D.C. Code § 12-301

For a malicious prosecution action, the § 12-301 limitations period begins when the underlying criminal or civil proceeding is disposed of in favor of the plaintiff.

Isidore Shulman, M.D. v. Dona L. Miskell, Philip F. Hudock, Esquire · filed 1980-05-07

D.C.Code § 12-301 provides that, with an exception not here relevant, the limitation period begins to run “from the time the right to maintain the action accrues.” The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has interpreted that provision in the context of a malicious prosecution action to mean that the period begins to run “from the time that all the elements of the cause of action exist.” ... Our review of the District of Columbia cases, including those decided subsequent to Brewster, convinces us that in the District the statute of limitations for malicious prosecution actions begins to run from the time the underlying criminal or civil actions is disposed of in favor of the malicious prosecution plaintiff.

Section 12-301(7) bars a contract action after three years but does not prevent a utility from enforcing a tariff that conditions reconnection of service on payment of the outstanding debt.

Jackson v. Public Service Commission · filed 1991-05-08(7)

Applying that standard, we accept as reasonable the PSC’s conclusion that expiration of the statute of limitations did not bar WGL from enforcing the terms of its tariff. See Riggs National Bank v. District of Columbia, 581 A.2d 1229, 1240-41 (D.C.1990).

Section 12-301 supplies the three-year limitations period for a claim against a third party, and D.C. Code § 36-335’s six-month period does not supersede or toll it based on pending workers’ compensation claims.

Simpson v. Jack Baker, Inc. · filed 1993-02-12

The Triplett court simply decided whether or not the six month statute of limitations provided for in D.C.Code § 36-335 was applicable to the case and, if applicable, when the statute of limitations began to run. The court did not make any determination that the six month statute of limitations in D.C.Code § 36-335 superseded D.C.Code § 12-301.

Section 12-301(8) does not prohibit private agreements to toll or suspend a limitations period; its exception gives precedence to other statutory limitation periods.

Hunter-Boykin v. George Washington University · filed 1998-01-09(8)

But there is no reason to read the statute as GW urges, and every reason not to do so. The most straightforward reading of the italicized phrase is that it was not intended to refer to private tolling agreements at all, but rather was intended to refer to other provisions of the D.C.Code that contain limitations periods for causes of action not listed in § 12-301 — so that it is clear those provisions take precedence over the three-year “catchall” of § 12-301(8). ... Hence, there is no reason to read the phrase as any kind of reference to private tolling agreements. ... We see no reason why similar effect may not be given, under § 12-301, to the agreement at issue in this case.

Section 12-301(8)’s three-year limitations period for fraud does not apply to will contests governed by the probate code.

Valentine v. Elliott · filed 2003-03-27(8)

We hold that the statute of limitations for fraud embodied in D.C.Code § 12-301(8) does not apply to will contests under the probate code.

Section 12-301 provides a three-year limitations period for claims to recover personal property and for breach-of-contract claims.

Ficken v. AMR Corp. · filed 2008-09-29(2), (7)

The statute of limitations applicable to claims for the recovery of personal property, infliction of emotional distress and breach of contract is three years. D.C.Code § 12-301(2) (establishing the statute of limitations on claims to recover personal property); ... D.C.Code § 12-301(7) (breach of contract claims).

Section 12-301(7) imposes a three-year limitations period on contract claims, and a claim is time-barred when the breach accrued more than three years before suit.

Armenian Assembly of America, Inc. v. Cafesjian · filed 2011-01-26(7)

The Grant Agreement is governed by District of Columbia law, see Grant Agreement § 7.2, and the statute of limitations for contract claims is three years, see D.C.Code § 12-301(7). Because Defendants did not take legal action to enforce the promissory note until April 26, 2007, their claim is untimely unless the cause of action accrued on or after April 26, 2004. ... Although the parties likely did not expect the Assembly to reissue the promissory note immediately, the Court finds that the Grant Agreement required the Assembly to reissue the note sometime before April 2004. Therefore, Defendant’s claim for breach of the Grant Agreement is time-barred with respect to the Assembly’s failure to reissue the promissory note.

Section 12-301(7) gives breach-of-contract claims a three-year limitations period, measured here from the alleged breach.

Nattah v. Bush · filed 2011-03-18(7)

The District applies a three-year time limitation on claims for breach of contract, D.C.Code § 12-301(7), which is applicable to the alleged employment agreement here. ... Here, plaintiff alleges that by March 20, 2003, he had been sold into slavery by L-3 Services to the United States Army. ... Even construing the allegations in the FAC as favorably as possible for the plaintiff — that is, assuming that the breaches occurred at the latest date possible — the applicable statute of limitations still required claims for breach of contract to be filed by March 20, 2006. Mr. Nattah did not file his complaint, however, until April 19, 2006 — almost a month after the applicable time period elapsed.

Section 12-301(7) sets a three-year limitations period for contract claims.

Moini v. Leblanc · filed 2020-04-24(7)

The statute of limitations for these claims is three years. D.C. Code § 12- 301(7).

Subsection (8) supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims, while subsection (4)'s one-year period applies to Bivens actions only when they are analogous to the listed common-law actions.

Lewis v. Bayh · filed 2008-09-09(8), (4)

In the District of Columbia, D.C.Code § 12-301(8) governs such claims and provides a three-year statute of limitations. ... The one-year limitations period set out in D.C.Code § 12-301(4) applies “only for Bivens actions analogous to [those] common law actions mentioned in [D.C.Code § 12-301(4) ].”

Section 12-301(8) supplies the three-year limitations period for claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Tyler v. Washington, D.C. Correction · filed 2016-05-16(8)

Second, in any event a claim under § 1983 must be brought within three years, see, e.g., Proctor v. District of Columbia, 74 F. Supp. 3d 436, 457 (D.D.C. 2014) (“Since Section 1983 does not have a built-in statute of limitations, the general three-year statute of limitations imposed by District of Columbia law on claims for personal injury, see D.C. Code § 12-301(8), applies.”), and since plaintiff’s cause of action arose in 2007, the limitations period would have expired in 2010, nearly six years ago.

Section 12-301(8)'s residual three-year limitations period could not be applied by the Board to bar the claimant's initial survivor-benefit claim through an adjudicative decision imposing a new claim-filing deadline.

Andrews v. District of Columbia Police & Firefighters Retirement & Relief Board · filed 2010-03-18(8)

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the Board’s order, on the ground that the Board may not apply a claim-filing deadline to bar petitioner’s claim.

Section 12-301(7)'s three-year limitations period for contract claims does not apply to a hybrid collective-bargaining-agreement/fair-representation claim against WMATA; the borrowed six-month NLRA § 10(b) period governs.

Price v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority · filed 2012-04-12(7)

Price’s primary argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in applying the six-month limitations period instead of the District of Columbia’s three-year limitations period applicable to claims for breach of contract and other claims (such as malpractice) for which a limitations period is not specifically prescribed. ... However, for the reasons explained below, we reject Price’s argument. ... These considerations give us a compelling reason to follow the lead of our sister courts in this region in applying a six-month limitations period to hybrid claims involving WMATA.