11 U.S.C. § 101

Section 101(10)(A) does not treat a bankruptcy trustee as a creditor because the trustee has no claim against the debtor arising by the order for relief.

Tarbox v. United States Trustee for the Northern District of Texas · filed 2005-04-01(10)(A)

A trustee is not a “creditor” as that term is defined by the Bankruptcy Code because a trustee does not have “a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor.” Id. § 101(10)(A).

Section 101(10) defines a creditor as a holder of a claim arising at or before the order for relief, excluding holders of post-petition administrative claims.

In Re Balderas · filed 2005-04-20(10)

Post-petition administrative claim holders are not included in the definition of "creditor,” but are instead a creature of statute by virtue of section 503(b), whose expense claims are then accorded priority treatment under section 507(a)(1).

Section 101(5) treats a creditor’s contractual right to mortgage fees as part of a pre-petition claim even when the fees are incurred after the petition is filed.

In Re Manus · filed 2005-05-12(5)

If a fee or expense claimed by a creditor is based on the creditor’s right to collect the fees under the respective pre-petition mortgage or deed of trust, the right to payment would be part of a pre-petition claim, even though the fees and charges were not incurred until after the debtor filed his respective bankruptcy petition.

Section 101(5) requires a right to payment for a creditor to have a claim against a debtor.

In Re: Neil O'Donnel v. · filed 2005-05-19(5)

Normali does not have an individual right to payment and therefore no longer has a “claim” against the individual Debtors.

Section 101(5) defines a claim to include a contractual right to payment, such as a right to indemnity.

Cossu v. Jefferson Pilot Securities Corporation · filed 2005-06-03(5)

The term “claim” is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(5), and includes a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured . . . .” ... [2] The bankruptcy court correctly determined that Jeffer- son Pilot had a bankruptcy claim against Cossu, pursuant to the above-quoted contractual indemnity provision.

Section 101(5)(B) does not treat a right to an equitable remedy as a claim when the breach gives rise to no right to payment.

Abboud v. Ground Round, Inc. (In Re Ground Round, Inc.) · filed 2005-06-06(5)(B)

I hold that the Article VII language regarding money damages does not connect with the Article II language regarding the retransfer of the License. ... The rights of Landlord do not constitute a claim and hence may not be discharged.

Section 101(5)(A) requires a claim to be an enforceable right to payment; an obligation unenforceable outside bankruptcy is not a claim in bankruptcy.

Montgomery County Maryland v. Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc. · filed 2005-06-17(5)(A)

The Bankruptcy Code defines a claim as a “right to payment.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). The Supreme Court and courts in the Second Circuit have interpreted this term to require “an enforceable obligation”. ... Because I find that Montgomery County’s claims were asserted in violation of the FTA and, consequently, unenforceable against the Reorganized Debtors outside of bankruptcy, it is axiomatic that these claims must be unenforceable within the context of bankruptcy.

Section 101(5)(A) includes disputed or contingent rights to payment in the definition of a bankruptcy claim, including a lawsuit pending on appeal.

Jaurdon v. Cricket Communications, Inc. · filed 2005-06-20(5)(A)

Because the definition of claim includes “right to payment, whether or not such right is . . . contingent, [or] disputed,” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A), it includes appellants’ situation -- be it disputed by Cricket or contingent upon this court’s decision on appeal.

Section 101(5) includes a pending claim for attorney’s fees that is disputed and contingent on a later court order.

Larson v. Larson · filed 2005-05-17(5)

In the present case, the claim for attorney’s fees was both contingent and disputed at the time of filing. The claim was disputed because, as indicated by the very fact of this appeal, the plaintiff contests that absent the bankruptcy proceedings, he should have any obligation to pay attorney’s fees to enable the defendant to defend the appeal from the judgment of dissolution. The claim was contingent because any obligation to pay would not be triggered until the time a court ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant attorney’s fees, an event that occurred postpetition. Because the claim falls squarely within the parameters of § 101 (5) of the Bankruptcy Code, we must consider next whether the plaintiffs discharge in bankruptcy discharged any obligation he would incur to pay the defendant attorney’s fees.

A purported lease termination creates no debt on a claim when the parties continue performing and the tenant suffers no damages.

Peltz v. Edward C. Vancil, Inc. (In Re Bridge Information Systems, Inc.) · filed 2005-07-13(5), (12)

Vancil, Inc. continued to pay rent and remain in the Building. Bridge accepted the rental payments, and allowed Vancil, Inc. to remain on the premises. No damages, therefore, were suffered by Vancil, Inc. as a result of the letter, and no debt was created.

Section 101(5) includes a claim for an alleged taking that accrued before bankruptcy, even when the claimant seeks relief after confirmation.

MCI, Inc. v. West (In Re WorldCom, Inc.) · filed 2005-07-20(5)

The alleged taking, here, would have accrued upon the installation of the fiber optic cable in 1986, resulting in a prepetition claim. ... Based upon the above, any cause of action related thereto was a “claim” pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 101(5) of the Bankruptcy Code.

A debt is liability on a claim, and a claim is a right to payment that is typically determined under nonbankruptcy law before the petition is filed.

Carlin v. United States (In Re Carlin) · filed 2005-07-26(5)(A), (12)

A “debt” in bankruptcy means “liability on a claim,” ... and a “claim,” in turn, means a “right to payment.” ... This “right to payment” is typically determined prepetition under nonbankruptcy law. Here, prior to the filing of the debtor’s petition, the IRS had a right to payment from the debtor resulting from her execution and filing of the joint tax returns. As such, a “debt” exists in the bankruptcy case, and for the reasons stated, it is a nondischargeable “debt” under § 523(a)(1)(A).

Section 101 distinguishes a creditor’s claim from a debtor’s debt, which requires actual liability on the claim.

In Re Leggett · filed 2005-08-19(12)

The Bankruptcy Code carefully distinguishes between “claim” and “debt.” Compare § 101(12) with § 101(5)(A). The use of “debt” in § 109(e) instead of “claim,” together with the requirement that the debtor owe it, demonstrates that chapter 13 eligibility is properly based on the amount of the debtor’s actual liability.

Section 101(5)(B) treats an equitable remedy for breach as a claim when the breach gives rise to a right to payment.

In re Nickels Midway Pier, LLC · filed 2005-09-01(5)(B)

The language of § 101(5)(B) states that a remedy for breach of performance can be a claim if that breach gives rise to a right of payment. Wild Waves can have a claim under the plain meaning of § 101(5)(B).

Section 101(5) does not treat an obligation to help transfer tax credits as a claim when it creates neither a right to payment nor an equitable remedy for breach that gives rise to payment.

In Re Repurchase Corp. · filed 2005-09-07(5)

The Judgment to which MJK’s proof of claim is based upon only requires Debtor to aid in the transfer of the tax credits by producing certain documents. This represents neither a “right to payment” nor a “right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance that gives rise to a right to payment.”

Section 101(5) includes a creditor’s surviving lien rights as a claim in a later Chapter 13 case, even after a Chapter 7 discharge eliminates the debtor’s personal liability.

In Re Haque · filed 2005-10-18(5)

While the Debtors’ in personam liability was discharged in the Chapter 7 case, the creditor still holds a claim pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) in a later Chapter 13 case.

Section 101(5)(A) includes contingent rights to payment as claims, and bankruptcy law determines when such a claim arises for discharge purposes.

Conseco, Inc. v. Schwartz (In Re Conseco, Inc.) · filed 2005-09-09(5)(A)

While state or other non-bankruptcy law generally applies to the merits of a claim, bankruptcy law governs when a claim arises for purposes of determining whether a party has a contingent claim that was discharged in bankruptcy.

Section 101(5)(A) includes contingent withdrawal liability within the definition of a claim before the employer withdraws from a pension fund.

In Re Crane Rental Co., Inc. · filed 2005-10-31(5)(A)

The Court finds that the withdrawal liability of the Debtor qualifies as a contingent claim held by the Fund.

Section 101 treats a right to payment under an enforceable contract as a debt even if the right is unliquidated, contingent, unmatured, or disputed.

Sharp Ex Rel. Commercial Financial Services, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA, N.A. (In Re Commercial Financial Services · filed 2005-09-14(5)(A), (12)

Under these definitions, a right to payment under an enforceable contract is a debt, even if it is “unliquidated,” “contingent,” “unma-tured,” and/or “disputed.” The statutory definitions do not support Chase’s position that the discounted present value of future financial obligations under contracts do not constitute “debts” for the purpose of assessing solvency under the adjusted net assets approach.

Section 101(5) includes disputed rights to payment within the definition of a claim.

In Re Arch Wireless · filed 2005-10-13(5)

The fact that the Debtor disputed Nationwide’s allegations has no bearing on whether Nationwide was, in fact, asserting a claim against the Debtor within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(5) defines a right to payment as a claim even if the right is contingent and unliquidated.

In Re Roubert · filed 2005-12-07(5)

On the Petition Date the Creditor was entitled to payment from the Debtors on account of its loan for the Truck. A right to payment is a “claim” even if it is contingent and unliquidated. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5).

Section 101(5) defines a claim to include a right to payment or an equitable remedy for breach of performance if the breach also gives rise to a right to payment.

In Re Little · filed 2005-12-22(5)

The term "claim" is defined by the Code as a (A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or (B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). ... The relief sought in CMEA's pending state court action sufficiently evinces the existence of a claim it has against Little.

Section 101(5)(A) defines a claim broadly enough to include rights to payment for CERCLA response costs, whether reduced to judgment or unliquidated.

United States v. Gurley · filed 2006-01-20(5)(A)

CERCLA proofs of claim are no exception to this rule. The Bankruptcy Code defines a “claim” in part as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). The Code also provides any creditor may file a proof of claim. Id. § 501(a). The government’s proof of claim fits these broad definitions.

Section 101(5)’s definition of “claim” does not include an attempt to evict occupants based on asserted ownership of real property.

In Re Anderson · filed 2006-02-06(5)

Instead, GRP is attempting to evict Mrs. Anderson and her husband, Ronald Anderson, from real property on the basis of GRP’s asserted ownership of the real property. That is not a “claim” as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) and thus § 1301 does not apply.

Section 101(5)(B) treats an equitable remedy as a claim when monetary damages are an alternative to that remedy.

In Re the Ground Round, Inc. · filed 2005-12-15(5)(B)

An equitable remedy will “give rise to a right of payment” and therefore be deemed a “claim,” when the payment of monetary damages is an alternative to the equitable remedy. ... The lease of the Property contains no language that could be construed as creating a right to money damages. Therefore, the rights of the Landlord do not constitute a claim and cannot be discharged.

A spouse’s contingent interest in marital property held in court-ordered escrow before a final divorce decree is not a claim under § 101(5).

Ford v. Skorich · filed 2006-02-03(5)

When property that is part of a marital estate, in accordance with New Hampshire divorce law, is transferred into escrow at the direction of a family court pending a final divorce decree, any title to that property, which had existed in either one or both of the spouses at the time of the transfer, is divested. The former owner spouse is left with a contingent interest in the funds in escrow. Such contingent interest is not a “claim” within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(5) allows equitable distribution rights to qualify as a claim before they are reduced to judgment.

In Re Hirsch · filed 2006-03-10(5)

Rather, it was attempting to determine the amount of a claim which Nachama had filed with the bankruptcy court on the basis of her state law equitable distribution rights. Those rights need not have been reduced to a judgment in order to give Nachama a claim against the bankruptcy estate.

A contingent claim may arise from prepetition conduct even when injury or costs arise later, but an obligation based entirely on postpetition conduct is not a prepetition claim.

In Re Worldcom, Inc. · filed 2006-03-30(5)

In those cases, the underlying conduct giving rise to the discharged claim occurred pre-petition, whereas only ancillary elemental requirements of the claim — such as injury or, in Chateaugay I, remedial costs — arose post-petition, rendering the claims sufficiently "contingent" prior to the petition date to be deemed existent at that time. ... Unlike Chateaugay I, which involved "ultimately maturing payment obligations based on pre-petition conduct," 944 F.2d at 1005, any obligations here stem from entirely post-petition conduct.

Section 101(5) includes contingent and unmatured rights to payment in the definition of a claim.

In Re SunCruz Casinos LLC · filed 2006-05-01(5)

Unfortunately for the Club, the fact that its prospective claim for Release Calls was contingent and unmatured on December 31, 2004, does not mean that the prospective claim was not a “claim” as to which a proof of claim had to be filed by the Extended Administrative Expense Bar Date if that claim were to be preserved.

Section 101(5) defines “claim” broadly enough to include a right to payment that arose before bankruptcy even if the debt had not matured when the petition was filed.

Egleston v. Egleston · filed 2006-05-05(5)

Under the Bankruptcy Code’s broad definition of “claim” as described above, Vicki therefore had pre-petition claims for this debt.

Section 101(5) includes an environmental mitigation order within the definition of a claim when compliance requires payment for past harm rather than action to prevent ongoing harm.

New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection v. IT Litigation Trust (In Re IT Group, Inc.) · filed 2006-03-17(5)

A claim is defined as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, equitable, secured or unsecured” or a “right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5); App. B-223. ... Thus, the only way for the Trust to comply with the Administrative Order is for the Trust to render the payment of money.

Section 101(10)(A) can treat the SEC as a creditor on a disgorgement judgment even though it is not the sole enforcer of the securities laws.

Sherman v. Securities & Exchange Commission (In Re Sherman) · filed 2006-03-22(10)(A)

First, that the SEC is not the sole enforcer of all sections of the statute at issue in the Whitworth action does not deprive the SEC of creditor status.

Section 101(37) defines a lien as an interest in property securing payment of a debt; a claim backed by a valid lien is secured.

Daimlerchrysler Financial Services Americas, LLC v. Brown (In Re Brown) · filed 2006-03-27(37)

11 U.S.C. § 101 establishes that a debt is “secured” by a lien. ... Consequently, the 910 Claims are secured.

Section 101(5) does not treat an obligation arising from entirely post-petition conduct as a pre-petition contingent claim.

Browning v. MCI, Inc. · filed 2006-03-30(5)

Unlike Chateaugay I, which involved “ultimately maturing payment obligations based on pre-petition conduct,” 944 F.2d at 1005, any obligations here stem from entirely post-petition conduct.

A claim can exist before a court enters final judgment, even when liability remains disputed.

Guastella v. Hampton (In Re Guastella) · filed 2006-04-11(5)

The Hamptons had a “claim,” and that claim was a “debt” within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code, even though the State Court had not yet reduced the claim to a final judgment when Guastella filed her petition.

Section 101(5)(B) treats a right to specific performance as a bankruptcy claim when breach also gives rise to a right to monetary damages.

Nickels Midway Pier, LLC v. Wild Waves, LLC (In Re Nickels Midway Pier, LLC) · filed 2006-04-24(5)(B)

This Court affirms the Bankruptcy Court’s determination that Wild Waves’ claim for specific performance of the oral contract for sale is a claim within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(5), and thus can be discharged in a bankruptcy proceeding.

Section 101(5)’s definition of a claim does not cover a debt satisfied before the debtor filed for bankruptcy.

Finova Capital Corp. v. FLMI, Inc. (In Re Optical Technologies, Inc.) · filed 2006-05-09(5)

After carefully reviewing the record on appeal and reading the parties’ briefs, we conclude that Byerly and FLMI were not creditors of Recomm because they did not have a “claim” as that term is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(5).

Section 101(5)(B) treats an Illinois real estate tax buyer’s interest as a claim when the debtor files before the redemption period expires.

In Re McKinney · filed 2006-05-17(5)(B)

After careful consideration of the issue in light of these opinions, this Court is of the opinion that the Bates reasoning is correct, that a tax buyer is a creditor who holds a claim that may be modified in a Chapter 13 plan, as long as the state law redemption period has not expired prior to the bankruptcy filing, and that Section 108(b) does not limit a debtor’s right to pay the claim over the term of the plan.

Section 101(5) includes a mortgage lien that survives discharge of the debtor’s personal liability within the definition of a claim.

In Re Wagner · filed 2006-05-22(5)

And, because discharge of personal liability does not extinguish a lien, it is permissible for a debtor to include in an otherwise confirmable Chapter 13 plan in-payment of a mortgage lien that suxvives a prior Chapter 7 case unaffected and remains a “claim” under 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (2005).

Section 101(5)(B) treats an equitable remedy as a claim when the breach gives rise to a right to payment, including a right held by the party seeking the remedy.

United States v. Apex Oil Co., Inc. · filed 2006-07-06(5)(B)

At the very most, then, Udell stands for the proposition that either a breaching party’s right to pay or a non-breaching party’s right to payment can give rise to a claim under 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(B). The Court finds the government’s argument that only the breaching party’s right to pay may be considered to be unfounded.

Section 101(5) excludes an unknown future tort claim when the claimant had no pre-petition relationship with the debtor or its product.

White v. Chance Industries, Inc. (In Re Chance Industries, Inc.) · filed 2006-07-07(5)

The Court concludes that an unknown future tort claimant does not have a claim within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) where the debtor and injured party had no pre-petition relationship.

Section 101(5) includes a mortgage claim against a debtor’s property interest even when the debtor lacks contractual privity with the lender, at least on the facts of this case.

In Re Flores · filed 2006-07-20(5)

The Court finds that the debtor is allowed to include LaSalle Bank’s claim against her property interest in a Chapter 13 plan, notwithstanding her lack of privity with LaSalle Bank. Because it could invite mischief to allow such inclusions across the board, I do not so rule here and instead find only that this debtor, on these facts, may do so.

Section 101(5) excludes an injunction that only restricts future conduct from the definition of a claim.

United States Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. NRG Energy, Inc. · filed 2006-08-04(5)

Because the injunction itself would only restrict NRG from committing future acts, this enforcement action is not a claim for purposes of § 101(5).

Section 101(5) includes a right to payment within the definition of a claim, regardless of whether allowing it serves other creditors’ best interests.

In Re Nazu, Inc. · filed 2006-08-25(5)

For the reasons set forth above in this Memorandum Opinion, Farr has a “right to payment” based on the Default Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc and the equities in this case. Accordingly, irrespective of whether Farr’s claim is in the best interests of the other creditors of the estate, Farr possesses a valid claim against the Debtor’s bankruptcy estate.

An undetermined equitable interest in marital property before its division in a divorce does not give a spouse a right to payment that qualifies as a claim.

Ford v. Skorich · filed 2006-08-29(5)

This interest does not depend on one party having a right to payment from the other as that term is ordinarily understood. Instead, it is a property right that ... each party has in marital property by virtue of New Hampshire divorce law.

Section 101(10) gives creditor status to a person owed a debt by the debtor on the petition date.

Colombo Bank, FSB v. Barnes (In Re Barnes) · filed 2006-08-29(10)

However, the plaintiff alleges that it was owed a debt by Barnes on the petition date, which establishes creditor status on the petition date. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10).

Section 101(5) includes a creditor’s in rem mortgage rights as a claim even when the debtor is not personally liable for the debt.

In Re Tewell · filed 2006-10-23(5)

Thus, it is the case here that the Creditor’s claim is in rem as to the Property, not in personam with recourse against the Debtor, similar to Johnson. That such rights are "claims” as defined in § 101(5), however, does not override or nullify the prohibition on modification contained in § 1322(b)(2).

Section 101(5)(A) includes a disputed right to payment within the definition of a claim, even if the amount is not fixed.

Guerriero v. Kilroy (In Re Kilroy) · filed 2006-10-30(5)(A)

“Debt” is defined under the Code as “liability on a claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(12). A “claim” is defined as “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). Under this expansive definition, Guerriero has a “claim” against Kilroy; therefore, a “debt” exists pursuant to the Code.

Section 101(5) does not treat remote potential tax liability as a claim when a future audit, tax assessment, and fault determination must occur before any right to payment arises.

Kirby v. Kirby · filed 2006-10-31(5)

Any potential liability of the Defendant is remote, contingent upon several steps: an additional audit taking place; the assessment of additional taxes, penalties, or interest; and a determination that the Defendant was at fault. While it is possible that at some time in the future the Defendant may become liable for taxes arising from joint tax returns for tax years 2002 and before, the Plaintiff does not now have a right to payment, a prerequisite for a claim.

Section 101(5) includes an in rem tax lien within the definition of a claim when the lien is enforceable against the debtor’s property.

In Re Barton · filed 2006-11-08(5)

The conclusion is clear: just as the in rem lien of the lender in Johnson was a claim that could be modified through chapter 13, the in rem lien of Will County is a claim that can be modified through chapter 13.

A spouse has an unsecured prepetition claim when the divorce action begins before bankruptcy, even if the divorce judgment is entered afterward.

DiGeronimo v. Weissberg (In Re DiGeronimo) · filed 2006-11-09(5)

Therefore, the Court finds that Weissberg holds a claim against the estate that arose prior to the time that the debtor filed his bankruptcy petition.

Section 101(10) treats a non-debtor spouse with an equitable distribution award entered after the bankruptcy filing as a creditor of the estate.

Musso v. Ostashko · filed 2006-11-06(10)

To the extent that the state court ultimately establishes an equitable distribution award in favor of a non-debtor spouse after the debtor spouse has filed for bankruptcy, that award transforms the non-debtor spouse into a creditor of the bankruptcy estate within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(10).

A right to payment can be a contingent claim before it matures, including when employees have earned wages but have not yet been paid.

Alberts v. HCA Inc. (In Re Greater Southeast Community Hospital Corp. I) · filed 2006-12-06(5)(A)

In this case, the IRS held a contingent claim against Michael Reese as soon as its employees performed work for which they were entitled to a wage (the contingency being the payment of the wage for the work performed). ... To the extent that this claim arose pre-petition, the IRS was a pre-petition creditor of Michael Reese. The date upon which the claim matured is irrelevant.

Section 101(10)(A) includes a guarantor with a contingent claim against the debtor within the definition of creditor.

Sunset Hollow Properties, LLC v. Bank of Western Massachusetts (In Re Sunset Hollow Properties, LLC) · filed 2007-01-03(10)(A)

The Related Debtors have obligations to secured parties that are cross-collateralized and cross-guaranteed by each debtor’s estate. As such, each one is a creditor with a contingent claim against the estate of the others and each is a party in interest to actions that effect the funds available to creditors of the other estates.

Section 101(5)(A) includes an enforceable obligation to make escrow deposits for the states’ benefit within the definition of a claim.

Settling States v. Carolina Tobacco Co. (In Re Carolina Tobacco Co.) · filed 2007-01-05(5)(A)

I find that the bankruptcy court properly applied the broad definition of “claim,” and found that “[bjecause the escrow obligations are legal obligations of [Carolina] to pay that the states are entitled to enforce,” the obligations are claims.

A spouse’s inchoate right to marital property in a pending divorce can be an unsecured contingent claim under § 101(5)(A).

Brundege v. Brundege (In Re Brundege) · filed 2007-01-10(5)(A)

This Court is bound by Ostashko and, accordingly, concludes that the Plaintiffs inchoate right to marital property places her in a position of holding what might be construed as an unsecured contingent claim in the Debtor’s bankruptcy case.

Section 101(5) defines a claim as a right to payment or an equitable remedy for a breach that gives rise to a right to payment; a representation or statement is not a claim.

Flanagan v. Howard (In Re Howard) · filed 2007-02-07(5)

First, section 727(a)(4)(B) is not applicable, as the falsehoods alleged by the Plaintiff are not the types of “claims” contemplated in the statute. For purposes of section 727(a)(4)(B) the term “claim” is defined by section 101(5). “Claim as so defined does not mean ‘representation’ or ‘statement’ but ‘right to payment’ or ‘right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment.’ ” See In re Gorchev, 275 B.R. at 164 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)). None of the allegations made by the Plaintiff involve a false claim.

Under § 101(5), a discharged debt cannot be included in a Chapter 13 plan when its creditor no longer has a right to payment.

In Re Starling · filed 2007-01-11(5)

Absent a creditor ... holding some “right to payment” from the Debtors, there is no “claim” that could be subject to a Chapter 13 reorganization plan.

Section 101(5)(B) treats an equitable remedy for breach as a claim when monetary damages are an alternative.

Blair 11D Condo, LLC v. Rabin (In re Rabin) · filed 2007-01-22(5)(B)

Based upon the statute, the legislative history and the Supreme Court’s analysis in Kovacs, an equitable remedy will “give rise to a right to payment” and therefore be a “claim” under § 101(5)(B) if the payment of monetary damages is an alternative to the equitable remedy.

A contingent right to payment is a claim, and the party liable on that claim is a debtor.

Dye v. Sachs (In re Flashcom, Inc.) · filed 2007-02-05(5)(A), (12)

Movant is correct that after execution of the Loan Agreement, Andra had a contingent right to payment from Respondents. Therefore, as contended by Movant, Respondents were debtors of Andra, and potential beneficiaries of the Transfer under § 550.

Section 101(5) treats a claim arising from pre-petition negligent treatment and a pre-petition doctor-patient relationship as a pre-petition claim, even if the patient dies after the petition date.

In Re Pan American Hospital Corp. · filed 2007-02-27(5)

If both the relationship and act occur pre-petition, as they have in this case, then the claim is a pre-petition claim.

Section 101(5)(A) includes contingent, unliquidated, and unmatured rights to payment in the definition of a claim, even if a cause of action has not accrued under state law.

Frederick v. Federal-Mogul Corp. · filed 2007-03-14(5)(A)

Under the plain language of 11 USC 101(5), a claim may be unliquidated, contingent, or unmatured at the time a debtor filed for bankruptcy, and the stay is not triggered solely when a cause of action is deemed to “accrue” (a term used with statutes of limitations).

Section 101(5)(A) requires a right to payment for a claim.

Gatzke v. Christian (In Re Gatzke) · filed 2007-03-27(5)(A)

Defendants’ offered no evidence at trial establishing that Northstar Development had a right to payment from Gatzke under 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) based on a written agreement, or otherwise.

Section 101(5)(A) defines a claim as a right to payment, usually one recognized under state law.

Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. · filed 2007-03-20(5)(A)

Accordingly, when the Bankruptcy Code uses the word “claim”—which the Code itself defines as a “right to payment,” 11 U. S. C. §101(5)(A)—it is usually referring to a right to payment recognized under state law.

A purported loan that is actually an equity investment is not a claim because it gives the investor no right to payment.

In Re Insilco Technologies, Inc. · filed 2007-03-20(5)(A)

Because only parties that hold “right[s] to payment” against the estate hold valid bankruptcy claims, 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(a), the assertion that a would-be debt should be treated as an equity investment challenges the debt’s status as a claim.

A spouse’s equitable interest in marital property is not a claim under § 101(5) when it gives no right to payment or equitable remedy for breach of performance.

Ford v. Skorich (In Re Skorich) · filed 2007-03-30(5)

Just prior to the escrow transfer, Skorich had shared legal title to the proceeds and a contingent equitable interest in the whole fund, but this was not a contingent right to payment from the debtor, whether out of his property share or otherwise; rather, it was an interest in property obtained upon the filing of the divorce petition by virtue of her status as spouse. ... Even if ... division of marital property were regarded as an equitable remedy, no breach of performance--for example, for failure to perform a contract--is involved in the present case and only equitable remedies for breach of performance are potentially claims under section 101(5).

Section 101(5) defines a claim as a right to payment or an equitable remedy for breach that gives rise to a right to payment.

In Re Airadigm Communications, Inc. · filed 2007-05-11(5)

Disallowing a claim under § 502(b) is appropriate not just when the claimant has no rights vis-á-vis the debtor, but when the claimant’s rights vis-a-vis the debtor do not satisfy the definition of claim in § 101(5).

Section 101(5)'s definition of a claim does not by itself prevent a claimant from seeking specific property when state law recognizes the interest and the Bankruptcy Code allows it.

Abboud v. Ground Round, Inc. (In Re Ground Round, Inc.) · filed 2007-03-30(5)

That one has a claim does not automatically foreclose a demand for specific property if state law recognizes the interest and the Bankruptcy Code does not disallow it.

Section 101(10)(C) treats a claimant against the community as a creditor even if the claim is small.

Lincoln National Life Insurance v. Silver (In Re Silver) · filed 2007-04-16(10)(C)

Even if Ms. Silver were able to demonstrate that the community benefitted only a little by the tortious activity, that would still leave Lincoln with some claim against the community, and therefore it would still be a creditor. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(C) (claimant against the community is a creditor).

Section 101(5) includes a creditor’s contingent right to contractual post-petition attorneys’ fees within the definition of “claim.”

Qmect, Inc. v. Burlingame Capital Partners II, L.P. (In Re Qmect, Inc.) · filed 2007-05-17(5)

Therefore, the Court holds that Burlingame’s post-petition attorneys’ fees do qualify as a “claim” under 11 U.S.C. § 101(5).

Section 101(5) includes a mortgage lender’s existing right to payment from a debtor’s property as a claim, even when the debtor has no personal liability on the note.

Glance v. Carroll · filed 2007-06-01(5)

The question in the end is not whether the creditor may extract full repayment from the debtor (or his property) immediately; the question is whether the creditor has a “right to payment” or a “right to an equitable remedy,” see 11 U.S.C. § 101(5), from the debtor (or his property) at the time the debtor filed his petition. The creditors here possessed such a right—as proved by the difficulty Glance would have faced if he had tried to sell the two properties without first satisfying the banks’ security interests.

Section 101(5)(A) includes unliquidated rights to payment within the definition of a claim, so a deficiency on a prepetition loan does not arise only when its amount is determined.

In Re Brooks · filed 2007-06-22(5)(A)

The term “claim,” broadly defined in the Bankruptcy Code includes a “right to payment, whether ... liquidated, unliquidated ... contingent, matured, unmatured ... secured, or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). ... The bifurcation process has nothing at all to do with determining when a claim arises and it most certainly does not support the inventive proposition that a deficiency claim on a prepetition, un-dersecured debt is deemed to come into existence only when the amount of the deficiency is established.

Section 101(5) includes disputed rights to payment in the definition of a claim.

Zurich American Insurance v. Tessler (In Re J.A. Jones, Inc.) · filed 2007-06-26(5)(A)

This is irrelevant to the known creditor analysis because a disputed claim is nonetheless sufficient to meet the definition of "claim" under Section 101(5) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(5)(A) does not treat hourly fees for postpetition legal services under a prepetition agreement as a prepetition contingent claim; the right to payment arises when the services are performed.

Varble v. Chase (In Re Chase) · filed 2007-05-18(5)(A)

Ultimately, the Court adopts the rationale set forth in Judge Tashima’s concurrence in Hines and holds that fees owed for legal services performed postpetition on an hourly basis pursuant to a prepetition agreement do not constitute a contingent claim — or right to payment — that arose before the date Debtor filed his chapter 7 bankruptcy petition.

Section 101(5)(A) does not treat hourly fees for postpetition services as a prepetition contingent claim merely because payment depends on performing the services.

Lubit v. Chase (In Re Chase) · filed 2007-05-18(5)(A)

Following this rationale, the Court holds that Lubit had “an enforceable obligation” — a “right to payment” — only after he actually rendered the postpetition expert witness services and the fact that his right to payment was contingent upon Lu-bit actually performing the services is not sufficient to bring this claim within § 101(5)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101’s definitions of claim and creditor exclude expenses incurred after the bankruptcy petition from claims against the estate.

In Re Karp · filed 2007-05-22(5), (10)

Claims of creditors that arise after the date of filing are not claims as defined in the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(10) defines a creditor as an entity with a claim against the debtor or the estate that arose by the order for relief.

Jensen v. Froio (In Re Jensen) · filed 2007-06-11(10)

The Code defines a “creditor” as an entity that has a claim against the debtor or the estate that arose at the time of or before the order for relief. ... Pursuant to this analysis, James is a creditor of the Debtor’s estate.

A government agency can be a creditor under § 101(10)(A) based on a disgorgement judgment even if it will not receive the funds and is not the sole enforcer of the underlying law.

Sherman v. SEC · filed 2007-07-03(10)(A)

As explained below, however, we conclude that these possible distinctions lack force, and that the SEC has creditor status under the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(5) includes a right to payment as a claim even when it is contingent, unliquidated, unmatured, or disputed on the petition date.

Monsour v. Monsour (In Re Monsour) · filed 2007-07-19(5)

The lump sum obligation constitutes a claim within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). The fact that Defendant’s “right to payment” as of the petition date may have been unliquidated, contingent, unma-tured, or disputed does not change this determination.

Section 101(10)(A) treats a party that has filed claims against the debtor as a creditor even when the parties dispute whose funds are at issue.

ORIUS CORP. v. Qwest Corp. · filed 2007-08-09(10)(A)

In the court’s view, it is merely a matter of semantics whether the funds in the Qwest Setoff Trust Account are viewed as Qwest’s money that later may become due to the Debtors or the Debtors’ money that Qwest claims it is owed. In any case, Qwest’s status as a creditor is verified by its participation in the Debtors’ bankruptcy proceedings, including that it has filed proof of claims against the Debtors.

Section 101(5)(B) treats an equitable remedy for breach of contract as a claim only if the breach gives rise to a right to payment that adequately substitutes for the equitable remedy.

Crafts v. Pitts · filed 2007-07-19(5)(B)

An action seeking equitable relief for breach of contract is discharged only "if such breach gives rise to a right to payment." 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(B). In other words, a right to specific performance (or any other equitable remedy) will not be discharged if money damages will not remedy the breach as much as specific performance.

Section 101(5) includes disputed claims in the definition of a claim.

Erhard v. Roberts · filed 2007-07-19(5)

Moreover, Erhard satisfies the broad definition of creditor under the Bankruptcy Code: he has a claim against Roberts for $20,000, even if that claim is disputed.

Under Section 101(5), an attorney's claim for fees arises when the attorney provides the services for which the debtor agreed to pay.

In Re Hermosilla · filed 2007-08-06(5)

That assertion is consistent with the rationale that an attorney only accrues a “claim,” as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(5), when the attorney actually provides the postpetition services for which the debtor agreed to pay.

Section 101(5) treats an attorney’s unauthorized fee demands against debtors as claims.

In Re Andreas · filed 2007-08-23(5)

The unauthorized fees paid to and concealed by Ms. Castagnoli are claims she asserted against the Debtors under 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(5), 503(b)(2), and 330(a)(4)(B).

Section 101 defines a creditor as an entity with a claim that arose by the order for relief and a claim as a right to payment, including one that is unliquidated, contingent or disputed.

Abbey v. Retz (In Re Retz) · filed 2007-09-06(5)(A), (10)(A)

For purposes of § 727(a)(2) and the Bankruptcy Code, the term “creditor” means an entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A). “Claim” means right to payment, including an unliquidated, contingent and disputed claim such as Brendon listed Abbey in his Schedule F. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). Thus for purposes of the above-captioned Chapter 7 case and this adversary proceeding, Abbey is a “creditor” with a “claim” by virtue of the proofs of claim he has filed in Brendon’s Chapter 7 case, to which no objection has been filed.

Section 101(5) includes a tax obligation within the definition of a claim once a right to payment arises, even if the obligation is contingent or unliquidated.

In Re Anchor Glass Container Corp. · filed 2007-09-10(5)

A tax “claim” for bankruptcy purposes includes any right to payment of a tax obligation whether fixed, contingent, or un-liquidated.

Section 101(5)(A) includes a prepetition OSHA whistleblower complaint within the definition of a claim.

Flake v. U.S. Department of Labor · filed 2007-09-21(5)(A)

That complaint constituted a claim under 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A), which was subsequently discharged by the terms of the reorganization plan for New World Pasta.

Section 101(5)(A) includes a right to payment in the definition of a claim even if it has not been reduced to judgment.

In Re Clarkson · filed 2007-09-25(5)(A)

“Claim” is defined as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). ... This claim for attorney’s fees, although not reduced to judgment until postpetition, arose prepetition and is concluded by the Court to be prepetition debt discharged in the Debtors’ Chapter 7 bankruptcy case.

Section 101(5)(A) includes a right to commissions for work completed before bankruptcy in its definition of a claim, even if payment is contingent or unmatured.

Al Perry Enterprises, Inc. v. Appalachian Fuels, LLC · filed 2007-09-27(5)(A)

Perry’s claim for commissions for work it had completed prior to the bankruptcy constitutes a pre-petition obligation which satisfies the definition of “claim” in 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) as “a right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured.”

Section 101(5)(A) defines a claim as a right to payment; the debtors had no claim against the credit union until funds were deposited.

In Re Moore · filed 2007-10-05(5)(A)

Although there is law stating that setoff may be asserted “even though one of the debts involved is absolutely owing but not presently due when petition is filed,” ... the debtors had no right to payment from Arkansas Best until funds were deposited.

Section 101(5) broadly defines a claim so potential rights to payment enter the bankruptcy process, but it does not preempt state law defenses to their allowance.

In Re Jafari · filed 2007-10-16(5)

The purpose of § 101(5) is not to preempt state law but rather to subject all “claims” to the bankruptcy process, in order to ensure that “all those with a potential call on the debtor’s assets ... come before the reorganization court so that those demands can be allowed or disallowed and their priority and discharge-ability determined.”

Section 101(5) includes a tax purchaser’s in rem right against a debtor’s property within the definition of a claim.

In Re Kasco · filed 2007-11-08(5)

Possession of an in rem right against property owned by a debtor in a bankruptcy case — a right provided by state law, which Travelers reminds us “governs the substance of claims” — gives the tax purchaser a claim in the bankruptcy.

Section 101(5)(A) includes disputed, unadjudicated rights to payment in its definition of a claim.

CM Temporary Services, Inc. v. Bailey (In Re Bailey) · filed 2007-09-12(5)(A)

Consistent with the plain meaning of the definitions in the Bankruptcy'Code, the court determines that the disputed nature of a debt is not a bar to the Plaintiff having standing to pursue a denial of the Debtor’s discharge pursuant to § 727 and the Plaintiff is a “creditor” within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code.

A surety with a contingent reimbursement claim against a debtor is a creditor before any claim is made on the bond.

Hutson v. Greenwich Insurance (In Re E-Z Serve Convenience Stores, Inc.) · filed 2007-09-18(10)

As a result, Greenwich had a contingent claim against the Debtor for reimbursement that became fixed if and when a claim was made against a bond. As an entity that had a claim against the Debtor, Greenwich was a creditor.

Section 101(5) requires a right to payment for a claim; a former spouse has no claim for a joint debt owed to a third party when the divorce decree gives her no right to payment from the debtor.

In Re Forgette · filed 2007-11-30(5)

Although this definition covers a broad range of “rights to payment,” it is not clear that the Claimant even holds a “right to payment.” ... The divorce decree did not order that James Forgette pay the Claimant for the joint debt. Therefore, because the Debtor has no obligation to pay the Claimant the Car Debt under the divorce decree, the Claimant does not have an allowable claim against the Debtor as of the petition date.

Section 101(5)(A) treats a right to payment arising from an allegedly improper pension plan termination as a bankruptcy claim.

Bosiger v. US Airways, Inc. · filed 2007-12-14(5)(A)

If US Airways improperly terminated the Non-Qualified Plan during its first bank- ruptcy, as Bosiger alleges, Bosiger’s injury made him an unsecured creditor of US Airways, and therefore the holder of a "claim" within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A), during the second bankruptcy.

Section 101(5)(A) includes a contingent, unliquidated claim for attorneys’ fees incurred after the petition when the right to those fees arises from a prepetition agreement.

Centre Insurance v. SNTL Corp. (In Re SNTL Corp.) · filed 2007-12-19(5)(A)

Here, the parties’ execution of a prepetition agreement containing an attorneys’ fees provision gives rise to a contingent, unliquidated attorney-fee claim.

Section 101(5) requires a right to payment independent of an equity security interest for that interest to qualify as a claim.

In re Beach Development, LP · filed 2008-01-23(5)

The determination of whether a particular document gives rise to a claim depends on whether it gives rise to a right to payment independent of the equity security. ... Nothing in the proof of claim asserts a right of payment against Debtor independent of the equity security. The court concludes that the receiver holds an equity security interest in the Debtor.

Section 101(5)(B) treats a request for specific performance as a claim when monetary damages are a viable alternative.

In Re Nickels Midway Pier, LLC · filed 2007-11-27(5)(B)

As compensatory, or “benefit of the bargain,” damages available under New Jersey law present an alternative to equitable relief under the facts of this case, see Donovan v. Bachstadt, 453 A.2d 160, 165 (N.J. 1982), we conclude, along with the District Court, that Wild Waves asserts a claim within the meaning of Bankruptcy Code § 101(5)(B).

Section 101(5)(A) includes unmatured rights to payment in the definition of a claim, so a claim can arise before payment is due.

CDI Trust v. U.S. Electronics, Inc. (In Re Communication Dynamics, Inc.) · filed 2008-02-21(5)(A)

A “claim” is defined as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliqui-dated, fixed, contingent, matured, unma-tured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured....” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). Thus, a claim arises when the right to payment accrues, not when payment is due.

Section 101(5)(A) includes a right to payment arising from prepetition asbestos exposure even if state law delays enforcement until an injury manifests.

In Re Quigley Co., Inc. · filed 2008-02-26(5)(A)

Here, too, an Asbestos PI Claimant’s pre-petition exposure to asbestos gave rise to a “claim,” regardless of whether the law of any particular state renders the cause of action unenforceable until some future contingency occurs.

Section 101(5) defines a claim as a right to payment; its broad definition does not give someone with no right to payment the status of a claimant.

In Re Adkins · filed 2008-03-19(5)

Although the term “claim” is given this expansive definition in the Code, “such definition may not confer the status of claimant upon a petitioning creditor who has no right to payment ...” In re First Energy Leasing Corp., 38 B.R. 577, 581 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1984). ... Overstreet’s remedy is against Personal Finance, not the Debtor.

A claim includes a post-petition right to payment, including a contingent right to reimbursement.

In Re M. Fabrikant & Sons, Inc. · filed 2008-04-09(5)(A)

Rather, the plain language of the Bankruptcy Code demonstrates that a “claim” includes a post-petition as well as pre-petition right to payment.

Section 101(5) treats a right to payment created by a confirmed chapter 11 plan as a claim in a later bankruptcy case.

In Re Pan American General Hospital, LLC · filed 2008-04-21(5)

We thus look first to see whether U.S. Bank holds a “right to payment” in this case. ... The Plan in the First Case thus created the “right to payment” that forms the basis for U.S. Bank’s claim in this case.

Under § 101(5) and (10), a co-owner’s rights against a debtor’s property interest can make the co-owner a creditor entitled to notice of a trustee’s sale.

In Re Langlands · filed 2008-04-02(5), (10)

The combination of 11 U.S.C. § 101(5), § 101(10), and § 102(2), under New York Law, renders the mother a “creditor” who was entitled to record notice of the Trustee’s intent to sell the Debtor’s undivided joint tenancy.

An entity with no claim against a debtor is not a creditor entitled to participate in that debtor’s claims adjustment process.

Chaussee v. B-Real, LLC (In Re Chaussee) · filed 2008-03-26(5), (10)

Because Defendant does not hold a ‘'claim” against Plaintiff, Defendant is not a "creditor” entitled to participate in the claims adjustment process under 11 U.S.C. §§ 501, 502.

Section 101 treats a contingent or unmatured right to future rent as a claim, and the corresponding obligation as a debt.

MIDWEST HOLDING & 7, LLC v. Anderson · filed 2008-04-22(5), (12)

The obligation to make future payments, rental or otherwise, is unquestionably a “debt” under the Bankruptcy Code. A “debt” is defined as a liability on a claim. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12). And a “claim” is a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured, ...” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5).

Section 101(5)(A) includes a contingent right to payment in the definition of a claim, even when payment depends on reversal of a judgment.

D'Auria v. Solomine · filed 2008-05-13(5)(A)

In the present case, the debt is contingent on the reversal of the trial court’s judgment, and it falls within the definition of a claim as stated in the Bankruptcy Code. As a result, it is capable of being discharged pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727.

Section 101(5) includes contingent and unmatured claims, so an indemnification claim can arise when the contract is signed, before the indemnitee suffers a loss.

In Re Designer Doors, Inc. · filed 2008-06-17(5)

Because a “claim” can be contingent or unmatured whereas a cause of action for indemnification cannot, an indemnification claim can arise for bankruptcy purposes when the contract requiring indemnification is executed, long before the indemnitee incurs any expense or suffers any loss.

Section 101(5) treats an enforceable remedy as a claim when it gives rise to a right to payment.

Burckhalter v. Burckhalter (In Re Burckhalter) · filed 2008-06-23(5)

Thus, the Court concludes that, so long as Colorado law gives the Plaintiff a right to enforce the allocation of marital debt delineated in the Separation Agreement, and that enforcement mechanism “gives rise to a right to payment,” ... then the debtor has incurred a debt in the course of his divorce proceeding that is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(15).

Section 101(10)(A) defines a creditor to include an entity that holds a claim against the debtor based on a prepetition judgment.

Federal Trade Commission v. Abeyta (In Re Abeyta) · filed 2008-05-08(10)(A)

The FTC holds a judgment against the Defendant that it obtained before the Defendant filed his bankruptcy petition. Consequently the FTC holds a claim against the debt- or and is a creditor as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A) with standing to bring an action under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).

Section 101 defines a debt as liability on a claim, which includes a right to payment that has not been reduced to judgment.

Winn v. Holdaway (In Re Holdaway) · filed 2008-05-12(5)(A), (12)

That cause of action is viable under Texas law and is a right to payment not yet reduced the judgment. Accordingly, this debt falls within the Title 11 definition of “debt.”

Section 101(5)'s definition of claim includes a debt that continues to exist under state law even when a limitations defense bars its collection.

In Re Varona · filed 2008-05-22(5)

What claims of creditors are valid and subsisting obligations against the bankrupt at the time a petition in bankruptcy is filed is a question which, in the absence of preempting federal law, is to be determined by reference to state law. ... Most importantly, while collection of the claims is arguably time-barred, under Virginia law the debts continue to exist. The bar of the statute of limitations raised by the Varo-nas in their Claim Objections prevents enforcement of the claims, but the claims are not extinguished.

Section 101(5)(A) defines a claim as a right to payment; a claimant whose right to payment has been extinguished has no valid bankruptcy claim.

In Re Orseno · filed 2008-06-10(5)(A)

The term “claim” means right to payment. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). ... Mrs. Orseno cannot establish that she has a right to payment under a valid bankruptcy claim.

Section 101(5)’s definition of a claim requires a right to retain payment; a mortgage lender has a claim for escrow charges only to the extent it actually advanced funds.

In Re Rodriguez · filed 2008-07-22(5)

A “right to payment”, as incorporated in the statutory definition of “claim” under 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) implicitly encompasses a right of retention, which is not subsumed in Countrywide’s “right to collect” escrow items. Absent sums actually expended, as permitted under the loan documents to protect its own collateral interest, Countrywide need not include pre-petition escrow arrears in its proof of claim inasmuch as the mortgage instrument only permits Countrywide to retain such funds as reimbursement to the extent of actual advances.

Section 101(5)(A) includes unliquidated rights to payment within the definition of a claim; the debtor need not know the amount sought.

Arch Wireless, Inc. v. Nationwide Paging, Inc. · filed 2008-07-23(5)(A)

The amount of money Nationwide would claim was certainly unknown, but Nationwide's emails could reasonably be understood to assert an entitlement to affirmative compensation for the defective pagers.

Section 101(5) treats preference and fraudulent transfer causes of action alleging rights to payment as claims.

Shapiro v. Meridian Automotive Systems (Delaware), Inc. (In Re Lorro, Inc.) · filed 2008-07-25(5)

The definition of “claim” in Meridian’s plan incorporates the broad language of § 101(5) of the Code, and extends it further to include such a claim, “whether or not asserted.” (See Meridian Plan, Section 1.2). In the Complaint, the Plaintiffs causes of action allege rights to payment. Plaintiffs claims are “Claims” as defined by both the plan and the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(5) defines a claim broadly; whether it arose before the bankruptcy petition depends on when the events giving rise to it occurred.

Suntrust Bank v. Roberson ( in Re Baseline Sports, Inc.) · filed 2008-08-01(5)

Whether a claim arises pre-petition, therefore, turns on whether the events giving rise to the claim occurred prior to the date the Debtor filed its bankruptcy petition.

Section 101(5) treats a right to payment through delivery of securing assets as a claim.

Federal Communications Commission v. Telephone & Data Systems, Inc. (In Re Airadigm Communications, Inc.) · filed 2008-08-12(5)

The signatories to the plan structured and documented the funding in all respects and in great detail as three non-recourse secured loans, making it indisputable that the plan created a right to payment within the meaning of § 101(5) in the form of delivery of the securing assets.

Section 101(5) defines a claim broadly enough to include a request to determine property rights arising from a prepetition driveway encroachment.

In Re Weinhold · filed 2008-08-13(5)

Moreover, the Court noted that within the very broad definition of claims, the Bankruptcy Code includes equitable and legal causes of action. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). ... The Court indeed considered the argument that a determination of property rights rather than a claim for personal liability was being sought by the LLC and Borowski, and the Court decided that under these circumstances, such a property-right determination is a “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(10) treats an assignee as a creditor only if it owns an enforceable claim against the debtor.

B-Real, LLC v. Melillo (Melillo) · filed 2008-07-08(10)

A “creditor” is an entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before entry of the order for relief. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10). A “claim” is “a right to payment” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). ... Therefore, the Appellant must demonstrate under Massachusetts law that it has an enforceable obligation against the Debtors.

An equitable remedy is a claim under § 101(5)(B) only if it is an alternative to payment or compliance requires payment; an injunction requiring a debtor to stop competing is not a claim.

In re: Bruce Gilpin v. · filed 2008-07-17(5)(B)

MCS’s right to enforce its noncompetition agreement by equitable relief does not constitute a claim under 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(B).

A mortgage servicer qualifies as a creditor with standing to file a proof of claim.

In Re Conde-Dedonato · filed 2008-07-22(10)(A)

The Code defines a creditor as “an entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A). ... A servicer of a mortgage is clearly a creditor and has standing to file a proof of claim against a debtor pursuant to its duties as a servicer.

Section 101 defines a claim as a right to payment and a debt as liability on a claim.

Beye v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of NJ · filed 2008-08-01(5), (12)

Claims such as those brought by Plaintiffs would constitute “debts” under the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(12) (“The term ‘debt’ means liability on a claim.”), 101(5) (“The term ‘claim’ means ... right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured....”).

Section 101(5)(A) includes unpaid pre-petition escrow payments in the definition of a claim when the lender has a contractual right to collect them.

Campbell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. · filed 2008-08-26(5)(A)

We determine only that unpaid escrow payments that accumulate pre-petition in the year that a bankruptcy petition is filed, and which the creditor had a right to collect under the loan documents, constitute a “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(5) broadly defines a claim to include an insurer’s right to payment under a self-insured retention when the debtor could have satisfied that obligation.

In Re Leisure, Inc. · filed 2008-09-16(5)

Applying the broad definition of claim set forth in § 101(5), the Court finds that Zurich has a claim against Leisure. Both Leisure and Broad Street Station, Inc. were named on the Policy. According to Zurich’s witness, a payment by either company would have satisfied the Self Insured Retention.

Section 101(5) defines a claim without distinguishing between rights to payment arising before and after bankruptcy.

In Re Plastech Engineered Products, Inc. · filed 2008-09-16(5)

The definition of claim makes no distinction as to whether such right accrued pre- or post-bankruptcy.

A right to payment can be a bankruptcy claim before it is liquidated or reduced to judgment.

Gray v. City of Decatur (In Re Gray) · filed 2008-09-24(5)(A)

The fact that, at the time of the Debtor’s bankruptcy filing, the City had not liquidated its claim against the Debtor is not determinative of the claim’s existence. A right to payment need not be reduced to judgment before it becomes a valid claim in bankruptcy.

Section 101(5) defines a claim as a right to payment or an equitable remedy that gives rise to a right to payment; enforcing property rights already determined to belong to the movant is not a claim against another debtor’s estate.

In Re Blast Energy Services, Inc. · filed 2008-09-24(5)

The Bankruptcy Code defines a “claim” as a “right to payment” or a “right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to aright to payment.” See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). Here, EDDO is not asserting a “right to payment” against Eagle’s bankruptcy estate; rather, EDDO is attempting to enforce rights to property that this Court has already determined that it owns.

Section 101(5) includes a right to reimbursement for asbestos cleanup costs within the definition of a claim.

In Re W.R. Grace & Co. · filed 2008-10-10(5)

The “clean-up costs” are damages and the money expended to put the property into a condition without the asbestos is the reimbursement sought. In bankruptcy terms, this is nothing more than a right to payment; i.e., a “claim” as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(5).

Section 101(5)(A) includes unpaid mortgage escrow payments in the definition of a claim when the lender has a contractual right to collect them.

Campbell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. · filed 2008-10-13(5)(A)

We determine only that unpaid escrow payments that accumulate pre-petition in the year that a bankruptcy petition is filed, and which the creditor had a right to collect under the loan documents, constitute a “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(5)(A) treats a right to recover future damages as a pre-petition claim when state law permitted recovery before the bankruptcy petition.

Browning v. MCI, Inc. (In Re WorldCom, Inc.) · filed 2008-10-14(5)(A)

Whether Browning would have been required under Kansas law to bring a pre-petition trespass claim for the cables, or merely would have been entitled to bring such an action at his election is immaterial: in either case, because Kansas law would have permitted recovery for his future damages, he would have had a pre-petition “claim” against MCI.

Section 101’s definitions of “claim” and “creditor” do not make an entity a creditor of a debtor when it seeks no payment or remedy for breach of performance from that debtor.

ASARCO LLC v. Americas Mining Corp. · filed 2008-08-30(5), (10)

The Court finds that ASARCO is not a “creditor” as the term is defined in the Bankruptcy Code, because it does not have a “claim” against SPHC; therefore, it was not required to file a proof of claim against SPHC. ASARCO is not asserting any right to payment by SPHC, nor is it seeking an equitable remedy for breach of a performance. Rather, the alter-ego claim is a threshold issue in ASARCO’s efforts to hold AMC, who is not a debtor in bankruptcy, liable for an alleged fraudulent transfer. Since ASARCO is not a creditor with a claim against SPHC’s estate, it was not required to file a proof of claim.

Section 101(10)(A) defines a creditor as an entity holding a claim that arose at or before the order for relief.

In Re Williams · filed 2008-09-12(10)(A)

Of the few reported decisions addressing this issue, none have accounted for the definition of “creditor” set forth in § 101(10)(A), which states that it refers to an “entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor.” ... Thus, by definition, this term would only include creditors holding prepetition claims.

Section 101(5) includes disputed debts within its broad definition of a claim.

Adler v. Ng (In Re Adler) · filed 2008-09-15(5)

Although the Debtor disputes that he owes a debt to plaintiffs and argues that plaintiffs lack standing under Section 523 or to object to his discharge under Section 727, the term ''claim” under the Bankruptcy Code is defined very broadly to include disputed claims. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). In fact, Debtor listed plaintiffs as creditors in the Petition on Schedule E. The fact that Debtor might dispute the existence or amount of plaintiffs' claim does not impact plaintiffs' status as creditors. Thus, the Court rejects Debtor’s argument that plaintiffs lack standing in connection with these claims.

Section 101(5) defines a claim to include a right to payment or an equitable remedy for breach that gives rise to a right to payment.

In Re Lockwood · filed 2008-11-17(5)

The Bankruptcy Code's definition of "claim" is expansive: ... 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). Therefore, JMS's right to an equitable remedy for breach of contract or for damages arising from a breach survived the bankruptcy; the fact that the IP Agreement became property of Debtor's estate (and was assumed, assigned or even rejected by Trustee) does not — in and of itself — relieve Lockwood from the consequences of the denial of discharge, nor does it deprive him of defenses otherwise available to him.

Section 101(5)(B) includes an equitable remedy such as reinstatement in the definition of a claim when monetary damages can substitute for it.

Rederford v. US Airways, Inc. · filed 2008-11-19(5)(B)

Because these authorities make clear that a claim for reinstatement can be reduced to a quantifiable dollar amount, then it inexorably follows that such a claim does give rise to a right to payment within the meaning of section 101(5)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(5)(A) requires an enforceable right to payment; a short-term capital loss carryover that creates no payment obligation is not a claim against the government.

Handelsman v. Johnson · filed 2008-12-05(5)(A)

For purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor’s claim must be an “enforceable obligation” to receive payment. ... Despite Handelsman’s contentions to the contrary, his STCL carryover does not give rise to a legal obligation to receive payment from the United States under tax, bankruptcy, or common law.

Section 101(5) treats an environmental cleanup obligation as a claim when it gives the creditor a right to payment for cleanup costs.

In Re High Voltage Engineering Corp. · filed 2008-11-07(5)

Thus, the Court concludes that the ACO executed by the NJDEP and HVE most closely resembles a claim for monetary damages, although contamination at the site, despite years of remediation, has been described as “on-going.”

Section 101(5) requires a right to payment for a claim; a contractual right to setoff alone does not qualify.

In Re SemCrude, LP · filed 2009-01-09(5)

Chevron does not even have a "claim" against SemCrude because to have a claim it must have a "right to payment" from SemCrude. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5).

Section 101(5) requires a right to payment for a claim; a contractual right to setoff that only reduces what a party must pay does not create one.

In re Semcrube, L.P. · filed 2009-01-09(5)

Although Chevron may be able to assert a state law right to the equitable remedy of setoff, this right is not based on a breach of performance that gives rise to a "right to payment,” as noted above. A setoff agreement such as the one in this case only creates a right to pay less or nothing, not a right to receive a payment.

Section 101(5)(B) treats an equitable remedy for breach as a claim when the breach gives rise to a right to payment.

Top Rank, Inc. v. Ortiz (In Re Ortiz) · filed 2009-01-21(5)(B)

To determine whether any provisions of the contract remain enforceable against the debtor, rather than as claims against the estate, courts must assess whether the right to an equitable remedy is a “claim” dischargeable in bankruptcy. This in turn requires an inquiry as to whether an equitable remedy is available under state law.

Section 101(5)(A) includes a right to payment for a prepetition contract breach even when the damages cannot yet be calculated.

In Re Bill Heard Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2009-02-12(5)(A)

While GM’s damages cannot be calculated at this time, GM’s claim for damages arose prior to the commencement of the petition.

Section 101(5)(A) defines a claim to include a right to payment that arises after the bankruptcy petition is filed.

In Re Worldcom, Inc. · filed 2009-02-26(5)(A)

Under § 101(5)(A), an entity with a right to payment against the estate has a claim. The timing of when that right to payment arose does not affect its status as a claim under the Code but rather the timing only affects whether the claimant must file a proof of claim or a request for an administrative expense.

Section 101(10) defines a creditor through three alternatives: a qualifying claim against the debtor, a specified claim against the estate, or a community claim.

In Re Cypresswood Land Partners, I · filed 2009-01-20(10)

Under § 101(10), IFA has three separate and distinct chances to achieve “creditor” status. The discussion above reflects that IFA has struck out in all three instances. Accordingly, IFA is not a “creditor.”

Section 101(10)(A) includes a person with a prepetition claim as a creditor, even if the debtor does not view that person as one.

United States Trustee v. Warr (In Re Warr) · filed 2009-02-06(10)(A)

As in Khalil, regardless of how Defendant viewed Killian, for bankruptcy purposes, Killian was Defendant’s creditor. Debtor should have listed Killian as a creditor in Debtor’s schedules.

Section 101(10)(A) defines a creditor as an entity whose claim against the debtor arose at or before the order for relief.

Weisel v. Dominion Peoples Gas Co. (In Re Weisel) · filed 2009-02-09(10)(A)

The term "creditor” is defined elsewhere in the Bankruptcy Code as an entity with a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A). Thus, as to the Postpetition Account under these facts, it does not appear that Dominion was a "creditor” of the Debtors and the plan would not be binding on Dominion pursuant to Section 1327(a).

Section 101 defines a claim as a right to payment and debt as liability on a claim, so payment reducing a claim also reduces the debt.

Spillman Investment Group, Ltd. v. American Bank (In Re Spillman Development Group, Ltd.) · filed 2009-01-29(5)(A), (12)

Fire Eagle’s claim is also its debt. “Debt” is defined as liability on a claim. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12). “Claim” means “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). Payment against the claim necessarily reduces the debt. It cannot reduce one and not the other.

Section 101(5)(A) includes contingent rights to payment, but a guaranty of future indebtedness creates no claim until a new advance is made.

Weeks v. Isabella Bank Corp. (In Re Weeks) · filed 2009-01-23(5)(A)

Or, to view it differently, no dischargeable “claim” (i.e., an enforceable obligation) can arise on account of a debtor’s guaranty of future indebtedness until a new advance has in fact been made.

Section 101(5)(A) defines a claim as a right to payment, including a right to payment for capital gains taxes.

United States v. Nazar (In Re Dawes) · filed 2009-03-12(5)(A)

The term “claim” is defined as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliqui-dated, fixed, contingent, matured, unma-tured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). In the case at hand, the IRS, a government unit, has a right to payment for capital gain taxes arising from the sale of the Debtors’ farm property. It thus has a claim against the debtors.