11 U.S.C. § 101

Section 101(36) includes attachment liens within the definition of judicial liens.

Saturley v. Casco Northern Bank, N.A. (In Re Saturley) · filed 1993-01-08(36)

Attachment liens are "judicial liens.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(36).

A mortgage lien that survives foreclosure is not a judicial lien because the mortgage, rather than the foreclosure judgment, created the lien.

Matter of Kennedy · filed 1993-09-10(36)

“Judicial lien” is a defined term in the Code meaning a “lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.” ... In contrast, the lien which remains a charge against property following the entry of a foreclosure judgment was obtained by, or arose, consensually, when the underlying mortgage and note or bond were executed.

Section 101(36) classifies a lien arising from a stipulated judgment as a judicial lien when the lien derives from the judgment rather than the settlement agreement.

Bank of Stockton v. Applebaum (In Re Applebaum) · filed 1993-09-27(36)

A “judicial lien,” on the other hand, is a lien obtained by “a judgment, levy, sequestration or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(36). ... Moreover, the Bank’s lien is judicial because it derives its power from a subsequently executed judgment.

Section 101(36) defines a judicial lien as a type of lien, so a reference to any lien includes judicial liens.

In Re Jean R. Deseno, Debtor. Midlantic National Bank v. Jean R. Deseno, Us Trustee, Trustee · filed 1994-03-16(36)

The definition of judicial lien, by making an internal reference to the concept of “lien,” suggests not that a judicial lien is something distinct from a lien generally, but instead that it is a part of that larger class. As a result, a reference to “any lien” surely includes judicial liens.

Section 101(36) covers a prejudgment real estate attachment as a judicial lien when it is valid and perfected under state law.

In Re Giordano · filed 1994-06-27(36)

The Cherenzias recorded their attachment on October 4,1991, and they have a valid and perfected judicial hen as of that date, within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(36).

Section 101(36) defines a judicial lien as one obtained by judgment or other legal proceeding.

In re Howard · filed 1994-08-18(36)

Conveniently, 11 U.S.C. § 101(36) provides the definition of a judicial lien. This section of the code defines a judicial lien as a lien obtained by judgment or other legal proceeding.

Section 101(36) defines a judicial lien to include a garnishment lien.

In Re Page · filed 1994-08-15(36)

A judicial lien is defined as a lien “obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(36). A garnishment lien is a judicial hen.

Section 101(36) treats a lien acquired through attachment and execution as a judicial lien.

In Re Bates · filed 1994-12-13(36)

First Citizens' lien upon the IRA is a "judicial lien." See § 101(36) (defining "judicial lien" to include liens acquired by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding).

Section 101(36) does not treat recording an agreed lien as creating a judicial lien when there is no judgment or administrative adjudicatory process.

Phillippy v. Corkscrew Woodlands Associates, Inc. (In Re Phillippy) · filed 1994-10-07(36)

In the case before us, we have neither a judgment nor an administrative adjudicatory process to support the argument that a judicial lien was created by the recordation of the lien. We simply have a document recorded in the proper county office evidencing a lien as tacitly agreed to by the Debtor when he purchased the property in question.

Section 101(36) includes a lien obtained through divorce proceedings in the definition of a judicial lien, regardless of its state law label.

In Re Levi · filed 1995-06-05(36)

The Bankruptcy Code defines “judicial hen” as a “hen obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(36). ... As such, the lien in question is a judicial lien under the Bankruptcy Code definition.

Section 101(36) treats a lien created by a recorded money judgment as a judicial lien.

In Re Thornton · filed 1995-07-17(36)

The Code further specifies that a judicial lien is a “lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding-” 11 U.S.C. § 101(36). ... The Court finds that the lien obtained by the claimants is a judicial lien within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 522(f).

Section 101(36) includes a recorded prejudgment attachment within the definition of a judicial lien when state law makes the attachment a valid and perfected lien.

In Re Giordano · filed 1995-10-25(36)

Therefore, the Cherenzias’ preudgment attachment constitutes a valid and perfected “judicial lien” under 11 U.S.C. § 101(36) on the real property attached, making them secured creditors under 11 U.S.C. § 506.

Section 101(36) defines a judicial lien to include a Minnesota homestead lien established through a judgment.

In Re Croce · filed 1995-12-28(36)

11 U.S.C. § 101(36) defines the term “judicial lien” as: ... Under the well established and well reasoned law of the District, liens established pursuant to Article I, Section 12, of the Minnesota Constitution, are “judicial liens” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1); and, they are avoidable by debtors to the extent that the liens impair exemptions to which debtors would have been entitled.

Section 101 defines a judicial lien as a lien obtained by judgment and a lien as an interest in property securing payment of a debt.

Straub v. Straub (In Re Straub) · filed 1996-02-22(36), (37)

A “judicial lien” is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(36) as a lien obtained by judgment. The term “lien” is defined as including an interest in property to secure payment of a debt. 11 U.S.C. § 101(37). As holder of a judicial lien, Cecilia was vested with an interest in property, the conversion of which is addressable by § 523(a)(6).

Section 101(36) defines a garnishment lien as a judicial lien.

In Re Vasquez · filed 1997-02-12(36)

First, it is undisputed that Mount Sinai has a judicial lien as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(36). Section 101(36) provides that ‘“judicial lien’ means lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(36). A garnishment lien is a “judicial lien.”

Section 101(36) treats a perfected lien granted to a secured creditor in a consensual order against the debtor’s collateral as a judicial lien.

In Re Waste Conversion Technologies, Inc. · filed 1997-01-24(36)

A perfected lien against the debtor’s collateral, granted to a secured creditor in a consensual order, is a judicial lien contemplated by § 101(36).

Section 101(36) does not classify a condominium assessment lien created under Maryland law without judicial action as a judicial lien.

King v. Cherrywood Residents Ass'n (In Re King) · filed 1997-05-07(36)

Accordingly, the court finds that the condominium lien obtained pursuant to the applicable subject provisions of Maryland law is not a judicial lien as defined under the Bankruptcy Code.

A judgment on a lien created by a homeowners’ association declaration does not turn the security interest into a judicial lien under § 101.

In Re Beckley · filed 1997-05-12(36), (51)

Although the hen is in the form of a Final Judgment, which, at first blush, appears to be a “lien obtained by judgment,” substantively, the lien stems from a security interest through the Declaration. After examining the nature of the lien, and not the form in which it appeal’s before the Court, the hen is not avoidable pursuant to section 522(f)(1) because it is a security interest, rather than a “judicial hen.”

Section 101(36) does not treat a lien as a judicial lien merely because a court clerk records it on the judgment docket.

In Re Fennelly · filed 1997-06-16(36)

The mere ministerial act of recording the hen does not create the requisite legal process or proceeding required to be a judicial hen.

Section 101(36) defines a judicial lien as one obtained through a judgment or legal or equitable process; a judgment recognizing a preexisting equitable lien does not make it a judicial lien.

Cloud v. Cloud (In Re Cloud) · filed 1997-07-17(36)

Under the Bankruptcy Code, a judicial hen is a “hen obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(36) (1994). ... The chancellor’s imposition of the hen merely recognized the Plaintiffs pre-existing property right, which was equitable rather than judicial in nature.

Section 101(36) includes a recorded judgment lien on a debtor’s real property within the definition of a judicial lien.

Canelos v. Mignini (In Re Canelos) · filed 1997-07-22(36)

A “judicial lien” is defined in the Bankruptcy Code as a "lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(36). ... The judgment rendered in the District Court of Maryland for Baltimore County became a judicial lien on the real properly owned by Mr. Canelos on September 29, 1996, when the respondent recorded the Notice of Lien among the land records in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County.

Section 101(36) includes a judgment lien within the definition of a judicial lien.

In Re Ulmer · filed 1997-08-20(36)

Clearly, Centura’s judgment lien is a judicial lien as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(36), but Centura argues that its judgment lien may not be avoided because Mr. Ulmer did not have an interest in the property that preceded the fixing of the lien.

Section 101(36) defines judicial liens to include garnishment and wage deduction liens.

In Re Andres · filed 1997-09-16(36)

A garnishment or wage deduction lien is a judicial lien. A judicial lien is a “lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(36). A garnishment or wage deduction lien is such a creature.

Section 101(36) includes wage deduction liens within its definition of judicial liens.

In Re Youngblood · filed 1997-09-16(36)

A judicial hen is a “hen obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(36). A garnishment or wage deduction hen is a such a creature.

A lien created by service of a garnishment summons and writ is a judicial lien under § 101(36).

Thomas v. Beneficial of Missouri (In Re Thomas) · filed 1997-11-28(36)

The lien created by service of a summons and writ of garnishment in these circumstances is a judicial lien. 11 U.S.C. § 101(36).

Section 101(36)’s definition of a judicial lien does not include a landlord’s interest in a security deposit applied against a judgment without steps to create a judicial lien.

In Re Johnson · filed 1997-12-16(36)

The Landlord’s interest in the security deposit (whatever the correct amount) was in the nature of a secured claim which, at all relevant times, was in the Landlord’s control and at least its constructive possession until it setoff. It was more akin to a pledge and hence a “lien” for purposes of § 101(37), and not a “judicial lien” as defined in § 101(36).

A lien created by a writ of execution is a judicial lien under § 101(36).

Nevettie v. Doering (In Re Nevettie) · filed 1998-03-10(36)

The lien of writ of execution is a judicial hen. 11 U.S.C. § 101(36).

Section 101(36) defines a judicial lien to include a lien obtained through a judgment or other legal process.

Bruin Portfolio, LLC v. Leicht (In Re Leicht) · filed 1998-07-07(36)

Bruin’s lien is a “judicial lien” within the meaning of the Code.

Section 101(36) defines a judicial lien as one obtained through judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process; a voluntarily granted lien is consensual.

In re Kemper · filed 1998-09-30(36)

Since Debtors gave the hen voluntarily, the lien must be classified as a consensual hen. ... A judicial hen is defined by the Code as “a hen obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding”. 11 U.S.C. § 101(36) (1997). ... LNB holds a consensual hen on Debtors’ homestead, and, therefore, Debtors cannot meet the requirements of § 522(f)(1)(A).

A divorce decree that creates a charge on property to secure payment can create a judicial lien under § 101.

Brasslett v. Brasslett (In Re Brasslett) · filed 1999-03-18(36), (37)

Pursuant to Fam-ey, I have no difficulty concluding that if the Brasslett decree, within its four corners, effected a “charge against or interest in” Ronald’s tools of the trade “to secure payment” of the property settlement, see § 101(37) (defining “lien” for the purposes of the Code), then it is a judicial lien, see 101(36) (defining judicial lien), that Ronald may not avoid. ... From that fact, it follows that the divorce decree itself fixed Patricia’s lien on the marital property no later than contemporaneously with its transformation to Ronald’s individual property.

An attorney’s charging lien created before judgment is not a judicial lien under § 101(36) merely because it is later reduced to judgment.

In Re Felizardo · filed 2000-11-07(36)

Since Rodriguez’ charging lien under Florida law does not fit within the Bankruptcy Code definition of “judicial lien” under § 101(36), the Debtor may not avoid the lien under § 522(f).

A security interest does not become a judicial lien merely because the secured claim is reduced to a foreclosure judgment; the interest remains intact unless the judgment expressly cancels or avoids it.

In Re Chu · filed 2001-01-31(36)

A “judicial hen” is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(36) as a “lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.” ... From this discussion, the Court concludes that, when a claim based on a security interest is reduced to judgment, while the claim may merge into the judgment, the security interest remains intact unless the judgment expressly cancels or avoids it.

Section 101(36) excludes a valid Florida attorney's charging lien from the definition of a judicial lien because the lien arises by operation of law before judicial proceedings.

Weed v. Washington · filed 2001-02-28(36)

We agree that a valid attorney's charging lien under Florida law arises by operation of law in advance of judicial proceedings and thus is not "obtained by judgment" as required for a judicial lien pursuant to § 101(36) of the Bankruptcy Code.

A personal money judgment creates a judicial lien, while foreclosure of an existing construction lien does not change that statutory lien into a judicial lien.

In Re Harpole · filed 2001-03-23(36), (53)

If the state court foreclosure judgment had been entered prior to bankruptcy, such judicial action would have been to enforce the lien, not to create the lien. Consequently, the judicial foreclosure would not have changed the statutory lien to a judicial lien. ... The entry of the personal money judgment against Debtors, without reference to the construction lien or its foreclosure, constitutes a judicial lien which is avoidable under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1)(A).

Under § 101(36) and (53), a lien that requires a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding to establish liability is a judicial lien rather than one arising solely by force of statute.

Straffi v. Anheuser Busch, Inc. (In Re Downey) · filed 2001-04-12(36), (53)

Thus, the lien does not arise “solely by force of statute” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(53) defining a statutory lien. ... For these reasons, the NJ-DWC is a judgment lien because under the terms of the statute it is one “obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding”, in accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 101(36).

Section 101(36) includes liens created through legal proceedings even when no appealable judgment has been entered.

In re Schalebaum · filed 2001-06-14(36)

It is not necessary for there to be an appealable judgment in order to create a judicial lien as any legal process or proceeding can create a judicial lien.

A lien on wages obtained through a wage deduction proceeding is a judicial lien under § 101(36).

In Re Rasberry · filed 2001-07-10(36)

For purposes of analysis under the Bankruptcy Code, the Judgment Creditor holds a judicial lien as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(36), which was obtained pre-petition and is a secured claim under § 506(b) in the Debtor’s earned, but unpaid, pre-petition wages and future post-petition wages, and not just those earned over a 12 week period.

Section 101(36) defines a judicial lien to include a lien created by a writ of garnishment.

In Re Bensen · filed 2001-05-17(36)

The Bankruptcy Code defines “judicial lien” as “a hen obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.” ... It is well established that a writ of garnishment constitutes a judicial hen for purposes of the hen avoidance provisions of § 522(f).

Section 101(36) defines a judicial lien to include a lien created by recording a confession of judgment.

In Re Higgins · filed 2001-10-30(36)

The Bankruptcy Code defines a judicial lien as a "lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding" 11 U.S.C. § 101(36). A lien obtained by the recording of a confession of judgment is unquestionably a lien obtained "by judgment" and by "legal . . . process."

Section 101(36) defines a judicial lien to include a lien obtained by recording a confession of judgment.

Kevin F. v. Erickson (In re Kevin F.) · filed 2001-10-30(36)

The Bankruptcy Code defines a judicial lien as a “lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding” 11 U.S.C. § 101(36). A lien obtained by the recording of a confession of judgment is unquestionably a lien obtained “by judgment” and by “legal ... process.”

Section 101(36) defines a judicial lien to include a lien obtained through a legal proceeding.

In Re Bankruptcy Estate of Markair, Inc., Debtor. William Barstow, III v. United States Internal Revenue Service · filed 2002-10-21(36)

The parties agree that the IRS’s lien on the ARC collateral is a “judicial lien,” which is defined in the Bankruptcy Code as a “hen obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(36). We also agree with this characterization because the IRS’s lien arose as a result of a legal proceeding.

Section 101(36) covers a creditor’s levy on wages held by the debtor’s employer before remittance as a judicial lien.

In Re McGovern · filed 2003-06-11(36)

This motion presents a threshold-level issue: did the statutory collection procedures that First Select had used to bring about the withholding from the Debtor’s wages create a judicial lien within the definition of § 101(36), that was in existence when the Debtor filed for bankruptcy? ... In the possession of the State of Minnesota on the date of the Debtor’s bankruptcy filing, the wages withheld from her on First Select’s levy were subject to a hen in favor of First Select. That lien was one “obtained by ... levy.”

Section 101(36) includes a recorded judgment that creates a lien against the debtor’s real property within the definition of a judicial lien.

Conner v. Wrobel (In Re Conner) · filed 2003-11-06(36)

As such, the judgment at issue here qualifies as a judicial hen for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(36).

Section 101(36) treats a lien as a judicial lien when a statute effectively confers a judgment rather than an express lien.

In Re Schick · filed 2003-11-18(36)

Where, as here, a statute effectively confers a judgment rather than an express lien in favor of a party, the party holds a judicial lien, as that term is defined in the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(36) treats a lien obtained by a docketed judgment as a judicial lien even when a statute authorizes the judgment.

In Re James · filed 2004-01-30(36)

By focusing on whether the surcharge statute creates a lien that is “obtained by judgment” and not by statute, the Court concludes that the lien is a judicial lien.

Section 101(36) defines a judicial lien to include a lien created by a writ of attachment and notice of levy.

In Re Newell · filed 2004-03-19(36)

There is no question that the lien created by Pikes Peak’s Writ of Attachment and Notice of Levy is a “judicial lien” as that term is defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(36) which provides that a judicial lien “means ... [a] lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.”

A Minnesota attorney levy on funds in a debtor’s bank account creates a judicial lien under § 101(36) while the bank retains the funds.

In Re Howard · filed 2004-04-06(36)

On March 10, 2003, the date of the Debtors’ bankruptcy filing, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. held a judicial lien within the scope of 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(36) and 522(f)(1)(A) against the sum of $1,050.00, then on deposit in the Debtors’ account at Community Bank Minnesota Valley, Jordan, Minnesota.

Section 101(36) treats a recorded judgment that creates a lien on a debtor’s real property as a judicial lien.

Lindsey v. Spagnol (In Re Lindsey) · filed 2004-08-24(36)

As such, the judgment qualifies as a judicial lien for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101 defines a judicial lien to include a lien obtained by judgment, including a judgment lien created through a divorce settlement.

White v. White · filed 2004-11-05(36)

Because a "judicial lien" is one obtained by judgment, the lien also qualifies as a "judicial lien" for purposes of Title 11 of the U.S8.Code.

Section 101(36) defines a judicial lien to include a lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.

In Re Adell · filed 2005-02-01(36)

Further, it is clear from a plain reading of Section 101(36) that a lien does not have to be based on “judgment” to qualify as a “judicial lien” within the meaning of the statute. The definition is written in the disjunctive.

Section 101(36) covers a lien obtained through contested litigation and a judgment, even when a statute authorizes the action.

In Re Beaumont · filed 2006-02-28(36)

In this case, obtaining the judgment was not merely a ministerial act. The parties litigated certain contested issues in court, and a judgment was subsequently entered. The lien obtained by Creditor required judicial action, and thus is judicial in nature.

Section 101(36) defines a judicial lien to include a recorded judgment lien against property a debtor owns with a nondebtor spouse as tenants by the entirety.

In Re Moreno · filed 2006-09-20(36)

A judicial lien is one “obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(36). A lien filed and recorded with respect to property held in tenancy by the entirety by a debtor and his non-debtor spouse fits this definition.

Section 101(36) defines a judicial lien as a lien obtained by judgment or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.

In Re Kelly · filed 2006-09-20(36)

That the Creditor’s perfected lien is a “judicial lien” as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(36), as opposed to a “lien” as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(37), is not disputed because § 101(36) covers only those liens defined in § 101(37) that were obtained by judgment or other legal or equitable process or proceeding. Thus, the Creditor’s judgment against the Debtor, which was recorded against the Property thereby perfecting the lien, was the origin of the Creditor’s lien, not the subsequent foreclosure judgment obtained by Washington against the Property in which the Creditor’s junior judgment lien was found to be valid but subordinate to Washington’s lien.

Section 101(36) defines a judicial lien as a lien obtained by judgment or other legal or equitable process.

In Re Jerew · filed 2009-01-30(36)

First, the evidence before the Court indicates that the hens held by the Fahey Bank were neither obtained by consent nor arose by operation of law, but were rather procured through the legal process as the result of the Debtors’ failure to satisfy a monetary obligation. This makes the hens “judicial hens” within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code. A “judicial hen” is defined by the Code to mean a “hen obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(36).

Section 101(36) treats an equitable mortgage or other equitable lien obtained at least partly through a judgment or legal or equitable proceeding as a judicial lien.

Kedzuf v. Turetsky (In Re Turetsky) · filed 2009-04-02(36)

However, the Court instead chooses to reject outright the holding in Gugenhan, holding contrarily that an equitable mortgage — or any equitable lien, for that matter — constitutes a judicial lien, within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(36), because (a) it is necessarily obtained, at least in part, by way of a judgment (or legal or equitable process or proceeding), and (b) “judicial lien” under the Bankruptcy Code is not defined to mean a lien solely obtained by judgment, etc.

Section 101(36) includes liens obtained by judgment in the definition of judicial liens.

In Re Gardner · filed 2009-10-05(36)

The Dykeman lien and the Campbell lien are both judicial liens and they both impair Debtors’ claimed exemption.

Section 101(36) defines a judicial lien to include a lien obtained through a judgment or equitable proceeding.

Gamble-Ledbetter v. Andra Group, L.P. · filed 2009-10-27(36)

The Court notes that the equitable lien awarded in the Amended Judgment clearly constitutes a "judicial lien” under 11 U.S.C. § 101(36), which defines the term "judicial lien” as a "lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.”

A mortgage does not become a judicial lien under § 101(36) by virtue of a foreclosure.

In Re Ingram · filed 2010-01-28(36)

The Bankruptcy Code defines a "judicial lien" as one "obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding." 11 U.S.C. § 101(36). ... As the bankruptcy court explained to the Appellant at the hearing on his motion, a mortgage is not converted into a judicial lien by virtue of a foreclosure. The lien that Chase held on the Appellant's property was a mortgage, not a judicial lien.

A prejudgment attachment perfected by levy and possession qualifies as a judicial lien securing a contingent judgment.

In Re International Banking Corp. B.S.C. · filed 2010-11-23(36)

Although the CPLR does not describe the priority as a “lien,” the description fits. ... The Banks obtained a judicial lien securing their contingent judgment that is perfected under New York law as against all third parties.

Section 101(36) does not treat a consensual mortgage lien as a judicial lien merely because a foreclosure decree has been entered.

In Re Ruck · filed 2011-05-18(36)

The term “judicial lien” is defined in the Code at § 101(36) as a “lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.” ... While the mortgage may have “merged” into the foreclosure decree, that does not convert the consensual lien of the mortgage to a judicial lien that is avoidable by use of § 522(f)(1).

Section 101(36) defines a judicial lien as a lien obtained by judgment or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.

In Re Hunnicutt · filed 2011-08-23(36)

“Judicial lien” is defined in the Bankruptcy Code as a “lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(36). Mr. Drennan’s lien clearly meets this definition. In 2007, Mr. Drennan obtained a judgment against Debtor for unpaid wages. This judgment was obtained through a legal proceeding in the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas. As such, Mr. Drennan’s lien meets the definition of “judicial lien” set forth in section 101(36) and is subject to avoidance under section 522(f).

A lien obtained by a judgment is a judicial lien under § 101(36).

White v. Commercial Bank & Trust Co. (In Re White) · filed 2011-11-16(36)

A judicial lien is a lien obtained by a judgment. 11 U.S.C. § 101(36). Clearly, Commercial Bank’s lien is a judicial lien.

Section 101(36) defines judicial liens to include citation and garnishment liens.

In re Quade · filed 2012-10-10(36)

To be clear, there is no question— despite EEI’s limited arguments to the contrary-that citation hens and garnishment Hens are, in fact, judicial Hens within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code in general and section 522(f) specifically.

Section 101(36) defines a judicial lien as one obtained through a judgment or other legal process; a statutory attorney’s charging lien does not qualify, but a judgment lien does.

In re Benbow · filed 2013-08-27(36)

Stoor-man’s Judgment lien is a judicial lien, as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(36) because it was obtained “by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.”

Section 101(36) defines a judicial lien as one obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process; a Pennsylvania lis pendens does not qualify.

Davis v. Dunmore Properties, Inc. (In re Davis) · filed 2013-12-12(36)

It follows that a lis pendens is not a judicial lien as defined in the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(36) includes an execution within the definition of a judicial lien.

In re D'Italia · filed 2014-03-18(36)

From the outset, it is important to recognize that Roberts is currently the holder of an execution, i.e., a judicial lien, and not a mortgage.

Section 101(36) defines a judicial lien as one obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or another legal or equitable process or proceeding.

In re Okrepka · filed 2015-03-04(36)

A judicial lien is a “lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.” ... Accordingly, Ivan holds what appears to be an unavoidable judgment hen that created an in rem interest in the Marital Residence to the extent of the award of the Equalization Payment and related interest, but not attorney’s fees.

Section 101(36) defines a judicial lien as one obtained through a judgment or similar legal process; a judgment must result in a lien attached to the debtor’s property to support a secured claim.

In re Ideal Mortgage Bankers, Ltd. · filed 2015-10-14(36)

Pursuant to section 101(36) of the Bankruptcy Code, the term “judicial lien” means a “lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(36). ... There is no evidence that the Default Judgment or the Execution Judgment resulted in a lien that attached to the Debtor’s assets under state law.

Section 101(36) defines a judicial lien to include a lien obtained by judgment.

CRP Holdings A-1, LLC v. O'Sullivan · filed 2016-01-19(36)

A “judicial lien” is a “lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(36). ... The lien at issue in this case was obtained by a judgment and thus falls within the scope of § 522(f)(1)(A).

Section 101(36) treats liens obtained by judgment or levy as judicial liens, even when they enforce an earlier assessment lien.

In re Coy · filed 2016-06-23(36)

A judicial lien, in turn, is defined as a lien “obtained by” judgment, levy, etc. 11 U.S.C. § 101(36). The liens sought to be avoided by the Motions fit this definition.

Section 101 classifies a lien resulting from a legal or equitable process or proceeding as a judicial lien rather than a lien arising solely by force of statute.

In re Leaks · filed 2016-07-08(36), (53)

An analysis of the facts and appropriate law compels the conclusion that the Certificates represent avoidable judicial liens as they do not “aris[e] solely by force of a statute on specified circumstances or conditions,” but rather as a result of “other legal or equitable process or proceeding.”

Section 101(5) includes a judicial lien in its definition of a claim because the lien gives its holder an enforceable right to payment against the debtor’s property.

Milliner v. Action Motors, Inc. (In re Milliner) · filed 2016-07-22(5)

Action’s judicial lien is a claim under § 101(5). It is an enforceable obligation against the Debtor’s property that attached to the Debtor’s personal property upon entry of the judgment.

Section 101(36) defines a judicial lien as a lien obtained by judgment or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.

In re Sternat · filed 2016-08-05(36)

Sarazin’s lien is a judicial lien. Any “charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation” (11 U.S.C. § 101(37)) “obtained by judgment ... or other legal or equitable process or proceeding” (11 U.S.C. § 101(36)) is a judicial lien for purposes of § 522(f).

Section 101(36) defines a judicial lien as a lien obtained through a judgment or other legal process; a judgment that creates no lien on the debtor’s property does not qualify.

Hunsicker v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC (In re Hunsicker) · filed 2017-01-12(36)

11 U.S.C. § 101(36) defines judicial lien as a lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding. ... The Debtor’s argument fails because, as referenced above, with no present ownership of real estate nor a writ of execution by a sheriff on the Debtor’s personal property, the entry of the judgment on the dockets of the court of common pleas in and of itself does not create a judgment lien subject to avoidability under the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101 distinguishes judicial liens from statutory liens; a federal tax lien is a statutory lien.

Mae Helen Burge · filed 2019-10-14(36), (53)

The tax lien which is the subject of this dispute is not a judicial lien, but a statutory lien which may not be avoided under § 522(f).

Section 101 classifies a lien obtained through mandatory administrative adjudication as a judicial lien rather than a statutory lien arising solely by force of law.

Shuntavia D Wigfall · filed 2019-10-29(36), (53)

The City’s lien did not arise solely by operation of the ordinance but only after completion of the mandatory administrative processes required by the ordinances. The lien is judicial, not statutory.

Section 101(36) defines a judicial lien to include a lien obtained by judgment.

COOPER ELECTRIC SUPPLY CO. VS. J & JAY ELECTRIC, INC. (L-4401-09, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-09-11(36)

No doubt, Cooper Electric's judgment lien is a "judicial lien" under the section. A "judicial lien" is a "lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding." 11 U.S.C. § 101(36).

A lien created through a legal or equitable proceeding is a judicial lien under § 101(36).

State Treasurer v. Wigger · filed 2020-11-16(36)

Accordingly, so long as the lien arises from a “legal or equitable process or proceeding,” it satisfies the definition of judicial lien.

Section 101 defines a debt as liability on a claim; a judicial lien securing that liability is not itself a debt.

Alliance Coal, LLC v. Savage · filed 2021-01-14(12)

While it may undoubtedly be a subtle difference, debts and judicial liens are distinguishable under the Bankruptcy Code. The former is a liability. The latter is a lien, a secured interest, obtained by a judgment. ... The judicial lien, itself, is not a debt.

Section 101(36) covers a lien obtained through prior adjudications even when the judgments do not themselves create the lien.

The City of Chicago v. Howard · filed 2021-01-29(36)

Regardless, the Court concludes that the City’s interpretation of the “obtained by” language as requiring a direct link between the final determinations of liability and the lien is entirely too narrow. It is not necessary that the instrument embodying a final determination of liability expressly create a lien; it is enough that the City’s ability to immobilize a vehicle and thus obtain a lien is dependent on prior judicial action. Put differently, because the lien is based on the combined effect of a certain number of judgments, it is obtained by those judgments.

A lien can be a judicial lien when obtaining it depends on prior judgments, even if the judgments do not themselves create the lien.

The City of Chicago v. Mance · filed 2021-01-29(36)

Regardless, the Court concludes that the City’s interpretation of the “obtained by” language as requiring a direct link between the final determinations of liability and the lien is entirely too narrow. It is not necessary that the instrument embodying a final determination of liability expressly create a lien; it is enough that the City’s ability to immobilize a vehicle and thus obtain a lien is dependent on prior judicial action.

Section 101(36) defines a judicial lien to include a lien obtained by judgment, regardless of the origin of the underlying debt.

Albarran v. Rivera · filed 2021-05-20(36)

As such, it was clearly a “lien obtained by judgment” in a nonconsensual legal process and, therefore, constitutes a “judicial lien” within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code.

A writ of execution on a debtor’s property qualifies as a judicial lien.

Nataly Minkina · filed 2021-07-28(36)

As used in the Bankruptcy Code, “lien” means, in relevant part, “charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt,” and “judicial lien” means “lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(37) (defining lien) and (36) (defining judicial lien). ... The parties agree, and the Court holds, that RP&S’s execution constitutes a lien and, in particular, a judicial lien within the meaning of § 522(f).

Section 101’s definitions include a creditor’s judgment lien as a judicial lien.

Robert Lawrence Moody, Jr. · filed 2021-09-30(36), (37)

The first two Farrey conditions for lien avoidance are met. There is no dispute that Kingston’s judgment lien is a “judicial lien” within the meaning of § 522(f)(1)(A) and as defined in § 101(36), (37) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101(36), (37).

A lien that depends on prior quasi-judicial proceedings is a judicial lien, even if a statute makes it attach automatically after impoundment.

City of Chicago v. Mance · filed 2022-04-21(36), (53)

Because Chicago’s impoundment lien on Mance’s vehicle did not arise solely by force of statute, the lien is a judicial lien for purposes of Mance’s bankruptcy.

Section 101(36)’s definition of a judicial lien includes a lien created by a divorce judgment to secure a spouse’s equity award.

Lunn v. Lunn · filed 2022-06-21(36)

There is no dispute that the Debtor’s equity award constitutes a judicial lien.

Section 101(36) defines a judicial lien as one obtained through a judgment or legal process; a consensual mortgage lien is not a judicial lien.

Disen v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC · filed 2022-05-31(36)

As defined by the Bankruptcy Code, a “judicial lien” is a “lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.” 11 U.S.C. §101(36). A consensual mortgage lien is not a judicial lien and cannot be avoided under §522(f)(1)(A).

Section 101(36) includes a lien created by recording an abstract of judgment within the definition of a judicial lien.

Charles Thomas Huth · filed 2022-06-10(36)

The Court concludes that the lien created by the Abstract of Judgment was “obtained by” judgment and is within the Bankruptcy Code definition of “judicial lien.”

Section 101 distinguishes judicial liens obtained through legal process from statutory liens arising by force of statute; the Oklahoma hospital liens are statutory liens.

Charlie Frank Martin and Misty Dawn Martin · filed 2022-07-19(36), (53)

The term “judicial lien” means a lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding. 11 U.S.C. § 101(36). The term “statutory lien” means a lien arising solely by force of a statute on specified circumstances or conditions, or lien of distress for rent, whether or not statutory, but does not include security interest or judicial lien, whether or not such interest or lien is provided by or is dependent on a statute and whether or not such interest or lien is made fully effective by statute. 11 U.S.C. § 101(53). ... There is no question that the three hospital liens which are the subject of this dispute are statutory liens which may not be avoided under § 522(f).

Section 101(36) does not treat a consent order approving an agreement to deposit funds as a judicial lien.

Myers v. U.S. Bank National Bank Association · filed 2023-09-05(36)

The Court agrees that the Consent Order is not and never was a judicial lien, but only an agreement ratified by the Court.

Section 101(36) includes a Wyoming LLC charging order within the definition of a judicial lien.

Pettine v. Lofstedt · filed 2023-11-15(36)

A charging order granted under Wyoming law is a type of a judicial lien, as that term is defined by the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(36) treats a stipulated deficiency judgment as a judicial lien when the judgment creates the lien.

Nicholas J. Gramigna, Jr. · filed 2024-12-20(36)

The Court further concludes that the stipulated deficiency judgment in this case is a judicial lien under section 101(36) that can be avoided under section 522(f)(1).

Section 101(36) treats a lien obtained through a money judgment or levy as a judicial lien.

Firstbase.io, Inc. v. Harbor Business Compliance Corporation · filed 2025-05-06(36)

This would also fall within the definition of a judicial lien which includes levy. ... Therefore, the Court rules that Defendant’s lien is a judicial lien and not a statutory lien.

Section 101(36) defines a judicial lien to include a lien obtained by judgment.

Robert Keith Monroe · filed 2026-05-19(36)

Both liens fall into the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of judicial liens as defined in Section 101(36), and both comply with the text of R.S.Mo. 511.440(1), which defines what creates a lien that is affixed to real estate.

Section 101(32) defines a judicial lien as a lien obtained through a judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.

In Re Harris · filed 1990-09-26(32)

11 U.S.C. § 101(32) defines a judicial lien as a lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.

A judicial lien requires a charge against or interest in property securing a debt; a discharged debt cannot support a lien on property the debtor acquires later.

In Re Yates · filed 1985-03-11(27), (28)

Thus, in Colorado, as in North Carolina, recording a judgment transcript can only create a lien if there is a res to which the lien can attach. In this case, before any lien could attach, the debt created by the judgment against the Debtor was discharged. Therefore, when he subsequently acquired property there was no debt owing to Farmers and White which would form the basis for a lien.

A creditor subrogated to a bank's consensual lien holds that consensual lien, even if the creditor also holds a judgment against the debtor.

Carter v. Estate of Leon J. Heimer · filed 2012-03-13(36)

A judicial lien is a "lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding." 11 U.S.C. § 101(36). ... Pursuant to I.C.A. § 626.37, the Heimer estate is subrogated to all the rights of the bank and is now the holder of that consensual lien.

Section 101(18)(A) excludes a debtor’s principal-residence debt from the family-farmer debt calculation unless it arises out of a farming operation.

Bussman v. Potter · filed 2024-09-30(18)(A)

The debt calculations for § 101(18) exclude a debt for the debtor’s principal residence of such individual unless the debt arises out of a farming operation. ... The Court has reviewed the record, and also finds no evidence that the loan proceeds were used directly for or in a farming operation.

Section 101(18)(A) counts both farm and non-farm debts toward an individual family farmer’s aggregate debt limit.

In re: Tony Perkins · filed 2018-03-13(18)(A)

Therefore we hold in the context of individuals who are family farmers that “aggregate debt” refers to the aggregate of their farm and non-farm debts.

Section 101(18)(A) counts the gross income of a debtor’s wholly owned S corporation when applying the family farmer income test.

In re DeGour · filed 2012-08-24(18)(A)

Because ADR’s gross income must be included in the calculation of the Debtors’ gross income, the Debtors do not qualify as family farmers under section 101(18)(A) and are ineligible to be chapter 12 debtors under section 109(f).

Section 101(17)(B)(ii) excludes principal residence debt when calculating the 80 percent farm debt requirement, but not the $1.5 million aggregate debt limit.

Matter of Baldwin Farms · filed 1987-09-14(17)(B)(ii)

The aggregate debt requirement is worded absolutely without qualification followed by the 80 percent (80%) farm debt provision. Statutory drafters would not seek to modify both requirements by placing a parenthetical phrase in the middle of the second requirement.

Section 101(17)(A) requires an individual or married couple to receive more than half of their gross income from farming in the specified prior tax year to qualify as a family farmer.

United States v. Lawless (In Re Lawless) · filed 1987-11-02(17)(A)

By the debtors’ own admission, debtors had no farm income in 1986; debtors did, however, have non-farm income in 1986 of approximately $50,000.00. Thus, the Bankruptcy Judge acted properly in dismissing debtors’ Chapter 12 petition.

Section 101(17) sets a $1.5 million aggregate debt limit for family farmers without requiring those debts to be noncontingent or liquidated.

In Re Carpenter · filed 1987-10-01(17)

Family farmers include an “individual or individual and spouse engaged in a farming operation whose aggregate debts do not exceed $1,500,000 ...” 11 U.S.C. § 101(17). No requirement that those debts be noncontin-gent or liquidated appears in that portion of the statutory definition of a family farmer, and those qualifiers expressly apply only to the portion of the definition which relates to the source of the debts.

Section 101(17)(A) requires a family farmer to receive more than half of the relevant year's gross income from a farming operation; the test is absolute.

In Re Seabloom · filed 1987-10-16(17)(A)

Moreover, this Court rejects the Seab-looms’ position that the test set forth in Section 101(17)(A) is not absolute. It is.

Section 101(17)(A) does not allow debtors to deduct trucking operating costs from gross receipts when calculating whether farming supplied more than half of their gross income.

Matter of Faber · filed 1987-10-20(17)(A)

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing analysis, it is hereby found that debtors’ “costs of operations” are not deductible from gross receipts in computing the gross income of the trucking operation. Accordingly, it is also found that less than 50% of the debtors’ total gross income in 1986 was derived from the farming operation, meaning that debtors do not qualify as family farmers pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 101(17)(A).

Section 101(17)’s family farmer definition imposes a $1,500,000 aggregate debt limit; debts extinguished before the petition date do not count toward it.

In re Budde · filed 1987-10-22(17)

Therefore, for the purpose of this motion, we find that on the date of the petition John Budde was not indebted to either Ford or to Cessna. ... Accordingly, for the purpose of jurisdiction only, we find as a preliminary matter that the debtor’s aggregate debts do not exceed $1,500,000.

A divorce settlement debt arising from the distribution of marital property does not count as a debt from a farming operation under the family farmer debt test.

Aud v. Van Fossan (In Re Van Fossan) · filed 1987-11-17(17)(A)

In examining the underlying circumstances of the debt, the Court may reasonably conclude that the debt did not arise from a farming operation. The debt arose at the time of the parties’ divorce as part of a distribution of marital property. The debt was not incurred as a result of a risk or activity involved in a farming operation as defined in 101(20).

Section 101(17)(A)'s debt test can be met when individuals operate a farm owned by their corporation and more than 80 percent of their qualifying debts arise from that farming operation.

Matter of Schafroth · filed 1987-12-23(17)(A)

Clearly, the corporation owns the farm but the debtors operate the farm. The Bank does not otherwise contest the debt requirement. The debtors’ schedules reflect that they are personally liable on many of the corporate debts and that more than 80 percent of their aggregate noncontingent, liquidated debt arises out of the farming operation. Given the status of the present record, the court concludes the debtors have satisfied the debt test of section 101(17)(A).

Section 101(17)(A) counts income from a crop-share lease as farm income toward the 50% income requirement for an individual family farmer.

Matter of Burke · filed 1987-12-02(17)(A)

Designating the rental income as farm income means the 50% requirement of section 101(17)(A) is met.

Section 101(17) requires more than half of a corporate family farmer’s stock or equity to be owned by a family or its relatives; shares held by another corporation do not count.

Matter of Tobin Ranch, Inc. · filed 1987-12-02(17)

To be eligible as a family farmer, 11 U.S.C. Section 101(17) requires a corporation’s majority ownership to be held by human beings. The statute refers to “family and the relatives of the members of such family,” not to corporations which hold stock interests in the alleged debtor.

Section 101(17)(A) requires individuals seeking to qualify as family farmers to meet the farming income threshold with their own income; a consolidated plan cannot supply another debtor’s income.

In Re Plafcan · filed 1988-02-03(17)(A)

However, substantive consolidation has never been used as a substitute for eligibility requirements for one or both of the debtors under the Bankruptcy Code. There are no reported cases on this issue, but it is logical that before one debtor’s case may be consolidated with another debtor’s case, both debtors must be eligible for relief. John and Betty Plafcan are not eligible for relief under chapter 12, therefore, the consolidated plan cannot be confirmed.

Section 101(17)(B) allows a qualifying farming partnership to be a family farmer without meeting the prior-year income requirement that applies to individuals.

In Re Schaurer Agricultural Enterprises · filed 1988-02-08(17)(B)

Schaurer Agricultural Enterprises is a partnership which meets the elements recited in 11 U.S.C. § 101(17)(B) and is a “family farmer” as thus defined. A partnership is not required to meet all of the eligibility requirements stated in subparagraph (A) of such section of the Code which identifies the elements required for an individual or individual and spouse engaged in a farming operation. Unlike a partnership, an individual or individual and spouse must establish that more than 50 percent of such individual’s income or such individual and spouse’s gross income for the preceding taxable year is derived from the farming operation.

Section 101(17)(A) counts cash rent as farming income when debtors with a longstanding farming operation temporarily curtail farming because they cannot obtain operating credit.

Matter of Jessen · filed 1988-01-29(17)(A)

Under the totality of the circumstances, the debtors in this case have established that the cash rent is derived from a farming operation. ... Under the facts of this case, finding that the cash rent is derived from a farming operation does not abuse the Congressional intent underlying 11 U.S.C. § 101(17)(A) in particular and Chapter 12 in general.

Section 101(20) excludes income from the sale of farm land from income derived from a farming operation.

In Re Sohrakoff · filed 1988-04-13(20)

This court distinguishes and thus declines to follow Armstrong and Rott and instead finds that income from the sale of farm land is not income from a farming operation.

Section 101(17)(A) counts principal residence debt toward the $1.5 million aggregate debt limit but excludes liens on property when the debtor has no liability on the underlying claims.

In Re Lands · filed 1988-04-26(17)(A)

PLB contends, and this Court agrees, that the exclusion for the debt on a principal residence refers to the 80% test and not to the $1,500,000.00 aggregate debt test. ... Although the debtors’ real estate title may be clouded, they have no “liability” on the claims, hence, no debt. Therefore inclusion in the calculation of “aggregate debt” is improper.

A net business loss does not reduce nonfarm gross income when determining whether a debtor receives more than half of gross income from farming operations.

Shamblin v. Dutton (In Re Dutton) · filed 1988-05-09(17)(A)

Consequently, the debtor’s assertion that the business loss of $1,014 should be subtracted from non-farm income is misplaced because that loss is a net loss, calculated by subtracting the associated costs and expenses from the gross income of the venture.

A corporation does not qualify as a family farmer merely by sharing the risks of its tenant’s farming operation; it must conduct a farming operation.

Tim Wargo & Sons, Inc. v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States · filed 1988-05-16(17)(B)

The Court agrees with debtor that it does bear a farming related risk that is greater than that borne by one receiving a cash rent paid in advance. However, the Court cannot agree with debtor that bearing such a risk satisfies the definition of a corporate “family farmer”, which must to satisfy requirements of the statute, “... conduct [a] farming operation ...” 11 U.S.C. § 101(17)(B).

Section 101(17)(B) allows equitable interests in a farming corporation to support family farmer eligibility for Chapter 12.

In Rer Turner · filed 1988-06-09(17)(B)

Likewise, the debtors, as officers and directors of the corporation, have an equitable interest in the corporation. Accordingly, under 11 U.S.C. § 101(17)(B) the debtors are eligible for relief under Chapter 12, Title 11 of the United States Code.

Income from cleaning other farmers’ chicken houses and selling the collected manure does not count as income from the debtor’s own farming operation under the family farmer definition.

Bankr. L. Rep. P 72,384 in Re Paul Douglas McNeal Debtor, Federal Land Bank of Columbia v. McNeal · filed 1988-06-27(17)

Second, although the cleaning of chicken houses to retrieve and sell manure may in some cases be a farming activity, in this case that activity related not to the debtor’s own farming operation but to the farming operations of others.

Under § 101(17), loan debt arises out of farming operations only when the proceeds are directly applied to or used in the farming operation.

In Re Kan Corp. · filed 1988-06-02(17)

For a debt incurred as a result of a loan to “arise out of farming operations”, the proceeds of the loan must in some way be directly applied to or utilized in the farming operation.

Section 101(17)(A) counts principal-residence debt toward the $1.5 million family-farmer debt limit; its exclusion applies to the 80% farm-debt test.

Reiners v. Federal Land Bank of Jackson (In re Reiners) · filed 1988-06-13(17)(A)

The Reiners contend, however, that the parenthetical language excluding debt for a principal residence applies to the $1.5 million aggregate limitation as well as to the 80% farm-related debt criterion. We disagree. Had Congress intended the parenthetical exclusion of the debt for a principal residence to modify the $1.5 million limitation on aggregate debt, the legislators would have placed that parenthetical after the first reference to "aggregate debts" in the statutory provision. Congress did not do so.

Section 101(20) includes farming land through a joint venture when the debtor shares in the proceeds and bears the risks of farming.

In Re Fogle · filed 1988-06-17(20)

Considering both the narrow and broad definition of farming operation, the court finds that Debtor is engaged in a farming operation and has met this requirement for chapter 12 relief.

Section 101(17)(A) counts gross farm receipts without deducting ordinary farm expenses when determining whether more than half of a debtor’s gross income came from farming.

In Re Gossett · filed 1988-06-30(17)(A)

This definition does not contemplate a reduction of gross receipts from farming by all farm expenses shown on debtors’ tax return as urged by LSB. It would only be proper to deduct the cost of resold livestock, a fact pattern which does not apply here. ... It is clear that for purposes of 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(17)(A) and 109(f), the debtors are family farmers and may be debtors under Chapter 12.

Section 101(17) treats fixed monthly rent from farm houses as non-farm income when the tenants’ assistance does not expose the debtor to the risks of farming.

In Re Maschhoff · filed 1988-08-23(17)

As in Armstrong, the rental income from debtors’ farm houses must be considered as non-farm income for purposes of § 101(17), and the Court so finds.

Section 101(17)(A) requires a debtor seeking to convert from Chapter 11 to Chapter 12 to qualify as a family farmer when the Chapter 11 petition is filed.

In re Ridgely · filed 1988-11-08(17)(A)

Although there are no cases that directly address the issue in this case, the statutory language of the preceding Code sections are clear and support the conclusion that in order for a debtor to convert from a Chapter 11 case to a case under Chapter 12, that debtor must have fulfilled the requirements of Section 101(17)(A) as of the date he filed his Chapter 11 petition.

Section 101(17)(A)'s farm-income requirement excludes fixed pasture rent because the payment does not depend on farming risks.

Matter of Krueger · filed 1988-09-30(17)(A)

Rental income from pasture rent should not be considered income from farming operations under 11 U.S.C. § 101(17) and (20) because the amount of rent is not dependent upon risks associated with farming.

Section 101(17)(A) counts debt for land acquired for farming toward the 80% farm debt requirement even when a divorce judgment makes the debtor responsible for the land contract payments.

In Re Reak · filed 1988-09-30(17)(A)

Adopting this logic in the case at bar, “but for” the land acquired by the debtor and Mrs. Reak under the land contract in 1979 for farming, there would be no farm; and “but for” the land contract, there would be no hold harmless agreement in the divorce judgment. ... Based upon the foregoing, the 80% farm debt requirement has been met by the debt- or, and he is a “family farmer” within the meaning of § 101(17)(A).

Sections 101(17) and (20) require a family farmer to be engaged in a farming operation when filing; crabbing, soybean storage and maintenance alone, and proposed recreational fishing and camping do not qualify.

Watford v. Federal Land Bank of Columbia (In re Watford) · filed 1988-11-01(17), (20)

Upon reviewing the record, this court finds that the bankruptcy court’s determination that the debtors’ crabbing operation, storage and maintenance of soybeans, and proposed recreational fishing and camping facility, are not “farming operations” as contemplated by 11 U.S.C. § 101(20) is not clearly erroneous. Also, the bankruptcy court’s finding of irrelevance concerning the debtors’ proposed commercial catfish farm because it was not engaged in at the time of filing is not clearly erroneous. Therefore, the debtors do not meet the jurisdictional requirements of 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(17) and (20) to be eligible for relief as family farmers under Chapter 12.

Section 101(17) measures a Chapter 11 debtor’s eligibility as a family farmer at the time of a motion to convert to Chapter 12.

In re Feely · filed 1988-12-06(17)

When a debtor ineligible for Chapter 12 relief properly files a Chapter 11 petition and subsequently seeks to convert to Chapter 12, the court should determine the debt- or’s eligibility for Chapter 12 at the time of the motion to convert.

For Section 101(17)(A)’s family farmer income test, a merchandising business’s gross income is its gross receipts minus the cost of goods sold.

Farm Credit Bank of St. Louis v. Cox (In Re Cox) · filed 1988-12-09(17)(A)

Using the tax law definition of “gross income from business,” debtors’ 1987 gross income from Cox Country Store is its gross profit of $48,412.91.

Section 101(17)(A) and (20) allow cash rent and farm labor wages to count as farm income when the debtor’s farming history and intent show that the proceeds support an ongoing farming operation.

In Re Hettinger · filed 1989-01-11(17)(A), (20)

After a review of the record, argument of counsel and briefs, I find that under the ... facts and totality of the circumstances of this case, that both the cash rent and farm labor wages are an integral part of their farming operations and, therefore, those proceeds are deemed “farm income” and Tracy Lynn Hettinger and Debbie Darlene Hettinger are “family farmers” as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(17).

A horse breeding, training, and boarding business that primarily provides services to others and owns few of the horses does not qualify as a farming operation.

In Re Cluck · filed 1989-01-12(20)

Under the Bankruptcy Code, a “farming operation” includes “farming, tillage of the soil, dairy farming, ranching, production and raising of crops, poultry or livestock and production of poultry or livestock products in an unmanufactured state.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(20). ... In the instant case, the Debtors solely engage in a breeding, training and boarding operation, with the Debtors owning only a very few of the horses involved in the operation. As such, Debtors’ eligibility fails on the grounds stated above.

Section 101(17)(B) requires a family member to play an active role in the farming operation for a corporation to qualify as a family farmer.

In Re Tim Wargo & Sons, Inc., Debtor. Tim Wargo & Sons, Inc. v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States · filed 1989-03-14(17)(B)

In order for debtor to be characterized as “conducting” the farming of its acreage within the meaning of § 101(17)(B), some member of the Wargo family must at minimum play an active role in the farming operation taking place on its land.

Section 101(17)(A)’s family-farmer income requirement is satisfied when farming provides more than half of the debtors’ total gross income for the relevant tax year.

In re Brown · filed 1989-02-06(17)(A)

Debtors’ 1987 gross income from wheat farming constituted nearly 75% of their total gross income. Therefore, the Court finds that Debtors meet the definition of “family farmer” under 11 U.S.C. Section 101(17)(A) and are eligible for Chapter 12 relief.

Section 101(20) can treat cash rent from farmland as income from a farming operation when leasing the land supports the debtor’s continuing farming activity.

In Re Coulston · filed 1989-03-16(20)

Using the Burke-Paul factors to consider the totality of the circumstances, the rental income is the fruit of a legitimate strategy to retain the farm for himself for purposes of his continuing to farm it, and, so, is derived from a farming operation.

Section 101(20)'s definition of farming operations does not cover debtors who stopped farming years earlier, had no family member actively farming the land, and rented it for cash.

Matter of Morgan Strawberry Farm · filed 1989-03-28(20)

This Court finds the Debtors have not engaged in “farming operations” under either the Armstrong test or the “totality of circumstances” test.

Section 101(17)’s Chapter 12 debt ceiling permits a debtor whose prior Chapter 7 discharge brought his debt below the limit to qualify as a family farmer.

In Re Wickliffe · filed 1989-04-03(17)

Aetna’s first argument relates to the $1,500,000.00 debt ceiling on chapter 12 filings, found at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(17) and 109(f). ... However, the debtor appears to have met the letter, if not the spirit, of the law as regards his initial eligibility to be a chapter 12 debtor. ... Accordingly, while we decline to dismiss the instant case on the ground that the debtor does not qualify to be a chapter 12 debtor, we believe that the debtor’s use of chapter 7 to achieve the result found here is a factor we must consider in assessing his good faith as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3).

Section 101(17)(A) excludes unsold grain inventory from gross income when determining whether a debtor qualifies as a family farmer.

In Re Snider · filed 1989-04-24(17)(A)

It is ludicrous to suggest that the Debtors’ unsold grain inventory constitutes gross income within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(17)(A).

Under § 101(17), cash rent from a temporary farm lease and forgiveness of a farm commodity loan can count toward the farming income needed to qualify as a family farmer.

In Re Vernon · filed 1989-05-03(17)

This Court finds the Rent Proceeds and the Loan Proceeds to be farm income arising from a farming operation.

Section 101(17)(A) includes disputed debts when calculating the aggregate debt limit for family farmer eligibility.

In Re Vaughan · filed 1989-05-22(17)(A)

There is no exception under the statute for disputed debts, and the plain language of the statute indicates that such debts should be considered along with other types of debts in the threshold test of section 101(17)(A) despite their disputed status.

Section 101(17)(A) counts rent toward the family farmer income requirement only if the debtor had a significant role or ownership interest in the farming that produced it.

In Re George Roger Easton and Elsie M. Easton, Debtors. Otoe County National Bank v. George Roger Easton and Elsie M. Ea · filed 1989-08-23(17)(A)

Those sums cannot be counted as Sec. 101(17)(A) income unless debtors show that they had some significant degree of engagement in, played some significant operational role in, or had an ownership interest in the crop production which took place on the acreage they rented to Larry Ritz.

Section 101(17)(A) counts the full amount of a nonrecourse secured debt toward the $1.5 million family farmer debt ceiling, even when the collateral is worth less.

Quintana v. Internal Revenue Service, Bureau of Land Management (In Re Quintana) · filed 1989-10-27(17)(A)

Accordingly, notwithstanding the non-recourse nature of the obligation, the entire debt is to be considered in computing aggregate debts.

Section 101(17)(A) caps a family farmer’s aggregate debts at $1,500,000, and § 101(18) requires regular annual income sufficient to make chapter 12 plan payments.

In Re Walton · filed 1990-02-05(17)(A), (18)

Applying the statutory requirements to Debtor’s case, the court finds that Debtor is ineligible for relief under chapter 12. Upon review of the record, the court finds that Debtor has no annual income and his aggregate debts exceed $1,500,000.

Section 101(17)(A) counts income toward family-farmer eligibility only when it comes from a farming operation the debtor owns or operates; fees for spraying other farmers’ crops do not count.

In Re Richardson · filed 1990-04-05(17)(A)

“Such farming operation” refers directly to the previous part of the statute to mean “a farming operation owned or operated” by the Debtor. The Debtor neither owns nor operates the farms where he contracts his spraying services.

A cotton gin that primarily processes cotton grown by other farmers is not a farming operation for Chapter 12 eligibility.

Annie Marie C. Rhea v. Somerville Bank & Trust Company · filed 1990-03-06(20)

After review of the record, the briefs and arguments of the parties, and the applicable case law, the court is of the opinion that, for the reasons expressed in its order dated January 20, 1989, the district court was correct in holding that the cotton gin was not a "farming operation" and that appellant was not entitled to relief under Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(17)(A) treats a divorce property settlement debt as arising from a farming operation when the payment allows the debtor to retain that operation.

Matter of Marlatt · filed 1990-03-27(17)(A)

The underlying purpose of the debtor’s payment to his former spouse was to allow the debtor to retain the farming operation. Such a division of property is within the scope of and “inescapably interwoven” with the farming operation.

Section 101(20) permits a debtor who was not physically farming when filing to remain engaged in a farming operation if, under the totality of the circumstances, the debtor intended to continue farming.

In re Watford · filed 1990-04-25(20)

The standard we adopt today is whether, in view of the totality of the circumstances, the debtor intends to continue to engage in a "farming operation" even though he or she was not engaged in the physical activity of farming at the time the petition was filed.

Section 101(17)(A) counts cash rent as farm income when the debtor plays a significant operational role in producing crops on the rented land.

In Re Easton · filed 1990-07-23(17)(A)

In conclusion, the Court finds that George Easton had a significant degree of engagement in, and played a significant operational role in, the production of crops on the land leased to Larry Ritz. Thus, the rental income from Larry Ritz is proper § 101(17)(A) income so as to qualify the Debtors for Chapter 12 relief.

Section 101(17)(A) counts agricultural subsidy payments as gross farm income for family farmer eligibility, including amounts the farmer elected to exclude from taxable income.

In Re Way · filed 1990-06-25(17)(A)

The Court agrees with the Debtor, that to determine whether the fifty percent threshold test of Debtor’s gross income is satisfied, the total amount of agricultural subsidy payments should be considered and the analysis should not be limited to the taxable amount.

Section 101(17)(A) does not allow a debtor to reduce aggregate debts by the amount of a counterclaim when determining Chapter 12 eligibility.

In Re Quintana · filed 1990-09-27(17)(A)

The clear, unambiguous language of 11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(17)(A) does not allow any setoff for an alleged counterclaim, even if the counterclaim is proven and judgment issued.