D.C. Code § 28-3904

Section 28-3904(r) applies to real estate mortgage finance transactions and covers knowingly making a loan with no reasonable probability of repayment or knowingly taking advantage of a borrower's inability to reasonably protect his interests.

Williams v. First Government Mortgage and Investors Corporation · filed 2000-08-01(r)

We find that a reasonable jury could conclude that First Government made the loan to Williams knowing "there was no reasonable probability of payment in full of the obligation." D.C. Code Ann. § 28-3904(r)(1). ... We likewise find that a reasonable jury applying subsection (r)(5) could conclude that Williams was unable fully to understand the transaction and that First Government "knowingly [took] advantage of [his] inability ... reasonably to protect his interests." Id. § 28-3904(r)(5).

Section 28-3904(r) defines unconscionability through five disjunctive, non-exhaustive factors, while subsection (e) prohibits misrepresenting material facts when the failure tends to mislead.

Hughes v. Abell · filed 2009-07-20(r), (r)(1), (r)(5), (e)

Considering together these three factors of section 28-3904(r), Hughes has stated a claim of unconscionability under the CPPA. ... The five factors by which the CPPA defines unconscionability are disjunctive and non-exhaustive. At a minimum, Hughes satisfies the Rule 12(b)(6) standard with respect to the first alleged factor that "there was no reasonable probability of payment in full." Therefore, the Court will allow Hughes's unconscionability claim to proceed. ... Hughes alleges a second violation of the CPPA under D.C. Code § 28-3904(e), claiming that Wells Fargo "misrepresent[ed] material facts when such failure tended to mislead." ... This allegation does not contain a misrepresentation. Banks may establish any conditions they wish, within the boundaries of the law, for their loans, and Wells Fargo accurately represented the terms on which it would refinance Hughes's mortgage. Although Hughes may be able to prove that these conditions are unconscionable, he has not alleged that they were misrepresented. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the portion of Count V that alleges misrepresentation in violation of D.C. Code § 28-3904(e).

Section 28-3904(r) prohibits making or enforcing unconscionable terms or provisions of sales or leases and does not require a material misrepresentation or omission with a tendency to mislead.

Carroll v. Fremont Investment & Loan · filed 2009-07-20(r)

Fremont further argues that count 1 does not plead a valid DCCPPA claim because the Carrolls do not plead a material misrepresentation or omission that has a tendency to mislead. In support of this argument, Fremont cites Alicke v. MCI Comm. Corp., 111 F.3d 909, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The provisions of the DCCPPA at issue in Alicke, however, were provisions (e) and (f), each of which required a tendency to mislead. See D.C. Code § 28-3904 (e) (“misrepresent as to a material fact which has a tendency to mislead”); (f) (“fail to state a material fact if such failure tends to mislead”). The provision of the DCCPPA that the Carrolls allege Fremont violated, by contrast, does not require a material misrepresentation or omission that has a tendency to mislead. See id. § 28-3904(r) (“make or enforce unconscionable terms or provisions of sales”). The Court concludes that it must deny Fremont’s motion to dismiss as to count 1.

Subsection (r) reaches unconscionable terms or provisions of an agreement, including mortgage terms, but not allegedly unconscionable acts performed in violation of the agreement.

Cannon v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2013-03-01(r)

Section 28-3904(r) of the D.C. Code provides for a violation of the consumer protection statute to “make or enforce unconscionable terms or provisions of sales or leases.” Courts have found this section applies to claims alleging that the terms of a mortgage agreement are unconscionable. ... Section 28-3904(r) creates a cause of action for making or enforcing “unconscionable terms or provisions” of an agreement, not arguably unconscionable acts purportedly performed in violation of the terms of an agreement. For this reason, the Plaintiff fails to state a claim under Section 28-3904(r).

Section 3904(e) prohibits a merchant from misrepresenting a material fact when the misrepresentation has a tendency to mislead.

Sloan v. Urban Title Services, LLC · filed 2010-02-12(e)

Section 3904(e) and (f) require that any misrepresentations or omissions are “material” in nature and have a tendency to mislead.

Section 28-3904 covers mortgage-related consumer transactions, and conduct occurring after the loan documents are signed is not automatically outside the statute's reach.

Ihebereme v. Capital One, N.A. · filed 2010-08-09(b)

Accordingly, the Court will not disqualify behavior falling outside of — or after — the act of signing the contract from the DCCPPA’s purview. ... Plaintiff alleges that defendant misrepresented material facts, refused to credit his timely and good-faith payments, changed his payment requirements without explanation, and generally engaged in improper trade practices. Questions may remain as to whether the behavior transpired as plaintiff alleges and whether it violates the DCCPPA, but at this juncture, the Court is satisfied that the allegations state a claim upon which relief can be granted and therefore the motion to dismiss will be denied.

The Consumer Protection Procedures Act applies to transactions primarily for personal, household, or family use, not commercial or investment transactions.

Bakeir v. Capital City Mortgage Corporation · filed 2013-03-04

The Consumer Protections Act, accordingly, does not apply to transactions of a commercial nature. ... Based on the evidence presented during the trial, it is clear that the plaintiff’s transaction with the defendants does not fall within the purview of the Consumer Protections Act in light of the Court’s finding that she purchased the property for investment purposes. ... Accordingly, the Court finds in favor of the defendants on the plaintiff’s claim under the Consumer Protections Act.

Section 28-3904(e) prohibits a corporation from misrepresenting a material fact with a tendency to mislead, without requiring proof of intentional misrepresentation.

Mero v. City Segway Tours of Washington Dc, LLC · filed 2011-11-28(e)

Under the CPPA, a corporation may not “misrepresent as to a material fact which has a tendency to mislead,” “whether or not any consumer is in fact misled, deceived or damaged thereby[.]” D.C. Code § 28-3904(e). A consumer bringing a claim under section 28-3904(e) “need not allege or prove intentional misrepresentation to prevail on a claimed violation [but] must allege a material fact which has a tendency to mislead.”

Section 28-3904(e) prohibits misrepresenting a material fact when the representation has a tendency to mislead.

Judith CARTER, Plaintiff, v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., Et Al., Defendants · filed 2012-08-08(e)

The specific violation the plaintiff alleges is that Bank of America “misrepresent[ed] as to a material fact which has a tendency to mislead” in violation of D.C. Code § 28-3904(e). The plaintiff has not, however, pled any facts beyond the bare allegation that Bank of America misled her that are sufficient to sustain such a claim.

Section 28-3904(e) requires a material misrepresentation, and an intentional breach of contract alone is not an unlawful trade practice merely because the breach was intended when the contract was formed.

Slinski v. Bank of America, N.A. · filed 2013-09-30(e)

To state such a claim, “the plaintiff must allege that the defendant made a material misrepresentation.” ... The court concludes that an intentional breach of contract is not punishable as an unlawful trade practice under the Consumer Protection Procedures Act simply because the breach was intended when the contract was formed.

Section 28-3904(e) is violated by an affirmative or implied material misrepresentation that tends to mislead, without requiring proof of intent.

Beck v. Test Masters Educational Services, Inc. · filed 2013-12-18(e)

Plaintiff must only establish that defendant made a misrepresentation—affirmative or implied—to prevail on the Section 28-3904(e) claim.

Section 28-3904(r) treats the five unconscionability factors as disjunctive and non-exhaustive considerations, with no single factor serving as an independent basis for recovery; § 28-3904(e) covers material misrepresentations that tend to mislead.

Hughes v. Abell · filed 2010-11-17(r), (r)(1), (r)(2), (r)(5), (e)

Considering together these three factors of section 28-3904(r), Hughes has stated a claim of unconscionability under the CPPA. ... The five factors by which the CPPA defines unconscionability are disjunctive and non-exhaustive. At a minimum, Hughes sufficiently alleges that, under the first factor, "there was no reasonable probability of payment in full." Therefore, the Court will allow Hughes's unconscionability claim to proceed. ... Under the liberal pleading standard of the Federal Rules, Hughes has also stated a CPPA claim for misrepresentation under D.C. Code § 28-3904(e).

Section 28-3904(r) prohibits unconscionable terms in sales or leases, but the CPPA applies only to consumer-merchant relationships, so a person on the consumer or buyer side is not a covered merchant.

Ali v. Tolbert · filed 2011-03-01(r)

Count 1 alleges that Tolbert, in “brokering the sale of 1010[ ]G Street,” violated the CPPA by “ha[ving] Ms. Ali agree to sell 1010 G Street on unconscionable terms, in violation of subsection (r)” of D.C. Code § 28-3904—which makes it a violation of the CPPA “for any person to . . . make or enforce unconscionable terms or provisions of sales or leases”—and by doing so “with full knowledge of [Ali’s] inability to negotiate a fair price for the sale of her property, or to avoid foreclosure by negotiations with her lender.” ... The district court was correct. ... The D.C. Court of Appeals has repeatedly concluded that the CPPA “ ‘was designed to police trade practices arising only out of consumer-merchant relationships.’ ” ... Ali has pointed to no evidence in the record even suggesting Tolbert supplied, or held himself out as a person who would supply, any goods or services to Ali in connection with her ownership or sale of the house. At most, Tolbert assisted Noble in purchasing the property, placing him on the “consume” rather than the supply side of the transaction.

The DCCPPA does not regulate a person's actions in a property sale when that person is not a merchant.

Ali v. Mid-Atlantic Settlement Services, Inc. · filed 2009-07-17(r)

Because Tolbert was not a merchant, his actions regarding the sale of Ali’s house were not regulated by the DCCPPA, and judgment will be entered for Tolbert on Count I.

Subsection (e) bars representations about a transaction’s characteristics or benefits that would tend to mislead a reasonable consumer, and a court may dismiss the claim when no reasonable consumer could be deceived.

Whiting v. AARP & Unitedhealthcare Insurance · filed 2011-03-08(e)

Assuming, as Whiting maintains, the Consumer Act applies to the promotional materials and the Certificate, under District of Columbia law a claim “of an unfair trade practice is properly considered in terms of how the practice would be viewed and understood by a reasonable consumer.” Pearson v. Soo Chung, 961 A.2d 1067, 1075 (D.C. 2008). ... In other words, for her statutory claim to succeed, Whiting must prove that a reasonable person would interpret the promotional materials and the Certificate to mean that inpatient radiology and laboratory/pathology services were covered. ... We agree with the principle underlying these cases and that the district court could appropriately grant a motion to dismiss on a deceptive practices claim if no reasonable person would be so deceived. ... Thus, reading them together, no reasonable person could read the promotional materials and Certificate and understand them to mean that inpatient radiology and laboratory/pathology services were covered under the Plan. Dismissal of the statutory claim was therefore warranted.

Section 28-3904 prohibits specified misleading or deceptive consumer representations and omissions, and the quoted provisions apply to deceitful communications aimed at consumers by the defendant.

Parr v. Ebrahimian · filed 2011-03-31

Those allegations state a claim under at least one subsection of the CPPA against the Rimcor defendants, since Ms. Parr alleges, among other things, that the Rimcor defendants falsely claimed that the Rhode Island Avenue condominium had been inspected by appropriate officials and complied with applicable statutes and regulations. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 33, 45. The Walker defendants, however, are not alleged to have made any representation to Ms. Parr and so cannot be held liable for a breach of any provision of the CPPA, including those quoted above, that prohibits false advertising, misleading or fraudulent representations, or other deceitful communications aimed at consumers. Because Ms. Parr identifies no portion of the CPPA that provides for liability based on any action allegedly taken by the Walker defendants, the CPPA claims against those defendants will be dismissed.

Section 28-3904(r) treats a sale as unconscionable based on factors including the seller’s knowledge that the consumer probably could not pay in full or could not receive substantial benefits from the property or services.

Chen v. Bell-Smith · filed 2011-03-08(r)

Plaintiffs have also raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Smiths' execution of the deed of sale was "unconscionable" under D.C. Code § 28-3904(r). Whether a transaction is "unconscionable" within the meaning of D.C. Code § 28-3904(r) depends on a number of factors, including "knowledge by the person at the time credit sales are consummated that there was no reasonable probability of payment in full of the obligation by the consumer"; and "knowledge by the person at the time of the sale . . . of the inability of the consumer to receive substantial benefits from the property or services sold."

Section 28-3904(r) prohibits making or enforcing unconscionable sales or lease terms, while §§ 28-3904(e) and (f) prohibit material misrepresentations and material omissions that tend to mislead; allegations of those practices may support a plausible CPPA claim at the pleading stage.

Solomon v. Wachovia Mortgage Corporation · filed 2011-06-15(r), (e), (f)

Under the CPPA, it is an unlawful trade practice to “make or enforce unconscionable terms or provisions of sales or leases . . . .” D.C. Code § 28-3904(r). In applying this provision, the statute instructs courts to consider “(1) knowledge by the person at the time credit sales are consummated that there was no reasonable probability of payment in full of the obligation by the consumer” and “(2) knowledge by the person at the time of the sale or lease of the inability of the consumer to receive substantial benefits . . . .” Id. Similarly, unfair trade practices include “misrepresent[ing] as to a material fact which has a tendency to mislead,” D.C. Code § 28-3904(e), or “fail[ing] to state a material fact if such failure tends to mislead,” D.C. Code § 28-3904(f). ... At the pleadings stage, these allegations “allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Section 28-3904(r) treats the listed circumstances as factors in deciding whether sales or lease terms are unconscionable, applies to real-estate mortgage finance transactions, and does not require a plaintiff to prove every factor.

Findlay v. Citimortgage, Inc. · filed 2011-09-26(r)(1), (r)(2), and (r)(5)

As the statute indicates, subsections (1) through (5) are merely factors to consider in determining whether the terms or provisions of sales or leases are unconscionable, see id., so a plaintiff is not required to satisfy each subsection in order to state a claim for unconscionability under the CPPA. Regarding the statute's applicability in this case, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has made clear that "§ 28-3904(r) applies to real estate mortgage finance transactions."

Section 28-3904(r) defines unconscionability through disjunctive, non-exhaustive factors, so knowledge that repayment was not reasonably probable may support a claim even when the consumer received substantial benefits and understood the transaction; subsection (e) does not treat an unsupported prediction about future refinancing as a material-fact misrepresentation.

Hughes v. Abell · filed 2012-06-07(r), (r)(1), (r)(2), (r)(5), (e)

Although the current facts are somewhat more favorable to Wells Fargo than were those in Williams, the Court finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Hughes-Wells Fargo transaction was unconscionable. A reasonable jury could conclude that Wells Fargo knew that there was no reasonable probability of payment on the loan. ... But as the Court has noted previously, "[t]he five factors by which the CPPA defines unconscionability are disjunctive and non-exhaustive." Hughes, 794 F. Supp. 2d at 9. ... The CPPA prohibits "misrepresent[ations] as to a material fact which has a tendency to mislead." D.C. Code § 28-3904(e). As a preliminary matter, Wells Fargo's statement was a suggestion about something that Hughes would be able to do in the future, rather than a statement about a "fact" in a literal sense. ... The statement was therefore not a misrepresentation because it might actually have been accurate. ... In sum, Hughes' claim under the CPPA may proceed, but in more limited form than alleged in the complaint. Hughes' CPPA unconscionability claim may proceed on the ground that Wells Fargo had knowledge that there was no reasonable probability of payment in full of the obligation by Hughes. But Hughes has presented insufficient evidence for a jury to reasonably conclude either that he did not understand the nature of the transaction with Wells Fargo or that he received no substantial benefit from the loan. Hughes has also presented insufficient evidence, as a matter of law, that Wells Fargo made a material misrepresentation of fact to Hughes in the transaction, and hence that CPPA claim must be dismissed.

Sections 28-3904(e) and (f) prohibit material misrepresentations or omissions tending to mislead without requiring intent, while subsection (w) applies only to violations of statutes specifically enumerated in the DCCPPA.

Ihebereme v. Capital One, N.A. · filed 2013-03-28(e), (f), (w)

Section 3904 is entitled “unlawful trade practices” and it lists thirty-five acts that are unlawful “whether or not any consumer is in fact misled, deceived or damaged thereby.” The list includes the proscriptions that it is unlawful to “(e) misrepresent as to a material fact which has a tendency to mislead” and “(f) fail to state a material fact if such failure tends to mislead.” ... The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has held, however, that a person bringing suit under Sections 28-3904(e) and (f) for misrepresentation do not need to allege or prove intentional misrepresentation or failure to disclose. ... The DCCPPA makes it a violation of the act for any person to “violate any provision” of several statutes. ... But the DCCPPA conspicuously does not mention D.C. Code § 47-1431. ... Given that the recordation statute does not provide for a private right of action and the DCCPPA does not include the recordation statute among those statutes that can create a violation of the DCCPPA, the Court finds no basis to conclude that a violation of section 47-1431 constitutes a violation of the DCCPPA.

Section 28-3904 prohibits material misrepresentations or omissions likely to mislead a reasonable consumer, but accurate, nonmisleading statements and puffery are not actionable.

Whiting v. Aarp · filed 2010-03-29

"[A] claim of an unfair trade practice [under the CPPA] is properly considered in terms of how the practice would be viewed and understood by a reasonable consumer." ... All statements that she points to as misleading are in fact either accurate, not misleading to a reasonable consumer, or mere puffery. ... Quite simply, there is no misrepresentation here, and no reasonable consumer would have been mislead.

Section 28-3904's CPPA protections apply only to consumer-merchant relationships and do not cover a commercial equipment-finance lease lacking allegations that the transaction was primarily for personal, household, or family use.

Hardy v. Northern Leasing Systems, Inc. · filed 2013-07-12

“Similarly, “[t]he purpose of the CPPA is to protect consumers from a broad spectrum of unscrupulous practices by merchants,” and “[d]espite its broad reach the CPPA applies only to consumer-merchant relationships.” ... According to the plaintiff, “the equipment that is at the core of this Complaint[] was delivered to a place of business,” yet “if used, was for personal use only.” ... Notwithstanding this assertion, the amended complaint contains no factual allegations to indicate that the underlying equipment finance lease was primarily for personal, household, or family use. ... The plaintiff fails to state claims under the Consumer Act and the CPPA upon which relief can be granted, and both claims will be dismissed.”

The CPPA reaches real-estate mortgage transactions, mortgage refinancing, and deceptive billing practices, although its application to mortgage-loan servicers remains unresolved.

Logan v. LaSalle Bank National Association · filed 2013-12-12(e), (f)

Finally, we address appellant‟s allegations of unlawful trade practices — specifically, violations of D.C. Code § 28-3904 (e), which prohibits “mispresent[ation] as to a material fact which has a tendency to mislead,” and D.C. Code § 28-3904 (f), which forbids the “fail[ure] to state a material fact if such failure tends to mislead.” ... We have recognized that the CPPA applies to real estate mortgage transactions, see Gomez v. Independence Mgmt. of Delaware, Inc., 967 A.2d 1276, 1287 n.12 (D.C. 2009) (discussing amendment of statute to include real estate transactions), and to mortgage refinancing, see DeBerry v. First Gov’t Mortg. & Investors Corp., 743 A.2d 699 (D.C. 1999). The CPPA also applies to deceptive billing practices related to a contract for consumer goods and services. See District Cablevision Ltd. P’ship v. Bassin, 828 A.2d 714, 723 (D.C. 2003) (noting enumerated violations of CPPA are not exclusive of trade practices that violate other laws).

Subsection (t) prohibits only deceptive representations or designations of geographic origin in connection with goods or services.

['HANCOCK v. URBAN OUTFITTERS, INC.'] · filed 2014-03-14(t)

The Court rejects the plaintiffs’ interpretation in favor of a plain reading of the subsection, as prohibiting only a deceptive representation of geographic origin or deceptive designation of geographic origin.

The CPPA bars merchants from misleading consumers, failing to provide required executable evidence of indebtedness, harassing or threatening consumers outside legal process, and using unconscionable credit terms or exploiting consumers’ inability to protect their interests.

Renchard v. Prince William Marine Sales, Inc. · filed 2015-04-09(o), (p), (q), (m), (r)(1), and (r)(5)

Consequently, there are material factual disputes about the necessity of the repairs performed and whether the plaintiff was provided the ability to sign off on those services, such that summary judgment is precluded as to claims of violations of D.C. Code § 28-3904(o–q). ... Therefore, summary judgment as to a potential violation of D.C. Code § 28-3904(m) is denied. ... Thus, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to purported violations of D.C. Code §§ 28-3904(r)(1) and (5) is denied.

Section 28-3904 prohibits material misrepresentations that tend to mislead consumers, and a CPPA claim need not allege that a promised background check would have uncovered the defendant's dangerousness; it requires a material misrepresentation, reliance, and resulting damages.

Search v. Uber Technologies, Inc. · filed 2015-09-10(a)-(e)

That allegation is sufficient to state a claim under the CPPA. This statute, unlike Plaintiff’s negligent-hiring claim, does not require Search to allege that, had Uber performed a background investigation, it would have unearthed information alerting it to Deresse’s dangerous personality. Under the Act, he need only allege that Defendant misrepresented a material fact that has a tendency to mislead, Plaintiff relied on that misrepresentation, and he suffered damages as a result. Search has done so here.

Section 28-3904(f) reaches material omissions that tend to mislead even without actual consumer deception or damage, while § 28-3904(h) requires factual allegations that plausibly show advertised coverage was never intended to be provided.

Campbell v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pa · filed 2015-09-16(f), (h)

Ms. Campbell’s conclusory allegation that Defendants advertised insurance coverage without the intent to sell such insurance, is effectively a bare recitation of the elements of a § 28-3904(h) claim not supported by the type of factual allegations that would render it plausible. ... By its terms, § 28-3904(f) applies regardless of whether “any consumer is in fact misled, deceived or damaged,” so the fact that Defendants’ alleged failure to comply with insurance laws and regulations did not result in her policy being unenforceable under D.C. law does not preclude her from asserting a violation of § 28-3904(f).

The D.C. Consumer Protection Act does not apply to commercial dealings outside the consumer sphere and applies only when the transaction is primarily for personal use.

Antoine v. U.S. Bank National Ass'n · filed 2010-10-24

The DCCPA does not apply to commercial dealings outside the consumer sphere. ... The DCCPA only applies, therefore, where the transaction at issue is primarily for personal use.

Section 28-3904 does not treat a debt collector’s effort to collect an already-existing debt as a “trade practice” when the collector is not offering goods, services, or consumer credit.

Baylor v. Mitchell Rubenstein & Associates, P.C. · filed 2014-07-08

Defendants conduct does not fall within that plain language. ... Defendants were not offering to sell or provide plaintiff with any goods or services, including consumer credit. Therefore, their attempts to collect debts are not trade practices under the DCCPPA. ... Since plaintiff cannot state a claim under the DCCPPA against defendants for the conduct alleged in the complaint, Count III will be dismissed.

Under § 28-3904(d)-(f), an alleged promise to complete renovations and an alleged failure to disclose property defects can support an unlawful-trade-practices claim at the pleading stage, while representations lacking details about when or how they were made are insufficient.

Regan v. Spicer Hb, LLC · filed 2015-09-22(d)-(f)

Plaintiff’s also claims that Defendants are liable for committing unlawful trade practices in violation of D.C. Code § 28-3904 (d)-(f) when ... With respect to the representation that Defendants promised to complete the repairs as stated in the Sales Contract Addendum, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has sufficiently identified when the representation was made by pointing to the addendum itself. See id. ¶ 108. As the Court explained above, the Court concludes that the April 19, 2012, General Addendum contains a promise to complete renovations on the Property. The Court concludes that this representation is also sufficient to serve as the basis for an unlawful trade practices claims. With respect to the claim regarding the failure to disclose certain defects, the Court also concludes that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged details regarding the making of such a representation: Plaintiff alleges that it was made in Disclosure Statement itself. The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the Disclosure Statement may serve as the basis for an unfair trade practice claims. For all of these reasons, the unfair trade practices claim relating to the failure to disclose and the failure to complete the renovations survives Defendants’ motion to dismiss, but the Court otherwise dismisses the unfair trade practices claim.

Subsections (e) and (f) do not require intentional misrepresentation or that a consumer actually be misled, deceived, or damaged to allege an unfair or deceptive trade practice.

McFadden v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC · filed 2022-04-04(e) and (f)

And with regard to Mr. Cooper’s second objection, “intent or knowledge is not required” to plausibly allege a claim of misrepresentation under the DCCPPA. Frankeny, 225 A.3d at 1005. In addition, the statute does not require that any consumer be actually misled. Instead, the DCCPPA makes it illegal to “engage in an unfair or deceptive trade practice, whether or not any consumer is in fact misled, deceived, or damaged thereby.” D.C. Code § 28-3904. Therefore, Plaintiffs did not have to allege “how they would have acted differently if they knew Mr. Cooper received a profit.”

Section 28-3904 claims based on alleged deceptive misrepresentations and omissions may proceed past a motion to dismiss when the same objections raised against the related fraud claim fail.

Jacobson v. Hofgard · filed 2016-03-01

For the same reasons that the court rejected Defendants’ arguments for dismissal of Plaintiffs’ fraudulent misrepresentation claim, it rejects Defendants’ arguments for dismissal of Plaintiffs’ CPPA claim. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ CPPA claim therefore is denied.

Section 28-3904 does not support a consumer-protection claim based only on allegedly unclear insurance documents absent proof that the insurer intentionally misled the policyholder or misrepresented the nature of the policy.

Gebretsadike v. Travelers Home & Marine Insurance Co. · filed 2017-06-26

The district court correctly granted summary judgment for appellee on the claim that appellee violated the District of Columbia Consumer Protection Procedures Act, D.C. Code § 28-3904. The record indicates that appellee sent appellant copies of his policy documents on the date the policy was issued, and there is nothing in the record to indicate that those copies were incomplete, or that appellee was made aware of any deficiencies in the copies. Insofar as appellant alleges that the documents were not understandable, he has not demonstrated that appellee intentionally misled him or misrepresented the nature of his insurance policy. See D.C. Code § 28-3904. On the contrary, the record indicates that appellee engaged in expensive communications with appellant to ensure that appellant understood his policy.

Section 28-3904 does not require a plaintiff pleading that an antitrust violation is an unlawful trade practice under the DCCPPA to allege unconscionable conduct, although some enumerated unlawful trade practices may require it.

In re Packaged Seafood Products Antitrust Litigation · filed 2017-03-14

this position is also legally incorrect. ... "The DCCPPA prohibits 'unlawful trade practices,' and, although certain of the enumerated 'unlawful trade practices’ as defined by D.C. Code § 28-3904 may require the element of unconscionable conduct to be alleged, Defendants have not identified any authority that suggests that an allegation of ‘unconscionable conduct’ is required in order for a violation of the Antitrust Act to constitute an unlawful trade practice under the DCCPPA for pleading purposes."

Subsection (a) prohibits representing that goods or services have a source, sponsorship, approval, certification, or other characteristic they do not have, including a falsely implied licensing status.

Mann v. Capital Health Care Associates, Inc. · filed 2017-04-27(a)

The text of the generally applicable subsections of § 28-3904 outline numerous ways that a merchant might mislead a consumer. See, e.g., id. § 28-3904(a) (“misrepresent that goods or services have a source, sponsorship, approval, certification . . . that they do not have”), (e) (“misrepresent as to a material fact which has a tendency to mislead”). Nothing in that text indicates that a merchant’s misrepresentation of whether it complied with a licensing statute is exempt from these generally applicable descriptions of unlawful trade practices unless that licensing statute is also listed in subsections (y)–(gg).

Section 28-3904(a) reaches deceptive representations about a product’s effectiveness or benefits even when conveyed nonverbally: product placement and associated signage can constitute actionable representations or innuendo.

Center for Inquiry, Inc. v. Walmart, Inc. & Center for Inquiry, Inc. v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc. · filed 2022-09-29(a)

As to the Superior Court’s first rationale for dismissal — no actionable “representation” through product placement and associated signage — we hold as a matter of law that the placement of a product can be a representation within the meaning of the CPPA. ... We discern no reason why appellees’ placement of homeopathic products — like shelf placement, pictures, and logos — could not similarly convey information about effectiveness or equivalence. Accordingly, we conclude, product placement and associated signage can be actionable representations or innuendo.

The CPPA covers representations that services are of a particular quality or style when they are not, and material misrepresentations need not be intentional to support a claim at the motion-to-dismiss stage.

Qureshi v. American University · filed 2023-03-07(d), (e)

In any event, the Court need not opine on every possible one of Plaintiffs’ theories to resolve this motion. In light of the D.C. Circuit’s decision in this case, Plaintiffs have at least alleged that American represented that its educational services were of a particular standard, quality, or style “when in fact they were of another” or misrepresented “as to a material fact which has a tendency to mislead.” ... but a “plaintiff does not have to establish intentional misrepresentation in order to make out a claim” under the CPPA’s misrepresentation provisions. ... Plaintiffs have therefore alleged material misrepresentations sufficient to support at CPPA claim, at least at the motion to dismiss stage.

Subsections (e) and (f) prohibit a merchant from misrepresenting a material fact or failing to state one when the misrepresentation or omission tends to mislead a consumer, even if no consumer is actually misled or deceived.

Baylor v. Mitchell Rubenstein & Associat · filed 2017-05-30(e) and (f)

Second, it might be argued that Appellee is a merchant in its own right. Yet, it seems perverse to suggest that the “consumer” of the services it provides – debt collection – is the individual from whom it is attempting to collect rather than the creditor who retained it. The provisions of the CPPA cited in Appellant’s Complaint, D.C. CODE § 28-3904(e) and (f), appear to apply only when a consumer is, or could be, misled by a merchant’s actions. See id. (“It shall be a violation of this chapter, whether or not any consumer is in fact misled [or] deceived…for any person to…misrepresent as to a material fact which has a tendency to mislead” or “fail to state a material fact if such failure tends to mislead.”). The situation here does not fit within the statutory proscription. In light of the terms of the statute, we are constrained to hold that Appellee’s conduct falls outside the scope of the CPPA. Appellant’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. Because we find that Appellee’s actions did not take place within the context of a consumer-merchant relationship, as required by the CPPA, we need not address Appellant’s claim that debt collection is a “trade practice” as defined by this statute.

Section 28-3904(e) and (f) prohibit misrepresenting a material fact that tends to mislead or failing to state a material fact when the omission tends to mislead; materiality turns on whether a reasonable person would consider the fact important, or the speaker knows or should know the recipient likely would.

Smith v. Hi-Tech Pharmaceuticals, Inc. · filed 2022-06-23(e), (f)

For purposes of § 28-3904 (e) or (f), a misrepresentation or omission is ‘material’ if a reasonable person would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in determining his or her choice of action in the transaction or the maker of the representation knows or has reason to know that the recipient likely regards the matter as important in determining his or her choice of action.” ... Again, the state requirement effectively parallels the federal requirement that the label not be misleading in that it not misrepresent or omit a material fact. ... In sum, because Smith’s claims under the DC CPPA mirror the FDCA requirement that labels be truthful and not misleading, they escape express preemption.

Section 28-3904(a), (e), and (f) prohibit misleading representations about a service's characteristics or benefits, misrepresentations of material facts, and omissions of material facts when the representation, misrepresentation, or omission tends to mislead.

Jessica Velcoff, Ph.D. v. MedStar Health · filed 2018-06-21(a), (e), (f)

To the contrary, the complaint clearly and specifically identifies several trade practices that the complaint alleges are illegal, including failing to provide the promised benefit of confidentiality, misrepresenting the degree of confidentiality provided, and failing to state material facts about the lack of confidentiality. Although the complaint does not cite the specific subsections of the CPPA to which each specific allegation relates, matching allegations of the complaint to corresponding subsections of the CPPA is a straightforward task. ... We conclude that the complaint alleges violations of the CPPA with adequate specificity to survive a motion to dismiss.

Section 28-3904 prohibits unfair or deceptive trade practices, including misrepresenting a product’s characteristics or quality; a claim based on mislabeled olive oil requires facts plausibly linking the purchased bottle to the alleged deficiency.

Fahey v. Deoleo USA, Inc. · filed 2018-11-08(a), (b)

The District of Columbia Consumer Protection Procedures Act makes it unlawful “to engage in an unfair or deceptive trade practice, whether or not any consumer is in fact misled, deceived, or damaged thereby[.]” D.C. Code § 28-3904. Illustrative “unfair or deceptive” practices include “represent[ing] that goods or services have . . . characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities that they do not have” and “represent[ing] that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality, grade, style or model, if in fact they are of another.” Id. § 28-3904(a), (b). ... On Deoleo’s motion to dismiss, therefore, the question is whether Fahey has alleged facts that support an inference that the particular bottle of Bertolli EVOO he purchased in April 2018 contained something other than “extra virgin” olive oil. The Court concludes that he has not.

Section 28-3904(a) prohibits representing that goods have characteristics or benefits they do not have; the court allowed a claim based on allegedly misleading ethical and sustainable fur-sourcing representations to proceed, but dismissed claims based on accurate compliance and licensing statements.

Lee v. Canada Goose US, Inc. · filed 2021-06-29(a)

Subsection (a) makes it a violation to “represent that goods or services have a source, sponsorship, approval, certification, accessories, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities that they do not have.” D.C. Code § 28-3904(a). ... However, insofar as the claims are based on Canada Goose’s representation that it is committed to ethical and sustainable fur-sourcing, the claims may proceed.

Subsections (d)–(f) require a misrepresentation or material omission tending to mislead, and an ordinary breach of contract by itself is not actionable under the CPPA.

Kelleher v. Dream Catcher, L.L.C. · filed 2019-07-31(d)–(f)

With regard to the first category of allegations, Plaintiff has not identified any false or misleading statement made by De Armas or Schultz. ... Without such evidence, Plaintiff cannot prevail on that theory of violation. ... Plaintiff cites no authority for the proposition that run-of-mill breaches of contract are actionable under the CPPA. ... Here, Plaintiff presents proof of no more than an ordinary breach of contract after the contract’s formation. Such evidence cannot sustain a claim under the CPPA. ... Each requires either a misrepresentation or material omission by the defendant, as opposed to a mere payment by a plaintiff tied to a specified purpose that went unfulfilled.

Section 28-3904(b) prohibits a merchant from representing that it has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, certification, or connection that it does not actually have.

McMullen v. Synchrony Bank · filed 2020-04-24(b)

Section 28-3904(b), to begin, prohibits a merchant from representing that it “has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, certification, or connection” that it does not actually have. Yet, One World and Steward used Chase’s logo and marketing materials to mislead customers into believing that Defendants were approved partners of the bank in signing them up for the healthcare program.

As applied to pesticide labels, Section 28-3904 does not impose a broader or different obligation than FIFRA.

Beyond Pesticides v. Monsanto Co. · filed 2018-04-30

Against this backdrop, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs' claims are not preempted because the DCCPPA, as it relates to pesticide labels, does not impose a broader or different obligation than FIFRA.

Section 28-3904 regulates transactions between a consumer and a merchant.

Adler v. Vision Lab Telecommunications, Inc. · filed 2005-10-17

The DCCPPA regulates transactions between a consumer and a merchant. D.C.Code § 28-3904. ... Plaintiffs’ argument is misplaced. As long as an entity falls within the definition of a “merchant,” the “actual vendor”— whether it transmits its information through an “intermediary” or directly to the injured consumer — will remain liable for DCCPPA violations. Moreover, the issue is not whether defendants have had “the most direct contact” with plaintiffs ... but rather whether plaintiffs “purchase[d], lease[d] ... or receive[d] ... services” from defendants, D.C.Code § 28-3901(a)(2), which they have not.

Section 28-3904 permits an unlawful trade practice even when consumers are not actually misled, deceived, or damaged, but a plaintiff must establish damages caused by the practice to assert a claim.

Jones v. Nvr Incorporation · filed 2020-04-29(a)

The Court acknowledges that the DCCPPA can be violated “whether or not any consumer is in fact misled, deceived or damaged thereby.” D.C. Code § 28-3904. However, a Plaintiff must still establish damages as a result of the unlawful trade practice in order to assert a DCCPPA claim.

Section 28-3904 prohibits unfair or deceptive trade practices including misleading material misrepresentations or omissions, false claims about rights or obligations, unconscionable terms, sham offers, false price-reduction representations, harassment, and misrepresentations about services or compliance with prior representations, with intent required for some provisions but not others.

E.M. v. Shady Grove Reproductive Science Center P.C. · filed 2020-10-21(e), (f), (f-1), (e-1), (r), (h), (j), (m), (a), (u)

Subsection (e) of the CPPA establishes a violation for a person who “misrepresent[s] as to a material fact which has a tendency to mislead.” D.C. Code § 28-3904(e). Subsection (f) makes it illegal to “fail to state a material fact if such failure tends to mislead,” and subsection (f-1) makes it illegal to “use innuendo or ambiguity as to a material fact, which has a tendency to mislead.” D.C. Code § 28-3904(f), (f-1). A plaintiff does not have to establish intentional misrepresentation in order to make out a claim under these provisions. ... Subsection (r) of the CPPA makes it an unfair or deceptive trade practice to “make or enforce unconscionable terms.” D.C. Code § 28-3904(r). Unlike most of the CPPA this provision does require that the practice be intentional. ... Subsection (h) of the CPPA makes it a violation to “advertise or offer goods or services without the intent to sell them or without the intent to sell them as advertised or offered.” D.C. Code § 28-3904(h). ... Because SGF did not use the “household” definition used by the IRS, a reasonable juror could find that the earlier version of the website made a misrepresentation with reference to an available price reduction, which would have misled a reasonable consumer. However, a reasonable juror could also find that a reasonable consumer would not have read the original website text in the way E.M. suggests. So E.M. has not proven her case as a matter of law either, and this claim may proceed. ... This claim may proceed because, as the Court has explained, see supra n.21, a claim based on a misrepresentation concerning HIPAA compliance is viable. ... Last, E.M. brings a claim under subsection (u), which makes it a CPPA violation to “represent that the subject of a transaction has been supplied in accordance with a previous representation when it has not.” D.C. Code § 28-3904(u).

Section 28-3904 creates a cause of action for unfair or deceptive trade practices, including material misrepresentations tending to mislead, judged from the perspective of a reasonable consumer.

Qureshi v. American University · filed 2021-05-07

The CPPA creates a cause of action against any person who “engage[s] in an unfair or deceptive trade practice” and lists examples of such practices, including “misrepresent[ing] as to a material fact which has a tendency to mislead.” D.C. Code § 28-3904. ... The students fail to allege that American made any false or misleading representation or omission about what it would provide in exchange for tuition. ... Yet, as already discussed, American made no express or implied representation that it would provide uninterrupted in-person education regardless of the circumstances. On the contrary, a “reasonable consumer” of American’s services, Pearson, 961 A.2d at 1075, would have understood from the outset that the university would adapt its program over time as reasonably necessary, even if that meant suspending all in-person education in response to a public health emergency. The students therefore may not recover any part of their tuition under the CPPA.

Section (e-1) prohibits deceptive trade practices, including representing that a transaction confers or involves rights, remedies, or obligations it does not have or involve, or that are prohibited by law.

Sizer v. Velasquez · filed 2022-02-24(e-1)

This liability did not arise for landlords until the CPPA was amended by emergency legislation in December 2016, D.C. Act 21-576, which expressly authorized the Attorney General to apply to landlord-tenant relations “the provisions and exercise the duties of this section”—including D.C. Code § 28-3904 (e-1), which makes it a violation for “any person to engage in . . . [a] deceptive trade practice, whether or not any consumer is in fact misled, deceived, or damaged thereby, including to . . . [r]epresent that a transaction confers or involves rights, remedies, or obligations which it does not have or involve, or which are prohibited by law.”

Section 28-3904 prohibits unfair or deceptive trade practices, including material misrepresentations tending to mislead and violations of Title 16 of the District of Columbia Municipal Regulations.

Khalil v. El Rafaei · filed 2022-07-22(e), (dd)

The Court has already ruled that El Rafaei violated D.C. Municipal Regulation § 16-809 and that he made fraudulent misrepresentations of material fact when he did so (and reiterates those findings below with respect to the 523 AP). Accordingly, the Court finds that El Rafaei also violated DC Code § 28-3904. Of the possible remedies available under the statute, Khalil has requested treble damages, reasonable attorney fees and punitive damages. D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(2). Treble damages in lack of home improvement license cases in the District are measured by the Plaintiff’s actual damages, and not the disgorged amount. Djourabchi v. Self, 571 F. Supp. 2d 41, 53-54 (D.D.C. 2008). “‘[O]nce it is established that a consumer [has] suffered any damage, the CPPA authorizes [the] court to treble damages without further findings.’” District Cablevision Ltd. P'ship v. Bassin, 828 A.2d 714, 729 (D.C.2003) (quoting Williams v. First Gov't Mortgage & Investors Corp., 343 U.S.App. D.C. 222, 229, 225 F.3d 738, 745 (2000)).

Section 28-3904(f) requires a material omission that tends to mislead; an admitted omission does not resolve those predicates when their significance is disputed.

Williams v. Aviles · filed 2022-07-08(f)

And, although Defendant admits he did not disclose his unlicensed status in the District of Columbia, id. at 9 ¶ 26.A, a question of fact remains whether that omission is “material” and if the failure to disclose “tends to mislead.” D.C. Code § 28-3904(f); see also Am. Compl. ¶ 40 (citing § 28-3904(f)).

Section 28-3904(e) prohibits misrepresentation of a material fact that has a tendency to mislead, and a claimant must allege resulting damage from the unlawful trade practice.

Owens v. Bank of America, Na · filed 2018-09-14(e)

Even if the DCCPPA were to apply, see Ihebereme v. Capital One, N.A., 730 F. Supp. 2d 40, 51 (D.D.C. 2010) (noting that mortgagees’ practices are subject to the DCCPPA), plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege how any defendant violated the statute. If, for example, plaintiff intends to allege “misrepresent[ation] as to a material fact which has a tendency to mislead,” D.C. Code § 28-3904(e), as with the fraud claim, the complaint fails to allege a material misrepresentation or to “establish that she has suffered damage as a result of the unlawful ... trade practice.”

Under the pre-amendment Consumer Protection Procedures Act, a claim based on a material omission requires actual damages and causation; causation may be shown under a reasonable-person standard, and delayed receipt of money may constitute injury in fact if the defendant's practices caused the delay.

Wells v. Allstate Insurance · filed 2002-08-12

A valid claims for damages under the preamendment Consumer Protection Act “requires a showing that the consumer suffered actual damages because of the misrepresentation or omission claimed to violate the Act.” ... Causation, or proof that class members would not have purchased insurance coverage from Allstate had they but known of the defendant’s claims processing policies, is based on a reasonable person standard, not individual proof. ... Although no court has addressed this issue in the specific context of the Consumer Protection Act, a claim for misrepresentation through a material omission under the Act “requires the same burden of proof as does a common law claim for such misrepresentation.” ... The class will be able to demonstrate injury in fact, through the loss of the time value of their money, if it can be proven that Allstate’s claims processing in fact caused the settlement of claims of those policyholders represented by counsel to be delayed in comparison to Allstate’s settlement of comparable claims for its non-represented insureds.

Section 28-3904 permits plaintiffs to plead deceptive acts without alleging a separate heightened degree of unconscionability or egregious circumstances, and the alleged exercise of monopoly power sufficed to plead unconscionability at the motion-to-dismiss stage.

Sky Federal Credit Union v. Fair Isaac Corporation · filed 2023-09-28

Unconscionability. FICO argues that certain States10 require the Plaintiffs to allege a degree of unconscionability or egregious circumstances, which are absent in the Complaints. FICO Br. at 43. The Plaintiffs have the better argument again. The Plaintiffs may plead deceptive acts under the Arkansas and D.C. statutes. Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-107(a); D.C. Code § 28-3904. Moreover, the Plaintiffs do sufficiently plead unconscionability to pass these bars, given the exercise of monopoly power alleged here. DPCC ¶¶ 308, 310; IPAC ¶¶ 341(b), 343(f).

Section 28-3904 allows plaintiffs to plead deceptive acts without alleging unconscionability or egregious circumstances.

Daly v. Fitlife Brands, Inc. · filed 2023-09-29

Unconscionability. FICO argues that certain States10 require the Plaintiffs to allege a degree of unconscionability or egregious circumstances, which are absent in the Complaints. FICO Br. at 43. The Plaintiffs have the better argument again. The Plaintiffs may plead deceptive acts under the Arkansas and D.C. statutes. Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-107(a); D.C. Code § 28-3904. Moreover, the Plaintiffs do sufficiently plead unconscionability to pass these bars, given the exercise of monopoly power alleged here. DPCC ¶¶ 308, 310; IPAC ¶¶ 341(b), 343(f).

Section 28-3904(dd) makes it an unlawful trade practice to violate any provision of Title 16 of the District of Columbia Municipal Regulations, including the home-improvement licensing rule at issue here.

Shalom v. Smith and Smith · filed 2023-11-22(dd)

As it stands on appeal, the Smiths’ CPPA claim is predicated on a violation of 16 D.C.M.R. § 800.1, because D.C. Code § 28-3904(dd) prohibits violation of “any provision of title 16 of the District of Columbia Municipal Regulations.” ... We have thus stated that an action for disgorgement under Section 800.1 cannot lie against a party who has not personally accepted payment.

Section 28-3904 prohibits deceptive trade practices and, as applied here, does not support a claim where the advertised higher price clearly and unambiguously identifies a future renewal price rather than a false comparison price.

Hirlinger v. WP Company LLC · filed 2024-06-10(e), (f), (j), (l)

The District of Columbia Consumer Protection Procedures Act (“CPPA”) prohibits “unfair or deceptive trade practice[s], whether or not any consumer is in fact misled, deceived, or damaged thereby . . . [.]” D.C. Code § 28-3904. ... The Court finds that Plaintiffs fail to identify any misleading statement because TWP’s advertisement clearly and unambiguously refers to the future renewal price for the subscription, not a false comparison price. ... Plaintiffs point to no additional facts or grounds to find that their allegations state a claim for CPPA violations. Therefore, for the same reasons they fail to state a claim for violation of the FAL, UCL and CLRA violations, they also fail to state a claim of the CPPA. The Court accordingly DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ CPPA claim with leave to amend.

Section 28-3904 permits a claim that a mortgage servicer misleads borrowers by charging pay-to-pay fees far above processing costs without disclosing the resulting profit.

Hardnett v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. · filed 2025-09-10(e) and (f)

The homeowners have sufficiently alleged that Select Portfolio’s practice of charging pay-to-pay fees is unfair and deceptive. ... Instead, Select Portfolio misleads borrowers by charging a “fee” of up to $15 for the purpose of processing a payment when the cost of processing is, in fact, little to nothing—and there is no benefit to consumers in return, since Select Portfolio, like other loan servicers, could offer the option to pay by phone or online for convenience, free of charge.

Section 28-3904(e) prohibits material misrepresentations that tend to mislead, but general, immeasurable puffery and conclusory allegations do not state an actionable CPPA violation.

Hargrove v. Medstar Washington Hospital Center · filed 2024-06-28(e)

In assessing whether a plaintiff's allegations plausibly plead an unfair or deceptive trade practice through the use of material misrepresentations or omissions, a court must “consider an alleged unfair trade practice ‘in terms of how the practice would be viewed and understood by a reasonable consumer.’” ... For example, if “[a]ll statements that [plaintiff] points to as misleading are in fact either accurate, not misleading to a reasonable consumer, or mere puffery,” there is no actionable conduct under the CPPA. ... The fundamental flaw in Count IJ is that none of the alleged misrepresentations are actually statements of material fact or actionable representations regarding the quality of services to be provided. ... Further, plaintiff makes no attempt to explain how these statements are allegedly false, material, or have a tendency to mislead. Instead, the Amended Complaint simply lists the statements along with the conclusory allegation that the statements were misrepresentations regarding the quality of medical care that MedStar provides. ... “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

Section 28-3904(e) prohibits misrepresenting a material fact tending to mislead or omitting a material fact when the omission tends to mislead, even without actual deception; non-actionable puffery is insufficient.

Ternes v. C.R. Home Improvement, Inc. · filed 2025-03-24(e)

A defendant violates the DCCPPA3 when it “misrepresent[s] a material fact which has a tendency to mislead or fail[s] to state a material fact if such failure tends to mislead, whether or not a consumer is in fact misled, deceived or damaged thereby.” Athridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 351 F.3d 1166, 1175 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing D.C. Code §§ 28-3904(e)–(f)). Although the parties need not prove that they were “actually deceived by the practice,” they cannot prove a violation by “point[ing] to statements that are . . . mere puffery.” E.M. v. Shady Grove Reprod. Sci. Ctr. P.C., 496 F. Supp. 3d 338, 409 (D.D.C. 2020) (cleaned up). ... The Court is satisfied that the Plaintiffs have alleged enough facts on this claim.

Section 28-3904(e) requires proof that a material fact was misrepresented and that the misrepresentation tended to mislead.

Calvetti v. Antcliff · filed 2004-11-16(e)

To state a claim under subsections (e) and (f), the plaintiff must establish (1) the failure to disclose a material fact or the misrepresentation of a material fact (2) which would tend to mislead. D.C.Code § 28-3904(e)-(f).

Section 3904(e) prohibits a merchant from misrepresenting a material fact when the misrepresentation has a tendency to mislead.

Sloan ex rel. Juergens v. Urban Title Services, Inc. · filed 2010-02-12(e)

Section 3904(e) and (f) require that any misrepresentations or omissions are “material” in nature and have a tendency to mislead. See D.C.Code § 28-3904(e) (prohibits “misrepresenting] as to a material fact which has a tendency to mislead”) and (f) (prohibits the “fail[ure] to state a material fact if such failure tends to mislead”).

Sections (e) and (f) prohibit misrepresentations and omissions of material facts as unlawful trade practices, but the challenged foreclosure-notice and recordation defects were not material.

Rose v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2013-08-29(e) and (f)

Those provisions bar, respectively, misrepresentations and omissions of a “material fact.” ... Therefore, this use cannot be considered a “material” misrepresentation or omission. ... Similarly, Wells Fargo’s failure to record its interest did not affect its right to foreclose on the property, and so again we perceive no “material” omission or misrepresentation.

Section 28-3904(f) requires only that a seller fail to state a material fact when the failure tends to mislead, without requiring proof of knowledge or concealment, while subsection (x) reaches sales inconsistent with express or implied warranties and incorporates the limits on warranty disclaimers in D.C. Code § 28:2-316.01.

Scott v. Apple Inc. · filed 2024-11-06(f), (x)

Apple’s first contention fails as a matter of law: under the CPPA, Plaintiff is not required to plead that Apple knew about the alleged defect. ... The CPPA requires only that Apple “fail[ed] to state a material fact if such failure tends to mislead.” D.C. Code § 28-3904(f). ... Instead, he alleges that Apple violated a specific provision of the CPPA, § 28-3904(x), which addresses warranties, including “express warranties” as defined by D.C. Code § 28:2-313. ... But Apple’s disclaimer is at odds with D.C. Code § 28:2-316.01, which is incorporated by reference into D.C. Code § 28-3904(x).

Section 28-3904(b) prohibits unfair or deceptive trade practices that represent a person has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, certification, or connection that the person does not have.

Williams v. Aviles · filed 2025-02-26(b)

Under the CPPA, it is unlawful “for any person to engage in an unfair or deceptive trade practice” by, among other things, “represent[ing] that the person has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, certification, or connection that the person does not have.” D.C. Code § 28-3904(b). ... Based on Williams’s responses, the district court concluded that her “claimed violation of the CPPA rests on affirmative misrepresentations, not material omissions.” A.A. 28. That ruling was not an abuse of discretion. See GSS Grp. Ltd., 680 F.3d at 812.

Section 28-3904 prohibits unfair or deceptive trade practices, including misrepresenting a material fact or failing to state a material fact likely to mislead.

Jones v. Vintage Equity Group, LLC · filed 2025-07-28(e), (f)

The CPPA makes it unlawful “to engage in an unfair or deceptive trade practice, whether or not any consumer is in fact misled, deceived, or damaged thereby.” D.C. Code § 28-3904. The statute provides a non-exhaustive list of practices that would violate the statute, including misrepresenting a material fact or failing to state a material fact that has a tendency to mislead. Id. § 28-3904(e), (f).

Section 28-3904 prohibits unfair or deceptive trade practices involving false or misleading statements, representations, or other fraudulent conduct directed to consumers.

Pendleton v. Capitol One Financial Corporation · filed 2026-04-27(a)–(ii)

D.C. Code § 28-3904 prohibits “any person to engage in an unfair or deceptive trade practice” and then lists actions that qualify as such practices, which all involve false or misleading statements or representations, or otherwise fraudulent conduct, directed to consumers. See D.C. Code. §§ 28-3904(a)–(ii). Pendleton does not allege any facts suggesting that Capital One did anything that would qualify as an unfair or deceptive trade practice under this statute. She alleges, in essence, that the fees imposed on her were incorrect because she had in fact paid her bills on time—not that they were imposed deceptively or fraudulently. Thus, such a claim would not survive a motion to dismiss, and so the Court need not allow Pendleton a chance to amend her complaint again to add it.

Section 28-3904 prohibits unfair or deceptive trade practices even without actual consumer deception or damage; a CPPA claim is judged from the reasonable consumer's perspective, and the plaintiff need allege only a material fact tending to mislead, not intentional misrepresentation.

Rector v. Walmart Inc. · filed 2025-03-03

Under the DCCPPA, it is illegal “for any person to engage in an unfair or deceptive trade practice, whether or not any consumer is in fact misled, deceived, or damaged thereby.” D.C. Code § 28-3904. “A claim . . . under the CPPA is properly considered in terms of how the practice would be viewed and understood by a reasonable consumer.” ... A consumer bringing a claim under the CPPA “need not allege or prove intentional misrepresentation to prevail on a claimed violation,” but the consumer “must allege a material fact which has a tendency to mislead.”

Section 28-3904(dd) covers residential home-improvement contracts of at least $300 when the contractor requires or accepts advance payment before completing the work and is not properly licensed, and it can impose liability on the individual who engaged in the contracting and requested payment on behalf of the company.

Leake v. Alex General Construction, LLC · filed 2025-05-08(dd)

Such a claim lies if there was a home-improvement contract for a residential property for at least $300; if, “under the contract, defendants required or accepted payment in advance of the full completion of all work required to be performed under the contract”; and if the “defendants were not licensed in the District of Columbia as home improvement contractors.” Hume, 680 F. Supp. 2d at 50 (cleaned up); see D.C. Code § 28-3904(dd); 16 DCMR §§ 800.1, 899.1. ... This Court therefore sees nothing in Hume to suggest that Salguero is across-the-board not liable under the CPPA for his actions if they were on behalf of AGC or part of its business activities. ... As a result, contrary to what he appears to argue, see Mot. at 6, he can be liable for certain CPPA claims even if he only misrepresented AGC’s licensure as opposed to his own.

A § 28-3904(dd) claim based on Municipal Regulation § 16-800.1 requires a residential home improvement contract of at least $300, payment before the work is completed, and defendants who lack District home improvement contractor licenses.

Hume v. Watson · filed 2010-01-14(dd)

To successfully establish a claim for a violation of D.C. Code § 28-3904(dd) predicated on a violation of Municipal Regulation § 16-800.1, Hume must show: “(1) that a home improvement contract for a residential property existed . . . ; (2) the contract was for at least $300.00; (3) [under] the contract, defendant[s] required or accepted payment in advance of the full completion of all work required” to be performed under the contract; and (4) defendants were not licensed in the District of Columbia as home improvement contractors.

Subsection (h) prohibits advertising goods or services without intent to sell them as advertised; a claim requires proof that the goods or services were not sold as advertised and that the merchant knew of the discrepancy, but materiality is not an element.

Hettinger v. Bozzuto Management Company · filed 2025-07-21(h)

Hettinger’s Subcount O alleges that the drip-pricing scheme also violated § 28-3904(h), which prohibits merchants from “advertis[ing] . . . goods or services . . . without the intent to sell them as advertised.” To succeed on this claim, Plaintiff must show that her rental unit was not leased to her “as advertised” and that Bozzuto “was aware” of that discrepancy. Wetzel v. Cap. City Real Est., LLC, 73 A.3d 1000, 1005 (D.C. 2013) (first quotation marks omitted); see E.M. v. Shady Grove Reprod. Sci. Ctr. P.C., 496 F. Supp. 3d 338, 414 (D.D.C. 2020) (“intent element” is “necessary for a claim under subsection (h)”). Unlike the provisions just discussed, however, subsection (h) does not mention materiality. The Court therefore joins the (slim) weight of authority in holding that this provision — like others with a similar omission — does not have a materiality element.

Claims based on unintentional misrepresentations under § 28-3904(e) and (f) need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.

District of Columbia v. Facebook, Inc. · filed 2025-07-31(e) and (f)

And we conclude that CPPA claims based on unintentional misrepresentations need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence, as opposed to clear and convincing evidence.

Section 28-3904(a) bars representing that goods or services have characteristics, uses, or benefits they do not have, while subsection (e) bars misrepresenting a material fact that tends to mislead.

Galvin v. Ruppert Nurseries, Inc. · filed 2025-08-28(a), (e)

It is a violation of the CPPA for any person to engage in an “unfair or deceptive trade practice,” including representing that “goods or services have,” among other things, “characteristics,” “uses,” or “benefits” that they do not have. D.C. Code § 28-3904(a). ... Under the CPPA, people and businesses are prohibited from “misrepresent[ing]” any “material fact which has a tendency to mislead.” D.C. Code § 28-3904(e).

Section 28-3904(a) prohibits representing that goods or services have a source, sponsorship, approval, certification, or other listed characteristic or benefit that they do not have, and covers a claim that copied certification-program materials were presented without acknowledging the owner's ownership.

International Kitchen Exhaust Cleaning Ass'n v. Power Washers of North America · filed 2000-01-11(a)

The court assumes that Kitchen Exhaust seeks relief under District of Columbia law. D.C.Code § 28-3904(a) prohibits any person from “represent[ing] that goods or services have a source, sponsorship, approval, certification, accessories, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities that they do not have.” Kitchen Exhaust's claim that Power Washers plagiarized Kitchen Exhaust’s certification-program materials without acknowledging Kitchen Exhaust’s ownership fits here.

Section 28-3904 does not treat shelving menthol and nonmenthol cigarettes next to each other as a representation, on these allegations, absent additional facts such as signage or consistent placement.

Reeves v. 7-Eleven, Inc. · filed 2025-09-30

Under the CPPA, it is unlawful “for any person to engage in an unfair or deceptive trade practice,” including, as relevant here, “(a) represent[ing] that goods or services have . . . characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities that they do not have;” “(d) represent[ing] that goods . . . are of a particular standard, quality, grade, style, or model, if in fact they are of another;” “(e) misrepresent[ing] as to a material fact which has a tendency to mislead;” “(f) fail[ing] to state a material fact if such failure tends to mislead;” “(f-1) us[ing] innuendo or ambiguity as to a material fact, which has a tendency to mislead.” D.C. Code § 28-3904 (a), (d), (e), (f), (f-1). ... It is therefore not plausible to claim that the average customer would conclude that 7-Eleven is making a representation of any kind, let alone one as to the relative risks associated with consuming menthol and nonmenthol cigarettes merely by shelving the products next to one another. ... For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiffs fail to present a plausible claim that 7-Eleven makes a representation at all. Because the existence of a misrepresentation is an essential element a CCPA claim, this finding proves fatal. ... To be clear, the Court does not foreclose the possibility that the mere placement of two products next to one another (even without additional signage or other facts) might, under appropriate circumstances, lead to a misrepresentation that is actionable under the CPPA.

Section 28-3904(e) prohibits misrepresenting a material fact that has a tendency to mislead consumers.

Goddard v. City University of Seattle · filed 2026-03-06(e)

It prohibits individuals and businesses from “‘misrepresent[ing]’ any “material fact which has a tendency to mislead,’” id. at 4 (quoting D.C. Code § 28-3904(e)), as well as “fail[ing] to state a material fact if such failure tends to mislead,” D.C. Code. § 28-3904(f).

Section 28-3904 is violated when a merchant makes a material misrepresentation or fails to make a material disclosure, and conclusory allegations that do not plausibly identify either cannot sustain a CPPA claim.

Merchia v. Ttr Sotheby's International Realty · filed 2026-03-23(e), (f)

The CPPA is violated when a “merchant [has] made a material misrepresentation under § 28-3904(e), or failed to make a material disclosure under § 28-3904(f).” ... Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Sotheby’s misrepresented or omitted anything, much less something material.

Section 28-3904(e) and (f) allow a condominium owner or condominium owners’ association to prevail on a CPPA claim for a material misrepresentation or failure to disclose that tends to mislead without alleging or proving intentional conduct.

Fort Lincoln Civic Ass'n v. Fort Lincoln New Town Corp. · filed 2008-03-20(e) and (f)

By contrast, § 28-3904(e) and (f) describe simple “misrepresentation] as to a material fact which has a tendency to mislead” and “fail[ure] to state a material fact if such failure tends to mislead.” In light of the plain language of these sections, the ordinary meaning of the words used, and all of the foregoing considerations, we now hold that a condominium owner or condominium owners’ association need not allege or prove intentional misrepresentation or failure to disclose to prevail on a claimed violation of § 28-3904(e) or (f) of the CPPA.

Section 28-3904(e) bars misleading material misrepresentations and subsection (f) bars misleading omissions of material facts; neither requires willfulness, intent, or proof that a consumer was actually misled, and materiality is generally for the jury.

Lemus v. Grover Montano Corp. · filed 2026-03-31(e), (f)

Relevant here, subsection (e) prohibits a “misrepresent[ation] as to a material fact which has a tendency to mislead,” while subsection (f) prohibits a “fail[ure] to state a material fact if such failure tends to mislead.” D.C. Code § 28-3904(e), (f). Importantly, “[t]here is no requirement that the alleged misleading statement or omission be willful or intentional,” at least for purposes of these two statutory subsections. Earth Island, 321 A.3d at 664 (cleaned up). More, “there is no requirement that any consumer in fact be misled by the deceptive statements.” Id. ... The Court has little trouble concluding that this theory, if proven, could support a viable CPPA claim. After all, it is no stretch to say that most homeowners who hire a contractor to perform renovation work on their property would reasonably expect the contractor to adhere to the approved construction plans for the project. And to the extent a contractor deviates from the plans, at least in some meaningful and material way, most reasonable homeowners would surely expect the contractor to disclose the change(s) and secure approval first. So framed, a jury may well find that a reasonable consumer would consider Montano’s claimed omissions “important in determining a course of action” as to the renovation. Saucier, 64 A.3d at 445 (citation omitted). ... Summary judgment is not appropriate on the Section 28-3904(f) claim. ... Because the applicable codes required the work to be completed as specified by the approved plans, that suffices to allow the claim to proceed to a jury. ... Because Lemus raises triable issues of material fact as to the affirmative-misrepresentation version of his CPPA claim, summary judgment is inappropriate.

Section 28-3904's consumer-protection prohibitions apply to a consumer-credit transaction in which real estate is used as collateral for a personal debt-consolidation loan, and to a lender on the supply side of that transaction.

Lawson v. Nationwide Mortgage Corp. · filed 1986-02-18

The Owens court held that the Act is inapplicable to a sale of real estate. 432 A.2d at 739. Transaction # 2 patently did not involve a sale of real estate; rather, it involved use of real estate as collateral for a personal debt consolidation loan. The Act specifically encompasses such “consumer credit” transactions. See D.C.Code § 28-3901(a)(7). Moreover, the narrow holding of the Howard court was that the Act applies only to unfair trade practices committed by entities “connected with the ‘supply’ side of a consumer transaction.” 432 A.2d at 709. Family Federal obviously meets this requirement. Thus, there is no bar to application of the Act to this case.

Section 28-3904(g) prohibits disparaging another’s goods, services, or business through false or misleading representations, but the CPPA’s private cause of action is limited to consumer-merchant relationships and does not allow one merchant to sue another merchant.

Independent Communications Network, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp. · filed 1987-02-25(g)

One type of practice prohibited is to “disparage the goods, services or business of another by false or misleading representations of material fact.” D.C.Code § 28-3904(g). ... In short, the CPPA supplies consumers with a private cause of action against merchants. It is not intended to supply merchants with a private cause of action against other merchants.

Section 28-3904's consumer-protection remedies do not apply unless the plaintiff's claims arise from purchasing, leasing, or receiving consumer goods or services and involve a consumer-merchant relationship; submitting a research proposal or manuscript does not make the submitter a consumer.

Slaby v. Fairbridge · filed 1998-04-01

In this case, the plaintiff is not a consumer within the meaning of the § 28-3904 because her claims do not arise from the purchase, lease or receipt of consumer goods or services. The plaintiffs claim against NASA arises from its rejection of her funding proposal. The fact that the plaintiff submitted a research proposal to NASA does not make her a consumer within the meaning of the statute. With regard to defendant AAAS, she alleges that AAAS illicitly obtained her research and distributed that information to the public. Plaintiff, however, does not allege that she purchased, leased or received consumer goods or services from defendant AAAS, and therefore fails to establish any consumer-merchant relationship to bring it within the scope of the CCPA.

Section 28-3904's unfair-trade-practices protections do not extend to a taxicab operator's business-related purchases because he is not a statutory consumer.

Mazanderan v. Independent Taxi Owners' Ass'n · filed 1988-11-17

It is difficult to understand how plaintiff, as a taxicab operator, fits under this conventional definition of consumer. First, the contested purchases of gasoline and supplies are made in connection with his role as an independent businessman. Such purchases cannot be categorized as being for “personal, household, or family use.” Nor can one extend this definition to plaintiff through the clause “a person who does or would provide the economic demand for a trade practice.” A trade practice is defined as: ... any act which does or would create, alter, repair, furnish, make available, provide information about, or, directly or indirectly, solicit or offer for or effectuate, a sale, lease or transfer, of consumer goods or services. ... Plaintiff is not providing the economic demand for a trade practice, that is, the offering of consumer services — he is providing the service itself. Nor is he on the “demand” side of the ledger with respect to ITOA, despite his purchase of gasoline and his contributions to the organization for group services. There is simply no basis for treating plaintiff as a consumer under the District’s unfair trade practices statute.

Section 28-3904's list of unlawful consumer trade practices is not exclusive; the CPPA may enforce trade practices made unlawful by other District statutes.

Atwater v. District of Columbia Department of Consumer & Regulatory Affairs · filed 1989-10-24

Although § 28-3904 makes a host of consumer trade practices unlawful, its list of such practices was not designed to be exclusive. The remainder of the statute obviously contemplates that procedures and sanctions provided by the Act will be used to enforce trade practices made unlawful by other statutes. If the § 28-3904 listing were exclusive, the references in § 28-3905 to to other laws and to the common law would serve no purpose.

Section 28-3904(x) prohibits merchants from selling consumer goods in a condition or manner inconsistent with that warranted by operation of federal law, and treats an entity providing consumer credit and an assignee extending credit as a seller for this provision.

Jackson v. Culinary School of Washington · filed 1992-03-26(x)

Plaintiffs also assert that the failure to include the notice of defenses clause constitutes an unfair trade practice within the meaning of § 3904(x). ... This provision prohibits merchants from “sell[ing] consumer goods in a condition or manner not consistent with that warranted by operation ... of federal law.” D.C.Code § 28-3904(x). ... As the Chrysler First case made clear, an entity which provides consumer credit is a seller of goods and services. Moreover, a consumer can maintain a CPPA action against an assignee of the seller which was extending credit to the consumer. ... Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have stated a claim under this provision.

Section 28-3904 prohibits merchants from making material misrepresentations to consumers, and a claim must allege facts showing that the provision applies.

Busby v. Capital One, N.A. · filed 2013-03-25

Busby also alleges that Capital One violated the CPPA, which prohibits merchants from making material misrepresentations to consumers; however, as Judge Urbina held previously, and as this Court finds today, Busby has alleged no facts establishing that the CPPA applies to this case.

A claim under §§ 28-3904(n) and (x) must be identified with enough specificity in the pleadings or pretrial statement to give the defendant notice of the statutory theory, and the claim must actually be litigated.

Adams v. A.B. & A., Inc. · filed 1992-05-01(n) and (x)

Appellant never made specific reference in the pleadings or in the pretrial statement to § 28-3904(n) and (x), the statutory provisions on which the jury’s verdict was allegedly based. This scattershot approach at pretrial, where only one provision of a statute is specified and the rest of the statute in general is mentioned, without any focus on what the pleader expects the opponent to defend under the balance of the statute, will simply not do. A defendant is entitled to more notice than that.

Section 28-3904(r) prohibits making or enforcing unconscionable sales or lease terms, while § 28-3904(x) applies only to consumer goods, not services.

Jackson v. Culinary School of Washington · filed 1993-01-06(r), (x)

That provision makes unlawful any efforts to “make or enforce unconscionable terms or provisions of sales or leases.” ... As a result, the Plaintiffs’ claims under D.C.Code Ann. § 28-3904(r) must fail. ... Upon review, this Court finds that § 28-3904(x) does not apply to the instant case because it only covers sales of goods, and not services. ... Because § 28-3904(x) applies only to consumer goods and not services, Plaintiffs’ claims based on § 28-3904(x) must be dismissed.

Subsections (r) and (x) do not make an omitted federal holder notice an unconscionable term or apply the statute's consumer-goods provision to student-loan contracts for services.

Armstrong v. Accrediting Council for Continuing Education & TrainIng, Inc. · filed 1993-09-08(r), (x)

First, the court holds as a matter of law that the absence of the holder notice is not unconscionable. ... Thus, the court holds, as a matter of law, that the absence of the holder rule is not unreasonably favorable to any party, and therefore is not unconscionable. Plaintiff has no cause of action under § 28-3904(r). ... Second, Judge Richey decided in Jackson II that § 28-3904 does not apply to GSL contracts, which are used for “services,” not “goods” (as required by § 28-3904(x)). 811 F.Supp. at 724-25. The court finds Judge Richey’s argument persuasive, and adopts it here. Thus, plaintiff fails to state a cause of action under § 28-3904(x).

Section 28-3904 applies to nonlawyers who purport to practice law; it covers misrepresentations about legal-service status and quality, while subsections (e), (q), and (u) require the specific misrepresentation, contract-supply obligation, or prior-representation facts described in those provisions.

Banks v. District of Columbia Department of Consumer & Regulatory Affairs · filed 1993-12-06(a), (b), (d), (e), (q), and (u)

The performance of legal services, therefore, is a “trade practice” under the Act. ... We believe the agency acted entirely properly, therefore, in agreeing with this court that Banks’ mode of operation — including the terminology he used (e.g., “administrative advocate”) — misrepresented himself under the circumstances as the purveyor of “legal advice” that “had a sponsorship, approval, certification, characteristic, and were of a particular standard, or quality when it did not in violation of D.C.Code, sec. 28-3904(a), (b) and (d).” ... D.C.Code § 28-3904(e) prescribed a violation for a “misrepresent[ation] as to a material fact which has a tendency to mislead.” This provision appears to be forward looking: did a party make a material misrepresentation that tended to mislead someone thereafter? ... D.C.Code § 28-3904(u) is equally problematic: it presupposes a “represent[ation] that the subject of a transaction has been supplied in accordance with a previous representation when it has not.” ... Accordingly, we must conclude that DCRA’s ruling that Banks engaged in a deceptive trade practice in violation of § 28-3904(q) is not supported by substantial evidence.

At the time of these transactions, § 28-3904 did not apply to real estate transactions.

Family Federal Savings & Loan v. Davis (In Re Davis) · filed 1994-08-08

FranMe Davis alleges that Family Federal engaged in Unlawful Trade Practices as defined in D.C.Code § 28-3904 by accepting the $40,000 loan as successor in interest to Olsen and misrepresenting that the loan was a business loan, and by misrepresenting that the $13,601.61 Second Trust Loan was being used to satisfy a remaining debt to Family Federal as well as to pay additional interest charges associated with the closing on the National loan. However, at the time of the transactions in question, the Consumer Protection Procedures Act, Title 28 of the D.C.Code, did not apply to real estate transactions.

Section 28-3904(r) applies to real estate mortgage finance transactions.

Lillie May Deberry v. First Government Mortgage and Investors Corporation · filed 2000-08-01(r)

On December 30, 1999, the D.C. Court of Appeals answered the certified question, holding that section 28-3904(r) of the CPPA does apply to real estate mortgage finance transactions. ... Accordingly, De-Berry’s CPPA claims relating to loans made in 1991 and 1992 are reinstated and the district court’s grant of summary judgment to First Government on all of DeBer-ry’s other CPPA claims is reversed.

Section 28-3904 does not support a deceptive omission claim based on undisclosed calculation errors without facts showing the defendant knew of the errors when it considered the loan modification request.

In re Wells Fargo Mortgage Modification Litigation · filed 2025-11-18

Although plaintiffs argue the SAC "adequately alleges [Wells Fargo] knew of these calculation errors prior to denying [Forney's] modification requests" (see Pls.' Opp. at 26:14.5-15.5), the Court, for the reasons set forth above with respect to Count Two, finds plaintiffs have failed to allege facts to support a finding that Wells ... Fargo, at the time it considered Forney's loan modification request, knew of the error on ... which plaintiffs base their claims.

Subsections (e) and (f) require an unfair-trade-practice claim to allege a material misrepresentation or omission with a tendency to mislead a reasonable customer.

Alicke v. MCI Communications Corporation · filed 1997-04-29(e) and (f)

Similarly, to state a claim based upon an unfair trade practice, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant made a material misrepresentation or omission that has a tendency to mislead. D.C.Code § 28-3904(e) and (f). Alicke has failed to state a claim for any of these causes of action because there is nothing in the way MCI reports the length of long-distance phone calls that could mislead a reasonable customer into thinking that she received more service than she really did receive and thereby cause her either to use more of MCI’s service than she otherwise would have or to refrain from switching to another carrier that bills for service in smaller increments.

Section 28-3904 prohibits misrepresenting a material fact or failing to state a material fact when the conduct tends to mislead, without requiring that a consumer actually be misled, deceived, or damaged; claims under those provisions must be pleaded with fraud-like particularity but do not require intent.

Witherspoon v. Philip Morris Inc. · filed 1997-05-02(e), (f)

This claim is analogous to the fraud by nondisclosure claim. ... Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied and Plaintiff is given leave to amend the complaint to comply with the pleading requirements. Except for the element of intent, the deceptive trade practices claim should track the fraud by nondisclosure claim.

Section 28-3904(r) prohibits making or enforcing unconscionable terms or provisions, and a violation may be established by either the lender's knowledge that there was no reasonable probability of payment in full or its knowingly taking advantage of the borrower's inability to protect his interest.

Williams v. First Government Mortgage & Investors Corp. · filed 1997-07-17(r), (r)(1), (r)(5)

The statute makes it a violation of District of Columbia law to “make or enforce unconscionable terms or provisions of sales or leases----” D.C.Code § 28-3904(r). Because the term “unconscionable” is probably not in the lexicon of the ordinary lay juror, the elements of an unconscionable contract found in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C.Cir.1965)— absence of meaningful choice and terms unreasonably favorable to one party — were set forth in the jury instruction by way of a definition. The jury, however, carefully was not asked to decide if the contract was unconscionable. See Dawson v. Contractors Transport Corp., 467 F.2d 727, 730 (D.C.Cir.1972). Instead, the jury was asked to decide whether terms or provisions of the mortgage loan were unconscionable, and they were instructed to make their decision on the basis of the two factors set forth in D.C.Code §§ 28 — 3904(r)(l) and (5). Those factors— knowledge by the lender that there was no reasonable probability of payment in full, and knowingly taking advantage of a borrower’s inability to protect his interest — were the only two enumerated in the Act that fit the facts proven at trial.

A deceptive-trade-practices claim based on affirmative statements or intentional omissions of material facts is analogous to fraud by nondisclosure, but intent is not an element.

Smith v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. · filed 1998-05-19(e)

A claim pursuant to the District's trade practices statute relying on affirmative statements or intentional omissions of material facts "is analogous to [a] fraud by nondisclosure claim,” except that intent is not an element.

Section 28-3904(e) prohibits misrepresenting a material fact with a tendency to mislead, and an intentional-misrepresentation claim under the CPPA must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.

Osbourne v. Capital City Mortgage Corp. · filed 1999-04-01(e)

Misrepresenting a material fact is among those unfair trade practices explicitly prohibited by the act. D.C.Code § 28-3904(e). ... By application of these rules to the CPPA, we reach the conclusion that a claim for intentional misrepresentation under the Act requires the same burden of proof as does a common law claim for such misrepresentation — the clear and convincing standard. ... Accordingly, we conclude the clear and convincing evidence standard applies to claims of intentional misrepresentation under the CPPA.

Subsection (r)(3) treats a gross disparity between a price and the value measured by readily obtainable prices for similar property or services as a factor in determining whether a sales or lease term is unconscionable.

Lund v. Watergate Investors Ltd. Partnership · filed 1999-04-08(r)(3)

The motions court did not explicitly consider § 28-3904(r)(3) which lists as one factor to be considered in applying subsection (r), the “gross disparity between the price of the property or services sold or leased and the value of the property and services measured by the price at which similar property or services are readily obtainable.” However, in reaching its conclusions the motions court implicitly addressed § 28-3904(r)(3). ... Moreover, because of restrictions placed on appellants by court order, see supra, note 11, there is no credible evidence in the record that reflects any gross disparity within the meaning of § 28-3904(r)(3), that is, “between the price of the property or services sold or leased and the value of the property and services measured by the price at which similar property or services are readily obtainable in transactions by like buyers or lessees.” Thus, we affirm the court’s judgment as to the consumer protection unlawful trade practices’ issue.

The DCCPPA can apply to a loan transaction involving a District of Columbia consumer even when the transaction took place in Maryland.

Wiggins v. Avco Financial Services · filed 1999-08-05

Defendant argues as a preliminary matter that the DCCPPA does not apply to the disputed transaction because the transaction took place in Maryland, rather than the District of Columbia. Our Court of Appeals rejected exactly that argument in Williams v. First Gov’t Mortgage and Investors Corp., 176 F.3d 497, 1999 WL 162596 (D.C.Cir.1999). Although the Court of Appeals approached the question from a diversity jurisdiction/choice of law approach, the reasoning from Williams nevertheless applies to this action, which was removed on federal jurisdiction grounds from the Superior Court for the District of Columbia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441.

Section 28-3904(r) applies to real estate mortgage finance transactions, including extensions of consumer credit secured by a home mortgage.

DeBerry v. First Government Mortgage & Investors Corp. · filed 1999-12-30(r)

We therefore hold that D.C.Code § 28-3904(r) applies to real estate mortgage finance transactions.

Under §§ 28-3904(e) and (f), a claimant must prove that the allegedly deceptive trade practice caused the claimant’s injuries; causation may be shown through reliance or another causal connection.

Smith v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. · filed 2000-07-19(e), (f)

Thus, Mrs. Smith must show that defendants’ allegedly deceptive trade practices caused her injuries, whether by virtue of her reliance on those practices or by virtue of some other reason.

Section 28-3904(d)–(f) prohibits false descriptions of a service and materially misleading statements or omissions; an accurately disclosed overdraft fee method does not support such a claim.

Chambers v. Nasa Federal Credit Union · filed 2016-10-21(d), (e), (f)

D.C.’s consumer protection law prohibits similar classes of false statements. See D.C. Code § 28-3904(d) (making it unlawful to represent that a service is of one model when it is of another); id. § 28-3904(e) (making it unlawful to misrepresent a material fact which has a tendency to mislead); id. § 28-3904(f) (making it unlawful to fail to state a material fact if such failure tends to mislead). ... In the absence of any misrepresentation, Chambers’ claims under the D.C. and Maryland Consumer Protection Acts must be dismissed.

The CPPA does not cover a physician's unintentional misrepresentation when it concerns the actual practice of medicine rather than the entrepreneurial aspect of the practice.

Dorn v. McTigue · filed 2000-09-28(e), (d), and (1)

Applying this analytical framework, the court determines that based on the facts in this case, the plaintiffs unintentional-misrepresentation claim falls outside the scope of the CPPA as it applies to the physician-patient relationship. The court reaches this conclusion based on the test outlined in its July 26, 1999 Memorandum Opinion. In that opinion, this court adopted the Gadson court’s holding which underscored the importance of preventing overlap between medical-malpractice claims and consumer-protection claims. “The distinction between the business aspects of medicine or the ‘actual practice of medicine’ or the non-business aspects of medicine is crucial.” Gadson, 807 F.Supp. at 1416. Therefore, even assuming arguendo that the plaintiff could prove that the defendant made an unintentional misrepresentation regarding the plaintiffs surgery, such a misrepresentation merely amounts to the actual practice of medicine. Such an unintentional misrepresentation would speak not to the entrepreneurial aspect of the defendant’s practice, but instead to his skill and competence as a doctor. Any resulting injury would be properly remedied by a medical-malpractice claim, not a CPPA claim.

Section 28-3904 misrepresentation claims against medical service providers do not require proof of intent, an entrepreneurial motive, or an entrepreneurial nexus.

Frankeny v. District Hospital Partners, LP · filed 2020-02-27(a), (d)-(f)

We expressly hold that there is not a different burden of proof for “general” ... CPPA claims and those against medical service providers, and a consumer is not required to proffer evidence of an “entrepreneurial motive” or an “entrepreneurial nexus” for the latter. Moreover, our cases have rejected the need for a consumer to prove a showing of “motive” or intent in connection with CPPA misrepresentation claims under D.C. Code § 28-3904(a) & (d)-(f), and we now reach the same conclusion as to CPPA claims against medical service providers.

Section 28-3904's list of unlawful trade practices is nonexclusive; the CPPA also reaches trade practices that violate other laws, including the common law.

District Cablevision Limited Partnership v. Bassin · filed 2003-07-17

While the CPPA enumerates a number of specific unlawful trade practices, see D.C.Code § 28-3904, the enumeration is not exclusive.

Section 28-3904(f) makes it unlawful in a commercial transaction to fail to state a material fact when the omission tends to mislead.

Washkoviak v. Student Loan Marketing Ass'n · filed 2004-05-06(f)

In complaining of the alleged non-disclosure by Sallie Mae of material information regarding the accrual and collection of late charges, the plaintiffs relied on § 28-3904(f). This provision makes it unlawful in commercial transactions for any person to “fail to state a material fact if such failure tends to mislead.” Section 28-3904(f) is obviously a disclosure statute, and for the reasons stated by the trial judge, the plaintiffs’ claim pursuant to that provision is expressly preempted by 20 U.S.C. § 1099.

The CPPA covers the performance of medical services as a trade practice, so it can apply to medical professionals; however, the billing notations at issue were not material misrepresentations tending to mislead.

Caulfield v. Stark · filed 2006-03-09(e)

Having ruled as we did in Banks with respect to legal services, we can discern no reason why the performance of medical services should not be a “trade practice” as well under the CPPA.

Section 28-3904 does not impose liability under the CPPA on a person who merely recommends another provider’s goods or services when that person is not a merchant or goods supplier covered by the statute.

Carleton v. Winter · filed 2006-06-15

Our decision in Howard v. Riggs Nat'l Bank also disposes of appellants’ contention that Winter’s recommendation of Phillips to appellants violated CPPA § 28-3904(a) — (f). ... This court concluded that the CPPA was intended to regulate the conduct of merchants or goods suppliers, and the bank did not fall into either category. ... Thus, Winter’s recommendation of Phillips because he had done good work for her in the past places neither her nor her employer within the ambit of the CPPA, and therefore the trial court’s conclusion that the CPPA did not apply to the facts and circumstances of this case was correct.

Section 28-3904(h) prohibits advertising or offering services without intending to sell them as advertised, even without a formal contract or payment.

Byrd v. Jackson · filed 2006-07-06(h)

If, for example, Byrd falsely “advertise[d] or offer[ed]” his services to Smith as a foreclosure-avoidance specialist “without the intent to sell them ... as advertised or offered,” D.C.Code § 28-3904(h), he violated the Act whether or not he entered a formal contractual relationship with her or received money for the services.

Section 28-3904 prohibits deceptive trade practices against consumers, but a CPPA claim requires a consumer-merchant relationship.

Busby v. Capital One, N.A. · filed 2011-03-28

The CPPA prohibits a wide variety of deceptive trade practices perpetrated against consumers. D.C.Code § 28-3904. The practices prohibited by the statute include misrepresenting the existence of a sponsorship or affiliation, misrepresenting a material fact which has the tendency to mislead and failing to state a material fact which has the tendency to mislead. ... [17] Despite its broad reach, the CPPA applies only to consumer-merchant relationships. ... Here, the amended complaint contains no factual allegations whatsoever indicating the existence of a consumer-merchant relationship between the plaintiff and either defendant. ... Although the plaintiff notes that the CPPA applies to lenders in residential mortgage transactions, ... as previously discussed, the plaintiff has alleged here that Capital One was not the lender and that its role in the lender-borrower relationship was limited to serving as the loan servicer, at best, ... Accordingly, the court dismisses the plaintiffs CPPA claim against both defendants.

Section 28-3904(r) applies to real-estate mortgage-finance transactions treated as sales of mortgage-financing services, supports an affirmative unconscionability action for available relief, and was adequately pleaded here.

Johnson v. LONG BEACH MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2001-4 · filed 2006-08-04(r)

First, in DeBerry v. First Gov’t Mortg. & Investors Corp., 743 A.2d 699, 703 (D.C.1999), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals expressly held that D.C.Code § 28-3904(r) applies to real estate mortgage finance transactions. Though mortgage finance transactions are not obviously “sales or leases,” the court found them “sales” of mortgage financing services for purposes of the D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act. Thus, D.C.Code § 28-3904(r) applies to the transaction at issue in this case. ... Second, D.C.Code § 28-3905(k)(1) authorizes “a person” to “bring an action under this chapter in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, seeking relief from the use by any person of a trade practice in violation of a law of the District of Columbia and may recover or obtain the following remedies ...” D.C.Code § 28-3905(k)(1) (2001). Remedies include treble damages, reasonable attorney’s fees, punitive damages, an injunction, and “any other relief which the court deems proper.” ... Thus, Plaintiff can bring an affirmative action in this Court asserting unconscionability under D.C.Code § 28-3904(r) and § 28-3905(k). ... Third, § 28-3904(r) states “in applying this subsection, consideration shall be given to ... (1) knowledge by the person at the time credit sales are consummated that there was no reasonable probability of payment in full of the obligation by the consumer; ... (5) that the person has knowingly taken advantage of the inability of the consumer to reasonably protect his interests by reasons of age.... ” D.C.Code § 28-3904(r) (2001). Plaintiff alleges, among other things, that “[a]fter closing on Loan II, Ms. Johnson had to pay over half of her monthly income to mortgage costs” and that in making the loans “Defendants took unfair advantage of Ms. Johnson’s age, limited education, limited ability to comprehend the nature of the loans, limited economic resources and lack of business sophistication.... ” Compl. ¶¶ 30, 51. Plaintiff has therefore adequately alleged a claim under § 28-3904(r). Plaintiffs unconscionability claim under § 28-3904(r) shall not be dismissed on the above grounds.

Section 28-3904(r) treats a price as unconscionably high when it is unreasonably favorable to the seller; under subsection (r)(3), the relevant price comparison for uniform fees is the seller’s average cost and comparable prices for similar services, not the fluctuating cost of each individual transaction.

Ford v. ChartOne, Inc. · filed 2006-09-28(r)(3)

Generally speaking, in order to show that a price was unconscionably high, the buyer must establish that the price was “unreasonably favorable” to the seller (and also, almost always, that the buyer did not have a meaningful choice of alternatives under the circumstances). ... For the purpose of determining whether a price is unreasonably favorable to the seller, the CPPA states that a factor to consider is whether there was a “gross disparity between the price of the property or services sold or leased and the value of the property or services measured by the price at which similar property or services are readily obtainable in transactions by like buyers or lessees[J” D.C.Code § 28-3904(r)(3); ... The question of whether a uniform price is unreasonably favorable to the seller, i.e., enables the seller to reap an exorbitant, non-competitive return, therefore cannot be answered one transaction at a time by comparing the uniform fees charged in each transaction with the actual, fluctuating costs allocable to that transaction. As to any given transaction, that is not an informative comparison. This is not to say that ChartOne’s costs of servicing records requestors are irrelevant. It is to say that in evaluating the reasonableness of the company’s uniform clerical, copying, and shipping fees in relation to its costs, the relevant comparison is to the company’s average costs.

Section 28-3904(e) may apply to claims involving non-District consumers, merchants, and transactions when the District of Columbia has the greater governmental interest in applying its consumer-protection law.

Shaw v. Marriott International, Inc. · filed 2007-02-22(e)

Marriott contends that the CPPA is not intended to have extraterritorial reach except in exceptional circumstances. However, courts in the District of Columbia have already concluded that its policies are advanced by application of the CPPA to cases involving non-District of Columbia consumers, merchants, and transactions. ... The District of Columbia has an even greater interest in applying its law to this case than it did in Washkoviak, where no plaintiffs had connections with this jurisdiction. For all these reasons, the Court concludes that at this stage in the proceedings Plaintiff has alleged a claim under the CPPA. Accordingly, Marriott’s motion to dismiss the CPPA claim (Count II) is denied.

Section 28-3904 does not eliminate the requirement that a DCCPPA plaintiff show an actual or threatened injury-in-fact to establish standing.

Hoyte v. Yum! Brands, Inc. · filed 2007-05-02

While the preceding language and the statute’s introduction — “[i]t shall be a violation of this chapter, whether or not any consumer is in fact misled, deceived, or damaged thereby,” D.C.Code § 28-3904 — might suggest that a plaintiff could pursue a claim under DCCPPA without an actual or threatened injury, the cases hold otherwise. ... Since plaintiff must present an actual or threatened injury-in-fact to have standing to raise his DCCPPA claims, the analysis of Count II will resemble that of Count I.

Section 28-3904(dd) makes violating any provision of Title 16 of the D.C. Municipal Regulations a violation of the DCCPPA, so a claim under this subsection requires an underlying Title 16 violation.

Chamberlain v. American Honda Finance Corp. · filed 2007-08-02(dd)

Finally, appellants claimed that the violations of §§ 341.5 and 342.2 constituted unfair and deceptive trade practices which violated the DCCPPA. ... For all these reasons, we agree that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. It does not plead (either directly or inferentially) that AHFC is a “holder” and thus fails to state a violation of § 341.5 or § 342.2. Because appellants failed to plead any violation of these regulations, they also failed to state a claim for violation of the DCCPPA.

Section 28-3904(dd) makes violating any Title 16 D.C. Municipal Regulation a violation of the Act regardless of consumer deception or damage, and § 28-3904(k)(l) permits treble damages and other listed remedies, with trebling based on proven actual damages.

Djourabchi v. Self · filed 2008-07-23(dd), (k)(l)

The D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act provides that “[i]t shall be a violation of this chapter, whether or not any consumer is in fact misled, deceived or damaged thereby, for any person to: ... (dd) violate any provision of title 16 of the District of Columbia Municipal Regulations.” D.C.Code § 28-3904(dd) (2008) (emphasis added). ... According to the District of Columbia Code, plaintiffs may request the following remedies: treble damages; reasonable attorney fees; punitive damages; an injunction against the use of the unlawful trade practice; any other relief which the court deems proper. ... The Court agrees with plaintiffs, that they have a right to trebled damages, but disagrees with their calculations. ... In effect, the District of Columbia Consumer Protection Act, “entitles the plaintiffs to three times the actual damages they suffered from [the defendant’s] wrongful conduct.”

Section 28-3904(a) reaches knowing and deliberate misrepresentations; § 28-3904(r)(1) requires actual knowledge that full repayment was unlikely; and § 28-3904(r)(5) requires knowingly taking advantage of a consumer's inability to protect the consumer's interests.

Dawson v. Thomas (In Re Dawson) · filed 2008-04-09(a), (r)(1), (r)(5)

Dawson has not shown that the defendants violated § 28-3904(a) by representing that the transaction had characteristics that it did not have. Section 28-3904(a) contemplates a knowing and deliberate misrepresentation of goods and services, and although the defendants failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain the true purpose of the loan and to verify the nature of the property securing the loan, willful blindness is not the same as actual knowledge, and it has not been established that the defendants actually knew that the product they were offering was required to be treated as a consumer rather than as a commercial credit transaction. Absent a showing that the defendants actually knew that the loan was required to be processed as a consumer credit transaction, they cannot be held liable under section 28-3904(a). ... Failure to verify Dawson’s repayment ability, however, is not the same as actually knowing “that there was no reasonable probability of payment in full of the obligation by the consumer.” As with § 3904(a), section 3904(r)(l) contemplates actual knowledge on the part of the offending party, and while other statutes such as TILA impose liability upon lenders who willfully turn a blind eye to pertinent facts such as a borrower’s ability to repay the obligation, a finding of liability under the D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act requires something more. ... Section 28-3904(r)(5) further provides that, in applying this subsection, consideration shall also be given to a person having “knowingly taken advantage of the inability of the consumer reasonably to protect his interests by reason of age, physical or mental infirmities, ignorance, illiteracy, or inability to understand the language of the agreement, or similar factors.” ... Accordingly, the court finds that Dawson failed to demonstrate that the defendants violated § 28-3904(r) by taking advantage of her inability to protect her interests due to her lack of sophistication.

Section 28-3904's list of unlawful trade practices is nonexclusive, so the DCCPPA can cover alleged price-fixing even when the conduct is not specifically listed.

In Re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litigation · filed 2008-08-25

“While the CPPA enumerates a number of specific unlawful trade practices, see D.C.Code § 28-3904, the enumeration is not exclusive.” ... “In light of this case law expansively interpreting the DCCPPA as a “comprehensive” statute designed to remedy “all improper trade practices,” the Court finds that plaintiffs may maintain a claim for defendant’s alleged price-fixing under the statute, and accordingly, DENIES defendants’ motion.”

Section 28-3904(a) does not make a “Satisfaction Guaranteed” sign deceptive when a reasonable consumer would understand it as a promise to remedy problems reasonably and compensate for the value of damaged clothing.

Pearson v. Chung · filed 2008-12-18(a)

Thus, the trial court, showing basic common sense, rejected this unlimited view of a “Satisfaction Guaranteed” sign, relying instead upon case law generally supporting the position that, as with a common law fraud claim, a claim of an unfair trade practice is properly considered in terms of how the practice would be viewed and understood by a reasonable consumer. ... Because we agree with the trial court that Pearson’s expansive interpretation of “Satisfaction Guaranteed” is not supported by law or reason, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that Pearson failed to establish that the Chungs’ “Satisfaction Guaranteed” sign constituted common law fraud or violated the CPPA.

Section 28-3904 reaches trade practices beyond deceptive conduct, including practices violating other laws, and allows indirect-purchaser claims for conspiratorial price fixing without proof of deception.

In Re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litigation · filed 2009-03-04

The Act’s prohibitions are not exclusive, however, and the DCCPPA does not require a showing of concealment or deception to support a claim. ... “Trade practices that violate other laws, including the common law, also fall within the purview of the [DCCPPA].” ... Hence, the DCCPPA subsumes a Sherman Act claim and creates an indirect purchaser cause of action for conspiratorial price fixing regardless of whether defendants have engaged in deceptive conduct.

A D.C. Code § 28-3904 consumer-protection claim based on allegedly unconscionable mortgage repayment terms accrues when the resulting foreclosure proceedings begin and is time-barred if filed more than three years later.

Koker v. Aurora Loan Servicing, LLC · filed 2013-01-03

1. Count I of the Complaint (Violation of D.C.Code § 28-3904 Against Aurora) ... Thus, in Murray, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the claims of home mortgagors under the D.C. Consumer Protection Act relating to a foreclosure sale accrued when “the trustees instituted foreclosure proceedings,” because that marked the point when the claim “could have been brought.” ... Because the plaintiffs purported injury is based on the foreclosure of the Property, see id. ¶¶ 23-24, her claim accrued, as in Murray, at the time Aurora initiated foreclosure proceedings on February 13, 2009, id. ¶ 18, because that is when the claim “could have been brought.” The plaintiff filed this action on March 21, 2012, more than three years after her claim accrued on February 13, 2009. The claim is therefore conclusively time-barred as discerned from the face of the complaint. See Firestone, 76 F.3d at 1209.

Section 28-3904's listed unfair-trade-practice examples do not naturally encompass failures to comply with the Rental Housing Conversion and Sale Act, and its cross-reference provisions omit that Act.

Gomez v. Independence Management of Delaware, Inc. · filed 2009-03-26

We find no evidence in the plain language of the CPPA that the legislature intended it to apply in these circumstances. Allegations that the defendants failed to comply with the Sale Act do not fit naturally within the thirty-some detailed examples of unfair trade practices set forth in D.C.Code § 28-3904 (2001). Tellingly, some portions of § 3904 make it a violation of the CPPA for any person to “violate any provision” of several other statutes, but these subsections conspicuously fail to mention the Sale Act at all.

Sections 28-3904(e) and (f) support CPPA claims for false or misleading statements or material omissions about cell phones without requiring proof that the phones caused bodily injury or were unreasonably dangerous.

Murray v. Motorola, Inc. · filed 2009-12-10(e) and (f)

The unlawful trade practices described in the CPPA, see D.C.Code § 28-3904, entitle an aggrieved person to sue for relief (under D.C.Code § 28-3905(k)(1)) “whether or not [plaintiffs were] ... damaged thereby.” D.C.Code § 28-3904. Under section 28-3905(k)(1)(A)(F), a successful CPPA plaintiff may recover statutory damages of $1,500 per violation (or, if greater, trebled actual damages) as well as punitive damages and other relief. Thus, in advancing CPPA claims, plaintiffs — who allege that they were “deceived” — do not necessarily seek to hold defendants liable solely for bodily injuries plaintiffs (allegedly) sustained from use of cell phones with allegedly dangerous RF radiation levels. Rather, defendants could be held liable for providing plaintiffs with false and misleading information about their cell phones, or for omitting to disclose material information about the phones, without plaintiffs having to prove that cell phones emit unreasonably dangerous levels of radiation.

Section 28-3904 prohibits misleading representations or omissions about goods or services, judged from the perspective of a reasonable consumer.

Whiting v. AARP · filed 2010-03-28(a), (d), (e), and (f)

The District of Columbia’s CPPA makes it a violation to: (a) represent that goods or services have a source, sponsorship, approval, certification, accessories, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities that they do not have; (d) represent that goods or services are of particular standard, quality, grade, style, or model, if in fact they are .of another; (e) misrepresent as to a material fact which has a tendency to mislead; (f) fail to state a material fact if such failure tends to mislead.... D.C.Code § 28-3904. “[A] claim of an unfair trade practice [under the CPPA] is properly considered in terms of how the practice would be viewed and understood by a reasonable consumer.”

Section 28-3904(r)'s listed circumstances are disjunctive, non-exhaustive factors for determining unconscionability rather than independent claims, while § 28-3904(e) prohibits material misrepresentations tending to mislead.

Hughes v. Abell · filed 2010-11-16(r), (r)(1), (r)(2), (r)(5), (e)

Because section 28-3904(r)(2) is merely a factor for the Court to consider in addressing whether there was an unconscionable practice, rather than an independent basis for recovery, the Court need not determine whether Hughes has sufficiently pled that Wells Fargo provided no “substantial benefit.” ... But again, this is only a factor is addressing unconscionability, not an independent claim. ... The five factors by which the CPPA defines unconscionability are disjunctive and non-exhaustive. At a minimum, Hughes sufficiently alleges that, under the first factor, “there was no reasonable probability of payment in full.” Therefore, the Court will allow Hughes’s unconscionability claim to proceed. ... Under the liberal pleading standard of the Federal Rules, Hughes has also stated a CPPA claim for misrepresentation under D.C.Code § 28-3904(e).

Sections 28-3904(a), (e), (f), (h), and (r) prohibit specified misleading representations, material omissions, deceptive offers, and unconscionable sales terms; §§ (e) and (f) do not require intentionality, but a claimant must plead a material fact that tends to mislead.

Grayson v. AT & T CORP. · filed 2011-01-20(a), (e), (f), (h), (r)(2), (r)(5)

We have said with respect to §§ 28-3904(e) and (f) that a person bringing suit under these sections “need not allege or prove intentional misrepresentation or failure to disclose to prevail on a claimed violation....” Fort Lincoln Civic Ass’n, Inc v. Fort Lincoln New Town Corp.102 We explained that “§ 28-3904(e) and (f) describe simple misrepresent[ation] as to a material fact which has a tendency to mislead and fail[ure] to state a material fact if such failure tends to mislead.”103 Even though Mr. Grayson does not have to allege that a misrepresentation or failure to disclose is intentional, to survive the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss his subsections (e) and (f) claims, he must allege a material fact that tends to mislead.

Section 28-3904(r) bars making or enforcing unconscionable sales terms and directs courts to consider knowledge of inability to pay and inability to receive substantial benefits; § 28-3904(e) bars material misrepresentations tending to mislead.

Solomon v. Falcone · filed 2011-06-15(r), (e)

Under the CPPA, it is an unlawful trade practice to “make or enforce unconscionable terms or provisions of sales or leases.... ” D.C.Code § 28-3904(r). In applying this provision, the statute instructs courts to consider “(1) knowledge by the person at the time credit sales are consummated that there was no reasonable probability of payment in full of the obligation by the consumer” and “(2) knowledge by the person at the time of the sale or lease of the inability of the consumer to receive substantial benefits.... ” Id. Similarly, unfair trade practices include “misrepresenting] as to a material fact which has a tendency to mislead,” D.C.Code § 28-3904(e), or “failing] to state a material fact if such failure tends to mislead,” D.C.Code § 28-8904(f).

Subsections (e) and (f) do not require intent; subsection (e) requires a misrepresentation, while subsection (f) requires a material omitted fact tending to mislead but does not require a duty to disclose.

Saucier v. Countrywide Home Loans · filed 2013-04-18(e) and (f)

Thus, a plaintiff “need not allege or prove intentional misrepresentation or [intentional] failure to disclose to prevail on a claimed violation of § 28-3904(e) or (f) of the CPPA.” ... However, under § 28-3904(e), a plaintiff must establish that a defendant made a misrepresentation, and under § 28-3904(f), that a defendant failed to make a required disclosure. ... Based on our understanding of the Council’s intent, and on our review of consumer protection cases in other jurisdictions, we hold that D.C.Code § 28-3904(f) does not require a plaintiff to plead and to prove a duty to disclose information.

Section 28-3904 applies to a homeowner’s foreclosure-rescue transaction when she seeks services to preserve ownership of her home for personal purposes, even if she also rents part of the property and has a financial motive.

MODERN MANAGEMENT CO. v. Wilson · filed 2010-06-03(e) and (r)

Therefore, the purpose of the transaction was personal to Wilson; she contracted with the appellants not as a landlord in order to gain profit, but as a consumer seeking to “receive” their services as self-proclaimed “foreclosure specialists” and “money lenders,” to help her maintain ownership of her house.

These provisions prohibit deceptive representations about goods, services, status, standards, and geographic origin, as well as omissions of material facts and passing off one person's goods or services as another's.

Floyd v. Bank of America Corp. · filed 2013-07-11(a), (b), (d), (f), (s), and (t)

We conclude that the Complaint does not allege misrepresentations about the Bank’s “economic output,” but instead alleges a misrepresentation about other matters (i.e., the legal environment and the climate of surveillance), and therefore does not state a claim under § 28-*2553904(a) and (d). ... Similarly, we will not distort the meaning of § 28-3904(a), (b), and (d) to encompass appellants’ claims about the susceptibility of their Bank account data to government surveillance. ... The understanding appellants describe about the inapplicability of U.S. legal protections to overseas trans-mittals of Bank-customer account information is a legal assessment of the implications of the Bank’s use of overseas call *256centers,13 not a fact. ... We therefore conclude that the omitted information was not “material” within the meaning of § 28 — 3904(f). ... We are persuaded by both arguments and therefore conclude that appellants have failed to state a claim under § 28-3904(s). The second of the arguments also leads us to conclude as a matter of law that merely by providing appellants with a ten-digit domestic-looking telephone number for customer service, appellees did not “use deceptive or representations or designations of geographic origin in connection with goods or services!/]” within the meaning of § 28 — 3904(t).

Section 28-3904 prohibits misleading representations about goods or services, including false claims about their characteristics or quality, material misrepresentations or omissions, and advertising without intent to sell as advertised.

Wetzel v. Capital City Real Estate, LLC · filed 2013-08-15(a), (d), (e), (f), and (h)

The complaint claimed a violation of D.C.Code § 28-3904(a) involving a “representation] that goods or services have ... characteristics ... or qualities that they do not have ...” (Complaint ¶ 64), based on various alleged misrepresentations about the condition of the property. (Complaint ¶ 61) As the complaint identified representations that fit within D.C.Code § 28-3904(a), appellants have stated a legally viable claim. ... The complaint also claimed a violation of D.C.Code § 28-3904(d) involving a “representation] that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality, grade, style, or model, if in fact they are of another.” (Complaint ¶ 64) Considering the previously mentioned representations, which we assume to be true, and taking into account “the requirement that we construe and apply the CPPA ‘liberally to promote its purpose,’” we must conclude *1005that the complaint stated a legally viable claim under D.C.Code § 28-3904(d). ... Additionally, appellants’ complaint alleged violations of D.C.Code § 28-3904(e) and (f) involving a “misrepresentation] as to a material fact which has a tendency to mislead” and the “fail[ure] to state a material fact if such failure tends to mislead.” (Complaint ¶ 64) “We have said ... that a person bringing suit under these sections need not allege or prove intentional misrepresentation or failure to disclose to prevail on a claimed violation-” Grayson, 15 A.3d at 251 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In order to survive a motion to dismiss, appellants “must allege a material fact that tends to mislead.” Id. Here, the complaint alleged, inter alia, that appellee “misrepresented that the basement and walls were free from defect, which misled [appellants] into thinking this Property was worth more than it actually was.” (Complaint ¶ 60) Thus, the complaint stated a legally viable claim under D.C.Code § 28-3904(e) and (f). ... The complaint’s final allegation under the CPPA is that appellee violated D.C.Code § 28-3904(h) by “advertising] goods or services ... without the intent to sell them as advertised or offered.” (Complaint ¶ 64) According to the complaint, appellee “actively advertised and marketed” the property and in the advertisements appellee misrepresented its condition “in an attempt to sell a subpar piece of Property.” (Complaint ¶¶ 61, 63) In light of the allegations that appellee was actively involved in renovating the property and, as a professional developer, was aware of its defects, (Complaint ¶ 50) the complaint stated a legally viable claim under D.C.Code § 28-3904(h). In sum, all of appellants’ claims under the CPPA survive appellee’s motion to dismiss and are remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

Section 28-3904(e) prohibits an affirmative or implied misrepresentation of a material fact that a reasonable consumer would deem misleading.

Salvador, Sr. v. Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company · filed 2020-11-30(e)

To state a claim under § 28-3904(e), “fa]ll that is required is ‘an affirmative or implied misrepresentation’ that ‘a reasonable consumer’ would deem misleading.” McMullen v. Synchrony Bank, 164 F.Supp.3d 77, 94-95 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Saucier v. Countrywide Home Loans, 64 A.3d 428, 442-43 (D.C.2013)).

Section 28-3904(e) prohibits material misrepresentations that tend to mislead, and claims based on affirmative misrepresentations are not preempted by HOLA.

Brown v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2012-06-22(e)

Therefore, the claims of violations of the CPPA as to affirmative misrepresentations are not preempted. These include claims asserted under section 3904(e) of the Act, which provides that “[i]t shall be a violation of this chapter, whether or not any consumer is in fact misled, deceived or damaged thereby, for any person to . . . misrepresent as to a material fact which has a tendency to mislead.” D.C. Code § 28-3904(e).

Section 28-3904(q) is preempted by the National Bank Act insofar as it would require a national bank to supply customer receipts and significantly interfere with its lending powers.

McMullen v. Synchrony Bank · filed 2018-01-11(q)

Because the interpretation of § (q) that Plaintiff urges on the Court would "significantly interfere" with national banks' exercise of their powers, it is preempted by the National Bank Act. Chase is therefore entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's § 28-3904(q) claim.

A person can violate § 28-3904 even if no consumer is actually misled, deceived, or damaged.

Sloan v. Soul Circus, Inc. · filed 2015-12-18

It is true that a person can violate the CPPA “whether or not any consumer is in fact misled, deceived or damaged thereby.” D.C. Code § 28-3904.

Section 28-3904 does not require any consumer to have been misled by a deceptive statement.

Corporate Accountability Lab v. Sambazon, Inc. · filed 2025-08-14

Further, and in contrast to the UCL, the CPPA was constructed such that “there is no requirement that any consumer in fact be misled by the deceptive statements.” Earth Island Inst. v. Coca-Cola Co., 321 A.3d 654, 664 (D.C. 2024) (citing D.C. Code § 28-3904); accord D.C. Code § 28-3904 (“It ... shall be a violation of this chapter for any person to engage in an unfair or deceptive trade practice, whether or not any consumer is in fact misled, deceived, or damaged thereby . . . .”).