D.C. Code § 12-301

Section 12-301(6) generally gives five years for an action on an executor’s or administrator’s bond, measured from accrual; for fraud-based claims by intestate heirs, the discovery rule postpones accrual until the claimant knows or reasonably should know of the claim.

Nethken v. Peerless Insurance Co. · filed 2009-08-20(6)

We have previously held that the statute of limitations for a claim on a personal representative’s bond begins to run when the final account is filed and approved by the Probate Division of the Superior Court.

Section 12-301(6)'s five-year limitations period for a claim on a personal representative's bond begins when the estate's final account is filed and approved by the Probate Division.

In Re Estate of Green · filed 2003-01-30(6)

Therefore, we hold that the special master’s claim on the removed personal representative’s bond accrued when the final account was filed by the special master and approved by the Probate Division of the trial court.

Under § 12-301(7), the three-year limitations period for contract actions begins only when the plaintiff has a legally cognizable cause of action.

Hartford Life Insurance v. Title Guarantee Co. · filed 1975-10-14(7)

The right to sue did not accrue until the plaintiff had a cause of action.

Section 12-301(7) gives a three-year limitations period for an action on a contract, measured from the breach; for this claim, the breach accrued when the decedent died and the plaintiff offered to purchase the stock.

Launay v. Launay, Inc. · filed 1985-08-23(7)

We find unpersuasive the Arpads’ further argument that the statute of limitations bars the Launays’ claim. The Arpads contend that if there was a breach, it occurred when Mrs. Ar-pad failed to obtain her husband’s signature on the agreement and when Michael Arpad himself failed to sign, both of which occurred 20 years prior to the instant action. To the contrary, the breach, if any, did not occur until the death of Michael Arpad and the Launays’ offer to purchase the stock, which places the suit within the 3-year statute of limitations. D.C.Code § 12-301(7) (1981).

Subsection (8) requires an action to be filed within three years after accrual; when the injury and alleged tortious conduct are obscure, accrual begins when the claim's facts are discovered or reasonably should have been discovered with due diligence.

Duggan v. Keto · filed 1989-03-28(8)

The statute of limitations applicable to this case requires that an action be brought within three years from the date on which the claim accrues. D.C.Code § 12-301(8) (1981). A cause of action usually accrues at the time of injury, but if “the relationship between the fact of injury and the alleged tortious conduct is obscure when the injury occurs, we apply a ‘discovery rule’ to determine when the statute of limitations commences.” ... Under the discovery rule, “[t]he statute of limitations begins to run when the facts which form the basis of the claim are discovered, or reasonably should be discovered in the exercise of due diligence.” ... Therefore, we hold that the earliest date upon which appellants could have discovered their alleged injury was October 2,1981, the date of Mary’s death.

For contract-interpretation claims, the 12-year limitations period begins when the plaintiff knows or should know that the parties have differing interpretations.

Air Transport Ass'n of America v. Lenkin · filed 1989-04-20(6)

An action is barred under D.C.Code § 12-301(6) if it is brought more than 12 years “from the time the right to maintain the action accrues.” ... To avoid such risks, causes of action based on contract interpretation, as opposed to situations devoid of any interpretive questions such as nonpayment of installments, should be deemed to accrue on the date on which plaintiff becomes or should become aware of the parties differing interpretations. Accordingly, plaintiff’s causes of action are barred by the statute of limitation and defendants’ motion for summary judgment must be granted.

D.C. Code § 12-301(8) provides the three-year general-fraud limitations period applicable to this securities action.

Wachovia Bank v. National Student Marketing Corp. · filed 1980-12-05(8)

This action is therefore guided by the three-year statute of limitations for general fraud.

Although IDEA fee applications are subject to a 30-day limitations period as ancillary claims, § 12-301(8)'s three-year period may be used when lack of notice makes applying the shorter period inappropriate.

Abraham v. District of Columbia · filed 2004-09-30(8)

the Court concludes that the issue of attorneys’ fees is indeed ancillary to the underlying dispute before an administrative agency; the 30-day limitations period selected by the D.C. Circuit for substantive appeals should be applied to attorneys’ fee applications, as well. ... For these reasons, the Court tolls the statute of limitations for each plaintiff for a period of three years.

For a defamation action, § 12-301 imposes a one-year limitations period, but when the injury is not readily apparent, accrual is tolled until the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered the essential elements of the possible cause of action.

['Hill v. Gray'] · filed 2014-03-21

A defamation action is considered untimely and barred if it is brought after one year from the time the action accrued. Farris v. Compton, 652 A.2d 49, 53-54 (D.C. 1994) (citing D.C. Code § 12-301 (1989)). The moment of accrual typically begins when the injury occurs. Id. at 54. However, with defamation claims, when the injury might not be readily apparent when it occurs, the moment of accrual is tolled and begins to run when the plaintiff “has discovered or reasonably should have discovered all of the essential elements of her possible cause of action.”

Subsection (8) provides a three-year limitations period for fraud claims and therefore supplies the analogous limitations period for a Lanham Act false-advertising claim.

Paleteria La Michoacana, Inc. v. Productos Lacteos Tocumbo S.A. De C.V. · filed 2014-09-25(8)

Because D.C. Code § 12-301(8) applies to fraud claims, the appropriate analogous statute of limitations claim for PROLACTO’s false advertising count is three years.

The court treats § 12-301(4), alongside subsection (8), as supplying the applicable limitations period for Bivens claims.

Richardson v. Federal Reserve Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · filed 2016-03-08(4)

So-called Bivens claims are subject to, at best, a three-year statute of limitations under D.C. Code §§ 12-301(4), (8).

D.C. Code § 12-301(9) imposes a one-year limitations period on claims under the D.C. Mental Health Information Act.

Brown v. Hill · filed 2016-03-28(9)

A claim under the DCMHIA, see D.C. Code § 7-1201.01 et seq., must be brought within one year. D.C. Code § 12-301(9).

The one-year limitations period in § 12-301(4) applies to invasion-of-privacy claims that are essentially defamatory; the three-year residual period in § 12-301(8) does not apply when a limitation is otherwise prescribed.

Grunseth v. Marriott Corp. · filed 1995-01-19(4), (8)

There is a one-year statute of limitations applicable for libel, slander, assault, and other similar intentional torts. See D.C.Code § 12-301(4). This limitation has been applied to invasion of privacy claims in the District of Columbia on the rationale that invasion of privacy is essentially a type of defamation. ... Plaintiff argues that his claim for invasion of privacy falls within the three year limitations period of D.C.Code § 12-301(8) rather than the one year limitations period of § 12-301(4). Section 12-301(8) only applies to those acts for which a limitation is not otherwise specifically prescribed. Contrary to Plaintiffs contention, invasion of privacy is an action where a limitation is prescribed. Plaintiff does not argue that this action is anything other than defamatory in nature; therefore, he cannot evade the statute of limitations applicable to such actions.

Section 12-301(8) supplies a three-year limitations period only for causes of action not specially prescribed, while § 12-301(4)'s one-year period governs a false-light claim intertwined with libel and slander.

Mittleman v. United States · filed 1997-01-10(8), (4)

Applying that standard to the claims at issue, we consider first the false light invasion of privacy claim. Under the three-year default provision, this would just make it, assuming that Mittleman got adequate notice only on July 6, 1983, when she received a copy of the OPM report that is the primary ground of this claim. But in fact the claim is thoroughly “intertwined” with libel and slander, governed by the one-year provision of D.C.Code § 12-301(4). According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which the District followed in finding that such a claim existed, see Vassiliades v. Garfinckel’s, 492 A.2d 580, 587 (D.CApp.1985), the sine qua non of a false light claim is giving “publicity” to a matter which places the plaintiff “before the public” in a false light. See Restatement (Second) Torts § 652E. Libel and slander similarly involve publication of false statements about another. Thus, the one-year statute of limitations should apply to both claims. See D.C.Code § 12-301(4).

Section 12-301(8) gives a distinct negligence claim a three-year limitations period, even when the claim arises from conduct also supporting an assault claim.

Reaves-Bey v. Karr · filed 2004-01-15(8)

Appellant asserts that her negligence action, although related to the assault incident, should be governed by the three-year statute of limitations for negligence. See D.C.Code § 12-301(8) (2001). ... However, in the case before us, appellant is alleging a distinct claim of negligence apart from the assault claim. The allegation of negligence is based on an independent duty; namely, that the appellees breached a duty of care toward her safety by negligently setting up a rendezvous with a person who presented a known danger to her.

Section 12-301(8)'s three-year limitations period applies to most Bivens actions unless the claim is for a constitutional tort specifically listed in § 12-301(4), and a strip-search claim alleging unreasonable government intrusion was not treated as assault at the pleading stage.

Bame v. Clark · filed 2006-12-11(4), (8)

In this Circuit, the state of the law is that the three-year statute of limitations found in “ § [12 — ]301(8) applies to most Bivens actions,” unless the claim is “for constitutional torts specifically listed” in § 12-301(4). ... The question is, therefore, whether or not Plaintiffs’ claims — as pled in the Amended Complaint — are most analogous to the specific torts identified in § 12-301(4). ... Looking at this allegation in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court does not agree that it is analogous to an assault claim. ... Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the Bivens claim as untimely will be denied.

Section 12-301 gives fraud claims a three-year limitations period in the District of Columbia; a tort claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the injury, its cause, and evidence of wrongdoing.

Richards v. Duke University · filed 2007-03-30

The statute of limitations for a fraud claim in the District of Columbia is three years. See D.C.Code § 12-301. A tort action accrues, under District of Columbia law, “when the plaintiff has knowledge of (or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have knowledge of) (1) the existence of the injury, (2) its cause in fact, and (3) some evidence of wrongdoing.”

Section 12-301 gives a fraud plaintiff three years to sue, measured from when the fraud is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered.

Elemary v. Philipp Holzmann A.G. · filed 2008-02-06

Moreover, even if Elemary had properly stated a fraud claim against Billy Harbert, HILLC, Bill L. Harbert, or HIE, the statute of limitations would very likely bar her suit. In the District of Columbia, a fraud claim must be brought, if at all, “within three years from the time the fraud either is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered.” King v. Kitchen Magic, Inc., 391 A.2d 1184, 1186 (D.C.1978) (citing D.C.Code § 12-301). Such a claim accrues “when the plaintiff has knowledge of (or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have knowledge of) (1) the existence of the injury, (2) its cause in fact, and (3) some evidence of wrongdoing.” Knight v. Furlow, 553 A.2d 1232, 1234 (D.C.1989). Because Elemary filed the present action on April 10, 2007, to survive the defendants’ statute of limitations challenge, her claim must have accrued after April 10, 2004.

Section 12-301 requires a Consumer Protection Procedures Act action to be filed within three years from when the right to maintain the action accrues.

Koker v. Aurora Loan Servicing, LLC · filed 2013-01-03

“A plaintiff must bring an action based on the Consumer Protection Procedures Act within three years ‘from the time the right to maintain the action accrues.’ ” Murray v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 953 A.2d 308, 323 (D.C.2008) (quoting D.C.Code § 12-301).

D.C. Code § 12-301 provides a three-year limitations period when no other limitation is specifically prescribed, and the court applied that period to the claim at issue.

Higgins v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority · filed 1981-02-27

D.C. Code § 12-301 (1973), establishes a three-year period for any action “for which a limitation is not otherwise specifically prescribed.”

A contract action or an action without a specific limitations period must be brought within three years, accruing when all elements of the cause of action exist.

Corley v. Hecht Co. · filed 1982-01-18(7), (8)

a contract action or an action for which no specific limitation is provided must be brought within three years of the time it accrues.

Section 12-301(8) supplies a three-year limitations period when no other limitation is specially prescribed.

Sykes v. District of Columbia · filed 2012-06-18(8)

“[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided by law, actions for the following purposes may not be brought after the expiration of the period specified below from the time the right to maintain the action accrues: * * * (8) for which a limitation is not otherwise specially prescribed -- 3 years . . . .”

Section 12-301 supplies three-year limitations periods for breach-of-contract, fraud, wrongful-termination, and interference or blacklisting claims, and a one-year period for defamation claims.

Yung v. It Discovery Inc. · filed 2012-03-15§ 12-301

Breach of Contract: 3 years; Misrepresentation (Fraud): 3 years; Wrongful Termination: 3 years; Interference and Blacklisting: 3 years; Defamation: 1 year. ... D.C. Code § 12-301.

D.C. Code § 12-301(7) sets a three-year statute of limitations for breach-of-contract claims.

Embassy of the Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Ugwuonye · filed 2012-11-05(7)

The statute of limitations for a breach of contract in both the District of Columbia and Maryland is three years.

D.C. Code § 12-301(8) imposes a three-year limitations period on actions for which no other limitations period is prescribed, including the claims at issue here.

Little v. Commercial Audio Associates, Inc. · filed 2015-02-27(8)

Under D.C. law, an action for which a period is not otherwise prescribed has a limitation of three years. See D.C. Code § 12-301(8). Counts II and III fall into this category.

D.C. Code § 12-301(7) and (8) impose a three-year limitations period on contract and tort claims.

Slate v. Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia · filed 2014-04-02(7), (8)

The statute of limitations for contract and tort claims is three years. D.C. Code § 12-301(7), (8).

D.C. Code § 12-301(8) imposes a three-year catch-all limitations period on breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims.

Edwards v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC · filed 2015-12-29(8)

In the District of Columbia, a claim for a breach of fiduciary duty is subject to a catch-all, three-year limitation period under D.C. Code § 12-301(8).

Subsection (8) imposes a catchall three-year statute of limitations on claims for breach of fiduciary duty and conversion.

Bartlett v. Overslaugh · filed 2016-03-11(8)

Under D.C. law, claims of breach of fiduciary duty and conversion are subject to the catchall three-year limitation period found in D.C. Code § 12-301(8).

D.C. Code § 12-301(8) supplies a three-year residual limitations period for negligence claims.

Davis v. Transportation Security Administration · filed 2016-07-20(8)

The request for leave to file the Amended Complaint was filed within the District of Columbia’s three-year statute of limitations for negligence claims.

D.C. Code § 12-301(8) provides a three-year limitations period for Bivens actions when no other limitation is specially prescribed.

Richardson v. Sauls · filed 2018-06-18(8)

D.C. Code § 12-301(8) provides a three-year limitations period for actions “for which a limitation is not otherwise specially prescribed.” Three years is therefore the longest period that could apply to Mr. Richardson’s Bivens claims.

D.C. Code § 12-301(8) provides a three-year limitations period for negligence, wrongful-death, and constitutional claims.

Upshaw v. Progressive Insurance Company · filed 2017-11-27(8)

The D.C. Code prescribes a three-year limit to actions for negligence, wrongful death, and constitutional claims.

D.C. Code § 12-301(8) provides a three-year limitations period for negligence, wrongful-death, and constitutional claims.

Upshaw v. Progressive Ins. Co. · filed 2017-11-27(8)

The D.C. Code prescribes a three-year limit to actions for negligence, wrongful death, and constitutional claims.

D.C. Code § 12-301(8) requires negligence actions to be brought within three years after accrual.

Gardel v. SK & A Structural Engineers PLLC · filed 2017-12-21(8)

Under District of Columbia law, an action for negligence must be brought within three years after the cause of action accrues.

D.C. Code § 12-301(8) provides a three-year limitations period for claims without another specially prescribed period.

Kubicki ex rel. Kubicki v. Medtronic Inc. · filed 2018-02-05(8)

actions for which a limitation is not otherwise specially prescribed must be brought within three years from the time the right to maintain the action accrues.

D.C. Code § 12-301(8) requires negligence actions to be brought within three years after accrual.

Paul v. Government of the District of Columbia · filed 2018-06-21(8)

Under District of Columbia law, an action for negligence must be brought within three years after the cause of action accrues.

Section 12-301(8) provides a three-year limitations period for claims, including fraud, when no other limitation period is specifically prescribed, and the court applied it to find the fraud claim untimely.

Dashiell v. Lew · filed 2019-11-22(8)

Both Delaware and the District of Columbia have a three-year statute of limitations for fraud. ... D.C. Code § 12-301(8) (providing a three year limitation in circumstances where “a limitation is not otherwise specifically prescribed.”).

Section 12-301(a) imposes a three-year limitations period when no other limitation is prescribed, running from when the right to sue accrues.

Wooderts v. Mars Inc. · filed 2025-12-03(a)

Under D.C. law, a three-year statute of limitations period applies to all actions “for which a limitation is not otherwise prescribed,” and it is measured “from the time the right to maintain the action accrues.” D.C. Code § 12-301(a).

Section 12-301(8) provides a three-year limitations period for actions lacking another specifically prescribed limitation and is broad enough to cover enforcement of federally created rights.

Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. · filed 1979-07-09(8)

Absent a D.C. statute sufficiently analogous to justify selection, a three year limitation period would still result. The D.C. Code provides a three year limitation on actions for which other specific limitations have not been specified. D.C.Code § 12-301(8). Casseli, in construing this provision in its earlier code form, held it to be sufficiently broad to include enforcement of federally created rights. Cassell, supra, 100 U.S.App.D.C. at 154 n. 3, 243 F.2d at 260 n. 3. This statute also leads to a three year period of limitation.

Section 12-301(8) supplies a three-year limitations period, which may be tolled for fraud or deliberate concealment until the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered the basis of the lawsuit.

Saffron v. Wilson · filed 1979-08-14(8)

The relevant statute of limitations is the three-year period provided by D.C.Code § 12-301(8); Memorandum and Order of October 2, 1978. Absent circumstances which tolled the Statute, it expired on January 20, 1976. ... Read into every federal statute of limitations, including the adoption of an analogous local statute of limitations, is the equitable doctrine that in case of defendant’s fraud or deliberate concealment of material facts relating to his wrongdoing, time does not begin to run until plaintiff discover[ed], or by reasonable diligence could have discovered, the basis of the lawsuit. ... Nonetheless if it were established that the Secret Service in fact acted to hide the identities of the agents involved, the statute of limitations might be tolled, most probably from the time plaintiff undertook efforts to identify Roe and Doe.

Section 12-301(8) supplies a three-year limitations period for an action with no other prescribed limitation, running from the time the right to maintain the action accrues.

Simpson v. District of Columbia Office of Human Rights · filed 1991-10-01(8)

Since the alternative statute and court rules suggested by the District have no application, we agree with Ms. Simpson that the issue before us is governed by D.C.Code § 12-301(8) (1989). Section 12-301 states in pertinent part: ... (8) for which a limitation is not otherwise prescribed — 3 years. ... We conclude for all of these reasons ... that Bond is distinguishable and that Ms. Simpson’s action did not accrue until October 30, 1985, when this court dismissed without prejudice her petition for review.

Section 12-301(8) supplies a three-year limitations period when no other limitations period is specially prescribed for the type of claim.

Chalabi v. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan · filed 2007-08-27(8)

The District of Columbia statute of limitations, D.C.Code § 12-301(8) (2001), applies a three-year limitations period where, as here, “a limitation is not otherwise specially prescribed” for the type of claim.

Section 12-301(8) supplies a three-year residual limitations period for an equal-protection claim, while an emotional-distress claim intertwined with a claim governed by a specific limitations period is subject to that specific period instead.

Muñoz v. Board of Trustees of the University of the District of Columbia · filed 2008-12-03(8)

Plaintiffs equal protection claim is subject to the District’s three-year residual limitation period, D.C.Code § 12-301(8). ... Thus, to be timely, plaintiffs claim must have accrued on or after June 2, 2005.

Section 12-301(7) and (8) impose a three-year limit on contract claims and claims with no specifically prescribed limitation period; the period begins when the plaintiff discovers, or with reasonable diligence should discover, the injury.

Jack's Canoes & Kayaks, LLC v. National Park Service · filed 2013-03-28(7) and (8)

Because Plaintiff instead waited nearly six years after the date on which it was put on inquiry notice, any claims it may have had against the District in connection with the Lease are three years overdue under D.C. Code § 12-301(7) and (8).

Section 12-301(7) and (8) provide a three-year limitations period that courts borrow for non-fiduciary ERISA claims.

Whetstone v. Howard University · filed 2024-09-12(7) to (8)

Courts in this district have thus uniformly applied a three-year statute of limitations, which is the District of Columbia’s statute of limitations for both breach-of-contract claims and claims for which District law does not specify a statute of limitations. See id. at 16; see also D.C. Code § 12-301(7) to (8).

The court held that D.C. Code § 12-301(8) supplied the applicable three-year general fraud limitations period for the federal securities claims, because the later two-year rule was prospective only.

Case name unavailable · filed 1981-06-15(8)

This action is therefore guided by the three-year statute of limitations for general fraud.

For fraud claims, § 12-301(8) requires suit within three years after the fraud is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered.

Childress v. Northrop Corp. · filed 1985-01-15(8)

D.C. Code § 12-301(8) requires that suit be brought "within three years from the time the fraud either is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered"

D.C. Code § 12-301(4) gives defamation claims a one-year limitations period running from accrual.

Alridge v. Rite Aid of Washington D.C. Inc. · filed 2015-11-30(4)

The District of Columbia provides a one-year limitations period for defamation claims.

Section 12-301(4) imposes a one-year limitations period on invasion of privacy claims, including intrusion.

Greenpeace, Inc. v. The Dow Chemical Company · filed 2014-08-21(4)

For these reasons, we decline to hold that intrusion should be subject to a three-year statute of limitations, in contrast to the other three invasion of privacy torts, and hold that Greenpeace’s invasion of privacy by intrusion claim is time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations.

Section 12-301(4) imposes a one-year limitations period on tort actions for libel, slander, malicious prosecution, and false arrest, and it controls over the three-year catch-all period in § 12-301(8) when those specific tort claims are pleaded.

Lewis v. District of Columbia · filed 2014-10-17(4)

The district court properly dismissed the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), based on its determination that the action was barred by the one-year statute of limitations prescribed by D.C.Code § 12-301(4), which applies to actions for libel, slander, malicious prosecution, and false arrest. Unlike the prior suit cited by appellant, which asserted a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, here he brought tort claims that are specifically covered by section 4; therefore, contrary to appellant’s contention, the three-year catch-all period of § 12-301(8) does not control.

Section 12-301(4) imposes a one-year limitations period on appropriation-of-name-or-likeness claims treated as invasion-of-privacy claims, so a claim filed after that period is time-barred.

Paul v. Judicial Watch, Inc. · filed 2008-02-06(4)

District of Columbia courts interpret an allegation of appropriation of name and likeness as a claim for invasion of privacy. ... Therefore, the one-year statute of limitations under D.C.Code § 12-301(4), which governs libel, slander, and similar intentional torts, applies to any invasion of privacy claims because such claims are types of defamation. ... Since the most recent allegation of defendants’ use of plaintiffs name or likeness refers to Judicial Watch’s January 6, 2006 press release, any claim filed after January 6, 2007, is time barred. Plaintiff did not file the instant action until February 6, 2007.

Section 12-301 imposes a one-year limitations period on libel and slander claims and a three-year period on the discharge-related claims addressed here.

Mittleman v. United States · filed 1998-02-09(4), (8)

The portions of her emotional distress and negligence claims based on the creation, maintenance, and dissemination of the allegedly false IG and OPM reports, the dissemination of suspicions that plaintiff had been going through papers in Altman’s office and that she was the source of news leaks, and the November 19 Secret Service document are clearly subject to D.C.’s one-year statute of limitations for libel and slander, and are therefore untimely. ... The claims arising out of her discharge from Treasury are also barred because, although they are governed by a three-year statute of limitations, the period began to run when she was discharged—at the latest in January of 1981. ... Thus, the Court dismisses plaintiffs remaining claims in Civil Action No. 92-1741.

Section 12-301(4) applies its one-year limitations period only to the torts expressly listed there and cannot be expanded to unlisted torts.

Stewart v. Thomas · filed 1982-05-06(4)

Section 12-301(4) enumerates those torts to which the statute applies ... and we find no basis for expanding the statute to apply to torts not included in the list.

D.C. Code § 12-301(4) gives defamation claims a one-year statute of limitations.

American Petroleum Institute v. Technomedia International, Inc. · filed 2010-03-31(4)

Because statutes of limitation are procedural, Jovanovic v. Us. -Algeria Business Council, 561 F. SUpp. 2d 103, 111 (D.D.C. 2008), the District of Columbia's one-year statute of limitations applies, D.C. Code § 12-301(4).

Section 12-301(4) gives one year to bring a libel or slander action after it accrues.

Brown v. Children's National Medical Center · filed 2011-03-30(4)

“the right to maintain [an] action accrues . . . for libel [and] slander” in one year.

Subsection (4) imposes a one-year statute of limitations on defamation claims.

Tressler v. National Passenger Railroad Corp. · filed 2011-05-13(4)

these claims are time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations. See D.C. Code § 12-301(4)

Subsection (4) imposes a one-year limitations period on battery claims.

Bergbauer v. Mabus · filed 2011-09-14(4)

She concedes, by failing to argue otherwise, that this claim is barred by the District of Columbia’s 1-year statute of limitations on such claims.

D.C. Code § 12-301(4)'s one-year limitations period bars a D.C.-law defamation claim filed more than one year after the alleged defamatory statements.

McDonald v. Kempthorne · filed 2011-12-23(4)

To the extent that McDonald’s complaint could be construed as alleging a defamation tort under D.C. law, that claim will be dismissed as untimely, since McDonald filed his complaint more than one year after the defendants allegedly made the defamatory statements. See D.C. Code 12-301(4).

D.C. Code § 12-301(4) requires libel, slander, malicious-prosecution, false-arrest, and false-imprisonment claims to be brought within one year of accrual.

Lewis v. Distict of Columbia · filed 2014-04-23(4)

Under the statute of limitations applicable to this diversity action, claims "for libel, slander . . . malicious prosecution, [and] false arrest or false imprisonment" must be brought within one year from the time the claim accrues.

D.C. Code § 12-301(4) gives civil-assault claims a one-year limitations period, and a compulsory counterclaim is tested independently for timeliness.

King v. Barbour Jr. · filed 2017-02-28(4)

The statute of limitations for civil assault claims in the District of Columbia is one year. D.C. Code § 12-301(4).

D.C. Code § 12-301(4) requires listed intentional-tort claims to be filed within one year of accrual.

Ferebee v. United Medical Center · filed 2018-03-08(4)

Under District of Columbia law, a person must bring an action for libel, slander, assault, battery, mayhem, wounding, malicious prosecution, false arrest or false imprisonment within 1 year of the claim accruing.

D.C. Code § 12-301(4) imposes a one-year statute of limitations on defamation claims, and the same period applies to a tortious-interference claim based entirely on the same defamatory facts.

Samuel v. Wells Fargo & Company · filed 2018-10-01(4)

The statute of limitations for defamation in the District of Columbia is one year. See Jin v. Ministry of State Sec., 254 F. Supp. 2d 61, 68 (D.D.C. 2003) (citing D.C. Code § 12-301(4)). Because Plaintiff’s tortious interference with business relations claim is based entirely on the same set of underlying facts as Plaintiff’s defamation claim, it is also subject to the one-year statute of limitations for defamation claims.

Section 12-301(8) bars an individual's tort claims when they are brought after the applicable three-year limitations period.

Roe v. Wilson · filed 2019-02-04(8)

To the extent Doe seeks or intends to bring tort claims in his individual capacity against any of the defendants, they are barred by section 12-301(8).

D.C. Code § 12-301(4) imposes a one-year limitations period for a false-arrest claim, and the period had expired before Banks filed suit.

Banks v. Bowser · filed 2019-05-17(4)

Similarly, because Count 2 raises a false arrest claim arising from the September 17, 2015 incident, see Superior Ct. Docs. at 7 (¶ 12), the one-year statute of limitations, see D.C. Code § 12-301(4), had run by the time Banks began this lawsuit.

D.C. Code § 12-301(4) requires a defamation claim to be filed within one year after the plaintiff discovers that the defamatory statement was published to her injury.

Braxton v. First Transit · filed 2018-08-20(4)

District law requires a plaintiff to bring her defamation claim within one year of discovering that a defamatory statement was published to her injury.

D.C. Code § 12-301(4) requires a defamation claim to be brought within one year after accrual, and the court applied that period to dismiss the plaintiff’s untimely defamation claim.

Obia v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. · filed 2020-09-09(4)

A defamation claim must be brought within one year from the date the claim accrues. See D.C. Code § 12-301(4).

For aiding-and-abetting battery claims, the one-year limitations period runs from when the right to maintain the action accrues; the court held this claim was time-barred because it was filed two years after the altercation.

Jackson v. Starbucks Corporation · filed 2021-04-08(a)(4)

Within the District of Columbia, claims for aiding and abetting battery must be brought no more than one-year after the “right to maintain the action” begins to accrue. D.C. Code § 12-301(a)(4).

Section 12-301(4) gives battery claims a one-year limitations period, so the court dismissed Anderson’s battery claim filed nearly three years after the alleged incident.

Anderson v. Washington Hilton, L.L.C. · filed 2021-08-31(4)

Defendant initially points out that Anderson’s first count (battery) falls victim to the District of Columbia’s one-year statute of limitations for such actions. See Def. MTD at 2–3 (citing D.C. Code § 12-301(4)); ... Plaintiff filed her suit on April 26, 2021, almost three years after the incident on May 29, 2018, and she does not argue that any tolling of the time is appropriate here. She is thus out of luck.

Section 12-301(4) provides a one-year limitations period for intentional tort claims, and the court applies that period to determine timeliness.

John Doe I v. Exxon Mobil Corp · filed 2022-08-02(4)

The District of Columbia has a one-year limitations period for filing intentional tort claims. D.C. Code § 12-301(4).

Section 12-301(a)(4) gives D.C. defamation claims a one-year statute of limitations, which appears to have expired here, although the defense was waived because defendants did not timely raise it.

Hits Before Fame, LLC v. Hernandez · filed 2025-03-26(a)(4)

The statute of limitations period for defamation under D.C. law is one year. D.C. Code § 12-301(a)(4). Plaintiffs filed suit on July 8, 2020, and the Court is under the impression that the allegedly defamatory statements were made by Mr. Hernandez shortly after his no-show on October 28, 2018.

For a D.C. defamation claim, § 12-301(a)(4) imposes a one-year limitations period, and the claim was untimely because that period expired before the case was filed.

Zavadovsky v. Republic of Austria · filed 2026-03-31(a)(4)

As a final point, the statute of limitations for a defamation claim in the District of Columbia is one year. D.C. Code § 12-301(a)(4). ... The one-year statute of limitations thus expired before the filing of this case in March 2025. As such, Plaintiffs’ defamation claim is subject to dismissal ... also because it is untimely.

Section 12-301(4) requires assault, battery, malicious prosecution, false arrest, false imprisonment, slander, and libel claims to be brought within one year after accrual.

Saddler v. D'AMBROSIO · filed 1990-06-28(4)

Mr. Saddler's common law claims of assault, battery, malicious prosecution, false arrest, false imprisonment, slander and libel are barred by the statute of limitations. All of these claims must be brought within one year from the time the action accrues. D.C.Code § 12-301(4).

Section 12-301(4) bars listed tort claims, including assault, malicious prosecution, false arrest, and false imprisonment, when brought more than one year after the right to maintain the action accrues.

Barnhardt v. District of Columbia · filed 2008-06-09(4)

Under District of Columbia law, an action “for libel, slander, assault, battery, mayhem, wounding, malicious prosecution, false arrest or false imprisonment” may not be brought after the expiration of the one-year period “from the time the right to maintain the action accrues.” D.C.Code § 12-301(4). ... Accordingly, the Court will grant defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs common law claims as conceded, and Counts 7-11 of the Amended Complaint will be dismissed with prejudice as untimely.

A constitutional Bivens-type assault claim closely analogous to common-law assault is governed by § 12-301(4)’s one-year limitations period rather than § 12-301(8)’s three-year residual period.

McClam v. Mayor Marion Barry, Municipality of the District of Columbia · filed 1983-01-04(4), (8)

the one-year period therefore applies to, and bars, appellant’s claim.

D.C. Code § 12-301(4)'s one-year defamation limitations period governs the plaintiff's Bivens claim under controlling precedent.

Jefferson v. Harris · filed 2016-03-21(4)

If Doe remains valid, the District’s one-year limitations period plainly bars Plaintiff’s claim here, given that Jefferson filed suit nearly three years after July 26, 2011 – the date he insists the claim accrued.

D.C. Code § 12-301(8) supplies a three-year limitations period for Bivens claims.

Berman v. Crook · filed 2018-02-02(8)

Thus, his claims under Count I and II are outside the limitations period and must be dismissed as time barred.

D.C. Code § 12-301(8) provides a three-year residual limitations period for Bivens claims.

Richardson v. Sauls · filed 2018-06-18(8)

Counts Nine and Ten will be dismissed as time-barred.

Section 12-301(4) supplies a one-year limitations period for a Bivens claim alleging reputational injury when the claim is most analogous to common-law defamation; § 12-301(8)'s three-year catchall does not apply merely because the claim is constitutional.

Doe v. United States Department of Justice · filed 1985-03-01(4), (8)

Concluding that “damage to reputation ... is central to the [plaintiff’s] claim,” Opinion at 2, the district court applied the District of Columbia’s one year statute of limitations governing defamation actions to Doe’s Bivens suit. See D.C.Code § 12-301(4).28 We agree with the district court that the one year limitations period should be applied. ... The plaintiff argues that the local three year limitations period on actions "for which a limitation is not otherwise specially prescribed,” D.C.Code § 12-301(8), should govern her Bivens claims, essentially because those claims derive from the Constitution. ... Our en banc decision in Foley compels us to forgo such a course.

Section 12-301 provides a one-year limitations period for libel claims, while its three-year residual period does not apply when a specific limitations period governs.

Foretich v. Glamour · filed 1990-04-03

Limitations periods in diversity cases in this Court are fixed by District of Columbia law. ... Plaintiffs’ claim for publication of defamatory and false material is covered by the District of Columbia limitations period for libel, which is one year. D.C.Code § 12-301. ... Accordingly, the three-year limitations period in D.C.Code § 12-301 for actions “for which a limitation is not otherwise specifically provided” is clearly not applicable, and the limitations period for both remaining counts in the complaint is one year.

Section 12-301(8) imposes a three-year limitations period on District of Columbia Survival Act claims, and a Maryland medical-malpractice arbitration filing does not toll that period for a suit brought in the District.

Huang v. D'Albora · filed 1994-06-27(8)

On appeal, appellants contend that the statutes of limitations under both counts (survival and wrongful death) were tolled by an arbitration claim they had filed in compliance with Maryland statutory law. As we agree with both trial judges that the filing and pendency of this claim did not toll the statutes of limitations governing appellants’ suit in the District of Columbia, we affirm the grants of summary judgment. ... The District's Survival Act, which appellants concede applies in this case, is subject to a three-year statute of limitations. D.C.Code § 12-301(8).

D.C. Code § 12-301(4)'s one-year limitations period applies to invasion-of-privacy claims, so disclosures occurring before December 1997 are time-barred.

Nix v. Hoke · filed 2001-04-26(4)

Even if plaintiff had stated a claim under Ohio law, the claims would likely be time-barred under the District of Columbia's statute of limitations relating to this type of invasion of privacy claim. Under District of Columbia law, there is a one-year statute of limitations applicable to libel, slander, and other similar intentional torts. See D.C.Code § 12-301(4). This bar has been applied to invasion of privacy claims in the District on the grounds that this type of claim is essentially a type of defamation. ... With respect to public disclosure of private facts, the record offers no indication when the last disclosures are alleged to have taken place, but to the extent the alleged disclosures occurred before December 1997, they are time-barred, even assuming that the allegations of the amended complaint relate back to the first complaint for statute of limitations purposes.

Section 12-301(8) provides a three-year limitations period for civil-rights deprivation claims.

Osuchukwu v. GALLAUDET UNIVERSITY · filed 2002-11-08(8)

The maximum statute of limitations in the District of Columbia for deprivation of civil of rights is three years.

Section 12-301(4) does not impose its one-year limitations period on a distinct negligence claim based on negligent hiring, training, and supervision; that claim is governed by a three-year limitations period.

Stewart-Veal v. District of Columbia · filed 2006-04-13(4)

These paragraphs stated the elements of a negligence claim, which is governed by a three-year statute of limitations.

Section 12-301(7) imposes a three-year limitations period on actions on a written contract.

Hunter Innovations v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Ct. · filed 2010-11-19(7)

Here, the record reflects that the contract at issue, which required HIC to repair the insured property, was performed in the District of Columbia, the insured property’s location. And, because the limitations period for a written contract is only three years in the District of Columbia, Virginia’s borrowing statute dictates that the District of Columbia’s three-year statute of limitations applies in this action.

Section 12-301(7) gives a contract claimant three years from the time the right to maintain the action accrues to sue.

National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Lexington Insurance · filed 2005-02-16(7)

Thus, under D.C.’s statute of limitations for contract actions, the issue for the Court is whether plaintiff brought this suit more than three years after “the time the right, to maintain the action accrue[d]” D.C.Code § 12-301(7). ... A party is not in breach of a contract until its performance is due, and performance is not due until the other party has fulfilled all conditions precedent to that performance. ... Thus, the statute of limitations could not have begun to run any earlier than August 28, 2001, when Amtrak made the first payment of $16.1 million. ... As Amtrak did not treat the repudiation, if any, as a breach of the 1996-97 policies, the Court concludes that Amtrak’s present cause of action could not have accrued (and the statute of limitations could not have begun to run) until the insurers’ performance came due on August 28, 2001, less than three years prior to the date this suit was filed. Therefore, defendants’ statute of limitations defense must fail.

Section 12-301(7) gives each missed monthly installment its own three-year limitations period, so a claim for an installment accruing within three years before suit is not barred.

Keefe Co. v. Americable International, Inc. · filed 2000-07-13(7)

For the foregoing reasons, we answer the certified question by holding that, on the facts as presented to us, the statute of limitations does not bar Keefe’s action to recover installment payments that accrued within three years prior to the filing of the action.

For a contract action, the three-year limitations period begins when the contract is breached, not when a possible future breach is announced.

Akins v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority · filed 1990-01-26(7)

A limitations period on a contract action runs from the time the contract is breached. ... A divergence between Akins’ interpretation of the contract — i.e. that he was entitled to payment until age 65 — and Mutual’s performance was only conjectural until January 1986 when Mutual ceased payment. That is when the breach occurred. ... Thus Akins’ complaint was timely filed, and the Court proceeds to consider the merits of Akins’ claim against Mutual.

D.C. Code § 12-301(7) provides a three-year limitations period for contract actions, but that period does not apply to a labor-law duty-of-fair-representation claim under § 301.

McPherson v. United States · filed 1983-06-09(7)

D.C. Code § 12-301(7), which provides a three year limitations period for contract actions, should be applied. This contention is without merit.

The court treated subsection (7) as a three-year limitations period that applied to the Parks’ claim and had run before dismissal.

Park v. Didden · filed 1982-12-10(7)

It appears that the District of Columbia’s three year statute of limitations, D.C. Code § 12-301(7), applies to, and ran on the Parks’ claim after the complaint was filed in federal district court but prior to dismissal by the court.

D.C. Code § 12-301(7) provides the applicable three-year limitations period for contractual claims when the analogous state-law limitations period is borrowed.

McKinney v. United States Postal Service · filed 2013-01-16(7)

And given the contractual nature of McKinney’s claims, the Court finds it most appropriate to apply the analogous state-law limitations period of D.C. Code § 12-301(7), rather than the more generalized “catch-all” limitations period of 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a).

A claim on a simple contract, whether express or implied, must be brought within three years from when the right to maintain the action accrues, which for breach of contract is when the breach occurs.

James v. Miche Bag Corp. · filed 2013-09-25(7)

Under District of Columbia law, a party must bring an action “on a simple contract, express or implied,” within three years “from the time the right to maintain the action accrues.” D.C. Code § 12-301. “A cause of action for breach of contract accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, at the time of the breach.”

D.C. Code § 12-301(7) provides a three-year statute of limitations for express or implied contract actions.

Berlin v. Bank of America, N.A. · filed 2015-04-24(7)

Under District of Columbia law, “[a] three-year statute of limitations applies to actions on a contract that is ‘express or implied.’” Murray v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 953 A.2d 308, 321 (D.C. 2008) (citing D.C. Code § 12-301(7)).

D.C. Code § 12-301(4) gives defamation claims a one-year limitations period, while subsection (7) gives breach-of-contract claims a three-year period running from the breach.

Mizell v. Suntrust Bank · filed 2014-03-18(4), (7)

The District of Columbia provides a one-year statute of limitations for defamation claims. ... The same is true of Mizell’s breach of contract claim. The applicable statute of limitations for breach of contract in the District of Columbia is three years.

D.C. Code § 12-301(7) and (8) provide three-year limitations periods for simple-contract and residual claims.

Reese v. Loew's Madison Hotel Corporation · filed 2014-08-28(7), (8)

The two claims alleged in the Complaint, breach of contract and unlawful trade practices in violation of the DCCPA, are governed by a three-year statute of limitations.

D.C. Code § 12-301(7) provides a three-year limitations period for contract claims.

Ford v. SunTrust Mortg. · filed 2017-10-20(7)

The statute of limitations for such a claim is three years.

D.C. Code § 12-301(7) imposes a three-year limitations period on express and implied contract claims.

Mawakana v. Board of Trustees of the University of the District of Columbia · filed 2018-03-28(7)

D.C. law imposes a three-year statute of limitations on contract claims, whether express or implied.

Section 12-301(7) provides a three-year limitations period for contract actions, and the period does not bar a claim before the plaintiff has a cause of action.

Hartford Life Insurance Co. v. Title Guarantee Co. · filed 1975-10-14(7)

Since almost twelve years elapsed between January, 1961, and the commencement of this litigation in December, 1972, the Court held that these claims are time-barred by D.C.Code § 12-301(7) (1973 ed.), which sets a three-year limitations period for actions based on contract. We disagree with the holding. ... The right to sue did not accrue until the plaintiff had a cause of action. ... Thus, Hartford's suit against Walker & Dunlop was commenced well within the applicable limitations period.

Section 12-301(7) requires contract actions to be brought within three years of the alleged breach.

Foster v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. · filed 1985-06-04(7)

Moreover, the plaintiff’s contract claims are time barred. Contract claims against Amtrak are governed by the laws of the District of Columbia. See 45 U.S.C. § 546(d). D.C.Code § 12-301(7) requires that contract actions be brought within three years of an alleged breach. Plaintiff asserts that the 1976 Memorandum and the alleged 1977 oral contract were breached when Thomas Rao was appointed to a management position in 1978. Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts as to Which There is No Genuine Issue at j| 12; Foster Deposition at 12. At best, plaintiff’s contract claim arose in May of 1978, when Jean Hughes was allegedly selected for a management position. Complaint at j[ 9. Nevertheless, plaintiff did not file this suit until 1983, five years after the alleged breach.

Section 12-301 requires contract suits to be filed within three years after the cause of action accrues; for a loan repayable on demand at a specified time, the limitations period begins when demand is made.

Dilbeck v. Murphy · filed 1985-12-20

The applicable statute of limitations for suits on contracts requires suit to be commenced within three years from the time the cause of action accrues. D.C.Code § 12-301 (1981). Where, as here, the un-controverted facts show a loan of money to be repaid on demand at a specified time, 1.e., 90 days after March 8, 1976, the statute begins to run at the time the demand is made.

Section 12-301(7) provides a three-year limitations period for contract actions not made under seal.

A.I. Trade Finance, Inc. v. Petra International Banking Corporation · filed 1995-08-22(7)

We therefore conclude that the three-year limitation period for contracts not under seal applies in the present case.

Section 12-301 imposes a three-year limitation on contract actions, a twelve-year period for actions on sealed instruments, and a residual three-year period when no other limitation applies.

Murray v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage · filed 2008-07-17(7), (6), (8)

For a contract-based action, the statute of limitations is ordinarily three years. D.C.Code § 12-301(7) (2001). The statute of limitations for an action brought on an instrument under seal however is twelve years, D.C.Code § 12-301(6) (2001), a period of time from breach to filing well beyond the time that elapsed here. Therefore we must first determine whether the settlement agreement in question here is an instrument under seal. ... In sum, we hold that the settlement agreement is a simple contract and not a sealed instrument because the word seal does not appear opposite the owners’ signatures, there is no clause in the body of the contract indicating the parties’ intent to create a sealed instrument, and there is no indication that the owners intended to adopt the notary stamps as their seals. Nor is there any claim that GE Capital intended the document to be one under seal. ... D.C.Code § 12-301(8) (2001) provides that a three-year statute of limitations applies when no other period of limitation is specified for an action. No statute of limitations is specified for actions brought under the D.C. Consumer Protection Act, D.C.Code §§ 28-3801-3819, and so the residual three-year statute of limitations applies. ... A plaintiff must bring an action based on the Consumer Protection Procedures Act within three years “from the time the right to maintain the action accrues!.]” D.C.Code § 12-301.

Section 12-301(8) supplies the limitations period that made the appellant’s negligence action time-barred.

Brown v. American Postal Workers Union · filed 2010-04-16(8)

The district court properly dismissed the appellant’s negligence action as time-barred pursuant to D.C.Code § 12-301(8).

Section 12-301(7) gives actions on simple contracts, express or implied, a three-year limitations period.

Gauer v. Gallaudet University · filed 2013-01-16(7)

The parties do not dispute that a three-year statute of limitations applies. ... under District of Columbia law, the limitations period for bringing an action “on a simple contract, express or implied[, is] 3 years.” D.C.Code § 12-301(7). By the Court’s calculation, plaintiff may maintain a FMLA or breach of contract claim arising on or after April 24, 2009, three years prior to the filing of plaintiffs initial complaint. ... Here, plaintiffs claims accrued no later than March 25, 2009, such that the filing of his complaint on April 24, 2012, is untimely because it was more than three years later.

Section 12-301(7) requires a contract action to be filed within three years after the right to maintain the action accrues, and a breach-of-contract claim generally accrues when the breach occurs.

Wright v. Howard University · filed 2013-02-14(7)

A contract action must be brought within three years of the date on which the “right to maintain the action accrues.” ... An action for breach of contract generally accrues at the time of the breach.

Section 12-301 provides a three-year limitations period for breach-of-contract claims.

Robinson v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority · filed 2016-03-08

Since the plaintiff alleges no breach of his Union’s duty of fair representation, the general three-year statute of limitations applicable under District of Columbia law applies to the plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claims.

Section 12-301(7) sets a three-year limit for simple-contract claims, but that limit does not warrant dismissing a complaint that plausibly alleges later breaches.

Mawakana v. Board of Trustees of the University of the District of Columbia · filed 2015-07-10(7)

For the same reason, defendant’s assertion that any breach prior to October 2, 2011 is time- barred is not a ground for dismissal of plaintiff’s contract claims. See Def.’s Mem. at 17, citing D.C. Code § 12-301(7) (setting a three-year statute of limitations for claims based “on a simple contract, express or implied”). Even if his claims based on an alleged breach prior to the fall of 2011 are outside the applicable statute of limitations, plaintiff has plausibly alleged that a breach of the Standards and Procedures’ annual tenure review provisions occurred in 2011 and 2012.

Section 12-301(7) provides the three-year breach-of-contract limitations period that the court applied to an ERISA benefit claim lacking an express federal limitations period.

Virtue v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Retirement & Family Protection Plan · filed 2013-04-25(7)

Under these circumstances, courts in this district have applied the District of Columbia’s statute of limitations for breach-of-eon-tract actions, see D.C.Code § 12-301(7), which runs for three years from the time when “the plaintiff discovers, or with due diligence should have discovered the injury that is the basis of the action.” ... The Court agrees: at the very least, this second notice triggered the statute of limitations, which began to run in April 2006 and expired no later than April 2009.

Section 12-301(7) gives three years to bring a state-law contract claim.

Snowden v. Zinke · filed 2020-12-09(7)

... his window for doing so has long expired, given that the statute of limitations for challenging contracts like the LCA ran out in 2014, at the latest, which was a whole year before Snowden filed this lawsuit, see Holmes v. United States, 657 F.3d 1303, 1313–17 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (explaining that if a contract falls within the purview of the Tucker Act, which allows plaintiffs to raise federal challenges regarding contracts with the United States government under certain circumstances, a six-year statute of limitations applies); see also D.C. Code § 12-301(7) (providing for a three-year statute of limitations for contract-based claims brought under state law).

Section 12-301(6) provides a twelve-year limitations period for instruments under seal, but it does not apply when no seal was attached or adopted.

Farouki v. Petra International Banking Corp. · filed 2015-06-02(6)

Petra alternately argues that the twelve-year statute of limitations applicable to instruments “under seal” should apply in this case. See D.C.Code § 12-301(6). That argument is foreclosed by Murray v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, 953 A.2d 308 (D.C.2008), in which the D.C. Court of Appeals declined to consider a similar contract as having been executed under seal. As in Murray, neither the word “seal” nor any physical seal appears next to Farouki’s signature on the Guaranty, and notary stamps were affixed only after the parties had signed the instrument. Id. at 318-19. The inclusion of language referencing a seal elsewhere in the document, moreover, “does not operate to make the instrument one under seal,” because “[i]t is the attachment or adoption of a seal that is the operative fact.” Id. at 318. The district court thus correctly found the twelve-year statute of limitations for sealed instruments inapplicable in this case.

Under § 12-301, a guaranty that is not shown to be sealed is subject to the three-year limitations period for simple contracts, rather than the twelve-year period for sealed instruments.

Farouki v. Petra International Banking Corp. · filed 2011-09-20(6) and (7)

The AEGIS Guaranty, on its face, does not contain an actual seal or the word “seal” next to or opposite Mr. Farouki’s signature. ... Absent any indication in the body of the Guaranty that the parties actually intended to seal the Guaranty when they signed it, the Court will not construe the conditional language in the recital clause as an intent to execute the Guaranty under seal. ... The Court has found that the AEGIS Guaranty was not an instrument under seal and is therefore subject to the three-year statute of limitations under D.C.Code § 12-301(7) for simple contracts.

Section 12-301(6)’s twelve-year limitations period for sealed instruments does not apply when the operative contract was not signed under seal.

District of Columbia Water & Sewer Authority v. Delon Hampton & Associates · filed 2004-05-27(6)

While the word seal appears on the signature page, no seal was placed anywhere on the contract, there were no seals on the critical signature page, and the signatures were not notarized. Moreover, the word “seal” does not appear next to any signatures. We have said that “[cjourts have been reluctant to declare a document to be sealed in the absence of evidence that the parties intended it to be under seal.” ... In light of this strict standard, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that the operative document was not signed under seal.

Subsection (6) establishes a twelve-year statute of limitations for instruments under seal.

Coker v. Basic Media, Ltd. · filed 1983-07-05(6)

D.C. Code § 12-301(6) establishes a twelve-year statute of limitations for instruments under seal.

D.C. Code § 12-301(6) applies a twelve-year limitations period to an action on a bond treated as a specialty.

President of Georgetown College v. Madden · filed 1980-09-24(6)

In both Maryland and the District of Columbia, a bond is a specialty to which a twelve year statute of limitations attaches.

The 12-year limitations period under § 12-301(6) begins when the guarantor becomes obligated to pay and bars an enforcement claim filed after that period expires.

Farouki v. Petra International Banking Corp · filed 2013-01-25(6)

The limitations period began in 1987, when AEGIS declared bankruptcy and Farouki was obligated to pay Petra under the Guaranty Agreement, and the limitations period expired in 1999. But Petra did not sue Farouki to enforce the Guaranty Agreement until 2009, which was far too late.

Section 12-301(6) gives a twelve-year limitations period to actions on an instrument under seal, and a corporate seal plus an attestation clause stating that the parties signed and sealed the document can qualify.

Burgess v. Square 3324 Hampshire Gardens Apartments, Inc. · filed 1997-04-03(6)

Thus, in order for a document to be an instrument under seal for statute of limitations purposes, something more than a corporate seal, such as, for example, a recitation that the document is “signed and sealed,” is required. ... On the basis of the forgoing, we are compelled to hold that the proprietary lease here was a sealed instrument and that the twelve year statute of limitations is applicable.

Section 12-301(6) specifically addresses sealed instruments and provides a twelve-year limitations period; the court found the foreclosure timely even under that shorter period.

Archie v. U.S. Bank, N.A., As Trustee for the RMAC Trust, Series 2016-CTT · filed 2021-08-05(6)

However, while § 28:3-118(a) is specific as to notes, § 12-301(6) is equally specific regarding instruments under seal. ... We need not address this argument either because there is no dispute that PennyMac timely commenced its action even if the applicable limitations period is the shorter, twelve-year period referenced in § 12-301(6).

For professional-malpractice claims, § 12-301(8)'s three-year period generally begins when the plaintiff suffers injury, but speculative or merely nominal harm does not trigger accrual; on this record, accrual could not be fixed before the IRS definitively disputed the refund claims.

Hillbroom v. Pricewaterhousecoopers LLP · filed 2011-04-07(8)

A claim for professional malpractice may not be brought more than three years after the right to maintain the cause of action accrues. See D.C.Code § 12-301(8) (2001); Weisberg v. Williams, Connolly & Califano, 390 A.2d 992, 994 (D.C.1978). In general, “this means the time when the plaintiff suffers injury.”

For a legal-malpractice claim subject to § 12-301's three-year period, the claim accrues when the client suffers actual injury, or, when the injury is not readily apparent, when the client knows or reasonably should have discovered the injury and the essential facts of malpractice.

Byers v. Burleson · filed 1983-08-05§ 12-301(8)

Legal malpractice claims in the District of Columbia “may not be brought” more than three years “from the time the right to maintain the action accrues.”

A legal-malpractice claim accrues when the client suffers actual injury, starting the statute’s three-year limitations period no later than that injury date.

Hunt v. Bittman · filed 1980-01-09§ 12-301(8)

Under this rule, a claim for legal malpractice accrues when the plaintiff-client suffers actual injury.

D.C. Code § 12-301(8) supplies a three-year limitations period for legal-malpractice claims, with accrual governed by the discovery rule and continuous representation.

Seed Co. v. Westerman · filed 2014-07-30(8)

In the District of Columbia, legal malpractice claims must be brought within three years of the claimed injury.

D.C. Code § 12-301(8)'s three-year limitations period and discovery rule bar legal-malpractice and fiduciary-duty claims when reasonable diligence would have revealed the injury and wrongdoing more than three years before suit.

Momenian v. Davidson · filed 2016-09-19(8)

the court adheres to its original conclusion: if Plaintiffs ‘had exercised reasonable diligence, as the ‘discovery rule’ requires, they would have learned’ about Defendant’s alleged malfeasance ‘well before’ May 6, 2012, the outer boundary of the three-year statute of limitations.

D.C. Code § 12-301(8) imposes a three-year limitations period measured from accrual.

Momenian v. Davidson · filed 2017-12-29(8)

The limitations period for Plaintiffs’ claims is three years from the date they accrued.

For claims governed by § 12-301(a)(7), the three-year limitations period does not begin until the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the injury, its cause in fact, and some evidence of wrongdoing; disputed accrual and diligence facts precluded summary judgment.

Radbod v. Mohim Superior Court · filed 2022-02-17(a)(7)

Under the “discovery rule,” however, a breach of contract claim does not accrue, and the statute of limitations period does not begin to run, “until the plaintiff knows, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should know, of the injury.” ... More generally, a cause of action subject to the discovery rule accrues when the plaintiff knows, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should know, of (1) the injury, (2) its cause in fact, and (3) some evidence of wrongdoing.

For a medical-malpractice claim, the three-year limitations period begins when the injured party knew, or through reasonable diligence should have known, the facts giving rise to the claim.

Maytrude Jones, Administratrix of Estate of Alexander L. Jones, Dec., Maytrude Jones v. Rogers Memorial Hospital · filed 1971-02-04(8)

We reverse the order dismissing the complaint and adopt the “discovery” rule set forth by the late Judge Holtzoff in Burke v. Washington Hospital Center, 293 F.Supp. 1328 (D.D.C. 1968), a ease where a foreign object was left in the patient under surgery. Under the discovery rule the statute of limitations does not begin to run in malpractice cases until the injured party knew, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, of the *775 facts giving rise to his claim.

Under the discovery rule, the limitations period begins when the plaintiff learns or should learn through due diligence that the injury resulted from the defendant's wrongdoing; certainty or knowledge of every legal element is unnecessary.

Dawson v. Eli Lilly and Co. · filed 1982-07-28(8), (4)

We predict that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals would hold that the statute of limitations in this case did not begin to run until plaintiff learned, or in the exercise of due diligence should have learned, that her injuries were the result of some wrongdoing on the part of defendants. This does not mean that plaintiff had to be aware of all the elements of a legal cause of action, of the probability of success in such a lawsuit, or that her knowledge of wrongdoing had to rise to a level of certainty. It merely means that she had to have some awareness, or imputed awareness, that her injuries were the result of some wrongdoing on the part of defendants.

For contract and property-damage claims arising from deficient design or construction, the three-year limitations period under § 12-301(7) and (3) begins when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the injury.

Ehrenhaft v. Malcolm Price, Inc. · filed 1984-11-14(7), (3)

Under D.C.Code § 12-301(7) (1981), in order to maintain a cause of action on a simple contract, express or implied, a lawsuit must be brought within three years following the accrual of the claim. ... Under D.C.Code § 12-301(3) (1981), a lawsuit to maintain a cause of action for the recovery of damages to real or personal property also must be brought within three years of the claim’s accrual. ... We therefore hold that in an action based upon tort and contract claims arising out of allegedly deficient design and construction of an addition to a house, the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff knows, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should know, of the injury.

Section 12-301(8) gives a personal-injury plaintiff three years from accrual to sue, subject to the discovery rule when the injury is not readily apparent.

Nelson v. American National Red Cross · filed 1993-03-12(8)

The District of Columbia Survival Statute, D.C.Code § 16-2701 (1981) saves an extant right of action “in whose favor it has accrued for any cause” for posthumous enforcement by a decedent’s estate. If the “cause” is a personal injury done to the decedent while he was alive, the “right of action” is governed for limitations purposes by D.C.Code § 12-301(8) (1981), which provides that such actions “may not be brought after the expiration of [three years] from the time the right to maintain the action accrues.” Estate of Chappelle v. Sanders, 442 A.2d 157, 158 (D.C.1982). Under controlling District of Columbia precedents the right to maintain an action for injury to the person “accrues” when “injury result[s]” from a prospective defendant’s wrongful conduct. See Hanna v. Fletcher, 231 F.2d 469, 472 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 989, 76 S.Ct. 1051, 100 L.Ed. 1501 (1956). But when “the fact of injury [is] not readily apparent and ... might not become apparent for several years after the incident causing injury ha[s] occurred,” Ehrenhaft v. Malcolm Price, Inc., 483 A.2d 1192, 1201 (D.C.1984), the District of Columbia courts follow the “discovery rule” by which the limitations period will not commence to run until the injury ought to be apparent, or “when the plaintiff knows or through the exercise of due diligence should have known of the injury.” Burns v. Bell, 409 A.2d 614, 617 (D.C.1979).

Section 12-301(8)'s discovery rule starts a medical-malpractice limitations period when the patient knows or reasonably should know of injury caused by negligence, and does not allow delaying suit to await later complications after appreciable harm.

Colbert v. Georgetown University · filed 1994-05-05(8)

In the District of Columbia, an action for medical malpractice must be brought within three years “from the time the right to maintain the action accrues.” D.C.Code § 12-301(8) (1989). ... Under that rule, a medical malpractice claim does not accrue until the patient has “discovered or reasonably should have discovered all of the essential elements of her possible cause of action, ie., duty, breach, causation and damages.” ... The discovery rule does not, however permit a plaintiff who has information regarding a defendant’s negligence, and who knows that she has been significantly injured, to defer institution of suit and wait and see whether additional injuries come to light.

Under § 12-301, when a plaintiff totally represses memories of childhood sexual abuse, the claim accrues when she recovers the memory enough to know or reasonably should know of the injury, its cause, and related wrongdoing.

Farris v. Compton · filed 1994-12-29(4)

Having considered these materials as well as our own cases, we now join those courts — apparently a substantial majority — which hold that where a plaintiff has alleged total repression of any recollection of sexual abuse which allegedly occurred during her childhood, her claim does not accrue until the date that she recovered her memory to the extent that she knows, or reasonably should know, of “some injury, its cause, and related wrongdoing.” ... If the defendant disputes the repression, or the date on which the plaintiff recovered her memory, then the issue must be determined by the trier of fact, and cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss the complaint.

Section 12-301(8) gives negligence, strict-liability, and misrepresentation claims three years after accrual, with discovery-rule accrual when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the injury, its cause, and some evidence of wrongdoing.

Colarossi v. Schmid Laboratories, Inc. · filed 1993-07-15(8)

Under District of Columbia law, an action for negligence, strict liability or misrepresentation must be brought within three years after a cause of action accrues. ... The court in Bussineau held: “[F]or a cause of action to accrue where the discovery rule is applicable, one must know or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should know (1) of the injury, (2) its cause in fact, and (3) of some evidence of wrongdoing.”9 518 A.2d at 435; see also Nelson v. American Nat. Red Cross, 815 F.Supp. 501, 503 (D.D.C.1993).

Section 12-301 permits the continuous-representation exception: a legal-malpractice claim does not accrue until representation concerning the specific matter ends, even if the client knows of the alleged negligence.

R.D.H. Communications, Ltd. v. Winston · filed 1997-09-18

We think that it should and now hold that the continuous representation rule is applicable in the District of Columbia. Under this rule, when the injury to the client may have occurred during the period the attorney was retained, the malpractice cause of action does not accrue until the attorney’s representation concerning the particular matter in issue is terminated.

Section 12-301(8) starts the three-year limitations period when a plaintiff knows or, with reasonable diligence, should know of the injury, its cause in fact, and some evidence of wrongdoing; inquiry notice may arise before all damages or facts are known.

Hendel v. World Plan Executive Council · filed 1997-12-30(8)

The parties agree that Ms. Hendel was required to bring her action within three years “from the time the right to,maintain the action accrues.” D.C.Code § 12-301(8) (1995). If, as a matter of law, Ms. Hendel’s claim accrued prior to September 1, 1986, then the complaint was time-barred. If, on the other hand, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Ms. Hendel’s right of action accrued before or after September 1,1986, then the. defendants were not entitled to summary judgment based on the expiration of the statute of limitations. ... The discovery rule does not, however, give the plaintiff carte blanche to defer legal action indefinitely if she knows or should know that she may have suffered injury and that the defendant may have caused her harm. Indeed, a right of action may accrue before the plaintiff becomes aware of all of the relevant facts. “It is not necessary that all or even the greater part of the damages ... occur before the [right] of action arises.” Knight v. Furlow, 553 A.2d 1232, 1235 (D.C.1989) (citation omitted). Any “appreciable and actual harm flowing from the [defendant’s] conduct” is sufficient. Id. “[T]he law of limitations requires only that [the plaintiff] have inquiry notice of the existence of a cause of action....” Colbert, supra, 641 A.2d at 473 (emphasis added) (quoting Baker v. A.H. Robins Co., 613 F.Supp. 994, 996 (D.D.C.1985)). We must therefore determine whether, as a matter of law, Ms. Hendel was placed on inquiry notice prior to September 1, 1986, of the possibility that she had suffered appreciable harm as a result of the wrongful conduct of the defendants. ... In our view, the record, considered in the light most favorable to Ms. Hendel, demonstrates beyond peradventure that prior to September 1, 1986, Ms. Hendel was placed on inquiry notice as to each element of her right of action. We are satisfied that no impartial juror could reasonably find that she was not.

Section 12-301(8) imposes a three-year limitations period that begins under the discovery rule when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the injury, its cause, and some wrongdoing.

Smith v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. · filed 1998-05-19(8)

Plaintiffs’ product liability claims are governed by a three-year statute of limitations. See D.C.Code § 12-301(8) (1981). The parties agree that the “discovery rule” applies in this situation. Thus, the statute of limitations on plaintiffs’ product, liability claims accrued when plaintiffs knew or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of Mrs. Smith’s injury, its cause in fact, and some wrongdoing by defendants.

Under the discovery rule, a medical-malpractice claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the injury, its cause in fact, and some evidence of wrongdoing, even without full knowledge of the wrongdoing.

Morton v. National Medical Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1999-02-11(8)

Applying the reasoning of Colbert to the present case, we hold that appellants’ malpractice actions accrued around the times of their hospitalizations because it was then that they gained some knowledge of appel-lees’ malpractice, and of their injuries. The fact that appellants lacked full knowledge of the extent of appellees’ alleged wrongdoing does not alter that conclusion. Thus, we reject appellants suggestion that they were not on notice of appellees’ malpractice until they learned of the alleged nationwide conspiracy.

Section 12-301(8) imposes a three-year limitations period on legal-malpractice actions, but accrual may depend on discovery or inquiry notice, and tolling may apply where fiduciary conduct conceals wrongdoing.

Ray v. Queen · filed 2000-03-16(8)

In this action for legal malpractice, the trial judge granted the attorney’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the suit was barred by the three-year statute of limitations. See D.C.Code § 12-301(8) (1995). The client appeals, contending that the action was timely under the “discovery rule” and related equitable principles. We conclude that a genuine issue of material fact is presented as to whether, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, the client should have known or suspected at the relevant times that the attorney’s conduct was wrongful. Accordingly, we reverse. ... Under the discovery rule, a plaintiffs right of action in a legal malpractice case does not accrue until the plaintiff has knowledge of, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have knowledge of (1) the existence of the injury; (2) its cause in fact; and (3) some evidence of wrongdoing. ... We hold only that, under all of the circumstances, summary judgment was not warranted.

The three-year limitations period under D.C. Code § 12-301 runs when a tort claim accrues, including when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the injury, its cause, and some evidence of wrongdoing.

Jacobsen v. Oliver · filed 2002-04-29

A claim accrues when the actual injury occurs. ... The statute of limitations on a tort claim ordinarily begins to run when plaintiffs sustain a tortious injury, but under the “discovery rule,” it begins to run when plaintiffs know or reasonably should know that the cause of action exists. ... In other words, under the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues when plaintiffs have knowledge or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have knowledge of (i) the existence of the injury; (ii) its cause in fact; and (in) some evidence of wrongdoing.

For a medical-negligence claim, § 12-301(8) gives the plaintiff three years from accrual; when the wrong and injury are not readily apparent, accrual waits until the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know the injury, its cause, and some evidence of wrongdoing.

Hardi v. Mezzanotte · filed 2003-03-20(8)

In this jurisdiction, an action for medical negligence must be filed within three years from the time the right to maintain the action accrues. See D.C.Code § 12-301(8) (2002). ... However, where the fact of the alleged tortious conduct and resulting injury are not readily apparent, we apply the discovery rule to determine the date on which the statute of limitations commences to run. ... Under the discovery rule, “a medical malpractice claim does not accrue until the patient has ‘discovered or reasonably should have discovered all of the essential elements of her possible cause of action, ie., duty, breach, causation and damages.” ’ ... This means that, under the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues for limitation purposes once the plaintiff: (1) has some knowledge of the injury, (2) its cause in fact, and (3) some evidence of wrongdoing on the part of the person responsible. ... The circumstances show that the wrong was not readily ascertainable before March 8th. Under the discovery rule, the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff knows or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should know of the injury, its cause in fact and some evidence of wrongdoing. ... We agree with the trial court that, on the record presented, the time when appellee can be charged with such knowledge occurred on or after March 8th. Therefore, the trial court properly granted partial summary judgment in her favor on this issue.

Section 12-301(8) imposes a three-year limitations period on tort claims, but under the D.C. discovery rule the period begins when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the injury, its cause, and some evidence of wrongdoing.

Lee v. Wolfson · filed 2003-05-08(8)

Plaintiffs tort claims are governed by the District of Columbia’s three-year statute Of limitations. D.C.Code § 12-301(8). Thus, plaintiff must file her claims within three years of the date on which they accrued. Generally, a cause of action accrues for the purposes of the statute of limitations at the time the injury actually occurs. ... However, in cases where the relationship between the fact of injury and the tortious conduct is obscure, District of Columbia law provides for the application of a discovery rule and the statute of limitations will not run until plaintiff knows or reasonably should know that an injury has been suffered due to the defendant’s wrongdoing. ... Specifically, under the discovery rule, “a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff has knowledge of (or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should' have knowledge of) (1) the existence of the injury, (2) its cause in fact, and (3) some evidence of wrongdoing.”

Section 12-301(8)'s three-year limitations period for legal-malpractice claims does not begin until the plaintiff sustains a demonstrable, legally cognizable injury; a merely potential injury is insufficient.

Wagner v. Sellinger · filed 2004-04-29(8)

This proposition becomes self-evident when one takes time to recognize that a statute of limitations cannot begin to run until the first day on which discovery will show that the plaintiff had a bona fide lawsuit based on injury, meaning a legally cognizable claim that would survive a motion to dismiss. Absent injury, there is no lawsuit. ... In sum, for lack of a demonstrable injury before the jury verdict was entered against the Wagners on August 27, 1996 in their medical malpractice action, Mrs. Wagner’s suit against appellee Sellinger and his firm, filed August 8, 1997, came well within the three-year statute of limitations.

Section 12-301(8) gives a products-liability plaintiff three years from accrual, which under the discovery rule occurs when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the injury, its cause in fact, and some evidence of wrongdoing.

Reeves v. Eli Lilly and Co. · filed 2005-03-11(8)

Product liability claims in the District of Columbia must be brought within a three-year period of limitation “from the time the light to maintain the action accrues.” D.C.Code § 12-301(8) (2001). ... Where the discovery rule is applicable, in order for the cause of action to accrue, “one must know (or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should know) (1) of the injury, (2) its cause in fact and (3) of some evidence of wrongdoing.”

Section 12-301(8) starts the three-year limitations period when, under the discovery rule, the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the injury, its cause in fact, and some evidence of wrongdoing; for medically complex causation, medical advice identifying the defendant's wrongdoing as a plausible cause is enough, rather than medical certainty.

Brin v. S.E.W. Investors · filed 2006-07-13(8)

Since patients must rely on their doctors, a person cannot reasonably be expected or required to act until that person has some medical advice to support a linkage between a known injury and wrongdoing of which the person has some evidence. On the other hand, while mere suspicion cannot supply that linkage, the medical advice need not show a linkage to a “reasonable medical certainty.”

Section 12-301(8) requires a legal-malpractice action to be filed within three years after the right to sue accrues, with accrual governed by injury, discovery, and the end of continuous representation.

Bleck v. Power · filed 2008-09-04(8)

A legal malpractice action in the District of Columbia must be filed within three years “from the time the right to maintain the action accrues.” ... Under the “discovery rule,” however, “a plaintiffs right of action in a legal malpractice case does not accrue until the plaintiff has knowledge of, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have knowledge of (1) the existence of the injury; (2) its cause in fact; and (3) some evidence of wrongdoing.” ... In addition, under the “continuous representation rule,” a chent’s legal malpractice claim “does not accrue until the attorney’s representation concerning the particular matter in issue is terminated” (even if the client knows before then that her attorney has made an injurious error).

Section 12-301(8) gives CPPA and common-law fraud claims a three-year limitations period that accrues upon the actual injury or its discovery; disputed concealment facts can prevent dismissal at the summary-judgment stage.

Hughes v. Abell · filed 2010-11-16(8)

The limitations period for bringing an action for a violation of CPPA or for common law fraud is three years. ... The three-year limitations period, however, accrues from the actual injury or the discovery of the injury. ... Because these disputed facts obscure when Hughes’s causes of action under CPPA and for fraud began to accrue, Counts I and IV will not be dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations at this juncture.

D.C. Code § 12-301(4) imposes a one-year limitations period on defamation claims.

Bouchet v. The National Urban League, Inc. Margo Bouchet v. The National Urban League, Inc. · filed 1984-03-23(4)

District of Columbia law ... unequivocally provides a one-year period for appellant’s defamation claim.

The one-year limitations period in § 12-301(5) applies to District of Columbia libel actions seeking forfeiture under § 22-1505(c), but it is tolled from seizure until judgment in the related criminal prosecution.

Ward v. District of Columbia · filed 1985-06-26(5)

the one-year limitations period “for a statutory penalty or forfeiture” in § 12-301(5) is applicable to libel actions for forfeiture brought under § 22-1505(c)

D.C. Code § 12-301(8) provides a three-year statute of limitations for intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims.

Cooke-Seals v. District of Columbia · filed 1997-07-17(8)

The applicable statute of limitations for plaintiffs claim is three years.

Subsection (4) imposes a one-year statute of limitations on assault claims.

Tibbs v. Williams · filed 2003-05-13(4)

the one-year statute of limitations contained in D.C. Code § 12-301(4)

When a claim without its own limitations period is intertwined with defamation, the one-year limitations period for defamation applies.

Dolly Kyle Browning and Direct Outstanding Creations Corporation v. Clinton · filed 2002-08-01(4)

When a cause of action with no prescribed statute of limitations is “intertwined” with one having a prescribed limitations period, District of Columbia courts apply the prescribed period.