11 U.S.C. § 101

Section 101(24) does not require a foreign representative to be appointed by a court.

In Re Board of Directors of Hopewell International Insurance · filed 1999-08-19(24)

But absolutely nothing in the statute requires the foreign representative to be appointed by a court.

Sections 101(23) and (24) can encompass a Bahamian insolvency proceeding and its court-appointed liquidators as a foreign proceeding and foreign representatives.

Aranha v. Eagle Fund, Ltd. (In Re Thornhill Global Deposit Fund, Ltd.) · filed 2000-02-01(23), (24)

Based on the section 304 petition, as supported by the affidavits and relevant foreign statutes, this Court finds that the Thornhill Global insolvency before the Bahamas Court is a “foreign proceeding” and that the Official Liquidators are “foreign representatives.”

Section 101(23) includes a foreign judicial insolvency proceeding aimed at orderly payment of debts, even if an out-of-court workout may ultimately benefit creditors.

In Re Mmg LLC · filed 2000-12-26(23)

MMG intends to accomplish its goal through a judicial process overseen by the Grand Court in which creditors may participate. The fact that an out of court workout may ultimately serve the best interests of creditors is true in every insolvency case, ... and does not alter the conclusion that the Cayman Islands case is a “foreign proceeding.”

Section 101(23) requires judicial or administrative oversight of a corporation’s business operations for a pending reorganization application to qualify as a foreign proceeding.

In Re Master Home Furniture Co. Ltd. · filed 2001-04-24(23)

As cited in the law above, in order for a foreign proceeding to be pending, there must be judicial or administrative oversight of the business operation of the corporation. While an application for reorganization is pending in Taiwan, no such oversight exists. Therefore, this court finds that there is no foreign proceeding as defined by § 101(23).

Section 101(23) excludes a foreign proceeding that is ancillary to the main bankruptcy proceeding in the United States.

In Re Griffin Trading Co. · filed 2001-07-18(23)

The proceeding in the U.K. is only ancillary to this proceeding. ... The Code provisions conferring rights within the U.S. proceeding for foreign representatives do not apply to foreign liquidators appointed by a foreign court to act in a foreign proceeding which is ancillary to the main U.S. proceeding.

Section 101(23) covers a Cayman Islands court-supervised winding up as a foreign proceeding, and § 101(24) covers its court-appointed liquidators as foreign representatives.

In Re Blackwell · filed 2001-11-29(23), (24)

Such proceedings thus qualify as a “foreign proceeding” within the meaning of Section 101(23). ... This appointment by the Grand Court is sufficient to confer “foreign representative” status on both Johnson and Blackwell within the meaning of section 101(24).

Section 101(24) permits a solvent debtor’s board of directors to qualify as a foreign representative without a court appointment.

In Re Board of Directors of Hopewell International Insurance · filed 2002-03-29(24)

The Bankruptcy Code defines a “foreign representative” as a “duly selected trustee, administrator, or other representative of an estate in a foreign proceeding.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(24). Plainly, the Board fits within this definition. ... Although General Mills and Gold Medal argue that the Board was not appointed by a court to act as a “foreign representative,” nothing in the statute requires a court appointment.

Section 101(23) broadly defines a foreign proceeding and does not require it to have reached a particular procedural stage if its other criteria are met.

In Re Netia Holdings S.A. · filed 2002-04-29(23)

The language of section 101(23) is broad, and by its terms encompasses a broad array of types of proceedings; requirements are notably absent in section 101(23) with respect to a proceeding’s procedural status, so long as it otherwise meets the statutory requirements.

Section 101(23) treats a liquidation in a foreign country as a foreign proceeding when the debtor was domiciled there at its commencement; a corporation’s domicile is its place of incorporation.

Hoffman v. Bullmore (In Re National Warranty Insurance Risk Retention Group) · filed 2004-03-05(23)

National Warranty is domiciled in the Cayman Islands. The company was incorporated in the Cayman Islands in 1984, has continually maintained its status as a Cayman Islands company since that date, and was a Cayman Islands company on June 4, 2003, the date the winding up petition was filed. Moreover, when the petition under 11 U.S.C. § 304 of the Bankruptcy Code was filed by the Joint Liquidators, a foreign proceeding, as that term is defined under the Code, was pending in the Cayman Islands.

Section 101(23) treats a corporation’s place of incorporation as its domicile when determining whether a liquidation is a foreign proceeding.

Hoffman v. Bullmore (In Re National Warranty Insurance Risk Retention Group) · filed 2004-09-24(23)

We thus conclude the term “domicile” as used in § 304 refers to a corporation’s place of incorporation.

Section 101 defines a foreign proceeding to include a qualifying insolvency proceeding abroad and a foreign representative to include its appointed trustee.

Adinolfi v. Marble (In Re Rosacometta, S.R.L.) · filed 2005-12-19(23), (24)

The Trustee submitted an order by a court of the Republic of Italy adjudicating the debtor bankrupt under the laws of that nation and appointing him as Trustee. Therefore, there is a pending foreign proceeding and the Trustee is a foreign representative entitled to seek relief under § 304.

A collective foreign insolvency proceeding in which a foreign court supervises the debtor’s assets and affairs for liquidation qualifies as a foreign proceeding under § 101(23).

In Re Tri-Continental Exchange Ltd. · filed 2006-09-11(23)

The ■ SVG winding-up proceeding is a “foreign proceeding,” as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(23), because it is a collective judicial or administrative proceeding in a foreign country under a law relating to insolvency in which the assets and affairs of the debtors are subject to control or supervision by a foreign court for the purpose of liquidation.

Section 101(24) defines a foreign representative as a duly selected representative of an estate in a foreign proceeding; a creditor asserting claims against the debtor does not meet that definition.

Osanitsch v. Marconi PLC (In Re Marconi PLC) · filed 2007-01-30(24)

Only a “foreign representative,” as defined by the Code, may file a petition under § 304(a); Osanitsch does not and cannot claim that he meets this definition.

Section 101(23) includes a bankruptcy proceeding under the English Insolvency Act of 1986 as a foreign proceeding.

In Re Loy · filed 2007-12-18(23)

Based on the evidence presented, the Court is convinced that O’Sullivan meets the definition in § 101(24) of a foreign representative and that the English proceeding is a foreign proceeding under § 101(23).

Section 101(23) includes an administrative insolvency proceeding supervised by a foreign authority competent to control it.

In Re Tradex Swiss AG · filed 2008-03-12(23)

Even if the decree of the SFBC were not subject to appeal to the Swiss Federal Administrative Court, and then the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, the SFBC itself comes within the definition of a foreign court. Thus the SFBC proceeding is a foreign proceeding and Dr. Lutz and Mr. Da Rugna are the foreign representatives.

Section 101(23)’s definition of a foreign proceeding encompasses an Australian voluntary winding up that satisfies its required elements.

In Re Betcorp Ltd. · filed 2009-02-09(23)

Both the text and existing interpretations of Australia’s corporations statute indicate that an Australian voluntary winding up has all of the necessary elements of a “foreign proceeding” as that term is used in section 101(23).

Section 101(23) requires a foreign proceeding to be collective in nature and to consider the rights and obligations of all creditors.

In Re Gold & Honey, Ltd. · filed 2009-08-21(23)

Thus, the Israeli Receivership Proceeding does not meet the Bankruptcy Code’s requirement that a foreign proceeding be “collective in nature.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(23).

Section 101(23) defines a foreign proceeding as a collective judicial or administrative proceeding in a foreign country under insolvency or debt adjustment law, subject to foreign court control or supervision, and aimed at reorganization or liquidation.

In Re British American Ins. Co. Ltd. · filed 2010-03-22(23)

Parsing this definition, the proceeding in question must: (1) be collective in nature; (2) be judicial or administrative; (3) be pending in a foreign country; (4) be under a law relating to insolvency or adjustment of debt; (5) subject the assets and affairs of the debtor to the control and supervision of a foreign court; and (6) be for the purpose of reorganization or liquidation.

Section 101(23) defines a foreign proceeding to include a collective foreign insolvency proceeding in which a foreign court supervises the debtor’s assets and affairs for liquidation.

In Re Fairfield Sentry Ltd. · filed 2010-07-22(23)

As a preliminary matter, and based upon the relevant evidence, the Court finds that the BVI Liquidation Proceedings are foreign proceedings under section 101(23) of the Code, as they are “collective judicial or administrative proceeding^] in a foreign country ... under a law relating to insolvency ... in which ... the assets and affairs of the debtor are subject to control or supervision by a foreign court for the purpose of ... liquidation.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(23).

A British Virgin Islands liquidation qualified as a foreign proceeding under § 101(23).

In Re British American Isle of Venice (BVI), Ltd. · filed 2010-12-23(23)

The BVI Proceeding is thus a foreign proceeding as defined in section 101(23).

Section 101(24) includes persons designated in a foreign proceeding to represent that proceeding when seeking Chapter 15 relief.

In Re Basis Yield Alphs Fund (Master) · filed 2008-01-16(24)

Paragraph 1(e) of the Joint Provisional Liquidator Order issued in the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands on August 28, 2007 clearly designates the petitioners as representatives of the Cayman Proceeding for the purposes of obtaining relief under Chapter 15.

A foreign representative appointed as receiver can qualify as a “person” under § 101(41).

In Re Ernst & Young, Inc. · filed 2008-02-08(41)

In addition, the Court finds Ernst & Young, as a foreign representative, constitutes a “person” under § 101(41).

Section 101(24) includes a person or body authorized in a foreign proceeding to act as its representative within the definition of “foreign representative.”

In Re Oversight & Control Commission of Avánzit, S.A. · filed 2008-04-18(24)

The Oversight Commission meets the definition of a “foreign representative,” and hence, of a “person or body.” It was created under the Convenio approved by the Spanish Insolvency Court for the stated purpose of protecting the interests of the creditors and assuring Avánzit’s compliance with its payment obligations. Furthermore, the Spanish Insolvency Court expressly authorized the Oversight Commission to pursue and recover the $25 million for the benefit of Avánzit’s creditors and distribution under Spanish law.

Section 101(24) includes a trustee authorized in a foreign bankruptcy proceeding to dispose of the debtor’s property within its definition of foreign representative.

In Re Loy · filed 2011-03-30(24)

By vesting that power in O’Sullivan, Judge Ayles enabled O’Sullivan to act with the status of a “foreign representative” in the eyes of a United States court pursuant to § 101(24).

Section 101(24) permits a debtor authorized to manage its affairs in a foreign bankruptcy proceeding to appoint its own foreign representative.

In Re Vitro, SAB De CV · filed 2012-05-01(24)

However, under the first prong of Section 101(24), those authorized "to administer the reorganization or the liquidation of the debtor's assets or affairs" are also permitted to be a foreign representative. ... While the Noteholders maintain that there are differences between the U.S. and the Mexican conceptions of a debtor in possession, Appellant's Brief at 21-22, the court is not persuaded that they are of sufficient magnitude to warrant the conclusion that Vitro cannot appoint its own foreign representative under the first prong of Section 101(24).

Section 101(24) allows a debtor in possession to appoint foreign representatives in the context of a foreign proceeding without a foreign court appointment.

Ad Hoc Group of Vitro Noteholders v. Vitro S.A.B. De C.V. · filed 2012-11-28(24)

Because the district court correctly interpreted § 101(24), defining foreign representatives as having been appointed in the context of a foreign proceeding, and because Vitro, as a debtor in possession, met the requirements of that subsection, we affirm the district court’s decision.

Section 101(24) allows a debtor in possession to appoint foreign representatives in the context of a foreign proceeding without a court order.

de CV v. Ad Hoc Group of Vitro Notehold · filed 2012-11-28(24)

Because the district court correctly interpreted § 101(24), defining foreign representatives as having been appointed in the context of a foreign proceeding, and because Vitro, as a debtor in possession, met the requirements of that subsection, we affirm the district court’s decision.

Section 101(24) allows a debtor in possession to appoint a foreign representative in the context of a foreign proceeding without a court appointment.

Ad Hoc Grp of Vitro Noteholder v. de CV · filed 2012-11-28(24)

Because the district court correctly interpreted § 101(24), defining foreign representatives as having been appointed in the context of a foreign proceeding, and because Vitro, as a debtor in possession, met the requirements of that subsection, we affirm the district court’s decision.

Section 101(24) does not require a foreign representative to be appointed by a foreign court.

Fintech Investments, Limited v. Ad Hoc Group of Vi · filed 2012-12-14(24)

Section 101(24)—defining the term “foreign representative”—is wholly devoid of any statement that a foreign representative must be judicially appointed.

Section 101(24) does not require a foreign representative to be appointed by a foreign court; a debtor in possession may appoint one in the context of a foreign proceeding.

de CV v. Ad Hoc Group of Vitro Notehold · filed 2012-12-14(24)

Because the district court correctly interpreted § 101(24), defining foreign representatives as having been appointed in the context of a foreign proceeding, and because Vitro, as a debtor in possession, met the requirements of that subsection, we affirm the district court’s decision.

Section 101(24) does not require a foreign representative to be appointed by a court.

de CV v. Ad Hoc Group of Vitro Notehold · filed 2013-01-07(24)

Section 101(24)—defining the term “foreign representative”—is wholly devoid of any statement that a foreign representative must be judicially appointed.

Section 101(24) allows a debtor in possession to appoint a foreign representative in the context of a foreign proceeding without a court appointment.

Fintech Investments, Limited v. Ad Hoc Group of Vi · filed 2013-01-07(24)

Because the district court correctly interpreted § 101(24), defining foreign representatives as having been appointed in the context of a foreign proceeding, and because Vitro, as a debtor in possession, met the requirements of that subsection, we affirm the district court’s decision.

Section 101(24) does not require a foreign representative to be appointed by a foreign court.

Ad Hoc Grp of Vitro Noteholder v. de CV · filed 2013-01-07(24)

Accordingly, we conclude that Sanchez-Mujica and Arechavaleta-Santos are not disqualified from serving as foreign representatives merely because they were not the subject of an official court appointment.

Section 101(24) does not require a foreign representative to be appointed by a foreign court.

Ad Hoc Grp of Vitro Noteholder v. de CV · filed 2012-12-14(24)

Section 101(24)—defining the term “foreign representative”—is wholly devoid of any statement that a foreign representative must be judicially appointed.

Section 101(23)’s collective proceeding requirement can be met by a foreign liquidation even when a parallel receivership leaves little for the liquidator to administer.

In Re: RCS Capital Development v. · filed 2013-08-27(23)

But that does not affect the collective nature of the Australian liquidation proceeding. Instead, it turns on the particular facts of ABC’s debts.

Section 101(23) includes an Argentine APE that restructures debt through a court-supervised insolvency proceeding binding on creditors.

In re Inversora Eléctrica de Buenos Aires S.A. · filed 2016-11-23(23)

An APE is a “court-supervised insolvency proceeding brought under the laws of Argentina that is designed to enable debtors that are unable to pay all or part of their debts as they become due to restructure those obligations in a manner that is binding upon all creditors -of the debtor.” (Mot. at 7.) This type of proceeding clearly falls within section 101(23)’s definition.

Section 101(24) allows a corporation’s board to authorize foreign representatives without a court appointment.

In re Cell C Proprietary Ltd. · filed 2017-07-27(24)

The Board Resolution therefore satisfies the requirements of section 101(24) and shows that the Foreign Representatives are qualified to be the foreign representatives in this case.

Section 101(23)'s foreign court control requirement is satisfied when a qualifying foreign insurance regulator controls the debtors' assets.

In re Ennia Caribe Holding N.V. · filed 2018-12-20(23)

Parman also argues that the Proceeding does not meet the definition of a foreign proceeding because the Foreign Debtors' assets are not "subject to control or supervision by a foreign court," as required by 11 U.S.C. § 101(23). This argument fails as well, as either the Curaçao court or the CBCS qualifies as a "foreign court" with control or supervision over the Foreign Debtors' assets.

Section 101(23) requires a foreign proceeding to be collective in nature, considering the rights and obligations of all creditors.

in Asi, Inc. v. Liquidators (In re Manley Toys Ltd.) · filed 2019-03-12(23)

A proceeding is collective if it considers the rights and obligations of all creditors. ... Accordingly, this Court holds that the Bankruptcy Court correctly held that the Liquidators had satisfied their burden of proving that the proceeding was collective in nature.

Section 101(23) does not require a foreign proceeding to mirror a U.S. bankruptcy case.

Alastair Beveridge of Alixpartners Servs. U.K., LLP v. Vidunas (In re O'Reilly) · filed 2019-03-22(23)

The Court reaches these conclusions because nothing in the text of 11 U.S.C. § 101(23) requires that a "foreign proceeding" mirror a case under the Bankruptcy Code.

A proceeding can remain a foreign proceeding under § 101(23) after it closes if the foreign court continues overseeing asset recovery and distributions to creditors.

Zhejiang Topoint Photovoltaic Co. v. Zhi Chen (In re Zhejiang Topoint Photovoltaic Co.) · filed 2019-04-02(23)

As such, the Court finds that the Foreign Main Proceeding continues to qualify as a foreign proceeding under section 101(23) ; and that this Court still has subject matter jurisdiction over the Main Case, and therefore this adversary proceeding under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(b) and 157(b)(2)(P).

Section 101(24) defines a foreign representative as a person or body authorized in a foreign proceeding to administer the debtor’s reorganization or liquidation or to represent that proceeding.

In re Serviços de Petróleo Constellation S.A. · filed 2019-05-09(24)

Therefore, the Petitioner is a proper "foreign representative" within the meaning of section 101(24) with respect to each of the Chapter 15 Debtors, and thus section 1517(a)(2) is satisfied.

Section 101(24) does not categorically bar appointment of a foreign representative after the foreign proceeding closes; the circumstances of the appointment matter.

In re PT Bakrie Telecom Tbk · filed 2019-05-13(24)

In reaching today's conclusion, the Court is unaware of any authority explicitly precluding the appointment of a foreign representative for purposes of pursuing Chapter 15 relief after the foreign proceeding has been closed. ... And, given the policy underlying Chapter 15, it would be hard to imagine why such action would be categorically prohibited. ... In the end, the Court concludes that a trial here is appropriate to examine the circumstances surrounding the timing of the foreign representative's appointment and the significance, if any, of the delay.

Section 101(24) defines a foreign representative to include a person appointed in a foreign proceeding to administer a debtor’s affairs or represent that proceeding.

Olinda Star Ltd and Eleanor Fisher · filed 2020-04-03(24)

Therefore, the Petitioner is a proper “foreign representative” within the meaning of section 101(24) of the Bankruptcy Code with respect to Olinda, and thus section 1517(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code is satisfied.

Section 101(24) includes court-appointed liquidators authorized to administer a debtor’s liquidation as foreign representatives.

Culligan Ltd. and Michael Morrison · filed 2021-07-02(24)

The Foreign Representatives are proper “foreign representatives” within the meaning of section 101(24) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(23) defines a foreign proceeding as a collective insolvency or debt adjustment proceeding in a foreign country, supervised by a foreign court to reorganize or liquidate a debtor’s affairs and assets.

Andrade Gutierrez Engenharia S.A. and Gustavo Braga Mercher Coutinho · filed 2022-11-03(23)

Section 101(23) requires that a “foreign proceeding” be (a) a collective judicial or administrative proceeding relating to insolvency or adjustment of debt; (b) pending in a foreign country; (c) under the supervision of a foreign court; and (d) for the purpose of reorganizing or liquidating the assets and affairs of the debtor. The Brazilian EJ Proceeding satisfies each of these elements.

Section 101(23) requires the petitioner to establish every element of the definition of a foreign proceeding.

Global Cord Blood Corporation and Margot MacInnis, John Royle, and Chow Tsz Nga Geor · filed 2022-12-05(23)

If the JPLs fail to meet their burden of proof on any one of these seven “definitional elements,” then the Cayman Proceeding is not a “foreign proceeding” within the meaning of Chapter 15.

Section 101(23) includes a South African provisional liquidation that collectively resolves creditor claims under insolvency laws and is supervised by a foreign court.

Comair Limited (In Provisional Liquidation) and Shaun Collyer and Richard A. Ferguson · filed 2023-02-12(23)

Notwithstanding that, it is clear that the Provisional Liquidation is a foreign proceeding within the meaning of section 101(23).

Section 101(24) allows a debtor that retains control of its affairs in a foreign insolvency proceeding to authorize a foreign representative; qualification turns on the federal definition rather than foreign appointment law.

Agro Santino OOD and Yordanka Ivanova Panchovska · filed 2023-07-24(24)

However, under Vitro, in considering whether a person may serve as a foreign representative, the Court does not look to foreign law governing appointments—it looks to section 101(24).

Section 101(23)’s definition of “foreign proceeding” permits Chapter 15 recognition even when the debtor is ineligible under Chapter 1.

Talal Qais Abdulmunem Al Zawawi v. Diss · filed 2024-04-03(23)

... we follow the logic of Goerg and hold that, based on the definition of “foreign proceeding” in § 101(12), as informed by the purpose of Chapter 15, debtor eligibility under Chapter 1 is not a prerequisite for the recognition of a foreign proceeding under Chapter 15.

Section 101(23)’s definition of a foreign proceeding covers the Brazilian RJ Proceeding.

InterCement Brasil S.A. and Antonio Reinaldo Rabelo Filho · filed 2025-03-31(23)

The Brazilian RJ Proceeding qualifies as a “foreign proceeding.” ... As such, the Court will not further examine each specific requirement of section 101(23).

A proceeding can remain a foreign proceeding under § 101(23) after plan confirmation when it remains pending under insolvency law and the debtor can still propose a court-approved restructuring agreement.

Oi S.A. and Antonio Reinaldo Rabelo Filho · filed 2025-10-01(23)

The Bankruptcy Code defines a “foreign proceeding” as a “collective judicial or administrative proceeding in a foreign country, including an interim proceeding, under a law relating to insolvency or adjustment of debt in which proceeding the assets and affairs of the debtor are subject to control or supervision by a foreign court, for the purpose of reorganization or liquidation.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(23). ... Here, the 2023 RJ Proceeding remains pending pursuant to Brazilian Bankruptcy Law—laws that relate to the adjustment of debt. ... Additionally, while the 2023 RJ Proceeding may have a supervisory element, the Company can still propose a court approved restructuring agreement. ... Therefore, the 2023 RJ Proceeding is unchanged for purposes of Section 1517(d).

A foreign insolvency proceeding can qualify under § 101(23) without complete court supervision.

In re Venus Capital Management Company · filed 2026-03-02(23)

However, complete court supervision of a proceeding is not required for it to meet § 101(23)’s requirements. ... This Court is therefore satisfied that the character of the Mauritius Proceedings are sufficiently “judicial or administrative” in nature pursuant to § 101(23)’s requirements.

Section 101(23) requires a foreign proceeding to be collective in nature, including consideration of creditors’ rights.

In re ARD Finance, S.A. · filed 2026-03-25(23)

The Luxembourg Proceeding, therefore, contains robust protections for creditors and is “collective in nature.”

A proceeding is collective under section 101(23) when it provides for the administration and recovery of creditors generally; a proceeding initiated for liquidation also meets the definition’s purpose requirement.

In re Prince Global Holdings Limited · filed 2026-04-23(23)

Rather, the BVI Attorney General has initiated a liquidation proceeding and this is sufficient for the Court to conclude that the BVI Proceeding was initiated for the purpose of liquidation. ... Additionally, the BVI Proceeding is “collective in nature” as it was initiated to provide for the administration and recovery of creditors generally.

Section 101(23) covers a collective foreign proceeding under an insolvency law that is pursued for liquidation.

In re Prince Global Holdings Limited · filed 2026-06-11(23)

Accordingly, the BVI Proceedings are collective in nature, and the Court finds that the BVI Proceedings qualify as “foreign proceedings.”

Section 101(20) defines a foreign proceeding as one pending in a country other than the United States.

France v. France (In Re France) · filed 1986-05-28(20)

That statute, however, is to be read in conjunction with 11 U.S.C. § 304, a statute concerning foreign bankruptcy proceedings; that is, actions pending in a country other than the United States. 11 U.S.C. § 101(20). Title 28 U.S.C. § 1410 has no application to proceedings such as those here at issue which involve proceedings in a federal bankruptcy court and in a state court.

A person who is not a foreign representative under § 101 cannot file an ancillary petition under § 304.

United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Miller Features Syndicate, Inc. · filed 2002-03-11

Since neither of the Vrooms is a “foreign representative” of the Canadian debtor within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101, the Vrooms apparently would not themselves have been able to avail themselves of § 304.

Section 101(43) defines a purchaser as the transferee of a voluntary transfer, excluding a buyer at a foreclosure sale.

Patty Denice Mitchell · filed 2024-12-02(43)

That definition plainly limits its applicability to voluntary transfers rather than transfers made through a foreclosure sale, tax sale, sheriff's sale, or any other type of involuntary, forced sale.

Section 101(32) treats a voluntary transferee as a purchaser.

Matter of Youngstown Steel Tank Co. · filed 1983-02-17(32)

A voluntary transferee is considered a purchaser under 11 U.S.C. § 101(32).

Section 101(37)’s definition of purchaser includes a secured creditor that receives assets in exchange for forgiveness of debt.

In Re Wieboldt Stores, Inc. · filed 1988-05-18(37)

The fact that Household is Wieboldt’s secured creditor and the consideration is in part forgiveness of Wieboldt’s debt does not prevent the transaction from constituting a sale. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(37) (“purchaser” is a transferee of a voluntary transfer). Like other purchasers, a secured creditor may hesitate to buy assets from a bankrupt or may discount its offer unless assured that the sale is final.

Section 101(37) defines a purchaser to include the transferee of a voluntary transfer.

Hoerner v. Elkins (In re Elkins) · filed 1988-12-13(37)

Under 11 U.S.C. § 101(37) Mr. Zaagman qualifies as “the transferee of a voluntary transfer.”

Section 101(43) includes a voluntary transferee as a purchaser even if the transfer was not from the issuer and involved no consideration.

Allen v. Geneva Steel Co. (In Re Geneva Steel Co.) · filed 2001-04-04(43)

Thus it is not necessary that Allen obtained the Notes when they were first issued. Nor is it necessary that he obtained them directly from Geneva Steel or that he provided any consideration in exchange for the Notes. His acquisition of the Notes places him in the category of “purchaser” as that term is defined in the Code and establishes a causal connection with the damages he seeks.

Section 101(43) defines a purchaser as the transferee of a voluntary transfer, so a buyer at a forced sheriff’s sale does not qualify.

Singleton v. Abusaad (In Re Abusaad) · filed 2004-03-18(43)

A “purchaser” is defined in the Bankruptcy Code as a “transferee of a voluntary transfer, and includes immediate or mediate transferee of such a transferee.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(43) (emphasis added). The express language of § 549(c), then, determines the answer. Section 549(c) provides protection to a purchaser in a voluntary transaction with the debtor. A Texas sheriffs sale is a far cry from a voluntary sale of real property. Therefore, Spring-park is not a transferee of a voluntary transfer and thus not a “purchaser” under the statute.

A buyer at a forced tax sale is not a “purchaser” under § 101(43) because the definition requires a voluntary transfer.

Litton Loan Servicing, LP v. Rockdale County (In Re Howard) · filed 2008-07-07(43)

Although the definition of transfer is broad, see § 101(54), the term “purchaser” contemplates that the transfer is “voluntary” leading this Court to conclude that a forced sale, such as a tax sale, does not satisfy the elements of § 549(c)’s exception.

Section 101(43) defines a purchaser as the transferee of a voluntary transfer.

In re Cooper · filed 2018-09-22(43)

If a "purchaser" is defined as the party on the receiving end of a voluntary transfer, the "seller" must be the party on the other end of the transfer. Under the Bankruptcy Code, then, the transaction between a purchaser and a seller is conceived of as a "voluntary transfer."

Section 101(45) uses New York law to measure degrees of consanguinity in a New York bankruptcy case; first cousins fall outside its third-degree definition of relative.

In re Olympia Office LLC · filed 2017-01-09(45)

Thus, this Court looks to New York state law as the source of the common law to be applied in strictly applying Bankruptcy Code § 101(45). ... Thus, under New York law, first cousins are further removed than the third degree of consanguinity. Therefore, the Investors Pilevsky are not insiders of Lawyer Pilevsky or of LHM, and LHM is disinterested under Bankruptcy Code § 101(14)(A).

Section 101(34) includes a daughter-in-law within the definition of “relative” because she is related by affinity within the first degree.

In Re Hilltop Sand & Gravel, Inc. · filed 1983-12-16(34)

The term “relative” . is defined at 11 U.S.C. Section 101(34) as meaning: ... As the associate of Mr. Guy is the daughter-in-law of a district judge, she is within the first degree of kinship, by affinity. Accordingly, Mr. Guy’s associate is a relative of a district court judge.

Section 101(39) excludes first cousins from the definition of “relative” when Missouri law places them outside the third degree of kinship.

Dewoskin v. Brady (In Re Hydraulic Industrial Products, Co.) · filed 1989-06-09(39)

Therefore, the Court concludes that for purposes of Section 101(39) of Title 11, common law refers to the computational method set out at Section 474.010, Mo.Rev. Stat. (1980). First cousins are not within the third degree and are not within the definition of “relative” in the Bankruptcy law.

Section 101(39) measures degrees of consanguinity by counting once between generations descending from a common ancestor when determining Chapter 12 family membership.

In Re Cloverleaf Farmer's Cooperative · filed 1990-05-31(39)

The Court adopts the “common law” method counting consanguinity degrees only once between generations in a descending manner from a common ancestor when determining Chapter 12 family membership. This single count common law technique applies Section 101(39)’s express language, yields uniform law nationwide, and promotes Congress’ policy of limiting Chapter 12 to family operations.

A spouse is not a relative by affinity under § 101(45); affinity connects a spouse to the other spouse’s blood relatives.

Barnhill v. Vaudreuil (In Re Busconi) · filed 1995-02-03(45)

The Defendant was therefor not related to the Debtor by affinity, and hence was not a relative even before the parties’ divorce judgment became absolute.

Section 101(45) uses the canon law method to determine whether relatives are related within the third degree.

O'Neal v. Arnold (In Re Gray) · filed 2006-11-14(45)

Accordingly, because I interpret § 101(45)’s reference to “common law” to mean the canon law method for determining consanguinity, Arnold is a “relative” and an “insider” of Debtor Braxton Gray.

Section 101(45) does not treat stepchildren as the debtor’s relatives when their biological parent’s death ended the relationship by affinity.

Curtis v. The Chapman Family Trust · filed 2021-03-05(45)

As such, the Court finds that Defendants are not relatives of Debtor under § 101(45), and do not qualify as statutory per se insiders under Count I of the Complaint.

Section 101(45) excludes first cousins from the definition of “relative” because they are related in the fourth degree under the civil-law method.

In re Brooks Custom Application, LLC · filed 2026-05-07(45)

Accordingly, the Court holds that a first cousin is not a “relative” within the meaning of § 101(45).

A hospital controlled by a county council qualifies as a municipality under § 101(40) because it is an instrumentality of the state.

In re Barnwell County Hospital · filed 2012-05-23(40)

Accordingly, Debtor constitutes a “municipality” as defined by the Code and was specifically authorized to file for bankruptcy under S.C.Code Ann. § 6-1-10.

Section 101(29) defines a municipality as a political subdivision or a public agency or instrumentality of a State.

In Re City of Wellston · filed 1984-09-12(29)

A municipality may file a petition for the adjustment of its debts if it is a political subdivision or a public agency or instrumentality of a State [11 U.S.C. § 101(29) ], and if it satisfies the other eligibility requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 109(c). Although the City has filed only a petition and a Statement of Qualification, and presented limited testimony in support of its authority to proceed in this case, the Court finds that the record considered as a whole is sufficient to establish the minimal requirements for eligibility to proceed under Chapter 9.

Section 101’s definition of municipality includes a public agency subject to control by public authority.

In Re Greene County Hospital · filed 1986-03-31(32)

The above quoted provisions make clear that the hospital is subject to control by public authority, i.e., the board of supervisors. Therefore, Greene County Hospital is a public agency; thus a municipality; and thus an entity within the meaning of Bankruptcy Code sections 11 U.S.C. § 101(32) (1985), 11 U.S.C. § 101(24) (1985), and 11 U.S.C. § 101(14) (1985).

Section 101(40) defines a municipality to include a public agency or instrumentality of a state; a nonprofit school building authority outside governmental control does not qualify.

In Re Ellicott School Building Authority · filed 1992-12-30(40)

“Municipality” is defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) as a “political subdivision or public agency or instrumentality of a State.” ... No governmental entity exercises any right of control over the Ellicott School Building Authority. ... Therefore, the Court finds that the Authority does not constitute a municipality for purposes of Chapter 9 eligibility under 11 U.S.C. § 109(c).

Section 101(40) includes a state political subdivision within the definition of municipality.

In Re Sullivan County Regional Refuse Disposal District · filed 1994-02-24(40)

Under the Bankruptcy Code, a “municipality” is a political subdivision or instrumentality of the state. 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (Supp.1993). Both the New Hampshire debtor and the Vermont debtor accordingly are municipalities as defined by the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(40)’s definition of municipality can include a public agency of a town; the agency need not be solely an agency of the state.

In Re Westport Transit District · filed 1994-03-16(40)

The phrase “of a State” in § 101(40) under these holdings, does not signify that only a public agency “of the State of Connecticut,” as opposed to a public agency “of the Town of Westport,” may be a Chapter 9 debtor.

Section 101(40) does not treat a county investment pool as a municipality when it is neither a political subdivision, public agency, nor instrumentality of the state.

In Re County of Orange · filed 1995-05-22(40)

Because the OCIP is not a political subdivision, public agency or instrumentality of the State of California within the meaning of § 101(40), the OCIP is not a municipality.

Section 101(40) includes an Illinois drainage district within the definition of a municipality.

In Re Slocum Lake Drainage District of Lake County · filed 2006-01-19(40)

The Debtor is an Illinois drainage district and, thus, a “municipality” as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(40).

Section 101(40) includes a state-created public benefit corporation that operates a revenue-producing enterprise within the definition of “municipality.”

In Re New York City Off-Track Betting Corp. · filed 2010-03-22(40)

NYC OTB is a creation of the state, made for the purpose of operating a “revenue producing enterprise.” As Congress previously directed jurisdiction over this type of entity, ... this Court concludes that NYC OTB is a “municipality” as defined by the current Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(40) requires control to classify an entity as a state instrumentality and therefore a municipality.

In Re Las Vegas Monorail Co. · filed 2010-04-26(40)

As noted above, control is an essential element in determining whether an entity is an instrumentality under Section 101(40).

Section 101(40) includes a county within the definition of a municipality because it is a political subdivision of a state.

Leibowitz v. County of Orange (In Re Leibowitz) · filed 1998-04-09(40)

The Stipulation renewing the Judgment states that the debt is owed to the County, which is a municipality as a political subdivision of the State. 11 U.S.C. § 101(40).

Section 101(9)(A) includes a limited liability company in its definition of “corporation.”

Ivanov v. Van's Aircraft, Inc. · filed 2024-06-11(9)(A)

Consistent with the statutory definition of “corporation,” which includes “association having a power or privilege that a private corporation, but not an individual or a partnership, possesses”7 and thus a limited liability company, I will follow the case-law convention of referring to an LLC debtor as a corporation.

Section 101(9) presumes that an entity incorporated under state law is a corporation under the Bankruptcy Code, unless the party challenging that status proves otherwise.

In re Charles Street African Methodist Episcopal Church · filed 2012-09-11(9)

Still, in view of the deliberately nondefinitional and expansive character of § 101(9), when an entity is considered a corporation under state law, it must enjoy a presumption of being a corporation for purposes of § 101(9) and the Bankruptcy Code, and the burden of proof is on the party asserting that its characteristics somehow disqualify it from being a § 101(9) corporation.

Section 101(8)(A)(i) does not treat a joint venture as a corporation merely because its venturers are corporations.

Twins Roller Corp. v. Roxy Roller Rink Joint Venture (In Re Roxy Roller Rink Joint Venture) · filed 1986-10-09(8)(A)(i)

Where, as here, any limitation on the liability of the participants in a joint venture flows solely from the corporate status of the joint venturers, the joint venture does not thereby become a corporation.

Section 101(8)(A)(iv) includes an unincorporated association, such as a church, in the definition of a corporation.

Shubert v. Sanders (In Re Sanders) · filed 1988-09-14(8)(A)(iv)

The church would appear to fall within the definition of an “unincorporated ... association.” Such an entity can be a debtor.

Section 101(8) includes an unincorporated nonprofit church association within its definition of a corporation.

In Re Miracle Church of God in Christ · filed 1990-09-13(8)

In applying the above definitions to the Debtor in this case, it becomes apparent that the Debtor falls within the definition of a corporation,' notwithstanding that it is an unincorporated association, and is thus eligible for relief under Chapter 11. The fact that the Church is a not-for-profit association does not detract from its eligibility to become a debtor.

Section 101(41) does not treat a dissolved corporation as a person eligible for bankruptcy relief after its limited existence under state law has expired.

In Re a Car Rental, Inc. · filed 1993-02-11(41)

“Person” includes individual, partnership, and corporation. 11 U.S.C. § 101(41). ... The court concludes that A Car Rental, Inc. was not a person within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code on the date of the petition. Thus it is not eligible for relief under the Code.

Section 101(9) includes a corporation whose charter has been revoked if state law preserves corporate powers that allow it to wind up and liquidate.

In Re Prism Properties, Inc. · filed 1996-08-02(9)

The definition of a corporation includes an “association having a power or privilege that a private corporation, but not an individual or a partnership, possesses....” 11 U.S.C. § 101(9). Whether a debtor has such a power or privilege, and therefore a debtor’s status as a corporation, is a matter of state law. ... State law provides, however, that after revocation a corporation may continue to act to preserve and pursue assets and claims and settle liabilities, and accordingly the Debtor may liquidate under the Bankruptcy Code, either via a liquidating Chapter 11 plan or under Chapter 7.

A corporation that continues to exist under Iowa law after administrative dissolution is a “person” eligible to be a Chapter 7 debtor.

In Re Quad City Minority Broadcasters, Inc. · filed 2000-04-11(41)

11 U.S.C. § 101(41) includes “individual, partnership, and corporation” in the definition of “person.” ... WHEREFORE, the Court finds that a corporation administratively dissolved under Iowa law may be a chapter 7 debtor and, therefore, the motion to dismiss must be denied.

Section 101’s definition of corporation includes an Oklahoma limited liability company that continues to exist after dissolution to wind up its affairs.

In Re Midpoint Development, L.L.C. · filed 2004-08-19(9)

“Person” is defined at 11 U.S.C. § 101(41) to include an “individual, partnership, and corporation.” ... Given the acknowledged similarities between corporations and limited liability companies, there is no reason that a dissolved limited liability company is ineligible to be a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(9)’s definition of “corporation” includes an LLC because of its structure and limited liability features.

Gilliam v. Speier (In Re KRSM Properties, LLC) · filed 2004-12-01(9)

In contrast, an LLC, by virtue of its structure and limited liability features, fits comfortably within the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of “corporation” and, hence, is a “person” eligible to be a debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 101(9).

Section 101(9) includes unincorporated associations within the definition of a corporation, but dissolution does not itself turn a corporation into an unincorporated association.

In Re American Heartland Sagebrush Securities Investments, Inc. · filed 2005-11-07(9)

The Code further states that a corporation includes: ... (iv) unincorporated company or association; ... 11 U.S.C. 101(9). ... O’Cheskey, the Receiver, argued in the alternative that Sagebrush somehow became an “unincorporated association.” The Court disagrees. Sagebrush is a dissolved corporation.

Section 101(9)(A)(ii) includes limited liability companies within the definition of corporation because they are sufficiently similar to corporations and limit liability for debts to subscribed capital.

In re QDN LLC · filed 2010-02-08(9)(A)(ii)

Limited liability companies are eligible to file bankruptcy petitions because they are sufficiently similar to a corporation and limit responsibility for the debts to the capital subscribed.

Section 101’s definition of corporation covers a state-incorporated church that conducts its own activities despite holding property in trust for a national church.

OneUnited Bank v. Charles Street African Methodist Episcopal Church · filed 2013-09-30(9)

CSAME’s status as a corporation under Massachusetts law renders it an eligible debtor and, even if that fact were not dispositive, CSAME’s policies and conduct confirm that it is not merely a “shell” to hold property for the National Church. ... Even acknowledging that the Book renders CSAME a trustee holding the National Church’s property in trust does not, however, render CSAME a nominee trust and, therefore, an ineligible debtor.

Section 101(9)(A)(ii) treats a limited liability partnership as a corporation when only its subscribed capital, and not its partners by virtue of their status, is responsible for its debts.

In re Beltway Law Group, LLP · filed 2014-08-07(9)(A)(ii)

Because District of Columbia law makes only the capital subscribed by partners responsible for the debts of a limited liability partnership, and makes partners of the LLP not liable for the debts of the LLP by reason of being partners, a District of Columbia LLP is treated as a “corporation” under the Bankruptcy Code, not as a partnership.

Section 101(9)(A)'s definition of corporation includes limited liability companies formed under Texas law.

In re Corrline International, LLC · filed 2014-08-21(9)(A)

The Court construes this definition to include limited liability companies formed under Texas law, such as CorrLine.

A New York limited liability partnership qualifies as a “corporation” under § 101 despite partners’ personal liability for their own wrongful conduct.

Jacobs v. Altorelli (In re Dewey & Leboeuf LLP) · filed 2014-10-29(9)(A)(ii)

Extending an individual LLP partner’s liability to liability arising from that partner’s wrongful conduct (including based on the conduct of someone the partner supervised) does not make that LLP partner liable for the debts of the partnership generally and does not affect whether a LLP fits within the definition of “corporation” under the Code. The Court concludes that Dewey, a LLP registered under New York law, should be considered a “corporation” for purposes of section 548(b).

Section 101(9) defines a corporation to include artificial entities, not individuals.

Rodriguez v. United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado · filed 2019-01-30(9)

The Bankruptcy Code defines “corporation” to include only artificial entities, not ... individuals.

Section 101(9) includes limited liability companies within the definition of “corporation.”

Cantwell-Cleary Co., Inc. v. Cleary Packaging, LLC · filed 2021-06-29(9)

The Court recognizes that the Defendant is a limited liability company. The Code defines “corporation,” however, to include an “unincorporated company or association.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(9). Consequently, “[a] limited liability company is a corporation within the meaning of § 101(9).”

Section 101(9)(A) includes limited liability companies within the definition of “corporation.”

Cantwell-Cleary Co., Inc. v. Cleary Packaging, LLC · filed 2022-06-07(9)(A)

The Bankruptcy Code, however, includes within its definition of “corporation” limited liability companies. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(9)(A).

Section 101(9)’s definition of “corporation” excludes an individual.

Enigami Systems, Inc. v. Baca (In re Baca) · filed 2014-02-28(9)

Additionally, and not unimportant to this Court’s analysis here, is the fact that the bankruptcy code itself defines the term “corporation” in 11 U.S.C. § 101(9) to expressly exclude the term individual.

Section 101(9)(A)(i) excludes individuals from the definition of a corporation, so a corporate debtor is not an individual debtor for purposes of § 523(a).

Korean v. Dow Silicones Corp. · filed 2024-11-07(9)(A)(i)

At bottom, the issue there involved a statutory exception to bankruptcy discharge that applies only to “individual debtor[s],” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a), which Dow is not, see id. § 101(9)(A)(i) (excluding “an individual” from the definition of “corporation”).

Section 101(36) treats a recorded judgment that clouds a debtor’s title as a judicial lien even when it is presently unenforceable.

CRP Holdings v. O'Sullivan · filed 2017-09-22(36)

The recording of CRP’s foreign judgment in Barton County created a cloud on the Debtor’s title on his exempt homestead, which constituted a “charge against or ... interest in property” under Missouri law and qualified as a “judicial lien” under the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(36) defines a judicial lien as a lien obtained through legal process; a priority for payment of a receiver’s fees does not itself create one.

In re Helligrath · filed 2017-06-12(36)

The Bankruptcy Code further defines a “judicial lien” as a “lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(36). While what constitutes a “lien” may be broadly worded in the Bankruptcy Code, bankruptcy courts must still look to state law to determine whether a creditor has acquired a lien and to what property that lien attaches. ... This Court concludes that the priority scheme in Paragraph 22 of the Receivership Order does not, in and of itself, create a judicial lien or charge against the Property in favor of the Receiver.

Section 101(36) defines a judicial lien; a divorce decree that creates only an unsecured payment obligation does not create one.

In re Canto · filed 2012-08-14(36)

While the Divorce Decree provides that certain sums will be paid to her upon the sale of the Property, it does not grant her a mortgage or other security interest to secure that payment. Baralee holds an unsecured obligation against Debtor, and, whatever its nature, it is not a judicial lien.

Section 101(36)’s definition of a judicial lien does not include a creditor’s lien acquired through subrogation to a bank’s consensual lien.

Carter v. Estate of Heimer (In Re Carter) · filed 2012-03-13(36)

A judicial lien is a “lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(36). ... Pursuant to I.C.A. § 626.37, the Heimer estate is subrogated to all the rights of the bank and is now the holder of that consensual lien.

Section 101(36) defines a judicial lien to include a lien obtained by judgment, including one securing an award of costs.

Maslar v. Martin · filed 2012-04-12(36)

It was by every definition a judicial lien—“a lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable proceeding.”

Section 101(30) defines a judicial lien to include a lien obtained through a deficiency judgment.

Matter of Dixon · filed 1987-11-10(30)

11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(30) defines a judicial lien as a “lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or pleading.” FORD obtained a deficiency judgment against the Debtors as a result of the repossession and sale of the Debtors’ automobile. Thus, there is no question that FORD holds a judicial lien ... against the Debtor.

Section 101(32) covers a creditor’s lien interest in garnished funds when the debtor retains rights in those funds.

In Re Evans · filed 1987-09-30(32)

The extent of American Express’s interest in the attached funds is that of a lien interest as defined in § 101(32) of the Code, and it has offered no non-bankruptcy law to assert that the Debtor’s rights to the seized funds were extinguished.

Section 101(32) includes a lien imposed by a divorce decree to secure property settlement payments within the definition of a judicial lien.

Pederson v. Stedman (In Re Pederson) · filed 1987-09-30(32)

The lien gave Stedman a secured interest in the real property and was obtained by a court decree. Thus, it fits precisely within the Code’s definition of “judicial lien.”

A judgment lien arising by operation of state law from a divorce decree is a judicial lien under § 101(27).

Nikki Dee Maus, Debtor-Appellee v. Maus · filed 1988-01-28(27)

We thus conclude that if the decree imposes a lien at all, it is a judgment lien under Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60-2202(a). Consequently, it is a judicial lien as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(27).

Section 101(32) treats a mortgage lien merged into a foreclosure judgment as a judicial lien because it arises through judicial process.

Jackson v. Citicorp Mortgage, Inc. (In Re Coleman) · filed 1988-01-27(32)

It is clear from this analysis that what remains is, in fact, a judicial lien as defined by the Bankruptcy Code. ... A judicial lien is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(32) as one which is “obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.” ... While the original mortgage was created by agreement, the nature of the merged lien is, in fact, established by process of law.

A lien imposed by a contested divorce decree can qualify as a judicial lien under § 101(32).

In Re Sanderfoot · filed 1988-03-09(32)

Mrs. Sanderfoot’s lien is without question a type of judicial lien. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32).

Section 101(32)’s definition of a judicial lien does not include a trustee’s statutory rights as a judicial lienholder for avoidance purposes.

In Re Milcher · filed 1988-05-26(32)

The Trustee does not have a judicial lien on the Debtors’ automobile. Rather, he merely has the rights of a judicial lienholder pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) for avoidance purposes.

A foreclosure decree enforcing a preexisting consensual mortgage does not turn the mortgage lien into a judicial lien.

Federal Land Bank of Omaha v. Blankemeyer · filed 1988-04-15(32)

The definition of “judicial lien” is found at 11 U.S.C. § 101(32) (Supp. IV 1986): “ ‘judicial lien’ means lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.” ... It is clear that a judicial decree of foreclosure merely confirms the preexisting consensual mortgage lien, ... and does not create a “judicial lien,” as that term is used in § 522(f)(1).

A lien obtained through a deficiency judgment qualifies as a judicial lien under § 101(30).

In Re Dixon · filed 1988-04-26(30)

Ford fulfilled the first requirement by obtaining a deficiency judgment against debtors. 11 U.S.C. § 101(30).

A lien imposed by a state court judgment to secure payment is a judicial lien under § 101(32).

In Re Markunes · filed 1988-05-23(32)

Therefore, the court finds that Movant’s lien is valid as a “judicial lien” as defined by Section 101(32) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101 defines a judicial lien as one obtained through legal process and a security interest as a lien created by agreement.

In Re Bland · filed 1988-07-13(30), (43)

11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(30) defines a judicial lien as a “lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or pleading.” 11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(43) defines a security interest as a “lien created by an agreement.” ... The Debtor’s agreement makes the lien consensual in nature. As a result, the Court finds that these three liens are nonavoidable under Sec. 522(f)(1).

Section 101(32) does not treat a lien voluntarily granted in a property settlement as a judicial lien merely because a court approves the settlement.

In Re Dunn · filed 1988-09-08(32)

The express policy of the state of Indiana is to encourage such settlements, and thus, the Court holds that the lien is not a judicial one as defined by § 101(32) for the purposes of § 522(f)(1), but a voluntary lien that was judicially sanctioned, and thus not voidable.

Section 101(32) defines a judicial lien; a divorce-decree lien structured as a mortgage securing a former spouse’s share of a homestead is not a judicial lien.

In Re Conway · filed 1988-12-02(32)

A judicial lien under the Bankruptcy Code is defined broadly as a “lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.” 11 U.S.C. sec. 101(32). ... the lien as conferred in the instant case is more in the nature of a security interest or a mortgage and thus is not a mere judicial lien which would entitle the debtor to avoid the debt.

Section 101(27) defines a judicial lien as one obtained through legal or equitable process; a properly constituted attorney’s charging lien arises by operation of law and falls outside that definition.

In Re Sacco · filed 1989-03-15(27)

The Bankruptcy Code defines a judicial lien as a “lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.” ... An attorney’s charging lien arises by operation of law. ... Therefore, we agree with the conclusion of the bankruptcy court in In re Sacerdote; we hold that a ... properly constituted attorney’s charging lien is a secured debt which may not be avoided pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1).

Section 101(32) defines a judicial lien by how it is obtained; a divorce decree lien enforcing a spouse’s preexisting property interest does not meet that definition.

Zachary v. Zachary (In Re Zachary) · filed 1989-04-21(32)

Judicial lien is defined in 11 U.S.C. section 101(32) as a “lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.” ... In the instant case, Mrs. Zachary’s interest in the property predated the dissolution decree. The lien simply recognized and provided a remedy to enforce a preexisting property right in the marital home. The interest recognized in the judgment and the concurrent lien of the dissolution decree existed prior to the entry of judgment. Therefore, it is not a “lien obtained by judgment”, that is, it is not a judicial lien for purposes of section 522(f)(1) and the appellant has failed to satisfy the third condition for lien avoidance under that section.

Section 101(32) includes a lien created by a divorce judgment within the definition of a judicial lien.

In Re Earnest James Pederson, Debtor. Bonnie Jean Stedman v. Earnest James Pederson · filed 1989-05-30(32)

In this case, the lien imposed by the Washington Superior Court is a judicial lien as defined in the Code: It was created by a judgment, as required by section 101(32), and it is a “charge against” the property awarded to Pederson to secure payment of the $8,000 debt owed to Stedman.

Section 101(32) treats a lien arising through judicial proceedings and service of process as a judicial lien even if a statute authorizes it.

In Re Weatherspoon · filed 1989-06-22(32)

The judgment creditors’ garnishment and citation liens are judicial liens because they arise by virtue of the judicial proceedings and the service of process on the employers and the bank. Without the judicial proceedings and service of process, the judgment creditors’ liens would not exist.

Section 101(32) includes a lien created by a divorce judgment within the definition of a judicial lien.

Boggess v. Boggess (In Re Boggess) · filed 1989-09-26(32)

The lien in the instant case was created by judgment as required by § 101(32) and is a “charge against” property awarded to debtor Jerome Boggess to secure payment of the $3,500 debt owed to plaintiff.

Section 101 defines a judicial lien as one obtained through legal or equitable process and a lien as an interest in property securing an obligation.

Elkhatib v. Elkhatib (In Re Elkhatib) · filed 1989-12-16(32), (33)

To decide if Zeyn has a “judicial lien”, the Court must first decide if the Judgment for Dissolution created a “lien” at all. The language of the Judgment for Dissolution does not give Zeyn a charge against the Dunkin Donuts franchise nor does it give her an interest in the franchise. Indeed, the Judgment for Dissolution specifically gives Walid the entire interest in the franchise free of any rights or liens.

Section 101(32)'s definition of judicial lien includes a garnishment lien when garnished funds are turned over to the sheriff.

Matter of Yetter · filed 1990-03-22(32)

Therefore, under Iowa law, funds which have been garnished and turned over to the sheriff come within the definition of “judicial lien” in the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(32) treats a lien created by a divorce judgment as a judicial lien, regardless of whether it is called an equitable lien, vendor's lien, or security interest.

In Re Gerald J. Sanderfoot, Debtor. Jeanne Farrey, F/k/a Jeanne Sanderfoot, Objector-Appellant v. Gerald J. Sanderfoot, · filed 1990-03-30(32)

We conclude that, whether liens of the type at issue in this case are called equitable liens or vendor's liens or security interests, they still are "judicial liens" within the definition of section 101(32) and, consequently, are within the embrace of section 522(f)(1).

A lien arising by operation of statute after a court enters judgment is a judicial lien under § 101(32).

In Re Porter · filed 1990-04-10(32)

Even though the judgement lien was created by operation of law and not by specific language of a judicial decree, it nevertheless falls within the ambit of the Bankruptcy Code definition of “judicial lien.” Section 101(32) defines a “judicial lien” as a lien obtained by judgement, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding. Because operation of § 511.350 of the Missouri Revised Statutes creates a lien after a court rendered judgement, any lien so created is clearly within the § 101(32) definition of a judicial lien.

Section 101(32) defines a judicial lien to include a lien obtained by judgment.

In Re Morris · filed 1990-07-10(32)

Papers show that the judgment was filed with the Clerk of the Court, County of Queens, in which the debtor’s property is located, thereby giving Devine the status of secured judicial lien creditor. A “judicial lien” is defined as a “lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration or other legal or equitable process or proceeding”.

Section 101(32) defines a judicial lien to include a lien obtained through a divorce judgment, even when the parties agreed to the settlement.

In re Showinsky · filed 1990-07-31(32)

I find that argument to be extraneous, as the definition of a judicial lien contains no requirement that the lien be involuntary. Ms. Lesperance’s lien was obtained through a judgment of the state circuit court pursuant to a divorce proceeding, and thus qualifies as a judicial lien under the language of § 101(32).

Section 101(32) includes a lien arising from a divorce decree within the definition of a judicial lien.

Holtzhauser v. Holtzhauser (In Re Holtzhauser) · filed 1990-06-26(32)

Ms. Holtzhauser holds a lien under Nebraska law upon the debtor’s residence by the express terms of the divorce decree. The lien also arises under Neb.Rev.Stat. Section 42-371 (1988) which applies in divorce proceedings and provides that all judgments and orders for the payment of money constitute liens upon all real property and certain personal property of the judgment debtor. The lien is thus a judicial lien under 11 U.S.C. Section 101(32).

Section 101(32) treats a lien created by incorporating a separation agreement into a divorce decree as a judicial lien.

In Re Stone · filed 1990-09-17(32)

This court agrees the incorporation by reference of the separation agreement in the decree creates a “judicial lien” under 11 U.S.C. § 101(32).

Section 101(32) treats a lien obtained through a divorce court’s judgment or equitable order, including an order compelling a deed of trust, as a judicial lien.

Montiel v. Shestko-Montiel (In Re Shestko-Montiel) · filed 1991-01-31(32)

The judicial lien which is subject to avoidance under 11 U.S.C. section 522(f) is defined by the Bankruptcy Code as a lien “obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.” 11 U.S.C. section 101(32). ... That signature, however, was not willingly given, but was instead compelled by an order of the state court. Accordingly, it was obtained through injunctive relief, entered by the state court sitting as a court of equity. Movant’s lien, having been “obtained by judgment ... or equitable process,” is thus a judicial lien.

Section 101(32) defines a judicial lien to include a lien obtained by judgment.

In Re Rivet · filed 1991-04-01(32)

Since Roux’s lien is clearly a “judicial lien” within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101(32), ... and since it impairs Rivet’s exemption to the extent of $5,350, Roux’s judgment lien may be avoided, to the extent that it impairs that exemption (i.e. $5,350).

Section 101(32)’s definition of a judicial lien excludes a consensual security interest in a vehicle.

VanGorp v. Norwest Financial Wyoming, Inc. (In re VanGorp) · filed 1991-05-09(32)

It does not involve a “judicial lien” within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32).

Section 101(32) defines a judicial lien as one obtained through a judgment or other legal process; a lien created by agreement is not a judicial lien.

In Re Inman · filed 1991-05-15(32)

The Assignment was not obtained by judgment or through any other legal proceeding and does not constitute a “judicial lien”.

Section 101(32) excludes a preexisting equitable lien that a divorce judgment merely recognizes from the definition of a judicial lien.

In Re Fischer · filed 1991-06-25(32)

Section 101(32) of the Bankruptcy Code defines judicial lien as a lien “obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.” ... The Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage did not impose Hall’s lien on the former marital home; rather, it simply recognized the Hall’s equitable lien which already existed.

Section 101(36) includes a valid and perfected prejudgment attachment made under Puerto Rico law within the definition of a judicial lien.

Quadrel Leasing De Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Carlos A. Rivera, Inc. (In Re Carlos A. Rivera, Inc.) · filed 1991-08-21(36)

Consequently, the court finds that Quadrel’s pre-judgment attachment of debtor’s property, made in accordance with the laws of Puerto Rico, constitutes a valid and perfected lien within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 101(36) (1990).

Section 101(36) treats a lien granted by a state court in a divorce decree as a judicial lien.

In Re Reinders · filed 1992-03-12(36)

The lien granted to John and Carol Reinders by the state court is a judicial lien within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(36).

Section 101(36) defines a judicial lien to include a lien obtained through a judgment or other legal process, such as a recorded post-judgment writ.

Applebee v. Brawn (In Re Brawn) · filed 1992-03-16(36)

A "judicial lien” is a lien obtained by "judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(36). Plaintiffs first acquired their lien by post-judgment writ issued by the state court and recorded in the Penobscot County Registry of Deeds.

A lien arising through divorce proceedings can be a judicial lien even when the parties agreed to the settlement terms.

In Re Wells · filed 1992-04-16(36)

Although the lien at issue here arose from a “Marital Settlement Agreement,” the Court believes that the lien more closely approximates a judicial lien than a consensual lien because the lien arose in the context of judicial proceedings. A judicial lien cannot be transformed into a consensual lien simply because the parties agreed to the terms of the document creating the lien. There are many instances where judicial proceedings are commenced and then settled by agreement. The agreement is then entered by the court in resolution of the case. The Court thinks that such a lien falls squarely within the definition of judicial lien in § 101(36).

Section 101(36) defines a judicial lien to include a lien imposed by judgment to secure an equitable claim.

Parrish v. McVay (In Re Parrish) · filed 1992-08-25(36)

11 U.S.C. § 101(36) defines “judicial lien” to mean a “lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or other equitable process or proceeding.” The lien granted to Ms. McVay in the divorce decree is such a judicial lien granted to secure her equitable claim.

Section 101(36) defines a judicial lien to include a lien obtained by sequestration.

In re Rouse · filed 1992-09-29(36)

11 U.S.C. § 101(36) defines a “judicial lien” as a “lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.” This language is broad and I hold that the fund in question is subject to a judicial lien, the type of lien avoided under § 522(f).

Section 101 distinguishes a judicial lien arising from a nonconsensual legal process from a security interest created by agreement; a court-ordered mortgage is a judicial lien.

In Re Haynes · filed 1992-11-16(36), (51)

This Court would look to substance over form in determining whether a lien is a judicial lien or a security interest. The key is not the name of the document creating the lien, but whether the lien arose by agreement or by a nonconsensual legal or equitable process. The execution of a mortgage under order of a court and under threat of contempt if the debtor does not obey would not create a lien by agreement.

A mortgage foreclosure judgment gives the mortgagee a judicial lien under § 101(36) before a foreclosure sale.

In re Bland · filed 1992-12-16(36)

Upon the entry of the mortgage foreclosure judgment and the merger of the debt into the judgment, the only real change of status of the Farm Credit Bank was that it became the holder of a judicial lien on the real property, rather than the holder of a mortgage lien or “security interest,” as such a “lien created by agreement” is called by the Bankruptcy Code.