11 U.S.C. § 101

Section 101(51B) excludes a debtor from the single asset real estate definition when it conducts substantial business on the property beyond operating the real estate.

Ad Hoc Group of Timber Noteholders v. Pacific Lumber Co. (In Re Scotia Pacific Co.) · filed 2007-11-13(51B)

We agree with the bankruptcy court’s holding that Scopac conducts substantial business other than operating the real property and activities incidental thereto.

Section 101(51B) can classify real property as single asset real estate even when the bankruptcy estate holds another asset, such as a litigation claim.

Suntrust Bank v. Global One, L.L.C. (In Re Global One, L.L.C.) · filed 2009-07-21(51B)

In light of the foregoing, I hold that despite the fact that the bankruptcy case may involve more than a single asset, the Property is “single asset real estate” within the meaning of § 362(d)(3).

The debtor’s property qualified as single asset real estate under § 101(51B).

In Re Mayslake Village-Plainfield Campus, Inc. · filed 2010-12-07(51B)

The Debtor is operating the Property as “single asset real estate” as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(51B).

Section 101(51B) excludes a hotel from single asset real estate when its operations constitute a substantial business beyond operating the property.

In re Iowa Hotel Investors, LLC · filed 2011-12-02(51B)

The Court concludes Debtors’ properties do not constitute “single asset real estate.” ... The facts demonstrate Debtors’ hotel operations constitute something more than “operating the real property and activities incidental thereto.”

Section 101(51B) has no whole business enterprise exception; absent substantive consolidation, single asset real estate status depends on the debtor’s own assets, income, and operations.

Meruelo Maddux Properties-760 S. Hill Street, LLC v. Bank of America, N.A. · filed 2012-01-27(51B)

We agree with the district court, and we hold that the plain language of § 101(51B) gives no basis for a “whole business enterprise” exception.

Section 101(51B) allows a property owner's case to qualify as single asset real estate even when the owner currently receives no income from the property.

In re City Loft Hotel, LLC · filed 2012-01-31(51B)

The absence of income does not preclude a case from being a single asset real estate case, despite the fact that a part of the test for the determination is that the real property “generates substantially all of the gross income of a debtor....” 11 U.S.C. § 101(51B).

Section 101(51B) treats multiple parcels as a single project when the debtor has a common plan or purpose for them, regardless of its tenants’ business activities.

In Re JJMM International Corp. · filed 2012-02-15(51B)

In fact, the definition of SARE in 11 U.S.C. § 101(51B) takes no account of the business activities of a debtor’s tenants, and those activities are irrelevant to determining whether a property constitutes a SARE. Instead, the question is whether the debtor treats its property as a single project or property by virtue of a common plan or purpose.

Section 101(51B) defines single asset real estate to include nonresidential property where the debtor conducts no substantial business beyond operating the property and related activities.

River East Plaza, Ll v. Lnv Corpora · filed 2012-01-19(51B)

A single real estate asset, within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code, is a nonresidential property, or a residential property containing five or more apartments or other residential units, “on which no substantial busi- ness is being conducted by a debtor other than the busi- ness of operating the real property and activities in- cidental thereto.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(51B).

Section 101(51B)’s definition of single asset real estate can cover a resort project that is the debtor’s sole or main asset.

In re Costa Bonita Beach Resort, Inc. · filed 2014-06-02(51B)

The Real Estate Collateral is the Debtor’s sole (or main) asset and, accordingly, this is a ‘Single Asset Real Estate Case’ as that term is defined in the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(51B) can treat multiple vacant lots as single asset real estate when they form one project, would generate substantially all of the debtor’s income, and have no substantial separate business conducted on them.

In re Sterling Bluff Investors, LLC · filed 2014-08-22(51B)

For the reasons explained below, the Court finds that the Debtor’s seventy-two lots are SARE and, therefore, the additional case requirements of § 362(d)(3) apply.

Land zoned for commercial development and planned for four or more residences plus a commercial building does not qualify for § 101(51B)'s exception for residential real property with fewer than four units.

In re Kachina Village, LLC · filed 2015-09-15(51B)

The Court is reluctant to punish Debtor’s principal for his truth and candor (which the Court applauds), but the fact is that Debtor’s intentions for the Property are inconsistent with a finding that the Residential Exception applies. ... The Court concludes the Property is SARE within the meaning of § 101(51B).

Section 101(51B) excludes property from single asset real estate when the debtor conducts substantial business there beyond operating the property, including a church’s ministry to its congregation.

In re Southside Church of Christ of Jacksonville, Inc. · filed 2017-06-15(51B)

However, the Church conducts “substantial business” on the Property-that is the “business” of ministering to its congregation-other than operating the Property and the Property is thus not single asset real estate.

Section 101(51B)’s exception for residential real property with fewer than four units includes property being developed or redeveloped for residential use, even if its existing dwelling is uninhabitable.

ETS of Washington LLC · filed 2021-02-04(51B)

The Court agrees with the court in Sunset Plaza and finds that the plain language of the Residential Exception includes properties of which the character of the property (including proposed development) is necessarily residential. This includes yet-to-be-developed properties, currently developed properties, and properties with existing structures to be redeveloped.

Sections 101(51B) and 101(51D)(A) do not require a hotel to earn separate income from services beyond room rental to avoid classification as single asset real estate.

ENKOGS1, LLC · filed 2021-04-20(51B), (51D)(A)

The fact that they do not earn separate income from these tasks is irrelevant under the statutory standard. So, courts rarely will classify even an economy hotel that offers no extra services for charge as a “single asset real estate” project.

Section 101(51B) requires single asset real estate to generate substantially all of a debtor’s gross income; property whose rents the debtor does not receive fails that test.

Richard Archibald McGrath and Jane McGrath · filed 2021-06-10(51B)

Citing the Agreed Order, the Court concluded that Debtors did not generate substantially all of their gross income from the Commercial Property because they were not entitled to (and were not receiving) any of the rents.

Section 101(51B)’s definition of single asset real estate includes property that generates no income.

The Source Hotel, LLC v. The Source Hotel, LLC · filed 2022-06-08(51B)

Accordingly, the court adopts the majority view expressed by other courts that the statutory definition of “single asset real estate” includes property which generates no income.

Section 101(51B) defines single asset real estate to include property that generates substantially all of a debtor’s gross income when the debtor conducts no substantial business beyond operating the property and incidental activities.

544 York Partners, LLC · filed 2022-08-05(51B)

And I hereby conclude that Pinecrest holds a secured claim on real estate that is single asset real estate within the meaning of section 101(51B) and that the provisions of section 362(d)(3) are applicable, And as the 90 period from the date of the commencement of this case has expired, the debtor shall have 30 days from the date of this order to file a plan of reorganization “that has a reasonable possibility of being confirmed within a reasonable time.”

Multiple parcels qualify as single asset real estate only if they form a single property or a single project linked by a common plan or scheme.

Nuovo Ciao-Di LLC and George E. Shoup III · filed 2023-05-19(51B)

Since the Properties are neither a “single property” nor a “single project,” the Properties do not fall within the definition of “single asset real estate” in 11 U.S.C. § 101(51B).

Section 101(51B) does not classify property as single asset real estate when the debtor’s income comes from providing services to its members rather than from the property itself.

255 North Front Street Condos, Inc. · filed 2025-04-08(51B)

The Property does not generate the Debtor’s gross income, and it does not fit within the Code’s definition of SARE.

Section 101(51B) treats multiple parcels as a single real estate project when the debtor uses them for a common purpose, including operating them together as a commercial landlord.

Amerinvest, LLC · filed 2025-04-25(51B)

In determining whether Amerinvest’s parcels constitute a single project, the Court must determine whether the parcels are used in a common plan or purpose of the Debtor. The most important aspect of this analysis is the use of the parcels. Here, the evidence is irrefutable: the parcels are all used in the Debtor’s common plan to act as a commercial landlord for the parcels.

Section 101(51B) supplies the definition used to classify a debtor as a single asset real estate debtor.

Veterans Holdings, LLC · filed 2025-07-09(51B)

The Debtor is a Single Asset Real Estate Debtor. ... The Debtor identified itself as a “single asset real estate” debtor, as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(51B).

Section 101(51B) treats real property as single asset real estate when it forms one property or project, generates substantially all of the debtor’s gross income, and supports no substantial business beyond operating the property and incidental activities.

In re Jerry’s Place Cleveland, LLC · filed 2026-05-19(51B)

It is further ORDERED that Jerry’s Place Cleveland, LLC is a single asset real estate debtor within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(51B).

Section 101(51B) treats multiple units as single asset real estate when they form one rental project that supplies the debtor’s income and the debtor conducts no substantial business beyond operating the property.

In re 25 My Rentco LLC · filed 2026-05-22(51B)

For the reasons stated herein, the Board’s Objection is SUSTAINED. RentCo is designated as a single asset real estate debtor under section 101(51B) of the Bankruptcy Code and its small business debtor and Subchapter V designations under sections 101(51D) and 1182(1) are hereby REVOKED.

Section 101(51B) covers the apartment projects as single asset real estate.

Condor One v. Archway Apartments, Ltd. (In Re Archway Apartments, Ltd.) · filed 1997-02-14(51B)

These are single asset real estate cases pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 101(51B) of the United States Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(51B)’s definition of single asset real estate covers a debtor whose single asset is a three acre parcel of undeveloped land.

Riggs Bank, N.A. v. Planet 10, L.C. (In Re Planet 10, L.C.) · filed 1997-10-29(51B)

This is a single asset real es ... tate case pursuant to the definition in 11 U.S.C. § 101(5133).

A hotel can qualify as single asset real estate under § 101(51B).

In Re 5877 Poplar, L.P. · filed 2001-09-27(51B)

This case is a single asset real estate case as contemplated under sections 101(51B) and 362(d)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”).

Section 101(51B) treats separate properties as a single project when they are linked by a common plan, use, or purpose; the party seeking that classification must prove it by a preponderance of the evidence.

In re Yishlam, Inc. · filed 2013-07-25(51B)

In order for two or more separate properties to constitute a “single project” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(51B), courts have generally determined that the multiple parcels of real estate must be purchased, developed, or sold pursuant to a “common plan or scheme,” linked together by “common usage” or in pursuit of a “common purpose.” ... Because the factors are largely in equilibrium, Great Central has failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the two properties constitute a single project.

Section 101(51B) defines single asset real estate, a classification that subjects a debtor to an expedited timetable for filing a viable reorganization plan.

In re Nierzwicki Holdings, LLC · filed 2015-12-30(51B)

The lead Debtor, Nierzwicki Holdings, LLC, is a single asset real estate (“SARE”) entity, see 11 U.S.C. § 101 (51B), so the Bankruptcy Code’s expedited time table for filing a viable plan of reorganization applies.

Section 101 does not define the term “trustee.”

Weir v. Lubbock Telco Federal Credit Union (In Re Weir) · filed 1997-05-30

The threshold issue is whether the use of the term “trustee” in § 547 includes a Chapter 13 debtor. Section 101, the general definition section of the Bankruptcy Code, contains no definition of that term.

Section 101(46) defines a repo participant as an entity with an outstanding repurchase agreement with the debtor during the 90 days before the bankruptcy petition.

Wyle v. Howard, Weil, Labouisse, Freidrichs Inc. · filed 1997-06-11(46)

A "repo participant” is “an entity that, on any day during the period beginning 90 days before the filing of the petition, has an outstanding repurchase agreement with the debtor." 11 U.S.C. § 101(46). It is undisputed that Howard Weil's last transaction with Hamilton Taft ended over two years prior to Hamilton Taft’s bankruptcy petition, and so Howard Weil does not qualify as a "repo participant."

Section 101(46) defines a repo participant as an entity with an outstanding repurchase agreement with the debtor on any day during the 90 days before the bankruptcy petition.

In Re Hamilton Taft & Company · filed 1997-06-11(46)

A "repo participant" is "an entity that, on any day during the period beginning 90 days before the filing of the petition, has an outstanding repurchase agreement with the debtor." 11 U.S.C. § 101(46). It is undisputed that Howard Weil's last transaction with Hamilton Taft ended over two years prior to Hamilton Taft's bankruptcy petition, and so Howard Weil does not qualify as a "repo participant."

Section 101(47)'s definition of a repurchase agreement does not cover a transaction involving securities outside its listed categories, even if the parties call it a repurchase agreement.

In Re Criimi Mae, Inc. · filed 2000-07-12(47)

The Purchased Securities set forth in the annexes to the Repo Agreement, are not certificates of deposit, bankers’ acceptances, or obligations of the United States and there is no evidence that the Purchased Securities are guaranteed by the United States or any agency thereof. The parties by contract cannot place their agreement within the purview of a statute that on its face does not apply.

Section 101(51A)'s definition of settlement payment applies to the forward contract trade.

Zahn v. Yucaipa Capital Fund · filed 1998-02-24(51A)

The definition of “settlement payment” in 11 U.S.C. § 101(51A) applies to the forward contract trade.

Section 101(51A) includes payments commonly used in the forward contracts trade within its definition of settlement payment.

In Re Olympic Natural Gas Co. · filed 2001-01-30(51A)

Further, the Court concludes the payments made between Olympic and Morgan Stanley were “settlement payments” as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(51A).

Section 101(51A)’s definition of “settlement payment” does not cover a private securities payment that involves neither public markets nor publicly traded securities.

Kapila v. Espirito Santo Bank (In Re Bankest Capital Corp.) · filed 2007-08-07(51A)

The Court agrees with the analysis in these decisions and finds that the Payment at issue was not a “settlement payment” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(51A). This case did not involve the utilization of public markets or publicly traded securities.

Section 101(4) treats counsel admitted to practice in the relevant federal and bankruptcy courts as an attorney eligible for compensation under the Bankruptcy Code.

Brown v. Smith (In Re Mendez) · filed 1999-03-03(4)

Because the debtor’s counsel was admitted by the United States District Court for the District Court of Arizona to practice in the federal and bankruptcy courts in that district, the bankruptcy court properly allowed his attorneys’ fees.

Section 101(10) defines a creditor by the existence of a claim; an equity security holder seeking only a return on an investment is not a creditor.

Crocker v. Namer (In Re AVN Corp.) · filed 1999-06-21(10)

For example, the Code’s broad definition of creditor as an entity with a claim against the debtor, ... and the language of 11 U.S.C. § 501(a) ... providing creditors and equity security holders distinct mechanisms to assert their respective claims or interests against an estate make clear that an equity security holder fails to possess that which symbolizes creditor status, i.e., a claim against the estate.

A person may be an insider of a corporate debtor by retaining effective control through contractual rights, even without managing daily operations.

Le Café Creme, Ltd. v. Le Roux (In Re Le Café Creme, Ltd.) · filed 2000-01-03(31)

Insiders of a debtor corporation include, among others, its directors, officers and persons in control. 11 U.S.C. § 101(31). ... Plainly, the LeRouxs retained incidents of control, notwithstanding that if the Perons did what was required of them, they could operate on a daily basis free from interference.

Section 101(4) requires an attorney to be authorized by applicable law to practice law; federal court admission alone does not authorize a general law practice in a state.

In Re Desilets · filed 2000-04-17(4)

Therefore, this court holds that Rittenhouse is not an “attorney” within the meaning of the Code because (with respect to his Michigan conduct and clients) he is not “authorized by applicable law to practice law.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(4).

Section 101(4) includes a lawyer admitted to practice in the relevant federal court even if the lawyer is not admitted to the state bar.

In Re Mary Poole, Debtor. Russell A. Brown, Chapter 13 Trustee v. Smith · filed 2000-08-25(4)

Thus, the Arizona Supreme Court rules cannot be the “applicable law” to which the Bankruptcy Code refers.

Section 101(4)’s definition of “attorney” incorporates applicable state law; admission to a federal bankruptcy court alone does not authorize a lawyer to practice law in that state.

Rittenhouse v. Delta Home Improvement, Inc. · filed 2000-11-20(4)

For purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, “attorney” is defined as “attorney, professional law association, corporation, or partnership, authorized under applicable law to practice law.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(4). ... For the reasons stated by the bankruptcy court, its holding that appellant Rittenhouse had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and was not an “attorney” within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code represents a correct application of governing law.

Section 101(31)'s list of insiders is nonexhaustive, so a person not listed may still qualify as an insider.

Walsh v. Dutil (In Re Demko) · filed 2001-07-19(31)

That is to say, a person or entity other than those specifically enumerated at § 101(31) may nonetheless qualify as an “insider” with respect to a debtor in bankruptcy.

Section 101(4) includes a lawyer properly admitted to practice before a federal bankruptcy court, even if the lawyer is not admitted to the bar of that state.

In Re Ernest J. Desilets, Debtor. Allan J. Rittenhouse v. Delta Home Improvement, Inc. · filed 2002-06-03(4)

We do not believe that the Western District of Michigan Local Rules and 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) can be read to prohibit Rittenhouse's practice, while permitting these other quotidian forms of practice.

Section 101(31) gives a nonexclusive list of insiders that can include an LLC controlled by a statutory insider.

In Re Fortune Natural Resources Corp. · filed 2003-09-28(31)

Again, however, the fact that Greenwich does not fit squarely within any of the five types of corporate insiders explicitly denoted in section 101(31) does not pretermit the inquiry, for section 101(31) sets forth only a non-exclusive list, providing examples of what the term insider “includes.” ... Indeed, when Brandon Lacoff is without question an insider of the debtor, it would be both folly and a triumph of form over substance to hold that the LLC over which Brandon exerts complete control is not an insider.

Section 101(31)'s definition of insider is nonexhaustive, so an entity outside its listed categories may still qualify.

Floyd v. Hefner · filed 2008-03-31(31)

The statutory definition of “insider” is not exhaustive. ... The court finds that there is a question of fact regarding whether the Entity Defendants qualify as “insiders” in this case.

Section 101(10)(A) requires a creditor to have a right to payment that arose by the petition date.

In Re Wells · filed 2009-06-19(10)(A)

Thus, to be a creditor, an entity must have a right to payment that came into existence by the time the petition was filed.

Section 101(11) includes a state-appointed partnership liquidator within the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of a custodian.

Szwak v. Earwood (In Re Bodenheimer, Jones, Szwak, & Winchell L.L.P.) · filed 2009-12-29(11)

At that moment, Earwood's position and authority changed from state-law liquidator of a Partnership to a ... federally superseded custodian of a bankruptcy estate.

Section 101(31)’s list of insiders is nonexclusive and can include a trust closely identified with a debtor’s relatives.

Boyd v. Petrie (In Re Tompkins) · filed 2010-06-28(31)

By using the word “includes” in the statute, the definition of “insider” is illustrative and not limiting, whereas the definition of “relative” is precise and exhaustive, because it uses the word “means” rather than “includes.”

Section 101(10)(A) defines a creditor by reference to claims arising at or before the order for relief; a later conversion does not make a holder of a post-order claim a creditor.

Byrd v. Johnson · filed 2012-03-19(10)(A)

First of all, Shulman did not become a creditor by virtue of the case’s conversion to Chapter 11. Pertinently, 11 U.S.C. § 101(10) defines creditor as an “entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A) (emphasis added). Here, the order for relief was entered on July 17, 2002. As the administrative claims in question did not arise until after this date, § 101(10)(A) is inapplicable.

Section 101(31) defines insider broadly enough to include alleged officers, directors, their relatives, and entities they control.

Industrial Enterprises of America, Inc. v. Mazzuto (In re Pitt Penn Holding Co.) · filed 2012-11-30(31)

“Insider” status is broad and open-ended under the Bankruptcy Code. ... IEAM adequately alleges the insider status of these Defendants.

Section 101(4) defines an attorney by authorization to practice law under applicable law, which permits a bankruptcy court to consider governing professional conduct rules when approving committee counsel.

In re Glenview Health Care Facility, Inc. · filed 2020-11-06(4)

The bankruptcy court’s reliance on state laws governing attorney ethics should come as no surprise to DBG given the Bankruptcy Code’s express reference to “applicable law” in defining and, thus, determining who may be employed as an “attorney.”

Section 101(10)(A) defines a creditor as an entity with a claim against the debtor that arose by the order for relief; a mortgage holder with a foreclosure judgment can qualify.

Paul R. Koch · filed 2023-06-06(10)(A)

Section 101(10) of the Bankruptcy Code defines a "creditor" as an "entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor." 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A). ... Deutsche Bank is a party in interest who may move for relief.

A pending fraudulent-conveyance claim against a debtor qualifies as a claim under § 101(5)(A), making its holder a creditor under § 101(10)(A) even if the debtor is not directly liable on a related award.

In Re: Mattei · filed 2025-03-11(5)(A), (10)(A)

Wiley’s fraudulent-conveyance claim filed against the Appellants in the Surrogate’s Court, which the Appellants specifically sought to discharge in bankruptcy, qualifies as a claim under the statutory definition.

An entity that can assert a claim for payment against the debtor is a creditor, including when its claim rests on an implied contract or equitable theory.

Steelcast Limited v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of LB Steel, LLC · filed 2025-04-04(10)(A)

Any of those theories (which can be plead in the alternative) would have provided plausible theories for recovery from Debtor. Because Limited could have asserted a claim against Debtor, Limited is a creditor.

Section 101(10) includes a trust’s remainder beneficiaries as creditors when they have a claim against the debtor before the order for relief.

King v. King · filed 2025-05-27(10)

Under the Bankruptcy Code, the term creditor is defined as an “entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor[.]” 11 U.S.C. § 101(10). A claim means “right to payment . . . or right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance[.]” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). Here, the King Kids had a claim against King before the judgment was issued by the state court.

Section 101(10)(A) includes an attorney as a creditor when the attorney has an unsecured right to payment that arose before the debtor filed a Chapter 13 petition.

City of Chicago v. Alayah · filed 2026-06-10(10)(A)

Given the Code’s statutory definitions, it stands to reason that any lawyer who accrues an unsecured right to payment before the debtor files a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition would qualify as an unsecured creditor who would then be able to receive projected disposable income.

Section 101(13) excludes a nonfiling spouse from the definition of a debtor.

Kapila v. Morgan (In Re Morgan) · filed 2002-10-10(13)

She is not an individual debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(13). Only her husband was an individual debtor on the date that he filed, so only he can claim an exemption that might pull her homestead out of his estate.

Section 101(53B) includes forward freight agreements that exchange freight rates and settle in a lump sum calculated from an identified index within the definition of swap agreements.

Interbulk, Ltd. v. Louis Dreyfus Corp. (In Re Interbulk, Ltd.) · filed 1999-10-22(53B)

Here, the FFAs essentially swap freight rates at a future date based on the changes of an index. Additionally, the settlement process of the FFAs is a lump sum payment at termination calculable from the changes of a specified index. Whereas Interbulk suggests that this price is not a fixed one, I disagree inasmuch as it is readily calculable pursuant to a stated formula based on an identified index. Thus, the FFAs conform to the definition of swap agreements and are swap agreements within the meaning of the Code.

Section 101(53B)’s definition of a swap agreement can include an equity swap under its “any other similar agreement” clause if the swap market generally understood it to be a swap agreement.

Enron Corp. v. Credit Suisse First Boston International (In Re Enron Corp.) · filed 2005-07-29(53B)

Although the definition of “swap agreement” in section 101(53B) of the Bankruptcy Code at the time of these transactions did not refer explicitly to equity swaps or equity forwards, it did include by its plain language “any other similar agreement.” ... To determine whether a transaction that is not specifically included in section 546(g) qualifies as “any other similar agreement,” it is necessary to establish if the swap market generally understands it to be a swap agreement.

Section 101(53B) does not treat an ordinary commodity supply contract with an end user as a swap agreement merely because it provides for future delivery.

Hutson v. Smithfield Packing Co. (In Re National Gas Distributors, LLC) · filed 2007-05-24(53B)(A)(i)(VII)

Because the contract is not clearly within the definition of swap agreement, the court will not upset the priority scheme of the Bankruptcy Code by affording the transfers under the contract the protections afforded to swap agreements and swap participants under § 546(g), and under § 548(c) and § 548(d)(2)(D).

A commodity forward agreement can qualify as a swap agreement even if it is not traded on a market or exchange and involves physical delivery of the commodity.

Hutson v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. (In Re National Gas Distributors, LLC) · filed 2009-02-11(53B)(A)(i)(VII)

Thus, insofar as our holding precludes the bankruptcy court from requiring, in defining a "commodity forward agreement," that the contract be traded in a market or on an exchange or that it not involve physical delivery of the commodity, our holding does not define that instrument or hold ... that the contracts in this case are commodity forward agreements.

An assignee of a right to collect fixed termination damages after a swap ends does not become a swap participant through that assignment.

A62 Equities LLC v. Chohan (In re Chohan) · filed 2015-05-28(53C)

Thus, the Congressional intent animating § 560 would not be served by allowing an assign-ee such as A62, under the circumstances of this case, to qualify as a “swap participant.”

Section 101(53B)(A)(i) includes terms incorporated by reference in a swap agreement within the definition of that agreement.

Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. v. Bank of America N.A. · filed 2020-08-11(53B)(A)(i)

Accordingly, the Priority Provisions are incorporated by reference into the Swap Agreement, and thus, under the Code, are themselves part of a “swap agreement.”

A party invoking a swap agreement defense must identify how the agreement satisfies the definition of “swap agreement” in § 101(53B).

BT Prime Ltd. v. Boston Technologies Powered by Forexware LLC · filed 2021-09-01(53B)

Swap agreement is a defined term whose sprawling definition includes many types of agreements that are swap agreements per se (listed in subsection (53B)(a)(i)), other agreements that are “similar to” those enumerated and otherwise satisfy subsection (53B)(a)(ii), and any security agreements related to any agreement in clause (i) through (v) of subsection (53B)(a). See 11 U.S.C. § 101(53B). As a preliminary matter, it is incumbent on a party invoking a swap agreement defense to specify how it contends this definition of swap agreement is satisfied. FXDD Malta has failed to do so.

Section 101(51C) counts disputed debts toward the small business debt limit when they are noncontingent and liquidated.

In Re Coleman Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2001-09-05(51C)

The Debtors’ eligibility hinged on debt structures with “aggregate noncontingent liquidated secured and unsecured debts” of less than a stated amount. When the Bankruptcy Code defines eligibility via this language, disputed debts that otherwise matched the statutory characteristics must be included in the calculation.

Section 101(51C) excludes a debtor from small-business status when its aggregate liquidated debts, including disputed debts, exceed $2 million.

Coleman Enterprises, Inc. v. QAI, Inc. (In Re Coleman Enterprises, Inc.) · filed 2002-03-27(51C)

Section 101(51C) of the Code specifically states that a business is not considered a small business unless its aggregated and liquidated debt does not exceed $2,000,000.00. ... The definition of aggregated and liquidated debt, however, includes disputed debt.

Section 101(51D) defines a small business debtor; the special small-business confirmation deadlines do not apply to a debtor outside that definition.

In Re Orbit Petroleum, Inc. · filed 2008-09-05(51D)

2. Orbit is not a small business as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(51D).

Disputed debts count toward the small business debtor debt threshold if they are liquidated and non-contingent.

In Re CCT Communications, Inc. · filed 2009-11-25(51D)(A)

“Disputed” debts count toward the threshold provided that they are liquidated and non-contingent.

Section 101(51D) excludes single asset real estate debtors from the definition of small business debtor.

In re PM Cross, LLC · filed 2013-06-21(51D)

In other words, debtors in single asset cases are plainly excluded from the definition of small business debtor.

Section 101(51D) excludes chapter 9 debtors from the definition of “small business debtor.”

In re City of Detroit · filed 2014-02-28(51D)

A chapter 9 debtor is not a “small business debtor” as that term is defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(51D) because the statutory definition is limited to “a person engaged in commercial or business activities.”

A debtor’s scheduled liabilities can disqualify the debtor from being a small business debtor under § 101(51D).

Popple v. Elliott Greenleaf & Siedzikowski, P.C. (In re Popple) · filed 2015-06-19(51D)

Based upon the scheduled liabilities, I find that the Debtor is not a “small business debtor” as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(51D).

Section 101(51D), as amended by the SBRA, excludes a real property business from small business debtor status only if its property is single asset real estate.

Moore Properties of Person County, LLC · filed 2020-02-28(51D)

Debtor’s property consists of at least two separate parcels, each generating Debtor’s revenue. Therefore, Debtor’s property is not SARE, and Debtor meets the definition of a small business debtor as of the date of the hearing on the BA’s objection, and is entitled to elect application of subchapter V.

A mortgage on property used primarily to operate a business may count as business debt when determining whether a debtor qualifies as a small business debtor, even if the debtor lives there.

Deirdre Ventura · filed 2020-04-10(51D)(A)

For all the reasons stated herein, this Court finds that the instant case comes within the purview of 11 U.S.C. § 101(51D)(A) because the primary use of the Property was, and remains, for the operation of a bed and breakfast, rather than as a principal residence.

Section 101(51D) includes an affiliate in the small business debtor definition only when the person and affiliate have coexisting bankruptcy cases.

Charles Christopher Wright · filed 2020-04-27(51D)

Coexistent cases for the person and the affiliate are required.

Section 101(51D) requires more than half of a small business debtor’s debts to arise from commercial or business activities.

Samuel Lee Crilly and Kimberly Deane Crilly · filed 2020-06-30(51D)

The Jacks’ claim, which comprises over 90% of Debtors’ debt, does not arise from commercial or business activities of Debtors nor was it incurred for the purpose of making a ... profit.

Section 101(51D)'s definition of a small business debtor requires at least 50% of the debtor's debts to arise from commercial or business activities.

Jeffrey Bernhard Wetter · filed 2020-10-14(51D)

As the UST correctly points out, the evidence at trial established that the Debtor is a small business debtor. The Debtor’s schedules list claims totaling $2,536,505.32 and his testimony during the hearing demonstrates that not less than 50% of his debts arose from commercial or business activities of the Debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(51D).

Section 101(51D)(B)(i) counts a single asset real estate affiliate’s debt toward the group debt limit for small business debtor status.

305 Petroleum, Inc. · filed 2020-10-27(51D)(B)(i)

Premier’s debt must therefore be added to the total of the affiliates, pushing the debtors over the threshold.

Section 101(51D) sets a debt limit for Subchapter V eligibility based on aggregate noncontingent, liquidated secured and unsecured debt at filing.

Arnold B Baker · filed 2020-12-21(51D)

As a preliminary matter, the aggregate noncontingent liquidated secured and unsecured debt limit of $2,725,625 as of the date of filing applies to the instant subchapter V case.

Section 101(51D) requires a small business debtor to be engaged in commercial or business activities; serving as an officer of a company the debtor does not own does not qualify.

Cord David Johnson and Sunny Lea Johnson · filed 2021-03-01(51D)

Thus, applying the ordinary meaning of “commercial or business activities” to the language of section 101(51D), a person engaged in “commercial or business activities” is a person engaged in the exchange or buying and selling of economic goods or services for profit.

Section 101(51D)’s definition of a small business debtor can include a debtor winding down its business when it files, even if its operations have ceased.

Offer Space, LLC · filed 2021-04-22(51D)

Accordingly, the distinction between Sections 1182 and 101 is immaterial for purposes of ruling on the U.S. Trustee’s objection, and the Court’s analysis is equally applicable to both statutes. ... Further, the Court agrees with and adopts Ikalowych’s rationale that a debtor’s actions in winding down its business constitute “commercial or business activities.”

Section 101(51D)(A) excludes unliquidated debts when determining whether at least half of a small business debtor’s qualifying debts arose from commercial or business activities.

Christopher Mark Wilson · filed 2024-12-27(51D)(A)

McGriff’s debt is unliquidated, so it will not be included in the debt limit calculation. The Debtor has not met his burden that not less than 50 percent of his debts arose from commercial or business activities, so he is not a small business debtor pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 101(51D) and is ineligible to proceed for relief under Subchapter V.

Section 101(51D) allows a nonprofit entity engaged in business activities to qualify as a small business debtor without a profit motive.

Guan v. Ellingsworth Residential Community Association, Inc. · filed 2025-01-13(51D)

The broad eligibility of 11 U.S.C. § 101(51D) does not limit subchapter V to for-profit entities.

Section 101(51D) treats rental activity, winding down a business asset, and efforts to restructure guaranteed business debt as commercial or business activities for Subchapter V eligibility.

Shawn Derrick Stevens and Suzanne Marie Stevens · filed 2025-01-28(51D)

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Debtors were engaged in “commercial or business activities” on the Petition Date through (1) the rental of real property through Lesage Properties; (2) the liquidation of a business asset postpetition, which is a wind-down business activity; and (3) the engagement in discussions, negotiations, and other efforts to restructure and repay indebtedness under personal guarantees of commercial business debt.

Section 101(51D) counts priority unsecured wage claims toward the debt limit for small business debtor eligibility under subchapter V.

Hub City Home Health, Inc. and American Medical Programs, Inc · filed 2025-03-17(51D)

Thus, the plain language of §§ 1182(1) and 101(51D), as read in the context of the entire Bankruptcy Code, unambiguously requires priority unsecured wage claims to be included when calculating the subchapter V debt limit.

Section 101(51C) excludes a Chapter 11 case from the definition of a small business case when the debtor elects to proceed under Subchapter V.

Nicholas Stephen Wallace and Pascale Marie Wallace · filed 2025-05-06(51C)

The term “small business case” means a chapter 11 case “in which the debtor is a small business debtor and has not elected that subchapter V of chapter 11 apply.” Id. § 101 (51C). Debtors amended petition in the First Case showed that Debtors were choosing to proceed under Subchapter V of Chapter 11 (First Case Doc. 1). The Debtors were “small business debtors,” but it was not a “small business case.” Therefore, section 362(n) does not apply here.

Section 101(51D)’s debt limit excludes judgment interest whose amount is not readily ascertainable when determining Subchapter V eligibility.

Jason Mowatt · filed 2026-05-11(51D)

To reiterate, this Court’s role is not to determine to what extent interest on the Judgment is available under New York law; it is only to evaluate whether the answer to that question is readily ascertainable. It is not. Accordingly, Debtor did not act improperly in scheduling Creditor’s claim at only the amount of the Judgment and omitting any amount for interest.

Section 101(51D) includes a debt ceiling in the definition of a small business debtor.

Nester v. Gateway Access Solutions, Inc. (In Re Gateway Access Solutions, Inc.) · filed 2007-09-24(51D)

Thus, the total scheduled liabilities are less than the $2,000,000.00 debt ceiling for a small business debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 101(51D).

Section 101(51D) defines a small business debtor as a debtor engaged in business activities whose debts do not exceed the statutory ceiling.

In re Simbaki, Ltd. · filed 2014-12-05(51D)

Simbaki is a small business debtor under 11 U.S.C. § 101(51D).

Section 101(51C) excludes a Chapter 11 case from the definition of a small business case when the debtor elects Subchapter V.

Twisted Oak Winery, LLC · filed 2022-10-05(51C)

See also, 11 U.S.C. § 101(51C), defines a “small business case,” stating, “ ... (51C) The term “small business case” means a case filed under chapter 11 of this title in which the debtor is a small business debtor and has not elected that subchapter V of chapter 11 of this title [11 U.S.C. §§ 1181 et seq.] shall apply. ... Here, Debtor/Debtor in Possession has elected that Subchapter V of Chapter 11 applies to this case.

Section 101(25)(A) requires a forward contract to mature more than two days after it is made; maturity turns on when the contract’s benefits or detriments from commodity price changes are realized.

Conti v. Perdue Bioenergy, LLC (In re Clean Burn Fuels, LLC) · filed 2015-09-29(25)(A)

In light of the purpose behind protecting forward contracts, the statutory language at issue, and the practical ramifications of contrary interpretations, the better interpretation of § 101(25)(A)’s maturity date is the date “that the benefit or detriment from the contract depends on future fluctuations in the market price of the commodity.” Nat’l Gas Distribs., 556 F.3d at 260.

Section 101(25) includes off-exchange commodity transactions for future delivery in the definition of forward contract, and § 101(51A) includes payments settling those contracts in the definition of settlement payment.

In Re: Olympic Nat G · filed 2002-06-28(25), (51A)

We agree with Morgan Stanley, and conclude that the transactions here fall within the scope of § 101(25)’s definition of forward contract. ... We believe that the definition of “settlement payment” in § 101(51A) encompasses payments made in settlement of forward contract transactions, such as the Payments at issue here.

Section 101(25) includes off-exchange contracts for future commodity delivery in the definition of forward contracts, and § 101(51A) includes payments settling those contracts in the definition of settlement payments.

Williams v. Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. · filed 2002-06-28(25), (51A)

With this background in place, we believe § 101(25)’s parenthetical reinforces the commonly-understood distinction between on- and off-exchange transactions, by clarifying that not all contracts with a delayed-delivery component are included within the definition of “forward contract”. ... We believe that the definition of “settlement payment” in § 101(51A) encompasses payments made in settlement of forward contract transactions, such as the Payments at issue here.

Section 101(26) requires a forward contract merchant to participate in the forward contract trade seeking profit; merely entering a forward contract in the course of business does not suffice.

Mirant Americas Energy Marketing, L.P. v. Kern Oil & Refining Co. (In Re Mirant Corp.) · filed 2004-05-17(26)

Applying the court’s conclusions concerning the meaning of forward contract merchant to the case at bar, in order for Kern to have been able to invoke properly sections 362(b)(6) and 556, Kern must have entered into the Agreements as a participant seeking profit in the forward contact trade.

A party's status as a forward contract merchant depends on its role in the transaction; evidence that it is not a producer, distributor or end-user does not establish that status.

In Re Gpr Holdings, LLC · filed 2004-09-30(26)

While Duke has presented summary judgment evidence that it was not a producer, distributor or end-user of natural gas, that does not translate into a fact that Duke was a forward contract merchant in the transaction at issue with Aurora. The court cannot find on this summary judgment record that Duke has established that it was a forward contract merchant in its transactions with Aurora.

Section 101(51A)'s definition of a settlement payment may exclude an atypical late payment made after collection efforts.

Newhouse v. Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. (In Re Aurora Natural Gas, LLC) · filed 2004-10-19(51A)

To the contrary, there is a genuine issue of material fact of whether the transfer was atypical and, thus, outside the definition of a settlement payment.

A natural gas supply agreement can qualify as a forward contract under § 101(25) even when the parties expect actual delivery, if it matures more than two days after execution.

BCP Liquidating LLC v. Bridgeline Gas Marketing LLC (In Re Borden Chemicals & Plastics Operating Ltd. Partnership) · filed 2006-01-13(25)

Therefore, the fact that the Agreement contemplated delivery of natural gas is only consistent with a holding that it constitutes a forward contract. ... Thus, all of the monthly nominations made by Borden matured beyond the two-day requirement provided by Code § 101(25).

Section 101(25) includes a single agreement within the definition of a forward contract; a series of agreements is unnecessary.

Lightfoot v. MXEnergy Electric, Inc. (In Re MBS Management Services, Inc.) · filed 2010-05-07(25)

The definition of forward contracts does not require that they be in a series, quite the opposite. Section 101(25) provides that a forward contract includes a single contract, any combination of agreements, or a master agreement.

Section 101(25) includes contracts for a buyer’s commodity requirements within the definition of a forward contract even when they specify no fixed quantity.

Lightfoot v. MXEnergy Electric, Inc. (In Re MBS Management Services, Inc.) · filed 2010-06-29(25)

They do not have to specify a set quantity for delivery, but are most often written to sell to the purchaser all it might need or demand of the commodity during the term of the contract.

A contract for the transfer of a commodity qualifies as a forward contract under § 101(25)(A) if it matures more than two days after the parties enter it.

U.S. Bank National Ass'n v. Plains Marketing Canada LP (In re Renew Energy LLC) · filed 2011-08-24(25)(A)

Therefore, because Contracts 954 and 955 involve a transfer of a commodity and matured more than two days after they were entered into, these contracts qualify as “forward contracts” under 11 U.S.C. § 101(25).

Section 101(25)(A) treats a commodity contract as a forward contract when its maturity date, determined by when ownership and risk of loss pass to the buyer and payment becomes due, is more than two days after contracting.

McKittrick v. Gavilon, LLC (In re Cascade Grain Products, LLC) · filed 2011-10-28(25)(A)

In light of the hedging component of forward contracts, I conclude that “maturity date,” as used in the definition of “forward contract” in § 101(25), means the future date at which the commodity must be bought or sold. That is the date on which the benefit or detriment will be realized, depending on the market price, which is the date when ownership and risk of loss passes to the buyer. That is the date on which the buyer’s obligation to pay matures, locking in the benefit or detriment of the contract.

Section 101(25)(A) does not require a forward contract to specify an exact quantity or delivery date.

Lightfoot v. MXEnergy Electric, Inc. (In Re MBS Management Services, Inc.) · filed 2012-08-02(25)(A)

As in Olympic, we rely on the statutory language alone, and the Trustee’s proffered requirements of specific quantity and delivery date must fail. Neither the definition of a forward contract, 11 U.S.C. § 101(25), nor the exemption from preference recovery, Section 546(e), contain such limitations.

A forward contract must involve a commodity or similar subject dealt in the forward contract trade and have a maturity date more than two days after the contract is made.

CCT Communications, Inc. v. Zone Telecom, Inc. · filed 2017-11-21(25)(A)

To qualify as a forward contract for purposes of the exception, then, an agreement must (1) involve the sale of a commodity or something akin to a commodity, (2) be the subject of dealing in the forward contract trade, and (3) have a maturity date more than two days in the future.

Section 101(26) defines a forward contract merchant by its business activities; parties cannot confer that status by agreement alone.

In re Firstenergy Solutions Corp. · filed 2019-01-15(26)

However, the parties cannot directly agree to confer legal status as forward contract merchant on Meadville, and bind this Court to that conclusion, any more than they could have backed into that status by mutually signing an agreement stipulating that Meadville is a Federal Reserve Bank.

Section 101(1) defines an accountant as someone authorized under applicable law to practice public accounting.

In Re Computer Learning Centers, Inc. · filed 2002-08-09(1)

An accountant is defined in the Bankruptcy Code as one who is “authorized under applicable law to practice public accounting.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(1).

Section 101(12) defines a debt as liability on a claim, so a court must determine whether a valid underlying claim exists before deciding dischargeability.

First Recovery, LLC v. Sanders · filed 2024-08-06(12)

The bankruptcy code defines “debt” as “liability on a claim,” 11 U.S.C. § 101(12); the issue of nondischargeability is governed by the federal bankruptcy code, but the validity of a creditor’s claim is determined by rules of state law.

Section 101(12) defines a debt as liability on a claim, so injunctive relief that gives the claimant no right to payment is not a debt.

Sound Rivers, Inc. v. Taylor (In re Taylor) · filed 2017-05-31(12)

The absence of a right to payment leads to the conclusion that the injunctive relief sought in the Lawsuit regarding alleged violations of the CWA is not a claim under the Bankruptcy Code. By extension, without a claim there can be no liability on a claim, or debt to be discharged. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12).

An enforceable right to payment for treble damages is a claim under § 101(5)(A), and the corresponding liability is a debt under § 101(12).

Hellenbrand Glass, LLC v. Pulvermacher (In re Pulvermacher) · filed 2017-03-31(5)(A), (12)

Section 101(12) of the Bankruptcy Code defines “debt” as a liability on a claim. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12). A “claim” is defined simply as a “right to payment.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A), And finally, a “right to payment” constitutes an enforceable obligation. ... Following the reasoning in Cohen and Pawlinski, the $20,821.24 constitutes an enforceable obligation stemming from a nondischargeable debt.

A reduction in military retirement pay to account for an earlier special separation payment is not a debt when the government has no claim for repayment and may only reduce future benefits.

Horn v. US Defense Finance · filed 2002-09-30(12)

A debt is defined as a ”liability on a claim,” 11 U.S.C. § 101(12), but there is no sense in which DFAS has a “claim”2 against Horn.

Section 101(12) treats a pretrial diversion repayment obligation as a debt because it is a liability on a claim.

In Re Etheridge · filed 2003-03-28(12)

The debtor argued at trial that the plan does not unfairly discriminate among debts because the pretrial diversion obligation is not a “debt." The debtor characterized the obligation as an "ongoing expense.” The argument is unpersuasive. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) defines "debt” as "liability on a claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) broadly defines "claim” to include any "right to payment.”

Section 101(12) defines a debt as liability on a claim; state law determines whether the creditor has a valid claim.

Jacobs v. State Bank (In Re AppOnline.Com., Inc.) · filed 2003-07-28(12)

Pursuant to Section 101(12) of the Bankruptcy Code, a “debt” means a liability on a claim. ... The validity of a creditor’s claim is determined by rules of state law.

Section 101(12) defines a debt as liability on a claim; a partnership’s obligation does not create a debt of an individual debtor who is not personally liable for it.

Hazelton v. Hazelton (In Re Hazelton) · filed 2003-08-01(12)

The Code defines a debt as a “liability on a claim” and a claim as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured.” ... Plaintiff does not hold an enforceable claim against Debtor for the satisfaction of the partnership’s liabilities.

Section 101(12) defines a debt as liability on a claim; an obligation to transfer property without a duty to pay is not a debt.

Roshan v. Nouri (In Re Nouri) · filed 2003-08-01(12)

Unlike Brugger, the Order here created an obligation to transfer property, not an obligation to pay. As such, the Order did not create a debt as defined under the Code.

Section 101(12) defines a debt as liability on a claim; a right to recoup overpayments from future disability benefits creates no debt because it gives no right to payment.

In Re Delicruz · filed 2003-10-31(12)

Therefore, the Court concludes that DaimlerChrysler’s ability to recover overpaid disability benefits from future disability benefits is a right of recoupment. Because a right to recoupment does not give rise to a right to payment, there is no liability on a claim and thus no “debt” as defined by the Bankruptcy Code. Therefore, the right of recoupment is not subject to the discharge.

Section 101(12) treats liability for rent due under a rejected lease as a debt, including rent that had not yet come due.

Lake Parkway Associates v. Noble · filed 2004-04-07(12)

Upon defendant’s breach of the lease, defendant’s liability for the rent due under the lease constituted a debt within the meaning of 11 USC § 101 (12).

Sections 101(5) and (12) define a debt by reference to a right to payment.

Ramey v. Barton (In Re Barton) · filed 2004-11-01(5), (12)

In turn, a “debt” under bankruptcy law denotes a right to payment. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(5)/(12). In the context of § 523(a)(14) then, for a “debt” to be “incurred” to pay a tax obligation, a bargained for exchange must exist — that is, a contractual relationship.

Section 101(12) defines a debt as liability on a claim; an asserted claim requires a threshold determination of the debtor’s probable liability before it counts as a debt under § 109(e).

In Re Arcella-Coffman · filed 2004-12-08(12)

As stated in § 101(12), it is liability of the debtor with respect to a claim that causes a “claim” to become a “debt”. There must therefore be some threshold determination of the debtor’s probable liability on a “claim” before a claim can become a “debt” for the purposes of § 109(e).

Section 101(12) defines a debt as liability on a claim; a mere obligation does not become a debt until it comes due.

Lyon v. Contech Constr Prod · filed 2005-04-15(12)

The Bankruptcy Code defines a “debt” as not just a mere obligation, but rather as a “liability on a claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(12). As such, under the Code, a debt arises only when the obligation comes due, and therefore must be paid out of the debtor’s assets.

A former spouse’s vested share of a debtor’s military pension is the spouse’s property, not a debt under § 101(12).

Petty v. Petty (In Re Petty) · filed 2005-09-21(12)

Consequently, the interest became the sole and separate property of the Plaintiff as of that date. The interest does not constitute property of the estate in the Debtor’s bankruptcy case, and does not constitute a “debt” owed by the Debtor to the Plaintiff.

Section 101’s definitions of debt and claim allow a debt arising from the disposition of collateral to be treated separately from the original loan obligation.

Bank Calumet v. Whiters (In Re Whiters) · filed 2006-02-02(12)

“Debt” is defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) to mean “liability on a claim”. The term "claim” is defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) to mean either a "right to payment” or a “right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment”. ... Rather, the "debt” which is the subject of this adversary proceeding arises from Whiters' alleged conduct with respect to disposition of a motor vehicle in contravention of the Bank's property interest in that motor vehicle as a result of a security agreement between the Bank and Whiters and/or Whi-ters’ disposition of the title to that vehicle.

Section 101(12) defines debt as liability on a claim, including a claim against the debtor’s property under the Code’s rules of construction.

In Re Jones · filed 2006-03-21(12)

Under the rules of construction provided in § 102(2), claims against the debtor include a claim against property of the debtor. Section 101(12) defines debt as “liability on a claim.” Section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the stay with respect to a debtor’s debts and, by definition, with respect to liability on claims including claims against property of the debtor.

Section 101(12) defines a debt as liability on a claim; for bankruptcy purposes, a claim and the corresponding debt arise when the underlying cause of action accrues under applicable state law.

Barber v. K-B Building Co. (In Re Barber) · filed 2006-03-17(12)

The term “debt” is defined in the Bankruptcy Code as “liability on a claim”. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12). ... It is the law in this Circuit that a claim, and hence a debt, arises for bankruptcy purposes when the cause of action underlying it accrues under applicable state law.

Section 101(12) defines a debt as liability on a claim; a gratuitous gift does not create the enforceable obligation needed for a debt.

Adam v. Fletcher (In Re Fletcher) · filed 2006-05-09(12)

By comparison, bankruptcy law defines a “debf’hence fixing the reach of § 523(a) — as “liability on a claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(12). ... It therefore follows that, unlike a gift which is accomplished voluntary and without consideration, a “debt” has as its key attribute a mutual exchange of value.

Section 101 treats an obligation to indemnify under a corporate charter as a contingent debt incurred when the corporation first becomes obligated to indemnify.

Boles v. Filipowski (In Re Enivid. Inc.) · filed 2006-07-12(12)

The Court finds that, if the Defendants are entitled to indemnification from the Company, such indemnification obligation was a contingent debt owed to the Defendants and incurred on the date when Divine first became obligated to indemnify them, namely the date of the filing of the Charter with the State of Delaware.

Section 101(12) treats an assessed tax liability as a debt even when the taxpayer disputes the assessment.

United States v. Ahmed (In Re Ahmed) · filed 2006-11-13(12)

“The term ‘debt’ means liability on a claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(12). ... There is no doubt that the $1.4 million tax assessment against Debtor is an enforceable obligation. A debt need not be reduced to judgment, as the statutory text makes clear.

A landlord does not incur a debt to a tenant merely by granting lease renewal options when the tenant has no claim to payment under the lease.

In re Bridge Information Systems, Inc. · filed 2007-01-10(12)

Bridge, the landlord, did not incur a debt to its tenant, Vancil, by virtue of the lease agreement. Vancil had no claim to receive payment under the lease.

Section 101 allows a claim to constitute a debt without a judgment, but the debtor’s liability must be established even if the amount is disputed.

Jensen v. White (In Re White) · filed 2007-03-02(5)(A)

While a claim need not be reduced to judgment to constitute a debt, the debtor’s liability must be determined, even if the amount of the debt is disputed.

Section 101(12) defines debt by reference to claim, so a debt can exist before a judgment becomes final.

In Re Wiencko · filed 2007-07-01(12)

Nowhere in the Bankruptcy Code does it require that a debt be based on a final order to be determined liquidated. To the contrary, the Bankruptcy Code defines debt (co-extensively from claim) to encompass obligations well outside the realm of finality.

Section 101 defines a debt as liability on a claim and a claim to include a right to payment; an entity that has assigned away its payment right has no debt owed to it.

In Re Saffold · filed 2007-07-30(5), (12)

A debt means “liability on a claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(12). A claim is, among other things, a “right to payment.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). The debt- or does not have any liability to Leader on a claim because Leader no longer has a right to payment from the debtor.

Section 101 defines debt as liability on a claim and includes unliquidated, unmatured, and contingent rights to payment within the definition of claim.

United States v. Carey (In Re Wade Cook Financial Corp.) · filed 2007-09-24(5), (12)

The Bankruptcy Code defines a “debt” as a “liability on a claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(12); ... A “claim” is a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured....” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). ... Even if the claim to the refund is unliquidated, unmatured or contingent, the taxpayer still holds an enforceable claim, which the IRS is obligated to satisfy.

Section 101’s definitions of “claim” and “debt” are interchangeable when determining Chapter 13 eligibility under § 109(e).

Darby Bank & Trust v. Grenchik (In Re Grenchik) · filed 2007-12-06(5), (12)

Since “debt” and “claim” can be used interchangeably in this context, I do not agree with Debtors’ argument that the use of the word “debt” in § 109(e) indicates this debt should only be treated as secured for eligibility purposes.

Section 101 defines a claim as a right to payment or a qualifying right to an equitable remedy, and a debt as liability on a claim.

In Re Orzel · filed 2008-01-04(5), (12)

The term “debt” is defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) to mean “liability on a claim”. The term “claim” is defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) to mean either a “right to payment” or a “right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment”. ... Because the judgment in the dissolution action upon which Urban relies specifically states that the debt imposed by that dissolution order requires the debtor Dale Orzel to pay Urban — not his former spouse— Orzel has no liability on a “claim” with respect to which his former wife can claim a direct right to payment.

A 401(k) loan from a debtor’s own retirement account is not a debt under Section 101 because the plan has no claim against the debtor.

In Re Smith · filed 2008-06-20(5), (12)

Without a claim, a 401 (k) plan loan is not a “debt” for bankruptcy purposes.

Section 101(12) treats an obligation to pay a tax refund as a debt under bankruptcy law.

Harchar v. United States (In Re Harchar) · filed 2008-07-14(12)

Where the IRS owes a refund to a debt- or, a debt for purposes of bankruptcy law exists. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12).

Section 101(12) defines a debt as liability on a claim; a casino marker creates a debt when the patron signs it and becomes legally bound to pay.

Homann v. R.I.H. Acquisitions In, LLC (In Re Lewinski) · filed 2008-09-30(12)

A “debt” is defined as a “liability on a claim,” see § 101(12), and a “claim” means a “right to payment,” see § 101(5(A)). ... Because the debtor created a debt owed to Resorts that he was legally bound to pay when he signed Resorts’ $50,000 marker on July 15, 2005, the court finds that the debtor’s payment of the $50,000 marker on August 4, 2005, with gambling chips was a payment for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor on July 15, 2008.

Under § 101, a debt arises when a creditor has a right to payment, even if the claim is contingent or unmatured.

Midwest Holding 7, LLC v. Anderson (In Re Tanner Family, LLC) · filed 2009-02-03(5)(A), (12)

Accordingly, a debtor incurs a debt to a creditor when the creditor has a claim against the debtor, even if the claim is unliquidated, unmatured, unfixed, or contingent.

Section 101(12) defines a debt as liability on a claim; the debtor must owe an obligation when the bankruptcy case is filed, even if that obligation is contingent.

Anglin v. Estes (In Re Estes) · filed 2009-03-24(12)

The Code defines a “debt” as a, “liability on a claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(12). A “claim” is defined as a “right to payment.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). Those terms presuppose that the relevant “right to payment” is held by a creditor who can enforce it against the debtor, otherwise there would be no need to pursue its discharge.

A judgment awarding attorneys’ fees is a debt when it gives the creditor an enforceable right to payment.

West Coast Rentals, Inc. v. Perez (In Re Perez) · filed 2009-06-23(12)

“Debt” is defined by the Bankruptcy Code as a “liability on a claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(12). “Claim” is simply defined as “a right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). ... Because the Contempt Judgment awarding WCR its attorneys’ fees represents an enforceable right to payment, it constitutes a debt within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(12) includes potential liability on a claim within the definition of debt.

Tam Travel, Inc. v. Delta Airlines, Inc. (In Re Travel Agent Commission Antitrust Litigation) · filed 2009-10-02(12)

In any event, we find no error in the district court's ruling that United's potential liability qualified as discharged debt under 11 U.S.C. § 101(12).

Section 101(12) includes potential liability on a claim within the definition of debt.

Travel Agent Comm'n Antitrust Litigation v. Alaska Air Group, Inc. · filed 2009-10-02(12)

In any event, we find no error in the district court’s ruling that United’s potential liability qualified as discharged debt under 11 U.S.C. § 101(12).

Section 101 treats a tax liability as a debt because the government has a right to payment as of the end of the taxpayer’s taxable year.

Klein v. Commissioner · filed 2010-07-27(5)(A), (12)

The Government has a right to payment for tax liabil- ities; and for bankruptcy purposes, a tax liability is thus a ‘‘liability on a claim’’ and hence a ‘‘debt’’ as of the end of the taxpayer’s taxable year.

A debt and a claim need not have the same dollar amount when applying §§ 707(b) and 502(b)(6).

United States Trustee v. Mohr · filed 2010-08-30(12)

Thus, while in many situations a debt and a claim may be the same amount of money, these two terms do not necessarily mean the same amount of money when applied to sections 707(b) and 502(b)(6).

Section 101(12) defines a debt as liability on a claim, including liability for the full amount of a final judgment.

In Re Carlson · filed 2011-08-30(12)

As defined in the Bankruptcy Code, "`debt' means liability on a claim." 11 U.S.C. § 101(12). The plaintiff's judgment unarguably is a claim in the bankruptcy case; it is a final and unappealed judgment. Since the full amount of a judgment is a valid claim, the $16,221.98 award cannot be modified, and the only issue before this Court is whether it is nondischargeable.

Section 101(12) defines a debt as liability on a claim; an invoice due on receipt creates an obligation to pay when received.

PN Chapter 11 Estate Liquidating Trust v. Inserts East, Inc. · filed 2012-03-22(12)

However, it defines “debt” as “liability on a claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(12). ... Based on the terms of Invoice # 21086, the Debtor was obligated to make payment for the paper upon its receipt of the invoice.

Under § 101(12), a debt is liability on a claim, including a liquidated damages award based on quantum meruit and unjust enrichment.

Stewart Tilghman Fox & Bianchi, P.A. v. Kane (In Re Kane) · filed 2012-05-10(12)

Contrary to the Defendants’ argument, the fact that the State Court Judgment awarded damages based on a claim of quantum meruit and unjust enrichment, rather than based on a tort claim, has no bearing on this Court’s ruling. Section 523(a) addresses certain “debts” that are excepted from discharge. A “debt” means liability on a claim. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12). The term “claim” is further defined in detail in section 101(5). The damages award contained in the State Court Judgment is a liquidated debt for purposes of section 523(a).

Section 101(12) defines debt as liability on a claim; when no claim exists, there is no debt.

Hann v. Educational Credit Management Corp. (Hann) · filed 2012-08-07(12)

The court having concluded that there is no extant claim, there can be no liability on a claim and hence no debt within the meaning of § 101(12).

Section 101(12) defines debt as liability on a claim, which can include a divorce decree obligation to pay a third party for a former spouse.

In re Mason · filed 2012-11-28(12)

Debt is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (2007) as “liability on a claim.” ... So, despite the language specifying a debt to a present or former spouse, the broad definition of debt has been interpreted to encompass divorce decree-imposed obligations to a former spouse to make payments on a loan from a third party. ... We agree with Howard and Wodark and hold that Robin’s obligation to pay 50% of Martin’s 2006 federal income taxes was a debt under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15).

Section 101(12) defines debt as liability on a claim, so a debt arises when the creditor first has a claim against the debtor.

Stoebner v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. · filed 2012-11-14(12)

Thus, the concept of a debt and a claim are coextensive under the Code,19 and a debtor incurs a debt to a creditor for purposes of § 547(b)(2) as soon as the creditor would have had a claim against the ... debtor's estate.

Section 101(12) defines a debt as liability on a claim, which includes an enforceable obligation arising from a divorce decree.

Stocker v. Stocker · filed 2012-12-10(12)

The Bankruptcy Code defines a “debt” as the “liability on a claim.” 11 U.S.C. §101(12). ... Under the plain language of the divorce decree, Wife had the right to seek enforcement of Husband’s obligation to pay the first mortgage. Therefore, we conclude that Husband, in the divorce decree, incurred a debt in favor of Wife.