11 U.S.C. § 101

Section 101 defines a debt as liability on a claim and includes rights to payment that have not been reduced to judgment within the definition of a claim.

Banks v. Gill Distribution Centers, Inc. · filed 2001-08-15(5), (12)

The Bankruptcy Code defines the term “debt” to mean “liability on a claim,” 11 U.S.C. § 101(12), and “claim” is defined as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment....” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). Nothing under the Bankruptcy Code requires a debt to have been reduced to a pre-petition state court judgment.

Section 101 defines a debt as liability on a claim, which can be a right to payment that has not been reduced to judgment.

In Re: Thomas M. Banks, Debtor · filed 2001-08-15(5), (12)

The Bankruptcy Code defines the term "debt" to mean "liability on a claim," 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(12), and "claim" is defined as a "right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment . . . ." 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(5). Nothing under the Bankruptcy Code requires a debt to have been reduced to a pre-petition state court judgment.

Section 101(5)(A) defines a claim as a right to payment; a person with no legal or factual right to payment holds no claim.

In Re Cadillac by DeLorean · filed 2001-05-25(5)(A)

The Bankruptcy Code defines a “claim” as a: ... right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured[.] ... 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). As a matter of law, Carnes, Lutz, and Perri do not come within the terms of § 303 because they do not meet the threshold requirement that they hold claims against DeLorean and Judge Carroll.

Section 101(5) treats a right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance as a claim only if it gives rise to a right to payment.

Swinehart v. Stubbeman, McRae, Sealy, Laughlin & Browder, Inc. · filed 2001-06-07(5)

Under 11 U.S.C. § 101(5), a right to equitable relief for breach of performance of a contract which does not give rise to a right of payment is not a “claim” for bankruptcy purposes and is not susceptible to discharge.

A claim includes a contingent or unmatured right to payment, including an obligation to pay for pre-petition legal services in later installments.

In Re: Jerry B. Jastrem, Debtor. American Law Center Pc v. Stanley · filed 2001-06-07(5)

We are not persuaded by ALC’s argument. First, the definition of “claim” in bankruptcy is exceedingly broad. A “claim” is “a right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured. ...” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). When we held in Biggar that an obligation to pay attorneys’ fees was a dischargeable debt, we implicitly held that such an obligation was a claim against the debtor’s estate, because a debt is a “liability on a claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(12).

Section 101(5)(A) includes a contingent claim arising from prepetition conduct even if the cause of action accrues later under state law.

Watson v. Parker (In Re Parker) · filed 2001-07-13(5)(A)

The central issue for a bankruptcy court is whether a claim as defined by the Bankruptcy Code existed pre-petition. We find that pursuant to the plain language of the statute, a claim will exist if some pre-petition conduct has occurred that will give rise to liability.

Section 101(5) defines “claim” to include unmatured interest, and that definition applies to the co-debtor stay under § 1301(c)(2).

Southeastern Bank v. Brown · filed 2001-07-17(5)

According to the definitions section of the Code, “claim” includes unmatured interest. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). Section 101 clearly states that the definitions contained therein apply “In this title.”

Section 101(5)(A) defines a claim as a right to payment; a party with no right to payment from the debtor does not hold a claim.

In Re Utilimax. Com, Inc. · filed 2001-07-24(5)(A)

As a threshold matter, a would-be joining creditor must possess a claim against the Debtor. A claim is defined in the Bankruptcy Code as a right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). The present joinders fail on this most fundamental of bases.

Section 101(4) defines claim broadly, but prepetition negligence that caused no injury before bankruptcy does not create a prepetition claim.

Warner v. Village Manor Health Care, No. Cv00-555034 (Aug. 9, 2001) · filed 2001-08-09(4)

True, to accomplish the broad purposes of the federal Bankruptcy Act "claim" under § 101(4), as it defines the ambit of § 362(a)(1) must be given a broad meaning. But it cannot be given such a broad interpretation as to define any rational concept of the word "claim" out of existence. ... There was no claim here until the defendant's alleged negligence permitted the actual contact with the plaintiff which caused injury.

Section 101(5) includes the Smiths’ counterclaim within the definition of a claim.

Chapman v. Charles Schwab & Co. (In Re Chapman) · filed 2001-08-15(5)

While the Smiths’ counterclaim is indeed a claim as defined in Section 101(5) of the Code, for reasons discussed below the assertion that the Smiths’ claim is time barred is incorrect.

A person who pays a debtor’s bills with personal funds has a right to payment that qualifies as a claim under § 101(5)(A).

Slone v. Mowry (In Re Mowry) · filed 2001-06-18(5)(A)

Any right to payment, whether or not it is reduced to judgment, is liquidated or not, i§ disputed or not, or is secured or not qualifies as a “claim” for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). Defendant unquestionably had a “right to payment” when defendant took it upon himself to pay with his own funds certain debts owed by debtor.

Section 101(5)(A) does not make payment for postpetition services a prepetition contingent claim merely because the service agreement predates the petition.

Knutson v. Tredinnick (In Re Tredinnick) · filed 2001-07-12(5)(A)

In light of the foregoing, we cannot say that Knutson’s right to payment was contingent in nature. ... Therefore, we conclude that the Tredinnieks’ debt to Knutson was postpetition and thus nondis-chargeable.

Section 101(12) defines debt as liability on a claim; a pending equitable distribution request creates no debt before divorce when state law gives the spouse no claim to marital property.

Sinha v. Sinha · filed 2001-07-12(12)

Rather, the issue is whether the equitable distribution claim created a dischargeable debt within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code, which defines debt as “liability on a claim” (11 USC § 101 [12]) and provides a broad definition of claim (see, 11 USC § 101 [5]). ... defendant had no basis under New York law to assert a claim against the marital property prior to divorce ... and, therefore, no debt had been incurred in the divorce ... action when the Bankruptcy Court discharged plaintiff from all dischargeable debts.

Section 101(10)’s definition of “creditor” does not include administrative expenses of the bankruptcy estate.

Ehrenberg v. WSCR, Inc. (In Re Hoover WSCR Associates Ltd.) · filed 2001-08-06(10)

The term “creditor” is defined in § 101(10) ... and the definition does not include administrative expenses of the bankruptcy estate.

Section 101(5) includes a right to payment from the debtor’s property even after a Chapter 7 discharge ends the debtor’s personal liability.

In Re Gounder · filed 2001-09-24(5)

The definition of a claim in section 101(5) encompasses both a right to payment from the debtor or a right to payment that can be satisfied from the debtor’s property.

Section 101(5)(A) requires a right to payment for a claim to arise; a taxing authority has no claim against a property owner before it acquires that right.

City of White Plains v. A & S Galleria Real Estate, Inc. (In re Federated Department Stores, Inc.) · filed 2001-11-06(5)(A)

A claim arises only when an entity has a “right to payment.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). In this case, the government entities did not have a right to payment from the owners of the property at issue until the taxes were levied.

Section 101(10) includes as a creditor a governmental unit with a legal right to require a debtor to disgorge funds, even if the unit will not receive the funds.

AARP v. First Alliance Mortgage Co. (In Re First Alliance Mortgage Co.) · filed 2001-09-24(10)

The Supreme Court did not find the distinction significant, and neither does this Court. Once a governmental unit has a right under the relevant law to make a debtor disgorge funds, that unit is a creditor under the Bankruptcy Code.

A tax purchaser with an enforceable obligation secured by a debtor’s property is a creditor under § 101(10)(A).

Davenport v. S.I. Securities (In Re Davenport) · filed 2001-10-01(10)(A)

We cannot misapply the holding from A.P. Properties so as to disregard application of the Code’s definitions to the facts here which clearly show that by its successful bid at the tax sale, S.I. obtained an enforceable obligation secured by Davenport’s residence. Thus, there was a debtor-creditor relationship between Davenport and S.I. as defined by the Code.

Section 101(10)(A) defines a creditor as someone whose claim against the debtor arose at or before the order for relief; fees for services rendered afterward do not qualify.

In re: D.W.G.K. Restaurants, Inc. v. Justus · filed 2001-10-12(10)(A)

Rentto filed a creditor’s claim in this proceeding, but he cannot prevail on that because all of his services were rendered after the inception of this bankruptcy. A claim is a “right to payment.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). As relevant here, a creditor is one who “has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A). Again, that does not define Rentto’s situation.

Section 101(5)(B) treats an equitable remedy as a claim only if it is an alternative to payment or compliance with the order requires payment.

Donald Ray Kennedy Shirley Jean Kennedy v. Medicap Pharmacies, Inc. · filed 2001-10-02(5)(B)

The right to equitable relief constitutes a claim only if it is an alternative to a right to pajnnent or if compliance with the equitable order will itself require the payment of money.

Section 101 does not treat an obligation from a marital property division as a claim before the state court enters a decree imposing it.

Nelson v. Miller (In Re Miller) · filed 2001-10-16(5)(A)

Consequently, a rule that no debt — contingent or otherwise — exists until the state court has actually entered its order or decree promotes judicial administration, by eliminating the filing of cases that cannot go forward, and helps to ensure more accurate decisions.

Section 101(5)(A) treats a right to payment as a claim before it is reduced to judgment; a later judgment does not create a new claim.

Hutchison v. Birmingham (In Re Hutchison) · filed 2001-12-07(5)(A)

As noted earlier, a “claim” is defined without regard to whether it has been “reduced to judgment.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). Thus the entry of judgment cannot properly be viewed as giving rise to a new “claim,” in the bankruptcy sense of that term.

A person with a right to payment of account funds is a creditor.

Daly v. Simeone (In re Carrozzella & Richardson) · filed 2001-12-11(10)

At all relevant times Josephine was a “creditor” of the Debtor, in that she had a “right to payment” of the balance in the Account. ... See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5), (10) (1995).

Under Section 101, a person with a right to payment of an account balance is a creditor.

Daly v. Mayo (In Re Carrozzella & Richardson) · filed 2001-12-12(5), (10)

At all relevant times Peter was a “creditor” of the Debtor, in that he had a “right to payment” of the balance in the Account.

Section 101 treats an entity with a prepetition right to payment as a creditor even if the claim is contingent or disputed.

Cadle Co. v. King (In Re King) · filed 2002-01-16(5)(A), (10)(A)

A creditor is any entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose before or at the time of the order for relief. § 101(10)(A). A claim includes “a right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” § 101(5)(A). ... If he truly believed them to be loans, or if the transfers were loans in fact, the Debtor had a duty to list both Jackson and Lay as creditors on his schedules.

Section 101(10)(A) defines a creditor as an entity with a claim against the debtor that arose by the order for relief.

Stewart v. Barry County Livestock Auction, Inc. (In Re Stewart) · filed 2002-02-15(10)(A)

A creditor is defined as an “entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A). ... The Court finds that Barry County Livestock Auction is a creditor for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(1), and that cashier’s checks number 83582 and 83692 were given by the debtor to Barry County Livestock Auction for antecedent debts.

Section 101(5)(A) defines a claim as a right to payment; recoupment raised as a defense is not a claim.

In Re Black · filed 2001-12-17(5)(A)

The Bankruptcy Code defines a claim as a right to payment whereas recoupment is a defense to a debtor’s right to payment. ... The doctrine of re-coupment is not a claim in the bankruptcy context and, thus, the order enjoining the Christensen estate from pursuing any other claim or cause of action based on the claims asserted in state court does not enjoin the Christensen estate from raising a defense that is related to the dismissed action.

Section 101(5) defines a claim as a right to payment, which requires an enforceable obligation against the debtor.

In Re Gurley · filed 2001-12-27(5)

The claim, as filed, does not represent an obligation enforceable against the Debtor’s estate.

Section 101(5)(A) defines a claim as a right to payment, even if the right has not been reduced to judgment.

In re Chauncey · filed 2002-02-11(5)(A)

11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) defines a claim as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, un-liquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” The Internal Revenue Service’s right to look to Debtor Paul Chauncey for payment of the partnership’s tax obligations is sufficient to give the Service an allowable claim.

Section 101(5) permits a creditor to assert a claim for an unmatured right to payment, while § 502(b) governs the amount allowed.

In Re Loewen Group International, Inc. · filed 2002-02-19(5)

A “claim” as defined in § 101(5) differs from an “allowed claim” which must be determined in accordance with § 502(b). Although § 101(5)’s definition of “claim” permits a creditor to assert a claim against the debtor for all amounts owed to him as of the petition date, even if such amounts are unmatured, § 502(b) provides that such claim will only be allowed to the extent the court determines those amounts “as of the date of the filing of the petition”.

Section 101(5) includes a nondebtor spouse’s unsecured right to a potential marital property award as a claim when state law gives the spouse no present interest in specific assets.

Davis v. Cox (In Re Cox) · filed 2002-02-22(5)

Its conclusion that unsatisfied divorce-sourced marital property rights obligations (or, for that matter, potential obligations) are not “claims” and not subject to discharge is belied by the 1994 enactment of § 523(a)(15).

Section 101(5) defines a claim as a right to payment or a right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance that gives rise to a right to payment, rather than a representation or statement.

M & I Heat Transfer Products, Ltd. v. Gorchev (In Re Gorchev) · filed 2002-03-07(5)

Of those various statements, only one concerns a “claim” as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (defining claim for purposes of purposes of title 11). Claim as so defined does not mean “representation” or “statement” but “right to payment” or “right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment.”

Sections 101(5) and (12) treat a disputed or unliquidated right to payment as a claim and the corresponding liability as a debt.

Peltz v. New Age Consulting Services, Inc. · filed 2002-04-09(5), (12)

Applying this analysis to the facts of this case, I find that USN incurred a “debt” (“Debt”) to Defendant, and Defendant held a “claim” against USN, as of the date upon which USN’s allegedly fraudulent conduct gave rise to the Ohio Action. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5), (12).

Section 101(10)(A) defines a creditor as an entity holding a claim against the debtor that arose before the bankruptcy petition was filed.

In Re Barnes · filed 2002-04-12(10)(A)

He is not a “creditor” because he did not hold a claim against the debtors that arose prior to the filing of the petition. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A).

Section 101 treats a guarantor’s contingent right to payment from the debtor as a claim and the guarantor as a creditor.

In Re Alliance Aerospace, LLC · filed 2002-04-19(5)(A), (10)(A)

As guarantors of Alliance Aerospace’s debt to Lucas Western, the Northrups are creditors of Alliance Aerospace with a contingent right to payment.

Section 101(5)(B) treats an equitable remedy for breach as a claim when the breach gives rise to a right to payment.

Bank of America, N.A. v. Garcia (In Re Garcia) · filed 2002-04-22(5)(B)

Similarly, the Code’s definition of “claim” treats most equitable remedies as monetary claims. § 101(5)(B). It does not permit the holder of an equitable remedy to avoid discharge except in the relatively rare circumstance where the equitable remedy is for a breach that does not give rise to any right to payment.

Section 101(5) includes a right to payment that has not been reduced to a final judgment, so such a claim can support a dischargeability complaint.

Garzoni v. K-Mart Corp. · filed 2002-05-08(5)

A claim is defined as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; ____” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (emphasis added). ... K-Mart has a claim within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code sufficient to support the filing of an adversary complaint.

Section 101(5)(B) can leave injunctive relief outside the definition of a claim subject to discharge.

River View Land Co. v. Bucak (In Re Bucak) · filed 2002-05-17(5)(B)

It is the sense of this court, ... that the prepetition injunctive relief granted in favor of River View by the Chancery Court against Mr. Bu-cak is not a "claim” subject to discharge by virtue of 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(B).

Section 101(12) defines debt as liability on a claim; casino markers create a debt when the casino advances chips and agrees to delay presenting the markers for payment.

Tunica v. Meeks · filed 2002-05-29(12)

The Bankruptcy Code defines "debt" as a "liability on a claim." Laws v. United Mo. Bank of Kansas City, N.A., 98 F.3d 1047, 1049 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 101(12)). ... When Harrah's extended a line of credit to Armstrong, permitted him to sign markers in exchange for chips, and promised not to present the markers to his bank for payment for a definite length of time, Harrah's made a short term loan to Armstrong. At that time, on October 12 and 13, Armstrong created a debt to Harrah's not due for thirty days.

Section 101(5)(A) includes a contingent right to payment as a claim when a prepetition relationship put the possible claim within the creditor’s fair contemplation.

In Re Parks · filed 2002-06-05(5)(A)

For the reasons stated in Morgan, this Court adopts the “fair contemplation” approach to determine when the claim arose.

Section 101(5)'s definition of a claim places premiums for insurance coverage after the bankruptcy filing in the postpetition period, even when the policy began before the filing.

In Re Camellia Food Stores, Inc. · filed 2002-08-16(5)

Therefore, any claim PMA or Camellia possesses for the 2001 insurance premiums is a post-petition claim since such insurance coverage occurred post-petition.

Section 101(12) defines debt without requiring personal liability, so a nonrecourse obligation can be a debt.

Berkelhammer v. Novella (In Re Berkelhammer) · filed 2002-06-13(12)

Neither section 525(a) (which refers to a “dischargeable” debt), section 727(b) (which describes the chapter 7 discharge as extending to all prepetition “debts”) or section 101(12) of the Bankruptcy Code (which defines “debt” as “liability on a claim”) contain the “personal” limitation found in section 524(a).

A bankruptcy claim requires a right to payment or an equitable remedy; a conceivable future interest alone does not qualify.

In Re North American Refractories Co. · filed 2002-06-28(5)

Although “claim” is broadly defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) and has been broadly interpreted by courts, not every conceivable future interest constitutes a claim for bankruptcy purposes. As a threshold matter, in order to have a claim for bankruptcy purposes, there must be a right to payment or a right to an equitable remedy.

Section 101(5)(A) defines a claim to include a right to payment that was contingent when the bankruptcy petition was filed.

In Re Talk City, Inc. · filed 2002-07-19(5)(A)

As defined in the Bankruptcy Code, “claim” includes even rights to payment that remained contingent as of the date of the bankruptcy filing.

Section 101(5) does not make a right to payment from a third party a claim against a debtor that owes no remaining payment or performance.

City of Springfield v. Lan Tamers, Inc. (In Re Lan Tamers, Inc.) · filed 2002-08-16(5)

Accordingly, the City has no “claim” against the Debtor as defined by § 101(5). To the extent that the City had an “expectation of payment” and thus a “claim” at all, it would be a claim against USAC arising out of the City’s separate relationship with USAC as a grantee of federal funds under the Universal Service program.

Section 101(5)(A) includes a claim arising from pre-petition acts even when the amount of damages is determined after the petition.

Wongco v. Federated Department Stores, Inc. (In Re R.H. MacY & Co.) · filed 2002-08-20(5)(A)

The fact that Wongco received the reassessment notice after the petition date does not alter this conclusion. Even assuming the veracity of the allegations in the complaint in the California Action, the only potential relevance of the reassessment to the Enjoined Claims is to fix the damages for which Appellees are purportedly liable. Therefore, the court finds that the Enjoined Claims are pre-petition claims for purposes of Section 101(5)(A).

A claim includes a right to payment arising before bankruptcy even if attorney fees are fixed after the petition.

Suggitt v. Foushee (In Re Foushee) · filed 2002-08-27(5)

A bankruptcy claim is a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). Therefore, Suggitt’s entire claim is a prepetition claim. The timing of the liquidation of attorney fees is not relevant to the dischargeability issue.

Section 101(5) includes contingent and disputed rights to payment within the definition of a claim, so an unresolved reimbursement claim can arise before bankruptcy.

LeJeune v. LeJeune (In Re LeJeune) · filed 2002-09-18(5)

The definition of “claim” includes a right to payment that is both contingent and disputed. ... Therefore, under either state law or bankruptcy law, which defines claims even more broadly, Mr. LeJeune’s reimbursement claim is a prepetition claim.

Section 101(5)'s broad definition of a claim can include an insurance claim arising from a prepetition loss even when the proof of loss is filed after the petition.

Roberds, Inc. v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. (In Re Roberds, Inc.) · filed 2002-10-10(5)

For purposes of establishing when a claim (11 U.S.C. § 101(5)) accrues under the Bankruptcy Code, the court is not limited to state law definitions of when a cause of action accrues and case law in support of determining whether a claim is pre-petition by the state law accrual test has been “widely criticized, and is generally not followed.”

Section 101(5)(A) defines a claim broadly enough to include an unmatured right to payment, even when the amount allowed for distribution is lower.

Pereira v. Nelson (In Re Trace International Holdings, Inc.) · filed 2002-10-11(5)(A)

The Bankruptcy Code defines “claim” as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured ....” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). ... The aggregate amount of Nelson’s unmatured claim for deferred compensation is unquestionably a “claim” under this definition.

Section 101(5)(A) defines a claim as a right to payment; after a discharge eliminates personal liability, the creditor has no claim against the debtor personally.

United States v. Myers (In Re Myers) · filed 2002-10-22(5)(A)

Section 101(12) of the Code defines a “debt” as “liability on a claim.” Section 101(5)(A) defines “claim” as “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.... ” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). This means that the ever since the discharge was entered the debtors have had no personal liability for their debt to the appellant. Or, put in other terms, since that date the appellant has had no claim against the debtors.

Section 101(5)(A)’s definition of a claim includes requests for payment of administrative expenses.

MicroAge, Inc. v. Viewsonic Corp. (In re MicroAge, Inc.) · filed 2002-10-23(5)(A)

Section 502(d) by its terms applies to “any claim” of an entity that received an avoidable transfer, and the definition of a “claim” in § 101(5) is sufficiently broad to include requests for payment of expenses of administration.

Section 101(5)(A) defines a claim as a right to payment that need not arise from a contract.

In Re Gibson · filed 2002-11-08(5)(A)

The Code defines claim as a “right to payment.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (2002). The Code does not mandate that Debtors’ right to payment arise from a contract.

Section 101(5) includes a right to repayment for money advanced on a debtor’s behalf within its definition of a claim.

Freeland v. Enodis Corp. (In Re Consolidated Industries Corp.) · filed 2002-12-09(5)

Furthermore, because Welbilt advanced the $108,500 on Consolidated’s behalf with the requirement of repayment, this created a claim which in turn made Welbilt a creditor of Consolidated. The term claim is broadly defined to include any “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliqui-dated, fixed, contingent, matured, unma-tured, disputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.”

Section 101(5) defines “claim” broadly enough to include requests for payment of administrative expenses.

MicroAge, Inc. v. Viewsonic Corp. (In Re MicroAge, Inc.) · filed 2002-12-11(5)

Section 502(d) by its terms applies to “any claim” of an entity that received an avoidable transfer, and the definition of a “claim” in § 101(5) is sufficiently broad to include requests for payment of expenses of administration.

Section 101(4) includes a contingent right to payment within the definition of a claim.

Maertin v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc. · filed 2002-12-11(4)

While the claim was contingent on sixty days passing from the November 22, 2000 date that the releases were fully executed, it was still a pre-petition claim under the definition in 11 U.S.C. § 101(4).

A claim includes a right to payment under a judgment even when an agreement permits satisfaction for a lesser amount by a deadline.

In Re Mr. Movies, Inc. · filed 2002-12-23(5)(A)

Its claim represents Rentrak’s right to payment. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). On the date of filing, Rentrak’s right to payment was for the amount of the judgment, subject to satisfaction for $145,000.00.

Section 101(5) does not treat equitable ownership of future annuity payments as a claim.

Granati v. Stone Street Capital, Inc. (In Re Granati) · filed 2002-12-24(5)

Likewise, this Court agrees with the finding of the bankruptcy court that the equitable enforcement of Stone Street’s rights to future payments are property interest and not claims subject to discharge under the bankruptcy code.

Section 101(5) defines a claim as a right to payment, whether secured or unsecured.

In Re Taylor · filed 2003-01-23(5)

A claim is a right to payment, whether secured or unsecured. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). Because of this, the first step in the claims process is always to determine whether there is a right to payment.

A statutory right to payment of student-loan collection costs is a claim under § 101(5)(A).

In Re Schlehr · filed 2003-01-31(5)(A)

“Claim” is broadly defined at 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) as a “right to payment”, no matter how remote or contingent. ... The Court views § 1091a(l) as giving ECMC a right to payment which is neither remote nor contingent.

Section 101(5)(A) includes an unmatured right to interest payments within a creditor’s claim, even when that interest may be disallowed under § 502(b).

United States v. Graham · filed 2003-02-18(5)(A)

Under Title 11, “claim means — right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). ... While this unmatured right to interest payments is subject to disallowance under 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) in most cases, it remains part of both IRS claims.

Section 101 defines a debt as liability on a claim and a claim as a right to payment; without a remaining debt, there is no claim.

Baxter v. Systems & Services Technologies, Inc. (In Re Dykes) · filed 2002-12-09(5), (12)

11 U.S.C. § 101(12) defines “debt” as a “liability” on a claim. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) defines “claim” as “a right to payment ....” If there is no debt there is no right to payment, and there is no claim in a bankruptcy case.

Section 101 treats an obligation to pay as a debt even when payment is also a regulatory condition.

Federal Communications Commission v. Nextwave Personal Communications Inc. · filed 2003-01-27(5)(A), (12)

Under the Bankruptcy Code, "debt" means "liability on a claim," 11 U.S.C. § 101(12), and "claim," in turn, includes any "right to payment," § 101(5)(A). ... In short, a debt is a debt, even when the obligation to pay it is also a regulatory condition.

Section 101(10)(A) treats an entity with a claim against the debtor as a creditor even if the entity did not know of or consent to the transaction that created the claim.

Bailey v. Big Sky Motors, Ltd. · filed 2002-12-30(10)(A)

Although these facts are not disputed, they do not undermine the conclusion that Big Sky was Ogden’s creditor under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. ... Accordingly, even though Big Sky only intended that Mr. Ogden receive the funds upon the satisfaction of the escrow conditions, when Avis & Archibald released the funds to Mr. Ogden, Mr. Ogden owed a debt to Big Sky, and Big Sky became a creditor with a conversion claim against Mr. Ogden.

Section 101(5) treats a guarantor’s right of subrogation as a contingent claim even when the creditor must be paid in full before the guarantor can seek reimbursement.

Russell v. Jones (In Re Pro Page Partners, LLC) · filed 2003-02-19(5)

The defendant’s argument confuses ripeness of a claim with a claim’s existence. ... The fact that the defendant’s claim against the debtor is subject to the Kenesaw and Thaxton obligations being paid in full does not nullify the defendant’s status as a creditor because he had a contingent claim as of the debtor’s bankruptcy filing.

An equitable remedy is a claim only if a monetary award can substitute for it; specific performance that money cannot adequately compensate is not a claim.

In Re Indian River Estates, Inc. · filed 2003-03-17(5)(B)

The key therefore, in determining whether an equitable remedy gives rise to a claim under bankruptcy law is to ascertain whether the equitable remedy would also give rise to a right to payment; that is, could a monetary award substitute for the equitable remedy. ... As such, while the monetary damages awarded to Preferred Properties may be included within the DIP’s Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization, Preferred Properties right to receive specific performance is not a claim, and thus be implication, the right of specific performance is not a debt that may be discharged in bankruptcy.

Section 101(5)(A) includes contingent and unmatured rights to payment in the definition of a claim.

Manty v. Miller & Holmes, Inc. (In Re Nation-Wide Exchange Services, Inc.) · filed 2003-03-31(5)(A)

Under § 101(5)(A), it does not matter if a right to payment is “liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, [or] unmatured.”

Section 101(5)(A) includes an unmatured right to payment in the definition of a claim.

Ciesicki v. Mae (In Re Ciesicki) · filed 2003-04-17(5)(A)

The immaturity of an obligation does not affect whether a right to payment is a claim. ... Accordingly, the fact that the consolidated note did not raise an obligation to pay until after Plaintiffs filed for relief is immaterial.

Section 101(5)(A) treats a right to payment from property sale proceeds as a claim.

In Re Loewen Group International, Inc. · filed 2003-04-16(5)(A)

This is a “right to payment” that constitutes a claim against Mt. Nebo for one half the Proceeds.

Section 101(5) defines claims against a bankruptcy estate; it does not determine whether a debtor’s cause of action is property of the estate.

In Re Smith · filed 2003-05-23(5)

That court correctly explains the scope of § 101(5) and the distinction between claims against the estate and claims that bring property into the estate under § 541(a)(1).

Section 101(5)(A) treats a contingent right to payment as a claim even when the right to payment arises after the bankruptcy petition.

Mason v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Ex Rel. FBI Distribution Corp. (In Re FBI Distribution Corp.) · filed 2003-05-27(5)(A)

While the claim under the Retention Agreement is enforceable against the estate in the bankruptcy proceeding, it is a prepetition claim.

Section 101(5) includes a known, contingent obligation to pay a partnership capital account deficit as a claim, even if the amount is not yet fixed.

In Re: Digicon Inc · filed 2003-06-11(5)

As set forth above, any obligation on the part of Digicon to eliminate the deficit in its capital account in the Partnership was a “claim” against the bankruptcy estate within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) when Digicon filed for bankruptcy.

Section 101(5) includes a seller’s right to payment as a claim when the seller tenders the goods or required documents, even if payment is due later.

Montgomery Ward, LLC v. Wiseknit Factory, Ltd. (In Re Montgomery Ward, LLC) · filed 2003-04-17(5)

A creditor has a claim where it has a right to payment, and Wiseknit’s right to payment arose when it tendered the goods (or, at the latest, when it presented the draft through customary banking channels). Wiseknit’s right to payment is distinct from Montgomery Ward’s right to retain and dispose of the tendered goods. Taking possession may have been a subsequent bad act, but Wiseknit already had a claim under the Bankruptcy Code in December of 2000 upon tender of the goods or documents.

Section 101(5)(A) includes contingent rights to payment as claims, even when liability remains uncertain.

Landrie v. Internal Revenue Service (In Re Landrie) · filed 2003-04-22(5)(A)

The expansiveness of these definitions, as exhibited by the use of the word “contingent” in the definition of “claim,” means that it need only be shown that a debtor may at some point in the future incur a legal liability for an action that transpired prepetition; certainty as to the existence of the obligation is therefore not a prerequisite to the existence of a claim, and therefore by implication the existence of a debt.

Section 101(5)(A) includes contingent contractual obligations as claims when the parties could reasonably have contemplated the future liability.

Wongco v. Federated Department Stores, Inc. · filed 2003-05-29(5)(A)

Wongco argues in wholly conclusory fashion that the property tax liabilities at issue were not sufficiently foreseeable so as to give rise to a contingent claim within the scope of § 101(5)(A). But it fails to offer any explanation as to why the increased tax liability, attributable to the disputed assignment of the lease, would not have been reasonably or fairly contemplated by the parties prior to the bankruptcy proceedings. Indeed, the lease itself contains detailed and specific provisions relating to the payment of taxes, strongly suggesting that the parties did contemplate the potential tax consequences of their contractual relationship.

Section 101(5) defines a claim as a right to payment; an invoice for future services alone does not create that right.

Vanguard Airlines, Inc. v. Airline Automation, Inc. (In Re Vanguard Airlines, Inc.) · filed 2003-06-16(5)

Merely providing an invoice does not give a creditor a right to payment. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (“claim” means a “right to payment...”). An invoice estimating the cost of services to be provided in the future does not create a debt.

Section 101(10)(A) generally requires an entity to hold a prepetition claim to qualify as a creditor.

Stalnaker v. DLC, Ltd. (In Re DLC, Ltd.) · filed 2003-06-18(10)(A)

To be a creditor, with certain exceptions not applicable here, an entity must hold a prepetition claim.

Section 101(10) defines a creditor to include an entity with a claim against the debtor arising before the order for relief or from rejection of a lease with the debtor.

In Re LeBlanc Inc. · filed 2003-08-06(10)

Sabre is not a creditor. The Code defines “creditor” as “an entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A). Sabre has no claim against the debtor. It has no claim against property that is or was the debtor’s. An entity may be a creditor if it has a claim arise by virtue of the rejection of a lease it had with the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(B), referring to 11 U.S.C. § 502(g). Sabre had no lease with the debtor.

Section 101(5) does not treat a violation of an injunction as a claim when contempt is the remedy and the aggrieved party has no right to payment.

Decker v. Aurora National Life Assurance Co. · filed 2003-06-18(5)

Nor did the BAP err in determining that violation of the injunction was not a “claim” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(5).

Section 101(5) defines a claim broadly enough to include a right to payment arising from prepetition conduct and a prepetition relationship, even if liability is established later.

In Re Dixon · filed 2003-07-07(5)

The Court agrees with other courts that have declined to apply the right to payment test because it conflicts with the broad definition of a “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code. ... The Court concludes that under either test, Allstate’s claim is a pre-petition claim.

Section 101(4)(A)’s definition of “claim” includes a right to prepetition interest on a debt.

Miller v. Internal Revenue Service (In Re Miller) · filed 2003-07-11(4)(A)

A claim under 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A) is defined as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” ... This definition of “claim” as a “right to payment” has been construed to include interest.

Section 101 defines a debt as liability on a claim, which requires an enforceable right to payment.

Thompson v. Roland (In Re Roland) · filed 2003-06-24(12)

A “debt” is a liability on a claim, 11 U.S.C. § 101(12), and a “claim” is a right to payment, 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A), which the Supreme Court has defined as “nothing more nor less than an enforceable obligation.” ... Accordingly, the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that she had a right to the payment of her attorney’s fees under applicable non-bankruptcy law. Since there is no “debt,” there is no non-dischargeable debt, and the plaintiffs claim fails on the merits.

A disputed claim is still a claim for bankruptcy scheduling purposes.

In Re Bachman · filed 2003-07-18(5)(A)

Even a disputed claim nevertheless is a “claim” for scheduling purposes.

Section 101(5) includes a contingent right to payment in the definition of a claim.

Jones v. Hall (In Re Hall) · filed 2003-07-24(5)

A contingent claim is an allowable claim in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (2000) (providing that a “ ‘claim’ means — right to payment, whether or not such right is ... contingent....”).

Section 101(9)(A) treats a debtor’s guarantor as a creditor.

Menninger v. Attiyah (In Re Midwest Mobile Technologies, Inc.) · filed 2003-07-29(9)(A)

A guarantor of a debtor is a “creditor” under 11 U.S.C. § 101(9)(A).

Section 101 treats a tax purchaser’s enforceable right against a debtor’s property as a claim, making the purchaser a creditor in the bankruptcy.

In Re Commings · filed 2003-07-31(5)

Because NIC has a right against the debtors’ property, NIC has a “claim” against the debtors and is a “creditor’” in their bankruptcy.

An enforceable obligation imposed by a court ordered equitable distribution is a debt because the former spouse has a right to payment.

Mannix v. Mannix (In Re Mannix) · filed 2003-08-01(5), (12)

The Code defines a debt as a “liability on a claim” and a claim as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(12), (5). ... The effect of an enforceable court ordered distribution is to create a liability against a debtor in favor of a former spouse. In this case, Debtor’s responsibility to Plaintiff to pay the PNC loan is a debt for the purposes of the court’s analysis of subsection 523(a)(5) and 523(a)(15).

Section 101(5)(B) treats a right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance as a claim if an alternative right to payment can satisfy it.

Shanri Holdings Corp. v. Kmart Corp. (In Re Kmart Corp.) · filed 2003-08-27(5)(B)

Thus, a right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance is a “claim” under Section 101(5)(B) if it can be satisfied by an alternative right to payment.

Section 101(5) includes a contingent right to payment under a signed indemnification agreement in the definition of a claim.

Qakfabco, Inc. v. American Standard, Inc. (In Re Kewanee Boiler Corp.) · filed 2003-08-29(5)

Under bankruptcy law, a claim is defined as a “right to payment,” whether or not such right is “unliquidated” or “contingent.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). ... Thus, Kewanee/OakFabco’s obligation to indemnify American Standard under the 1970 Agreements was a pre-petition claim in existence at the time of the filing of the bankruptcy petition in 1986.

Section 101(5)(A) treats a prepetition request for equitable distribution as a claim even without an agreement or court order fixing it.

Schorr v. Schorr (In Re Schorr) · filed 2003-09-05(5)(A)

We conclude on the basis of the foregoing considerations that defendant in this adversary action had “a right to payment” and therefore a “claim” when she requested equitable distribution of marital property prior to the filing of debtor’s bankruptcy petition. Debtor, in other words, owed defendant a pre-petition “debt” that had not yet been reduced to judgment when debtor received a discharge.

Section 101(5) defines a claim to include a right to payment whether secured or unsecured.

In Re SunCruz Casinos, LLC · filed 2003-09-08(5)

Further, 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) defines a “claim” as, among other things, a “right to payment, whether or not such right is ... secured, or unsecured.” Accordingly, the plain language of the statute makes clear that the secured creditor may credit bid its entire claim, including any unsecured deficiency portion thereof.

Section 101(5) includes a right to payment for breach of an agreement as a claim even if no lawsuit has been filed or judgment entered before bankruptcy.

In Re Dill · filed 2003-10-03(5)

This is a claim for bankruptcy purposes even though Ms. Dill had not commenced an action or reduced it to judgment before the debtor filed bankruptcy.

A tax certificate holder has a claim when its lien is enforceable against the debtor’s property, even without a personal claim against the debtor.

In Re Lago · filed 2003-10-15(5)

Thus, consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Johnson, this Court finds the tax certificate holders have claims against the Debtors and are therefore creditors in these Chapter 13 cases.

Section 101(5)(A) includes contingent and unmatured rights to payment in the definition of a claim, so future maintenance payments can qualify.

Thomas v. Lawrence · filed 2003-11-13(5)(A)

Claim includes these rights to payment whether fixed, contingent, matured, unma-tured, secured, unsecured. § 101(5)(A). The definition clearly eliminates Thomas' concern that Miller's maintenance obligation did not ripen until Allen had survived the month. The fact that maintenance payments would cease upon Allen's death is of no significance to the determination that Allen had a right to maintenance payments.

Section 101(5) defines a claim broadly enough to include remote and contingent legal obligations that arise before a settlement agreement.

Peltz v. Edward C. Vancil, Inc. (In Re Bridge Information Systems, Inc.) · filed 2003-11-15(5)

Because the Code’s definition of a claim includes even remote and contingent legal obligations of the debtor, Vancil would have had a claim against Bridge prior to the parties’ execution of the settlement agreement.

Section 101(10)(A) includes an ex-spouse with contingent liability on marital debts in its definition of creditor.

Morton v. Morton (In Re Morton) · filed 2003-09-12(10)(A)

An ex-spouse with contingent liability on marital debts is clearly a creditor within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(10).

Section 101(10)(A) does not treat counsel as a creditor when the debtor owed counsel nothing on the petition date, even if counsel held a retainer securing future fees.

In Re Advanced Imaging Technologies, Inc. · filed 2003-11-14(10)(A)

A disinterested person is defined in Section 101(14)(A) as one who is not a “creditor”. Section 101(10)(A) in turn defines a “creditor” as one that “has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor.” Section 101(5)(A) defines a “claim” as a right to payment. Because Gray Cary was not owed anything as of the petition date, it was not a creditor for purposes of Section 327(a).

Section 101(5)(A) includes disputed rights to payment as claims, whose holders qualify as creditors under section 101(10)(A) without first proving the claims’ merits.

Jeffrey M. Goldberg & Associates, Ltd. v. Holstein (In Re Holstein) · filed 2003-09-24(5)(A)

Because Goldberg holds a “claim” under 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) and hence is a “creditor” under 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A), the court concludes that Goldberg has standing to seek the denial of Holstein’s discharge regardless of the merits of Goldberg’s claim.

A claim requires a right to payment; absent overriding federal law, state law determines when that right arises.

In Re Retort · filed 2003-10-23(4)(A)

Consequently, the critical issue in the present matter is when did respondent’s right to payment for the legal services rendered arise. ... Debtor’s failure to pay respondent’s fees breached the contract between the parties, which in turn created respondent’s right to payment. ... Therefore, respondent’s claim was clearly subsequent to debtor’s March 27, 2001, chapter 7 filing.

Section 101(5) includes a contingent indemnification claim arising from prepetition conduct, even if the surety pays the obligation later.

In Re Marshall · filed 2003-11-14(5)

The conduct which gives rise to USFG’s indemnification claim and state court judgment, is the debtor’s indemnification agreement and nonpayment of the 1993 sales tax — both of which occurred prior to debtor’s bankruptcy in July 1994. Accordingly, this Court concludes that USFG’s indemnification claim against the debtor is a prepetition claim within the meaning of § 101(5).

Section 101(5)(A) includes a prepetition right to payment as a claim even when its amount remains contingent, unliquidated, or disputed.

In Re Gullone · filed 2003-11-21(5)(A)

I conclude that Chartwells’ right to payment arose when the debtor filed his CEPA action in May 2001. When the debtor filed his bankruptcy petition in September 2001, Chartwells held a pre-petition contingent, unliquidated, disputed claim against the debtor.

Section 101 defines a debt as a liability on a claim and a claim as a right to payment or an equitable remedy; a bankruptcy discharge does not extinguish an interest in property.

Paul Mundell, Jr. v. Susann E. Ortega Mundell · filed 2003-11-05(5), (12)

A “debt” means a liability on a claim. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12). A “claim” means a right to payment, or a right to an equitable remedy. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). A discharge extinguishes rights to payment. It does not extinguish interest in property.

Section 101(12A)'s definition of “debt for child support” does not help determine whether a debt is in the nature of support under § 523(a)(18).

Alter v. Illinois Department of Public Aid (In Re Alter) · filed 2003-11-10(12A)

No assistance is to be gained from the Bankruptcy Code's definition of "debt for child support” as "a debt of a kind specified in section 523(a)(5) of this title for maintenance or support of a child of the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(12A). As noted by Collier’s, the term "debt for child support” does not appear anywhere in the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(10) defines a creditor as an entity whose claim against the debtor arose at or before the order for relief.

United States v. State Street Bank and Trust Co. · filed 2003-12-12(10)

In relevant part, § 101(10) provides that a creditor is an “entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor.” Here, the IRS did not have a claim until the assets were sold, which occurred several years after the entry of the Confirmation Order. Thus, the IRS was not a creditor in the first case and did not become a creditor until after the second case was commenced.

Section 101(10) treats a government agency as a creditor when it acts for the public and has authority to enforce a debtor’s restitution obligation, even if the payment benefits private individuals.

Idaho, Department of Finance v. McClung (In Re McClung) · filed 2004-01-27(10)

If, in securing a restitution award, a governmental entity is acting on behalf of the general public and is empowered by applicable statutes to enforce a payment obligation against the debtor, then it follows that the governmental entity should be considered a “creditor” for purposes of the Code.

Section 101(10) excludes holders of postpetition claims from the definition of creditor.

In Re Shin · filed 2004-02-13(10)

Accordingly, the holder of such a claim is not a creditor, 11 U.S.C. § 101(10), and is not entitled to file a proof of claim.

Section 101(5) broadly includes an unliquidated right to reimbursement that exists before payment is made.

Davie v. Rudgers (In Re Davie) · filed 2003-12-12(5)

On the date of the filing of the involuntary petition, the Commissioner had a claim against the Debtor within the meaning and intent of Section 101(5), which is and is intended to be very broad.

A prepetition retainer creates one claim under § 101(5), even when some legal services are performed after the petition is filed.

Bethea, Albert v. Robert J. Adams & · filed 2003-12-17(5)

One contract (the retainer) gives rise to one claim, meaning a “right to payment, whether or not such right is . . . fixed, contingent, matured [or] unmatured”. 11 U.S.C. §101(5).

Section 101(5) defines a claim broadly enough to include gambling debts that Florida law would otherwise make unenforceable.

Mirage-Casino Hotel v. Simpson (In Re Simpson) · filed 2003-12-31(5)

The term “claim” is given the broadest possible meaning due to the Congressional intent to bring all legal obligations of a debtor within the bankruptcy case. Application of conflict preemption subrogates Florida’s statutory provision of non-enforcement of gambling debts to the comprehensive federal bankruptcy scheme crafted by Congress, through the authority of the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs claims for gambling debts, normally unenforceable in Florida are deemed enforceable.

Section 101(5)(A) includes a pending cause of action for payment within the definition of a claim, even before judgment.

In Re Agway, Inc. · filed 2003-12-31(5)(A)

A pending cause of action is ineontrovertibly a claim.

Section 101(5) defines a claim broadly enough to include collection costs even if they have not yet been assessed.

In Re Brown · filed 2004-01-15(5)

It therefore follows that collection costs, even if not yet assessed, are within the scope of a “claim” in bankruptcy.

Section 101(5)’s definition of a claim does not include an insurer’s defense to coverage arising from the debtor’s settlement with claimants.

In Re Mid-Valley, Inc. · filed 2004-02-11(5)

At best, the assertion provides a defense to coverage but does not provide the insurers with a “claim” as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(5).

Section 101(5) requires a connection between a claimant and the debtor’s product; unidentified people who may be injured after confirmation do not yet hold claims.

In Re Hoffinger Industries, Inc. · filed 2004-01-14(5)

The unknown persons defined in component (c) simply do not hold claims under § 101(5), as defined and as limited by the “contingent or unliquidated” clause in § 502(c). Those in component (b) do.

Section 101 defines debt as liability on a claim and claim broadly enough to include a right to payment arising from the debtor’s fraud.

In Re Tankersley · filed 2004-02-12(5), (12)

The Bankruptcy Code defines “debt” very broadly, as “liability on a claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(12). And, “claim” is likewise defined very broadly, as any “right to payment,” whether liquidated or unliquidated, disputed or undisputed, legal or equitable. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). The debt at issue is the debt the Debtor incurred to K & M by committing a fraud against the company.

A contingent right to payment is a claim under Section 101(5), and an entity holding that claim is a creditor under Section 101(10).

Field v. Insituform East, Inc. (In Re Abatement Environmental Resources, Inc.) · filed 2004-03-31(5), (10)

The code defines creditor to mean an "entity that holds a claim against the debtor....” 11 U.S.C. § 101(10). The code also defines claim to mean a "right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, ... contingent,....” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). ICSP holds a contingent claim against AER, which makes ICSP a creditor of the bankruptcy estate and subject to the avoidance powers in Section 547.

Section 101 treats a right to payment for pension benefits withheld in breach of a property settlement agreement as a claim, and the resulting personal liability as a debt.

Holbrook v. Holbrook · filed 2004-03-12(5), (12)

11 U.S.C. § 101(12) defines “debt” as a “liability on a claim.” ... Notwithstanding Gwendolyn’s initial interest in the pension funds, Vester’s breach of the property settlement agreement constituted a claim which he was legally (although not morally or equitably) entitled to discharge upon approval by the bankruptcy court.

Section 101 defines a debt as liability on a claim and a claim as a right to payment; an enforceable obligation can exist even if payment is contingent or unliquidated.

United States Ex Rel. Department of Agriculture Farm Service Agency v. Myers (In Re Myers) · filed 2004-03-29(12), (5)(A)

The Bankruptcy Code defines “debt” as ‘liability on a claim’ and the term “claim” as the “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured.” ... Accordingly, a debt arises pre-petition for set-off purposes when some “right to payment” exists pre-petition; that is, when an enforceable obligation exists at the time the debtor files his bankruptcy petition.

Section 101(5)(A) includes a right to payment as a bankruptcy claim even if it has not been reduced to judgment.

United States v. Galletti · filed 2004-03-23(5)(A)

Moreover, a claim is allowable in bankruptcy “whether or not such right is reduced to judgment.” 11 U. S. C. § 101(5)(A).

Section 101(5) defines a claim broadly enough to include a right to payment before judgment, so a court may examine the underlying claim rather than limit it to the relief awarded.

Weissmann v. Pre-Press Graphics Co. (In Re Pre-Press Graphics Co.) · filed 2004-03-24(5)

This interpretation, however, conflicts with the broad definition above, which indicates that a claim exists prior to judgment.

Section 101(5) defines a claim broadly to include contingent and unliquidated rights to payment.

Georgetown Steel Co. v. Capital City Insurance (In Re Georgetown Steel Co.) · filed 2004-04-28(5)

The definition of “claim” in the Bankruptcy Code is very broad, and includes a right to payment, whether or not such right is, inter alia, unliquidated, contingent, or unsecured. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5).

Section 101(10)(A) treats a government agency with a prepetition right to restitution as a creditor.

Chao v. Duncan (Duncan) · filed 2004-03-24(10)(A)

The terms of the Bankruptcy Code and Rules also support a finding that DOL has standing to bring this Adversary Proceeding. ... Therefore, DOL is an “entity” for the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code because it is a “governmental unit.” ... DOL has a “right to payment” in the form of the restitution provisions of the Consent Judgment. ... And the right to payment arose “at the time of or before the order for relief,” inasmuch as the Consent Judgment was entered by the District Court on February 6, 2001, well before the Debtor’s August 13, 2002, Petition Date. Thus, DOL has a “claim” for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(5) includes a contingent, unmatured right to payment under a contract as a claim.

Casini v. Graustein (In Re Casini) · filed 2004-03-31(5)

11 U.S.C. § 101(5). Thus, a debt arose prepetition if the creditor had a right to payment prepetition.

Section 101(5)(A) includes a contingent claim arising from prepetition conduct when the parties could fairly contemplate the claim, even if the cause of action had not accrued under state law.

In Re Agway, Inc. · filed 2004-04-19(5)(A)

Rather, the Court will apply the fair contemplation test, which provides that a claim exists if, based on the prepetition conduct in question, the parties can fairly contemplate the existence of a claim.

Section 101(10) generally limits creditor status to holders of claims against the debtor arising on or before the order for relief.

In Re Ockerlund Construction Co. · filed 2004-04-07(10)

Nevertheless, the definition of who is a “creditor” usually requires a right to payment from (or a “claim against”) the debtor on or before the order for relief (the petition date in a voluntary case), see § 101(10), and only a “creditor” is entitled to file a “proof of claim” in a bankruptcy case, see § 501.

Section 101 defines a creditor to include an entity with a claim against the debtor that arose before the order for relief.

Boston Regional Medical Center, Inc. v. Massachusetts Division of Health Care Finance & Policy · filed 2004-04-14(10)(A)

Appellant has stipulated that it owes appellee $1,702,714. Accordingly, appellee is a creditor. 11 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "creditor," inter alia, as "entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor," and defining "claim," inter alia, as a "right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.").

A creditor under § 101(10)(A) must have a claim that arose at or before the order for relief; a spouse’s later equitable distribution claim does not qualify.

In Re Howell · filed 2004-07-01(10)(A)

The decision in Lawrence to treat the spouse’s equitable distribution claim as a general unsecured creditor is inconsistent with Berlingeri’s holding that such claims are post petition. Post petition claims are not discharged under § 727 of the Bankruptcy Code as Berlingeri held; neither are they allowable as claims to share in distribution of property of the estate under § 726. A "creditor” is defined as an "entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A).

Section 101 treats an entity with a disputed right to payment from the debtor as a creditor.

In Re Cellular 101, Inc., Debtor, Cellular 101, Inc. v. Channel Communications, Inc. John Price · filed 2004-07-28(5), (10)

Accordingly, a "creditor" can include an entity that has a "disputed" right to payment from the debtor. Price fits within the Bankruptcy Code's definition of creditor because he filed a Joint Proof of Claim with Channel against Cellular based on a contract that he signed with Cellular.

Section 101(5)(A) includes a prepetition right to attorneys’ fees within the definition of a claim even if the fees are incurred after the bankruptcy filing.

In Re New Power Co. · filed 2004-07-16(5)(A)

When a creditor’s right to payment for fees exists pre-petition, the right to payment constitutes a “claim,” within the meaning of § 1G1(5)(A), albeit an unliquidated, unmatured claim that may be estimated for purposes of allowance, if necessary, pursuant to § 502(c). So long as the right to collect the fees existed pre-petition, the fact that the fees were actually incurred during the post-petition period is not relevant to the determination of whether the creditor has an allowable pre-petition claim for the fees.

A claim arising from postpetition employment discrimination is not a contingent or unliquidated claim at the commencement of the bankruptcy case because no right to payment existed then.

Wakefield v. Southwest Securities, Inc. (In Re Wakefield) · filed 2004-07-19(5)

A claim under § 525(b) cannot be considered a “contingent” claim or an “unliq-uidated” claim as of the commencement of the case. A “claim” means a “right to payment, whether or not such right is ... unliquidated [or] ... contingent ....” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5).

An attorney’s fee agreement creates a claim under § 101(5) and a corresponding debt under § 101(12) when the client becomes obligated to pay.

In Re Shell · filed 2004-07-30(5), (12)

At the time Backus entered into an agreement with his client for representation in this case, a claim for attorney’s fees came into existence. At the time the agreement was struck, the Debtor became obligated to pay Backus $900.00 for his services. This obligation is a claim. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5), (12).

Section 101's definitions of claim, debt, and creditor cover a party with a right to the return of funds it advanced, whether it acted as a purchaser or lender.

In Re Apponline. Com, Inc. · filed 2004-09-30

In sum, the Court concludes that the Trustee has established that by making the June Advances, Matrix became a "creditor" of the Debtors with a "claim" for the return of those funds or delivery of a promissory note executed in connection with the underlying mortgages. The Court also concludes that the June Advances gave rise to a "claim" as defined by the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(5)(A) treats future condominium assessments as contingent, unmatured claims when the obligation to pay arises under state law upon taking title.

In Re Hawk · filed 2004-08-06(5)(A)

They are a pre-petition claim because they arose upon the Debtor taking title to the property, which occurred pre-petition. The post-petition assessments that are at issue here are merely the “contingent”, “unmatured” portion of that prepetition claim.

Section 101(5) treats separate rights to payment under separate judgments as separate claims.

In Re Bowshier · filed 2004-08-18(5)

Instead, the petitioners have separate rights to payment on their judgments and separate claims under 11 U.S.C. § 101(5).

Section 101(5)(A) includes contingent, unliquidated rights to indemnification in the definition of a claim, even before the indemnitee is sued.

In Re Engage, Inc. · filed 2004-10-08(5)(A)

These rights, coupled with the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of “claim,” namely that it includes a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed...,” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A), leads to the inevitable conclusion that each held a contingent, un-liquidated claim for indemnification well before they were actually sued.

Section 101(5)(A) includes a contingent contractual right to payment in the definition of a claim, even when payment depends on the debtor later requesting services.

In Re Griffin · filed 2004-08-26(5)(A)

Thus, the contract should be read as containing a separate term creating a "contingent” claim on the petition date, ... because the contract causes the debtor to be liable for that amount only if she subsequently chooses that legal service. Nonetheless, the contingent claim for the $600 is still within the definition of a "claim” arising before the commencement of the case.

A creditor’s claim gives rise to a corresponding debt even when the debtor disputes liability.

In Re Huelbig · filed 2004-08-30(5)(A), (12)

11 U.S.C. § 101(12) defines “debt” as “liability on a claim.” ... This Court, following Davenport, concludes that Allstate’s claim for damages in its RICO action is a debt within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(5) includes a contractual right to fees in a prepetition claim even when the fees are incurred after the bankruptcy petition is filed.

In Re Alanis · filed 2004-10-18(5)

If the fees and expenses were based on the creditors’ right to collect the fees under the respective pre-petition mortgages or deeds of trust, the right to payment would be part of a pre-petition claim, even though the fees and charges were not incurred until after the debtors filed their respective bankruptcy petitions.

Section 101(5)(A)’s definition of a claim includes a creditor’s claim for interest on an unsecured foreclosure deficiency.

In Re Fast · filed 2004-12-21(5)(A)

The Court begins its analysis with the proposition that the claim to interest is a “claim” as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A).

Section 101(5) includes a contingent or unmatured right to payment in the definition of a bankruptcy claim, including a demand for attorney fees made before settlement.

Phoenix Restaurant Group, Inc. v. Fuller, Fuller & Associates, P.A. (In Re Phoenix Restaurant Group, Inc.) · filed 2004-11-08(5)

Edge points firmly to the conclusion that Fuller and/or the ADA plaintiffs had a right to payment — a claim for bankruptcy purposes — antecedent to PRG’s payment of the attorney fees portion of that debt. The ADA plaintiffs claimed a right to payment and other remedies from PRG well in advance of settlement of the ADA litigation. The ADA plaintiffs included a demand for attorney fees in the district court complaint — filed many months before those fees were paid to Fuller by PRG. Payment of attorney fees as part of the settlement of the ADA plaintiffs’ claims came after those claims were reduced to judgment, matured and were liquidated as contemplated in § 101(5).

Section 101 defines a debt as liability on a claim, and a claim as a right to payment.

Dean v. Telegadis (In Re Dean) · filed 2004-11-22(5), (12)

The term “debt” is defined in the Bankruptcy Code as “liability on a claim”. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12). “Claim” in turn means a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured”. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). A debt, in other words, is liability on a right to payment. ... We conclude in light of the foregoing that the debt owed to Telegadis for all payments due and owing after January 23, 2004, is not discharged. The debt at issue is a post-petition obligation, not a pre-petition one.

Section 101(10)(A) requires a creditor to have a claim against the debtor; without an enforceable obligation, an entity has no claim.

Premier Capital, LLC v. Gavin (In Re Gavin) · filed 2004-12-16(10)(A)

Absent such evidence, Premier has failed to establish title to the Note, and thus has no enforceable obligation against the Debtor. Without an enforceable obligation Premier has no claim, and therefore is not a creditor for purposes of Bankruptcy Rule 4007(a).

A party to a prepetition executory contract is a creditor when it has a contingent or unmatured right to payment under the contract.

In Re M.A.S. Realty Corp. · filed 2004-12-20(5)(A), (10)(A)

Upon consideration of the foregoing, this Court concludes that the Code’s express shift from provability to a broader definition of claim, a shift which encompassed within its ambit unliquidated, contingent and unmatured rights to payment, renders non-debtor parties to executory contracts creditors of the Debtor.

Section 101(10) excludes post-petition administrative claimants from the definition of “creditor” for claim-documentation requirements.

United States Internal Revenue Service v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Industrial Commercial Electrical, · filed 2005-01-04(10)

As an administrative claimant, the IRS was under no obligation to verify, certify, or support by documentation its administrative claim, as that requirement applies to “creditors” — that is, individuals or entities with pre-petition claims — and not to post-petition administrative claimants under Section 503.

Section 101(10)(B) includes a recipient of a potentially avoidable payment as a creditor when the recipient has a contingent, unmatured claim for reimbursement.

Slone v. M2M International, Inc. (In Re G-P Plastics, Inc.) · filed 2005-02-07(10)(B)

Thus, in accepting these monies, M2M became a creditor of the Debtor and, by virtue thereof, became a holder of an unliquidated, unmatured, and contingent right to the payment (i.e., a “claim” for reimbursement) that G & P could have avoided during bankruptcy proceedings.

Section 101(10) excludes holders of administrative expense claims from the definition of “creditor” for the disinterested person test.

White v. Burdick (In Re CK Liquidation Corp.) · filed 2005-03-11(10)

As Estate Counsel are not “creditors” as defined in § 101(10), the prohibition against employment of creditors for the “disinterested persons” test does not apply to them.

Section 101 distinguishes a creditor, which has a claim against the debtor, from a custodian, which includes an assignee for the benefit of creditors.

Sherwood Partners, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc. · filed 2005-01-11(10)(A)

The Bank- ruptcy Code defines “creditor,” in relevant part, as an “entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A). “Custodian” is a different concept, which includes receivers, trustees and “assignee[s] under a general assignment for the benefit of the debtor’s creditors.” Id. § 101(11).

Section 101(5)’s definition of a claim includes an attorney’s entitlement to fees as an administrative expense.

Weber v. Heitkamp (In Re Hopson) · filed 2005-01-18(5)

Here, Appellant’s entitlement to attorney’s fees as an administrative expense under § 503 of the Bankruptcy Code makes Appellant the holder of a “claim”.

Section 101(5)'s definition of a claim includes the present asbestos claims held by the committee's constituents.

In Re G-I Holdings, Inc. · filed 2005-02-01(5)

It cannot be disputed that the Committee’s con...stituency, holders of present claims, satisfies the definition for claims under § 101(5) of the Code.

Section 101(5)’s definition of “claim” does not determine whether a debtor’s cause of action is property of the bankruptcy estate.

Casey v. Grasso (In Re Riccitelli) · filed 2005-02-07(5)

It is not intended to identify those of a debtor’s claims that are assets of the estate under § 541(a)(1). This is not to say that, insofar as claims are concerned, §§ 541(a)(1) and 101(5) are not coextensive; it is only to say that § 101(5) does not govern the issue.

A claim arises when the elements of a right to payment under applicable nonbankruptcy law are present; bankruptcy law determines when that occurred.

In Re WorldCom, Inc. · filed 2005-02-14(5)

A “debt” is defined as “liability on a claim,” 11 U.S.C. § 101(12); a “claim” is defined as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured, or right to any equitable remedy.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). ... Bankruptcy law determines when a claim arises, however, state law determines the elements of a particular claim. ... Bankruptcy law only determines when the particular elements under state law were present such that a claim would arise.