) enables bankruptcy courts to order any entity from which a debtor receives income to pay to the bankruptcy trustee all or any part of the debtor’s income. A governmental unit such as the Social Security Administration is considered to be an entity within the purview of this statute. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14).
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Section 101(21)'s definition of governmental unit includes a regional transit authority that is a political subdivision of a state.

In Re Latchaw · filed 1982-11-08(21)

In so holding, this Court initially finds that Metro is a governmental unit under the definition of that term in the Bankruptcy Code.
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Section 101(14) includes governmental units in its definition of an entity; the court treated a state court as a governmental unit covered by the bankruptcy stay order.

First Nat. Bank of Shreveport v. Crawford · filed 1983-01-17(14)

An entity under the Bankruptcy Code "includes any person, estate, trust, governmental unit." 11 U.S.C. § 101(14). "Governmental unit" includes the United States or any state. In the Matter of Troy Indus. Catering Service, 2 B.R. 521 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Mich.1980). A state court is a governmental unit for the purposes of the interpretation of "applicable entities" as contained within the instant stay order; therefore, it is obvious that the stay order is not only addressed to all creditors, including the Bank, but also to the trial court and its officers.
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Section 101(21) defines “governmental unit” to include an agency of the United States.

In Re Newlin · filed 1983-04-19(21)

“Governmental unit” includes an agency of the United States. 11 U.S.C. § 101(21).
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Section 101(21) includes municipalities within the definition of “governmental unit.”

City of Memphis v. Wilson (In Re Wilson) · filed 1983-04-27(21)

Under 11 U.S.C. § 101(21) “governmental unit” is defined as including a “municipality” such as the plaintiff here.
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Section 101 defines an entity to include a governmental unit, which includes a federal agency such as the Social Security Administration.

United States v. Devall · filed 1983-05-16(14), (21)

Moreover, the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of “entity” makes clear that the provision for income deductions applies to government agencies such as the Social Security Administration.
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Section 101(14) defines “entity” to include governmental units.

Wallingford's Fruit House v. Inhabitants of Auburn (In Re Wallingford's Fruit House) · filed 1983-06-06(14)

The automatic stay applies to all “entities,” which by definition includes governmental units.
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The governmental unit definition in § 101 includes a state university college as a state agency or instrumentality.

In Re Joan Edna Shore, Debtor. Columbus College, a Unit of the University System of Georgia v. Shore · filed 1983-06-24(21)

Columbus College is a governmental unit within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(2) (Supp.IV.1980). That section defines a governmental unit to include a state or department, agency, or instrumentality of a state. Columbus College is an institution in the university system of Georgia. Control of institutions in the system is vested in the Board of Regents, a state governmental agency.
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Section 101(21) limits “governmental unit” to actual governmental entities and excludes private organizations acting in a governmental capacity.

Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Revere Copper Products, Inc. (In Re Revere Copper & Brass, Inc.) · filed 1983-08-22(21)

Clearly, both the statutory language and the legislative history demonstrate that the term “governmental unit” in the bankruptcy code refers exclusively to actual governmental groups and not to organizations acting in a governmental capacity.
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Section 101 defines “entity” to include governmental units and “governmental unit” to include federal agencies such as the IRS.

In Re Burrow · filed 1984-01-25(14), (21)

The term “entity” includes governmental units. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14). The term “governmental unit” includes a department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States. 11 U.S.C. § 101(21). Thus, the determination by this court of any issues involving the violation of Section 362(a) or of the order of this court made under that section binds the IRS notwithstanding any assertion of sovereign immunity.
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Section 101(30) excludes governmental units from the definition of “person,” so they cannot serve on a creditors’ committee even as nonvoting members.

Matter of Baldwin-United Corp. · filed 1984-02-29(30)

A “person” as defined in § 101(30) “includes individual, partnership, and corporation, but does not include governmental unit.” ... The FDIC attempts to sidestep this clear statutory language by asserting that it only precludes a governmental unit from acting as a voting member of a committee. We find nothing in the Code or the legislative history to support this view.
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Section 101(21) includes a state in the definition of a governmental unit.

People of State of Ill. v. Electrical Utilities · filed 1984-04-23(21)

Section 101(21) of title 11 includes “state” within the meaning of “governmental unit.”
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Section 101(14) includes a trust within the definition of an entity that can be subject to a pay order.

Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Health & Welfare Pension Fund v. Stephenson (In Re McLean) · filed 1984-06-15(14)

A trust is clearly an "entity” which is subject to a pay order.
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Section 101(21) defines “governmental unit” to include the United States and its departments, agencies, and instrumentalities.

In re Dimmig · filed 1984-08-27(21)

We note that the Bankruptcy Code defines the term “governmental unit” to include, inter alia, “United States; ... department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States_” 11 U.S.C. § 101(21).
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Section 101(21) includes a state administrative commission within the definition of a governmental unit.

Begley v. Philadelphia Electric Co. (In Re Begley) · filed 1984-09-28(21)

The PUC is “an independent administrative commission_” 66 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 301(a) (Purdon 1979). It is therefore an “agency ... of ... a State” and constitutes a “governmental unit” for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.
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Section 101(21) includes the Packers and Stockyards Administration within the definition of a governmental unit.

Davis v. United States (In Re Farmers & Ranchers Livestock Auction, Inc.) · filed 1984-12-10(21)

In addition, the Packers and Stockyards Administration is a “governmental unit” within the meaning of section 362(b)(4). See 11 U.S.C. § 101(21).
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Section 101(14) defines “entity” to include a person.

Materia v. Pereira (In Re Pereira) · filed 1984-11-28(14)

The term “entity” includes a person. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14).
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Section 101(14) includes governmental units in the definition of “entity,” making a government creditor subject to Section 363 on the same terms as other secured creditors.

Martin v. United States (In re Martin) · filed 1985-05-07(14)

Section 363 applies to all entities who have an interest in the bankruptcy estate, and the term "entity" includes governmental units. See 11 U.S.C. Secs. 101(14), 106(c). We conclude that CCC, as a governmental unit, is bound by the provisions of section 363 to the same extent as any other secured creditor.
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Section 101(14) includes governmental units within the definition of “entity,” making them subject to Section 363 on the same terms as other secured creditors.

Martin v. United States · filed 1985-05-07(14)

Section 363 applies to all entities who have an interest in the bankruptcy estate, and the term “entity” includes governmental units. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(14), 106(c). We conclude that CCC, as a governmental unit, is bound by the provisions of section 363 to the same extent as any other secured creditor.
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Section 101(21) defines a governmental unit to include a federal agency or instrumentality, including the Farmers Home Administration.

Kight v. United States (In Re Kight) · filed 1985-04-30(21)

To follow the government’s reasoning that the above waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply to the Farmer's Home Administration would be to deny that it as “agency” or “instrumentality of the United States” or a “governmental unit”. ... See also our above comment on the inclusion of the term “instrumentality of the United States” in the definition of “governmental unit” used in 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) and (c) quoted supra and in the definition of that term as inter alia “... department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States ” in 11 U.S.C. § 101(21).
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Section 101(14) defines an entity to include a governmental unit, such as a town.

Village Savings Bank v. Town of Lewisboro (In Re Haight) · filed 1985-05-24(14)

The term entity is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(14) to include a “governmental unit.” Hence, the Town of Lewisboro is not immune from the application of the automatic stay.
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Section 101(14) includes governmental units within the definition of “entity.”

In Re Wood · filed 1985-06-25(14)

The term “entity” includes the Commission which is a governmental unit.
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Section 101 defines an entity to include a person and a person to include a partnership.

In Re Nunn · filed 1985-06-14(14), (33)

Entity is defined as including a “person, estate, trust, and governmental unit.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(14). In turn, a “person” includes an “individual, partnership, and corporation.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(33). There is no doubt but that an organization such as NCE would be included within the protective scope of Rule 9018.
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Section 101(21)’s definition of “governmental unit” excludes a private bank.

Wilson v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank · filed 1985-11-26(21)

The Bank is clearly not a governmental unit.
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Section 101(14) includes governmental units in the definition of “entity.”

In Re Jenkins · filed 1986-02-07(14)

At 11 U.S.C. § 101(14) the Code defines “entity” as including governmental units.
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Section 101(24) does not treat a private insurer as a governmental unit merely because state law requires its bond.

Kentucky Central Insurance v. Lueking (In Re Lueking) · filed 1986-03-11(24)

By no stretch of the imagination can plaintiff be considered even remotely as a “governmental unit.”
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Section 101(14) defines “entity” nonexclusively, but that definition does not make a court’s entry of judgment subject to the automatic stay.

Great Southwest Fire Insurance v. Triple "I" Insurance Services., Inc. · filed 1986-03-19(14)

The term ‘entity’ is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(14) as including persons, trusts and governmental units. Although this definition is not exclusive, there is no indication that the automatic stay would act to stay the entry of judgment by a court. ... We find Willard persuasive and adopt that reasoning.
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Section 101(24) defines “governmental unit” to include a state agency.

Elsinore Shore Associates v. New Jersey Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control (In Re Elsinore Shore Associates) · filed 1986-04-02(24)

“Governmental unit” is defined under the Bankruptcy Code to mean, “United States; State; Commonwealth; District; Territory; municipality; foreign state; department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States, a State, a Commonwealth, a District, a Territory, a municipality, or a foreign state; or other foreign or domestic government.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(24). The defendants fall within this definition of governmental unit.
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Section 101(24)'s definition of governmental unit includes Wyoming's Employment Security Commission.

Rees v. Employment Security Commission of Wyoming(In Re Rees) · filed 1986-05-02(24)

ESC is a “governmental unit” as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(24).
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Section 101(24) includes a state board that approves educational courses for veterans’ benefits within the definition of a governmental unit.

In Re the Bible Speaks · filed 1987-01-15(24)

We conclude that the Board is a “governmental unit,” see 11 U.S..C. § 101(24), and that its revocation of approval of the School for veterans’ benefits purposes constitutes the revocation of “a license, permit, charter, franchise, or other similar grant ... solely because ... [the Debtor] ... has been insolvent ... during the case ...” within the meaning of Section 525(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.
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Section 101(14) defines “entity” to include a person.

York v. Castro (In Re Castro) · filed 1987-05-21(14)

The definition of entity includes person. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14).
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Section 101(14) defines “entity” to include a governmental unit.

Inslaw, Inc. v. United States (In Re Inslaw, Inc.) · filed 1987-07-31(14)

This is so because (i) section 106(c) clearly provides that “a provision of [Title 11] that contains the term ‘creditor,’ ‘entity,’ or ‘governmental unit’ applies to governmental units”; (ii) section 362, by its express terms, is “applicable to all entities”; and (iii) by definition, “ ‘entity’ includes ... governmental unit ...” 11 U.S.C. Section 101 (14).
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Section 101(14) defines “entity” to include governmental units.

Stucka v. United States of America (In Re Stucka) · filed 1987-09-09(14)

The automatic stay applies to all “entities,” which by definition includes governmental units.
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Section 101(26) defines “governmental unit” to include a state.

Tew v. Arizona State Retirement System · filed 1987-09-23(26)

As discussed above, “governmental unit” is specifically defined to include states.
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Section 101(14) defines “entity” to include a governmental unit, so the IRS is subject to the turnover requirements of § 542(a).

In Re Cleveland Graphic Reproduction, Inc. · filed 1987-10-19(14)

The IRS, although a governmental entity, is subjected to § 542(a) requirements as is any other entity which is defined at § 101(14).
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Section 101(26) excludes a privately owned landlord from the definition of “governmental unit” when it receives HUD subsidies but neither distributes HUD funds to tenants nor collects funds for the government.

Spruce Ltd. Partnership v. Lutz (In Re Lutz) · filed 1988-02-22(26)

Although Spruce Park receives a subsidy from HUD, it does not extend HUD money to the debtor and it does not collect any funds from the debtor on behalf of or for the benefit of the government. The debtors’ failure to pay their prepetition rent, thus, harms Spruce Park, not the government. This court, accordingly, finds that Spruce Park is not a governmental unit as defined in the Bankruptcy Code and that Section 525, thus, does not apply in this case.
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Section 101(14)'s definition of entity does not prevent one federal agency from setting off a debt against payments owed by another federal agency.

In Re Thomas · filed 1988-03-30(14)

This Court does not think that Congress intended to change this long-established governmental right of setoff when it adopted the definition of entity in § 101(14).
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Section 101(35)'s definition of governmental unit does not include a private community service organization merely because it is funded by government grants.

In re Joliet-Will County Community Action Agency · filed 1988-06-01(35)

A community service organization is not among the entities to which Congress in the Bankruptcy Code has denied the privilege (often of course the burden) of bankruptcy, see 11 U.S.C. Secs. 101(35), 109, for it is not a governmental unit.
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Section 101(26) includes the FDIC as a governmental unit because it is a federal agency.

Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Wright (In Re Wright) · filed 1988-06-24(26)

First, the FDIC is a governmental unit. 11 U.S.C. § 101(26) defines a governmental unit as a “... department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States_” 11 U.S.C. § 101(26).
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Section 101(14) includes a person within the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of “entity”.

Perrin v. Meyer (In Re Meyer) · filed 1988-06-06(14)

The bankruptcy definition of “entity” includes person. Section 101(14).
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Section 101(26) defines “governmental unit” to include state government.

Wayne Manor, Inc. v. Department of Public Welfare (In Re Wayne Manor, Inc.) · filed 1988-07-15(26)

Section 101(26) defines governmental unit to include state government. The debtor, pursuant to Section 542 of the Bankruptcy Code can compel an “entity”, including state government, to turnover property belonging to the estate before the filing of the bankruptcy petition.
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Section 101(26) defines a governmental unit to include the United States, encompassing federal agencies such as the IRS.

United States v. Thomas (In Re Thomas) · filed 1988-10-14(26)

“Government unit” is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(26) as the United States. Thus, under § 106, all United States agencies with a pre-petition claim against the debtor must set off their claims. Therefore the IRS should be considered in the motion to lift stay, even though it was not one of the movants.
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Section 101(14) includes governmental units within the definition of “entity,” making them subject to the automatic stay.

In Re Parr Meadows Racing Ass'n, Inc. · filed 1988-10-14(14)

Governmental units are within the code’s definition of the term “entity” and, thus, are subject to the bar against creating, perfecting, or enforcing liens against a bankrupt’s property.
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Section 101(14) defines “entity” to include governmental units.

In Re Price · filed 1989-08-23(14)

The automatic stay applies to all “entities” which by definition includes governmental units. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14).
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Section 101(26)'s definition of “governmental unit” does not cover a privately owned housing firm merely because it participates in a federally regulated public housing program.

In Re Rosemond · filed 1989-09-22(26)

For purposes of § 525 AHRCO does not fall within the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of “governmental unit.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(26). Rather, it is “a privately owned entity which participates in a federally regulated public housing program.”
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Section 101(14) includes a person within the definition of an entity, so a committee made up of people qualifies as an entity.

Unsecured Creditors' Committee of Goldblatt Bros. v. United States (In Re Goldblatt Bros.) · filed 1989-10-10(14)

An “entity” under the Bankruptcy Code “includes” a “person”, and therefore includes the group of persons comprising the Committee in this case.
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Qualifying as a governmental unit under § 101(26) does not itself give an entity authority to sue or be sued in bankruptcy court.

Town & Country Home Nursing Services, Inc. v. Blue Cross of California (In Re Town & Country Home Nursing Services, Inc. · filed 1990-03-30(26)

Following this authority, even an entity that qualifies as a governmental unit under § 101(26) cannot be sued in bankruptcy court unless that governmental unit has independent statutory authority to sue and be sued. HCFA has no such authorization, thus its dismissal from the adversary proceeding was correct.
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Section 101(26) includes a state racing commission within the definition of “governmental unit.”

Will Rogers Jockey & Polo Club, Inc. v. Oklahoma Horse Racing Commission (In Re Will Rogers Jockey & Polo Club, Inc.) · filed 1990-03-13(26)

It is undisputed that the Racing Commission is a “governmental unit” as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(26) and as employed in 11 U.S.C. § 106(c) and § 525.
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Section 101(14) includes governmental units within the definition of an entity.

Redevelopment Agency of Long Beach v. Altamirco (In Re Altamirco) · filed 1990-05-25(14)

Since Agency is a governmental unit, it is clearly an entity, as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(14). Hence, Agency is stayed from prosecuting its condemnation actions under section 362(a)(1).
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Section 101(26) includes a state bar acting as an instrumentality of a state supreme court in attorney disciplinary matters within the definition of “governmental unit.”

Wade v. State Bar of Arizona (In Re Wade) · filed 1990-06-18(26)

Having determined that the Bar, in performing its disciplinary function, has a sufficiently close and active relationship with the Supreme Court and is engaged in a government function, we conclude that, with respect to the Bar’s involvement in disciplinary matters, it is an instrumentality of the Arizona Supreme Court and is therefore a “governmental unit” under section 101(26).
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Section 101(14) defines an entity to include a governmental unit such as the Commodity Credit Corporation.

Commodity Credit Corp. v. Marlow (In Re Julien Co.) · filed 1990-08-16(14)

Section 363 is applicable to property of the estate and thus to entities claiming an interest in the bankruptcy estate, and 11 U.S.C. § 101(14) defines entity to include a “governmental unit” such as CCC.
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Section 101(26) includes the United States within the definition of a governmental unit.

In Re James C. Pearson, Ida J. Pearson, Debtors. James C. Pearson, Ida J. Pearson v. United States · filed 1990-10-30(26)

Because the United States is a governmental unit, 11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(26), it is bound by the stay.
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Section 101(26) includes a receiver appointed under state law for a state savings and loan association within the definition of a governmental unit.

In Re Piperi · filed 1990-11-28(26)

This court finds that the movant, as a receiver pursuant to state statute, of a state savings and loan association, falls within the category of a governmental unit as that term is defined at 11 USC § 101(26).
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Section 101(14) defines “entity” to include a governmental unit.

Gulfco Finance v. McCormick · filed 1991-04-03(14)

In the instant case, the fact that the parish of Union is a governmental unit as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(26) [2] does not immunize it from the automatic stay provisions of § 362. The automatic stay provisions expressly apply to "all entities." The term "entity" includes a "governmental unit." 11 U.S.C. § 101(14); In re Haight, 52 B.R. 104 (S.D.N.Y.1985).
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Section 101(27) defines governmental units to include states.

In Re Howard Carl Gustafson, Jr., Debtor. California State University, Fresno v. Howard Carl Gustafson, Jr. · filed 1991-05-28(27)

Section 101(27) of the Code defines “governmental units” to include states.
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Section 101 defines “entity” to include a “governmental unit” and “governmental unit” to include a federal agency or instrumentality.

In Re Everett · filed 1991-06-07(14), (26)

The term “entity” as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(14) includes a “governmental unit.” Since “governmental unit” includes a “department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States,” § 101(26), the U.S. Postal Service clearly is a “governmental unit.”
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Section 101(26) includes an agency of the United States as a governmental unit.

Murray v. United States, Department of Treasury (In Re Murray) · filed 1991-06-17(26)

Defendant, as an agency of the United States, is a “governmental unit” for purposes of Title 11. 11 U.S.C. § 101(26).
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Section 101(14) includes governmental units such as the IRS in the definition of an entity.

Wright v. Internal Revenue Service (In Re Canon) · filed 1991-08-23(14)

The IRS is a governmental unit which is, by definition, an entity as the term is used in the Code.
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Section 101 defines “entity” to include an individual.

McGee v. McCown (In Re McCown) · filed 1991-07-11(14), (37)

Entity includes an individual. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(14), 101(37).
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Section 101(27) defines the United States as a governmental unit.

In Re Husher · filed 1991-09-13(27)

Under the Code, the United States is a “governmental unit.”
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Section 101(27)’s definition of governmental unit includes a state supreme court’s instrumentality, such as a state bar conducting attorney disciplinary proceedings.

In Re E. Gene Wade Joyzelle I. Wade, Debtors. E. Gene Wade Joyzelle I. Wade v. State Bar of Arizona · filed 1991-11-08(27)

The definition of the term “governmental unit” includes a “department, agency, or instrumentality” of a state. 11 U.S.C. § 101(27) (West Supp.1991) (formerly designated section 101(26)). ... Accordingly, the BAP correctly held that with respect to disciplinary proceedings, the Bar acts as an instrumentality of the Arizona Supreme Court enforcing its police or regulatory power, and therefore the disciplinary proceedings against Wade are excepted from the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).
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Section 101(14) includes governmental units such as counties within the term “entities.”

First American Savings Bank, FSB v. Iron County (In Re United Construction & Development Co.) · filed 1992-01-07(14)

Plaintiffs are correct in noting that the term “entities” includes governmental units such as Iron County.
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Section 101 defines “entity” to include a governmental unit and “governmental unit” to include federal agencies.

Taborski v. United States Internal Revenue Service · filed 1992-03-10(14), (26)

Section 362(a) imposes the stay on all “entities,” which are defined to include a “governmental unit.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(14). Governmental unit in turn is defined to include a “department, agency or instrumentality-of the United States.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(26). Thus, the United States and the IRS are subject to the automatic stay.
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Section 101(27) includes an attorney disciplinary board created as an arm of a state supreme court within the definition of a governmental unit.

Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility v. Haberman (In Re Haberman) · filed 1992-02-05(27)

BAPR, created as an arm of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, is an agency or instrumentality of a governmental unit within the clear contemplation of § 101(27) of the Bankruptcy Code.
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Section 101(15) defines “entity” to include the IRS, making it subject to the automatic stay.

In Re Solis · filed 1992-02-14(15)

IRS is an “entity,” as that phrase is defined in § 101(15), ... and is thus subject to the automatic stay.
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Section 101(15)’s definition of “entity” includes the Ohio Public Employees Deferred Compensation Program.

McClatchey v. Ohio Public Employees Deferred Compensation Program (In Re Matheney) · filed 1992-03-24(15)

The Ohio Public Employees Deferred Compensation Program is an entity. 11 U.S.C. § 101(15).
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Section 101(26) defines “governmental unit” to include a state.

995 Fifth Avenue Associates, L.P. v. New York State Department of Taxation & Finance (In re 995 Fifth Avenue Associates, · filed 1992-04-13(26)

Similarly, the text’s failure specifically to mention states is irrelevant: § 106(a) uses the term “governmental unit,” which the Bankruptcy Code defines in 11 U.S.C. § 101(26) (1988) as including a “State.”
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Section 101(26) defines “governmental unit” to include a State.

In Re: 995 Fifth Avenue Associates, L.P. · filed 1992-05-08(26)

Similarly, the text's failure specifically to mention states is irrelevant: § 106(a) uses the term "governmental unit," which the Bankruptcy Code defines in 11 U.S.C. § 101(26) (1988) as including a "State."
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Section 101 treats state agencies with separate claims as separate creditors because each agency is a distinct governmental unit and entity.

In Re Lakeside Community Hospital, Inc. · filed 1992-04-28(10), (15), (27)

But the IDPA is a different agency, and therefore a different “entity”, than the IDR/IDES. Since the IDPA is a different “entity”, it is also a different “creditor” than the agencies seeking relief here. On this literal reading, the mutuality required by section 553 is therefore lacking.
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Section 101(15) includes trusts and other qualifying organizations in the definition of an entity.

Loux v. Gabelhart (In Re Carriage, House, Inc.) · filed 1992-07-14(15)

However, as noted above, private trusts, partnerships, and unincorporated associations as well as business trusts are all considered entities under the Bankruptcy Code.
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Section 101(15) includes governmental units in the definition of “entity,” making them subject to the automatic stay.

Gumport v. Interstate Commerce Commission (In Re Transcon Lines) · filed 1992-10-09(15)

The automatic stay provided by 11 U.S.C. § 362 applies to all entities. “All entities” includes governmental units. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a); 11 U.S.C. § 101(15).
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Section 101(14) defines “entity” to include governmental units.

University Medical Center v. Sullivan (In re University Medical Center) · filed 1992-08-24(14)

In drafting the Bankruptcy Code, Congress subjected the government, acting as creditor, to the limitations of the automatic stay provision. By its terms, section 362(a) applies to “all entities.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). The Bankruptcy Code defines the term “entity” as including governmental units. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14).
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Section 101(14) defines “entity” to include governmental units.

In Re University Medical Center · filed 1992-10-21(14)

In drafting the Bankruptcy Code, Congress subjected the government, acting as creditor, to the limitations of the automatic stay provision. By its terms, section 362(a) applies to "all entities." 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). The Bankruptcy Code defines the term "entity" as including governmental units. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14).
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Section 101(15) includes governmental agencies among the entities subject to the automatic stay.

Cooper v. Interstate Commerce Commission (In Re Bulldog Trucking, Inc.) · filed 1992-10-22(15)

The automatic stay applies to all entities, including governmental agencies. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(15), 362(a).
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Section 101(27) includes a state attorney disciplinary commission within its definition of “governmental unit.”

Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Commission of the Supreme Court v. Betts (In Re Betts) · filed 1993-01-07(27)

The Court concurs with those decisions and finds that ARDC constitutes a “governmental unit.”
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Section 101(27) includes the United States in the definition of governmental unit.

Quillard v. United States (In Re Quillard) · filed 1993-01-15(27)

Section 106(c) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that “a provision of [the Bankruptcy Code] that contains ‘creditor’, ‘entity’, or ‘governmental unit’ applies to governmental units,” and the United States is included in the definition of governmental unit. 11 U.S.C. § 101(27).
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Section 101 lists a State and its departments separately as governmental units, allowing state departments to be treated as distinct creditors.

Illinois v. Lakeside Community Hospital, Inc. (In Re Lakeside Community Hospital, Inc.) · filed 1993-03-08(27)

The list enumerates separately both “State” and “department, [or] agency of the State”. Congress intended that these units were to be treated as distinguishable and therefore not the same creditor within the provisions of the statute.
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Section 101(27) includes a state bar association in the definition of a governmental unit when it acts as a state agency regulating legal practice.

In Re Williams · filed 1993-04-06(27)

While the Bar is not necessarily an arm of the Idaho Supreme Court, it satisfies the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of a governmental unit in its own right as an agency of the State of Idaho, ... in that the Bar carries out many functions normally associated with the government, including protecting the public from the unprofessional, improper and unauthorized practice of law.
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Section 101(27) includes a state in the definition of a governmental unit.

New York v. Kelly (In Re Kelly) · filed 1993-06-09(27)

The treble damages are payable to a state, a governmental unit as defined under 11 U.S.C. § 101(27).
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Section 101(27) includes the FDIC acting as receiver within the definition of a governmental unit.

Marshack v. Tapager (In Re Motivation Resources, Inc.) · filed 1993-07-23(27)

Given the Congressional intent behind the formation of the FDIC and the FDIC’s admitted status as a governmental entity for the purposes of FIRREA, the FDIC in its capacity as receiver is a governmental unit subject to 11 U.S.C. § 106(a).
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Section 101(27) includes the Oklahoma State Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Control as a governmental unit.

Goff v. Oklahoma Ex Rel. Means (In Re Goff) · filed 1993-09-28(27)

The Bureau is a “governmental unit,” see 11 U.S.C. § 101(27).
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Section 101(15)’s definition of “entity” includes a Chapter 7 trustee.

Barber v. Martin (In Re Martin) · filed 1993-11-30(15)

That term is defined by § 101(15) of the Bankruptcy Code to include “person, estate, trust, governmental unit, and United States trustee.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(15). OMI’s trustee falls within that definition.
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A county that is a political subdivision of a state is a governmental unit under § 101(27) and (40).

Coats v. Vawter (In Re Coats) · filed 1993-12-09(27), (40)

This Court concludes that Montgomery County is a governmental unit under the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 101(27) defines governmental unit as including a “municipality”. 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) defines municipality as a “political subdivision or public agency or instrumentality of a State”. Montgomery County, a political subdivision of the State of Texas, is a governmental unit within the purview of these provisions.
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Section 101(27) includes a state agency carrying out attorney disciplinary duties within the definition of a governmental unit.

Betts v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Commission · filed 1994-01-26(27)

Our first question is whether the ARDC is a “governmental unit” under the bankruptcy code. A “governmental unit” is defined in section 101(27) of the Code as: ... Therefore, there is no question that the Plaintiff is an agency of the State of Illinois and thus a “governmental unit” for purposes of section 523.
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Section 101 defines governmental units to include federal departments and agencies, which the court treats as separate creditors for setoff.

Shugrue v. Fischer (In Re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.) · filed 1994-02-18(27)

An entity is defined § 101(15) to include a “governmental unit,” and a “governmental unit” is in turn defined in section 101(27) of the Code as “United States; State; ... [or] department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States.” ... Therefore, one agency should not be able to set off the claims and debts of another.
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Section 101(14) defines “entity” to include governmental units.

Medicar Ambulance Co. v. Shalala (In Re Medicar Ambulance Co.) · filed 1994-05-06(14)

The Bankruptcy Code defines the term "entity” as including governmental units. § 101(14).
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Section 101’s definition of “entity” includes an individual debtor or a bankruptcy estate.

In re Mcnitt · filed 1994-05-24(15)

The court believes § 503 is clear in that it allows an entity to file a request for payment of an administrative expense and that an individual, a debtor, or an estate would qualify as an entity.
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Section 101(27)’s definition of governmental unit supports treating federal departments and agencies as separate entities when deciding whether debts are mutual for setoff.

United States v. Maxwell (In Re Pyramid Industries, Inc.) · filed 1994-07-22(27)

The Court concludes that the better reasoned approach is to treat each department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States as a separate entity for purposes of setoff. Here, the Navy and the SBA must be considered to be two distinct entities.
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Section 101(15) defines “entity” to include a person.

Carter v. Trammell (In Re Trammell) · filed 1994-08-18(15)

"Entity” includes a person. 11 U.S.C. § 101(15).
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Section 101(15)’s definition of entity encompasses the United States, so the automatic stay applies to it.

Westefield v. Internal Revenue Service (In Re Westefield) · filed 1994-09-09(15)

One need look no further than the use of the phrase “all entities” in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) and the definition of entity at 11 U.S.C. § 101(15) to determine that the injunction applies to the United States and to everyone who has sworn an oath to uphold its laws.
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Section 101(15) includes an individual in the definition of “entity.”

Holliday v. Kline (In Re Kline) · filed 1994-10-19(15)

Under 11 U.S.C. § 101(15), an individual is included within the definition of "entity.”
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Section 101(27)'s definition of “governmental unit” does not include a private customs broker that pays a debtor's customs duties.

In Re Chalk Line Manufacturing, Inc. · filed 1995-05-02(27)

Jones is not a “governmental unit” pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 101(27).
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Section 101(15) defines “entity” to include debtors, making them subject to the automatic stay.

Martinson v. Michael (In Re Michael) · filed 1995-06-15(15)

Given such unambiguous statutory language, there can be little argument that the Debtors are entities as defined at § 101(15). ... As such, this Court holds that the Debtors are entities subject to the automatic stay under § 362(a)(3) against recording their post-petition declaration of homestead.
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Section 101(15) defines “entity” to include debtors.

Martinson v. Michael (In Re Michael) · filed 1995-08-14(15)

Given such unambiguous statutory language, the Court holds that the Debtors are entities as defined at § 101(15), and as such subject to the automatic stay.
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Section 101(27)’s definition of governmental unit excludes a private, for-profit mortgage corporation.

In Re Merriweather · filed 1995-07-27(27)

It is undisputed that PHH is a private corporation that originates, funds, and services mortgages for profit, and not a “governmental unit” as contemplated by the statutes.
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A legislative charter, a governmental purpose, and active state involvement support treating an entity as a governmental unit under § 101(27).

Matter of Kent · filed 1995-12-05(27)

We can glean from this discussion that a legislative charter, a governmental purpose, and an active interaction between the entity and the State are some of the characteristics of a governmental unit. ... We readily conclude that both the JUA and the MTF constitute “governmental units” within the meaning of § 523(a)(7).
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Section 101(27) includes the United States government within the definition of “governmental unit”.

McLeod v. AFSA Data Corp. (In Re McLeod) · filed 1996-03-25(27)

Further, the Notes were made under the Robert T. Stafford Loan Program which is funded by the United States government, a “governmental unit” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(27).
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Section 101(27) includes state departments, agencies, and instrumentalities as distinct governmental units for purposes of interagency offset.

William Ross, Inc. v. Biehn Construction, Inc. (In Re William Ross, Inc.) · filed 1996-04-22(27)

While the Gibson court is correct in noting that lower tier units of a government (ie., a “department, agency, or instrumentality”) operate on behalf of that government, this Court cannot ignore the fact that those same lower tier units are also explicitly included within § 101(27)’s definition of “governmental unit.” Because of this inclusion this Court therefore finds that'it is constrained to recognize, rather than look past (or through), these lower tier units when applying § 101(27) in the context of either § 106 or § 553.
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Section 101 defines governmental units to include individual federal agencies, which are treated as separate entities in bankruptcy.

Lopes v. U.S. Department of Housing & Urban Development (In Re Lopes) · filed 1996-06-17(27)

In addition, the Bankruptcy Code makes governmental unit synonymous with the term entity, see 11 U.S.C. § 101(15), and defines governmental unit as the United States, an individual agency, or a department. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(27). Under bankruptcy law, these definitions require that federal agencies be treated as individual entities, separate and distinct from one another.
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Section 101(27) includes the National Labor Relations Board, a federal administrative agency, within the definition of a governmental unit.

National Labor Relations Board v. Fogerty (In Re Fogerty) · filed 1996-11-08(27)

In the current instance, both the fine for the contempt order and the attorneys’ fees assessed are owed to the NLRB, an administrative agency of the United States Government and a governmental unit pursuant to § 101(27).
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Section 101(27) includes state instrumentalities within its definition of “governmental unit,” even if they are not state agencies.

Kish v. Verniero (In Re Kish) · filed 1997-02-10(27)

Nor is it inconsistent with this court's finding in In re Bill, 90 B.R. 651 (Bankr.D.N.J.1988) that "[t]he JUA is not a state agency" because, as the legislative history of Code § 101(27) makes clear, the definition of governmental unit is not limited to state agencies but includes departments and instrumentalities of the state as well.
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Section 101(27) includes a state department or instrumentality in the definition of a governmental unit.

In re George Transfer, Inc. · filed 1997-04-22(27)

It is undisputed that ODOT, as a department or instrumentality of the government of the State of Oregon, is a governmental unit.
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Section 101(15) includes governmental units in the definition of “entity.”

Horwitz v. Zywiczynski (In Re Zywiczynski) · filed 1997-07-16(15)

A “governmental unit” is included in the definition of "entity” contained at 11 U.S.C. § 101(15).
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Section 101’s definitions of “entity” and “governmental unit” do not require federal agencies to be treated as separate creditors for bankruptcy setoff.

In Re Lopes · filed 1997-08-01(15), (27)

However, the fact that the Code includes "governmental unit" as one of the meanings of the term "entity" and further defines "governmental unit" to include the United States, an individual agency, or a department, does not naturally lead to the conclusion that federal agencies should be treated as discreet entities, thus destroying the mutuality requirement to effect a setoff.
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Section 101(27) defines governmental unit broadly to include federal agencies such as the IRS.

Pansier v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue (In Re Pansier) · filed 1997-08-26(27)

The IRS is clearly a governmental unit of the United States as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(27), which defines a “governmental unit” as “United States—department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States.” This definition is to be afforded a broad interpretation.
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Section 101(27) defines “governmental unit” to include states and state agencies.

Consumer Protection Division, Office of the Attorney General v. Luskin's, Inc. (In Re Luskin's, Inc.) · filed 1997-08-25(27)

This argument fails because the Bankruptcy Code defines “governmental unit” to include states and state agencies.
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Section 101(27) treats a state as the governmental unit for sovereign immunity purposes even when different state departments act on its behalf.

Brewer v. New York State Department of Correctional Services (In Re Value-Added Communications, Inc.) · filed 1997-09-10(27)

Section 101(27) defines governmental unit to mean a state or a department, agency or instrumentality of a state. ... Governmental unit as used in § 106(b), therefore, must refer to the sovereign, that is, the state.
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For setoff under § 553, federal agencies count as a single governmental unit under § 101(27).

In Re: Hal, Inc. Hawaiian Airlines Inc. West Maui Airport, Inc. Debtors. Hal, Inc. Hawaiian Airlines Inc. West Maui Airp · filed 1997-09-16(27)

Accordingly, we hold that for purposes of setoff under § 553, the agencies of the United States constitute a single “governmental unit,” as defined in § 101(27), and that the agencies of the United States were lawfully permitted a setoff in this ease.
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Section 101(27) includes federal credit unions as governmental units because they are federal instrumentalities performing an important governmental function.

In Re Trusko · filed 1997-09-03(27)

Under one of its delegated powers, Congress created a system of federal credit unions making possible the extension of credit on reasonable terms ordinarily not available to wage earners. Therefore, the FCU’s are governmental instrumentalities engaged in the performance of an important governmental function.
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Notes 1–150 of 6,417, oldest cases first.

6,926 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

In Re Quantum Development Corporation, the court cites § 101 for restrictions on depositing bankruptcy funds but decides the banks’ liability under trust and commercial law. opinion →
In The Matter Of New World Inns, Inc., the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to Chapter VII while deciding the bank's setoff and litigation expenses. opinion →
Bonhiver v. Peoples Bank of Trenton, the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to Chapter VII while deciding the bank’s setoff and liability for litigation expenses. opinion →
Stephens v. Stephens, the court cites § 101 in a footnote identifying the 1978 Bankruptcy Act and its effective date while discussing discharge of support obligations. opinion →
In re Paragon Securities Co., the court mentions § 101 as part of the new Bankruptcy Act while deciding a claim under the former Act’s § 60e. opinion →
In re Paragon Securities Co., the court cites § 101(39) as a source of the stockbroker definition while deciding a claim under the former Bankruptcy Act. opinion →
In Re MacOn Uplands Venture, the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code, while deciding the effect of a separate savings provision. opinion →
In Re Smith, the court cites § 101 only as the first section in a reference to the Bankruptcy Reform Act and decides whether the utility violated Bankruptcy Rule 401(a). opinion →
In Re MacOn Uplands Venture, the court cites section 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code, while deciding jurisdiction and transfer issues under other provisions. opinion →
1 Collier bankr.cas.2d 281, Bankr. L. Rep. P 67,291 in Re Pacific Homes, Debtor. Richard E. Matthews v. The United Metho, the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act while deciding jurisdiction under the earlier Bankruptcy Act. opinion →
In Re MacOn Uplands Venture, the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of an et seq. reference to the Bankruptcy Code and decides transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1475. opinion →
Matter of Maidman, the court mentions § 101 while comparing the later Bankruptcy Code with the 1898 Act that governs the case. opinion →
Board of Trustees v. Bruce (In Re Bruce), the court cites § 101 et seq. only as a reference to the Bankruptcy Act and decides dischargeability under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. opinion →
Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc., the opinion cites § 101(26) while recounting Aetna’s proposed insolvency test, then addresses the meaning of a private contract. opinion →
In re Allen, the court cites Section 101(14) for comparison while deciding whether the SBA was stayed under the former Bankruptcy Act. opinion →
In Re Ford, the court cites § 101(38) as a comparison while interpreting “applicable nonbankruptcy law” in § 522(b)(2)(B). opinion →
Matlock Truck Body & Trailer Corp. v. Steinberg (In Re Southeastern Truck Body & Trailer Corp.), the court cites Section 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Act while deciding an assignment under Section 365. opinion →
Peoples Bank of Pound v. Newsome (In Re Newsome), the court cites the definition of “entity” as background while deciding who may apply for reaffirmation under § 524. opinion →
Bergquist v. First National Bank of St. Paul (In Re American Lumber Co.), the court cites § 101 only as the start of an et seq. reference to the later Bankruptcy Code and applies the prior Bankruptcy Act. opinion →
In Re Hill, the court recites § 101(27)'s definition of a judicial lien while deciding whether debtors may avoid liens under § 522(f). opinion →
In Re Hobday, the court cites § 101(24)'s definition as background while deciding whether a Chapter 13 plan meets § 1325's good faith requirement. opinion →
First National Exchange Bank of Virginia v. Myers (In Re Burton), the court assumed the debt was a consumer debt under § 101(7) and decided whether to lift the co-debtor stay under § 1301. opinion →
Williams v. Gunnar, the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the later Bankruptcy Reform Act while deciding jurisdiction under earlier law. opinion →
Williams v. Gunnar, the court cites § 101 only as the start of a reference to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, which took effect after this case arose. opinion →
Curry v. Associates Financial Services (In Re Curry), the court recites § 101(27)'s definition of a judicial lien while deciding whether § 522(f) overrides Ohio law. opinion →
In Re Western Management, Inc., the court cites § 101’s definitions to support its conclusion that Western is eligible for Chapter 11 relief. opinion →
In the Matter of the Magnavox Company and Sanders Associates, Inc. Appeal of Universal Research Laboratories, Inc., Debt, the court cites § 101 to explain how the new Code differs from the prior Act that governed the case. opinion →
Matter of Schatz Federal Bearings Co., Inc., the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Reform Act while deciding whether vacation pay is an administrative expense under § 503. opinion →
In Re the Select-A-Seat Corporation, an Arizona Corporation, Debtors. Fenix Cattle Company v. Warren M. Silver, Trustee, the court cites § 101 only as the start of a reference to the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act, which did not govern the case. opinion →
In Re Adana Mortgage Bankers, Inc., the court cites § 101(14) and (21) in footnotes while deciding whether GNMA violated the automatic stay. opinion →
Gantt v. First Alabama Bank (In Re Gantt), the court cites § 101(40) in a footnote to explain an analogy to preferential transfers while deciding whether to stay a lien avoidance action. opinion →
Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. Monsour Medical Center (In Re Monsour Medical Center), the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding whether a creditors’ committee may bring an avoidance suit. opinion →
Borman's, Inc. v. Allied Supermarkets, Inc. (In Re Allied Supermarkets, Inc.), the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Revised Bankruptcy Act, which it says does not apply to the case. opinion →
In Re Caldwell, the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding whether to enjoin a creditor’s collection efforts. opinion →
Anderson Oil Co. v. Benton Oil Co., the court cites § 101 et seq. to identify the new Bankruptcy Code’s effective date while deciding the case under the former Bankruptcy Act. opinion →
Wymer v. Wymer, the court cites § 101(14) to identify governmental units as entities while discussing § 523(a)(5), then reverses on assignment grounds without deciding dischargeability. opinion →
Matter of McCordi Corp., the court cites § 101 as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Reform Act while deciding whether § 1104 requires appointment of a trustee. opinion →
W. R. Gustin & Ass'n South v. Graham (In Re Graham), the court cites § 101(12) to support its reading of a Bankruptcy Rule governing service of process. opinion →
In Re White Motor Credit Corp., the court mentions § 101 while identifying the debtors and their Chapter 11 filings, then decides committee appointments under § 1102. opinion →
Household Finance Corp. v. Callery (In Re Callery), the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code and decides whether the debt is dischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(B). opinion →
King's Place, Inc. v. First National Bank of Strasburg (In Re King's Place, Inc.), the court cites the definition of “insider” while deciding whether the allegation is sufficient under the federal pleading rules, leaving the Bank’s insider status for trial. opinion →
Matter of Hurd, the court cites § 101(24)’s definition to support its decision that a no-payment Chapter 13 plan lacks good faith under § 1325(a)(3). opinion →
In The Matter Of Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Company, the opinion cites § 101 only as the start of a reference to the Bankruptcy Reform Act and decides the case under the former Bankruptcy Act. opinion →
Appeal of Apalachicola Northern Railway Co. v. First National Bank, the court cites Section 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Reform Act and declines to decide the argument concerning that Act. opinion →
Pittsburgh National Bank v. Dee (In Re Dee), the court cites section 101 only as the start of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code and decides whether discharge should be denied under section 727(a)(2). opinion →
Greene v. Newman (In re Newman), the court cites Section 101(26)(A) to describe the debtor’s insolvency while deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction in a fraudulent-transfer action. opinion →
In Re Morgan, the court cites § 101(37) to explain its use of “security interest” while deciding the debtor’s exemption rights under § 522. opinion →
In Re Breining, the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of an “et seq.” reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding whether to extend the time for filing discharge complaints. opinion →
Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Century City, Inc. (In Re Century City, Inc.), the court cites the definition of debt while deciding whether the Chapter 11 filing was an abuse of process. opinion →
First Service Corp. v. Schlickmann (In Re Schlickmann), the court cites § 101 only as the start of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code; it decides attorney’s fees under § 523(d). opinion →
In Re Jackson, the court cites § 101(12) only to correct the motion’s use of “bankrupt” instead of “debtor.” opinion →
Melichar v. Ost, the court cites § 101 only as the start of a reference to the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act and applies the prior Bankruptcy Act. opinion →
Malpeli v. Beneficial Finance Co. of Illinois (In Re Malpeli), the court uses Section 101’s definitions of security interest and lien in deciding whether Section 522(f) can extinguish the creditor’s preexisting rights. opinion →
Murray v. Community Sayings Bank (In Re Cohn), the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding whether it has jurisdiction over the trustee’s dispute. opinion →
In Re Germann, the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of an “et seq.” reference to the Bankruptcy Code and decides whether the plan satisfies § 1325(a)(3). opinion →
Harris v. Supreme Plastics, Inc. (In Re Supreme Plastics, Inc.), the court cites § 101 only as the first section in a reference to the new Bankruptcy Act, then applies the former Act to this case. opinion →
Russell v. Equibank, N. A. (In Re Russell), the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code and decides the case under § 549(c). opinion →
Uvezian v. Kojoyian (In Re Kojoyian), the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding dischargeability under § 523(a)(2). opinion →
In Re Westgate-California Corporation, Debtors. Royal Bank of Canada, and v. Curvin J. Trone, Jr. And Herbert Kunzel, Tr, the court cites § 101 as the start of a reference to the new Bankruptcy Code and applies the former Bankruptcy Act because the case was filed before the Code took effect. opinion →
Coomer v. Barclays American Financial, Inc. (In Re Coomer), the court cites § 101(37) to explain why it turns to the Uniform Commercial Code to decide whether the security interest is purchase money. opinion →
State of Connecticut v. Glidden (In Re Glidden), the court cites the definitions to explain why an assignment to Connecticut falls under § 523(a)(5)(A), then decides whether that provision is constitutional. opinion →
Pillow v. Avco Financial Services (In Re Pillow), the opinion cites Section 101(7) while describing reaffirmation procedures under Section 524 and uses Section 101 et seq. to identify the Bankruptcy Code. opinion →
Bennett v. Knabe (In Re Knabe), the court mentions Section 101’s definition of “entity” while deciding whether attorney’s fees are dischargeable under Section 523(a)(5). opinion →
Farris v. Barclays American Financial, Inc. (In Re Farris), the court cites Section 101’s definitions in a footnote while deciding whether the debtors can avoid a security interest under Section 522(f). opinion →
In Re Northern Boneless Meat Corp., the court cites § 101 only as the start of a reference to the new Bankruptcy Code while applying the earlier Bankruptcy Act. opinion →
In Re Gerard J. Cantwell, Debtor. Appeal of Continental Bank and Beatrice Pitt and Samuel Pitt, the court cites § 101 only as the first section in a reference to the new Bankruptcy Code while applying the prior Bankruptcy Act. opinion →
Pereira v. Checkmate Communications Co. (In Re Checkmate Stereo & Electronics, Ltd.), the court cites § 101(26) in a footnote to identify the Code’s insolvency test without stating or deciding its rule. opinion →
In Re Cummins, the court cites section 101 only as the first section in a reference to the new Bankruptcy Code and decides the case under the earlier Bankruptcy Act. opinion →
County of Humboldt v. Grover, the court cites § 101 only as the start of a reference to the Bankruptcy Reform Act and decides the case under the earlier Bankruptcy Act. opinion →
Horn v. Rincker, the court cites section 101 only as the first number in a reference to the Bankruptcy Act while addressing a stay under section 362. opinion →
Matter of Moses, the court cites § 101 only as the start of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding claim objection procedures under § 502. opinion →
Hammer v. Beneficial Finance Co. (In Re Hammer), the court quotes § 101’s definitions as background while deciding whether § 522(f) applies retroactively. opinion →
Gibbs v. Housing Authority of New Haven (In Re Gibbs), the court cites § 101(21) for the Authority’s conceded status as a governmental unit while deciding a § 525 claim. opinion →
Sams v. Avco Financial Services (In Re Sams), the court cites § 101 for definitions while deciding whether retrospective lien avoidance under § 522(f) violates due process. opinion →
Isaak v. County of Yavapai (In Re Prescott College), the court cites § 101 only as the first section in a reference to the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act, which did not govern this bankruptcy. opinion →
In The Matter Of U.S. Golf Corporation, the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the new Bankruptcy Act while deciding attorney fees under the old Act. opinion →
Neville v. Eufaula Bank & Trust Co., the court cites § 101 only as the start of a reference to the new Bankruptcy Act while discussing attorney compensation under § 330(a)(1). opinion →
Ragsdale v. Genesco, Inc. (In Re Ragsdale), the court cites § 101(27) to define an undisputed judicial lien while deciding whether the debtors can avoid it under § 522. opinion →
Capital Management Co. v. Alison Corp. (In Re Alison Corp.), the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding whether to dismiss the Chapter 11 case. opinion →
LaFave v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In Re LaFave), the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding whether a creditor may retain voluntary installment payments. opinion →
Massachusetts Higher Education Assistance Corp. v. Packer (In Re Packer), the court cites § 101 only as the start of an et seq. reference to the Bankruptcy Code and applies the prior Bankruptcy Act to the student-loan debt. opinion →
In Re Pearson, the court cites § 101(24) to describe Chapter 13 eligibility while deciding how a plan must treat a foreclosure judgment. opinion →
Matter of Verrazzano Towers, Inc., the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while describing the Chapter 11 petition. opinion →
Matter of Gadsby, the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding whether to allow an amendment to the debtor’s schedules. opinion →
Daviau v. Daviau (In re Daviau), the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding a dischargeability issue under § 523(a)(5). opinion →
Whippany Paper Board Co. v. Victory Container Corp. (In Re Whippany Paper Board Co.), the court cites Section 101 only as the first number in a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding personal jurisdiction and venue. opinion →
Thunderbird Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. Penn-Dixie Steel Corp. (In Re Penn-Dixie Steel Corp.), the court cites § 101 only as the start of a general Bankruptcy Code reference identifying the debtor’s reorganization filing. opinion →
In re State of Missouri, the court cites § 101 as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding jurisdiction over the grain under other provisions. opinion →
Missouri v. U. S. Bankruptcy Court for E. D. of Arkansas, the court cites section 101 as the start of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding jurisdiction over the grain and warehouses. opinion →
West Springfield M. E. Credit Union v. Finnie (In Re Finnie), the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding whether a debt is dischargeable under § 523(a)(6). opinion →
Or-Import, Inc. v. Collins, the court cites § 101 et seq. only to identify the current version of the former Bankruptcy Act and decides the discharge issue under former § 35. opinion →
Beck v. Amato (In Re Amato), the court cites the insider definition when discussing a hypothetical November transfer; it avoids the actual transfers under the ninety-day preference period. opinion →
Ray v. Dawson (In Re Dawson), the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of an et seq. reference to the Bankruptcy Code. opinion →
Michigan Milk Producers Ass'n v. in Re Bancroft Milk Products, Inc. (In Re Bancroft Dairy, Inc.), the court borrowed § 101(25)’s term “insider” to describe an officer while deciding a notification issue under Michigan law. opinion →
In Re Reed, the court mentions § 101(24) to describe the debtor’s argument, then decides that possible Chapter 13 eligibility does not bar a Chapter 7 involuntary petition. opinion →
Coleman v. American Finance Corp. (In Re Coleman), the court cites § 101(37)'s definition of a security interest to support its ruling on lien avoidance under § 522(f)(2). opinion →
Matter of Faust, the court cites § 101(24) while recounting another court’s Chapter 13 eligibility ruling. opinion →
Associates Commercial Corp. v. a & a Transport, Inc. (In Re a & a Transport, Inc.), the court cites § 101 only as the start of an et seq. reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding relief from the automatic stay under § 362. opinion →
Bankr. L. Rep. P 68,455 Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Incomco, Inc., Philip M. Smith, Lincolnwood, Inc., Rober, the court cites § 101 as the start of a reference to the Bankruptcy Reform Act while applying § 362’s exception to the automatic stay. opinion →
McClamma v. Commissioner, the court cites section 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding the effect of the automatic stay under section 362(a)(8). opinion →
In Re Blier Cedar Co., Inc., the court cites § 101(11) in a footnote describing the allegations in an involuntary bankruptcy petition. opinion →
In Re Reed, the court cites Section 101 only to identify the Bankruptcy Reform Act, without deciding any of its definitions. opinion →
In Re White Motor Credit Corp., the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code when describing the debtors’ Chapter 11 filings. opinion →
Esgro, Inc. v. Esgro, Inc., the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the new Bankruptcy Code and applies the former Bankruptcy Act. opinion →
Toys "R" US, Inc. v. Esgro, Inc., the court cites § 101 only to identify the new Bankruptcy Code and decides the case under the former Bankruptcy Act. opinion →
Securities and Exchange Commission v. First Financial Group of Texas, the court cites Section 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Reform Act when describing the timing of a bankruptcy petition. opinion →
Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Sholos (In Re Sholos), the court cites § 101(7) to identify the reaffirmed debt as consumer debt while applying § 524’s reaffirmation requirements. opinion →
In Re Clayborn, the court assumes the contractual attorney’s fee is part of the creditor’s claim and decides whether the Chapter 13 plan must pay it. opinion →
Matter of Adana Mortg. Bankers, Inc., the court cites § 101 only in a footnote alongside § 525 while addressing GNMA’s authority and the bankruptcy stay. opinion →
Matter of OPM Leasing Services, Inc., the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code as a whole. opinion →
Harold C. Abramson, Trustee v. Lakewood Bank and Trust Company, the court cites § 101(40) only to identify the current version of a definition while deciding the case under the former Bankruptcy Act. opinion →
Bankr. L. Rep. P 68,050 Mary Frances Erspan, Cross-Appellant v. Lloyd J. Badgett, Cross-Appellee, the court cites Section 101 only to identify the later Bankruptcy Reform Act, which did not govern the defendant’s bankruptcy proceedings. opinion →
Bell v. Public Service Co. (In Re Tennecomp Systems, Inc.), the court recited § 101(40)’s definition of “transfer” while analyzing a preference claim. opinion →
Matter of KC Marsh Co., Inc., the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code; it decides whether to convert the case under § 1112. opinion →
Futuronics Corp. v. Arutt, Nachamie & Benjamin, the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 while deciding that the prior Bankruptcy Act applies. opinion →
Baltic Linen Co. v. Rubin (In Re Rubin), the court cites § 101 only as the start of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding an objection to discharge under § 727(a)(2)(A). opinion →
In Re Petite Auberge Village, Inc., the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the new Bankruptcy Code and applies the former Bankruptcy Act to the case. opinion →
Stodd v. State of California Employment Development Department, the court cites § 101 et seq. to explain why the earlier Bankruptcy Act governs the case. opinion →
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Yates Motor Co., the court cites § 101 only as the start of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code and decides the scope of the automatic stay under § 362. opinion →
Elder v. City of Thomasville (In Re Elder), the court cites § 101’s definitions of “entities” and “persons” to support its ruling about the reach of § 362’s automatic stay. opinion →
Phillips v. Beneficial Finance Co. (In Re Phillips), the court cites Section 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Act and decides the constitutionality of Section 522(f). opinion →
Matter of Trotta, the court quotes § 101(26)’s definition of insolvency in a footnote while deciding whether Thomas could claim a property exemption. opinion →
Ageton v. Cervenka (In Re Ageton), the court cites § 101(6) only to identify the definition of community claims while deciding how community property is administered. opinion →
Provident Bank v. BBT (In Re BBT), the court cites § 101(33) while recounting the debtor’s argument about railroad reorganization, but does not decide what the definition means. opinion →
Steinberg v. Reagan (In Re Reagan), the court cites § 101 as the starting point of the Bankruptcy Reform Act and denies discharge under § 727. opinion →
Booth v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. (In Re Cafes Internationale, Ltd.), the court cites a repealed provision formerly numbered 11 U.S.C. § 101 in a footnote about bankruptcy funds, without deciding the rules of the current definitions section. opinion →
Oliver Reginald Cheeseman and Isabelle Cheeseman v. Erwin B. Nachman, in Re Oliver Reginald Cheeseman and Isabelle Chees, the court cites § 101 only to identify the Bankruptcy Reform Act while deciding Virginia’s householder definition and the effect of § 522(m). opinion →
In The Matter Of Futuronics Corporation, the court cites § 101 only as the start of a reference to the later Bankruptcy Reform Act; it applies the earlier Bankruptcy Act and bankruptcy rules. opinion →
Young v. Republic National Factors Corp. (In Re Lucasa International, Ltd.), the court cites Section 101(37) in passing while deciding whether the security interest was perfected under state law and whether the payment was a preference. opinion →
Cohen v. Werner (In Re Cohen), the court mentions § 101(37) when describing an alternative request to modify the lien, but reduces the lien under § 522(f). opinion →
In Re Fireside Office Supply, Inc., the opinion mentions § 101 only as the start of a citation to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding reimbursement under § 503 and Bankruptcy Rule 11-29. opinion →
Ray v. Dawson, the court cites § 101 only as the start of an et seq. reference to the Bankruptcy Reform Act while deciding an exemption issue under § 522. opinion →
Turner v. New York Hospital (In Re Moskowitz), the court reports the Bankruptcy Court’s application of the transfer definition and denies permission to appeal because factual questions remain. opinion →
Carrigg v. Carrigg (In Re Carrigg), the opinion cites § 101 only as the start of an et seq. reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding whether the payments are nondischargeable under § 523(a)(5)(B). opinion →
In Re Southland Supply, Inc., Bankrupt. Sam Jonas, Trustee of Southland Supply, Inc. v. United States Small Business Adm, the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of the later Bankruptcy Reform Act, which it says does not apply to the case. opinion →
Creditors' Committee 1 v. Osborne, the court applied the former Bankruptcy Act’s compensation provision and cited § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the 1978 Act. opinion →
In Re Baker, the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the new Bankruptcy Code while applying the former Act. opinion →
Whitinsville Savings Bank v. Grundstrom (In Re Grundstrom), the court cites § 101 only as the first section of the Bankruptcy Code when describing the debtors’ filing. opinion →
Pearl-Wick Corp. v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance (In Re Pearl-Wick Corp.), the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code when describing the debtor’s Chapter 11 petition. opinion →
Triangle Laboratories, Inc. v. Halvajian, the court cites § 101 only as the start of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding which law governed a lease termination. opinion →
Kopelman v. Halvajian, the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding which law governs termination of the lease. opinion →
Matter of Ramsden, the court cites § 101 only as the start of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding issues under § 303. opinion →
Spence v. Lansing Automakers Federal Credit Union (In Re Satterla), the court cites Section 101(40) for an undisputed characterization of the account debit as a transfer while addressing preference and setoff issues under other provisions. opinion →
Alsop v. Alaska (In Re Alsop), the court discussed § 101(40)’s definition of transfer but decided when the transfer occurred under § 548(d)(1). opinion →
In The Matter Of Visioneering Construction, Et Al., the court cites § 101 only to identify the new Bankruptcy Code, then applies the former Bankruptcy Act because the case was filed before the new Code took effect. opinion →
In Re Kontaratos, the dissent cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Reform Act while discussing the court's power under § 1102(c). opinion →
Greene v. Newman (In Re Newman), the court cites § 101(26)(a) to describe the debtor’s uncontested insolvency while deciding fraudulent conveyance claims under § 548 and New York law. opinion →
Monzack v. Industrial National Bank (In re Stern), the court cites § 101 only as the start of a reference to the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act while deciding jurisdiction under the earlier Bankruptcy Act. opinion →
In Re Morgan, the court cites § 101 as the start of a reference to the Bankruptcy Reform Act while deciding exemption procedures under § 522. opinion →
Mayo v. United Services Automobile Ass'n (In Re Mayo), the court quotes § 101(40)’s definition of transfer as background while deciding when garnished wages became preferential transfers under § 547. opinion →
Abraham & Straus v. Francis (In Re Francis), the court cites § 101(7) to define consumer debt while deciding whether to lift the § 1301 stay. opinion →
Murray v. Lyon (In Re Cohn), the court cites Section 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while discussing valuation under Section 506(a). opinion →
Tapp v. Fairbanks North Star Borough (In Re Tapp), the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding its authority under § 505. opinion →
National Labor Relations Board v. Brada Miller Freight System, Inc. (In Re Brada Miller Freight System, Inc.), the opinion cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Reform Act while deciding whether other provisions give bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over unfair labor practices. opinion →
Sarkis v. American State Bank of Rapid City (In Re Sarkis), the court treated the debtor’s argument about § 101 as irrelevant and resolved the bank’s setoff under § 553 and South Dakota law. opinion →
Central Trust Co. v. Official Creditors' Committee of Geiger Enterprises, Inc., the court cites § 101 as the start of the New Code but decides the effect of the separate transitional rule in § 403(a). opinion →
In Re Thc Financial Corporation, the court decides compensation under former § 641 and cites § 101 only as the first section in a reference to the Bankruptcy Act of 1978. opinion →
McCracken v. Selner (In Re Selner), the court cites Section 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding whether a tax refund belongs to the estate. opinion →
Butz v. Pingel (In Re Pingel), the court cites § 101(40) for the parties’ undisputed premise that perfecting the security interest was a transfer, then decides whether the transfer is avoidable under § 547. opinion →
In re Gifford, the dissent cites Section 101(40) while explaining lien avoidance under Section 522(f)(2). opinion →
In re Gifford, the dissent cites § 101(40) to explain its proposed reading of the lien avoidance provision in § 522(f)(2). opinion →
Colandrea v. Colandrea (In Re Colandrea), the court cites § 101 only as the start of a range identifying where the Bankruptcy Reform Act was codified. opinion →
Carlton v. Internal Revenue Service (In Re Carlton), the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Act while interpreting §§ 523(a)(7) and 724(a). opinion →
In Re Manzey Land & Cattle Co., the court treated the debtors’ status as farmers under § 101 as undisputed while deciding consolidation and other requests. opinion →
Rosen v. Associates Financial Services Co., the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Act while deciding lien avoidance under § 522(f)(2). opinion →
Van Lieshout v. Verill (In Re Verill), the court cites § 101 only as the start of a range identifying where the 1978 Act was codified and applies the earlier Bankruptcy Act. opinion →
In re Innkeepers of New Castle, Inc., the court cites § 101 only to locate the preface containing the 1978 Act while explaining that the earlier Bankruptcy Act governs. opinion →
In re Innkeepers of New Castle, Inc., the court cites § 101 only to locate a reprint of the 1978 Act while explaining that the former Bankruptcy Act governs. opinion →
Paccar Financial Corp. v. Pappas (In Re Pappas), the court cites § 101 only as the start of an “et seq.” reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding conversion and relief from the automatic stay under other sections. opinion →
TELEGRAPH S & L ASS'N v. Federal S & L Ins. Corp., the court cites the Bankruptcy Code definition as an example while construing the insolvency test for savings and loan receivership. opinion →
Matter of Noonan, the court cites § 101(4) when describing Arista’s contingent claim and § 101(24) as background on chapter 13, while deciding whether to convert Noonan’s case under § 706(b). opinion →
In Re Spenard Ventures, Inc., the court cites § 101 et seq. to identify the Bankruptcy Code while deciding whether to dismiss the petition under §§ 1112(b) and 305(a)(1). opinion →
In the Matter of John W. Foster, Jr. And Myrtha D. Foster, Debtors. John W. Foster, Jr., and Myrtha D. Foster v. William, the court quotes the section’s definition of “individual with regular income” in a footnote while deciding how a Chapter 13 plan may treat mortgage payments. opinion →
Juergens v. Rice (In re Rice), the court cites Section 101's definition of “person” as support for interpreting an Ohio exemption statute. opinion →
In Re Chugiak Boat Works, Inc., the court cites § 101 only to identify the Bankruptcy Code and decides administrative expense priority under §§ 503(b) and 507(a)(1). opinion →
La Jolla Mortgage Fund v. Rancho El Cajon Associates, the court cites § 101(16) while interpreting the equity requirement of § 362(d)(2)(A). opinion →
Matter of McGinnis, the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding whether the Chapter 13 plan was proposed in good faith. opinion →
Curry v. Dial Finance Corp. (In Re Curry), the court cites § 101 only as the start of an “et seq.” reference to the Bankruptcy Reform Act while addressing § 522(f). opinion →
In Re Heark Corp., the court cites § 101’s definitions as background and applies Maryland law to decide whether a corporation with a forfeited charter can file a Chapter 7 petition. opinion →
Air Transport Ass'n of America v. Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (In Re Professional Air Traffic Cont, the court cites § 101(27) to identify the attachments as judicial liens while discussing preference avoidance under § 547(b). opinion →
Rubinstein v. Alaska Pacific Consortium (In Re New England Fish Co.), the court cites section 101 only as the start of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding whether a bankruptcy sale can be free of civil rights claims. opinion →
Matter of Landmark Capital Co., the court cites § 101(31) while distinguishing a bankruptcy case from related civil proceedings for purposes of venue. opinion →
Green v. Alton Telegraph Printing Co., the court cites § 101 et seq. to identify the bankruptcy law under which Alton Telegraph filed its petition, while deciding the effect of removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1478. opinion →
Tarrant v. Spenard Builders Supply, Inc. (In Re Tarrant), the court cites § 101 only as the opening number of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code and decides the debtors’ lien avoidance claim under § 522(f). opinion →
In Re Beef N' Burgundy, Inc., the court cites § 101(37) only in a footnote while deciding the scope of adequate protection under § 362(d)(1). opinion →
In Re Booth, the court assumes that vendors have a claim under Section 101(4) without deciding what the definition covers. opinion →
Webber v. Credithrift of America, the court cites § 101(28) for the definition of a lien while deciding a constitutional challenge to lien avoidance. opinion →
Webber v. Credithrift of America, Inc., the court cites § 101(28) to identify a lien as a property interest while deciding whether applying § 522(f) violates the Fifth Amendment. opinion →
Johnston Memorial Hospital v. Hess (In Re Hess), the court cites the section while discussing how exemptions would affect insolvency in a hypothetical action by the trustee. opinion →
Peter C. Augustine and Nancy L. Augustine v. United States of America, United States Department of Agriculture, Farmers, the court cites Section 101(17) to report the parties’ stipulation that Peter Augustine was a farmer. opinion →
Seidle v. Lita Records, Inc. (In Re Belize Airways Ltd.), the court cites § 101(27) in a footnote for the definition of “judicial lien” while deciding lien validity under § 544 and Florida law. opinion →
Wander v. Steinhardt Partners (In re Sheridan Associates), the court cites the definition to explain why the partners’ financial records matter to its venue decision. opinion →
Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Schweitzer (In Re Schweitzer), the court cites § 101(7) while recounting the debtor’s redemption argument and does not decide the definition in that section. opinion →
Farley v. Moore's Building Supplies (In Re Farley), the court recites Section 101’s definition of a judicial lien, a status the defendant conceded, while deciding whether the lien could be avoided under Section 522(f)(1). opinion →
In the Matter of Tape City, U.S.A., Inc., Debtor. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corporation v. Tape City, U.S.A., Inc., the court cites § 101 only as the start of a general reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding whether a Louisiana vendor’s privilege remains valid in bankruptcy. opinion →
In Re Julian Roosevelt Goeb and Jane Alma Goeb, Debtors. In Re Julian Roosevelt Goeb and Jane Alma Goeb v. Heid, the court mentions § 101(24) as a possible obstacle to zero-payment plans but expressly reserves judgment on their legality. opinion →
In Re Camelot, Inc., the court found the custodian issue moot and did not decide whether anyone met the definition in Section 101(10). opinion →
Sioux Valley Hospital Ass'n v. Davison County, the court cites the bankruptcy definition while deciding whether Chapman's bankruptcy established indigency under state medical assistance law. opinion →
O'Connell v. Continental Bank (In re Sturm), the court cites § 101 et seq. only to identify the Bankruptcy Code under which the debtor filed his petition. opinion →
Beery v. Turner, the court mentions § 101(17)'s definition of farmer but expressly declines to apply or interpret it because the old Bankruptcy Act governs. opinion →
Matter of Market Response Group, Inc., the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of an “et seq.” reference to the Bankruptcy Reform Act while deciding whether former creditors’ committee counsel may represent the trustee. opinion →
James E. Klapmeier, Jack Dekker, Zaven A. Dadekian, and David S. Wilbourn, as Assignees of Telecheck International, Inc., the court cites § 101 only as the first section of the new Bankruptcy Code and applies the former setoff provision. opinion →
Winshall v. Mazzetti (In Re Mazzetti), the court cites the insider definition in a footnote about a hypothetical earlier transfer while deciding that a mortgage granted within 90 days of bankruptcy was avoidable under section 547. opinion →
First National Bank & Trust Co. of Fremont v. Shreves (In Re Kock), the court quotes § 101(40)'s general definition of transfer while deciding when a mortgage transfer occurs under § 727(a)(2). opinion →
Ragsdale v. Credithrift of America, Inc. (In Re Derritt), the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding a preference claim under § 547. opinion →
Napotnik v. Equibank and Parkvale Savings Association, the court cites § 101 only as the start of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding an exemption under § 522. opinion →
Mccannon v. Marston, the court cites Section 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding the trustee's powers under Section 544. opinion →
Matter of Parker, the court cites § 101(9) as part of Credithrift’s rejected argument that the debtor’s attorney had to file a proof of claim, then resolves the issue under § 503. opinion →
Ford Motor Credit Company v. Robert L. Weaver, John C. Weaver and Sons and Weaver Farms, Defendants, the court cites § 101 only as the start of a reference to the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act and decides the case under the 1898 Act. opinion →
Matter of Asplund, the court mentions Section 101’s definitions in the debtor’s argument but decides the creditor’s secured status under Section 506(a). opinion →
Lawyers Title Insurance Corp. v. Madrid (In Re Madrid), the majority did not decide whether the foreclosure sale was a transfer; only the dissent invoked § 101(40)'s definition. opinion →
In Re B.D. International Discount Corp., the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while affirming an order for relief under Chapter 7. opinion →
Huddleston v. Castle (In re Stewart), the court cites § 101(25) in a footnote explaining the preference period but does not decide whether anyone was an insider. opinion →
Calypso Yacht Charters, Inc. v. Nautilus Virgin Charters, Inc. (In Re Nautilus Virgin Charters, Inc.), the court discussed Section 101 only in a preliminary assessment of the earlier dismissal, then denied reconsideration as untimely without deciding that issue. opinion →
Otero Mills, Inc. v. Security Bank & Trust (In Re Otero Mills, Inc.), the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding whether § 105 permits an injunction. opinion →
Beery v. Turner, the court mentions Section 101(17)'s definition of farmer but applies the former Bankruptcy Act instead. opinion →
Lezer v. New York State Higher Education Services Corp. (In Re Lezer), the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of an et seq. reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding student-loan discharge under § 523(a)(8)(B). opinion →
Gilbert v. Shape (In Re Shape), the court quotes another bankruptcy court’s reference to § 101(14) while deciding jurisdiction over tribal property and whether to lift the automatic stay. opinion →
Davis v. Crescent Beach Inn, Inc. (In re Crescent Beach Inn, Inc.), the court cites the insider definition while considering possible preferences but makes no final decision about insider status. opinion →
MATTER OF DeBRUNNER, the court refers to § 101(4) while deciding whether disputed debts count toward § 109(e)'s Chapter 13 debt limit. opinion →
Rio Grande Valley Bank v. Waldroop (In Re Waldroop), the court cites § 101 only as the start of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding whether the debtor’s conduct barred discharge under § 727. opinion →
In Re Wilnor Drilling, Inc., the court recounts the Bankruptcy Court’s finding under Section 101 and decides the committees’ payment priority under other provisions. opinion →
Aetna Finance Co. v. Martinez (In Re Martinez), the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding whether to deny discharge under § 727. opinion →
Penco Corp. v. Andrews (In Re Andrews), the court cites § 101’s definitions while reporting another court’s ruling on whether confessed-judgment liens are avoidable under § 522(f)(1). opinion →
In re Gifford, the majority cites § 101 as the starting point of the Act’s codification while deciding § 522(f), and a dissent separately cites § 101(28). opinion →
In re Gifford, the court cites Section 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Reform Act while deciding whether Section 522(f) applies to an earlier security interest. opinion →
Malone v. Payeur (In Re Payeur), the court cites § 101 only as the start of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code and decides the appeal on record and joinder grounds. opinion →
Oien v. Sioux Falls Paint & Glass (In re Oien), the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Reform Act while addressing a claim under § 548. opinion →
Campbell v. Kimberly Clark Corp. (In Re Skinner Lumber Co.), the court cites § 101(40) in a quotation from another decision while deciding when a check payment becomes a preferential transfer under § 547. opinion →
In Re Barnes, the court mentions § 101(24)'s definition as an unresolved question and does not decide whether the debtor meets it. opinion →
Rcm Supply Company, Inc. v. Hunter Douglas, Inc., the court cites § 101 only as the start of an et seq. reference identifying the bankruptcy law under which RCM was reorganized. opinion →
Ardmore Sales Co. v. Thico Plan, Inc. (In Re Ardmore Sales Co.), the court treats the payment as an undisputed transfer under Section 101(40) and decides when it occurred under Section 547. opinion →
In Re William A. Westerhoff and Barbara A. Westerhoff, Debtors. William A. Westerhoff and Barbara A. Westerhoff v. Richa, the court cites § 101 et seq. to identify the bankruptcy filing while deciding a contribution claim under Minnesota law. opinion →
Matter of Colby, the court mentions § 101(27) but leaves Copas’ lien classification unresolved while allowing the state court to determine his property interest. opinion →
Air Transport Ass'n v. Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (In Re Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org, the court cites § 101 et seq. to identify the Bankruptcy Code under which PATCO filed and decides whether PATCO was entitled to a jury trial. opinion →
Matthews v. Johns-Manville Corp., the court cites § 101 only as the first section in a reference to the Bankruptcy Act while deciding the scope of the automatic stay under § 362. opinion →
Rubenstein v. Sachs (In Re Locarno), the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while discussing exemptions under § 522. opinion →
In Re Overstreet, the court cites § 101(24) while discussing Chapter 13 eligibility but makes only a tentative statement about the debtor’s eligibility. opinion →
Matter of Gagel & Gagel, the court cites the definition alongside Chapter 11 eligibility provisions without deciding what Section 101(12) means. opinion →
Hollytex Carpet Mills v. John v. Tedford and Viola J. Tedford, the court cites the section to identify when the bankruptcy case begins while deciding when the debtors’ exemptions are determined. opinion →
In Re Nelsen, the court mentions § 101(26) only to record the parties’ agreement that the debtor was insolvent. opinion →
Wilson v. Upreach Ministries (In Re Missionary Baptist Foundation of America, Inc.), the court cites the insider definition in a tentative observation about Henderson, then decides the fraudulent-transfer claim under § 548. opinion →
In Re Bellucci, the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding equitable subordination under § 510(c). opinion →
Westerby v. Johns-Manville Corp., the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Reform Act while deciding whether bankruptcy proceedings affect dismissal for forum non conveniens. opinion →
Clotfelter v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. (In Re Threewitt), the court cites § 101(25)(A) to identify insiders while explaining the scope of the pension exemption under § 522(d)(10)(E). opinion →
In Re Carl Edward Bozzo and Diane Filice Bozzo, Bankrupts, Highlands Insurance Company of Houston, Texas v. Edward, the court cites § 101 only as the start of a reference to the new Bankruptcy Code and applies the former Act. opinion →
United States v. Security Industrial Bank, the concurrence cites § 101 only to identify the Bankruptcy Act before discussing § 522’s exemption provisions. opinion →
John L. Whitlock, Trustee v. John W. Hause, D/B/A Hause Floor Co., the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of an et seq. reference to the Bankruptcy Reform Act while addressing the right to a jury trial. opinion →
Matter of Hochdorf, the court cites the definition only to explain its use of “debtor” while deciding the objection under the Bankruptcy Reform Act’s savings clause. opinion →
Allied Technology, Inc. v. R.B. Brunemann & Sons, Inc. (In Re Allied Technology, Inc.), the court cites § 101’s claim definitions while deciding whether the deadline for prepetition claims bars a claim arising from lease rejection. opinion →
In Re Artists' Outlet, Inc., the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of an “et seq.” reference while deciding whether to abstain under § 305(a). opinion →
Ohio Citizens Bank v. Satterfield (In Re Satterfield), the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding dischargeability under § 523(a)(2)(A). opinion →
In Re Iowa Premium Service Co., Inc., Debtor. Iowa Premium Service Co., Inc. v. First National Bank in St. Louis, St. Lo, the court cites Section 101 for the definitions of debt and claim while deciding when interest debt is incurred under Section 547(c)(2). opinion →
Matter of Bay Area Services, the court cites § 101 only as the beginning of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding the treatment of deferred tax payments under § 1129(a)(9)(C). opinion →
Daniels v. Daniels Cleaners, Inc. (In re Daniels Cleaners, Inc.), the court cites the insider definition while reversing a finding that lacked evidentiary support, without deciding whether the purchaser was an insider. opinion →
Garnett State Savings Bank v. Tush, the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Reform Act, which did not apply to the bankruptcy at issue. opinion →
Inforex Inc. v. Burridge (In Re Inforex Inc.), the court cites § 101 as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding the effect of plan confirmation under § 1141. opinion →
In the Matter of Emerald Oil Co., Debtor. William C. Sandoz, Trustee, Cross-Appellant v. Fred Wilson Drilling Company, C, the court cites Section 101’s definitions to support its interpretation of Section 547’s preference rules. opinion →
Jensen Electronics, Inc. v. American Computer & Telecommunications Corp. (In re American Computer & Telecommunications C, the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Reform Act while deciding its jurisdiction. opinion →
Chandler Bank of Lyons v. Ray (In Re Ray), the court cites Section 101's definitions while discussing how the automatic stay applies to secured creditors. opinion →
In Re Fisher, the court cites section 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code when noting its effective date. opinion →
National Sugar Refining Co. v. C. Czarnikow, Inc. (In Re National Sugar Refining Co.), the court quotes § 101(38)’s definition of a statutory lien but addresses the seller’s rights under § 546(c) without deciding whether the definition covers stoppage in transit. opinion →
Ledford v. McCormick (In Re McCormick), the court cites § 101(4) while explaining why postpetition interest claims would generally be disallowed under Chapter 7. opinion →
Walter E. Heller & Co. v. Taylor-Ramsey Corp. (In Re Skinner Lumber Co.), the court cites the bankruptcy definition of debt while deciding whether Taylor-Ramsey was a buyer in ordinary course under South Carolina law. opinion →
Southern Discount Co. v. Maddox (In Re Maddox), the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding a filing fee issue. opinion →
In the Matter of Triangle Chemicals, Inc., Debtor. Darryl Fanelli v. Nelson T. Hensley, Trustee, the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding whether a bankruptcy court may retroactively approve an attorney’s employment. opinion →
Matter of Great Northwest Development Co., the court cites Section 101’s definitions to explain the corporation’s undisputed eligibility, then decides whether its board authorized the petition under Michigan law. opinion →
Gary Aircraft Corp. v. United States, the court cites § 101 only as the start of a reference to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 while explaining that the case arises under the earlier Bankruptcy Act. opinion →
In Re Toga Manufacturing Ltd., the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Reform Act while deciding relief under § 304. opinion →
In Re Allied Artists Industries, Inc., the court cites § 101 et seq. to identify the 1978 Act while explaining why the earlier Bankruptcy Act governs this case. opinion →
Hoffman v. Internal Revenue Service (In Re Hoffman), the court recited § 101(27)’s definition of a judicial lien in a footnote but found the tax lien’s classification moot. opinion →
Park Nursing Center, Inc. v. Michigan Department of Social Services (In Re Park Nursing Center, Inc.), the court cites § 101 as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Reform Act while resolving a jurisdictional challenge. opinion →
Q1 Corp. v. Reichenstein (In Re Q1 Corp.), the court cites § 101 only to locate a note containing the Act’s effective-date provision while deciding bankruptcy jurisdiction. opinion →
Armstrong World Industries, Inc. v. James A. Phillips, Inc. (In Re James A. Phillips, Inc.), the court cites § 101 only as the start of an “et seq.” reference to the Bankruptcy Code when describing the debtor’s chapter 11 filing. opinion →
Margaret Austin, Etc. v. Unarco Industries, Inc., the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Reform Act while deciding whether § 362’s automatic stay reaches a solvent co-defendant. opinion →
Matter of Hearth & Hinge, Inc., the court cites § 101(10) in support of its discussion of administrative priority for pre-petition custodian expenses, without deciding the definition in that section. opinion →
Meister v. State National Bank of Connecticut (In Re Mailbag International, Inc.), the court quotes Section 101’s definition of transfer as background while deciding when the transfer occurred under Section 547. opinion →
J. Kenneth Rhodes, Debtor v. Larry Stewart, Trustee, the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Reform Act while deciding whether Tennessee’s exemption opt-out statute is valid. opinion →
Anderson v. Associates Commercial Corp. (In Re Anderson), the court cites § 101(10)(C) only while describing another court’s ruling on the definition of custodian. opinion →
Seychelles, Partnership & Genius Corp. v. Banyan Corp., the court cites § 101(12) to identify a partnership as a debtor while deciding whether conversion under § 706(a) requires all partners’ consent. opinion →
Commercial Union Insurance v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In Re Johns-Manville Corp.), the court quotes another court’s use of § 101’s definitions while deciding whether CU may seek relief from the automatic stay. opinion →
Green v. Han Mok Yang (In Re Green), the court cites § 101(9)(A) while suggesting the claim may have arisen after the bankruptcy petition, but leaves that issue unresolved. opinion →
Butz v. Society National Bank of the Miami Valley (In re Clark), the court cites § 101(4) and (12) while explaining why the trustees’ state law claims are related bankruptcy proceedings within the district court’s jurisdiction. opinion →
Lawrence Tractor Co. v. Gregory, the court cites § 101 only as the first section in a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while explaining when the Code became effective. opinion →
In Re Dakota Industries, Inc., the court recites the creditor definition while deciding that parties in interest must receive notice before Jahan’s administrative expense claim is considered. opinion →
Love v. Kradel (In Re Love), the bankruptcy judge discussed Section 101’s definitions in a proposed order that required district court consideration. opinion →
Borman's, Inc. v. Allied Supermarkets, Inc., the court cites § 101 only as the first section in a reference to the Revised Bankruptcy Act and decides the case under the former Act. opinion →
McLaughlin v. McPhail, the court cites § 101 only as the start of a reference to the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 while explaining why earlier bankruptcy rules govern. opinion →
Noble v. Yingling, the court cites § 101 only as the start of a reference to the Bankruptcy Reform Act while deciding a filing deadline under § 522(f). opinion →
In Re Madison Hotel Associates, the court uses § 101’s definitions to support its decision that a foreclosure right is impaired under § 1124. opinion →
Eanes v. Shepherd, the court cites § 101 as the starting point of the Bankruptcy Reform Act while deciding estate property and exemptions under §§ 541 and 522. opinion →
In re Amatex Corp., the bankruptcy judge applied § 101’s definitions in a recommendation to the district court concerning a guardian for future asbestos claimants. opinion →
Mego International, Inc. v. Packaging & Assembly Manufacturing Corp. (In Re Mego International, Inc.), the opinion cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code and does not decide any of its definitions. opinion →
Matter of Clark, the court cites § 101’s lien definitions to illustrate Congress’s drafting while deciding whether § 1322(b)(5) permits a debtor to cure a default after a foreclosure judgment. opinion →
McLaughlin v. McPhail, the court cites § 101 only as the first section in an et seq. reference to the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 while explaining why earlier procedural rules govern the case. opinion →
United States v. American Pouch Foods, Inc. (In Re American Pouch Foods, Inc.), the court cites § 101 only as the start of a general reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding ownership under a contract. opinion →
In Re Teti, the court cites § 101 only as the start of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding whether to reopen its judgment under Rule 60(b)(5). opinion →
Hunter v. Schultheis Bros. Co. (In Re Hunter), the court cites § 101 et seq. to identify the Bankruptcy Code while deciding whether § 522(f)(1) applies to judgment liens created before the Code took effect. opinion →
Wilson v. Otto (In re Wilson), the court cites § 101 only to identify the Bankruptcy Code under which the debtors filed. opinion →
Moore v. Gilmore (In Re Gilmore), the court quoted § 101(41)’s definition of transfer but assumed without deciding that the foreclosure sale fell within it. opinion →
In Re Robert J. Mason, Debtor. Robert J. Mason v. Integrity Insurance Company and Sherwood & Roberts, Inc., the court cites § 101 only to identify the Bankruptcy Reform Act and decides appealability and the requirements of § 303. opinion →
Rogue Valley Stations, Inc. v. Birk Oil Co., the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while discussing the automatic stay under § 362. opinion →
Kranzdorf v. Green, the opinion cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Reform Act while deciding jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1471. opinion →
Dunne Trucking Co. v. Internal Revenue Service of the United States (In Re Dunne Trucking Co.), the court cites section 101(10) to identify a custodian while explaining the difference between the turnover rules in sections 542 and 543. opinion →
Kutztown State College v. Degler-Whiting, Inc., the court mentions § 101(12) only to identify the current location of a former Bankruptcy Act definition. opinion →
Matter of Allied Supermarkets, Inc., the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the 1978 Bankruptcy Act while explaining that former law governs the petition. opinion →
Enterprises, Inc. v. Goodman Oil Company, the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding whether equitable payment rules apply. opinion →
In Re Manchester Hides, Inc., the court cites the definition of “entity” while explaining that the attorneys could request payment of an administrative expense under § 503. opinion →
Chippenham Hospital, Inc. v. Robert E. Bondurant, in Re Robert E. Bondurant, Debtor, the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Reform Act while deciding an exemption issue under § 522. opinion →
Maddox v. Southern Discount Co., the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding lien avoidance under § 522(f). opinion →
Maddox v. Southern Discount Co., the opinion cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding the meaning of “debtor’s interest” under § 522. opinion →
New York v. Reinstein (In Re Reinstein), the court cites § 101 only as the start of an et seq. reference to the Bankruptcy Code when describing the debtors’ Chapter 7 petition. opinion →
In Re Microdisk, Inc., the court recites the definition of “disinterested person” while deciding whether to remove the trustee for cause under § 324. opinion →
In Re Blehm, the court cites § 101 while recounting other courts’ analyses, then decides whether veil-piercing claims count toward the § 109(e) debt limit. opinion →
In Re Grodel Manufacturing, Inc., the court mentions § 101 only as the first section in a reference to Title 11 while deciding whether a former trustee may buy the debtor’s stock. opinion →
Georgia Pacific Corporation v. Sigma Service Corporation, the court cites § 101 only as the start of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code and decides issues under §§ 541 and 542. opinion →
In the Matter of Jane Marlene Busick, Debtor-Appellant, the court cites § 101(30) to describe who qualifies as a person while expressly leaving the joint involuntary petition’s jurisdictional effect undecided. opinion →
Credit Union National Ass'n v. National Credit Union Administration Board, the court cites § 101 only to identify the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 as background to an NCUA liquidation rule. opinion →
In Re Ms. Kipps, Inc., the court cites section 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while discussing jurisdiction. opinion →
Bank of Virginia v. Lindamood (In Re Lindamood), the court cites § 101(24) to describe Chapter 13 eligibility while deciding whether the bank’s lien is protected from modification under § 1322(b)(2). opinion →
In Re Twin Parks Limited Partnership. N.S.C. Contractors, Inc. v. Twin Parks Limited Partnership, the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Reform Act and applies the Act’s transition provision instead. opinion →
Matter of North Port Development Co., the court cites Section 101 to identify the receiver as a custodian while deciding compensation under other Bankruptcy Code provisions. opinion →
Orsburn v. Diners Club, Inc. (In Re Orsburn), the court noted that the lien’s status under § 101(27) was undisputed and decided whether it impaired the debtors’ exemption under § 522(f)(1). opinion →
Combs v. Combs (In Re Combs), the court mentions Section 101’s definitions while considering the status of creditors added to a Chapter 13 case, but resolves the plan modification under other provisions. opinion →
Forestry Products, Inc. v. Hope, the court uses § 101’s definitions to support its ruling on corporate eligibility for Chapter 13 under § 109(e). opinion →
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Radden (In Re Radden), the court cites § 101 only to note GMAC’s concession that it is an entity for purposes of the § 542 turnover claim. opinion →
Browning v. Navarro, the court cites Section 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code, while deciding the effect of the automatic stay under Section 362. opinion →
NRT Metals, Inc. v. Manhattan Metals (Non-Ferrous) Ltd., the court cites § 101 as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while describing NRT’s argument about its liquidation plan. opinion →
Maryland National Bank v. The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, in the Matter of Maryland Glass Corporation, Debtor, the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Reform Act; it decides the priority of a tax lien under other provisions. opinion →
Matter of Nat. Awards Mfg. Inc., the court cites the insider definition while expressly leaving aside whether enough creditors who were not insiders accepted the plan. opinion →
In Re Sea Catch, Inc., the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. opinion →
Schlecht v. Alaska (In Re Schlecht), the court cites § 101 only to identify the Bankruptcy Code while deciding entitlement to attorney’s fees under § 506(b). opinion →
Opn. No., the attorney general cites Section 101’s definition of “governmental unit” in an advisory opinion about traffic fines and penalties. opinion →
Marketing Resources International Corp. v. PTC Corp. (In Re Marketing Resources International Corp.), the court cites § 101(25)(B) when recounting the debtor’s insider allegation but does not decide whether PTC meets that definition. opinion →
Matter of Don Miller, Inc., the court cites § 101’s definitions in a footnote while applying Wisconsin law to reject Miller’s claimed security interest. opinion →
Matter of Featherworks Corp., the court cites § 101(25)(E) in describing the debtor’s argument, then decides when insider status matters under § 1129(a)(10). opinion →
In the Matter of Unr Industries, Inc., Debtors-Appellants, the court cites § 101(4)(A) when describing the district judge’s view of future asbestos claims, but leaves that question open and dismisses the appeal. opinion →
Cooper-Jarrett, Inc. v. Central Transport, Inc., the court cites § 101 as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code and decides the setoff issue under § 553. opinion →
In the Matter of Ronald Shuler A/K/A Ronnie Shuler F/d/b/a Delta Motor Company, Bankrupt. Harold v. Simpson and Company, the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding the debt’s dischargeability under § 523. opinion →
In Re Johns-Manville Corp., the court quotes another court’s discussion of Section 101 while granting a motion to appoint a representative under Section 1109(b). opinion →
Richardson v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n (In Re Stroud Wholesale, Inc.), the court cites the definition of “entity” while describing the sale provisions, then concludes that the validity of the sale is moot. opinion →
In Re Ward, the court cites section 101’s definitions while applying section 522(g)(1) to the debtors’ voluntary mortgages. opinion →
In Re Werth, the court cites Section 101 only as part of an et seq. reference when describing Werth’s bankruptcy filing. opinion →
In Re Tinsley, the court treats the debtors’ farmer status as undisputed and decides whether a creditor may propose a Chapter 11 liquidation plan. opinion →
In Re Carr, the court quotes another judge’s definition of “claim” while deciding whether a mortgage creditor can collect interest on arrearages under a Chapter 13 plan. opinion →
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Lawrence (In Re Lawrence), the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of an “et seq.” reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding whether the debtors must reaffirm their debt or redeem their vehicles. opinion →
In the Matter of Lhd Realty Corporation, Debtor. Appeal of National Life Insurance Company, the court cites § 101 as the starting point of a general Bankruptcy Code reference while deciding the lender’s prepayment premium and late charges. opinion →
In Re Butterworth, the court cites § 101 only as the start of a general reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding whether a creditor’s letter served as an informal proof of claim. opinion →
Vaughan v. Central Bank of the South, the court quotes the definition of “debt” while deciding Chapter 13 eligibility under § 109(e). opinion →
Donovan v. Hamilton County Municipal Court, the opinion mentions § 101 only in a quotation of an Ohio statute that references the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. opinion →
In Re Judith Lynne Madrid, Debtor. Judith Lynne Madrid v. Lawyers Title Insurance Corp., and Donald Turney, the court mentions Section 101's general definition of transfer while deciding when a transfer occurred under Section 548. opinion →
Maldonado v. Ramirez, the court cites § 101(4) while deciding whether the creditor’s attorney’s knowledge of the bankruptcy caused her unscheduled claim to be discharged. opinion →
Noble v. Yingling, the court cites § 101 only as the start of a reference to the Bankruptcy Reform Act while deciding when debtors may seek lien avoidance under § 522(f). opinion →
Burroughs Corp. v. Gillman (In Re Electrospace Corp.), the court cites § 101 only as the beginning of the current Bankruptcy Code while holding that the former Bankruptcy Act governs the appeal. opinion →
Egan v. Oliver (In Re Oliver), the court quotes § 101(41)'s definition of transfer in a footnote while deciding whether the conveyance was avoidable under § 548. opinion →
Tignor v. William C. Parkinson, Jr., in Re Henry Clay Tignor, Debtor, the court cites § 101(4) in a footnote comparing the treatment of tort claims under the old and new bankruptcy laws, without deciding a claim against this debtor. opinion →
In Re National Hospital & Institutional Builders Co., the court cites § 101 only as the start of a reference to the 1978 Act while deciding that the 1898 Act governs this case. opinion →
Matter of Skelly, the court cites § 101(37)'s definition of “security interest” while expressly declining to decide whether it allows modification of a foreclosure judgment. opinion →
In Re Stancraft Corp., the court cites § 101(13) for the definition of “disinterested” while deciding whether to disqualify the trustee’s counsel under § 327(a). opinion →
Mc Louth Steel Corp. v. AJF, Inc. (In Re Mc Louth Steel Corp.), the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of an “et seq.” reference to the Bankruptcy Reform Act while deciding whether preference actions carry a right to a jury trial. opinion →
In Re Paul Tipps East Oregon Co., the court cites § 101(14) for general entity principles while deciding whether the debtor’s future earnings could fund a feasible Chapter 11 plan. opinion →
Brown v. Traders National Bank (In Re Spears), the court mentions the definition of “lien” as a possibility, then decides the seller’s claim under § 546(c)’s reclamation requirements. opinion →
In Re First State Securities Corp., the court cited the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of “disinterested person” hypothetically, then applied SIPA to deny removal of the trustee. opinion →
Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Gary Weintraub, and Frank H. McGhee and Andrew McGhee Intervening, the court cites § 101(30) as background while deciding whether a bankruptcy trustee may waive a corporation’s attorney-client privilege. opinion →
Grubbs v. Houston First American Savings Association, the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of an et seq. reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding § 1322(b). opinion →
Bankr. L. Rep. P 69,858 in the Matter of Mooney Aircraft, Inc. And Mooney Corporation, Bankrupts. Mooney Aircraft Corp., the court mentions § 101(4)’s definition of “claim” but leaves its application undecided because the former Bankruptcy Act governs. opinion →
In Re Bud Long Chevrolet, Inc., the court cites § 101 only as the start of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code when describing the debtor’s filing. opinion →
Penn Terra Limited v. Department Of Environmental Resources, the court cites Section 101 only while distinguishing another court's decision about the definitions of claim and debt from its own automatic-stay ruling. opinion →
Long v. Long (In Re Long), the court cites § 101(14) to explain that an attorney may be an entity, but resolves the dispute by finding no assignment of the fee award. opinion →
Matter of Borne Chemical Co., Inc., the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding whether state environmental requirements are preempted. opinion →
Boyd-Leopard v. Douglass (In Re Boyd-Leopard), the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while stating when the plaintiff filed his petition. opinion →
In Re Landscaping Services, Inc., the court cites the section to describe the debtor as insolvent in its factual background. opinion →
Rechnitzer v. Boyd (In Re Executive Growth Investments, Inc.), the court cites Section 101(27) alongside its explanation of the trustee’s power under Section 544(a), without deciding what Section 101(27) means. opinion →
United States v. Westside Bank v. O'Sullivan Industries, Inc. v. Howard Horton, Intervenors-Appellees, the court cites § 101 et seq. only to identify the former Bankruptcy Act governing Samuels while deciding a seller’s reclamation priority under Texas law. opinion →
Kenan v. Hilliard Oil & Gas, Inc. (In Re George Rodman, Inc.), the court cites the definition of security interest in a footnote while deciding whether Oklahoma law gives the operator a statutory lien. opinion →
In Re Kenval Marketing Corp., the court cites the definition of custodian but orders relief because the debtor was generally not paying its debts, without deciding whether the assignment qualified. opinion →
United National Bank v. Corsica Enterprises, Inc. (In Re Corsica Enterprises, Inc.), the court cites section 101 for background definitions while deciding the priority of the trustee’s lien under section 544 and South Dakota law. opinion →
In the Matter of Ray Bryan ADAMS, Jr., Bankrupt. Z.D. BONNER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ray Bryan ADAMS, Jr., Defendant-App, the court cites § 101 only as the start of the former Bankruptcy Act’s code range while deciding dischargeability under a different section. opinion →
Myers v. Cohen, the court cites section 101 only as the first number in a reference to the Bankruptcy Act while deciding an abuse of process claim. opinion →
Allman v. Allman, the court cites Section 101 only as the start of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code and decides dischargeability under Section 523. opinion →
Bankr. L. Rep. P 69,937 in the Matter of James Larry Poston, Bankrupt. Patino's, Inc. v. Poston, the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code and decides dischargeability under § 523. opinion →
Tober Saifer Shoe Co. v. Allman, the court cites § 101 et seq. to identify the Bankruptcy Code while deciding whether the debt is dischargeable under § 523. opinion →
In Re Four Star Terminals, Inc., the court cites § 101 only as the first section in an et seq. reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding attorney fees under § 330. opinion →
In the Matter of Brints Cotton Marketing, Inc., Debtor. Mike Addison v. David R. Langston, Trustee, the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding claim estimation under § 502(c)(1). opinion →
In Re Shaffer-Gordon Associates, Inc., the court mentions § 101(4) only while recounting another court’s decision and decides whether to appoint an additional creditors’ committee under § 1102. opinion →
In Re Duncan, the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of an “et seq.” reference while deciding lien avoidance under § 522(f). opinion →
In re Townsend Farms, Inc., the court cites § 101 to identify the debtor’s bankruptcy filing and decides whether a creditor’s claim was timely and proved. opinion →
General Office Furniture Wholesalers, Inc. v. U.S. Furniture Industries, Inc., the court cites section 101(41) for the undisputed definition of “transfer” while deciding whether the payments involved property of the debtor under section 547(b). opinion →
Jeanine M. BOYD, F/K/A Jeanine Boyd Robinson, Appellant, v. Bruce G. ROBINSON, Appellee, the court recites Section 101’s definition of a judicial lien but decides the case under Section 522(f)(1) without deciding whether the lien meets that definition. opinion →
In Re Kehn Ranch, Inc., the court cites Section 101(17) for the debtor’s undisputed status as a farmer while deciding whether a creditor’s liquidation plan can be confirmed. opinion →
In Re Love, the court cites § 101(27) to identify the judgment lien as a judicial lien while deciding how far § 522(f)(1) permits avoidance. opinion →
In Re Marriage of Logston, the court cites section 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Reform Act while interpreting an Illinois exemption statute. opinion →
Southmark Properties and St. Charles Avenue, Inc. v. The Charles House Corporation, the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the former Bankruptcy Act. opinion →
Village of Montpelier v. Riche, Chenevert & Andress Construction Co., the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding whether the corporation’s citizenship defeats diversity jurisdiction. opinion →
Farm Fresh Poultry, Inc. v. Hooton Co. (In Re Hooton Co.), the court notes that § 101 does not define “individual” while deciding whether a partnership can have a particular debt excepted from discharge under other provisions. opinion →
In Re Lion Capital Group, the court cites § 101 only as the start of a reference to the Bankruptcy Code while deciding counsel retention under § 1103(b). opinion →
In Re Russell, the court cites § 101(17) to identify the debtors as farmers while deciding whether their Chapter 11 plan can be confirmed. opinion →
Thomas Solvent Co. v. Kelley (In Re Thomas Solvent Co.), the court mentions § 101(4) while recounting another case’s ruling on whether a cleanup obligation was a bankruptcy claim. opinion →
In Re Doug Allen Pontiac Porsche-Audi, the court cites § 101 only as the starting point of a general reference to Chapter 11 and decides priority under §§ 503 and 507. opinion →
Kremen v. Design Print, Inc. (In re L.B. Smith, Inc.), the court cites § 101 et seq. to identify the Bankruptcy Code under which the debtor filed, without deciding the definitions in § 101. opinion →
…and 6,526 more.

Statutory history

(Pub. L. 95–598, Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2549; Pub. L. 97–222, §1, July 27, 1982, 96 Stat. 235; Pub. L. 98–353, title III, §§391, 401, 421, July 10, 1984, 98 Stat. 364, 366, 367; Pub. L. 99–554, title II, §§201, 251, 283(a), Oct. 27, 1986, 100 Stat. 3097, 3104, 3116; Pub. L. 100–506, §1(a), Oct. 18, 1988, 102 Stat. 2538; Pub. L. 100–597, §1, Nov. 3, 1988, 102 Stat. 3028; Pub. L. 101–311, title I, §101, title II, §201, June 25, 1990, 104 Stat. 267, 268; Pub. L. 101–647, title XXV, §2522(e), Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4867; Pub. L. 102–486, title XXX, §3017(a), Oct. 24, 1992, 106 Stat. 3130; Pub. L. 103–394, title I, §106, title II, §§208(a), 215, 217(a), 218(a), title III, §304(a), title V, §501(a), (b)(1), (d)(1), Oct. 22, 1994, 108 Stat. 4111, 4124, 4126–4128, 4132, 4141–4143; Pub. L. 106–554, §1(a)(5) [title I, §112(c)(3), (4)], Dec. 21, 2000, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A–393, 2763A–394; Pub. L. 109–8, title I, §102(b), (k), title II, §§211, 226(a), 231(b), title III, §306(c), title IV, §§401(a), 414, 432(a), title VIII, §802(b), title IX, §907(a)(1), (b), (c), title X, §§1004, 1005, 1007(a), title XI, §1101(a), (b), title XII, §1201, Apr. 20, 2005, 119 Stat. 32, 35, 50, 66, 73, 80, 104, 107, 110, 145, 170, 175, 186, 187, 189, 192; Pub. L. 109–390, §5(a)(1), Dec. 12, 2006, 120 Stat. 2695; Pub. L. 111–327, §2(a)(1), Dec. 22, 2010, 124 Stat. 3557; Pub. L. 116–51, §2, Aug. 23, 2019, 133 Stat. 1075; Pub. L. 116–52, §2, Aug. 23, 2019, 133 Stat. 1076; Pub. L. 116–54, §4(a)(1), Aug. 23, 2019, 133 Stat. 1085; Pub. L. 116–92, div. A, title XVII, §1736, Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 1819; Pub. L. 116–136, div. A, title I, §1113(a)(4)(A), (b)(1)(A), (2)(A)(i), Mar. 27, 2020, 134 Stat. 311, 312; Pub. L. 117–151, §2(a), June 21, 2022, 136 Stat. 1298.)

  • 2022—Par. (51D)(B)(i). Pub. L. 117–151, §2(a)(1), inserted "under this title" after "affiliated debtors".
  • Par. (51D)(B)(iii). Pub. L. 117–151, §2(a)(2), substituted "a corporation described in clause (ii)." for "an issuer (as defined in section 3 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c))."
  • 2020—Par. (10A)(B)(ii)(V). Pub. L. 116–136, §1113(b)(2)(A)(i), struck out subcl. (V) which read as follows: "Payments made under Federal law relating to the national emergency declared by the President under the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) with respect to the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID–19)."
  • Pub. L. 116–136, §1113(b)(1)(A), added subcl. (V).
  • Par. (51D)(B)(iii). Pub. L. 116–136, §1113(a)(4)(A), amended cl. (iii) generally. Prior to amendment, cl. (iii) read as follows: "any corporation that—
  • "(I) is subject to the reporting requirements under section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m, 78o(d)); and
  • "(II) is an affiliate of a debtor."
  • 2019—Par. (10A)(B). Pub. L. 116–92 added subpar. (B) almost identical to that added by Pub. L. 116–52 and struck out former subpar. (B). See Codification note above.
235 earlier amendment entries
  • Pub. L. 116–52 added subpar. (B) and struck out former subpar. (B) which read as follows: "includes any amount paid by any entity other than the debtor (or in a joint case the debtor and the debtor's spouse), on a regular basis for the household expenses of the debtor or the debtor's dependents (and in a joint case the debtor's spouse if not otherwise a dependent), but excludes benefits received under the Social Security Act, payments to victims of war crimes or crimes against humanity on account of their status as victims of such crimes, and payments to victims of international terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of title 18) or domestic terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of title 18) on account of their status as victims of such terrorism." See Codification note above.
  • Par. (18). Pub. L. 116–51 substituted "$10,000,000" for "$3,237,000" in two places.
  • Par. (51C). Pub. L. 116–54, §4(a)(1)(A), inserted "and has not elected that subchapter V of chapter 11 of this title shall apply" after "is a small business debtor".
  • Par. (51D)(A). Pub. L. 116–54, §4(a)(1)(B)(i), substituted "single asset real estate" for "or operating real property or activities incidental thereto" and "not less than 50 percent of which arose from the commercial or business activities of the debtor; and" for "for a case in which the United States trustee has not appointed under section 1102(a)(1) a committee of unsecured creditors or where the court has determined that the committee of unsecured creditors is not sufficiently active and representative to provide effective oversight of the debtor; and".
  • Par. (51D)(B). Pub. L. 116–54, §4(a)(1)(B)(ii), substituted "does not include—" for "does not include", inserted cl. (i) designation before "any member", and added cls. (ii) and (iii).
  • 2010—Par. (13A)(A). Pub. L. 111–327, §2(a)(1)(A)(i), inserted "if used as the principal residence by the debtor" after "a residential structure".
  • Par. (13A)(B). Pub. L. 111–327, §2(a)(1)(A)(ii), inserted "if used as the principal residence by the debtor" before period at end.
  • Par. (35)(B). Pub. L. 111–327, §2(a)(1)(B), substituted "paragraphs (21B) and (33)(A)" for "paragraphs (23) and (35)".
  • Par. (40B). Pub. L. 111–327, §2(a)(1)(C), substituted "record relating to a patient, including a written document or a" for "written document relating to a patient or a".
  • Par. (42). Pub. L. 111–327, §2(a)(1)(D), which directed substitution of "303 and 1504" for "303, and 304", was executed by making the substitution for "303, or 304" to reflect the probable intent of Congress.
  • Par. (51B). Pub. L. 111–327, §2(a)(1)(E), inserted "thereto" before period at end.
  • Par. (51D)(A). Pub. L. 111–327, §2(a)(1)(F), inserted "of the filing" after "as of the date".
  • 2006—Par. (22)(A). Pub. L. 109–390, §5(a)(1)(A), struck out "(domestic or foreign)" after "an entity" and inserted "(whether or not a 'customer', as defined in section 741)" after "custodian for a customer".
  • Par. (22A)(A). Pub. L. 109–390, §5(a)(1)(B), inserted "(aggregated across counterparties)" after "principal amount outstanding" and substituted "at such time or on any day during the 15-month period preceding the date of the filing of the petition" for "on any day during the previous 15-month period" in two places.
  • Par. (25)(A). Pub. L. 109–390, §5(a)(1)(C), inserted ", as defined in section 761" after "commodity contract" and substituted "repurchase or reverse repurchase transaction (whether or not such repurchase or reverse repurchase transaction is a 'repurchase agreement', as defined in this section)" for "repurchase transaction, reverse repurchase transaction,".
  • Par. (53B)(A)(i)(II). Pub. L. 109–390, §5(a)(1)(D)(i)(I), substituted ", precious metals, or other commodity" for "or precious metals".
  • Par. (53B)(A)(i)(VIII). Pub. L. 109–390, §5(a)(1)(D)(i)(III), substituted "option, future, or forward agreement" for "weather derivative, or weather option".
  • Par. (53B)(A)(i)(IX), (X). Pub. L. 109–390, §5(a)(1)(D)(i)(II), (IV), added subcls. (IX) and (X).
  • Par. (53B)(A)(ii). Pub. L. 109–390, §5(a)(1)(D)(ii), inserted "or other derivatives" after "dealings in the swap" in subcl. (I) and substituted "future, option, or spot transaction" for "future, or option" in subcl. (II).
  • Par. (53B)(B). Pub. L. 109–390, §5(a)(1)(E), substituted "the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the Legal Certainty for Bank Products Act of 2000, the securities laws (as such term is defined in section 3(a)(47) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) and the Commodity Exchange Act" for "the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, the Investment Company Act of 1940, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, the Commodity Exchange Act, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, and the Legal Certainty for Bank Products Act of 2000".
  • 2005—Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(1), substituted "In this title the following definitions shall apply:" for "In this title—" in introductory provisions.
  • Pars. (1), (2). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Par. (3). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Pub. L. 109–8, §226(a)(1), added par. (3).
  • Par. (4). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Par. (4A). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Pub. L. 109–8, §226(a)(2), added par. (4A).
  • Pars. (5) to (7). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Pars. (7A), (7B). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Pub. L. 109–8, §1007(a)(1), added pars. (7A) and (7B).
  • Pars. (8) to (10). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Par. (10A). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Pub. L. 109–8, §102(b), added par. (10A).
  • Pars. (11), (12). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Par. (12A). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(8), which directed the substitution of a period for a semicolon at end, could not be executed because par. (12A) ended in a period after amendment by Pub. L. 109–8, §226(a)(3). See below.
  • Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), inserted "The term" after par. designation.
  • Pub. L. 109–8, §§211(1), 226(a)(3), added par. (12A) and struck out former par. (12A) which read as follows: " 'debt for child support' means a debt of a kind specified in section 523(a)(5) of this title for maintenance or support of a child of the debtor;".
  • Par. (13). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Par. (13A). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Pub. L. 109–8, §306(c)(1), added par. (13A).
  • Par. (14). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Pub. L. 109–8, §414, amended par. (14) generally. Prior to amendment, par. (14) consisted of subpars. (A) to (E) defining "disinterested person".
  • Par. (14A). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Pub. L. 109–8, §211(2), added par. (14A).
  • Pars. (15) to (17). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Par. (18). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Par. (18)(A). Pub. L. 109–8, §1005, substituted "for—
  • "(i) the taxable year preceding; or
  • "(ii) each of the 2d and 3d taxable years preceding;
  • the taxable year" for "for the taxable year preceding the taxable year".
  • Pub. L. 109–8, §1004(1), substituted "$3,237,000" for "$1,500,000" and "not less than 50 percent" for "not less than 80 percent".
  • Par. (18)(B)(ii). Pub. L. 109–8, §1004(2), substituted "$3,237,000" for "$1,500,000" and "50 percent" for "80 percent".
  • Par. (19). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Pars. (19A), (19B). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Pub. L. 109–8, §1007(a)(2), added pars. (19A) and (19B).
  • Pars. (20) to (21B). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Par. (22). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Pub. L. 109–8, §907(b)(1), added par. (22) and struck out former par. (22) which consisted of introductory provisions and subpars. (A) and (B) defining "financial institution".
  • Par. (22A). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Pub. L. 109–8, §907(b)(2), added par. (22A).
  • Pars. (23), (24). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Pub. L. 109–8, §802(b), added pars. (23) and (24) and struck out former pars. (23) and (24) which read as follows:
  • "(23) 'foreign proceeding' means proceeding, whether judicial or administrative and whether or not under bankruptcy law, in a foreign country in which the debtor's domicile, residence, principal place of business, or principal assets were located at the commencement of such proceeding, for the purpose of liquidating an estate, adjusting debts by composition, extension, or discharge, or effecting a reorganization;
  • "(24) 'foreign representative' means duly selected trustee, administrator, or other representative of an estate in a foreign proceeding;".
  • Par. (25). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Pub. L. 109–8, §907(a)(1)(A), substituted "means—" for "means", designated subsequent provisions as subpar. (A), substituted ", or any other similar agreement" for ", or any combination thereof or option thereon", and added subpars. (B) to (E).
  • Par. (26). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Pub. L. 109–8, §907(b)(3), added par. (26) and struck out former par. (26) which read as follows: " 'forward contract merchant' means a person whose business consists in whole or in part of entering into forward contracts as or with merchants in a commodity, as defined in section 761(8) of this title, or any similar good, article, service, right, or interest which is presently or in the future becomes the subject of dealing in the forward contract trade;".
  • Par. (27). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Par. (27A). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Pub. L. 109–8, §1101(a)(2), added par. (27A). Former par. (27A) redesignated (27B).
  • Pub. L. 109–8, §306(c)(2), added par. (27A).
  • Par. (27B). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Pub. L. 109–8, §1101(a)(1), redesignated par. (27A) as (27B).
  • Pars. (28) to (34). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Par. (35). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Par. (35)(B). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(3), substituted "paragraphs (23) and (35)" for "paragraphs (21B) and (33)(A)".
  • Par. (35A). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (4), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for "; and" at end.
  • Pars. (36), (37). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Par. (38). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (4), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for "; and" at end.
  • Pars. (38A), (38B). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Pub. L. 109–8, §907(c), added pars. (38A) and (38B).
  • Par. (39). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), inserted "The term" after par. designation.
  • Par. (39A). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Pub. L. 109–8, §102(k), added par. (39A).
  • Par. (40). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Pars. (40A), (40B). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Pub. L. 109–8, §1101(b), added pars. (40A) and (40B).
  • Par. (41). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Par. (41A). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Pub. L. 109–8, §231(b), added par. (41A).
  • Pars. (42) to (45). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Par. (46). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Pub. L. 109–8, §907(a)(1)(B), substituted "at any time before" for "on any day during the period beginning 90 days before the date of".
  • Par. (47). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Pub. L. 109–8, §907(a)(1)(C), amended par. (47) generally. Prior to amendment, par. (47) read as follows: " 'repurchase agreement' (which definition also applies to a reverse repurchase agreement) means an agreement, including related terms, which provides for the transfer of certificates of deposit, eligible bankers' acceptances, or securities that are direct obligations of, or that are fully guaranteed as to principal and interest by, the United States or any agency of the United States against the transfer of funds by the transferee of such certificates of deposit, eligible bankers' acceptances, or securities with a simultaneous agreement by such transferee to transfer to the transferor thereof certificates of deposit, eligible bankers' acceptances, or securities as described above, at a date certain not later than one year after such transfers or on demand, against the transfer of funds;".
  • Par. (48). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Pub. L. 109–8, §907(a)(1)(D), inserted ", or exempt from such registration under such section pursuant to an order of the Securities and Exchange Commission," after "1934".
  • Par. (48A). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Pub. L. 109–8, §401(a), added par. (48A).
  • Pars. (49) to (51A). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Par. (51B). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (5), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and "who is not a family farmer" after "income of a debtor" and substituted a period for "thereto having aggregate noncontingent, liquidated secured debts in an amount no more than $4,000,000;".
  • Pars. (51C), (51D). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Pub. L. 109–8, §432(a), added pars. (51C) and (51D) and struck out former par. (51C) which read as follows: " 'small business' means a person engaged in commercial or business activities (but does not include a person whose primary activity is the business of owning or operating real property and activities incidental thereto) whose aggregate noncontingent liquidated secured and unsecured debts as of the date of the petition do not exceed $2,000,000;".
  • Pars. (52) to (53A). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Par. (53B). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Pub. L. 109–8, §907(a)(1)(E), amended par. (53B) generally. Prior to amendment, par. (53B) consisted of introductory provisions and subpars. (A) to (C) defining "swap agreement".
  • Par. (53C). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Par. (53D). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Par. (54). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(8), substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(6), added par. (54) and struck out former par. (54) which read as follows: "The term 'transfer' means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor's equity of redemption;".
  • Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), inserted "The term" after par. designation.
  • Par. (54A). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(8), which directed the substitution of a period for semicolon at end, could not be executed because par. (54A) ended in a period after amendment by Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(4). See below.
  • Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(4), (7), substituted "The term" for "the term", realigned left margin, and substituted a period for "; and" at end.
  • Par. (55). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), (8), inserted "The term" after par. designation and substituted a period for semicolon at end.
  • Par. (56A). Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(8), which directed the substitution of a period for semicolon "in each of paragraphs (40) through (55)" at end, was executed to par. (56A), to reflect the probable intent of Congress, because par. (56A) follows par. (53C) in text.
  • Pub. L. 109–8, §1201(2), inserted "The term" after par. designation.
  • 2000—Par. (22). Pub. L. 106–554, §1(a)(5) [title I, §112(c)(3)], amended par. (22) generally. Prior to amendment par. (22) read as follows: " 'financial institution' means a person that is a commercial or savings bank, industrial savings bank, savings and loan association, or trust company and, when any such person is acting as agent or custodian for a customer in connection with a securities contract, as defined in section 741 of this title, such customer;".
  • Par. (54A). Pub. L. 106–554, §1(a)(5) [title I, §112(c)(4)], added par. (54A).
  • 1994—Par. (3). Pub. L. 103–394, §501(a)(1), redesignated par. (3) as (21B) and inserted it after par. (21A).
  • Par. (6). Pub. L. 103–394, §501(b)(1)(A), substituted "section 761" for "section 761(9)" after "customer, as defined in".
  • Par. (12A). Pub. L. 103–394, §304(a), added par. (12A).
  • Par. (21B). Pub. L. 103–394, §501(a)(1), redesignated par. (3) as (21B).
  • Par. (22). Pub. L. 103–394, §501(b)(1)(B), substituted "section 741" for "section 741(7)".
  • Par. (33)(A). Pub. L. 103–394, §501(d)(1)(A)(i), struck out "(12 U.S.C. 1813(u))" after "section 3(u) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act".
  • Par. (33)(B). Pub. L. 103–394, §501(d)(1)(A)(ii), struck out "(12 U.S.C. 1786(r))" after "Act".
  • Par. (34). Pub. L. 103–394, §501(d)(1)(B), struck out "(12 U.S.C. 1752(7))" after "Act".
  • Par. (35). Pub. L. 103–394, §501(b)(1)(C), (d)(1)(C), struck out "(12 U.S.C. 1813(c)(2))" after "Act" in subpar. (A) and substituted "paragraphs (21B)" for "paragraphs (3)" in subpar. (B).
  • Par. (35A). Pub. L. 103–394, §501(a)(4), redesignated par. (56) defining "intellectual property" as (35A) and inserted it after par. (35).
  • Par. (39). Pub. L. 103–394, §501(a)(5), redesignated par. (57) defining "mask work" as (39) and inserted it after par. (38). Former par. (39) redesignated (51A).
  • Par. (41). Pub. L. 103–394, §106, amended par. (41) generally. Prior to amendment, par. (41) read as follows: " 'person' includes individual, partnership, and corporation, but does not include governmental unit, Provided, however, That any governmental unit that acquires an asset from a person as a result of operation of a loan guarantee agreement, or as receiver or liquidating agent of a person, will be considered a person for purposes of section 1102 of this title."
  • Par. (42A). Pub. L. 103–394, §208(a)(1), added par. (42A).
  • Par. (48). Pub. L. 103–394, §501(d)(1)(D), struck out "(15 U.S.C. 78q–1)" after "Act of 1934" and "(15 U.S.C. 78c(12))" after "such Act".
  • Par. (49)(A)(xii). Pub. L. 103–394, §501(d)(1)(E)(i), struck out "(15 U.S.C. 77a et seq.)" after "Act of 1933" and "(15 U.S.C. 77c(b))" after "such Act".
  • Par. (49)(B). Pub. L. 103–394, §501(b)(1)(D), (d)(1)(E)(ii), substituted "section 761" for "section 761(13)" in cl. (ii) and struck out "(15 U.S.C. 77c(b))" after "Act of 1933" in cl. (vi).
  • Par. (51A). Pub. L. 103–394, §501(a)(2), redesignated par. (39) as (51A) and inserted it after par. (51).
  • Par. (51B). Pub. L. 103–394, §218(a), added par. (51B).
  • Par. (51C). Pub. L. 103–394, §217(a), added par. (51C).
  • Par. (53A). Pub. L. 103–394, §501(a)(3), (b)(1)(E), redesignated par. (54) defining "stockbroker" as (53A) and substituted "section 741" for "section 741(2)" in subpar. (A).
  • Par. (53B). Pub. L. 103–394, §501(a)(3), redesignated par. (55) defining "swap agreement" as (53B).
  • Par. (53C). Pub. L. 103–394, §501(a)(3), redesignated par. (56) defining "swap participant" as (53C).
  • Par. (53D). Pub. L. 103–394, §501(a)(3), (d)(1)(F), redesignated par. (57) defining "timeshare plan" as (53D) and substituted semicolon for period at end.
  • Par. (54). Pub. L. 103–394, §501(a)(3), redesignated par. (54) defining "stockbroker" as (53A).
  • Par. (55). Pub. L. 103–394, §501(a)(3), redesignated par. (55) defining "swap agreement" as (53B).
  • Pub. L. 103–394, §215, inserted "spot foreign exchange agreement," after "forward foreign exchange agreement,".
  • Par. (56). Pub. L. 103–394, §501(a)(3), redesignated par. (56) defining "swap participant" as (53C).
  • Pub. L. 103–394, §501(a)(4), redesignated par. (56) defining "intellectual property" as (35A) and inserted it after par. (35).
  • Par. (56A). Pub. L. 103–394, §208(a)(2), added par. (56A) and inserted it after par. defining "swap participant".
  • Par. (57). Pub. L. 103–394, §501(a)(3), redesignated par. (57) defining "timeshare plan" as (53D).
  • Pub. L. 103–394, §501(a)(5), redesignated par. (57) defining "mask work" as (39) and inserted it after par. (38).
  • 1992—Par. (21A). Pub. L. 102–486 added par. (21A).
  • 1990—Par. (3). Pub. L. 101–647, §2522(e)(4), added par. (3). Former par. (3) redesignated (4).
  • Pars. (4) to (23). Pub. L. 101–647, §2522(e)(3), redesignated pars. (3) to (22) as (4) to (23), respectively. Former par. (23) redesignated (24).
  • Par. (24). Pub. L. 101–647, §2522(e)(3), redesignated par. (23) as (24). Former par. (24) redesignated (25).
  • Pub. L. 101–311, §201(1), inserted "as defined in section 761(8) of this title, or any similar good, article, service, right, or interest which is presently or in the future becomes the subject of dealing in the forward contract trade," after "transfer of commodity," and ", including, but not limited to, a repurchase transaction, reverse repurchase transaction, consignment, lease, swap, hedge transaction, deposit, loan, option, allocated transaction, unallocated transaction, or any combination thereof or option thereon" after "entered into".
  • Par. (25). Pub. L. 101–647, §2522(e)(3), redesignated par. (24) as (25). Former par. (25) redesignated (26).
  • Pub. L. 101–311, §201(2), substituted "a commodity, as defined in section 761(8) of this title, or any similar good, article, service, right, or interest which is presently or in the future becomes the subject of dealing in the forward contract trade" for "commodities".
  • Pars. (26) to (32). Pub. L. 101–647, §2522(e)(3), redesignated pars. (25) to (31) as (26) to (32), respectively. Former par. (32) redesignated (36).
  • Par. (33). Pub. L. 101–647, §2522(e)(2), added par. (33). Former par. (33) redesignated (37).
  • Par. (34). Pub. L. 101–647, §2522(e)(2), added par. (34). Former par. (34) redesignated (38).
  • Pub. L. 101–311, §201(4), added par. (34). Former par. (34) redesignated (36).
  • Par. (35). Pub. L. 101–647, §2522(e)(2), added par. (35). Former par. (35) redesignated (39).
  • Pub. L. 101–311, §201(4), added par. (35). Former par. (35) redesignated (37).
  • Par. (36). Pub. L. 101–647, §2522(e)(1), redesignated par. (32) as (36). Former par. (36) redesignated (40).
  • Pub. L. 101–311, §201(3), redesignated par. (34) as (36). Former par. (36) redesignated (38).
  • Pars. (37) to (48). Pub. L. 101–647, §2522(e)(1), redesignated pars. (33) to (44) as (37) to (48), respectively. Former pars. (45) to (48) redesignated (49) to (52), respectively.
  • Pub. L. 101–311, §201(3), redesignated pars. (35) to (46) as (37) to (48), respectively. Former pars. (47) and (48) redesignated (49) and (50), respectively.
  • Pars. (49), (50). Pub. L. 101–647, §2522(e)(1), redesignated pars. (45) and (46) as (49) and (50), respectively. Former pars. (49) and (50) redesignated (53) and (54) defining "stockbroker", respectively.
  • Pub. L. 101–311, §201(3), redesignated pars. (47) and (48) as (49) and (50), respectively. Former pars. (49) and (50) redesignated (51) and (52), respectively.
  • Pub. L. 101–311, §101(2), added pars. (49) and (50). Former pars. (49) and (50) redesignated (51) and (52), respectively.
  • Par. (51). Pub. L. 101–647, §2522(e)(1), redesignated par. (47) as (51). Former par. (51) redesignated (55) defining "swap agreement".
  • Pub. L. 101–311, §201(3), redesignated par. (49) as (51). Former par. (51) redesignated (53).
  • Pub. L. 101–311, §101(1), redesignated par. (49) as (51). Former par. (51) redesignated (53).
  • Par. (52). Pub. L. 101–647, §2522(e)(1), redesignated par. (48) as (52). Former par. (52) redesignated (56) defining "swap participant".
  • Pub. L. 101–311, §201(3), redesignated par. (50) as (52). Former par. (52) redesignated (54) defining "transfer".
  • Pub. L. 101–311, §101(1), redesignated par. (50) as (52). Former par. (52) redesignated (54).
  • Par. (53). Pub. L. 101–647, §2522(e)(1), redesignated par. (49) as (53). Former par. (53) redesignated (57) defining "timeshare plan".
  • Pub. L. 101–311, §201(3), redesignated par. (51) as (53). Former par. (53) redesignated (55) defining "United States".
  • Pub. L. 101–311, §101(1), redesignated par. (51) as (53). Former par. (53) redesignated (55).
  • Par. (54). Pub. L. 101–647, §2522(e)(1), redesignated par. (50) as (54) defining "stockbroker".
  • Pub. L. 101–311, §201(3), redesignated par. (52) as (54) defining "transfer". Former par. (54) redesignated (56) defining "intellectual property".
  • Pub. L. 101–311, §101(1), redesignated par. (52) as (54).
  • Par. (55). Pub. L. 101–647, §2522(e)(1), redesignated par. (51) as (55) defining "swap agreement".
  • Pub. L. 101–311, §201(3), redesignated par. (53) as (55) defining "United States". Former par. (55) redesignated (57) defining "mask work".
  • Pub. L. 101–311, §101(1), redesignated par. (53) as (55).
  • Par. (56). Pub. L. 101–647, §2522(e)(1), redesignated par. (52) as (56) defining "swap participant".
  • Pub. L. 101–311, §201(3), redesignated par. (54) as (56) defining "intellectual property".
  • Par. (57). Pub. L. 101–647, §2522(e)(1), redesignated par. (53) as (57) defining "timeshare plan".
  • Pub. L. 101–311, §201(3), redesignated par. (55) as (57) defining "mask work".
  • 1988—Par. (31). Pub. L. 100–597 inserted "and a municipality" after "partnership" in subpar. (A) and added subpar. (C).
  • Pars. (52), (53). Pub. L. 100–506 added pars. (52) and (53).
  • 1986—Par. (14). Pub. L. 99–554, §201(1), substituted "governmental unit, and United States trustee" for "and governmental unit".
  • Pars. (17), (18). Pub. L. 99–554, §251(2), (3), added pars. (17) and (18) and redesignated former pars. (17) and (18) as (19) and (20), respectively.
  • Par. (19). Pub. L. 99–554, §251(1), (2), redesignated former par. (17) as (19) and inserted "(except when such term appears in the term 'family farmer')". Former par. (19) redesignated (21).
  • Pars. (20) to (25). Pub. L. 99–554, §251(2), redesignated former pars. (18) to (23) as (20) to (25), respectively. Former pars. (24) and (25) redesignated (26) and (27), respectively.
  • Par. (26). Pub. L. 99–554, §201(2), inserted "(but not a United States trustee while serving as a trustee in a case under this title)".
  • Pub. L. 99–554, §251(2), redesignated former par. (24) as (26). Former par. (26) redesignated (28).
  • Pars. (27) to (42). Pub. L. 99–554, §251(2), redesignated former pars. (25) to (40) as (27) to (42), respectively. Former pars. (41) and (42) redesignated (43) and (44), respectively.
  • Par. (43). Pub. L. 99–554, §251(2), redesignated former par. (41) as (43). Former par. (43) redesignated (45).
  • Par. (43)(A)(xv). Pub. L. 99–554, §283(a)(1), substituted "security" for "secuity".
  • Pars. (44) to (50). Pub. L. 99–554, §251(2), redesignated former pars. (42) to (48) as (44) to (50), respectively. Former par. (49) redesignated (51).
  • Par. (51). Pub. L. 99–554, §283(a)(2), substituted a period for the semicolon at the end thereof.
  • Pub. L. 99–554, §251(2), redesignated former par. (49) as (51).
  • 1984—Par. (2)(D). Pub. L. 98–353, §421(a), struck out "or all" after "business".
  • Par. (8)(B). Pub. L. 98–353, §421(b), substituted a semicolon for the colon at end of subpar. (B).
  • Par. (9)(B). Pub. L. 98–353, §421(c), inserted reference to section 348(d).
  • Par. (14). Pub. L. 98–353, §421(d), inserted "and" after "trust,".
  • Pars. (19) to (21). Pub. L. 98–353, §421(j)(3), (4), added par. (19) and redesignated former pars. (19), (20), and (21) as (20), (21), and (24), respectively.
  • Pars. (22), (23). Pub. L. 98–353, §421(j)(2), (5), added pars. (22) and (23) and redesignated former pars. (22) and (23) as (25) and (26), respectively.
  • Pars. (24) to (26). Pub. L. 98–353, §421(j)(2), redesignated former pars. (21) to (23) as (24) to (26), respectively. Former pars. (24) to (26) redesignated (27) to (29), respectively.
  • Par. (27). Pub. L. 98–353, §421(e), (j)(2), redesignated former par. (24) as (27) and substituted "stockbroker" for "stock broker". Former par. (27) redesignated (30).
  • Par. (28). Pub. L. 98–353, §421(j)(2), redesignated former par. (25) as (28). Former par. (28) redesignated (31).
  • Par. (29). Pub. L. 98–353, §421(f), (j)(2), redesignated former par. (26) as (29) and, in subpar. (B)(ii), substituted "nonpartnership" and "(A)" for "separate" and "(A)(ii)", respectively, wherever appearing. Former par. (29) redesignated (32).
  • Pars. (30) to (32). Pub. L. 98–353, §421(j)(2), redesignated former pars. (27) to (29) as (30) to (32), respectively. Former pars. (30) to (32) redesignated (33) to (35), respectively.
  • Par. (33). Pub. L. 98–353, §421(g), (j)(2), redesignated former par. (30) as (33) and amended definition of "person" generally, thereby inserting proviso relating to consideration of certain governmental units as persons for purposes of section 1102 of this title. Former par. (33) redesignated (36).
  • Par. (34). Pub. L. 98–353, §421(j)(2), redesignated former par. (31) as (34). Former par. (34) redesignated (37).
  • Pars. (35), (36). Pub. L. 98–353, §421(j)(2), redesignated former pars. (32) and (33) as (35) and (36), respectively. Former pars. (35) and (36), as added by Pub. L. 98–353, §391(2), redesignated (38) and (39), respectively.
  • Pub. L. 98–353, §391, added pars. (35) and (36), and redesignated former pars. (35) and (36) as (37) and (38) which were again redesignated as (40) and (41), respectively.
  • Par. (37). Pub. L. 98–353, §421(j)(2), redesignated former par. (34) as (37). Former par. (37) redesignated successively as (39) and again as (42).
  • Par. (38). Pub. L. 98–353, §§391(2), 421(j)(2), added par. (35) and redesignated such par. (35) as (38). Former par. (38) redesignated successively as (40) and again as (43).
  • Par. (39). Pub. L. 98–353, §§391(2), 421(j)(2), added par. (36) and redesignated such par. (36) as (39). Former par. (39) redesignated successively as (41) and again as (45).
  • Par. (40). Pub. L. 98–353, §§391(1), 421(j)(2), redesignated successively former par. (35) as (37) and again as (40). Former par. (40) redesignated successively as (42) and again as (46).
  • Par. (41). Pub. L. 98–353, §§391(1), 401(1), 421(h), (j)(2), redesignated successively former par. (36) as (38) and again as (41), and, in subpar. (B)(vi), substituted "certificate of a kind specified in subparagraph (A)(xii)" for "certificate specified in clause (xii) of subparagraph (A)" and substituted "required to be the subject of a registration statement" for "the subject of such registration statement". Former par. (41) redesignated successively as (43), again as (44), and again as (48).
  • Par. (42). Pub. L. 98–353, §§391(1), 421(j)(2), redesignated successively former par. (37) as (39) and again as (42).
  • Par. (43). Pub. L. 98–353, §§391(1), 421(j)(2), redesignated successively former par. (38) as (40) and again as (43).
  • Pub. L. 98–353, §401, redesignated former par. (43), originally par. (41), as (44), and added another par. (43) which was redesignated (47).
  • Par. (44). Pub. L. 98–353, §421(j)(6), added par. (44). Former par. (44) originally was par. (41) and was redesignated successively as (43), again as (44), and again as (48).
  • Pars. (45), (46). Pub. L. 98–353, §§391(1), 421(j)(1), redesignated successively former pars. (39) and (40) as (41) and (42), and again as (45) and (46), respectively.
  • Par. (47). Pub. L. 98–353, §§401(2), 421(j)(1), added par. (43) and redesignated such par. (43) as (47).
  • Par. (48). Pub. L. 98–353, §§391(1), 401(1), 421(i), (j)(1), redesignated successively former par. (41) as (43), again as (44), and again as (48), and substituted "and foreclosure of the debtor's equity of redemption; and" for the period at the end.
  • Par. (49). Pub. L. 98–353, §421(j)(7), added par. (49).
  • 1982—Par. (35). Pub. L. 97–222, §1(a)(2), added par. (35). Former par. (35) redesignated (36).
  • Par. (36). Pub. L. 97–222, §1(a)(1), (b), (c), redesignated par. (35) as (36) and substituted "is required to be the subject of a registration statement" for "is the subject of a registration statement" in subpar. (A)(xii) and substituted "forward contract" for "forward commodity contract" in subpar. (B)(iii). Former par. (36) redesignated (37).
  • Pars. (37) to (39). Pub. L. 97–222, §1(a)(1), redesignated pars. (36) to (38) as (37) to (39), respectively. Former par. (39) redesignated (40).
  • Pars. (40), (41). Pub. L. 97–222, §1(a)(1), (d), redesignated former par. (39) as (40) and restructured its provisions by dividing the former introductory provisions into subpars. (A) and (B) and by redesignating former subpars. (A) and (B) as cls. (i) and (ii), respectively, of subpar. (B). Former par. (40) redesignated (41).

Enactment and amendment notes are the official text of the United States Code, 2024 edition (laws through 2025-01-06), Office of the Law Revision Counsel, via govinfo.gov.

References in text

The Social Security Act, referred to in par. (10A)(B)(ii)(I), is act Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620, which is classified generally to chapter 7 (§301 et seq.) of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see section 1305 of Title 42 and Tables.

The Internal Revenue Code of 1986, referred to in pars. (12A)(B) and (41)(C), is classified generally to Title 26, Internal Revenue Code.

Section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, referred to in pars. (12A)(D), (21B)(A), (33)(A), (35)(A), and (54A), is classified to section 1813 of Title 12, Banks and Banking.

Sections 101 and 206(r) of the Federal Credit Union Act, referred to in pars. (12A)(D), (33)(B), and (34), are classified to sections 1752 and 1786(r), respectively, of Title 12, Banks and Banking.

The Investment Company Act of 1940, referred to in par. (22)(B), is title I of act Aug. 22, 1940, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 789, which is classified generally to subchapter I (§80a–1 et seq.) of chapter 2D of Title 15, Commerce and Trade. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see section 80a–51 of Title 15 and Tables.

Section 402 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, referred to in par. (22A)(B), is classified to section 4402 of Title 12, Banks and Banking.

The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, referred to in pars. (47)(A)(i), (48), (48A), and (53B)(B), is act June 6, 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881, which is classified principally to chapter 2B (§78a et seq.) of Title 15, Commerce and Trade. Sections 3, 6, 15A, and 17A of the Act are classified to sections 78c, 78f, 78o–3 and 78q–1, respectively, of Title 15. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see section 78a of Title 15 and Tables.

The Securities Act of 1933, referred to in par. (49)(A)(xii), is act May 27, 1933, ch. 38, title I, 48 Stat. 74, which is classified generally to subchapter I (§77a et seq.) of chapter 2A of Title 15, Commerce and Trade. Section 3(b) of the Act is classified to section 77c(b) of Title 15. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see section 77a of Title 15 and Tables.

The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, referred to in par. (53B)(B), is Pub. L. 106–102, Nov. 12, 1999, 113 Stat. 1338. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title of 1999 Amendment note set out under section 1811 of Title 12, Banks and Banking, and Tables.

The Legal Certainty for Bank Products Act of 2000, referred to in par. (53B)(B), is title IV of H.R. 5660, as enacted by Pub. L. 106–554, §1(a)(5), Dec. 21, 2000, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A–457, which is classified to sections 27 to 27f of Title 7, Agriculture. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title of 2000 Amendment note set out under section 1 of Title 7 and Tables.

The Commodity Exchange Act, referred to in par. (53B)(B), is act Sept. 21, 1922, ch. 369, 42 Stat. 998, which is classified generally to chapter 1 (§1 et seq.) of Title 7, Agriculture. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see section 1 of Title 7 and Tables.

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