11 U.S.C. § 101

Section 101(4)’s definition of a claim includes a mortgage lien even when the underlying debt was discharged and the debtor has no personal liability.

In Re Klapp · filed 1987-12-11(4)

Thus, the court holds that a mortgage securing a debt previously discharged in Chapter 7 proceedings and thus constituting a nonre-course obligation, may be scheduled and treated in a Chapter 13 plan.

Section 101(4) includes an agency’s right to reimbursement from a recipient’s property within the definition of a claim.

In re Camp · filed 1987-12-18(4)

I premised my prior holding that DPW possesses an in rem unsecured claim upon its statutory right to seek reimbursement from certain property of the debtors, such as real estate. This right to recover constitutes a claim pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)... Camp at 62-63.

Section 101(4)(A) includes a contingent, unliquidated government contract right to payment as a bankruptcy claim when an officer in authority knows of it before Chapter 11 plan confirmation, even without contract officer certification.

In Re Remington Rand Corporation · filed 1988-01-06(4)(A)

Accordingly, we reverse the district court and hold that in a Chapter 11 proceeding, the two statutes are best effectuated by requiring the government to assert its claims--even those not yet authorized pursuant to the Act--when an officer in authority has knowledge of them before confirmation of a reorganization plan. Here, the government's contingent and unliquidated contract claim, stemming from breaches in 1980 and 1981, and discovered five months before confirmation of Remington's Chapter 11 reorganization plan, fell within the Code's broad definition of "claim."

Section 101(4)(A) includes a contingent, unliquidated government contract right to payment known before Chapter 11 plan confirmation, even if a contracting officer has not yet certified it.

Kilbarr Corp. v. General Services Administration, Office of Federal Supply & Services (In re Remington Rand Corp.) · filed 1988-01-06(4)(A)

Here, the government’s contingent and un-liquidated contract claim, stemming from breaches in 1980 and 1981, and discovered five months before confirmation of Remington’s Chapter 11 reorganization plan, fell within the Code’s broad definition of “claim.” Although the claim was not certified pursuant to the Act until April 29, 1985, the government’s right to payment existed before the plan’s December 24, 1981 confirmation, and the government had the requisite knowledge of its right to payment before that date as well.

Section 101(4) includes an unmatured right to demand bullion within the definition of a claim.

In Re Bullion Reserve of North America, a California Corporation, Curtis B. Danning, Chapter 7 Trustee v. Bo · filed 1988-01-11(4)

Under these definitions, it is clear that Bozek became a creditor when he transferred funds to BRNA for the purchase of bullion. At that moment, Bozek accrued a right to demand bullion from BRNA. This right, although unmatured, constituted a “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(4)(A) includes a right to payment under a marital property settlement as a claim even if the divorce judgment has not been entered.

Smith v. Smith (In Re Smith) · filed 1988-01-13(4)(A)

The obligations Ricky incurred to Vicki and the Kruegers under the Settlement would also fall under this definition. Granted, the Settlement may not have had the force of a judgment until signed by the state court judge. Nonetheless, a right to payment is a claim dischargeable in bankruptcy “whether or not such right is reduced to judgment.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A).

A person whose only claim against a debtor has been finally dismissed loses creditor status.

Stanley v. Vahlsing (In re Vahlsing) · filed 1987-12-14(9)(A)

Although Stanley was correctly listed as a contingent creditor in Vahlsing's bankruptcy petition, once the New Jersey Surrogate Court dismissed her claim, Stanley lost creditor status.

Section 101(4) includes contingent obligations within the definition of a claim, even when the amount owed requires a later calculation.

Energy Cooperative, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp. (In Re Energy Cooperative, Inc.) · filed 1987-12-17(4)

“Claim” is defined under § 101(4) of the Code so as to include all equitable and legal obligations of the debtor, no matter how remote or contingent. ... The broad legislative intent of § 101(4) would clearly encompass the type of obligation incurred by ECI by accepting delivery of the oil upon payment of only an estimated amount.

Section 101 defines a debt as liability on a claim and includes contingent and unliquidated obligations within the definition of a claim.

In Re Britton · filed 1988-01-15(4), (11)

The word “debt” means liability on a claim. 11 U.S.C. § 101(11). A “claim” includes contingent and unliqui-dated debts. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4). The debt- or-creditor relationship existed between FmHA and the debtors and between CCC and the male debtors at the time of bankruptcy.

Section 101 defines a creditor as an entity with a claim, meaning a right to payment; the court held that the discharged debt left no claim for the trustee to preserve.

In Re Bagnato · filed 1987-12-21

T.W.A. was no longer a creditor of the debtor upon entry of the order of discharge. A creditor, as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101 is broadly defined as an entity with a “claim”. A “claim” is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101 to mean “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, secured, or unsecured ...”. Upon discharge all claims included in the debtors schedules were discharged without opposition by any creditor or the trustee". Therefore, there was no claim for the trustee to set aside or preserve for the benefit of the estate.

Section 101(4) includes a right to payment in the definition of a claim even before a cause of action to enforce that right accrues.

In Re Clinton Centrifuge, Inc. · filed 1988-01-22(4)

As the example of a surety contract makes clear, a right to payment within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code may exist long before any cause of action accrues to enforce that right to payment.

Section 101(4)(B) includes an equitable remedy for breach within the definition of a claim when the breach gives rise to a right to payment, even if damages are difficult to calculate.

Goodman v. National Labor Relations Board (In Re Goodman) · filed 1988-01-25(4)(B)

That the amount of damages flowing from a breach that gives rise to an equitable remedy is not readily calculable should not defeat treating such an obligation as a claim in bankruptcy.

A demand for payment against a debtor in possession is a claim against the bankruptcy estate under § 101(4).

Taubman Western Associates, No. 2 v. Beugen (In Re Beugen) · filed 1988-01-26(4)

By asserting a demand for payment against debtor-in-possession Beugen in this chapter 11 bankruptcy case, Taubman has asserted a “claim” against the estate.

Section 101(4) treats a present contingent right to future indemnification as a claim, even if the right to payment has not matured.

In Re Amfesco Industries, Inc. · filed 1988-01-27(4)

Applicants’ state law cause of action for indemnification, being a present contingent right to future payment, is definable as an unmatured, contingent right to payment under § 101(4).

Section 101(4) defines a secured right to payment as a claim that remains rooted in its pre-petition contract even when a confirmed plan modifies that contract.

Mellon Financial Services Corp. 9 v. Broman (In Re Broman) · filed 1988-02-17(4)

11 U.S.C. § 101(4) defines “claim” as a “right to payment ... secured or unsecured.” The creditor herein has a secured claim that arose pre-petition. The contract giving rise to its claim may be modified under the confirmed plan, but its “claim” nevertheless arose pre-petition.

Section 101(4)(B) treats a right to an equitable remedy for breach as a claim only if the breach gives rise to a right to payment.

Roxse Homes, Inc. v. Roxse Homes Ltd. Partnership · filed 1988-03-03(4)(B)

Since an award of money damages would have been improper, the breach at issue clearly did not “give rise to a right to payment.” Consequently, appellee does not hold a “claim” under 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(B).

Section 101(4) includes a claim whose amount is unknown when the bankruptcy petition is filed if the facts establishing the cause of action have already occurred.

Converse v. Sarapas (In Re Sarapas) · filed 1988-03-03(4)

Although the exact amount of their loss was not known when the Debtor filed his bankruptcy petition, all the operative facts establishing the plaintiffs’ cause of action had taken place. The plaintiffs clearly had “claims” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) which could have been addressed in the Debtor’s original bankruptcy case.

Section 101(4)(B) treats a reclamation obligation as a claim to the extent compliance would require the debtor to spend money, but leaves an obligation the debtor can perform personally outside that claim.

United States v. Whizco, Inc. · filed 1988-03-07(4)(B)

We hold that to the extent that fulfilling his obligation to reclaim the site would force the defendant to spend money, the obligation was a liability on a claim as defined ... by the Bankruptcy Code.

A creditor has a claim when rejection of an executory contract causes a breach.

Lindermuth v. Myers · filed 1988-03-16(4)

As a result of the rejection which by operation of law caused a breach of the contract with the debtors, the Appellants had a claim as creditors. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(4)(a-b), 365(g), 502 and 502(g) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).

Section 101 defines a creditor as an entity with a claim against the debtor and includes partnerships within the entities that can hold claims.

Barker v. Clemens (In Re Clemens) · filed 1988-01-28

“Creditor” refers to an “entity that has a claim against the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(9). “ ‘Entity’ includes person, estate, trust, governmental unit, and United States trustee.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(14). “Person” includes a partnership. 11 U.S.C. § 101(35). O.R.C. § 1775.05(A) defines a partnership as “an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit.” Plaintiffs’ complaint is brought by plaintiff Vincent L. Barker, Jr., individually and as a partner of the partnership, and by plaintiff John C. Purdue Company, individually and as a partner of FBPC. Because plaintiffs were co-owners of the business with Debtor, they are entitled to bring this action on behalf of the partnership.

Section 101(9) excludes a debtor’s attorney from the definition of creditor when the attorney has no claim arising by the order for relief.

In Re Barbee · filed 1988-01-29(9)

First of all, the Debtor’s attorney is not a “creditor” under the Bankruptcy Code because he does not have “... a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor”.

Section 101’s definitions allow a government agency seeking restitution on behalf of injured parties to qualify as a creditor.

In Re West Texas Marketing Corp. · filed 1988-02-18(9)(A)

As defined in § 101(9)(A) “creditor” includes any “entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor.” Section 101(4) defines “claim” as a “right to payment” and § 101(14) defines “entity” to include a “governmental unit.” Thus, in its representative capacity, the DOE meets the definition of a creditor under the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(4)(A) includes a contingent right to payment for a tort arising from acts before bankruptcy, even if the injury manifests after filing.

Grady v. A.H. Robins Co. · filed 1988-02-04(4)(A)

Code Sec. 101(4)(A) provides for a "right to payment" whether or not "such right" is "contingent." ... We do not believe that there must be a right to the immediate payment of money in the case of a tort or allied breach of warranty or like claim, as present here, when the acts constituting the tort or breach of warranty have occurred prior to the filing of the petition, to constitute a claim under Sec. 362(a)(1).

Section 101(4)(A) includes contingent rights to payment as claims even when their value is uncertain.

In the Matter of American Reserve Corporation, Debtor. Appeal of Clear and Doris Elaine Huddleston · filed 1988-02-18(4)(A)

Under § 101(4)(A) there may be many “claims” of uncertain value, and holders of contingent claims — such as the policyholders — may not recognize their entitlement to file unless some champion appears.

Section 101(4)(A) includes disputed rights to payment as claims; a pending dispute does not eliminate a creditor’s claim.

In Re Richmond Tank Car Co. · filed 1988-03-03(4)(A)

The fact that Scullin has a “disputed” claim which is currently being litigated in state court does not nullify Scullin’s claim or Scullin’s status as an unsecured creditor.

Section 101(4) defines “claim” broadly enough to include a contempt fine, whether civil or criminal, for purposes of an involuntary bankruptcy petition.

In Re Caucus Distributors, Inc. · filed 1988-03-08(4)

The 16-million dollar contempt fine, whether characterized as civil or criminal, is a “claim” for the purposes of a petition in involuntary bankruptcy and, accordingly, there is no genuine issue as to a material fact on this issue.

Section 101(4) includes prepetition criminal restitution obligations within the definition of a claim.

Davenport v. Pennsylvania, Department of Public Welfare (In Re Davenport) · filed 1988-03-08(4)

Although I conclude that restitution obligations are claims as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(4), that conclusion does not completely end the analysis in this proceeding.

Section 101(4)(A) includes contingent rights to payment as claims, but a right that did not exist when the petition was filed is not a contingent prepetition claim.

In Re Stephenson · filed 1988-03-21(4)(A)

When the Debtors filed their petition in this case on March 31, 1987, there was no claim against the CCC for disaster payments under the 1987 Act because that Act was not passed until May 27, 1987. The claim under the 1987 Act could not be classified as a contingent claim on the date these proceedings were filed because the claim did not exist; it did not come into being until the 1987 Act was passed.

Section 101’s definition of debt includes an employer’s unfunded vested pension liability when determining insolvency, even before the employer withdraws from the plan.

Fryman v. Century Factors (In Re Art Shirt Ltd.) · filed 1988-03-23(11)

Based on the above analysis, I find that withdrawal liability under the MEPPAA is a debt which should be considered in determining insolvency under the Code. It is clear from the case law analyzing withdrawal liability in a bankruptcy context that the relevant definitions of “debt” and “claim” are satisfied.

Section 101(4)(A) includes claims arising from prepetition conduct even when the right to payment remains contingent or is reduced to judgment later.

LF Rothschild & Co., Inc. v. Angier · filed 1988-03-25(4)(A)

Because the underlying conduct occurred pre-petition, Angier’s discharge covered any “claims”, as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(a), arising therefrom.

Section 101(4)(A) includes unliquidated rights to payment as claims, even before a judgment is affirmed on appeal.

In Re Evans Products Co. · filed 1988-04-20(4)(A)

It is clear beyond any question that a claim in bankruptcy need not even be liquidated, much less affirmed by an appellate court.

Section 101(4)'s definition of a claim includes condominium assessments due after filing when they are unmatured portions of a prepetition liability.

In Re Rosteck · filed 1988-04-21(4)

This court finds that the liability for condominium assessment fees arose prepetition. All assessments coming due after the filing of the petition were merely unma-tured portions of the original liability.

Section 101(4) includes a breach-of-contract claim against a debtor as an undisclosed principal, even when the creditor cannot hold the debtor liable on promissory notes issued by another person.

Feldman v. Kaufman (In Re Kaufman) · filed 1988-05-04(4)

Although the plaintiff may not assert a cause of action against the debtor for liability under the promissory notes issued by Emil V. Gorla, even as an undisclosed principal, it does not follow that the plaintiff lacks standing as a creditor for the purpose of holding the debtor liable for breach of contract on the theory that she is an undisclosed principal. Accordingly, the plaintiff holds a claim against the debtor within the meaning of that term, as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(4), so that he may properly contest the nondischargeability of that claim pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523.

A claim under § 101(4) requires a right to payment, determined by state law; a fraud claim does not arise before the plaintiff suffers damage.

John Deere Co. v. Epstein · filed 1988-05-18(4)

"Claim" is defined generally as a "right to payment." 11 U.S.C. § 101(4). However, "right to payment" is not defined, and the question of whether a party has a right to payment against the debtor is to be determined by reference to state law.

A guarantor with a contingent claim against the debtor is a creditor under § 101(9)(A).

Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Financial Corp. (In Re V.N. Deprizio Construction Co.) · filed 1988-04-27(9)(A)

If the debtor fails to meet its obligations, the creditor may recover from the guarantor. Then the guarantor may seek recovery from the debtor. Therefore, a guarantor has a contingent claim against the debtor and is a "creditor” of the debtor.

A claim under § 101(4) requires a right to payment; a prospective insurance surcharge with no prepetition right to payment is not a prepetition debt.

New Jersey, Division of Motor Vehicles v. Graham (In Re Graham) · filed 1988-04-29(4)

Whether or not the State of New Jersey, Division of Motor Vehicles has a “right to payment” is dependent upon state law. ... Thus, since there is no pre-petition “right to payment” no matter how incomplete same may be, there can be no debt dis-chargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 727.

Criminal restitution imposed as a condition of probation is a debt under the Bankruptcy Code.

Cancel v. City of Schenectady (In Re Cancel) · filed 1988-05-02(11)

Nevertheless, the court must reverse, for in this circuit criminal restitution constitutes a “debt” within the meaning of the Code.

Section 101’s definition of “creditor” excludes a former lender whose discharged debt leaves it with a right to the collateral but no claim for payment.

Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Saylors (In Re Saylors) · filed 1988-05-10(9)(A)

The Bankruptcy Code defines “creditor” as an “entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(9)(A). ... It is clear that at the time of commencement of Sturdivant’s Chapter 13 petition, First Family was not a creditor. It had no right to payment from Sturdivant, nor did it have an equitable remedy for breach of performance giving rise to a right of payment.

Section 101 includes an unincorporated association within the definition of a corporation, allowing a union to qualify as an entity capable of asserting a bankruptcy claim.

U.S. Truck Co. v. Teamsters National Freight Industry Negotiating Committee (In Re U.S. Truck Co.) · filed 1988-05-26(8)(A)(iv)

In bankruptcy, a creditor is an “entity that has a claim against the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(9). An “entity” is defined as “a person, estate, trust [or] governmental unit.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(14). A “person” is defined as an “individual, partnership, [or] corporation.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(35). Finally, a corporation includes an “unincorporated company or association.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(8)(A)(iv). As an unincorporated association, a union has the capacity to assert a claim.

Section 101(9) treats a state holding a pre-petition claim against a debtor as a creditor.

Bavely v. Ohio, Department of Liquor Control (In Re Terwilliger's Catering Plus, Inc.) · filed 1988-06-02(9)

That the State was a creditor is clear from 11 U.S.C. § 101(9) for, as we have seen, it held a pre-petition claim against the debtor at the time of filing.

Section 101(9) treats a guarantor as a creditor when the guarantor has a right to reimbursement from the debtor for payments the guarantor must make.

Gosch v. Burns (In Re Finn) · filed 1988-06-30(9)

It is clear from the Code that a guarantor is a "creditor” by virtue of the right to reimbursement from the debtor for any payments that the guarantor must make; here, the parties do not contend otherwise. 11 U.S.C. § 101(9).

Section 101(9) defines a creditor by reference to a claim arising before the order for relief, which generally excludes holders of administrative expense claims arising after the petition.

In Re Transouth Truck Equipment, Inc. · filed 1988-06-30(9)

“Creditor” is defined as an entity with a claim against the debtor which arose before the order for relief concerning the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 101(9).

Section 101 includes a disputed right to payment in the definition of a claim and treats an entity with a qualifying claim against the debtor as a creditor.

In Re HBA East, Inc. · filed 1988-06-03(4)(A), (9)(A)

It is clear that by virtue of 11 U.S.C. § 101(9)(A) the term “creditor” is defined to mean an “entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose ... before the order for relief concerning the debtor”. In turn, the term “claim” is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A) to mean a “right to payment, whether or not such right is ... disputed”. Accordingly, Movants are creditors and have standing to raise the issue of bad faith.

An entity with no remaining claim against the debtor after foreclosure is not a creditor at plan confirmation.

In re Thomas · filed 1988-06-20(9)

Because Western had bid in its entire indebtedness to the foreclosure sale, there was no deficiency. ... “Creditor” is defined as an entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at or before the order for relief concerning the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 101(9).

Section 101 defines claim broadly and gives debt the same scope, so a disputed obligation can still be a debt.

In Re Pulliam · filed 1988-06-21(4), (11)

Congress intended for the term debt to be given the same broad meaning given to the term claim.

Section 101(4) treats a debtor’s prepetition environmental obligations, including reclamation obligations, as claims that may be addressed and discharged through a reorganization plan.

Utah Division of Oil & Mining v. Kaiser Steel Corp. (In Re Kaiser Steel Corp.) · filed 1988-07-12(4)

As to the pre-petition activities of the Debtor which were carried on in Utah, that state’s claim against the Debtor for violations of its environmental laws, including the failure to reclaim, are clearly “claims” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) and, as such, are subject to being dealt with in a plan and discharged as part of the Debtor’s plan of reorganization.

Section 101(4) and (11) treat civil penalties levied by a state licensing agency as debts in bankruptcy.

Poule v. Registrar of Contractors of California (In Re Poule) · filed 1988-07-05(4), (11)

The penalties levied by the Registrar are “debts” in the bankruptcy sense. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(4), (11).

Section 101(11) includes a prepetition contractual obligation in the definition of debt even when its amount is determined after the bankruptcy petition is filed.

Behrens v. Ass'n · filed 1988-07-26(11)

The fact that the amount of the debt can not be determined until after the bankruptcy petition is filed in no way precludes it from being included within the Bankruptcy Code definition of “debt” and the Debtors’ discharge.

Section 101 defines a debt as liability on a claim, including a prepetition claim discovered later or one whose damages partly accrue after the petition.

Bowen v. Residential Financial Corp. (In Re Bowen) · filed 1988-08-17(11)

Thus, notwithstanding Defendant’s delay in uncovering the alleged fraud, and notwithstanding the possibility that some portion of the alleged damage accrued post-petition, Plaintiff’s alleged liability under Defendant’s causes of action still constituted “debts” for the purposes of Plaintiff’s bankruptcy case.

Under § 101(4), a contractual right to payment can be a claim before the creditor knows of specific overpayments.

Wayne H. Coloney Co. v. US Dept. of Air Force · filed 1988-08-08(4)

The “legal relationship” which establishes the Air Force’s right to payment in this case is the 0451 Incentive Price Contract, irrespective of any actual knowledge the Air Force may or may not have had of any specific over-payments it was entitled to recover under the contract’s re-determination provisions.

A potential restitution obligation arising from prepetition conduct is a claim even if criminal proceedings had not begun or reached sentencing when the debtor filed for bankruptcy.

O'Malley v. Rarer (In Re O'Malley) · filed 1988-08-24(4)

The very broad definition of “claim” in § 101(4) makes it clear that any potential liability she had under any state-court restitution order which might be premised on pre-petition events also constitutes a “claim” and, therefore, a “debt” for bankruptcy purposes. This is so notwithstanding the fact that criminal proceedings either had not been commenced, or had not proceeded to the dispositional stage, before her bankruptcy filing.

Section 101(4) defines a claim as a right to payment that includes interest due on pre-petition taxes.

In Re Standard Johnson Co., Inc. · filed 1988-08-30(4)

11 U.S.C. § 101(4) defines a claim as a “right to payment.” ... Encompassed within the broad definition of claim is a right to payment, which encompasses interest due on pre-petition taxes.

Section 101(9) treats a surety with a contingent indemnity claim against the debtor as a creditor.

O'Rourke v. Coral Construction, Inc. (In Re E.R. Fegert, Inc.) · filed 1988-08-08(9)

As a holder of a contingent claim, Seabord was ... a creditor of the Debtor.

Section 101(4) includes contingent claims for contribution or indemnity based on prepetition obligations between joint tortfeasors.

In Re Production Plating, Inc. · filed 1988-08-11(4)

This court holds that since these claims existed as prepetition claims within the meaning of § 101(4) and yet were not filed and allowed with the Bankruptcy Court, they are barred by the statute and order of this court.

Section 101(4)(A) treats a right to payment as contingent when it depends on future performance; an obligation already absolutely owed is fixed.

In Re Fryar · filed 1988-09-01(4)(A)

A “claim” is the “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. sec. 101(4)(A). ... If a claim is “absolutely” owed, then it is “fixed” and no longer “contingent.” ... The debt owed by ASCS-CCC to the Debtor was contingent on the Debtor’s performance through December 31, 1987.

Under § 101(4), a product liability claim arises after the bankruptcy petition when the claimant’s first exposure to the defective product and resulting injury both occur after filing, even if the debtor manufactured and sold the product earlier.

Pettibone Corp. v. Ramirez (In Re Pettibone Corp.) · filed 1988-08-26(4)

Conversely, if a tort claimant whose employer had purchased a defective product pre-petition is exposed only post-petition to that product and sustains bodily injury only after filing of the manufacturer’s bankruptcy, the claimant’s bankruptcy claim arises post-petition. This is so even though the debtor wholly manufactured and sold the defective product before commencement of the bankruptcy.

A creditor must have a claim against the debtor; a speculative contingent indemnity claim does not suffice.

Harrison v. Brent Towing Co. (In Re H & S Transportation Co.) · filed 1988-09-02(4), (9)

In the Bankruptcy Code: a “creditor” is an “entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor,” 11 U.S.C. § 101(9); and a “claim” is any “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured,” 11 U.S.C. § 101(4).

Section 101(4)(A) treats a fine as a prepetition claim when the conduct giving rise to it occurred before the bankruptcy petition, even if the fine was imposed later.

Wisconsin Barge Lines, Inc. v. United States (In Re Wisconsin Barge Lines, Inc.) · filed 1988-09-08(4)(A)

This Court finds the broad definition of “claim” and the majority of case law supporting this definition dictates that the fines imposed upon the Debtors are pre-pe-tition claims because the conduct giving rise to these claims occurred before the filing of the bankruptcy petition.

Section 101’s relevant definitions do not encompass a class or class representative.

In Re Allegheny International, Inc. · filed 1988-09-23

Neither do the relevant definitions in section 101, 11 U.S.C. § 101, encompass a “class” or “class representative.”

Section 101(4) defines a claim to include a right to payment, a broader category than an allowed claim.

In Re Gleason · filed 1988-09-26(4)

In § 101(4), it is stated that “ ‘claim’ means ... [among other things] right to payment”; thus, “claim” is broader than the technical term “allowed claim.”

Section 101(4) defines a claim to include disputed and unliquidated rights to payment.

In Re Liquidating Committee of Papeleras Reunidas, S.A. · filed 1988-11-03(4)

There is nothing to suggest that “claim” in § 304(c)(1) differs from the broad definition of “claim” of § 101(4), which includes unliquidated and disputed claims.

Section 101(11) defines debt as liability on a claim; an equitable assignment of an attorney’s share of a settlement creates no such liability for the debtor.

Olsen v. Russell (In Re Kleckner) · filed 1988-10-07(11)

The Code does, however, define the term “debt” as “liability on a claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(11) (1982). ... Therefore, there was (1) no transfer of property of the debtor as the debtor had no right to control or disburse; and (2) no antecedent debt, as the debtor had no liability on a claim as those terms are used in Section 547(b).

Section 101’s definition of debt includes contingent and unmatured obligations, including an employee’s obligation to repay advanced leave.

Soiett v. United States of America Veterans' Administration · filed 1988-10-14(11)

The definition of a debt is amply broad to include obligations that are fixed, contingent, matured and unmatured.

Section 101(11) includes an obligation as a debt even when payment is enforced through license suspension rather than a money judgment.

Christensen v. New Jersey, Division of Motor Vehicles (In Re Christensen) · filed 1988-10-17(11)

The fact that the DMV’s right to payment is enforceable by suspension of the driver’s license rather than by a money judgment in favor of the DMV is not sufficient in this Court’s view to render the obligation of the debtor not a debt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 101(11).

Section 101 includes disputed rights to payment within the definition of a claim, so listing an entity as a creditor does not admit that its claim or amount is valid.

Gutierrez v. MBank the Woodlands, N.A. · filed 1988-12-01(4), (9)

Furthermore, the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. sec. 101(4) defines claim as (A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or (B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right of payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured. and sec. 101(9) defines creditor as: (A) entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor; (B) entity that has a claim against the estate of a kind specified in section 348(d), 502(f), 502(g), 502(h), or 502(i) of this title; or (C) entity that has a community claim. ... We hold listing of the bank as a creditor is no admission, in this proceeding, that either the claim or the amount was valid.

Section 101(4)(A) defines a claim broadly enough to include prepetition interest on a tax liability.

In the Matter of Roger Roy Larson and Joan Rosemary Larson, Debtors-Appellants · filed 1988-12-02(4)(A)

Section 101(4)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A), provides that the term “claim” means a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” This broad definition of a “claim” as a “right to payment” has been read to include interest. ... Here it is uncontested that the underlying tax liability is nondischargeable. The pre-petition interest is thus similarly non-dischargeable.

Section 101(4)'s definition of claim includes existing indemnification claims even if they are unliquidated.

In Re Sherwood Square Associates · filed 1989-01-12(4)

Whatever claims may be asserted under the present indemnification provision already exist under the definition of claim in 11 U.S.C. § 101(4), although they may not be liquidated. These claims are not being rejected.

Section 101(9)(A) treats a person with a prepetition claim as a creditor even if the debtor disputes the claim.

Lewis v. Diethorn (In Re Joseph M. Eaton Builders, Inc.) · filed 1988-12-06(9)(A)

Defendants are creditors of the Debtor inasmuch as they have a claim against Debtor which arose pre-petition, notwithstanding the fact that Debtor disputed the claim. 11 U.S.C. § 101(9)(A).

Section 101 includes contractual debts that have not matured when the bankruptcy petition is filed.

Pierce v. Pierce (In Re Pierce) · filed 1988-12-30(4), (11)

If a contract was validly formed when the letter agreement was executed, that contract created a debt, albeit one that would not mature and become due until the children reached college age. The Bankruptcy Code defines debts as including those which have not yet matured at the time the bankruptcy petition is filed. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4), (11).

Section 101(4)(A) requires a right to payment for a claim; under this opinion, a mortgagee whose debtor’s personal liability was discharged under Chapter 7 has no claim against the debtor.

In Re Johnson · filed 1989-01-03(4)(A)

It is clear to the court that the Bank has no “right to payment” from the debtor herein since the debtor’s personal liability on the underlying obligation was discharged under Chapter 7. Thus, the Bank has no “claim” against the debtor as that term is defined at § 101(4)(A).

A state surcharge creates a debt under Section 101 when it gives rise to a right to payment, even if the state enforces payment through license suspension.

Lugo v. Paulsen (In Re Lugo) · filed 1989-01-13(4), (11)

Under the holding of Kovacs, the court finds that the $3,000 surcharge is a “debt” or “liability on a claim.”

Section 101(11) treats an obligation as a debt when the state has a right to payment, even if it enforces payment by suspending a driver’s license.

In Re Adams · filed 1989-01-20(11)

The fact that DMV’s right to payment is enforceable by suspension of the driver’s license rather than by a money judgment in favor of DMV is not sufficient in this court’s view to render any portion of the debtor’s obligation not a debt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 101(11).

Section 101(11) includes condominium assessments that accrue after a bankruptcy petition but arise from a prepetition contract within the definition of debt.

In Re Elias · filed 1989-03-14(11)

We decline to follow Rostech and Horton, and instead hold that condominium assessments that accrue postpetition but arise out of a prepetition contract are “debts” within the meaning of sec. 101(11) and are dischargeable in a Chapter 7 proceeding.

A city can have a claim under § 101(4) when it sends a nuisance notice before bankruptcy, even if demolition costs arise later.

In Re Caslin · filed 1989-01-24(4)

With regard to the Strawberry Row property, for which a “Notice of Nuisance” was sent to the debtor prior to the filing of bankruptcy, the court finds that the City of Dayton was asserting a claim prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition (See n. 2).

Section 101(4)(A) includes a right to payment under a debtor’s personal guarantee even if the right has not been reduced to judgment, liquidated, fixed, matured, or undisputed.

Conway v. First Interstate Bank of Englewood, N.A. (In re Conway) · filed 1989-01-30(4)(A)

The “claim” of First Interstate is its asserted right to payment arising out of the debtor's personal guarantee of loans extended to Conway Corporation. Significantly, under § 101(4)(A), a “right to payment” need not be reduced to judgment, liquidated, fixed, matured, or undisputed.

Section 101(4), read with § 102(2), treats a lien against the debtor’s property as a claim even after the debtor’s personal liability has been discharged.

In Re Ligon · filed 1989-02-27(4)

In determining the definition of “claim” for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) and § 102(2) must, of course, be read together. There can be little doubt that under § 102(2) “claim” includes nonrecourse liens.

Section 101(4)(A) includes contingent and disputed rights to payment as claims, so those liabilities count in the insolvency calculation at their expected value.

Sierra Steel, Inc. v. Totten Tubes, Inc. (In Re Sierra Steel, Inc.) · filed 1989-02-06(4)(A)

To the extent the bankruptcy court refused to consider the $300,000 claim only because it was a disputed or unliquidated claim, its determination was erroneous. A “debt” is defined as liability on a claim. 11 U.S.C. § 101(11). A claim includes a right to payment, even if it is contingent, unma-tured, or not reduced to judgment. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A). Since claims may be disputed or contingent, disputed or contingent liabilities must be included in determining total indebtedness for purposes of determining insolvency.

Section 101(4)(A) includes unmatured rights to payment in the definition of a claim, so including them in a proof of claim does not accelerate the debt.

The Greenhouse Patio Apartments and the Greenhouse 484 v. Aetna Life Insurance Company · filed 1989-03-20(4)(A)

Under the Code, “claim” is defined to include any right to payment, whether or not the right is matured or unmatured (or even disputed). 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A). Thus a proof of claim should properly include unmatured obligations, and filing such a claim does not cause acceleration.

Section 101(9)'s definition of creditor excludes administrative expense claimants from the creditors addressed by Section 1226(c).

In Re Heller · filed 1989-03-21(9)

The term creditor under this section does not include administrative expense claimants. In re Barbee, 82 B.R. 470 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1988), 11 U.S.C. Section 101(9).

Section 101(9)’s definition of creditor does not make an income tax claim collectible from the bankruptcy estate when the debtor fails to elect to close the taxable year at the start of the case.

In Re Mirman · filed 1989-04-12(9)

Looking to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101(9) states as follows: ... Upon review of the applicable statutory provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and Title 26 of the United States Code, the Court finds that the Internal Revenue Service is not a creditor of the debtors’ bankruptcy estate. The I.R.S. holds a valid claim against the debtors individually for the taxable year 1982, but since the debtors failed to make an election under 26 U.S.C. § 1398(d) to divide their taxable year, no part of the debtors’ tax liability for the year is collectible from the estate.

Section 101(4) defines a claim broadly enough to include rights to payment that are unliquidated, contingent, unmatured, or disputed.

Lubman v. Sovran Bank, N.A. (In Re a & B Homes, Ltd.) · filed 1989-03-24(4)

The fact that as of the time of the filing of the petition, some of Sovran’s other claims were unliquidated, contingent, un-matured, or disputed is of no consequence. The broad definition of claim in 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) permits Sovran to satisfy the second element necessary for setoff.

A mortgage lien that survives discharge of the debtor’s personal obligation does not, by itself, give the lienholder a claim under § 101(4)(A).

In Re Hundley · filed 1989-03-24(4)(A)

“Claim” is defined at 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A) as a right to payment, or a right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment. Unquestionably, American Home, a real estate mortgagee, possessed a claim in the Chapter 7 case in which Hundley received a discharge. In the present case, however, American Home is not a creditor within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code. Its right to payment from Hundley disappeared when the note it held was discharged when he received his discharge in bankruptcy in his earlier Chapter 7 case.

Section 101 treats the corporation holding a claim as the creditor, rather than its unincorporated business division.

Bucyrus Construction Products, Inc. v. McGregor (In Re Ray Brooks MacHinery Co.) · filed 1989-04-11(9), (14), (35)

The error in the argument is that Northwest is the entity that is the creditor in this case, not Bucyrus. Distribution under 11 U.S.C. § 726 is made to creditors. “Creditor” means an “entity that has a claim against the debtor ...” 11 U.S.C. § 101(9). Bucyrus was not a corporation or a partnership, estate, or trust, such as are included within the meaning of the term “entity” under section 101(14) and (35). It is called a “division,” which is generally understood to mean an operating or administrative unit of a business.

Sections 101(4)(A) and 101(9)(A) treat a guarantor as a creditor because the guarantor has a contingent right to reimbursement from the debtor.

Block v. Texas Commerce Bank National Ass'n (In Re Midwestern Companies, Inc.) · filed 1989-04-18(4)(A), (9)(A)

Read together, sections 101(4)(A) and 101(9)(A) reveal that a guarantor is a creditor because he has a contingent right to payment.

Section 101’s definition of debt covers an obligation to repay overpaid federal disability benefits when the overpayment gives the government a right to payment.

Baker v. United States Ex Rel. United States Department of Labor · filed 1989-04-21(11)

The Court finds that the monetary obligation in this case clearly falls within the definition of “debt” and “claim” as defined by the bankruptcy code. The government’s overpayment of FECA benefits to the debtor created a liability on the part of the debtor. This liability made a claim or a “right to payment” exist between the government and the debtor.

Under § 101’s definitions of claim, creditor, and debt, a mortgagee has no claim against a debtor who is not liable on the mortgage.

In Re Jones · filed 1989-04-21(4), (9), (11)

Because Debtor is not liable on the mortgage, there exists no debt owing to the Bank; the Bank has no claim against Debtor; and there exists no creditor-debtor relationship.

Section 101(4) includes a prepetition contractual right to payment within the definition of a claim even when the amount due is unknown at the time of filing.

In Re Flight Transportation Corporation Securities Litigation · filed 1989-05-12(4)

The Bankruptcy Code defines a "claim" as a "right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured." 11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(4). ... In the present case, we think MHT had a "claim." Under Sec. 607 of the Indenture Agreement, MHT had a contractual right to payment for its services and to reimbursement of its expenses, including its attorney's fees. This right to payment arose when the Indenture Agreement was executed. The petition in bankruptcy was not filed until about two weeks later. Thus, as of the date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, MHT had a right to payment but the amount due was unknown.

Section 101(4) includes a contractual right to payment within the definition of a claim even when the amount due is unknown when the bankruptcy petition is filed.

Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Bartsh · filed 1989-05-12(4)

We think the district court defined “claim” too narrowly for purposes of § 502. The Bankruptcy Code defines a “claim” as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(4). ... In the present case, we think MHT had a “claim.” Under § 607 of the Indenture Agreement, MHT had a contractual right to payment for its services and to reimbursement of its expenses, including its attorney’s fees. This right to payment arose when the Indenture Agreement was executed. The petition in bankruptcy was not filed until about two weeks later. Thus, as of the date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, MHT had a right to payment but the amount due was unknown.

Section 101(4)’s broad definition of “claim” supports including a mortgage debt in a chapter 13 plan even after the debtor’s personal liability was discharged in chapter 7.

In Re Fuller · filed 1989-05-17(4)

But the broad definition of “claim” under the Code is not the only justification for including a mortgage debt, where there is no personal liability, in a chapter 13 plan.

Section 101(4) defines a claim as a right to payment or an equitable remedy for breach of performance that gives rise to a right to payment; a land bank’s right to require stock ownership is neither.

In Re Shannon · filed 1989-05-18(4)

A “claim” is a “right to payment” or a “right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment,” 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (1982); the Land Bank’s right is not a “claim” since it is neither of these.

Section 101(4)(A) treats a creditor’s right to payment under an in rem judgment as a claim even if the debtor’s personal liability was discharged.

In re Randall · filed 1989-05-18(4)(A)

Regardless of whether the obligation owed to creditor Jim Walters Homes, Inc. was indeed discharged in the prior Chapter 7 proceedings, it is clear that this creditor possesses at least a “right to payment” pursuant to the in rem judgment obtained in State Court. ... Thus, we hold that creditor Jim Walters Homes, Inc. does indeed have a claim which may be treated under the Debtors’ Chapter 13 Plan.

Section 101(4) includes contingent rights to payment in the definition of a claim, including obligations arising before bankruptcy that may be fixed later.

In Re Grove · filed 1989-05-26(4)

Even claims which are un-matured, unliquidated or contingent are clearly included in the definition of a claim.

Section 101(9) treats an equitable distribution award as a claim against the debtor’s estate when no interest in the property vested before the bankruptcy filing.

Goldberg v. Hilsen (In Re Hilsen) · filed 1989-06-08(9)

To the extent the state matrimonial court adjudicated an equitable distribution award in favor of the defendant spouse, such award becomes a claim within the context of 11 U.S.C. § 101(9). The defendant spouse’s claim is an entitlement against the debtor’s estate, and thus, she becomes one of the general unsecured creditors of the estate.

Section 101(4) defines “claim” broadly enough to include a right to payment arising from a debtor’s conversion of entrusted mortgage funds.

First Federal of Michigan v. Barrow · filed 1989-06-16(4)

The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code evidences Congress' desire to provide the broadest possible definition of "claim" when it enacted Section 101(4). ... the mortgagors as well as the appellant taxing authorities and investors were stripped of their status as beneficiaries of any trust or constructive trust that may have existed while the mortgage payments were identifiable in segregated escrow accounts and they became general creditors of the debtors and the debtors' bankrupt estate because the debtors' conversion of the mortgage payments had occurred at the moment when the identifiable funds were deposited into Salem's negative balance Central Account from which transfers were made to satisfy debtors' pre-existing indebtedness to the mortgagors and appellants.

A person who buys claims to harass a debtor cannot use those claims to object to the debtor’s discharge.

Young v. Beugen (In Re Beugen) · filed 1989-05-16(9)(A)

Bankruptcy Code Section 101(9)(A) defines a “creditor” as any “entity that has a claim against the debtor at the time of or before the order for relief.” ... The question we must resolve, however, is whether a party who was not the original holder of claims is nevertheless a “creditor,” within the meaning of the Code, who is entitled to object to a debtor’s discharge. ... Therefore, we hold that “[t]he right to object to a debtor’s discharge is not a marketable commodity which may be purchased by one party from another in order to inflict further punishment and discomfort upon the debtor.”

A lien securing payment for postpetition legal services does not make an attorney a creditor under Section 101 because the lien itself creates no right to payment.

In Re Carter · filed 1989-05-24(9)(A)

The filing of a lien does not create a right to payment. The rendering of services creates the right to payment. The lien only secures it, but it is not a right independent of the liability it secures. Since the law firm had no pre-petition claim against the debtor, it could not meet the definition of creditor.

Section 101(4)’s broad definition of a claim includes a condominium association’s contingent right to future assessments under a prepetition agreement.

In Re Ryan · filed 1989-06-02(4)

A “claim”, in turn, is broadly defined as any right to payment .. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4). ... Woodhaven’s right to payment for postpetition assessments was contingent upon the happening of an uncertain future event, that event being that the Debtors would retain postpetition title to the property.

Section 101(4) includes an investor’s right to recover money placed in a fraudulent scheme as a claim, but fictitious profits are not a claim when the investor has no right to payment.

In the Matter of Ronald Cohen, Debtor. Dale Wootton, Trustee for the Estate of Ron Cohen A/K/A Ronald Cohen v. V.W. Barg · filed 1989-06-19(4)

We are unable to agree with the lower courts’ conclusion that Barge had a claim, i.e. a right to payment, from Cohen in excess of the amount he invested with him.

Section 101 treats a contingent or unmatured right to payment as a claim and liability on that claim as a debt.

In Re Turner · filed 1989-07-07(4), (11)

A debt, as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(11), means “liability on a claim.” A claim, as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(4), is a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” ... Thus, the debtor’s personal liability on Meadow-brook’s right, albeit unmatured or contingent, to payment of common expenses was clearly discharged in this case.

Section 101(4) includes contingent obligations arising from prepetition traffic tickets as claims dischargeable in Chapter 13.

Colon v. Hart (In Re Colon) · filed 1989-07-11(4)

Similarly, as contingent claims are also debts within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101(4), ... the debtors’ obligations arising from the issuance of prepetition traffic tickets are dischargeable obligations in chapter 13! ... See, e g., Smith v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Transportation; In re Young.

Section 101(9) includes a seller as a creditor when the seller has a right to payment for goods or an equitable remedy for their return.

Scott v. Almiro Fur Fashion Design (In Re Fisher) · filed 1989-07-28(9)

Under 11 U.S.C. § 101(9), a “creditor” is an “entity that has a claim against a debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor.” A “claim” is a “right to payment or a right to an equitable remedy.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(4). Here, Debtor had the obligation to either return the Minks or to pay for the merchandise. Put differently, Almiro had a right to payment for the Minks or to an equitable remedy for their return. Accordingly, Almiro was a creditor as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(9) and the transfers in question were to or for Almi-ro’s benefit within the meaning of 11 U.S. C. § 547(b)(1).

A preferred shareholder’s redemption right does not count as a debt when redemption depends on the corporation having sufficient assets.

Joshua Slocum, Ltd. v. Boyle (In Re Joshua Slocum, Ltd.) · filed 1989-08-03(11)

Thus, we do not believe, at least on the basis of the present record, that the redemption rights of preferred stockholders of the Debtors here can be properly characterized as debts.

Section 101 defines debt broadly enough to include criminal restitution obligations enforceable by a victim or the state.

Erickson v. District Court of the State of Colorado (In Re Erickson) · filed 1989-08-14(11)

One can only conclude that restitution obligations are debts within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) and (11).

Section 101(4)(A) includes contingent, unliquidated, and unmatured contractual rights to payment within the definition of a claim, so such a claim can arise when the agreement is signed.

Service Decorating Co. v. Travelers Insurance (In Re Service Decorating Co.) · filed 1989-09-21(4)(A)

Hence, Travelers’ contingent right to payment existed upon the signing of the insurance agreement. That the amount owed to Travelers was unliqui-dated, contingent and unmatured at that time does not matter, since a “claim” under § 101(4) means a right to payment whether or not it is “unliquidated ... contingent... [or] unmatured.”

Section 101(4)(A) defines a claim broadly: a right to payment need not be reducible to a money judgment.

Lugo v. Paulsen · filed 1989-09-28(4)(A)

In addition, requiring that a claim be reducible to a money judgment would conflict with the congressional mandate that “claim” be defined broadly.

Section 101(4)(A) includes a right to payment from the debtor held by suppliers who dealt with its disclosed agent.

In Re Aztec Co. · filed 1989-11-22(4)(A)

EBR ordered the goods and services and paid the bills, but the evidence established that EBR acted as agent in these transactions and disclosed that agency to the suppliers, etc. The non-insider claimholders in Class 5 had rights to payment by the debtor at the petition. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A).

A claim requires a right to payment; the creation of a preference cause of action when a bankruptcy petition is filed does not alone establish that such a right exists.

Fonda Group, Inc. v. Contemporary Packaging Corp. (In Re Fonda Group, Inc.) · filed 1989-09-29(4)(A)

Fundamental to Movant’s argument is the premise that the right to avoid preferences under Avoiding Powers itself constitutes “a right to payment”. Although the preference cause of action is created on the date the petition is filed, whether an actual claim or right to payment exists is not so determined.

Section 101(4)(A) defines a claim as a right to payment, which is not extinguished by a creditor’s failure to file a timely proof of claim.

Gaudio v. Stamford Color Photo, Inc. (In Re Stamford Color Photo, Inc.) · filed 1989-10-11(4)(A)

Bankruptcy Rule 3003(c)(2) does not extinguish a creditor’s status, it merely eliminates a creditor’s right to a distribution if the creditor has not timely filed a proof of claim. Thus, even if the movant failed to timely file a proof of claim and was not entitled to a distribution, she would nonetheless have a “right to payment”, see § 101(4)(A), upon termination of the automatic stay under § 362(c) if her claim would not be discharged under § 1141(d)(2).

Section 101(4)(A) broadly defines a claim as a right to payment, including a judgment creditor’s right to payment from property held under a supersedeas bond trust agreement.

Gnidovec v. Alwan (In Re Alwan Bros.) · filed 1989-10-13(4)(A)

The definition of claim is very broad and the Bankruptcy Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to determine the allowability and dischargeability of creditors’ claims. Even though, as of the date of the bankruptcies were filed, the MOVANTS had the right to have their claims satisfied from the proceeds of the sale of the real estate, the provisions of the bond trust agreement do not abrogate this Court’s jurisdiction over the MOVANTS’ claims.

Section 101(4)(A) includes an enforceable right to payment as a claim even when the creditor cannot reduce the obligation to a money judgment.

Lugo v. Paulsen · filed 1989-10-26(4)(A)

In addition, requiring that a claim be reducible to a money judgment would conflict with the congressional mandate that "claim" be defined broadly.

Section 101(4) broadly defines a claim to include virtually all legal or equitable rights to payment.

Bayless v. Crabtree Through Adams · filed 1989-12-04(4)

The term “claim” under the bankruptcy laws includes virtually all legal or equitable rights to payment and is broadly construed.

Section 101(4) includes a mortgagee’s right to payment or foreclosure within the definition of a claim even when the debtor is not personally liable for a deficiency.

Marshall v. Farm Credit Bank of St. Louis (In Re Marshall) · filed 1989-12-05(4)

The ASSOCIATION had the right to demand payment from the Debtors and absent payment, the right to the equitable remedy of foreclosure. Such a relationship clearly falls within the definition of the term “claim”. The fact that the ASSOCIATION could not collect a deficiency arising from the foreclosure from the Debtors does not mean that the ASSOCIATION does not have a claim against the Debtors.

Section 101(9)(A) includes a secured lienholder as a creditor after the debtor’s personal liability is discharged because the lienholder retains a claim against the debtor’s property.

Grundy National Bank v. Johnson · filed 1989-10-12(9)(A)

Because a holder of nonrecourse debt is a Chapter 13 creditor, a secured creditor whose debtor is discharged under Chapter 7 from personal liability on the debt underlying the lien, is also a “creditor” for purposes of a subsequent Chapter 13 plan and is therefore subject to that plan.

Section 101 includes entities holding secured claims among creditors whose interests count when a court considers converting or dismissing a Chapter 11 case.

U.S. Trustee v. GPA Technical Consultants, Inc. (In Re GPA Technical Consultants, Inc.) · filed 1989-10-20(9), (4)(A)

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Sections 101(9) and 101(4)(A), entities holding secured claims are “creditors”. It follows that the secured creditor’s interests must be taken into account.

Section 101(4)(A) includes a contingent right to payment in the definition of a claim, even when payment depends on a future event.

Burson v. Marine Corps Finance Center (In Re Burson) · filed 1989-11-15(4)(A)

Of the adjectives used in Section 101(4) to define the term “claim,” the adjective most applicable to the present dispute is the term “contingent”. ... Accordingly, the Court finds that MCFC held a pre-petition contingent claim.

Section 101 defines creditors as holders of pre-petition claims and equity security holders as shareholders of the debtor.

Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. PSS Steamship Co. (In Re Prudential Lines, Inc.) · filed 1990-01-04(9), (16)

The term "creditors” is defined to consist of holders of pre-petition claims, 11 U.S.C. § 101(9), and the reference to equity security holders means shareholders of the debtor, 11 U.S.C. § 101(16), even though the rights and interests of shareholders could be terminated under § 1141(d)(1)(B) of the Code.

Section 101(11) defines a debt as liability on a claim, even when liability is disputed or has not been finally determined.

Matter of McGovern · filed 1990-01-26(11)

Consequently, the definition of debt as “liability on a claim” does not require that liability be conceded or otherwise established. Instead, liability on a claim exists even though that claim has not been finally determined and is disputed, contingent, or unliquidated.

Section 101(4)(B) includes a contractor’s breach of contract claim arising from a subcontractor’s failure to pay suppliers.

In Re Null's Service, Inc. · filed 1990-01-17(4)(B)

Therefore, McCain has a pre-petition claim against debtor for debtor’s failure to pay material-men and suppliers. This claim is in the form of a breach of contract which is a claim as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(B).

Section 101(4) includes a prepetition breach-of-contract claim even if it has not been reduced to judgment.

In The Matter Of Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Management Corporation · filed 1990-02-22(4)

Savings thus had a valid pre-petition claim based on breach of contract. Although this claim had not been reduced to judgment on the filing date, it is nonetheless a valid claim, see 11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(4) (1988), eligible for setoff under section 553.

Section 101(4) includes a prepetition breach-of-contract claim even if it has not been reduced to judgment.

Cohen v. Savings Building & Loan Co. (In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Management Corp.) · filed 1990-02-22(4)

Although this claim had not been reduced to judgment on the filing date, it is nonetheless a valid claim, see 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (1988), eligible for setoff under section 553.

Section 101(4)(A) treats accrued temporary alimony as a right to payment and therefore a claim against the bankruptcy estate.

Bible v. Bible (In Re Bible) · filed 1990-02-23(4)(A)

The accrued alimony at the time of the filing constitutes a right to payment, a claim against the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A).

Section 101(9)(A) includes Colorado as a creditor when it seeks repayment of unemployment benefits.

Colorado, Division of Central Services, Central Collection Service v. O'Brien (In Re O'Brien) · filed 1990-01-18(9)(A)

Moreover, Colorado is clearly a creditor under 11 U.S.C. § 101(9)(A). This defense is denied.

Section 101(9) excludes the SEC from being a creditor of the estate for a securities law violation arising from a confirmed plan.

In Re Food City, Inc. · filed 1990-01-30(9)

Third, the SEC does not qualify as a “creditor” of the estate bound by the confirmed plan. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(9), 1141(a). The SEC would thus not be barred from enforcing the securities laws with respect to the violation arising out of the plan notwithstanding its confirmation by court order.

A contractual right to payment is a claim even if it is unmatured when the bankruptcy petition is filed.

In the Matter of United Sciences of America, Inc., Debtor. Daniel J. Sherman v. First City Bank of Dallas · filed 1990-02-06(4)(A)

The Code defines “debt” as a “liability on a claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(11). It defines claim as the “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A). As we have already indicated, the Merchant/Bank Agreement gave First City a right to payment from USA for chargebacks executed by the issuing bank. This right to payment, and hence USA’s debt to First City, arose not later than when the charged back item was initially credited to USA’s account, regardless of when the issuing banks actually asserted their chargeback claims against First City pursuant to the Visa and MasterCard operating regulations. USA’s debt to First City for charges paid post-petition, although “absolutely owing,” was thus simply unmatured at the time of the petition.

A preference defendant with no right to payment from the debtor is not a creditor under § 101 merely because the trustee seeks to recover a transfer.

Langenkamp v. Hackler · filed 1990-03-05(9)

A creditor is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(9) as an “entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor.” Claim is defined in turn as a “right to payment.” Id. § 101(4). Appellants do not have even a contingent right to payment from the debtors’ estates at this point; rather, as defendants in the trustee’s adversary proceedings, they may have an obligation or liability to pay the estates the monies transferred to them by the debtors.

Section 101(9) requires a creditor to have a claim against the debtor; possible liability to the estate in a preference action does not itself create a claim.

In Re Republic Trust & Savings Company · filed 1990-04-10(9)

Appellants, however, are not "creditors" entitled to notice within the purview of Rule 2002. A creditor is defined in 11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(9) as an "entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor." Claim is defined in turn as a "right to payment." Id. Sec. 101(4). Appellants do not have even a contingent right to payment from the debtors' estates at this point; rather, as defendants in the trustee's adversary proceedings, they may have an obligation or liability to pay the estates the monies transferred to them by the debtors.

Section 101(4)(B) treats an equitable remedy as a claim when the breach also gives the creditor a right to payment, even if payment is optional.

United States v. Chateaugay Corp. (In Re Chateaugay Corp.) · filed 1990-03-15(4)(B)

Even an optional right to payment is nonetheless a right to payment and the fact that EPA may not choose to exercise that option in no way negates the existence of that right. It follows that absent any congressional intent to preclude the dischargeability of such claims, these claims for injunc-tive relief fall within the broad language of Section 101(4).

Section 101 includes disputed claims in its definition of claim and holders of disputed claims in its definition of creditor.

American Motors Leasing Corp. v. Morando (In Re Morando) · filed 1990-03-16(4), (9)

The debtor misconstrues both the scope of the definition of a creditor under 11 U.S.C. § 101(9) and claim under 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) which include holders of disputed claims, and the focus of § 727 which is unlike a dischargeability § 523 complaint.

Section 101 treats a limited partner’s enforceable right to guaranteed payments as a claim that confers creditor status, even when the partner also holds an equity interest.

In Re St. Charles Preservation Investors, Ltd. · filed 1990-03-28(4), (9)

There is no provision in the Bankruptcy Code that a limited partner with an equity security interest cannot also have án independent claim within the definition of 101(4) arising out of the same instrument. In other words, the appellees cannot demonstrate that the definitions of “creditor” and “equity security holder” are mutually exclusive.

Section 101(9)(A) includes an entity with a real or contingent claim against the debtor in its definition of creditor.

In Re C-L Cartage Co., Inc. · filed 1990-04-03(9)(A)

Whether viewed as creditors or guarantors, the Fosters fall within the broad definition of "creditor" in section 101(9)(A) since they have a real or contingent "claim" against Cartage.

Section 101(11)’s definition of debt includes attorney’s fees incurred to enforce a contract between parties of relatively equal bargaining power when the contract requires the losing party to pay them.

Commercial Factors of Salt Lake City, Inc. v. Jensen (In Re Jensen) · filed 1990-04-13(11)

It is this court’s interpretation that attorney’s fees incurred in the enforcement of a contract freely entered into between parties of relatively equal bargaining power is ... part of the debt as defined in section 101(11). If the contract provides that the losing party shall bear such fees and costs in enforcing the contract, then those fees and costs may be included as part of a debt found to be nondischargeable under the Code and judgment may be rendered accordingly.

Section 101(11) treats an obligation to pay future condominium assessments under a prepetition agreement as a debt, even when the payments remain contingent.

In the Matter of William N. Rosteck and Joyce M. Rosteck, Debtors. Appeal of Old Willow Falls Condominium Association · filed 1990-04-13(11)

Under those broad definitions of claim and debt, the Rostecks had a debt for future condominium assessments when they filed their bankruptcy petition.

Section 101(4)(A) includes contingent and unmatured rights to payment in the definition of a claim, even before a cause of action accrues under state law.

Danzig v. Grynberg (In Re Grynberg) · filed 1990-04-16(4)(A)

Further, the interpretations made by such courts more effectively give full meaning to each and every word of Section 101(4), particularly the words “contingent” and “unmatured.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A). It must follow that the costs represented by the first cost memorandum fit the definition of claim, arose prepetition and are, therefore, discharged because of the applicants’ failure to file a timely proof of claim covering these items.

Section 101 treats a contingent right to payment as a claim, making its holder a creditor even before the right matures.

Wallis v. Justice Oaks II · filed 1990-04-25(4)(A), (9)(A)

A "creditor" is an "entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor." 11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(9)(A). A "claim" for the purposes of the Code means any "right to payment, whether or not such right is ... fixed, contingent, matured, [or] unmatured." Id. Sec. 101(4)(A). Obviously, the Wallises had a "claim," albeit a contingent or unmatured claim, which, in turn, made them "creditors" of Justice Oaks and thus "parties in interest" to the confirmation proceeding ... We reach this conclusion even though the Wallises did not have an allowable claim against Justice Oaks and could not request equitable subordination or imposition of an equitable lien.

Section 101(4)(A) includes a contingent right to payment within the definition of a claim.

In Re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group Inc. · filed 1990-05-03(4)(A)

The Group Members, including the Banks, clearly had, however, a "right to payment," 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A), from Drexel on the filing of the petition even though payment was contingent on subsequent valuation of the collateral.

Section 101(4) treats a right to payment as a claim; a mortgagee whose debt is satisfied by foreclosure and who cannot recover a deficiency has no claim against the debtor.

Page v. Consolidated Title & Abstract Co. (In re Brewery Ltd. Partnership) · filed 1990-04-27(4)

Even if the City had bid in only a portion of the debt, it is barred by Minnesota’s anti-deficiency statute from asserting any additional claim against the debtor under the mortgage. Accordingly, the City has no claim against the debtor, and hence, no right to payment from the estate or the escrow fund held by Consolidated Title.

Section 101(4) includes a legal or equitable entitlement to payment within the definition of a claim even if it has not been reduced to judgment.

Winslow v. Williams Group · filed 1990-05-08(4)

Second, whether the County’s claim is cast as a legal or equitable entitlement to payment, that claim falls within the definition set out in 11 U.S.C. § 101(4). Winslow’s argument that the claim had not been reduced to a judgment is irrelevant.

Section 101(4) does not treat a mortgage lender’s surviving foreclosure lien as a claim against a debtor whose personal liability on the mortgage was discharged.

In Re Curtis Reed Johnson, Debtor. Home State Bank of Lewis, Lewis, Kansas, and Cross-Appellant v. Curtis Reed Johnson, · filed 1990-06-07(4)

Clearly, the Bank has no “right to payment” from Johnson under § 101(4)(A), because Johnson’s personal liability on the mortgage was discharged under Chapter 7. Moreover, the Bank has no right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance which gives rise to a right to payment under § 101(4)(B).

Section 101(4) does not treat a cleanup obligation as a claim when the government seeks performance and cannot demand payment instead.

United States v. Hubler · filed 1990-06-08(4)

As plaintiff has not converted defendants’ obligations into a monetary liability, nor may plaintiff do so, defendants’ obligations are not “claims” under the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(11) defines debt as liability on a claim; a pension award paid directly by the Army is not the debtor’s debt when the debtor owes no payment.

Stolp v. Stolp (In Re Stolp) · filed 1990-05-23(11)

“ ‘[D]ebt’ means liability on a claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(11). In the present case, the Plaintiff does not have a claim against the Debt- or for any payments of any kind; the Plaintiff has a right to receive payments from the United States Army.

Section 101(11) defines debt broadly enough to include criminal restitution obligations.

Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare v. Davenport · filed 1990-05-29(11)

We conclude, based on the language and structure of the Code, that restitution obligations are “debt[s]” as defined by §101(11).

A guarantor with a contingent right to payment against the debtor qualifies as a creditor under § 101.

Billings v. Key Bank of Utah (In Re Granada Inc.) · filed 1990-05-25(4)(A), (9)(A)

Larsen is a “creditor” of the estate because, as a guarantor of the partnership-CSB loans, he has a contingent right to payment against the partnerships that will become fixed upon his payment of their obligations on the loans.

Section 101 defines a debt as liability on a claim and includes claims that have not yet matured, allowing a creditor to seek a nondischargeability ruling before final liability is determined.

Custer v. Dobbs (In Re Dobbs) · filed 1990-05-30(4), (11)

The statute allows for a determination that "debts” are nondischargeable, and "debt” is defined in the Code as "liability on a claim”, 11 U.S.C. § 101(11). "Claim” is'defined in turn as a right to payment or other relief, whether matured or not. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4).

Section 101(4)(B) treats an equitable remedy for breach as a claim when the breach gives rise to a right to payment.

A.J. Lane & Co. v. BSC Group (In Re A.J. Lane & Co.) · filed 1990-06-13(4)(B)

The Debtor’s breach for which BSC has an equitable remedy is a breach which gives rise to a right to payment within the meaning of § 101(4)(B). The breach gives rise to BSC’s claim against the Debtor for $150,000.

Section 101(4)(A) includes a contingent right to payment in the definition of a claim, even when payment depends on services performed after the bankruptcy petition.

Michel v. Carter (In Re Carter) · filed 1990-06-22(4)(A)

The Code’s definition of claim expressly includes a right to payment that is contingent. ... Thus, at the time the bankruptcy petition was filed, Ludwig was a creditor, as defined by the Code, of the Carters and the bankruptcy court’s holding to the contrary is overruled.

Section 101(4) requires a right to payment for a mortgagee to hold a claim against the debtor; after discharge of the debtor’s personal liability, the surviving lien alone does not qualify.

In re Lawson · filed 1990-07-02(4)

After long and thoughtful consideration, this Court continues to uphold the majority view as set forth in the Binford case. In Binford, Judge Brown held that a Chapter 13 plan can only deal with creditors, i.e. those entities holding a claim against a debtor. Judge Brown refers to 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) which defines a claim as either a right to payment or a right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a ‘right to a payment’. ... The discharge of a recourse claim does not convert the obligation to a nonrecourse claim. The bank simply holds a lien against the debtor’s real estate which is not accompanied by any obligation, note, debt or right to payment upon the debtor’s right to performance.

Section 101(4) treats a former spouse’s right to direct pension payments as a claim against the party directly liable for those payments.

Tidwell v. Tegtmeyer (In Re Tidwell) · filed 1990-08-06(4)

Under the terms of the FSPA, and the regulations promulgated attendant thereto, the United States Air Force was directly liable to the creditor for the pension benefits which constituted her sole property thereby giving her a “claim” against the Air Force and not the debtor.

Section 101(9)(A) treats a lender as the debtor’s creditor when the lender assigns its receivable to its own banks only as collateral.

In Re Fricker · filed 1990-06-22(9)(A)

Clearly, any claim arising from the loan transaction of July 1, 1985, belongs to AAA and, under 11 U.S.C. § 101(9)(A), AAA, rather than the line banks, is a creditor of the Debtors.