11 U.S.C. § 101

Section 101 treats a loan co-signer with a contingent claim against the debtor as a creditor.

Browning v. Browning (In Re Browning) · filed 1983-07-18(9)(A)

A “creditor” is an entity with a claim against the debtor that existed at the time the bankruptcy petition was filed. 11 U.S.C. § 101(9)(A). A “claim” is a right to payment whether or not the right is contingent. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A). ... A co-signer of a loan is thus clearly a creditor under the Bankruptcy Code for he has a claim against the debtor which remains contingent so long as the debtor has not defaulted on the loan.

Section 101(9) defines a creditor as an entity that, in essence, has a pre-petition claim.

In Re Hefner · filed 1983-08-24(9)

A creditor under 11 U.S.C. § 501 is defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(9) as an entity that in essence has a pre-petition claim.

A refundable deposit is a debt under § 101(11) because even a contingent right to repayment is a claim under § 101(4).

Brooks Shoe Manufacturing Co. v. United Telephone Co. (In Re Naudain, Inc.) · filed 1983-09-21(4), (11)

Furthermore, we are convinced that the deposit constitutes a “debt” within the meaning of the Code. A “debt” is defined by the Code as “liability on a claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(11) (1979). A “claim” is defined by the Code as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured....” 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (1979). ... Consequently, we conclude that the debtor possessed a “right of payment” even though said right may have been contingent upon the debtor’s fulfillment of its obligations to United Telephone.

Section 101 treats an equitable cleanup obligation as a claim, and liability on that claim as a debt, when the debtor can perform only by paying money.

In Re William Lee Kovacs, Dba B & W Enterprises State of Ohio, Ex Rel., William J. Brown, Attorney General v. Le · filed 1983-09-22(4), (11)

Ohio futilely seeks support in the legislative history of § 101(4). ... Ohio claims there is no alternative right to payment, but when Kovacs failed to perform, state law gave a state receiver total control over all Kovacs’ assets. Ohio later used state law to try and discover Kovacs’ post-petition income and employment status in an apparent attempt to levy on his future earnings. In reality, the only type of performance in which Ohio is now interested is a money payment to effectuate the Chem-Dyne cleanup.

Under § 101(9), a mortgagee is not a debtor’s creditor when the debtor did not assume the mortgage and owes the mortgagee no other debt.

Karagianis v. G.F.C. Consumer Discount Co. · filed 1983-10-07(9)

There being no evidence that they were liable to G.F.C. on some other debt prior to the transfer being made, the Karagianis have failed to show that the transfer benefited a creditor, as defined at 11 U.S.C. ... § 101(9) (1978), ... and that the transfer was on account of a debt owed by them prior to the transfer being made.

Section 101(9)(A) treats a cosigner with a contingent claim under a hold-harmless agreement as a creditor even before the cosigner pays the debt.

Brown v. Brown (In Re Brown) · filed 1983-11-23(9)(A)

Mrs. Brown, as cosignor of the credit obligations for which debtor had agreed to hold her harmless, had a contingent claim against debtor while said credit obligations remained unpaid. To hold that a cosignor of incurred debts lacks standing to challenge dischargeability of the obligations, notwithstanding an existing hold harmless agreement to which the debtor is subject, would force the cosignor to pay all debts if standing to object to discharge were to be achieved. Such a result would be manifestly unjust, and this Court finds that Mrs. Brown is a “creditor” within the language and meaning of Code provisions with right to challenge the discharge of debtor’s assumed credit obligations.

Section 101 does not treat unknown, possible future asbestos claimants as creditors.

In Re Amatex Corp. · filed 1983-11-25

After careful review of all briefs and arguments, I have concluded that unknown, possible future asbestos claimants are not creditors under the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(4) defines a claim to include a right to payment that has been reduced to judgment.

Valente v. Savings Bank of Rockville · filed 1983-10-12(4)

“Claims,” according to 11 U.S.C. § 101(4), include any rights to payment, whether or not they have been “reduced to judgment.”

Section 101(4) defines “claim” broadly, so a bankruptcy court need not determine whether a claim is provable.

Hoenig v. Hoffman (In Re Hoffman) · filed 1983-10-19(4)

Now, under the broad definition of “claim” pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 101(4), the bankruptcy court need not concern itself with provability.

Section 101(4) includes constructive trust claims within the definition of “claim,” so they must be asserted within the period for claims against the bankruptcy estate.

Associated Container Transportation (Australia) Ltd. v. Black & Geddes, Inc. (In Re Black & Geddes, Inc.) · filed 1983-11-30(4)

According to 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) of the Code, “claim” includes any right to payment, whether or not reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliq-uidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unma-tured, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured. ... Based upon these provisions, I can only conclude that Congress intended that constructive trust claims be asserted within the period fixed for asserting all other claims against the bankruptcy estate.

Sections 101(4) and (11) define a debt as liability on a claim; withholding future benefits to recoup a prior payment does not create a debt when the recipient has no obligation to repay it.

Newman v. Veterans Administration (In Re John) · filed 1983-12-09(4), (11)

11 U.S.C. § 101(11) defines debt as liability on a claim. Claim is defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) as being a right to payment or a right to an equitable remedy. ... The fact of the debtor’s discharge is immaterial since the debtor never owed a debt to the VA and or the Army.

A dispute over repayment of a commission is a claim under § 101(4)(A), and the employer asserting it is a creditor under § 101(9)(A).

In Re Kopfstein · filed 1983-12-14(4)(A), (9)(A)

This monetary dispute between the parties does come within the provisions of the definition of a “claim” as defined under 11 U.S.C. section 101(4)(A) and Ohio Bell does come within the definition of a “creditor” as set forth under 11 U.S.C. section 101(9)(A).

Section 101(9) defines a creditor as an entity with a claim against the debtor or the debtor’s estate; restitution payable directly to individuals does not make the State a creditor.

Missouri v. Cannon (In Re Cannon) · filed 1983-12-20(9)

For purposes of this action, “creditor” means an entity that has a claim against the debtor or his estate. 11 U.S.C. § 101(9). ... However, it is clear that the debtor owes no debt to the State of Missouri. The order involved directs that restitution be made to eight named individuals, not to the State, and the State has not provided the Court with a citation to any particular section of the Missouri statutes authorizing it to act on behalf of private individuals in collecting the amount due them as a result of the above-mentioned order.

Section 101(4)(A) includes a contingent right to payment within the definition of a claim.

Briggs Transportation Co. v. Norwest Bank Minneapolis, N.A. (In Re Briggs Transportation Co.) · filed 1984-01-18(4)(A)

Thus, from the moment the letter of credit was issued, Norwest Minneapolis had a present claim against Briggs for reimbursement, contingent upon Norwest Minneapolis actually paying a conforming draft. Accordingly, the claim arose long before Briggs filed its Chapter 11 petition. Under the Bankruptcy Code a right to payment is considered a “claim”, “whether or not such right is ... contingent.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A). There is no dispute that Norwest Minneapolis was legally obligated to, and did, pay the letter of credit. Thus, the contingency occurred and the claim is now fixed.

Section 101(4)(A) includes a collective bargaining representative’s right to payment of unpaid wages under a collective bargaining agreement as a claim.

In re Altair Airlines, Inc. · filed 1984-02-14(4)(A)

Because we hold that a collective bargaining representative has a “right to payment” of unpaid wages within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(4), and thus is a creditor within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 1102(aXl), we need not address ALPA’s alternative argument that in any event 11 U.S.C. § 1102(c) authorizes its designation as a representative of the employee claimants.

A claim arises when a right to payment exists, even if payment is contingent on demand, and the corresponding liability is a debt.

Dickinson v. Meredith (In Re Wathen's Elevators, Inc.) · filed 1984-03-08(4), (11)

As of delivery Meredith had a right to payment (a “claim” arose); concurrently, Wathen’s became liable on that claim (a “debt” arose). Whether Meredith’s right to payment was contingent on his demand notice, and whether he chose to delay invoicing of that claim does not affect the underlying obligation.

Section 101(4) includes a collective bargaining representative’s right to payment of unpaid wages under a collective bargaining agreement as a claim.

In Re Altair Airlines, Inc. Appeal of Air Line Pilots Association, International · filed 1984-03-26(4)

Because we hold that a collective bargaining representative has a “right to payment” of unpaid wages within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(4), and thus is a creditor within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1), we need not address ALPA’s alternative argument that in any event 11 U.S.C. § 1102(c) authorizes its designation as a representative of the employee claimants.

Section 101 defines a creditor by its claim against the debtor, defines a claim to include a right to payment, and defines debt as liability on a claim.

Thomas W. Garland, Inc. v. Internal Revenue Service (In Re Thomas W. Garland, Inc.) · filed 1984-04-17(4), (9), (11)

A threshold issue which must be resolved is whether or not the IRS was at the time of the payments a “creditor” as that term is used in the Bankruptcy Code, and, conversely, whether or not the payments were made in payment of a “debt” to the IRS. ... “Debt” means liability on a claim. 11 U.S.C. § 101(11). ... Accordingly, I find that the IRS, upon its service of the Notice of Levy, became a creditor of Garland’s, and that Garland’s became indebted thereby to the IRS.

Section 101(11) defines a debt as liability on a claim, including a claim arising after the petition but before confirmation.

Orcon, Inc. v. Nevada Emergency Services, Inc. (In Re Nevada Emergency Services, Inc.) · filed 1984-05-11(11)

The Code defines "debt” as “liability on a claim,” § 101(11); therefore, postpetition preconfirmation claims are discharged by operation of § 1141, assuming all of the other conditions for discharge have been met.

Section 101(11) defines a debt as liability on a claim: an obligation payable from the debtor’s assets when it comes due.

In Re Central Hobron Associates · filed 1984-07-16(11)

11 U.S.C. § 101(11) defines “debt” as “liability on a claim”; that is further explained in the legislative history as “liability for repayment.” From such definitions, this court concludes that “debts” means obligations which, when they come due, will have to be paid out of the debtor’s assets.

Section 101(4)(B) includes an equitable remedy in the definition of a claim when the remedy gives rise to a right of payment.

Lawless v. Anderson (In Re Moore) · filed 1984-05-14(4)(B)

In any event, we must find that the defendant’s argument is invalid under the Code and that if it had some validity he would nonetheless lack standing to assert it. ... The Code defines a “Claim,” as inclusive of ... right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right of payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured.

Section 101(4) includes a damages claim disclosed to the bankruptcy court through an adversary proceeding, even if the claimant has not yet filed a formal proof of claim.

Matter of Pizza of Hawaii, Inc. · filed 1984-07-26(4)

Accordingly, this court concludes that Shakey’s has a claim within the meaning of ... 11 U.S.C. § 101(4).

A purchaser whose only interest in estate property arose after the bankruptcy petition was filed is not a creditor under § 101(9).

Vieland v. First Federal Savings Bank (In Re Vieland) · filed 1984-06-06(9)

When the debtors filed their petition Mr. Neverman had no interest in any of the property of the estate. Specifically he had no interest in the real property at issue. Any interest in the property which he now claims was acquired post-petition, at the sheriffs sale. Thus, in these proceedings, Mr. Neverman is not a “creditor” as that term is used under the Bankruptcy Code.

A party with no claim against the debtor at or before the order for relief is not a creditor under § 101(9)(A).

In Re Waipuna Trading Co., Inc. · filed 1984-08-30(9)(A)

11 U.S.C. § 101(9)(A) defines a creditor as an “entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor.” ... At the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor herein, Movant had no “claim” against Debtor herein and was, therefore, not a creditor of Debtor and not entitled to notice of the public auction in question.

Section 101 defines a debt as liability on a claim; the terms “debt” and “claim” are coextensive.

In Re John Clay and Co., Inc. · filed 1984-06-15(11)

11 U.S.C. § 101(11) states that a "debt” means liability on a claim. ... The terms "debt” and "claim” are coextensive.

Sections 101(4) and (11) define claim and debt so that an obligation to pay a third party under a divorce decree can be a debt to a former spouse.

Williams v. Holt (In Re Holt) · filed 1984-07-13(4), (11)

When the statute is viewed as a whole, there is no requirement of direct payability. Indeed, that is a strained construction of the sections involved, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(4), 101(11), and 523(a)(5).

A claim under § 101(4) includes an unmatured right to payment, so it can count in a § 553(b) insufficiency calculation before the debt matures.

Matter of Hecht · filed 1984-08-02(4)

Section 101(4) of the Code defines "claim" as a "right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured. . . ." [emphasis added]. The Code definition of "debt" is "liability on a claim." 11 U.S.C. § 101(11). In applying the Code definitions of "claim" and "debt" to the Code definition of "insufficiency" in section 553(b)(2), the only logical conclusion is that an insufficiency is the amount by which a creditor's right to payment, regardless of whether such right is matured or unmatured, exceeds a debt the creditor owes to the debtor.

Section 101(9) treats the United States as a creditor when it has a claim against the debtor.

In Re Braniff Airways, Inc. · filed 1984-08-07(9)

As an entity with a claim against Braniff, the United States is a creditor under 11 U.S.C. § 101(9) and 106(c)(1), entitled to claim the right of setoff pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 553.

Section 101(9)(A) defines a creditor as an entity with a claim against the debtor or the debtor’s estate; a state with no right to payment under a restitution order payable to individuals is not a creditor.

In Re William Anthony Cannon, Jane Cannon, Debtors. State of Missouri, Ex Rel., John D. Ashcroft, Attorney General v. Wi · filed 1984-08-21(9)(A)

A “creditor” is an entity that has a claim against the debtor or his estate. 11 U.S.C. § 101(9)(A) (1979). ... The State of Missouri was not a creditor to whom a debt was owed within the meaning of the bankruptcy code, accordingly, it lacked standing to challenge the discharge-ability of the debt.

Section 101 treats a foreclosing mortgagee as a creditor holding a claim while the debtor’s redemption period remains open.

In Re Rice · filed 1984-08-31(4), (9)

Home Federal was a creditor of the debtors in March of 1983. 11 U.S.C. § 101(9). Home Federal also had a “claim” against the debtors in March of 1983. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4).

A right to payment owed to utility customers is a bankruptcy claim that a public service commission may assert on their behalf.

In Re Jal Gas Co. · filed 1984-11-25(4)(A), (9)(A)

The PSC would therefore be a claimant in the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy definition of a claim is broad. For a claim to come within the jurisdiction of the Court it merely has to be a “right to payment.” The money at issue in this case is a right to payment by Jal Gas Company to its gas users which is being administered by the PSC.

Section 101’s definition of creditor includes an indenture trustee empowered to file claims for debenture holders and administer a trust.

In Re Charter Co. · filed 1984-09-04(9)(A)

The Code defines a creditor in pertinent part as an entity having a claim against the debtor at or before the entry of the order for relief. 11 U.S.C. § 101(9)(A). The terms of the indentures specifically empower the indenture trustees to file claims in bankruptcy on behalf of the beneficial owner (and to recover judgment against the obligor in event of default). Thus each of the indenture trustees has a claim within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(4). An “entity” includes “person, estate, trust, or governmental. unit.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(14). The indenture trustee administers, and is empowered to act on behalf of, a trust. Thus the statutory requisites for creditor status have been met by the indenture trustees.

Section 101(9) includes as a creditor an assignee whose prepetition right to collect rent gives it a claim against the debtor.

In Re Riverside Nursing Home · filed 1984-10-29(9)

There is no question that Citizens’ pre-petition right to collect rent from the debtor following the lessor-mortgagee’s default gives Citizens the status of a creditor who has a claim against the debtor that arose before the order for relief, as described in the definition of the term “creditor” in 11 U.S.C. § 101(9).

Section 101(4)(A) treats workers’ compensation benefits arising from a prepetition injury as a prepetition claim, even when weekly payments come due later.

Matter of US Truck Co., Inc. · filed 1984-09-07(4)(A)

After considering the expert testimony of the Chief Deputy Director of the Workers’ Compensation Bureau, the Court is satisfied that the Debtor is correct in emphasizing as the controlling event the pre-petition date of injury for purposes of both state and federal-bankruptcy law.

Section 101(4) covers a claim for payment when a debtor fails to remit a former spouse’s awarded share of pension funds.

Thomas v. Lyles (In Re Thomas) · filed 1984-12-11(4)

No debt is created by a provision in a property settlement agreement in the apportionment of military retirements benefits, for the debtor incurs no personal financial obligation. If the government does not appropriate these funds, the defendant would have no claim against the Debtor. His responsibility is simply to forward her share when and if received. When he fails to relay these funds, at that time a debt is created, which would support a claim against the debtor personally. See 11 U.S.C. Section 101(4).

A claim under § 101(4)(A) requires a right to payment, even if that right is contingent, unmatured, or disputed.

Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. · filed 1984-09-17(4)(A)

While all of these adjectives may describe A & B’s cause of action against the Frenvilles, the threshold requirement of a claim must first be met — there must be a “right to payment.”

Section 101 defines a claim as a right to payment and a debt as liability on a claim; the two describe the same liability.

In Re Morton · filed 1984-09-18(4), (11)

This court agrees that the definitions of “claim” and “debt” in the bankruptcy code reveal that they represent the same liability. A claim is essentially a right to payment. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4). A debt is a liability on a claim. 11 U.S.C. § 101(11).

Section 101 treats an unliquidated, disputed, or contingent right to payment as a claim, and liability on that claim as a debt.

Ducker v. Isaac Building Corp. (In Re Bridges Enterprises, Inc.) · filed 1984-12-20(4), (11)

Since the Code’s definition of “claim” includes unliquidated, disputed, and contingent rights to payment, and since “debt” is defined as liability on a claim, it is evident that in the instant case a debt existed at or before the date of litigation between Isaac and Bridges. Since the debt arose before the commencement of this case, the trustee may avoid the $5000 payment which secured the release of claims.

Section 101(4)(A) defines a claim broadly enough to include a request for punitive damages before liability is established.

Lisk v. Criswell (In Re Criswell) · filed 1984-11-01(4)(A)

Count Five of the plaintiffs’ complaint is a “claim” against the estate. ... The term “claim” is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A) to mean a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured .... ”

A claim requires a right to payment, even if that right is contingent, unmatured, or disputed.

In The Matter Of M. Frenville Co., Inc. · filed 1985-01-04(4)(A)

While all of these adjectives may describe A & B's cause of action against the Frenvilles, the threshold requirement of a claim must first be met--there must be a "right to payment."

Section 101(4)(B) can treat an equitable remedy for breach of a statutory duty as a claim when the breach gives rise to a right to payment.

Ohio v. Kovacs · filed 1985-01-09(4)(B)

There is no indication in the language of the statute that the right to performance cannot be a claim unless it arises from a contractual arrangement.

Under § 101, a debt is a liability on a claim and arises when the debtor becomes legally bound to pay.

In Re Gold Coast Seed Company, Debtor, M. Nolden, Trustee v. Van Dyke Seed Company, Inc. · filed 1985-01-16(11)

The Bankruptcy Code defines debt as a “liability on a claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(11). “Claim” in turn is defined as a “right to payment _” 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A). Thus a debt is incurred when a debtor becomes legally bound to pay.

A secured obligation can be a debt under § 101(11) even when the debtor has no personal liability, because the creditor has a claim against the debtor’s property.

Carter v. Homesley (In Re Strom) · filed 1985-02-04(11)

This state of the law, however, does not render the debtors’ obligations under the notes and deeds of trust any less an “antecedent debt.” Debt is defined in the Bankruptcy Code to be “liability on a claim.” (11 U.S.C. § 101(11)). A “claim” means a “right to payment ... (which may be) secured....” 11 U.S.C. § 101(4). Although the debtors had no personal liability for the purchase money obligation, the property of the debtors, i.e., the beach house, was subject to the liability evidenced by the notes and the deeds of trust.

Section 101(11) excludes a discharged obligation that was not reaffirmed from treatment as a debt in a later bankruptcy case unless the parties create a novation or a new debt.

Manufacturer's Hanover Mortgage Corp. v. Fryer (In Re Fryer) · filed 1985-02-28(11)

Thus, although a lien may survive, 11 U.S.C. § 506(d), a discharged debt which was not properly reaffirmed is not cognizable as “debt” in a subsequent proceeding without either a novation of the prior obligation or the creation of an entirely new debt. 11 U.S.C. § 101(11). ... The Court is satisfied that the above quote accurately states the law.

Section 101(4)(A) includes a contractual right to payment as a claim when the debtor becomes legally bound, even if payment depends on a future event.

Kallen v. Litas · filed 1985-03-14(4)(A)

Although the existence or amount of the instant debt depended on the existence or amount of the settlement of the forcible detainer action, a provable contingent claim came into existence upon the signing of the retainer agreement on October 11, 1981, when the debtor first became legally bound to pay for the firm’s legal fees.

A mortgagee whose right to payment was discharged in Chapter 7 does not hold a claim under § 101(4) merely because its lien survives.

In Re Brown · filed 1985-03-19(4)

In the present case the mortgagee is not a creditor within the meaning of that term as defined in the Bankruptcy Code. Its right to payment pursuant to a contractual arrangement with debtor disappeared upon the prior discharge granted to debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 727. Nor does mortgagee hold a claim within the alternative meaning of § 101(4), the right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance; there is no extant contract as to which mortgagee is entitled to relief.

Section 101 defines debt as liability on a claim and claim to include a right to payment; these definitions support treating an entire fraudulently incurred debt as nondischargeable.

BIRMINGHAM TRUST NATIONAL BANK, a National Banking Association, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John P. CASE, Jr., Defendant-Appe · filed 1985-03-25(4), (11)

First, 11 U.S.C. § 523 states that the “debt” is riot discharged. “Debt” is defined as “liability on a claim,” 11 U.S.C. § 101(11), and claim is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) as: ... In the instant case, the plain language of the statute suggests that dis-chargeability is an “all or nothing” proposition.

Section 101(4)(A) includes unmatured, unliquidated, and contingent rights to payment in the definition of a claim.

Baldwin-United Corp. v. Named (In Re Baldwin-United Corp.) · filed 1985-04-10(4)(A)

This is so because a “right to payment” under the definition of “glaim” includes obligations which are neither matured, nor liquidated, nor fixed.

Section 101(9)(A) treats an ex-spouse contingently liable on marital debts as a creditor even if the debtor did not list him in her schedules and he filed no proof of claim.

Hunn v. Hunn (In Re Hunn) · filed 1985-04-29(9)(A)

While Bankruptcy Rule 3002(a) clearly requires a proof of claim to be filed in order for the claim to be allowed for purposes of the claimant sharing in distribution in the estate, there is no suggestion in the statutes or the rules that a claim ceases to exist if not supported by a timely proof of claim. Title 11, U.S.C. § 101(9)(A) defines a creditor simply as an entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the Order for Relief concerning the debtor. There is no reference to schedules or proofs of claim.

Section 101(4) excludes a shareholder’s interest in the value of her stock from the definition of a claim because it is neither a right to payment nor a right to an equitable remedy.

In Re J.M. Check Cashing Corp. · filed 1985-05-14(4)

Her claim for the liquidated value of her stock does not come within the scope of a claim as defined in § 101(4) of the Bankruptcy Code. As a shareholder she has an interest in the corporation and not a “right to payment” or a “right to an equitable remedy” as required by that subsection.

Section 101(9) requires an entity to have a claim to qualify as a creditor; a claim requires a right to payment.

National Mediation Board v. Continental Airlines Corp. (In Re Continental Airlines Corp.) · filed 1985-05-31(9)

Since neither the Board nor the Teamsters derive any “right to payment” from these NMB proceedings, they are not “creditors” from whom the automatic stay is designed to protect Continental.

Section 101(9) defines a creditor to include an entity with a claim against the debtor that arose by the order for relief.

In Re Bell & Beckwith · filed 1985-06-04(9)

In that regard, the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 101(9) states in pertinent part: ... “(9) “creditor” means— ... (A) entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debt- or;” ... Under these provisions, it is readily apparent that the customers are creditors of the estate, and that as creditors their interests may be represented by the Trustee.

Section 101(9) excludes a person whose wrongful-death claim arose after the bankruptcy petition from the definition of a creditor.

Matter of Tonty · filed 1985-06-24(9)

Accordingly, neither Paul E. O’Brien, Honeywell, Inc. or any other person or entity sought to be added to the debtor’s schedules was an “entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order of relief” under the definition prescribed by 11 U.S.C. § 101(9) and Judge Adams’ interesting discussion in Frenville Co. Inc., et al., supra.

Section 101 treats a state agency authorized to recover excess rents for tenants as a creditor holding a claim.

In re Berry Estates, Inc. · filed 1985-06-04(9)(A)

Indeed, this governmental unit is the only entity authorized under state law to recover excess rents collected by New York landlords in violation of the ETPA. As such, it is entitled to the status of a creditor, as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(9)(A), holding a claim within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(4).

A person who files a proof of claim qualifies as a creditor under Section 101(9)(A).

Ross v. National Bank of Commerce (In Re Auto-Pak, Inc.) · filed 1985-06-20(9)(A)

Given the broad definition of claim in section 101(4)(A), a proof of claim filed pursuant to section 501 is sufficient to qualify the filing person as a creditor.

Section 101(11) defines debt as liability on a claim; a pension award creates no debt between former spouses when the United States alone is liable for payment.

Hall v. Hall (In Re Hall) · filed 1985-06-24(11)

The rights and responsibilities created by the property division resulted in no debt between Mr. Hall and Mrs. Hall, as the term debt is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(11).

An obligation barred by the applicable statute of limitations is not an enforceable claim or debt for purposes of a dischargeability objection.

General Electric Credit Corp. v. Dunn (In Re Dunn) · filed 1985-07-02(4), (11)

Debt is described in 11 U.S.C. § 101(11) as a liability on a claim (emphasis added). Claim is defined under 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) as a right to payment or right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance (emphasis added). ... Therefore, Dunn’s obligation, if any, to GECC is not a “claim” or “debt” to which an objection to discharge may be made under 11 U.S.C. § 523 since such a claim is not enforceable and not in need of discharge.

Section 101(9)(A) defines a creditor as an entity with a claim against the debtor; a class or its representative is not a creditor merely because class members have claims.

Matter of Baldwin-United Corp. · filed 1985-08-07(9)(A)

A “creditor” is defined as an “entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(9)(A). An “entity” is then defined as a “person, estate, trust, and governmental unit.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(14). “Person” is defined in § 101(33) as including “individual, partnership, and corporation, but does not include governmental unit.” Nowhere in the Code is “creditor” defined as a “class” or “representative” of a group or class.

Section 101(9)(A) treats a party owed a debt by the debtor as a creditor, including when the debt is for reimbursement of tax.

Drabkin v. Finalco, Inc. (In Re Auto-Train Corp.) · filed 1985-08-22(9)(A)

The contractual obligation and debt, therefore, ran from the Debtor to Finalco, and not from the Debtor to the District of Columbia. The Court is satisfied that Finalco is a creditor within the meaning of section 101(9)(A), and that the transfer was to it qua creditor of the Debtor, thus bringing the transaction within section 547(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Under § 101’s definitions of debt and claim, a debt arises when a creditor gains a right to payment, even if payment is not yet due.

Ramy Seed Co. v. Habstritt Farms, Inc. (In Re Ramy Seed Co.) · filed 1985-08-16

The Bankruptcy Code defines “debt” as “liability on a claim”. 11 U.S.C. § 101(11). The Code further defines “claim” as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is ... matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, [or] equitable ...” 11 U.S.C. § 101(4). A reading of these two definitions in conjunction with § 547(c)(2)(B) compels the Court to conclude that Debtor’s debt to Defendant was “incurred” when Defendant shipped the seed to Peterson Seed Company on or about December 23, 1981.

Section 101(11)'s definition of debt covers a contractual right to payments from production proceeds when the agreement conveys no property interest.

In re Simasko Production Co. · filed 1985-08-28(11)

I, therefore, find that the settlement agreement did not convey a “production payment” to Claimants. The settlement agreement created a debt, as that term is defined in 11 U.S.C. 101(11), between Simp-eo and Claimants. No independent interest in real property has been conveyed.

A contingent right to payment is a claim even if the condition for payment is satisfied after the bankruptcy case begins.

In Re Roberts & Porter, Inc. · filed 1985-09-04(4)(A)

Section 101(4)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A) defines a “claim” as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is * * * contingent, * * * unmatured, * * * or unsecured.” On May 16, 1983, when Debtor’s Chapter 11 proceedings commenced, Petitioner held a contingent claim against Debtor’s estate. This contingency was removed on May 18, 1983, on the thirtieth day of Roberson’s employment by the Debtor.

Section 101(4) includes an equitable claim that can be reduced to a money judgment, even when the claimant requests an injunction.

Dade County School District v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In Re Johns-Manville Corp.) · filed 1985-09-26(4)

As in Kovacs and Robinson, the Schools Committee’s claim is one which can be reduced to a money judgment. Thus, their adversary proceeding is not an appropriate vehicle for adjudicating the claim.

Section 101(4) includes a statutory right to reimbursement for environmental cleanup as a claim even when the cleanup has not occurred by the bankruptcy filing date.

In Re Stevens · filed 1985-10-09(4)

It is the right of the State of Maine to reimbursement, as provided by state statute, that gives rise to the claim. The fact that as of the date of filing of the bankruptcy petition the hazardous waste had not yet been removed from the debtors’ property does not affect the underlying right to reimbursement prescribed by the statute and the claim arising thereby.

Section 101(4)(A) defines a claim to include contingent or unmatured rights to payment, even when a related cause of action has not accrued.

Baldwin-United Corp. v. Paine Webber Group, Inc. (In Re Baldwin-United Corp.) · filed 1985-10-22(4)(A)

The legislative history of this definition suggests that Congress did not intend to equate a bankruptcy claim with an accrued cause of action.

Section 101(4) includes a right to payment as a claim even before it is fixed or reduced to judgment.

Seymour Ostrow, P.C. v. Schwartz (In Re Schwartz) · filed 1985-10-03(4)

A “claim” is defined in § 101(4) as a right to payment or a right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment. ... That judgment was not entered is inconsequential. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4).

Section 101(4)(B) treats an equitable remedy for breach as a claim when the injury can be adequately compensated by a monetary award.

In Re Cox · filed 1985-10-15(4)(B)

If the state court finds that Executone is entitled to injunctive relief against debtor then this relief would not be a “claim” within the meaning of § 101(4)(B). However, if the state court finds that Executone’s injury can be adequately compensated by a monetary award then this monetary award would be a claim within the meaning of § 101(4)(B) which would be discharged under § 727(b). The Court finds that Executone is entitled to limited relief from the discharge injunction to pursue injunctive relief against debtor.

Under Section 101’s definitions of claim and debt, an obligation to pay a former spouse a share of retirement benefits arises when each payment becomes due.

In Re Earl William Teichman, Debtor. Barbara F. Teichman, Cross-Appellant v. Earl William Teichman, Cross-Appellee · filed 1985-10-25(4), (11)

The husband is under no obligation to pay his former wife until the Air Force pays him; therefore, a debt does not arise under the Code until each payment is due. See 11 U.S.C. Secs. 101(4), (11).

A claim for pension withdrawal liability arises as employees earn and vest pension rights, rather than when the employer withdraws from the plan.

In Re Pulaski Highway Express, Inc. · filed 1986-01-09(4)(A)

As demonstrated above, it is the accrual of rights through labor by employees not the event of withdrawal which determines when the claim arises for bankruptcy purposes.

Section 101 treats a debt as arising when the debtor first becomes obligated to pay, even if the obligation is unmatured or contingent.

Henderson v. Allred (In Re Western World Funding, Inc.) · filed 1985-10-29(11)

The accepted view as to when a debt is incurred accords with the definitions of “debt” and “claim” found in Code § 101. A debt is incurred when the debtor first becomes obligated to pay.

Section 101(11) includes a criminal restitution obligation as a debt when any person or entity has a right to receive payment from the debtor.

In Re ROBINSON · filed 1985-10-29(11)

We think the interpretation that more faithfully reflects Congress's intent is the one we adopt here: that any right to the payment of restitution is a claim within the meaning of the Code; and that if any person or entity has a right to receive a payment of restitution from the bankruptcy debtor, the obligor has a debt within the meaning of the Code.

Section 101(4)'s definition of a claim includes interest accrued on the underlying right to payment before bankruptcy.

Matter of Keller & Katkowsky, PC · filed 1985-11-08(4)

Hence, the court found a claim as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) includes the right of payment as well as the interest accruing thereon. ... We find the rule adopted In re: Treister applies to the facts presented here. The pre-petitioned interest of $776.26 is a priority claim under 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(6) and is to be treated consistent therewith.

Section 101(9) includes a lender with a prepetition right to payment as a creditor even if its claim is unliquidated or disputed.

NCNB Financial Services, Inc. v. Shumate (In Re Shumate) · filed 1985-11-12(9)

NCNB’s right to payment, therefore, is un-liquidated and thus, even if disputed, satisfies the definition of claim set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 101(4). Accordingly, because such right to payment arose prior to the filing of debtor’s bankruptcy petition, NCNB meets the definition of creditor under 11 U.S.C. § 101(9).

Section 101(9) defines a creditor as an entity with a claim against the debtor that arose at or before the order for relief; an entity with no claim is not a creditor.

In Re Rath Packing Co. · filed 1985-11-27(9)

Under the Bankruptcy Code, a creditor is an “entity which has a claim against the debtor that arose at or before the order for relief concerning the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(9). Stated conversely, an entity with no claim is not a creditor.

Section 101(9) treats a transferee who pays under a property purchase contract as a creditor because the payment gives the transferee a claim against the transferor.

Grover v. Gulino · filed 1985-12-30(9)

... interest, obtains a claim against the trans-feror and thus becomes a creditor under the Bankruptcy Code.

Under Section 101(9), a mortgagee with no claim on a discharged promissory note is no longer a creditor for a later Chapter 13 plan.

In Re McKinstry · filed 1986-01-07(9)

The mortgagee is, therefore, no longer a creditor as defined in 11 USC Section 101(9), for it has no claim on the promissory note accompanying the mortgage.

Section 101(4)(A) includes a contingent right to contractual damages as a claim when the right to payment arose before the bankruptcy petition, even if the breach occurred afterward.

In Re Peltz · filed 1985-11-27(4)(A)

Consequently, the “right to payment” on Apperson’s claim for damages arose on the day Apperson and debtor entered into their agreement but was contingent upon the happening of an event, i.e., debtor’s breach of the covenant not to compete. Since the “right to payment” arose pre-petition even though the technical “breaching day” occurred post-petition, Apperson’s claim for damages is discharged under 11 U.S.C. § 727(b).

Under § 101, a person with a claim against the debtor is a creditor even if someone else may also be liable for the debt.

Ross v. Penny (In Re Villa Roel, Inc.) · filed 1985-12-12(4), (9)

This obligation gave the defendants a “claim” against the debtor which in turn made them creditors of the debtor.

Section 101(4) defines a claim to include a right to payment even if it is contingent or unmatured.

Matter of Baldwin-United Corp. · filed 1985-12-13(4)

The concepts of provability and allowability were eliminated in favor of an all-encompassing definition of “claim,” which includes any right to payment regardless of how contingent or unmatured it might be.

Section 101(4) treats an unliquidated and unmatured right to payment as a claim.

In Re Silver Wheel Freightlines, Inc. · filed 1985-12-20(4)

Based upon the definition of a “claim” in 11 U.S.C. § 101(4), the Board at the time of filing chapter 11 had an unliquidated and unmatured right to accelerate payment when the debtor permanently shut down.

Section 101(4) includes contingent contractual rights to payment within the definition of a bankruptcy claim.

Matter of Hadden · filed 1986-01-22(4)

However, the language of section 101(4) shows a definite intent to include claims which are contingent in nature. ... Thus at the time this bankruptcy case was filed, Stettler’s contractual right to receive attorney’s fees previously incurred was sufficient to constitute a claim in bankruptcy.

Section 101(4)(A) includes contingent indemnity and contribution claims rooted in prepetition conduct, even if the cause of action becomes cognizable under state law only after the petition is filed.

In Re Johns-Manville Corp. · filed 1986-02-11(4)(A)

Thus, for federal bankruptcy purposes, a prepetition “claim” may well encompass a cause of action that, under state law, was not cognizable until after the bankruptcy petition was filed.

Section 101 defines a creditor as an entity with a claim against the debtor; a class representative is not a creditor merely because it represents claimants.

In Re Electronic Theatre Restaurants Corp. · filed 1986-01-15(9)(A)

A “creditor” is defined as an “entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(9)(A). An “entity” is then defined as a “person, estate, trust, and governmental unit.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(14). “Person” is defined in section 101(33) as including “individual, partnership and corporation, but does not include governmental unit.” Nowhere in the Code is “creditor” defined as a “class” or “representative” of a group or class.

Section 101(4) includes debts that are not yet due within the definition of a claim.

In Re Rushton · filed 1986-01-22(4)

And it can make little difference that the debts to be paid under the plan are not yet due and payable. They may be estimated and included, since they are “claims” (11 U.S.C. § 101(4)), which may be allowed.

Section 101(11)'s definition of debt, read with sections 523 and 727, prevents a court from treating part of a debt as dischargeable and another part as nondischargeable.

Commercial Securities Co. v. McCall (In Re McCall) · filed 1986-01-29(11)

The definition of the word debt (11 U.S.C. § 101(11)) and the plain language of sections 523 and 727 preclude this Court from rendering some “part” of the debt dis-chargeable and some “part” nondischargeable.

Section 101(11) treats military pay advances against future wages as debts when they create a liability on a claim.

United States v. Wall (In Re Wall) · filed 1986-02-13(11)

The Bankruptcy Code defines “debt” as a liability on a claim. 11 U.S.C. Section 101(11). ... The statute states that the unliquidated amount remains a debt leading to the inescapable conclusion that there was a debt incurred when the advance was paid.

Section 101(11) defines a debt as liability on a claim, including an obligation whose amount cannot be calculated until after the bankruptcy filing.

Matter of Nickerson & Nickerson, Inc. · filed 1986-02-25(11)

Bankruptcy Code § 101(11) states that a “debt” means liability on a claim. ... A & A, as agent for the insurer, owes a debt to Nickerson for unearned prepetition premiums, the amount of which could not be calculated until after the bankruptcy petition was filed.

Contract for deed purchasers who are the equitable owners of property do not qualify as creditors or indenture trustees merely because the debtor sells the vendor’s interest.

Horton v. Rehbein (In Re Rehbein) · filed 1986-03-07(9), (4), (25)

The Appellants have argued in the alternative that even if a Contract for Deed is not executory, they are entitled to notice as creditors or as indenture trustees under 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(9), 101(4), and 101(25). ... However, for purposes of bankruptcy law, the Appellants are the equitable owners of the property. ... It is the vendor whose interest is equivalent to that of a lien. ... Thus, no notice to Appellants was required.

A person whose asbestos injury has not yet manifested has no claim under § 101(4)(A) and is not a creditor under § 101(9)(A).

In Re Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc. · filed 1986-03-11(4)(A), (9)(A)

Although the Court is aware that the potential claimants do not have a claim against the debtor as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A) nor are they creditors of the debtor as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(9)(A), ... this is not fatal to the debtor’s application.

Section 101(9) includes a union with a claim against the debtor in its definition of creditor.

Matter of Enduro Stainless, Inc. · filed 1986-03-19(9)

This court agrees with the analysis set forth by the Third Circuit and holds that the USWA is a creditor eligible to participate on Enduro’s unsecured creditors’ committee.

Section 101(4) and (11) include a criminal restitution obligation within the definition of debt when the state has an enforceable right to payment.

Heincy v. Superior Court of the State of California (In Re Heincy) · filed 1986-03-26(4) and (11)

The Court concludes that the restitution order of the State criminal court in this case created a debt as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) and (11).

Section 101(4) defines a claim as a right to payment or an equitable remedy for breach that gives rise to a right to payment; a foreclosed lender with no right to payment has no claim.

In re Stage I Land Co. · filed 1986-04-01(4)

A claim is defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) as a right to payment or a right to an equitable remedy for a breach of performance that gives rise to a right to payment. At the time that the petitions were filed in these cases, HUD had no right to payment, and it has no right to payment now. ... Accordingly, HUD has no claim and §§ 1123 and 1124 are inapplicable.

Section 101(4)(B) treats a breach of an ordinary commercial contract as a claim actionable in bankruptcy.

Corporacion De Servicios Medicos Hospitalarios De Fajardo v. Izquierdo Mora (In Re Corporacion De Servicios Medicos Hosp · filed 1986-04-15(4)(B)

The Supreme Court decision in Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 105 S.Ct. 705, 83 L.Ed.2d 649 (1985), is authority for the proposition that the breach of an ordinary commercial contract gives rise to a claim actionable in bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(4)(B). The Kovacs rationale, seen in light of the case at bar, allows a conclusion that the Department had a claim in bankruptcy which it sought to enforce through the local injunction.

Section 101(4) includes unliquidated and disputed claims in the definition of a bankruptcy claim.

In Re Southern Commodity Corp. · filed 1986-04-30(4)

The term “claim” for bankruptcy purposes is not restricted to liquidated or undisputed claims. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4).

Section 101(4)(A) includes contingent, unliquidated, and unmatured rights to payment within a claim.

Coppa v. Security Bank of Nevada (In Re Taylor Motors) · filed 1986-05-15(4)(A)

A “claim” is a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured....” 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A). ... Security’s claims against the debtor under contracts purchased pursuant to the Agreement were unliquidated, contingent, or unmatured when Taylor’s bankruptcy petition was filed. Nevertheless, Security’s claims on the contracts purchased from Taylor are clearly prepetition claims.

Section 101(4) defines a claim as a right to payment or an equitable remedy for breach of performance that gives rise to a right to payment.

Success Tool & Manufacturing Co. v. United States Department of Treasury (In Re Success Tool & Manufacturing Co.) · filed 1986-05-27(4)

A “claim” is defined in the Bankruptcy Code as a right to payment or the right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance which gives rise to a right to payment. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4). Under this definition, the Debtor’s petition for injunc-tive relief does not constitute a claim.

Section 101(4) includes a contingent right to payment in the definition of a claim, so a commission earned before the petition can be a prepetition claim even if payment is due later.

Zerodec MegaCorp. v. Terstep of Texas, Inc. (In Re Zerodec MegaCorp.) · filed 1986-04-08(4)

Ergo, all doubt as to the time that a claim arose, should clearly be resolved in favor of finding it a prepetition claim. Applying this law to the case before us, we conclude that federal law provides an adequate and proper basis on which to conclude that Terstep’s commission is a prepetition claim.

Section 101 defines a debt as liability on a claim and a claim as a right to payment; without a right to payment from the debtor, there is no debt to discharge.

Vazquez v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare · filed 1986-04-11(11), (4)(A)

Pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code, therefore, no debt between appellants and the Commonwealth existed that could be discharged. The Code defines a debt as "liability on a claim." 11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(11). "Claim" means a right to payment. Id. at Sec. 101(4)(A). The Commonwealth having no right to receive payment from appellants, it could not, and did not, file a claim against appellants. No debt existing between the parties, the Commonwealth was entitled to retain the reimbursement for the interim assistance payments made to appellants.

Section 101 defines a debt as liability on a claim, which requires a right to payment from the debtor.

Vazquez v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania · filed 1986-04-11(11)

Pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code, therefore, no debt between appellants and the Commonwealth existed that could be discharged. The Code defines a debt as “liability on a claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(11). “Claim” means a right to payment. Id. at § 101(4)(A). The Commonwealth having no right to receive payment from appellants, it could not, and did not, file a claim against appellants.

Section 101(11)’s definition of debt includes a district court judgment for money.

McCullough v. Suter (In Re Suter) · filed 1986-04-29(11)

The district court judgment here clearly is a debt for money under the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(9)(A) treats a federal agency enforcing statutory obligations in the public interest as a creditor in its own right.

In Re Evans Products Co. · filed 1986-05-09(9)(A)

As a federal agency seeking to enforce statutory obligations in the public interest, the FTC is a creditor within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code.

A claim for prepetition negligence arises when the negligent act occurs, even if the victim discovers the injury after the bankruptcy petition.

Roach v. Edge (In Re Edge) · filed 1986-05-09(4)(A)

In conclusion, a right to payment and thus a claim arose at the time of the debtors’ prepetition misconduct.

A criminal restitution obligation is a debt for bankruptcy purposes.

Everett C. Turner Realtors v. Carroll (In Re Carroll) · filed 1986-05-21(11), (4)

the court held that a criminal restitution obligation was a “debt” for bankruptcy purposes. Accordingly, the restitution obligation was subject to the various discharge provisions of the code. This court agrees.

Section 101 defines a claim to include a right to payment that has not matured, so an unmatured child support obligation can be a debt.

Baddin v. Olson (In Re Olson) · filed 1986-07-03(4), (11)

Thus, even Debtor’s unmatured child support obligations may be considered an antecedent debt; they were created by the Judgment and Decree prior to the transfer, and the mere fact that Defendant’s entitlement to the payments had not yet matured did not make them any less a “claim” as held by Defendant and a “debt” as imposed on Debtor.

Collectible real property taxes are a claim and debt under § 101(4) and (11), despite peculiarities of state law.

Hester v. Powell (In Re Hester) · filed 1986-08-05(4), (11)

Not every peculiarity or technicality of state law is controlling in deciding what is a “debt” or “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code’s definitions. ... The defendant admits that the taxes are within those definitions by admitting that they are collectible from the debtors. As a practical matter, real property taxes are a debt owed by the property owner and are routinely treated as such in bankruptcy cases.

Section 101(4) includes a creditor’s encumbrance against estate property as a claim even when the debtor has no personal liability.

In Re Lewis · filed 1986-07-18(4)

In light of the breadth of the definition of the term “claim”, we hold that a claim may include a creditor’s encumbrance against property of the estate although there is no in personam liability against the debtor.

Section 101(4)(A) includes unpaid casino license fees within the definition of a claim.

Elsinore Shore Associates v. Casino Control Commission (In Re Elsinore Shore Associates) · filed 1986-08-29(4)(A)

Clearly, the unpaid fees at issue are claims under 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A).

Section 101(11) defines a debt as liability on a claim; without an allowable claim against a debtor, there is no debt owed by that debtor.

Hamilton v. Betz (In Re Betz) · filed 1986-08-08(11)

If a creditor cannot assert an allowable claim against a debtor, there can be no debt from which liability “on a claim” can arise.

Section 101(4)(A) treats a right to payment as a claim when the acts giving rise to alleged liability occur, even if a cause of action accrues later under state law.

In Re AH Robins Co., Inc. · filed 1986-08-25(4)(A)

Accordingly, this Court concludes that women, who were allegedly injured by the Daikon Shield, have a “right to payment” which arises when the acts giving rise to the alleged liability were performed.

An equitable remedy for breach of performance is a claim if the breach also gives rise to a right to payment.

In Re Aslan · filed 1986-09-05(4)(B)

Therefore it is clear that the final version, as passed and signed into law, is intended to include as a claim a right to an equity remedy for breach of performance if the breach gives rise to an alternative right to payment.

Section 101(4) includes a state's contingent claim for environmental cleanup costs before the state has spent funds.

In Re Distrigas Corp. · filed 1986-09-26(4)

Thus, New Jersey has a contingent administrative claim within the definition of 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) and could object under 11 U.S.C. ... § 1126(a) to any plan that did not afford it the treatment due under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(A), otherwise, it is not a voting class under 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(1).

Section 101(4) includes contingent or unmatured claims for contribution or indemnification even when they were not yet enforceable under state law when the bankruptcy petition was filed.

In Re Black · filed 1986-11-18(4)

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that movants’ claim against the debtor is a contingent or unmatured claim within the purview of § 101(4), which was not yet cognizable under state law at the date of the bankruptcy filing.

Section 101(4) defines a claim broadly enough that a court’s power to issue a stay under § 105 is not limited to money judgments.

Norwesco Development Corp. v. Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources (In Re Norwesco Development Corp.) · filed 1986-10-17(4)

A stay under 11 U.S.C. § 105 is not so limited. It is governed by the broader definition of a claim under the Code. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4).

Section 101(4)'s definition of “claim” as a “right to payment” includes pre-petition interest on a tax debt.

In Re Reich · filed 1986-10-28(4)

This Court agrees with the court in Razorback that the issue is not whether pre-petition interest is part of a “claim,” because it is clear that interest falls within the broad definition of a “claim” as a “right to payment” contained in 11 U.S.C. § 101(4).

Section 101 includes an entity with a prepetition disputed right to payment within the definition of creditor.

In Re Charter Co. · filed 1986-12-29(4)(A), (9)(A)

A creditor in the bankruptcy context is “an entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(9)(A). This claim can be a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A). ... Pemex certainly satisfies the statutory definition of creditor. Pemex asserts a disputed claim against CCOC which claim arose before the order of relief was entered on April 20, 1984.

Section 101 defines a debt as liability on a claim and includes disputed rights to payment within claims; a disputed claim can still be liquidated.

In Re Burgat · filed 1986-12-30(4), (11)

A “debt” is defined to mean a “liability on a claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(11). A “claim” is defined very broadly as a “right to payment” regardless of whether the right is “liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(4). Thus, in defining a “claim,” Congress has clearly distinguished between “liquidated” claims and “disputed” claims.

Section 101 treats an unliquidated right to payment as a claim and liability on that claim as a debt.

Langston v. Hunt (In re Brints Cotton Marketing, Inc.) · filed 1986-12-30(4)(A), (11)

A “debt” means liability on a claim, 11 U.S.C. § 101(11) and a “claim” means a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured,” 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A). Thus, the debt arose at the time the warehouse receipts were delivered to BCMI and it makes no difference that the debt was unliquidated because the contract had not been called at that time.

Section 101(4) includes unliquidated, unmatured, and contingent rights to payment as claims, but the claimant must establish that a right to payment exists.

In Re Amburgey · filed 1987-01-05(4)

The question is not whether Short’s right to payment was unliquidated, unmatured, or contingent as of April 22, 1985, for if it were merely unliquidated, unmatured, or contingent, she would still have a claim for the purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 101(4). The question is, given the law of subrogation and the right to contribution as discussed above, whether Short had any right to payment at all as of April 22, 1985. Short did not present sufficient evidence to establish that her right to payment existed as of April 22, 1985.

Section 101(4) includes unliquidated and unmatured rights to payment as claims, allowing a tax liability on prepetition income to be treated as a prepetition claim before its exact amount is known.

Matter of OPM Leasing Services, Inc. · filed 1987-01-20(4)

Indiana’s argument that because it had no right to collect the tax covered by the disputed claim prior to the filing date, that claim is entitled to an administrative expense priority, is disingenuous. The definition of a claim includes a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured_” 11 U.S.C. § 101(4).

Section 101(4) includes a disputed right to payment within the definition of a claim.

Stinehart v. Mid-American Bank & Trust Co. (In re Firsdon) · filed 1987-01-21(4)

However, as a substantive matter, the Court notes that regardless of whether or not the Plaintiff's action against the Debtor is found to be meritorious, the Plaintiff will, as a result of the case, only have a claim against the Debtor for the value of the allegedly converted grain.

Section 101(4) broadly defines a claim to include a criminal restitution obligation that gives rise to a right to payment.

Commonwealth, Department of Public Welfare v. Johnson-Allen (In Re Johnson-Allen) · filed 1987-01-23(4)

The question is whether the Court’s dictum in Kelly v. Robinson in which it states that it has “serious doubts whether Congress intended to make criminal penalties ‘debts’ within the meaning of § 101(4)” of the Bankruptcy Code, 107 S.Ct. at 361, casts a sufficient shadow to overrule all prior decisions and the policy arguments expressed herein-before to the contrary. We think not.

Section 101(4) expands the kinds of rights that may be asserted as bankruptcy claims; it does not determine how those claims must be filed.

Huddleston v. Holland (In Re American Reserve Corp.) · filed 1987-01-23(4)

By expanding the definition of a claim, Congress expanded the kinds of rights which may be asserted in bankruptcy proceedings. The issue here, however, is not which legal obligations may be dealt with in the bankruptcy court, but rather the procedural mechanisms for asserting those rights.

Section 101(4)(A)’s definition of a claim as a right to payment includes prepetition interest on a tax debt.

In Re Young · filed 1987-02-03(4)(A)

“Claim” is defined by 11 U.S.C. Section 101(4)(A) as any “right to payment.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A). The pre-pe-tition interest assessment is an integral portion of and indeed is “for” the underlying principal tax liability for the applicable taxable year(s).

Section 101(4) defines a claim broadly enough to include a right to payment for pre-petition interest due on unpaid taxes.

In Re Stonecipher Distributors, Inc. · filed 1987-02-03(4)

“Claim,” as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(4), means a “right to payment.” This Court now concludes that the broad definition of “claim” includes a right to payment for the interest due.

Section 101(9) includes a party with a contingent indemnity claim against the debtor within the definition of creditor.

Harrison v. United Liberty Life Insurance (In Re H & S Transportation Co.) · filed 1987-02-17(9)

The court finds that United and Brent are creditors. The trustee established the existence of liens on United’s and Brent’s boats. These liens made United and Brent secondarily liable on the fuel debts if the debtor failed to pay. As a result of this liability, United and Brent held contingent indemnity claims against the debtor. These claims are sufficient to classify United and Brent as creditors under the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(4)(B) treats a right to specific performance as a bankruptcy claim only if the breach also gives rise to a right to payment.

Rusiski v. Pribonic (In Re Pribonic) · filed 1987-03-05(4)(B)

Where a creditor holds a right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance (e.g., a decree for specific performance of a land sale contract), that person will have a “claim” for bankruptcy purposes only if the specific performance decree may be satisfied by an alternative award of monetary damages.

Section 101(4)(A) includes contingent rights to payment as claims; an indemnification claim arises when the acts giving rise to liability occur, regardless of when the cause of action accrues under state law.

Hi-Lo Powered Scaffolding, Inc. v. Penn (In Re Hi-Lo Powered Scaffolding, Inc.) · filed 1987-03-06(4)(A)

Regardless of when the principals’ cause of action for indemnification might have accrued under state law, their “right to payment” arose at the “time when the acts giving rise to the alleged liability were performed.”

A state is not a creditor of a debtor’s victims merely because it can seek restitution for them; it must have a right to payment.

Oregon Ex Rel. Frohnmayer v. Lacy (In Re Lacy) · filed 1987-03-31(9)

A “creditor” is an entity that has a claim against the debtor or his estate. § 101(9). A “claim” is defined as meaning either a right to payment, or a right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment. § 101(4). ... This Court concludes that under ORS 59.255(2)(a), the State does not have the right to enforce a restitution order. Thus, the State does not have a right to payment and cannot bring a dischargeability complaint based upon the rights of the injured individuals.

Section 101(4)(A) treats a homeowners’ association assessment as a claim when the association has a right to payment, which arises as each monthly installment comes due under the governing covenants.

Horton v. Beaumont Place Homeowners Ass'n (In Re Horton) · filed 1987-04-03(4)(A)

Under the declarations and covenants, the Association does not have a “right to payment” — and hence, a claim— within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A) until each monthly installment is due.

Section 101(4) includes contingent and unliquidated rights to payment in the definition of a claim.

In Re Placid Oil Co. · filed 1987-04-07(4)

Thus, the evidence conclusively establishes that AIU is the holder of a “claim” that arose pre-petition. ... Because the full extent of the Debtor’s liability is yet to be determined, the claim must be considered contingent.

Section 101(9)(A) defines a creditor as an entity whose claim against the debtor arose by the order for relief.

Davis v. Clark (In Re Clark) · filed 1987-04-10(9)(A)

A “creditor” is defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(9)(A) as an “entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor.” Appellants clearly fall within this category.

Sections 101(4) and (11) allow a debt to arise before bankruptcy even when the amount owed is calculated afterward.

Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Exxon Co. · filed 1987-04-20(4), (11)

A "debt" is defined as "a liability on a claim." 11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(11). A "claim" is defined as a "right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, natural, unnatural, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured...." 11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(4). ... We find no language in the definition of a "debt" or "claim," or in the elements of section 553, giving rise to a requirement that an amount due must be computed prior to the filing of bankruptcy.

Section 101(11) treats liability on a claim arising from a breached contract as a debt, even when the debtor disputes it.

In Re Michaelsen · filed 1987-05-13(11)

Having characterized the debtor’s transactions with Osterhus and Romano as 'breaches of contracts, and in light of the broad meaning of the term “claim”, the court concludes that these transactions constitute debts as defined in § 101(11), and as used in § 109(e).

Section 101(4)(B) excludes a decree for specific performance from the definition of a claim when state law provides no alternative right to payment.

In Re Roxse Homes, Inc. · filed 1987-06-03(4)(B)

The legislative history suggests that, if the only remedy allowed by state law for the Partnership’s decree is a non-monetary one, then the Partnership does not have a claim. ... Thus, the judgment is not a “claim” under section 101(4)(B).

A civil restitution judgment giving a state a right to payment is a debt under Section 101.

People v. Taite (In Re Taite) · filed 1987-06-11(11)

The Bankruptcy Code defines “debt” as “liability on a claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(11). ... Under these definitional sections, therefore, the restitution judgment constitutes a “debt” that is subject to discharge in bankruptcy unless excepted from discharge under one or more provisions of Section 523.

Section 101(4)(A) includes contingent rights to payment, including indemnity rights, in the definition of a claim.

In Re Christian Life Center · filed 1987-07-10(4)(A)

A contingent claim for indemnity falls within the Code's definition of a "claim" as a "right to payment, whether or not such right is ... contingent." 11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(4)(A).

Section 101(9)(A) treats an injured person as a creditor when the accident gives rise to a claim, before a lawsuit or judgment.

Thibodeaux v. Olivier · filed 1987-07-15(9)(A)

The claim "arose" and Thibodeaux became a creditor for purposes of 11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(9)(A) (defining creditor) when the accident occurred.

Section 101(11) includes an obligation to return an investor’s principal as a debt, whether it arises from contract or restitution.

Merrill v. Abbott (In Re Independent Clearing House Co.) · filed 1987-07-23(11)

We believe that the Code’s definition of “debt” and its related terms is broad enough to cover the debtors’ obligation to return a defendant’s principal undertaking, whether that obligation was based on the contract between the debtors and the defendant or was based on the defendant’s right to restitution.

Section 101(4)’s definition of a claim does not cover an environmental order aimed at preventing future harm when payment of money cannot satisfy it.

Commonwealth v. Norwesco Development Corp. · filed 1987-09-15(4)

In substance, the payment of money could not satisfy this claim. ... Thus, we conclude that the DER order does not constitute a claim dischargeable in bankruptcy.

Section 101(4), read with § 102(2), includes an unsecured right against a debtor’s property as a claim even when the debtor has no personal liability.

In Re Camp · filed 1987-09-22(4)

Sections 101(4) and 102(2) of the Bankruptcy Code undercut the debtors’ argument that DPW’s right to reimbursement is not allowable as an unsecured claim.

Section 101(4), read with § 102(2), recognizes a statutory in rem reimbursement right against a debtor’s property as a bankruptcy claim.

In Re Andrews · filed 1987-10-01(4)

Nevertheless, by the terms of 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(4) and 102(2), DPW does have a claim potentially cognizable under the Bankruptcy Code against the Debtor’s property.

Section 101(4)(A) includes a right to payment for losses caused by a breach of warranty within the definition of a claim.

Southeastern Sprinkler Co. v. Meyertech Corp. · filed 1987-10-14(4)(A)

Clearly Southeastern's breach of warranty action falls within this definition since it represents a right to payment for losses suffered as a result of Meyertech's supplying unfit goods.

An equitable distribution award in favor of a nondebtor spouse is a claim under § 101(9), making the spouse a general unsecured creditor of the estate.

Matter of Palmer · filed 1987-10-15(9)

To the extent that the state matrimonial court adjudicates an equitable distribution in favor of the non-debtor spouse, such award becomes a claim within the context of 11 U.S.C. § 101(9). The non-debtor spouse’s claim is an entitlement against the debtor’s estate, and thus she becomes one of the general unsecured creditors of the estate.

Section 101’s definitions of claim and debt include a criminal restitution payment.

Superior Court of the State of California v. Heincy (In Re Heincy) · filed 1987-09-16(4), (11)

On their face the definitions of "claim" and "debt" in the Bankruptcy Code encompass a restitution payment, and there is no legislative history which would suggest exclusion of restitution payments from these definitions.

Section 101(9) excludes holders of postpetition administrative expense tax claims from the definition of creditor.

In Re Spruill · filed 1987-10-09(9)

PCA and the Land Bank are not indenture trustees and are not “creditors” with respect to their administrative expense priority postpetition tax claims. A creditor is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(9) as an entity that has a claim against the debtor which arose at or prior to the time of filing of the debtor’s voluntary bankruptcy petition or a claim of a kind specified in 11 U.S.C. § 502(i) and other sections not relevant here.

A judgment creditor holding an unsecured claim qualifies as a creditor under § 101(9)(A) because the judgment is a claim under § 101(4).

In Re Texaco Inc. · filed 1987-10-30(9)(A)

As a judgment creditor holding the largest unsecured claim against Texaco, Pennzoil’s claim, as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(4), gives Pennzoil the status of a creditor within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(9)(A).

A person whose only claim against the debtor has been finally dismissed is no longer a creditor.

Stanley v. Vahlsing · filed 1987-10-16(9)(A)

When, as in our case, however, a would-be creditor’s only claim has been finally dismissed, a discharge will not even potentially affect her interests. Thus, Stanley is not a creditor.

Under § 101, an anticipatory breach that gives the other party a right to damages creates a claim and therefore a debt, even if recovery is contingent.

In Re Energy Cooperative, Inc., Debtor. Energy Cooperative, Inc., Jay A. Steinberg, Trustee v. Socap International, Ltd. · filed 1987-10-29(4), (11)

When ECI breached the contract with SOCAP, SOCAP acquired a claim against ECI; therefore, ECI incurred a debt to SOCAP.

Section 101 treats bondholders asserting fraud claims against a debtor as creditors with claims, even if the debtor did not list them.

Sheftelman v. Standard Metals Corp. · filed 1987-12-29(4), (9)

There would seem to be no question that in these circumstances the bondholders of this bond issue are "creditors" under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(9) and that they seek to advance a "claim," 11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(4). These are not "unknown" creditors just because the debtor did not schedule them as the bankruptcy court seemed to indicate.