11 U.S.C. § 101

Section 101(17)(A) can count farmland rent as farm income when the debtor works in the farming operation and shares its financial risk.

In Re Voelker · filed 1990-12-10(17)(A)

We therefore hold that the $31,-200.00 in farm rental income qualifies as farm income for purposes of § 101(17) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(18)’s family farmer gross-income test includes Social Security disability benefits even when they are tax-exempt, but excludes debt forgiveness that merely reduces liabilities and creates no new funds.

In Re Koenegstein · filed 1991-08-12(18)

The Court finds that the debtors’ social security disability income of $20,440 should be included as part of their total gross income for 1990 in determining their qualification as family farmers under § 101(18). ... The Court finds that the $30,513 in debt forgiveness realized in November 1990 should not be counted as gross income in determining the debtors’ eligibility as family farmers.

Section 101(18) does not require a family farmer to reside on or possess the farm to qualify for Chapter 12.

In Re French · filed 1992-03-20(18)

Qualification as a Chapter 12 debtor does not hinge on possession alone. In fact, the Code does not include residence or possession as a requirement at all.

Section 101(18)(A) requires a family farmer to have received more than half of gross income from a farming operation in the taxable year before filing.

In re Grey · filed 1992-09-23(18)(A)

Accordingly, the Court finds that the debtor is not eligible to proceed in a Chapter 12 bankruptcy. He has not shown that he received more than 50 percent of his gross income from a farming operation in taxable year 1991, the taxable year preceding the filing of his Chapter 12 petition.

Section 101(21)'s definition of a farming operation does not cover a business that applies seed and chemicals to crops owned by other farmers.

In Re Van Air Flying Service, Inc. · filed 1992-10-23(21)

The Court concludes that these activities do not rise to the level of a farming operation for purposes of Chapter 12 relief.

Section 101(18) measures Chapter 12 debt eligibility on the petition date and counts facially valid disputed debts toward the $1,500,000 aggregate debt limit.

In Re Cross Timbers Ranch, Inc. · filed 1993-03-09(18)

This Court agrees that the filing date would seem to be the appropriate measuring point and concludes that the amount owed as of May 21, 1992, determines the issue of eligibility as to the $1,500,000.00 aggregate debt requirement. ... This Court agrees that the plain language of the statute indicates that disputed debts must be considered if they have any facial validity.

Section 101(18) counts rent for farmland and equipment and payments for farming services as farm income when the debtor remains involved in the farming operation.

In Re Creviston · filed 1993-06-25(18)

Therefore, the payments made to the debtor by RVC for rent of the land, equipment and the debtor’s farming services are includable as farm income for purposes of Chapter 12 eligibility.

Section 101(18)(A) counts proceeds from selling farm equipment and performing custom-hire farm work as farm income when they arise from the farming operation.

In Re Barnett · filed 1993-12-14(18)(A)

Included in farm income is $5,442.00 from the sale of farm equipment and other farm-related property and $1,540.00 from custom-hire farm work. Only if both of those items were excluded from farm income would debtor not qualify as a family farmer pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 101(18)(A). I find, however, that both such items do constitute farm income for these purposes.

Section 101(17) includes disputed claims and unliquidated debts when calculating the family farmer debt limit.

Coones v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York · filed 1994-03-10(17)

The Court finds that the bankruptcy court properly determined that both claims and unliqui-dated debts are to be included in the debt eligibility calculation stated in section 101(17), whether or not they are disputed by the debtor.

Section 101(18) counts proceeds from the sale of farm equipment as farming income when the equipment was part of the farming operation and was sold to scale it down.

Cottonport Bank v. Dichiara · filed 1996-01-12(18)

With this said, we find that the bankruptcy court properly classified the debtors’ income from the sale of their farm equipment as received from their farming operation and thus affirm its holding that the debtors satisfied the income test of section 101(18).

Section 101(21) does not treat minor grazing income and horse-breaking services for another farmer as a debtor’s farming operation.

In Re Buckingham · filed 1996-06-03(21)

The Court finds the Debtors’ current inconsequential income generating activities they engage in on their rural property do not rise to the level of “farming operations” sufficient for them to satisfy the definition of “family farmers” under the Bankruptcy Code.

Farm land rent can count as income from a farming operation under § 101(18)(A) when the circumstances show that it arose from farming.

In Re Lamb · filed 1997-03-25(18)(A)

Thus, under the circumstances of this case, the Court finds that the rental income of $37,000 was income which arose out of a farming operation in accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 101(18) & (21).

Section 101(18) does not require family farmer debtors to own every asset used in their farming operation.

In Re Howard · filed 1997-07-15(18)

Section 101(18) does not require debtors to only use assets belonging to them; instead the debtors only have to be “engaged in a farming operation” as long as the other requirements for a family farmer are met.

Section 101 defines a family farmer by engagement in a farming operation, which includes raising poultry; that status determines initial eligibility for Chapter 12 relief.

In Re Lockard · filed 1999-06-04(18), (21)

The Code defines a “family farmer” as an individual or individual and spouse “engaged in a farming operation” whose aggregate debts and income fall within certain parameters, 11 U.S.C. § 101(18), and defines “farming operation” as including, among other things, “production or raising of ... poultry,” 11 U.S.C. § 101(21), which is the Debtors’ business. If a debtor is not a “family farmer” or is not engaged in a “farming operation,” he or she cannot file for relief under Chapter 12 in the first instance.

Under § 101(18)(A), a capital gain from selling farmland counts toward the family farmer gross income threshold when the sale is related to the debtor’s farming activities.

In Re Bircher · filed 1999-07-27(18)(A)

Just as any income, minimal or not, generated from the sale of livestock that grazed on the 50-acre farm would have been considered farm income in 1996, the net capital gain realized from the sale of the 50-acre farm to keep the farm operation going must be considered farm income in 1997.

A corporation can count a debt toward the family farmer definition’s 80 percent farming debt requirement only if it actually owes that debt.

In re McSwine Creek Farms, Inc. · filed 2000-08-30(18)(B)(ii)

The most significant question is 80% of the aggregate non-contingent, liquidated debt owed by McSwine Creek Farms, Inc., arises out of the farming operation owned or operated by the debtor corporation. Clearly, if the corporate debtor could assume the indebtedness owed to FSA, this requirement would be met. ... Consequently, the debt to FSA is not owed by the corporate debtor.

Section 101(18)(A) requires an individual family farmer to receive more than half of the prior year's gross income from a farming operation the individual owns or operates; income paid to a corporation the debtor owns does not count as the debtor's income.

In Re Gregerson · filed 2001-10-29(18)(A)

That code section defines an individual “family farmer” as one who receives from a farming operation owned or operated by him more than 50 per cent of his gross income for the taxable year preceding the taxable year in which the case was filed. ... An examination of the 'tax return clearly shows that Gre-gerson had not received more than 50 per cent of his gross income from a farming operation owned or operated by him. ... I find that Gregerson could not have reasonably believed that he was a family farmer who was qualified to seek relief under chapter 12.

Section 101(18) excludes proceeds from land sold as an investment from the farm income used to determine family farmer eligibility.

Integra Bank, N.A. v. Ross (In Re Ross) · filed 2001-12-07(18)

While the Court in this case does not question the debtors’ sincerity or their good faith in selling the subject property in the year prior to bankruptcy, the Court cannot find, on the evidence presented, that the debtors’ income from the sale of the 18 acres in question constituted farm income. The debtors, therefore, do not meet the 50 percent farm income test for “family farmers” under § 101(18).

Section 101(18)(A) determines family farmer status when the bankruptcy case is filed; a later change in farming operations does not end Chapter 12 eligibility.

In Re Clark · filed 2003-01-22(18)(A)

The test for a “family farmer” as described in 11 U.S.C. § 101(18)(A) clearly provides that the debtor’s status is determined at the time the case is filed and is measured inter alia by a gross income requirement for the taxable year preceding the taxable year of filing.

Cash rent paid in full at the start of the crop year is not income from a farming operation for the family farmer gross income test.

In Re Swanson · filed 2003-01-29(21)

Following that precedent, the cash rent received by the DEBTOR in 2001 is not income received from a farming operation. Less than fifty percent (50%) of the DEBTOR’S gross income for taxable year 2001 was received from a farming operation. Therefore, the DEBTOR was not a family farmer at the time he filed his Chapter 12 petition and the petition must be dismissed.

Section 101(18) requires a family farmer to be farming when the petition is filed; temporarily stopping during the case does not end Chapter 12 eligibility.

In Re Nelson · filed 2003-04-17(18)

In sum, depending upon the facts of each case, the better-reasoned case law supports interpreting the phrase “engaged in a farming operation” in § 101(18) as requiring only that a debtor be farming at the time of filing.

Section 101(18) excludes debtors whose aggregate debts exceed its limit from the definition of a family farmer eligible for Chapter 12.

In Re Birky · filed 2003-07-10(18)

Although it was clear from a cursory review of Debtors’ bankruptcy schedules that Debtors aggregate debts exceeded the limit set by 11 U.S.C. § 101(18), no one initially sought dismissal of Debtors’ Chapter 12 proceeding for ineligibility based upon Attorney Narmont’s assertion that the aggregate debt originally scheduled by the Debtors would be greatly reduced to an amount within the limitations of 11 U.S.C. § 101(18). ... Based upon the Debtors’ ineligibility for relief under Chapter 12, there was, in essence, no jurisdiction to accomplish the reorganization contemplated by the Debtors under their original Chapter 12 Plan of Reorganization and the Plan as it was subsequently amended.

Section 101(18) counts rent from a farming corporation as farm income when the debtor personally operates the farm and bears traditional farming risks.

In Re Maynard · filed 2003-07-21(18)

In total, the circumstances support a finding that MFI’s rents constitute “farm income” as established in Creviston. ... For the reasons stated above, this Court finds Maynard a “family farmer” as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(18) and denies Sapir’s Objection to Confirmation of Maynard’s Amended Chapter 12 plan.

Section 101(18)(A)’s family farmer definition excludes a debtor who neither owns nor operates a farming operation.

Dye, Bart H. v. US Farm Service · filed 2004-03-10(18)(A)

In addition, Dye’s petition would be dis- missed in any event because he conceded at oral argument that the government has leased the farm to others and he is thus not an owner or operator of a farming operation as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(18)(A).

Section 101(18)(A) excludes a debtor who neither owns nor operates a farming operation from the definition of family farmer.

Bart Harrison Dye, Debtor-Appellant v. United States of America, Farm Services Agency (Fsa), Creditor-Appellee. In Re: B · filed 2004-03-10(18)(A)

In addition, Dye’s petition would be dismissed in any event because he conceded at oral argument that the government has leased the farm to others and he is thus not an owner or operator of a farming operation as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(18)(A).

Section 101(18)(A) requires 80% of qualifying debt to arise from farming and more than 50% of gross income to come from farming in the specified preceding taxable year; schedules can provide rebuttable evidence of eligibility.

In Re Torelli · filed 2006-02-28(18)(A)

The Debtor’s schedules are some evidence of his eligibility for Chapter 12 relief. ... Regions offered no evidence to rebut the presumption created by the Debtor’s schedules and statement of financial affairs that he qualifies as a family farmer.

Section 101(18)(A) counts a debt as arising out of a farming operation only when its purpose is connected to the debtor’s farming activity; using farmland as collateral alone is insufficient.

In Re Saunders · filed 2007-10-01(18)(A)

Based on the reasoning of other courts to consider this issue, the Court concludes that to “arise out of a farming operation” the purpose of a debt must have some connection to the debtor’s farming activity. Merely using farmland as collateral for a debt that has no other relation to the farming activity will not suffice.

Section 101(18)(A) includes disputed debts in the family-farmer debt calculation when they are noncontingent and liquidated.

In Re Haarmann · filed 2008-04-15(18)(A)

The fact that the Debtor disputes the claim of SDS is of no consequence. It is clear that even disputed debts are not excluded from the calculation under § 101(18).

Section 101(18)(A) counts debt incurred to build a farmhouse toward the farm-debt requirement when the home is connected to the debtor’s farming activities.

First National Bank v. Woods (In re Woods) · filed 2012-02-27(18)(A)

Because the farmhouse is connected to the Woods’ farming activities, including the construction portion of the loan in the farm debt calculation was proper.

Section 101(18)(A) includes principal-residence loan debt in the family farmer debt calculation when the loan proceeds are used directly for or in a farming operation.

First National Bank v. Woods (In Re Woods) · filed 2014-02-19(18)(A)

That is, if the loan proceeds were used directly for or in a farming operation, the debt “arises out of” that farming operation.

Section 101(18) counts settlement proceeds from earlier farming operations as farm income in the taxable year the debtor receives them.

In re McLawchlin · filed 2014-06-05(18)

The statute does not require that Mr. MeLawchlin earn the income during the taxable year preceding. Although the settlement payment arises from the rice farming operation he ran in previous years, he received the income in 2012.

Section 101(18)(A)’s Chapter 12 debt cap includes mortgage claims enforceable against the debtor’s property after a Chapter 7 discharge of personal liability.

Davis v. U.S. Bank · filed 2015-02-17(18)(A)

Our decision in Quintana II thus confirms the distinction, established in Johnson and Davenport, between in rem and in personam liability in this context, and likewise compels us to conclude that a creditor’s claim remains a “debt” so long as it is enforceable against either the debtor or the debtor’s property. Accordingly, the debtor’s “aggregate debts” include the amount of that claim, even after a prior discharge from personal liability under chapter 7.

Section 101(18)(A) excludes principal residence debt from both sides of the farm debt calculation when that debt does not arise from a farming operation.

Acee v. Oneida Savings Bank · filed 2015-03-31(18)(A)

Thus, the Court is persuaded that Appellants are correct — if the principal residence debt is not farm related, then it should be excluded from both the numerator and denominator — and finds that the Bankruptcy Court erred in its construction of the farm-debt test under § 101(18)(A).

Section 101(18)(A) requires a Chapter 12 family farmer to receive more than 50% of gross income from farming operations during the specified tax years.

In re Myrstol-Snyder · filed 2015-05-18(18)(A)

Congress also required, in § 101(18)(A), that a chapter 12 debtor establish gross income from farming operations constituted more than 50% of total gross income in one of two relevant periods-either the taxable year preceding the year of filing, or the 2nd and 3rd taxable years preceding the year of filing.

Section 101 requires a family fishing entity to meet the family ownership definition and have regular annual income sufficient to make Chapter 12 plan payments.

In re Victorious, LLC · filed 2016-02-17(19A), (19B)

Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, analysis of pertinent jurisprudence, and conclusions of law, the Court determines the Debtor is ineligible for Chapter 12 relief under § 109(f), because it is not a family fisherman with regular annual income as defined under § 101 (19A) and (19B) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(18)’s family farmer debt limit counts all claims against the debtor, including disputed claims.

In re Clark · filed 2016-04-13(18)

In other words, eligibility is determined by all the claims against the debtor, regardless of whether the claims are secured, unsecured, liquidated, unliquidated, contingent, matured, unmatured or disputed, etc.

A debtor who admitted he failed § 101(18)(A)’s family farmer income requirement was ineligible for Chapter 12 relief.

Jason L Evansingston · filed 2019-09-13(18)(A)

The Debtor admits he does not meet the income requirements to qualify as a family farmer and the evidence introduced at the hearing supports this conclusion. Based on the Debtor’s admission, this issue does not warrant further discussion by the Court. The Motion will be granted on the ground that the Debtor is ineligible to be a debtor under Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code.

Horse boarding income does not count toward the family farmer income requirement when the operator does not bear the risks associated with raising the animals.

Shirley Hoel and Roger Hoel · filed 2020-07-20(18)(A)(i)

That income, however, is only 30% of the total income they claim flows from farming. ... The balance of the income derives from boarding horses. ... While both a family farmer and a boarding operator may face some of the same risks, the effect of those risks is different for each. ... For these reasons, the Trustee’s Motion to Dismiss is granted.

For the family farmer income test, section 101(18)(A)(i) counts Social Security benefits as gross income only to the extent the Tax Code includes them.

Mary Ellen Rosenberger · filed 2020-09-29(18)(A)(i)

In the absence of a statutory definition otherwise, this Court will look to the Tax Code’s definition of “gross income” to guide the calculation of “gross income” in section 101(18). ... Given that the Tax Code definition would exclude Ms. Rosenberger’s Social Security income from her “gross income” in taxable year 2019, she satisfies the 50 percent income test required by section 101(18) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Farming through an LLC may count when deciding whether an individual is engaged in a farming operation under the family farmer definition.

Roger Leon Comeau · filed 2021-10-21(18)(A)

Nowhere in this definitional maze is a prohibition on farming through a business entity.

A corporate debtor must show that at least half of its qualifying debts arose from its farming operation to meet the family farmer debt requirement.

DLB II, LLC · filed 2023-09-08(18)(B)(ii)

DLB II had to show that the debt owed to Moana arises out of the farming operation in order to meet the 50% threshold required by 11 U.S.C. § 101(18)(B). DLB II offered no such evidence.

Section 101 does not define or explain “party in interest.”

In Re Hicks · filed 1987-09-29

The term “party in interest” is not one of those defined or explained in title 11, United States Code, and its meaning is not settled.

Section 101 does not define “parties of interest.”

In Re Gallagher · filed 2002-07-01

The term “parties of interest” is not defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101, but it is well established that the property of the estate is liquidated primarily for the benefit of the unsecured creditors and not for the benefit of the secured creditors or the Debtor.

Section 101’s broad definitions of “claim” and “creditor” support treating a loan servicer with a direct stake in a bankruptcy claim as a party in interest entitled to defend it through counsel.

Greer v. O'Dell · filed 2002-09-23(5)(A), (10)(A)

A servicer is a party in interest in proceedings involving loans which it services. The Bankruptcy Code and Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Procedure each have liberal standing provisions, designed to allow a party to appear as long as it has a direct stake in the litigation under the particular circumstances. ... Even assuming, however, that Max Flow was merely the servicer for a disclosed principal of that claim, it was a party in interest entitled to defend the claim on behalf of MBNA and to take all required action through counsel to protect its interests and those of MBNA.

Section 101(49)'s definition of the United States includes American Samoa, where federal courts exercise judicial power.

Southwest Marine of Samoa, Inc. v. S & S Contracting, Inc. · filed 1987-10-22(49)

The bankruptcy code in 11 U.S.C. § 101(49) defines the "United States" as "all locations where the judicial jurisdiction of the United States extends, including territories and possessions of the United States." ... American Samoa is a possession of the United States. A restrictive reading of the reach of the bankruptcy code would be contrary to the purpose of the bankruptcy laws and especially to the purpose of its automatic stay provisions. Even though there is no Article III, or bankruptcy, judge or court in American Samoa, federal courts do exercise judicial power over American Samoa.

Section 101(27) excludes a United States trustee serving as a trustee in a bankruptcy case from the definition of “governmental unit,” limiting § 106(a)’s sovereign immunity waiver.

Brandon v. Sherwood (In re Sann) · filed 2016-02-26(27)

As for the UST, because of the definition of the term “governmental unit” at § 101(27)..., the Ninth Circuit wrote in Balser : “Thus, by its plain terms, the Bankruptcy Code does not contain an unequivocally express waiver of sovereign immunity for United States trustees. To the contrary, United States trustees expressly are excepted from the § 106(a) sovereign immunity waiver.” 327 F.3d at 908.... Therefore, as for the United States, the DOJ, Neal Jensen and the UST, based upon the Defendants’ failure to show an unequivocally expressed waiver of sovereign immunity, the Federal Defendants all are immune from suit under the United States’ sovereign immunity.

Section 101(6) treats a prepetition claim as a community claim when qualifying marital property could be used to satisfy it.

Grimm v. Grimm (In Re Grimm) · filed 1988-02-03(6)

Therefore, a thorough reading of sections 101(6) and 541(a)(2) indicates that Esther holds a community claim.

Section 101(6) treats a spouse’s debt as a community claim only if applicable state law permits payment from community property that would pass into the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.

In Re Sweitzer · filed 1990-02-22(6)

Central Trust can enforce its judgment under Ohio law only against Mr. Sweitzer and Mr. Sweitzer’s property. The second of the three requirements for a “community claim” has thus not been met. The judgment is not satisfiable from community property under applicable state law. Because Central Trust’s judgment is not a “community claim” under Ohio law, no 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(3) injunction bars Central Trust from its garnishment of Mr. Sweit-zer’s wages.

Section 101(7) defines a community claim as a claim arising before the debtor’s bankruptcy case for which property described in section 541(a)(2) is liable.

In Re Strickland · filed 1993-05-04(7)

Community claims are defined as claims that arose prior to commencement of the bankruptcy case concerning the debtor for which property specified in section 541(a)(2) is liable. 11 U.S.C. § 101(7). ... This Court finds that Wess’ claim is a community claim discharged in debtor’s bankruptcy proceeding.

Section 101(7) defines a community claim to include a prepetition claim for which qualifying community property is liable, even if no such property exists when the bankruptcy case begins.

Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Soderling (In re Soderling) · filed 1993-07-13(7)

A "community claim" is defined as any "claim that arose before the commencement of the case concerning the debtor for which property of the kind specified in section 541(a)(2) 5 of this title is liable, whether or not there is any such property at the time of the commencement of the case." Id. § 101(7) (1988). ... Thus, the FDIC's claim as a claim against the respective communities is nondischargeable and all of the community property of both Soderling couples is potentially liable for the debt represented by the claim.

Section 101(7) defines a community claim to include a debt recoverable from community property.

In Re Passmore · filed 1993-07-19(7)

Since community property can be recovered to satisfy the debt, the obligation is a community claim under 11 U.S.C. § 101(7).

An ex-spouse’s enforceable prepetition interest in proceeds of a former community home is a community claim under § 101(7).

In re Stouder · filed 1994-01-20(7)

Michael’s proof of claim is based on a liquidated and enforceable ownership interest in his one-half share of the proceeds from the sale of the former community home, acquired three months before Janine filed for bankruptcy. It is a community claim against the bankruptcy estate.

Section 101(7) defines a community claim as a prepetition claim for which the community property specified in section 541(a)(2) is liable.

Brown v. Kastner (In Re Kastner) · filed 1996-08-12(7)

The Bankruptcy Code defines “community claim” as a “claim that arose before the commencement of the case concerning the debtor for which property of the kind specified in section 541(a)(2) of this title is liable ...”. 11 U.S.C. § 101(7). ... The Commissioner has a community claim against the estate.

Section 101(7) defines a community claim to include a claim for which a creditor can reach any portion of community property.

Bielicki v. Portuondo · filed 1998-03-04(7)

Una obligación de la comunidad existe siempre que un acreedor pueda alcanzar una porción de la propie-dad de la comunidad, independientemente de las leyes es-tatales existentes sobre la responsabilidad de los esposos.

Section 101(7) includes a debt as a community claim when community property could be liable for it, even if that property does not exist when the case begins.

In Re Pfalzgraf · filed 1999-05-26(7)

Dennis’ nonmarital assets would not be property of Kathleen’s bankruptcy estate, but there could conceivably be community property liable for these debts that would also be property of Kathleen’s bankruptcy estate. It is not necessary that such property actually exist. 11 U.S.C. § 101(7).

Section 101(7) includes a prepetition claim against a debtor’s spouse as a community claim when community property could have satisfied it.

In Re Schmiedel · filed 1999-07-09(7)

Community claims are defined as claims that arose prepetition concerning the debtor for which property specified in § 541(a)(2), i.e., most community property, is liable, whether or not such property actually exists. 11 U.S.C. § 101(7). The claim the Jolliffs have against the debtor’s former husband meets this definition because at the time of the debtor’s bankruptcy, there could have been some form of community property owned by the Schmiedels — either parties’ accumulated wages, for example — that could have been recovered to satisfy the claim against him.

Section 101(7) gives a nondebtor spouse’s creditor a community claim if the creditor could satisfy its claim from community property, even if no such property has passed to the bankruptcy estate.

In Re Whitus · filed 1999-10-08(7)

As a result, a creditor of the non-debtor spouse who would have been able to satisfy a claim prior to bankruptcy from community assets holds a “community claim” against the debtor’s estate, regardless whether section 541(a)(2) property has actually passed to the estate as of the petition date.

Section 101(7) defines a community claim to include a prepetition debt for which community property is liable.

In Re Martell · filed 2005-04-12(7)

Because all of the debts Debtor listed in her schedules arose before the commencement of the bankruptcy case and because community property is, under Idaho case law, liable for those claims, all of these debts constitute community claims for purposes of § 726(c).

Section 101(7) treats a spouse’s premarital debt as a community claim when community property in the debtor’s bankruptcy estate is liable for it.

In Re Field · filed 2009-10-08(7)

Therefore, since Charles’ interest in the couple’s community property is liable for his premarital tax debts and since that community property is part of Hidemi’s bankruptcy estate, the IRS has a community claim, as that term is defined under Section 101(7), in Hidemi’s bankruptcy case.

Section 101(7) includes a tax debt incurred during marriage as a community claim when estate community property is liable, even if the debt is settled after separation.

In re Cohen · filed 2014-11-13(7)

By far the largest portion of the filed IRS Claim is for the miscellaneous penalty, which arises from the 2003 through 2008 tax years and is for debts that were incurred prior to separation. Ms. Cohen has not established that the settlement of those debts in 2010 somehow retroactively caused them to be “incurred” after separation. The IRS has a community claim for the miscellaneous penalty.

Section 101 includes an entity with a community claim in its definition of creditor, even when the entity has no personal claim against the debtor spouse.

Buescher v. First United Bank & Trust (In Re Buescher) · filed 2015-04-13(10)(C)

The Bankruptcy Code defines “creditor” to include an “entity that has a community claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(C). It defines “community claim” as a claim “for which property of the kind specified in section 541(a)(2) of this title is liable.” Id. § 101(7). ... Because First United could satisfy its claim against Dean through an in rem suit against Sherry, First United is Sherry’s creditor under § 727(c)(1).

Section 101(7) defines a community claim as a prepetition claim for which community property is liable, even if only the nondebtor spouse is personally liable.

Kelly v. Andersen · filed 2020-10-28(7)

A “community claim” is any obligation that existed as of the filing of the bankruptcy case by the debtor-spouse for which the community property is liable – whether the debtor-spouse filing bankruptcy is personally liable or if it is an obligation for which only the non-debtor spouse is personally liable, but for which the community property is liable for such obligation.

Section 101(7) defines a community claim by whether community property is liable for a prepetition debt; under California law, debts incurred after the spouses separated did not qualify.

Fava · filed 2026-05-29(7)

That separation date precludes any claims arising after that date from being designated as community claims that can be paid under the distribution waterfall in subsections 726(c)(2)(A), (B), or (D).

Section 101(7) includes a prepetition claim as a community claim when community property of the kind described in § 541(a)(2) is liable for it.

Rooz v. Kimmel (In Re Kimmel) · filed 2007-04-11(7)

Rooz is asserting a community claim because he asserts that Roberta’s wages are community property and that such property is liable for the Judgment against David.

Section 101(49)(A)(xiv) includes restricted stock units that bear the hallmarks of interests commonly known as securities.

Adler v. Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc. (In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.) · filed 2017-05-04(49)(A)(xiv)

We therefore conclude that the claimants’ RSUs are securities within the meaning of section 510(b) because they meet the definition of that term set forth in section 101(49)(xiv) insofar as they bear hallmarks of interests commonly known as securities.

Section 101(49)(A)(i) does not treat a note evidencing a commercial loan for business operations as a security merely because it is a note.

Bakst v. Bank Leumi, USA (In re D.I.T., Inc.) · filed 2016-12-22(49)(A)(i)

The term “security” is defined to include a “note.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(49)(A)(i). ... The Bank Leumi Payoff represented payment on a commercial loan used for business operations. Under the Reves analysis, the related notes were not securities.

Section 101(49)(B)(i) excludes letters of credit from the definition of a security.

EPLG I, LLC Ex Rel. QR Liquidating Trust v. Citibank, National Ass'n (In Re Qimonda Richmond, LLC) · filed 2012-03-26(49)(B)(i)

The payment of a letter of credit is specifically excluded from the definition of a security and thus any payment on a letter of credit cannot comprise a settlement payment.

Section 101(43) includes the debtor’s notes within the definition of “security.”

In Re Blondheim Real Estate, Inc. · filed 1988-09-16(43)

There is no question that each note issued by the debtor in this case constituted a “security” within the meaning of the statutory language. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(43) (definitional provision).

Section 101(44) defines a security agreement as an agreement creating or providing for a security interest; whether a lease qualifies depends on applicable state law.

Tri Leasing Corp. v. Fulton Textiles, Inc. (In Re Fulton Textiles, Inc.) · filed 1990-06-29(44)

The Court does not need to address the various factors set out by the Georgia Court of Appeals in C & S and Woods, because, unlike in those cases, the Agreement in this case satisfies all of the elements of the three-part test and fits squarely within the statutory definition of a security agreement.

Section 101(45)’s definition of security excludes a simple written bilateral contract for non-monetary performance when neither party can be considered its holder.

In Re Smith · filed 1991-02-11(45)

However, the list does not include simple written bilateral contracts for performance of non-monetary obligations, wherein neither party could be considered the “holder" thereof.

Section 101(43)(A)(xiii) includes a limited partnership interest in the definition of a security.

Lowin v. Dayton Securities Associates (In Re the Securities Group 1980) · filed 1991-02-20(43)(A)(xiii)

A limited partnership interest is a security, see 11 U.S.C. § 101(43)(A)(xiii), and therefore, the defendants’ claims (which arise from the purchase or sale of their limited partnership interests) cannot be used to reduce the plaintiffs recovery, which is made for the benefit of creditors.

Section 101(49)(A)(xiii) includes a limited partner’s interest in a limited partnership within the definition of “security.”

Butters v. Mountain Side Holdings, Inc. (In Re Mountain Side Holdings, Inc.) · filed 1992-06-30(49)(A)(xiii)

Butters’ second argument is that the Bankruptcy Code does not permit the debtor to grant a creditor a limited partnership interest in a reorganized entity under a plan. That argument is likewise flawed. Section 1123(a)(5)(J) expressly permits the issuance of securities to implement a plan. The term “security” is defined under the Code to include an “interest of a limited partner in a limited partnership.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(49)(A)(xiii).

An inchoate lien created by agreement is a security interest under § 101(37) and (51).

In Re Vienna Park Properties · filed 1992-09-29(37), (51)

An agreement that creates an inchoate lien on rents creates a "security interest" under the Bankruptcy Code. A "security interest" is defined in the Bankruptcy Code as simply a "lien created by an agreement." Id. § 101(51). "Lien," in turn, is broadly defined as a "charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation." Id. § 101(37). This definition includes inchoate liens.

Section 101(49)(A)(iv) includes a bond in the definition of “security.”

Matter of Verdunn · filed 1993-11-04(49)(A)(iv)

There is no doubt that there is a “security” in the bond. 11 U.S.C. § 101(49)(a)(iv).

Section 101(51) defines a security interest as a lien created by agreement, including a consensual mortgage.

First National Bank of Damariscotta v. Sidelinger (In Re Sidelinger) · filed 1994-10-28(51)

"Security interest" means a "lien created by an agreement;” thus it comprehends consensual mortgages.

Section 101(51) defines a security interest as a lien created by agreement, which excludes nonconsensual tax liens.

In Re DeMaggio · filed 1994-11-03(51)

As noted above, “security interest” is defined by the Code as a “lien created by an agreement.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(51). The Town’s liens, albeit secured claims, were clearly not consensual agreements between the taxpayer and the Town. Thus, the Town’s tax claims fall outside the definition of a consensual “security interest” as defined by the Code.

Section 101(49)’s definition of “security” does not include a priority tax claim.

In Re Union Meeting Partners · filed 1995-02-14(49)

Lincoln argues that the quoted portion of F.R.B.P. 3018(a) is not relevant because the priority tax claim is not based upon a “security of record.” See 11 U.S.C. § 101(49) (definition of security). We conclude that Lincoln’s position is correct.

Section 101(49) includes interests subject to Securities Act registration or exempt under section 3(b) in the definition of security, but excludes interests covered only by other registration exemptions.

Jenkins v. Tomlinson (In Re Basin Resources Corp.) · filed 1995-04-24(49)(A)(xii)

The Bankruptcy Code excludes from its definition any interest which is not subject to Securities Act registration unless the interest is exempt from registration under section 3(b) of the Securities Act. ... The first two categories of Securities Act securities are encompassed by the Bankruptcy Code definition of “security.” The third is not.

Section 101(49)'s definition of security does not govern the phrase “other security” in § 366(b).

Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Caldor, Inc. · filed 1997-06-10(49)

The Bankruptcy Code does define the term "security,'' see 11 U.S.C. § 101(49), but this definition is inapplicable in the context of § 366(b), and neither of the parties to this action has suggested that § 101 provides the governing definition.

Section 101 treats stock options as securities because they are rights to purchase shares.

Allen v. Levey (In Re Allen) · filed 1998-11-10(49)(xv)

Stock options, as rights to purchase securities, are securities under the Code, and become property of the estate.

Section 101(49)(A)(v) includes debentures in the definition of a security, even before they are converted into stock.

In Re NAL Financial Group, Inc. · filed 1999-08-02(49)(A)(v)

Based on § 101’s definition and the language of the Securities Purchase Agreement, ... the Court finds that even if Interbanc’s causes of action arose before Interbanc converted the Debentures into Restricted Stock, those Debentures constituted security within the meaning of § 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(49)(A)(i) includes a note in the definition of a security; the Series Note qualified under that definition.

NationsBank v. Commercial Financial Services, Inc. (In Re Commercial Financial Services, Inc.) · filed 2001-10-15(49)(A)(i)

According to 11 U.S.C. § 101(49)(A)(i), the term “security” includes a note. ... The Court finds that the Series Note, as it is described in the Agreement, is a security encompassed by the language of Section 510(b).

Section 101(49)’s definition of security includes limited liability company interests analogous to stock and partnership interests.

Chase Manhattan Bank v. Iridium Africa Corp. · filed 2002-04-23(49)

“Security” is expansively defined in the Bankruptcy Code as including items such as “stock,” “certificate of interest or participation in a profit-sharing agreement,” and the “interest of a limited partner in a limited partnership.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(49). Interests in a limited liability company are analogous to such typical types of “security.”

Section 101(51) treats an agreement as creating a security interest when it gives a creditor an interest in property to secure a debt, even without using the words “security interest.”

In Re Pedigo · filed 2002-09-23(51)

An agreement can create a security interest without using the words “security interest” or any similar words. It creates a security interest if it gives the creditor a charge against or an interest in property to secure a debt. The insurance policy and security agreement accomplish that purpose as to the unearned premium. They establish the debtors’ right to the unearned premium, and then grant Citifinancial the right to collect the debt by taking the unearned premium ahead of the debtors. The court concludes that the agreements grant Citifinaneial a security interest in the debtors’ right to the unearned premium to secure their debt to Citifinaneial.

Section 101(16)(C) includes stock and warrant repurchase rights as equity securities; when an interest in the debtor also qualifies as a claim, its equity status prevails.

Carrieri v. Jobs. Com, Inc. · filed 2003-10-31(16)(C)

As with the C-l rights, the rights to demand repurchase of the warrants clearly fall within the definition of “equity security.” ... After considering the various authorities, the court concludes that the equity security status of an interest will prevail over the claim status of the same interest if it is an interest in the debtor.

Section 101(49)(A) includes stock options in the definition of a security.

In Re Enron Corp. · filed 2006-05-02(49)(A)(xv)

Section 101(49)(A)(xv) defines a “security” as including a “warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase or sell, a security,” and as section 101(49)(A)(ii) makes plain, a stock is a security. 11 U.S.C. § 101(49)(A)(ii), (xv) (2006). Therefore, the Bankruptcy Code is clear that a stock option is a “security” as that term is used in section 510(b).

Section 101(49)(A)(i) includes promissory notes in the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of a security.

Banco Espirito Santo International, Ltd. v. Garmendia (In Re Bankest Capital Corp.) · filed 2006-10-04(49)(A)(i)

Based on the unambiguous language of the statute and the above-cited case law, the Court finds as a matter of law that the promissory notes issued to Garmendia by the Debtor that are the subject of this Adversary Proceeding are “securities” as contemplated by Section 510(b) and as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(49)(A)(i).

Section 101(51) defines a security interest as a lien created by an agreement, which excludes a tax buyer’s statutory rights.

Salta Group, Inc. v. McKinney · filed 2008-01-04(51)

A security interest is defined as a lien created by an agreement, 11 U.S.C. § 101(51), and Salta does not have a lien on the duplex created by an agreement. Instead, Salta, as a tax buyer, has their claim secured by statutory rights rather than a security interest.

Section 101(49) includes stock in the definition of a security.

In Re Touch America Holdings, Inc. · filed 2008-01-22(49)

Bankruptcy Code § 101(49) defines the term "security” to include stock.

Section 101(49)(A)(i) includes notes in the definition of a security, including notes that are secured debt rather than equity.

In Re Patriot Aviation Services, Inc. · filed 2008-11-18(49)(A)(i)

Although Congress primarily focused in § 510(b) on the concern that equity not be able to reap a benefit in bankruptcy by elevating an equity interest through rescission to a general unsecured status, the statute clearly applies more broadly and I therefore conclude that the Notes contemplated in the LOI are “seeurit[ies]” under the plain language of §§ 510(b) and 101(49)(A).

Section 101(49)(A)(xiii) treats a limited partnership interest as a security.

SeaQuest Diving, LP v. S&J Diving, Inc. (In Re SeaQuest Diving, LP) · filed 2009-08-13(49)(A)(xiii)

S&J’s LP interest qualifies as a “security” for purposes of § 510(b), see 11 U.S.C. § 101(49)(A)(xiii), and Jones’s LLC interest either qualifies as a “transferable share” or falls within the broad residual category.

Section 101(49)(A)(i) includes commercial paper issued as a note in the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of a security.

Alfa, S.A.B. De C v. v. Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. · filed 2009-11-20(49)(A)(i)

Commercial paper is included in the definition of “security” under the Bankruptcy Code. Specifically, a security is defined, inter alia, as a “note,” “stock,” “treasury stock,” “bond,” “indenture,” “collateral trust certificate,” “pre-organization subscription or certificate,” “transferable share,” “voting-trust certificate,” “certificate of deposit,” or a “certificate of deposit for security.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(49)(A)(i)-(xi).

Section 101(49)(B)(i) excludes currency, checks, drafts, bills of exchange, and bank letters of credit from the definition of a security.

Walker Ex Rel. Aphton Corp. v. Sonafi Pasteur (In Re Aphton Corp.) · filed 2010-01-27(49)(B)(i)

The Bankruptcy Code specifically excludes "currency, check, draft, bill of exchange or bank letter of credit” from the definition of "security.”

Section 101(51) defines a security interest as a lien created by agreement and includes a mortgage on real property.

Fidelity National Title Insurance v. Garcia (In Re Garcia) · filed 2011-02-09(51)

The Bankruptcy Code defines a security interest as a “lien created by an agreement.” ... A mortgage and security agreement both fall under this definition by creating a security interest in either real property or personal property.

Section 101(49)(A)(i) defines commercial paper as a security under the Bankruptcy Code.

Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Alfa, S.A.B. De C.V. · filed 2011-06-28(49)(A)(i)

The payments at issue were made to redeem commercial paper, which the Bankruptcy Code defines as a security.

Section 101(49)(A)(i) includes notes in the definition of a security.

Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Quebecor World (USA) Inc. v. American United Life Insurance (In Re Quebecor · filed 2011-07-27(49)(A)(i)

The Notes are expressly defined as securities in the Code.

Section 101(49) defines “security” to include notes, stock, bonds, and debentures.

In Re Tribune Co. · filed 2011-10-31(49)

The Bankruptcy Code defines the term “security” to include notes, stock, bonds, and debentures (11 U.S.C. § 101(49)), and, thus, the PHONES Notes would fall within that definition.

Section 101(49)(A)(i) includes a note in the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of a security.

Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Quebecor World (USA) Inc. v. American United Life Insurance (In re Quebecor · filed 2012-09-28(49)(A)(i)

Finally, the payment was made to “complete” a securities transaction, as the Notes indisputably qualify as “securities” under the Bankruptcy Code. See id. § 101(49)(A) (i) (defining the “term ‘security’ ” to include a “note”).

Section 101(49)(A)'s list of securities is nonexclusive and encompasses LLC membership interests.

O'Donnell v. Tristar Esperanza Properties, LLC (In Re Tristar Esperanza Properties, LLC) · filed 2013-03-08(49)(A)

It follows that, if the interest of a limited partner in a limited partnership is a “security” under the Bankruptcy Code, then the interest of a member in an LLC is also a “security” for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.

Stock issued by a fraudulent fund remains a security under § 101(49)(A)(ii).

Peterson ex rel. Estates of Lancelot Investors Fund, L.P. v. Somers Dublin Ltd. · filed 2013-09-06(49)(A)(ii)

Section 741(7) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a “securities contract” is a contract for the purchase or sale of a security, and § 101 (49) (A) (ii) says that security includes stock. The definition in § 101(49) comes almost verbatim from the Securities Act of 1938 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. No one doubts that shares of stock issued by crooked mutual funds or hedge funds are “securities” for the purpose of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. They are “securities” for the purpose of § 546(e) as well.

Section 101(49) defines security through a nonexclusive list that includes equity interests within its broad residual category.

O'Cheskey v. Koehler (In re American Housing Foundation) · filed 2013-09-30(49)(A)(xiv)

Further, these interests are the type of “other claimfs] or interestfs] commonly known as ‘security’ ” described by § 101(49)(A)(xiv). These equity interests fit into the Fifth Circuit’s “broad residual category.” In addition, the list in § 101(49) is not exclusive, and the Koehler Family Members’ interests are equity interests even if they do not match any of the labels provided.

Section 101(49) includes bonds in the definition of a security.

In re Lehman Bros. · filed 2014-01-27(49)

The LBHI Bonds are securities as defined in section 101(49) of the Bankruptcy Code. This definition expressly includes a “bond.”

An LLC membership interest qualifies as a security under the Bankruptcy Code’s definition, either as a transferable share or under the residual category.

Pensco Trust Co. v. Tristar Esperanza Properties, LLC · filed 2015-04-02(49)(A)

The parties agree that O’Donnell’s membership interest in Tristar is a “security of the debtor.” They are correct. Among the non-exclusive list of items defined as securities under the Bankruptcy Code, “[an] LLC interest either qualifies as a ‘transferable share’ or falls within the broad residual category.” In re SeaQuest Diving, LP, 579 F.3d 411, 418 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 101(49)(A)(viii), (xiv)).

Section 101(49)(A)(i) includes a note evidencing a term loan in the definition of a security.

Motors Liquidation Co. Avoidance Action Trust ex rel. Wilmington Trust Co. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In re Motors Li · filed 2016-06-30(49)(A)(i)

Section 101 (49)(A)(i) defines a “security” to include a “note.” This is obviously important because the Term Loan is evidenced by a note, which is considered a “security” for purposes of the other relevant sections of the Code.

Section 101(49) includes common stock in the definition of a security.

In re Caprock Oil Tools, Inc. · filed 2018-03-09(49)

Common Stock, as issued in the Shareholder Agreement, falls squarely within the Bankruptcy Code's enumerated definition of security.

Section 101(49)(A)(xiv) includes interests commonly known as securities, including deemed dividend rights that carry the risks and potential benefits of share ownership.

French v. Linn Energy, L.L.C. · filed 2019-09-03(49)(A)(xiv)

The residual clause provides that if a claimant’s interest does not fit any of the specific examples provided in the Code and is not explicitly excluded from the definition of “security,” it will be considered a security if it is any “other claim or interest commonly known as ‘security.’” 11 U.S.C. § 101(49)(A)(xiv). ... We conclude that the Estate’s deemed dividends are properly considered securities under the Code.

Section 101(49)(A) excludes a partnership interest from these security categories when its holder is not a limited partner and lacks the right to share in the partnership’s profits and losses.

Spectrum Alliance, LP · filed 2022-01-24(49)(A)(xiii), (xiv)

Particularly where the admission of the Pension as a Class PE Partner under §3.01(b) came with the reservation that it would have only those rights specifically ascribed to it; the terms of the LP Agreement simply do not support a finding that the Pension purchased an “interest of a limited partner in a limited partnership” under §101(49)(A)(xiii). ... With this key feature of a security missing, the Class PE Partner Interest was not a security as contemplated by §101(49)(A)(xiv)’s residual provision, and the Investment was not the purchase of a security of the Debtor or its affiliate as ... contemplated under §510(b), notwithstanding its broad application.

Section 101(49)(A)(i) includes a note in the definition of a security; a written promise to pay a definite sum at a specified time qualifies as a note.

Kelley v. Safe Harbor Managed Acct. 101 · filed 2022-04-21(49)(A)(i)

The term “security” is defined by the Code as including a “note.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(49)(A)(i). ... This definition clearly encompasses the MGC Finance Notes, which provided that MGC Finance promised to pay Metro or its assigns a definite sum of money at a specified time.

Section 101(49)(B)(vii) excludes debt for goods sold and delivered or services rendered from the definition of a security.

In Re: Arcapita Bank B.S.C.(C) · filed 2022-05-23(49)(B)(vii)

In addition, and as the Bankruptcy Court noted, the murabahas, by their own terms, do not qualify as securities because Section 101(49)(B)(vii) specifically excludes a “debt or evidence of indebtedness for goods sold and delivered or services rendered.”

Section 101(49)(A)(ii) includes privately held stock in the definition of a security.

Petr v. BMO Harris Bank N.A. · filed 2024-03-15(49)(A)(ii)

Because a “security” includes “stock,” the Trustee’s own alle- gations establish that the SPA was a contract for the purchase of a security, and therefore a securities contract.

Section 101(49) does not expressly classify an interest in a limited liability company as a security.

Horizon Pipeline and Construction, LLC · filed 2025-05-01(49)

The Bankruptcy Code does not expressly include an interest in an LLC in its definition of a “security,” and the parties have presented conflicting case law regarding the interpretation and ... application of WeStreet’s affirmative defense.

Section 101(49) does not expressly include LLC interests in its definition of a security; whether an interest qualifies requires further analysis.

Luke Homen, Chapter 7 Trustee v. WeStreet Credit Union · filed 2025-05-01(49)

While the Court acknowledges that the statutory text should generally be broadly construed, it is incomplete since it does not specifically include an interest in an LLC. Thus, this Court must resort to case law and, perhaps, legislative history, to determine the issues presented in WeStreet’s Motion.

Section 101(49) defines “security” to include stock.

BMO HARRIS BANK, N.A. v. JOHN J. PETR, TRUSTEE FOR BWGS, LLC · filed 2023-05-02(49)

"Security" is defined in a general definitions section of the Bankruptcy Code as, among other things, "stock." 11 U.S.C. § 101(49).

Section 101 does not define “dependent,” so the term takes its ordinary meaning in bankruptcy disclosures.

Leslie Womack Real Estate, Inc. v. Dunbar (In Re Dunbar) · filed 1989-04-21

Furthermore, “dependent” is not defined in the general definitional section of the Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101(5) includes a futures commission merchant with customers in its definition of a commodity broker.

Inskeep v. Grosso (In Re Financial Partners, Ltd.) · filed 1990-07-26(5)

Accordingly, for the purposes of Section 764, Financial is a futures commission merchant and thus a commodity broker, and Section 764(a) applies.

Section 101(6) requires a commodity broker to be a futures commission merchant with a customer; receiving funds transferred by another merchant does not itself qualify an entity.

In Re MF Global Holdings Ltd. · filed 2012-02-01(6)

Section 101(6) of the Bankruptcy Code provides two requirements for an entity to be considered a “commodity broker.” ... Based on the foregoing, it follows that if customer funds were solicited and accepted by MFGI and then transferred to the Chapter 11 Debtors, the Chapter 11 Debtors would still not be considered an FCM or “commodity broker” under the Bankruptcy Code and the CEA.

Section 101(46) requires a securities dealer to have customers to qualify as a stockbroker.

Max WIDER, Appellant, v. Dale WOOTTON, Trustee of the Estate of Ronald Cohen, Appellee · filed 1990-09-06(46)

11 U.S.C. § 101(46) (1984) (emphasis added). The critical aspect of this definition is the “customer” requirement; if a securities dealer has no “customers,” then the dealer is not a “stockbroker.”

Section 101(54)(B) includes dealers who transact in securities with the public from their own accounts within the definition of stockbroker.

Nos. 90-1243, 90-1245 · filed 1991-12-30(54)(B)

However, the definition of "stockbroker" was intentionally fashioned to include dealers who "effect[ ] transactions in securities ... with members of the general public, from or for such person's own account," 11 U.S.C. § 101(54)(B) (emphasis added), and "customer," as used in the Code is a term of art, broadly defined in § 741(2) to "include anybody that interacts with the [broker] in a capacity that concerns securities transactions."

Section 101(54)(B) includes dealers who trade securities with the public from or for their own accounts in the definition of stockbroker.

Kaiser Steel Corp v. Pearl Brewing Co. · filed 1991-12-30(54)(B)

However, the definition of "stockbroker” was intentionally fashioned to include dealers who "effect[ ] transactions in securities ... with members of the general public, from or for such person's own account" 11 U.S.C. § 101(54)(B) (emphasis added), and "customer," as used in the Code is a term of art, broadly defined in § 741(2) to "include anybody that interacts with the [broker] in a capacity that concerns securities transactions.” S.Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 100 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5886.

Section 101(53A) does not require a stockbroker to be a licensed broker-dealer.

WesBanco Bank Barnesville v. Rafoth (In re Baker & Getty Financial Services, Inc.) · filed 1997-02-12(53A)

Section 101(53A), however, does not require that one be a licensed broker-dealer before becoming a stockbroker, and nothing in the legislative history suggests that the legislature intended that licensed broker-dealers alone qualify for stockbroker status.

Section 101(53A) determines stockbroker status from the debtor’s overall securities business, so fraud in transactions with particular customers does not remove that status.

In Re: Baker & Getty Financial Services, Inc. · filed 1997-03-07(53A)

Section 101(53A) defines a stockbroker, not on a customer-by-customer basis, but as one "engaged in the business...." In other words, we look not to a single maverick transaction when determining whether a person is a stockbroker but, instead, to the underlying business at issue.

Section 101(53A) defines a stockbroker as a person with at least one customer who engages in the business of effecting securities transactions.

Hays v. Morgan Stanley Dw Inc. (In Re Stewart Finance Co.) · filed 2007-03-30(53A)

Section 101(53A) is clear and unambiguous that a stockbroker is a person who has at least one customer, as that term is defined in § 741(2), and who engages in the business of effecting transactions in securities.

Section 101(53A) requires a person to have customers and engage in the business of effecting securities transactions to qualify as a stockbroker.

Slatkin v. Neilson · filed 2008-05-06(53A)(B)

To be a “stockbroker” under the Bankruptcy Code, an individual has to (1) have a “customer” as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 741, and (2) be “engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities — (i) for the account of others; or (ii) with members of the general public, from or for such person’s own account.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(53A). We hold that although Slatkin had “customers,” he was not “engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities,” and was not, therefore a “stockbroker.”

Section 101(53A)(B) requires a stockbroker to be in the business of effecting securities transactions; placing trades through other brokers does not satisfy that requirement.

Johnson v. Neilson · filed 2008-05-06(53A)(B)

We hold that Slatkin was not “engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities” and therefore was not a “stockbroker.”

Section 101(53A)'s definition of stockbroker covers Lehman Brothers.

American Home Mortgage Investment Corp. v. Lehman Bros. (In Re American Home Mortgage, Holdings, Inc.) · filed 2008-05-23(53A)

As the Court finds that Lehman Brothers is a "stockbroker,” an analysis of whether Lehman Brothers is a "financial participant” is unnecessary.

Section 101(53A) defines a firm as a stockbroker when it effects securities transactions through some divisions, even if another division does not trade for its clients.

Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC · filed 2012-05-15(53A)

As to whether Madoff Securities was a “stockbroker” under the Bankruptcy Code, section 101(53A) of the Code defines “stockbroker” to include entities that “engage[ ] in the business of effecting transactions in securities.” ... Thus, even assuming the truth of the allegation that Madoff Securities’ investment advisory division never traded securities on behalf of clients, Madoff Securities nonetheless qualifies as a stockbroker by virtue of the trading conducted by its market making and proprietary trading divisions.

Section 101(35A) omits trademarks from its definition of intellectual property, so § 365(n) does not determine what happens to trademark rights when a license is rejected.

Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC · filed 2012-07-09(35A)

The limited definition in §101(35A) means that §365(n) does ... not affect trademarks one way or the other.

Section 101(56)(A) includes trade secrets in the definition of intellectual property, with state law determining whether information is a trade secret.

Harmon v. McGee (In Re McGee) · filed 1993-08-19(56)(A)

Section 101(56)(A) of the Code defines one type of “intellectual property” as “trade secrets.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(56)(A). State law defines what property constitutes a trade secret. ... It appears to this Court that the Bill of Materials would constitute a “trade secret” under Virginia law.

Section 101(35A) excludes trademarks and trade names from its definition of intellectual property.

In Re HQ Global Holdings, Inc. · filed 2003-02-25(35A)

Trade names, trademarks, and other proprietary marks are expressly excluded from the definition of “intellectual property.”

Section 101(35A) covers patent applications to the extent applicable nonbankruptcy law protects them.

Keen, Inc. v. Gecker · filed 2003-05-16(35A)

Under the current code, patent applications are subject to bankruptcy administration “to the extent [they are] protected by applicable non-bankruptcy law.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A).

Section 101(35A)'s definition of intellectual property excludes trademarks.

In Re Exide Technologies · filed 2006-04-03(35A)

11 U.S.C. § 101(35A). It is clear from the plain language of this definition that trademarks are excluded.

Section 101(35A)’s definition of intellectual property excludes trademarks.

In Re Dynamic Tooling Systems, Inc. · filed 2006-08-31(35A)

Hantover’s license to use DTS’s trademarks and service marks is not protected by § 365(n) at all because trademarks are not “intellectual property” as that term is defined in the Code, § 101(35A).

Section 101(35A) excludes trademarks from the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of intellectual property.

Szilagyi Ex Rel. Lakewood Engineering & Manufacturing Co. v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC (In Re Lakewood Enginee · filed 2011-09-29(35A)

Section 365(n) does not apply to trademarks, however, because the Code’s definition of intellectual property, found at § 101(35A), does not include trademarks.

Section 101(35A)’s omission of trademarks from the definition of intellectual property does not itself bar protection of trademark licensees after rejection.

In re Crumbs Bake Shop, Inc. · filed 2014-10-31(35A)

While § 365(n) applies to intellectual property licenses, the definition of “intellectual property” is not found within that section of the Bankruptcy Code; rather, the definition is found in § 101(35A). Therein, Congress failed to include explicitly trademarks. ... This Court adopts a position which differs from LFAC’s limited view of § 365(n), and holds that reasoning by negative inference is improper in the context of the rejection of trademark licenses.

Section 101(35A) defines intellectual property without including trademarks or logos.

Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology LLC (In re Tempnology LLC) · filed 2016-11-18(35A)

We agree that § 365(n) incorporates the definition of intellectual property set forth in § 101(35A), and that the definition does not encompass trademarks and logos.

Section 101(35A) defines intellectual property through an exhaustive list that excludes trademarks.

Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC · filed 2018-01-12(35A)

In defining the intellectual property eligible for the protection of section 365(n), Congress expressly listed six kinds of intellectual property. 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A). Trademark licenses (hardly something one would forget about) are not listed, even though relatively obscure property such as “mask work protected under chapter 9 of title 17” is included. Id. Nor does the statute contain any catchall or residual clause from which one might infer the inclusion of properties beyond those expressly listed.

Section 101(51B) requires proof of a single project; mere intent to develop property does not establish one.

In re Alvion Properties, Inc. · filed 2015-09-17(51B)

The movant has the burden of proving a “single project” and if mere intent is insufficient to prove multiple projects, it is insufficient to prove a “single project.”

Section 101(51B) requires multiple properties to be used together in a common scheme to qualify as a single project; excluding any property defeats that classification.

In Re Hassen Imports Partnership · filed 2012-03-07(51B)

Thus, the exclusion of any property from the common scheme precludes a finding that a single project exists.

Section 101(51B)’s definition of single asset real estate does not cover a marina that operates a boating business beyond renting moorings.

In Re Kkemko, Inc. · filed 1995-04-26(51B)

The drafters and promulgators of § 101(51B) were working in a bankruptcy context, and we have no doubt that their intention in using the phrase “single asset real estate” grew out of the common usage of that term in bankruptcy. By it, they meant a building or buildings which were intended to be income producing, or raw land. With that interpretation, debtor’s marina is not embraced within the phrase.

Section 101(51B) can treat a series of semidetached houses operated by one debtor as a single real estate project.

In Re Philmont Development Co. · filed 1995-05-12(51B)

For all the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that each of the limited partnerships constitute a “single project” within the purview of section 101(51B).

Section 101(51B) includes undeveloped real property that generates no income and counts the full amount of asserted secured claims toward its $4 million limit regardless of property value.

In Re Oceanside Mission Associates · filed 1996-01-25(51B)

For the reasons set forth above this Court concludes that the definition of “single asset real estate” in section 101(51B) includes undeveloped real property which generates no income, and that the calculation of the amount of “aggregate non-contingent, liquidated secured debts” is to be based upon the full amount of asserted secured claims without respect to the value of the property.

Section 101(51B) excludes a full service hotel from single asset real estate when its operations amount to more than operating the property; calling a building a hotel alone is insufficient.

Centofante v. CBJ Development, Inc. (In Re CBJ Development, Inc.) · filed 1996-09-17(51B)

Thus, although merely calling a building a hotel is insufficient to remove it from the definition of “single asset real estate,” the operation of a full service hotel is more than the mere operation of property.

Section 101(51B)'s definition of single asset real estate excludes a debtor whose secured debts exceed $4,000,000.

In Re Jacksonville Riverfront Development, Ltd. · filed 1997-11-10(51B)

The Court is conscious of the fact that the instant case does not qualify as a “single asset real estate" case as defined under the Bankruptcy Code because the debtor's secured debts exceed $4,000,000.

Section 101(51B) excludes property used for substantial business activities beyond operating the real estate from the definition of single asset real estate.

In Re Larry Goodwin Golf, Inc. · filed 1997-11-26(51B)

Debtor operates a.golf course with associated golf car rentals, a pool, provides concessions, and owns adjacent land that is currently for sale. All of these activities constitute operating a business on the property versus simply the holding of real property solely for income. ... Debtor does not fit within the definition of a single asset real estate case.

A residential rental building with less than $4 million in encumbering debt and no business beyond renting qualifies as single asset real estate.

In Re Syed · filed 1999-05-13(51B)

The premises is single asset real estate under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3) and as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(51B).

Section 101(51B)'s definition of single asset real estate includes property formerly used and intended to be used again to produce income, even if it currently generates none.

In Re Syed · filed 1999-08-16(51B)

Debtor’s only argument contends that the phrase “generates substantially all of the gross income of a debtor” in section 101(51B) is limited solely to present income (since the Premises currently generates no income) and does not include future income (even though Debtor seeks rehabilitation of the property so that it will then generate substantially all of her income and substantially all income used to fund the plan). It seems clear, however, from the relevant case law, that “single asset real estate” includes property formerly used and intended to be used in the future as income producing property.

Section 101(51B) recognizes single asset real estate cases, so owning a single real estate asset does not by itself make a bankruptcy filing bad faith.

In Re Balboa Street Beach Club, Inc. · filed 2005-01-05(51B)

A single asset real estate is not per se a bad faith filing, since Congress in the 1994 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code implicitly allowed “single asset real estate” cases by assigning a definition to them under 11 U.S.C. § 101(51B).

Section 101(51B) excludes a hotel from single asset real estate when its services amount to a substantial business beyond operating the property; a gift shop or restaurant is not required.

In Re Whispering Pines Estate, Inc. · filed 2006-04-10(51B)

The existence or nonexistence of those services is not determinative, though such services are to be considered. In this case the Debtor’s hotel operations, even without those services, constitute more than “the business of operating the real property.”

Section 101(51B)'s definition of single asset real estate does not cover these debtors' gas station and convenience store properties.

In Re Northwest Timberline Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2006-09-15(51B)

While these *431 cases do not technically meet the codified definition of a “single asset real estate” case under 11 U.S.C. § 101(51B), the Debtors’ only substantive assets are the collateral securing Chevron’s loans to the Debtors — ie., the two properties housing the two gas stations/convenience stores.