11 U.S.C. § 101

Sections 101(13A) and 101(27B) inform what counts as a debtor’s residence, including a mobile home, surrounding land commonly conveyed with it, and accompanying oil and gas rights.

Zebley v. Graff (In Re Graff) · filed 2011-08-23(13A), (27B)

Construing the term “residence” for purposes of § 522(d)(1) by referring to §§ 101(13A) and 101(27B), as did the La-nier court, it is fair to conclude, as a matter of law, that, inter alia, a debtor’s residence can include: (a) a mobile home; (b) the underlying land upon which the mobile home is situated, regardless of whether such mobile home is attached to such land; (c) the land that surrounds such mobile home, which land can be many acres thereof if it is located in a rural rather than an urban area, which legal conclusion is warranted given that (i) such surrounding land would commonly be conveyed with a structure located thereon, and (ii) the language of § 522(d)(1) limits only the value of a debtor’s interest in a residence that can thereby be exempted, not the size of such residence; and (d) oil and gas rights that accompany such realty.

Section 101(27B)’s definition of incidental property is not limited to the items it lists.

Kreitzer v. Household Realty Corp. (In re Kreitzer) · filed 2013-04-04(27B)

The codification of “incidental property” appears to codify Davis and similar decisions and was not intended to limit “incidental property” to those items specifically described in § 101(27B).

Section 101(27B) includes fixtures among the incidental property of a debtor’s principal residence, so a security interest in fixtures does not remove a home mortgage from the protection against modification.

Shull v. PNC Bank (In re Shull) · filed 2013-05-31(27B)

Section 101(13A) defines the “debtor’s principal residence” to include incidental property. Section 101(27B) provides: ... (B) all easements, rights, appurtenances, fixtures, rents, royalties, mineral rights, oil or gas rights or profits, water rights, escrow funds, or insurance proceeds; ... I conclude that the security interest in fixtures granted to the Bank by the Debt- or constitutes such incidental property.

A debtor who admits using a residential structure as a principal residence may be estopped from denying that it is his principal residence under § 101(13A)(A).

In re Laycock · filed 2013-09-25(13A)(A)

Taking both of these admissions into consideration, the Court finds that the Debtor is estopped from arguing that the Route 28A property is not his principal residence as the Debtor admits that the Route 28A Property is a “residential structure [ ] used as the principal residence by the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(1SA)(A); see also Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534, 124 S.Ct. 1023, 157 L.Ed.2d 1024 (2004) (discussing application of statute’s plain language unless disposition is absurd).

Section 101(27B) includes escrow funds and insurance proceeds in the incidental property of a debtor’s principal residence.

Abdosh v. IndyMac Mortgage Corp. (In re Abdosh) · filed 2014-07-30(27B)

These items are incidental property commonly conveyed in a deed of trust and defined in 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(13)(A) and (27)(B) as a part of a debtor’s principal residence.

Section 101(27B)(B) includes escrow funds and insurance proceeds as incidental property of a debtor’s principal residence; comparable miscellaneous proceeds tied to the home can also be incidental property.

Akwa v. Residential Credit Solutions, Inc. · filed 2015-04-30(27B)(B)

As explained above, the Bankruptcy Court properly found that the provisions in the Deed of Trust were incidental property, and thus, were not additional security interests under the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101 includes incidental property in a debtor’s principal residence and does not authorize separating a parcel that constitutes a principal residence into residential and incidental portions.

White v. McDermott (In re White) · filed 2015-07-31(13A)(A), (27B)(A)

The bankruptcy code authorizes no such treatment. The Code further defines “incidental property” as, “with respect to a debtor’s principal residence[,] ... property commonly conveyed with a principal residence in the area where the real property is located[J” 11 U.S.C. § 101(27B)(A). Thus, the Code is clear in two separate sections that there is no authority for separating a parcel of land that constitutes a principal residence.

Section 101(13A) requires a debtor’s principal residence to be a residential structure; a lot alone does not qualify.

In re Tillman · filed 2016-09-30(13A)

While the Lot is real property, it cannot alone be the debtor’s personal residence, because it is not a “residential structure” as required by § 101 (13A).

Section 101 treats escrow funds, insurance proceeds, and miscellaneous proceeds tied to a home as incidental property included in a debtor’s principal residence.

Birmingham v. PNC Bank, N.A. (In Re Birmingham) · filed 2017-01-18(27B)

These items, however, are incidental property frequently conveyed in a deed of trust and defined in 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(27B) and 101(13A)(A) as part of a debtor’s principal residence.

Section 101 includes rents from a debtor’s principal residence in the incidental property that forms part of that residence.

In re Addams · filed 2017-03-09(13A)(A), (27B)

Thus, Congress defined the debtor’s principal residence to include rents derived from the real property, and, as such, a security interest in rents is part of the security interest in the principal residence.

Section 101(13A) defines a debtor’s principal residence to include a residential structure used as the debtor’s principal residence plus incidental, non-residential property.

In re Hock · filed 2017-08-15(13A)

The definition of “debtor’s principal residence” does not include a provision that a debtor’s principal residence must be a structure that is used exclusively as the principal residence of the debtor. Therefore, the definition contemplates that a debtor’s principal residence may be a residential structure that the debtor uses as his principal residence plus incidental, non-residential property.

Section 101(27B) treats property commonly conveyed with a debtor’s residence as incidental property, but a separate rental unit and undeveloped acreage do not qualify without a showing that they are typically conveyed with residences in the area.

In re Faulring · filed 2017-08-30(27B)

However, neither the stand-alone rental unit nor the 65 acres of undeveloped land would satisfy the definition of “incidental property,” as stated in 11 U.S.C. § 101(27B). Specifically, the debtor makes no showing that either of these portions of his property are of a type that is typically conveyed with residences in the area. The rental unit and acreage are also readily identifiable apart from the debtor’s home, and therefore do not qualify as mere additions to the residence.

Section 101(13A) defines a debtor's principal residence by the debtor's use of the property; for this determination, the court looks to the petition date.

In re Wong · filed 2019-03-13(13A)

The operative verb in § 101(13A) is "used." It is debtor's use, not the lender's intent, or contractual language, that distinguishes "the debtor's principal residence" from other real property. ... In bankruptcy, the petition date is often a proxy for the present, and, here, the petition date is the only practical date to use for the present.

Section 101(27B)'s definition of incidental property does not include substantial business facilities on property that also contains the debtor's principal residence.

Chad T. Olsen · filed 2019-07-22(27B)

The business facilities are not merely incidental to the residence. 11 U.S.C. § 101(27B).

Section 101(13A) treats a residential structure as the debtor’s principal residence when the debtor uses it as such, even if it also serves another purpose.

Wissel, IV v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company as Trustee fo · filed 2020-09-14(13A)

Instead, the Court finds that the plain, unambiguous text of §§ 1123(b)(5) and 101(13A) clearly provides that the anti-modification provision applies to mortgages secured by property that the debtors use as their principal residence, regardless of other uses.

Section 101’s definition of a debtor’s principal residence includes incidental property, allowing land conveyed with the residence to be treated as part of it.

Patricia Benton Lee · filed 2020-10-23(13A)

Debtor’s principal residence includes incidental property and bifurcating Respondent’s property would directly contradict the Code’s definitions. Therefore, the fact that the leased property is incidental to the Respondent’s home unites them under the plain language of the statute and subjects the entirety of the property to § 1123(b)(5).

A debtor’s principal residence includes the residential structure and incidental property conveyed with it, even when part of the property is used for farming.

LEE v. U.S. NATIONAL BANK ASSOCIATION · filed 2021-10-04(13A)

A debtor’s “principal place of residence” therefore includes both the residential structure and any incidental property. There is no language in the Code suggesting that the structure and the incidental property can somehow be bifurcated, nor is there evidence in this case that the residence and adjoining farmland were conveyed independently.

Section 101(27B) defines incidental property to include fixtures and additions, and covers appliances and other property directly connected to a residence.

Pedicone v. Ajax Mortgage Loan Trust 2018-F, Mortgage-Backed S · filed 2021-11-23(27B)

Each of these items fall squarely within the definition of “incidental property,” as defined in § 101(27B).

Section 101(27B) treats fixtures, additions, appliances, and other property directly connected to a residence as incidental property.

John Michael Pedicone · filed 2021-11-23(27B)

Each of these items fall squarely within the definition of “incidental property,” as defined in § 101(27B).

Section 101(13A)(A) defines a debtor’s principal residence as a residential structure the debtor uses as a principal residence, even when another unit is rented.

Juan M. Sandoval · filed 2022-03-31(13A)(A)

The result is that a chapter 13 plan cannot modify the rights of the holder of a claim secured only by a security interest in “a residential structure” that the debtor uses as his “principal residence”, including “property commonly conveyed with a principal residence in the area where the real property is located”.

Section 101(13A) includes a manufactured home used as the debtor’s principal residence, even if it is not attached to real property.

Shalonda M White · filed 2022-07-19(13A)(A), (B)

As to the first element, the term “debtor’s principal residence” is defined by the Bankruptcy Code to mean “a residential structure if used as the principal residence by the debtor, including incidental property, without regard to whether that structure is attached to real property,” including “a mobile or manufactured home[.]” 11 U.S.C. § 101(13A)(A), (B).

Section 101 includes easements, appurtenances, and fixtures among the incidental property treated as part of a debtor’s principal residence.

Bishawjit Saha · filed 2023-02-21(27B)(B)

... U.S.C. § 101(27B)(B) and finds that the items that Debtor attempts to characterize as additional collateral are in fact “incidental property,” which is included in the definition of a “principal residence” under 11 U.S.C. § 101(13A)(A).

Section 101(13A)(A) defines a debtor’s principal residence to include incidental property, which may encompass property interests beyond the residence itself.

Lee v. U.S. Bank National Association · filed 2024-05-23(13A)(A)

In the 2005 amendments, Congress de- fined “debtor’s principal residence” to include “incidental prop- erty,” which can itself include other property interests in addition to the debtor’s residence.

Section 101(13A) defines a debtor’s principal residence to include a mobile home, but does not make a home that is personal property eligible for the anti-modification protection of Section 1322(b)(2).

Jordan v. Greentree Consumer Discount Co. (In Re Jordan) · filed 2009-03-27(13A)

The Jordans are correct that the large majority of cases deciding the issue have reached the conclusion that Section 101(13A) did not render Section 1322(b)(2) ambiguous and did not operate to change pre-BAPCPA law by extending the anti-modification provision of Section 1322(b)(2) to encompass security interests in residences that are not real property.

Section 101(4A)'s definition of bankruptcy assistance covers preparing bankruptcy schedules during an initial consultation when the firm charges for that work.

In Re Humphries · filed 2011-04-19(4A)

Although "bankruptcy assistance" is broadly defined under 11 U.S.C. § 101(4A), B.O.C. maintains that the initial conference amounted to no more than an explanation of the process, costs, and fees so that Ms. Humphries could decide whether to hire the law firm. ... B.O.C.'s argument breaks down, however, when one considers William Orlow's time entry for November 17 that states that he started preparing bankruptcy schedules, coupled with the fact that B.O.C. actually charged for the time and work performed on that day. To suggest that no bankruptcy services were provided, and then seeking compensation for those same services, is an untenable argument.

Section 101(4A) covers work preparing bankruptcy schedules during an initial consultation when the law firm charges for that work; merely talking with a prospective client does not automatically count.

B.O.C. Law Group, P.C. v. Carroll · filed 2011-04-19(4A)

Although “bankruptcy assistance” is broadly defined under 11 U.S.C. § 101(4A), B.O.C. maintains that the initial conference amounted to no more than an explanation of the process, costs, and fees so that Ms. Humphries could decide whether to hire the law firm. Actual services were not furnished, says B.O.C., until December 15, 2009 when Ms. Humphries hired B.O.C. That argument has some purchase. After all, every encounter by a law firm with a prospective client does not amount to providing legal services, and clients certainly may shop around before making a hiring decision. To suggest that the five-day window is opened whenever a client talks to a law firm would distort the meaning of section 528(a) and serve no useful purpose. B.O.C.’s argument breaks down, however, when one considers William Orlow’s time entry for November 17 that states that he started preparing bankruptcy schedules, coupled with the fact that B.O.C. actually charged for the time and work performed on that day. To suggest that no bankruptcy services were provided, and then seeking compensation for those same services, is an untenable argument.

Section 101(22A)(A) defines a financial participant by reference to qualifying securities contracts or swap agreements and their outstanding value.

Peterson v. Enhanced Investing Corp. (In Re Lancelot Investors Fund, L.P.) · filed 2012-10-25(22A)(A)

They claim to be financial participants as they had securities contracts or swap agreements with a debtor or other entity of a total gross dollar value of not less than $1,000,000 in notional or actual principal outstanding at the appropriate time as required by 11 U.S.C. § 101(22A)(A). ... The Defendants convincingly argue that the transfers satisfy these requirements and are protected from recovery and avoidance by the Trustee.

Section 101(22A)(A) allows an entity to qualify as a financial participant based on transactions with the debtor or another entity; the debtor need not be a party to the swap.

Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC · filed 2013-12-26(22A)(A)

And, as mentioned above, for claims against financial participants, rather than swap participants, it is irrelevant that the debtor was not a party to the relevant swap transaction.

Securities contracts held 19 months before the petition do not establish financial participant status under Section 101(22A)'s 15-month lookback.

Fairfield Sentry Ltd. v. Theodoor GGC Amsterdam (In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd.) · filed 2018-12-06(22A)

Since October 2008 was 19 months prior to Sentry's petition, the value of outstanding securities contracts at that time is not dispositive of Sentry's status as a "financial participant."

Section 101(22A) does not exclude debtors from the definition of financial participant.

Kravitz v. Samson Energy Company, LLC · filed 2020-12-23(22A)

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the plain text and structure of the Code’s definition of financial participant does not exclude debtors.

Section 101(22A) measures financial participant status on the dates specified in its definition, rather than on the transfer date.

Kravitz v. Samson Energy Company, LLC · filed 2022-08-04(22A)

Therefore, the Court concludes that whether an entity is a financial participant is not determined on the transfer date, but on the dates set forth in the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of financial participant at § 101(22A).

Section 101(22A) measures financial participant status on the dates specified in its definition, rather than on the transfer date.

Samson Resources Corporation · filed 2022-08-04(22A)

Therefore, the Court concludes that whether an entity is a financial participant is not determined on the transfer date, but on the dates set forth in the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of financial participant at § 101(22A).

Section 101(22A) allows FX forward contracts to count toward the $1 billion threshold for financial-participant status.

Opioid Master Disbursement Trust II v. Covidien Unlimited Company · filed 2025-08-20(22A)

The Trust’s position that FX forwards are not the type of financial instrument that can be valued by reference to notional amount is contradicted by the plain language of the statute. Section 101(22A) expressly includes “forward contracts” among the type of agreements that can be considered.

Section 101’s definitions of “assisted person” and “consumer debt” help determine whether a debtor is covered by the debt relief agency provisions.

Joel Jay Thomas and Deann Julie Thomas · filed 2024-02-14(3), (8)

As a preliminary matter, there appears to be no question about whether the Debtors are “assisted persons” under the Code; the agreement and related notices signed by Mr. Thomas incorporate the disclosure obligations of debt relief agencies, and nothing in the case record suggests that the Debtors are not “assisted persons” based on the value of their nonexempt property or the nature of their debts. 11 U.S.C. §101(3), (8).

Section 101’s definitions of “assisted person” and “debt relief agency” cover a consumer debtor and the debtor’s attorney in this context.

Lance Terel Perryman · filed 2024-03-29(3), (12A)

The legislation regulates certain interactions between an “assisted person” and a “debt relief agency,” as defined in the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 101(3), (12A); Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 232-33. In the context of the cases now before this Court, those terms refer to a consumer debtor and a consumer debtor’s attorney.

Section 101(3) and (12A) define “assisted person” and “debt relief agency” to include the consumer debtors and their attorneys in these cases.

Catherine G Carlisle · filed 2024-03-29(3), (12A)

The legislation regulates certain interactions between an “assisted person” and a “debt relief agency,” as defined in the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 101(3), (12A); Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 232-33. In the context of the cases now before this Court, those terms refer to a consumer debtor and a consumer debtor’s attorney.

Section 101(3) defines an assisted person by primarily consumer debts and nonexempt property below the statutory threshold.

Dignity Health v. Seare (In re Seare) · filed 2013-04-09(3)

The Debtors qualify as “assisted persons” because, first, their debts consist primarily of consumer debts — approximately two-thirds of their debts are consumer debts. ... Second, the Debtors filed a no-asset case; their non-exempt assets are nowhere near the $175,750 statutory threshold.

Section 101(3) defines an assisted person by reference to primarily consumer debts and a limit on nonexempt property value.

Enrique Aguilar-Lara · filed 2018-08-23(3)

“. . . any person whose debts consist primarily of consumer debts and the value of whose nonexempt property is less than $186,825.” 11 U.S.C §101(3).” All of the debtors in the Iowa cases meet this definition.

Section 101(3) defines an assisted person by reference to primarily consumer debts and a limit on nonexempt property value.

Jose A Vargas and Bertha R. Vargas · filed 2018-08-23(3)

All of the debtors in the Iowa cases meet this definition.

Section 101(3) defines an assisted person by reference to primarily consumer debts and a limit on nonexempt property value.

Blanca Estela Gaytan · filed 2018-08-23(3)

“. . . any person whose debts consist primarily of consumer debts and the value of whose nonexempt property is less than $186,825.” 11 U.S.C §101(3).” All of the debtors in the Iowa cases meet this definition.

Section 101(3) defines an assisted person by reference to primarily consumer debts and a limit on nonexempt property value.

Kim M. Petersen · filed 2018-08-23(3)

13 “. . . any person whose debts consist primarily of consumer debts and the value of whose nonexempt property is less than $186,825.” 11 U.S.C §101(3).” All of the debtors in the Iowa cases meet this definition.

Section 101(32)(C)(ii) permits a municipality to be insolvent before it runs out of cash if it cannot pay debts as they become due.

In re City of Stockton · filed 2013-06-12(32)(C)(ii)

The consequence of the § 101(32)(C)(ii) temporal definition of insolvency is that a municipality need not be actually out of cash before it is cash insolvent.

Section 101(32)(C) defines municipal insolvency as either generally failing to pay undisputed debts as they become due or being unable to pay debts as they become due.

In re City of Detroit · filed 2013-12-05(32)(C)

The Court finds that the City of Detroit was, and is, insolvent under both definitions in 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(C).

Section 101(32)(C) defines a municipality as insolvent if it is generally not paying its debts as they become due or is unable to pay them as they become due.

In re City of Detroit · filed 2013-12-20(32)(C)

For a municipality, the bankruptcy code defines “insolvent” as a “financial condition such that the municipality is — (i) generally not paying its debts as they become due unless such debts are the subject of a bona fide dispute; or (ii) is unable to pay its debts as they become due.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(C). ... The Court finds that the City of Detroit was, and is, insolvent under both definitions in 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(C).

Section 101(32)(C)(i) excludes debts subject to a bona fide dispute when determining whether a municipality is generally paying its debts as they become due.

In re Ravenna Metropolitan District · filed 2014-12-15(32)(C)(i)

To say the least, there is a serious legal question as to whether the payment obligations under the Lease represent a legally enforceable debt of the District. Consequently, there is a bona fide dispute as to the Lease and, therefore, it may not be considered as evidence of the District’s current insolvency.

Section 101(52) treats Puerto Rico as a state except when defining who may be a Chapter 9 debtor.

Tax-Free v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico · filed 2015-07-06(52)

In any event, Congress was quite clear in the Bankruptcy Code that Puerto Rico was to be treated like a state, except for the power to authorize its municipalities to file under Chapter 9.

Section 101(52) includes Puerto Rico in the definition of “State” except when defining who may be a Chapter 9 debtor.

Franklin California Tax-Free Trust v. Rico · filed 2015-02-06(52)

Therefore, Puerto Rico is a “State” within the meaning of section 903(1) unless section 903(1) fits into the narrow exception of “defining who may be a debtor under chapter 9.”

Section 101(52) treats Puerto Rico as a State for bankruptcy purposes.

Gonzalez v. Puerto Rico Treasury Department (In re Carrasquillo Gonzalez) · filed 2015-06-22(52)

Puerto Rico is a considered a State for bankruptcy purposes pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 101(52).

Section 101(52) includes Puerto Rico as a State, except when defining who may be a Chapter 9 debtor; Puerto Rico therefore cannot authorize its municipalities to seek Chapter 9 relief but remains subject to Chapter 9’s pre-emption provision.

Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust · filed 2016-06-13(52)

The 1984 amendment precludes Puerto Rico from authorizing its municipalities to seek relief under Chapter 9, but it does not remove Puerto Rico from the reach of Chapter 9’s pre-emption provision.

Section 101(34) and (35) define insured credit unions and depository institutions; individual creditors do not fall within those definitions.

Sawyer v. Thompson · filed 2019-08-01(34), (35)

Here, Plaintiffs are individuals, not a “depository institution” or an “insured credit union” as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(34) and (35).

Section 101(35) includes insured credit unions within the definition of an insured depository institution.

In re Drobney · filed 2018-03-26(35)

Advia is an "insured depository institution" within the meaning of Rule 7004(h).

Section 101(27) includes a municipality in the definition of a governmental unit.

City of Chi. v. Spielman (In re Spielman) · filed 2018-08-06(27)

As an initial matter, in regard to both components of the judgment award that the City argues are nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(7), the City is undoubtedly a "governmental unit" as that term is used in the Bankruptcy Code. In particular, the Code defines "governmental unit" as including a municipality.

Section 101(27) includes state instrumentalities within its definition of a governmental unit; state control is a critical factor in deciding whether an entity qualifies.

Ky. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Seven Counties Servs., Inc. · filed 2018-08-24(27)

We therefore conclude that Seven Counties is not an instrumentality of the Commonwealth of Kentucky under 11 U.S.C. § 101(27) despite the public purpose of its work.

Section 101(27) includes an agency or instrumentality of a Commonwealth within the definition of a governmental unit.

In re: Channer · filed 2019-12-11(27)

The Bankruptcy Code defines a “governmental unit,” in relevant part, as a “department, agency, or instrumentality of . . . a Commonwealth. . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 101(27). Here, PHEAA plainly qualifies as a governmental unit.

Section 101(27)’s definition of governmental unit includes the SBA.

Calais Regional Hospital v. Carranza, in her capacity as administrator for the · filed 2020-06-03(27)

In light of section 106, and because the SBA qualifies as a governmental unit under 11 U.S.C. § 101(27), sovereign immunity does not preclude the exercise of jurisdiction over the SBA as to the Debtor’s claim under section 525.

Section 101(27)’s definition of governmental unit excludes ConServe, a private contractor collecting tax debt for the IRS.

Bryan Starling · filed 2020-06-19(27)

The Court finds that ConServe is not a “government unit” under § 106 and will not apply § 106(a)(3) here.

Section 101(27) includes an instrumentality of a state in the definition of “governmental unit.”

Channer v. Penn. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency · filed 2020-12-17(27)

And PHEAA plainly qualifies as a governmental unit within the meaning of Section 523(a) because it is a government instrumentality of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Section 101(27) defines “governmental unit” to include a state.

RGV Smiles by Rocky L. Salinas D.D.S. P.A. and Rocky Salinas · filed 2021-01-06(27)

The Bankruptcy Code defines “governmental unit” as “United States; State; Common- wealth; District; Territory; municipality; foreign state; department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States (but not a United States trustee while serving as a trustee in a case under this title) . . . .”33 It is undisputed that the State of Texas falls squarely within that definition.

Section 101(27) includes the Department of Education as a governmental unit.

Latson v. US Department of Education · filed 2021-09-30(27)

The Department is a “governmental unit.”

Section 101(27) defines “governmental unit” to include the Small Business Administration.

Springfield Hosp., Inc., Springfield Med. Care Sys., Inc. v. Guzman · filed 2022-03-16(27)

As the SBA is unquestionably a governmental unit as defined in Title 11, 19 and as the parties do not dispute that Springfield was excluded from the PPP solely based upon its bankruptcy status, the only question before us is whether, as a matter of law, the PPP is a “license, permit, charter, franchise, or other similar grant” covered under Section 525(a).

Section 101(27) defines a governmental unit to include a municipality.

Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C. · filed 2022-04-07(27)

Baltimore clearly qualifies as a “governmental unit” since it is a municipality under Title 11 and, thus, for the purposes of § 1452(a) as well. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(27) (defining a “governmental unit” as a “municipality”).

A state agency qualifies as a governmental unit under § 101(27).

Express Grain Terminals, LLC · filed 2022-04-07(27)

The Court finds that the Mississippi Department of Agriculture and Commerce is a governmental unit under the Bankruptcy Code.10 The dispute, however, lies with whether the State of Mississippi is seeking to exercise its police and regulatory power.

Section 101(27) includes Connecticut’s Second Injury Fund as a governmental unit because it carries out a state function by providing public workers’ compensation insurance.

In re: Hopkins Fabrication, LLC · filed 2022-04-26(27)

Therefore, the Court concludes that, in the context of the present appeal, and unlike the entities in Pulley, the SIF is a “governmental unit” for the purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 101(27).

Section 101(27) includes Indian tribes as domestic governments within its definition of governmental unit.

Coughlin v. Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Ind · filed 2022-05-06(27)

Thus, a tribe is a domestic government and therefore a government unit.

Section 101(27)’s definition of governmental unit does not include a private student loan servicer merely because it contracts with the Department of Education to service loans.

Charles · filed 2022-09-30(27)

The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the Charleses’ argument that Great Lakes qualifies as an instrumentality of the United States.

A state oil and gas regulatory commission qualifies as a governmental unit under § 101(27).

Black Diamond Energy of Delaware, Inc. · filed 2024-11-27(27)

The Commission qualifies as a “governmental unit” for purposes of section 362(b)(4)124 and “exercises the police power of the State of Wyoming when it issues its orders.”

Section 101(27) includes California’s Labor and Workforce Development Agency within the definition of a governmental unit.

(BK) In Re: Ernesto & Marilyn Patacsil · filed 2024-12-16(27)

The LWDA meets this definition because it is an executive branch agency of the State of California.

Section 101(27) defines a municipality as a governmental unit under the Bankruptcy Code.

City Wide Community Development Corporation v. City of Dallas · filed 2025-01-07(27)

A municipality is a governmental unit under the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(27) includes a state department, agency, or instrumentality in the definition of a governmental unit.

Patricia Bell Muhammad · filed 2026-03-19(27)

The Bankruptcy Code’s definition of “governmental unit” includes a “department, agency, or instrumentality of . . . a State.” The Debtor does not dispute, and it is plain to the Court, that NCDMV qualifies as a governmental unit under § 362(b)(4). 11 U.S.C. § 101(27).

Section 101(27) includes federal agencies such as the IRS in the definition of “governmental unit.”

Matthew G Brown · filed 2026-06-10(27)

IRS is an agency of the United States, 26 C.F.R. § 601.101(a), within the Bankruptcy Code definition of “governmental unit.”

Section 101(27) includes municipalities in the definition of a governmental unit.

Alexander Moss, Jr. - Adversary Proceeding · filed 2020-06-17(27)

Defendant, a governmental unit and a municipality, cannot assert sovereign immunity, knowingly violating the discharge injunction, and is subject to findings for contempt.

Section 101(5)’s definition of “claim” applies only within Title 11 and does not define “claim” for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1452.

Pearl Beta Funding, LLC v. Biodata Medical Laboratories, Inc. · filed 2019-08-21(5)

But even assuming that the judgment here would meet the definition of “claim” in § 101 (5), that definition section applies only to Title 11; it does not define “claim” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1452, and Biodata cites no authority otherwise.

Section 101(47)(A)(v) requires a filed deficiency claim for its damages limit on credit enhancements to apply.

Wells Fargo v. Bear Stearns Co Inc · filed 2019-12-24(47)(A)(v)

Because of the aforementioned reasons, we hold that “damages” as described in § 101(47)(A)(v) necessitates the filing of a deficiency claim.

Section 101(41A) defines personally identifiable information as information provided by an individual to the debtor; it excludes information provided by business entities.

Celsius Network LLC · filed 2022-09-28(41A)

Section 101(41A) of the Bankruptcy Code defines ... “personally identifiable information” to mean information provided by “an individual to the debtor”; it does not include information provided by business entities.

Section 101(11) defines a custodian through specified receiver, trustee, assignee, and agent roles; mere possession of property does not make someone a custodian.

Fava · filed 2026-06-12(11)

Under the Bankruptcy Code, the term custodian means: ... The defendant does not meet any of the above definitions and is in possession of the Property.

Section 101(11) defines who qualifies as a custodian; a complaint must allege facts bringing a defendant within that definition.

BT Prime Ltd. v. Bos. Techs. Powered By Forexware LLC (In re BT Prime Ltd.) · filed 2019-03-29(11)

The Court agrees that the complaint does not expressly or in substance allege that one or more of the defendants was a custodian within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code definition of that term, or a receiver, trustee, or assignee of the Debtor's assets for the benefit of creditors. The Debtor has not alleged facts on which Forexware, FXDD US, FXDD Malta, or CMH Malta might constitute a custodian under § 543(b).

Section 101(5) treats separate rights to payment as separate claims even when they are reduced to a single judgment.

In Re Richard A. Turner Co., Inc. · filed 1997-06-09(5)

A claim is defined under 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” ... The Court holds that a single judgment encompassing individual claims does not merge those claims for purposes of § 303(b)(1).

Section 101(5) includes fraud claims in its definition of “claim” even after their subordination under section 510(b), at least for equitable subordination purposes.

ABF Capital Management v. Kidder Peabody & Co. (In Re Granite Partners, L.P.) · filed 1997-07-16(5)

I conclude that the subordination of the plaintiffs’ claims under 11 U.S.C. § 510(b) does not bar them from seeking equitable subordination. The plaintiffs still hold fraud claims, see 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (defining “claim”), at least for equitable subordination purposes.

Section 101(5) includes an enforceable right to payment created by a divorce decree within its broad definition of a claim.

Gibson v. Gibson (In Re Gibson) · filed 1998-04-03(5)

As a result of the broad definition of claim enacted by Congress (§ 101(5)) ... the Panel holds that the Debtor’s obligation to pay the Note, an obligation which is not of the kind described in § 523(a)(5), was incurred by the Debtor in connection with the Separation Agreement incorporated into the Dissolution Decree and therefore satisfies the qualifying language of § 523(a)(15), notwithstanding that the debt is payable to a third party and the Separation Agreement lacks hold harmless or other indemnification language.

Section 101(5) includes a right to payment from a settlement or lawsuit within the definition of a claim.

In Re Barber · filed 1998-07-28(5)

Schedule B requires debtors to disclose personal property assets, including, at subpart 20, claims, which would include the right to payment to be liquidated by a settlement or a lawsuit. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5).

Section 101(5) recognizes a claim even when the debtor disputes the payment owed.

In Re Wells · filed 1998-12-07(5)

... Debtor implicitly recognizes that Namtron has a “claim” against her as defined in section 101(5) of the Code, regardless whether such payment is disputed or undisputed.

Section 101(5) treats a disputed right to payment, including a proposed trust fund recovery penalty, as a claim.

In Re Elstien · filed 1999-07-27(5)

There is no argument that the proposed trust fund recovery penalty was not a claim under § 101(5) (“‘claim’ means — (A) right to payment, whether or not such right is ... disputed”).

Section 101(5)’s definition of “claim” includes demands for monetary damages and indemnification arising from a hazardous release.

Solow Building Co., LLC v. ATC Associates, Inc. · filed 2001-11-28(5)

Thus, plaintiffs’ claims in this case are covered by the statutory definition of a “claim” dischargeable in bankruptcy.

A judgment is a claim even when the right to payment is disputed.

In Re Hoffinger Industries, Inc. · filed 2002-02-28(5)

The judgment obtained by Bunch is a liquidated but disputed claim in this case.

Section 101(5)(A) defines a claim broadly enough to include a right to payment for negligent or reckless conduct even if the right has not been reduced to judgment.

Montgomery v. Homestead Health Center, No. Cv01 0182762 S (Jan. 7, 2003) · filed 2003-01-07(5)(A)

The definition of "claim" in the Bankruptcy Code is a "right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured." 11 U.S.C. § 101 (5) (A). ... The plain language of § 1141(d) and Article XI, section 11.01 of the plan, as incorporated in the confirmation order, coupled with the fact that the plaintiff has not submitted any evidence that shows that a proof of claim was filed appropriately, confirms that the defendant's liability for any negligent or reckless conduct has been discharged by order of the Bankruptcy Court, thereby divesting this court of jurisdiction.

Section 101(4)(A) includes unmatured rights to payment within the definition of a claim.

Nationwide Mutual Insurance v. OpTel, Inc. (In Re OpTel, Inc.) · filed 2003-03-25(4)(A)

While Nationwide was able to assert a claim for the Deferred Payment although its right to payment had not matured by the petition date, due to the operation of the automatic stay it was not able to take any steps to increase its recovery under the Agreement of Sale.

A petition to dissolve a marriage is not a claim under the bankruptcy definition, though the state court remains constrained in matters involving property of the bankruptcy estate.

In Re Surgent · filed 2003-11-06(5)

The courts reasoned that a divorce petition is not a “claim” as used in section 362(a)(1) and defined in section 101(4). ... Although the bankruptcy case was pending at the time his wife filed for divorce, the automatic stay did not serve as a complete bar to the divorce action in state court. The trial court had jurisdiction to hear matters pertaining to the dissolution of the marriage, even though it was constrained in matters relating to property that was part of the bankruptcy estate.

Section 101(5) defines a claim to include a right to payment; a judgment against a debtor partnership’s partners alone does not create a claim against the partnership.

Greenfield v. BFP Investments, Ltd. · filed 2005-08-11(5)

Further, under Florida law, the facts that Greenfield might be considered a creditor of BFP Incorporated and that BFP Incorporated is a general partner in BFP Limited does not give him a right to payment from BFP Limited directly or the authority to levy directly on any of BFP Limited’s assets in the bankruptcy estate.

Section 101(5) includes contingent and disputed rights to payment as claims, even if a later judgment fixes their amount.

In Re Atamian · filed 2006-06-15(5)

All the judgment against Superior did was liquidate the amount of the contingent and disputed claim Quirk had against Superior. Prior to the Petition Date Quirk had, but did not assert in its proof of claim or anything attached to its proof of claim, a claim ... that the Debtor might be liable for any judgment entered against Superior under a corporate veil-piercing theory.

Section 101(5)(A) includes a right to payment that has been reduced to a judgment within the definition of a claim.

In re ProCare Automotive Service Solutions, LLC · filed 2007-01-24(5)(A)

A claim is a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment!;.]” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). When a claim objection is filed, § 502(b) instructs the court to do a two-step analysis: first, (1) determine the amount of the claim; and then, (2) allow the claim — including a claim reduced to judgment — as provided for in that section.

Section 101(5)(A) defines a claim broadly as a right to payment, including a right reduced to judgment.

In Re Knight · filed 2007-03-28(5)(A)

Section 101(5) broadly defines the term “claim” to include a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). ... Evergreen, as of the Petition Date, held a liquidated claim, that is not contingent as to liability, against the Debtor by virtue of the Matae-ka Judgment.

Section 101(5)(A) defines a claim as a right to payment; a mortgagee’s claim is not limited to the loan principal when it has a right to additional amounts.

In re Cahill · filed 2013-12-19(5)(A)

Under the Bankruptcy Code a claim is a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). ... Section 506(a) does not alter this scheme and does not limit the amount of a secured claim to the principal amount of a loan.

Section 101(5)(A) includes a right to payment on a time-barred debt within its broad definition of a claim when state law preserves that right.

Jenkins v. Credit Management, Inc. (In re Jenkins) · filed 2015-09-17(5)(A)

The notion that the FDCPA prohibits, and therefore penalizes, a debt collector who attempts to collect a time-barred debt by filing a proof of claim in a bankruptcy case loses traction when considered in light of: (i) the claims-filing, objection, allowance, and disallowance procedures prescribed in Code §§ 501 and 502, and Rules 3001-3008; (ii) the Code’s broad definition of “claim” in § 101(5)(A); and (iii) the Alabama cases holding that a right to payment remains for a time-barred debt even though it may not be judicially enforceable.

Section 101(5)(A) defines a claim as a right to payment even if it has been liquidated or reduced to judgment.

Hagerstown Block Co. v. Solomon (In re Hagerstown Block Co.) · filed 2017-04-21(5)(A)

Section 101(5) defines claim as “a right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, [or] fixed ....”§ 101(5)(A). Section 510(b) applies to a “claim” for damages arising from the purchase or sale of a security. Quite literally, § 510(b) applies to “a right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliqui-dated, [or] fixed” for “damages arising from the purchase or sale” of the security of Debtors. This is precisely what Claimants hold here.

Section 101(5)(A) includes contingent and unliquidated rights to payment in the definition of a claim, including potential claims.

Black v. Buffalo Meat Service, Inc. d/b/a Boulevard Black Angus a/k/a Black Angus Meats a/k/a Black Angus Meats & Seafoo · filed 2021-05-21(5)(A)

The Bankruptcy Code defines a claim as the “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured,” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (emphasis added); ... The twin barriers of standing and judicial estoppel clearly apply to potential claims as of Plaintiff’s March 2009 bankruptcy petition.

Section 101(5) includes matured and unmatured debts in the definition of a claim.

Matthews v. Gamboa · filed 2021-09-21(5)

Further, in applying §523(a)(3), courts have generally considered whether the debtor had knowledge of a “claim,” which by definition includes matured and unmatured debts.

Section 101(5)(A) defines a claim as a right to payment; liability arising from post-petition conduct is outside a prepetition claim.

WASCO LLC v. Northrop Grumman Corporation · filed 2021-09-30(5)(A)

Such post-petition, post-confirmation, and post-closing conduct could not have been discharged in Anvil’s bankruptcy and therefore any liability for such conduct would remain with Anvil or, in this case, its successor-in-interest, Defendant Gildan.

Section 101(5) treats the right to pursue a civil lawsuit for payment as a claim against the defendant.

Murray, Patricia v. No · filed 2022-01-02(5)

In essence, Appellants seek to purchase the rights to the civil lawsuit, which under the Bankruptcy Code would be a claim against Appellees.

Section 101(5) treats a right to payment pursued through a civil lawsuit as a claim.

National Enterprises of St.Croix, Inc . v. No · filed 2022-01-02(5)

In essence, Appellants seek to purchase the rights to the civil lawsuit, which under the Bankruptcy Code would be a claim against Appellees.

Section 101(5)’s definition of a claim does not encompass a former spouse’s proprietary interest in a military pension, which survives the debtor’s bankruptcy discharge.

Brown v. Brown · filed 2023-05-02(5)

In this case, defendant has a proprietary interest in the military pension that survives plaintiff’s bankruptcy discharge. Thus, defendant is entitled to prosecute a claim for distribution of that per se marital property.

Section 101(5) defines a claim as a right to payment, so injunctive relief is unavailable through the bankruptcy claims resolution process.

Ditech Holding Corporation · filed 2023-05-04(5)

Injunctive relief is not available through the claims resolution process. See In re J.S. II, L.L.C., 427 B.R. 673, 675 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010) (noting that injunctive relief should be pursued under Bankruptcy Rule 7001); see also 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (defining “claim” as a right to payment).

A right to payment counts as a claim even if it has not been reduced to judgment or is disputed.

Reichel v. Jensen-Carter · filed 2023-06-23(5)(A)

Having carefully reviewed the record and the arguments on appeal, we affirm the judgment.2 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (providing that a “right to payment” need not be “reduced to judgment” or “undisputed” to count as a “claim”); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(c)(2)(D)(ii) (authorizing the bankruptcy court to determine “appropriate relief” when a proof of claim lacks supporting information).

Section 101(5) treats a right to future rent accelerated by a bankruptcy filing as a claim.

In Re: 6525 Belcrest Road, LLC · filed 2025-06-04(5)

But the Amended Assignment Agreement between Dewey and New Town provided that Dewey would retain all rights to rents that “accrued” prior to the Revenue Transfer date—and because all of Belcrest’s debts were immediately accelerated upon filing for Belcrest’s bankruptcy petition on May 19, 2021, see 11 U.S.C. § 101(5), this would include all future rents pursuant to the Lease Agreement as of that date.

Section 101(10) treats holders of contracts for uncompleted goods as creditors when they have an interest in completion or monetary or equitable relief.

Moe v. Wise · filed 1999-11-19(10)

The hull owners were creditors: they held contracts for uncompleted goods and had an interest in having Hoquiam Boat either complete their contracts or provide monetary or equitable relief. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(10) (defining "creditor"). Consequently, sending the letter to hull owners did not abuse the qualified privilege.

Section 101(10) defines a creditor as an entity whose claim arose at or before the order for relief, excluding claims for postpetition taxes.

In Re Dow Corning Corp. · filed 1999-11-30(10)

Section 101(10), in turn, provides that a “ ‘creditor’ means ... [an] entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(10). ... The Texas Comptroller cannot, therefore, have a priority tax claim against the Debt- or for taxes that arose postpetition. Rather, such taxes would give rise to an administrative expense against the estate.

Section 101(10)(A)’s definition of creditor includes a statutory representative enforcing creditors’ direct claims against a debtor.

Michael E. Moecker of Michael Moecker & Associates, Inc. v. Strasnick (In Re Strasnick) · filed 2000-11-08(10)(A)

The Code defines a creditor as “an entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A) (2000). ... The Court finds that both Barman and Davis operate to extend the meaning of “creditor” in § 727(c)(1) to include Plaintiff.

A law partnership that holds a claim when a bankruptcy case begins qualifies as a creditor even if its membership has changed since the debt arose.

Moss v. Burton & Norris (In Re Moss) · filed 2001-10-02(10)

Since those two entities were the holders of a claim in this chapter 7 case when the chapter 7 case was filed, 11 U.S.C. § 101, those entities were entitled to, and did, file a proof of claim. The fact that a legal directory published by a private firm indicates that the members of the partnership may have changed since 1989 does not alter the partnerships’ right to file a proof of claim for a debt owed to them.

Section 101(10) defines a creditor to include an entity with a claim against the debtor or a community claim.

In Re Trammell · filed 2007-11-09(10)

The term "creditor” as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(10) and as is relevant here, means an entity that has a claim against the debtor, or an entity that has a "community claim.”

Section 101(10) defines a creditor as an entity with a claim arising by the order for relief; secured creditors count when assessing a sale’s effect on creditors.

In Re Hart's Manufacturing Co. · filed 2008-03-19(10)

An application of the “best interest of creditors” test must look at the effect on all creditors, not just general unsecured creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10) (2007) provides that “[t]he term ‘creditor’ means—(A) entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor.”

A creditor must have a right to payment from the debtor arising no later than the order for relief to serve as the trustee’s referent creditor.

In re Petters Co. · filed 2013-06-19(10)(A)

A “creditor” is “an entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief against the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A). The referent creditor here must have a claim “allowable” in the bankruptcy ease. This means, first, that the creditor must have had a “right to payment” from the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (definition of “claim”).

A claimant listed in the debtor’s schedules who files a proof of claim is a creditor while its claim that the funds are outside the estate remains undecided.

Casino Caribbean, LLC v. Money Centers of America, Inc. (In re Money Center of America, Inc.) · filed 2016-01-28(10)

Precedent clearly indicates that QCA should be deemed a creditor under § 1109(b). First, QCA’s claim that the funds are not property of Debtors’ estate has not been determined by this Court. QCA is nominally a creditor based on Debtors’ schedules and QCA’s proof of claim.

Section 101(10)(A) includes a vendor as a creditor if it retains a contingent claim against the debtor under a factoring agreement.

Miller v. Monarch Apparel Group, Inc. · filed 2022-09-16(10)(A)

While the agreements at issue in Attaway and Connolly both clearly provided the factors with recourse against the defendants in certain situations, and therefore left the defendants as contingent creditors against the debtors, the agreement at issue here is not as clear.

Section 101(10) includes a salaried employee with a claim for work performed in its definition of creditor.

Curtis v. Awbrey · filed 2022-11-21(10)

First, § 547(b)(1) is satisfied because Awbrey was a creditor as defined in § 101(10) as he was a salaried employee who held claims124 against Debtor for work performed.

Section 101(5)(A) includes contingent rights to payment in the definition of a claim.

M & T Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. Capital Lighting & Supply, Inc. (In Re M & T Electrical Contractors, Inc.) · filed 2001-04-09(5)(A)

Section 101(5)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code defines the term claim to include a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured.”

Section 101(5)'s definition of a claim includes a mortgage enforceable against the debtor’s property even when the debtor is not personally liable on the mortgage.

In Re Rosa · filed 2001-04-17(5)

The court concludes from these authorities that the right to joint possession under N.J.S.A. 3B:28-3 is a form of property interest in the marital residence. As previously noted, the Supreme Court held in Johnson that if a claim is enforceable against property of the debtor, that claim can be modified under a chapter 13 plan even if the debtor is not personally liable to the lienholder. The court holds that the marital residence is “property of the debt- or” who holds a right to joint possession of that property under N.J.S.A. 3B:28-3.

Section 101(32)'s fair market valuation test can be used to assess a national bank's insolvency even though the bank cannot be a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code.

Branch v. Ernst & Young U.S. · filed 2004-03-30(32)(A)

Similarly misplaced is Ernst & Young's inventive argument that the fair market valuation test set out in section 101(32) of the Bankruptcy Code cannot be used to value a national bank because banks cannot be debtors under the Bankruptcy Code.