D.C. Code § 28-3901

Section 28-3901(a)(2) defines “consumer” to include persons who purchase or provide the economic demand for consumer goods or services, but a taxicab operator’s business-related purchases and services do not qualify.

Mazanderan v. Independent Taxi Owners' Ass'n · filed 1988-11-17(a)(2)

“Consumer” is defined as: ... a person who does or would purchase, lease (from), or receive consumer goods and services, including a co-obligor or surety, or a person who does or would provide the economic demand for a trade practice; as an adjective, “consumer” describes anything, without exception, which is primarily for personal, household, or family use. ... It is difficult to understand how plaintiff, as a taxicab operator, fits under this conventional definition of consumer. ... There is simply no basis for treating plaintiff as a consumer under the District’s unfair trade practices statute.

Section 28-3901(a)(2) limits the CPPA’s private cause of action to consumers, not merchants suing other merchants.

Independent Communications Network Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp. · filed 1987-02-25(a)(2)

In no imaginable way could plaintiff ICN be categorized as a consumer.

The CPPA protects consumer-plaintiffs, not corporations; a plaintiff that is not a consumer cannot sue under the Act.

Clifton Terrace Associates Ltd. v. United Technologies Corp. · filed 1990-01-10

This Court has held that the legislative history of the CPPA, along with a consistent reading of its provisions, unequivocally indicates that the CPPA was intended to protect consumer-plaintiffs only, and not corporations.

Section 28-3901(c) limits CPPA claims to plaintiffs who purchased, leased, or received goods or services in the District of Columbia.

Dekom v. Mae · filed 2021-02-11(c)

Because Dekom did not allege that he purchased, leased, or received goods or services in the District of Columbia, he fails to state a claim under D.C. Code § 28-3901(c).

The CPPA covers a consumer who receives or demands goods or services primarily for personal, household, or family use, assessed when the alleged misconduct occurred.

Hawthorne v. Rushmore Loan Management Services LLC · filed 2021-08-30(a)(2)

In Shaw v. Marriott International, the D.C. Circuit concluded that, for purposes of the CPPA, a “consumer” is “a person who receives or demands goods or services that are primarily for personal, household, or family use.” 605 F.3d 1039, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing D.C. Code § 28-3901(a)(2), (6)). ... The same approach applies here. As in Baylor, there is little doubt that Plaintiff engaged in a covered, consumer transaction when she originally borrowed funds to purchase her personal residence. Id. at 948. But by the time Rushmore became the loan servicer and executed the modification agreements on behalf of U.S. Bank, which itself did not acquire the debt until May 2016, Dkt. 7-3 at 10, Plaintiff no longer resided at the property and, apparently, held the property for investment purposes. Because the CPPA applies only to “consumers”—that is, those who receive or demand goods or services “primarily for personal, household, or family use,” Shaw, 605 F.3d at 1043, her claim fails as a matter law.

Section 28-3901(a)(2) generally covers a transaction when the purchaser is not regularly in the business of buying the type of goods or services for resale; the purchaser’s business status, rather than the goods’ ultimate use, controls.

Adam A. Weschler & Son, Inc. v. Klank · filed 1989-08-07(a)(2)

This analysis, as well as the language of the statute itself, indicates that the relevant distinction is one between retail and wholesale transactions. Transactions along the distribution chain that do not involve the ultimate retail customer are not “consumer transactions” that the Act seeks to reach. Rather, it is the ultimate retail transaction between the final distributor and the individual member of the consuming public that the Act covers. Accordingly, it is not the use to which the purchaser ultimately puts the goods or services, but rather the nature of the purchaser that determines the nature of the transaction. If the purchaser is regularly engaged in the business of buying the goods or service in question for later resale to another in the distribution chain, or at retail to the general public, then a transaction in the course of that business is not within the Act. If, on the other hand, the purchaser is not engaged in the regular business of purchasing this type of goods or service and reselling it, then the transaction will usually fall within the Act. Since Klank is not in the regular business of the retail sale of antiques, it follows that the transaction is one within the Act and its protections.

Section 28-3901(a)(2) treats a person as a consumer when the person does or would purchase, lease, or receive consumer goods or services, or provide the economic demand for a trade practice.

Adler v. Vision Lab Telecommunications, Inc. · filed 2005-10-17(a)(2)

The DCCPPA regulates transactions between a consumer and a merchant. D.C.Code § 28-3904. ... A “consumer” is “a person who does or would purchase, lease (from), or receive consumer goods or services, ... or a person who does or would provide the economic demand for a trade practice.” D.C.Code § 28-3901(a)(2). ... Moreover, the issue is not whether defendants have had “the most direct contact” with plaintiffs (id.), but rather whether plaintiffs “purchase[d], lease[d] ... or receive[d] ... services” from defendants, D.C.Code § 28-3901(a)(2), which they have not.

The CPPA treats a person who purchases or receives consumer goods or services as a consumer, and defines goods and services broadly to include all parts of society's economic output and consumer services of all types.

Di Feng v. Lim · filed 2011-05-12(a)(2), (a)(7)

The CPPA defines a “consumer” as “a person who does or would purchase, lease (from), or receive consumer goods or services ____” § 28-3901(a)(2). “Goods and services” are defined as “any and all parts of the economic output of society, at any stage or related or necessary point in the economic process, and includes consumer credit, franchises, business opportunities, real estate transactions, and consumer services of all types.” § 28-3901(a)(7). In the present case, Plaintiff alleges that he contracted to purchase a service from Lim — i.e., assistance in obtaining a green card. ... Given the broad definition of “goods and services” contained in § 28 — 3901(a) (7) and Plaintiffs allegations that he contracted with Lim for a service in exchange for $10,000, the Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged the facts necessary to establish his status as a consumer for the purpose of these Motions to Dismiss.

Section 28-3901(a)(2)(A) does not treat a loan of money as a purchase or lease of goods or services for purposes of defining a consumer.

Jones v. Law Office of David Sean Dufek, & Cach, LLC · filed 2015-01-06(a)(2)(A)

The DCCPPA defines “consumer” as a “person who, other than for purposes of resale, does or would purchase, lease (or lessee), or receive consumér goods or services, including as a co-obligor or surety, or does or would otherwise provide the economic demand for a trade practice.” D.C.Code § 28-3901(a)(2)(A). Plaintiff does not allege that she purchased or leased any goods or services from defendant, only that there was a loan from CACH’s predecessor-in-interest. PI. Mem. at 14. Money, of course, is neither a good or service, it is a medium of exchange, and a loan of money is not a purchase or lease of goods or services.

Section 28-3901(2) limits “consumer goods” to products used or bought primarily for personal, household, or family use; industrial HVAC valves that are not furniture, furnishings, or personal effects used in the home are excluded.

Quality Air Services, L.L.C. v. Milwaukee Valve Co. · filed 2008-07-21(2)

D.C.Code § 28-3901(2) defines “consumer” goods as products used or bought “primarily for personal, household or family use” without further explanation. ... “Statutory provisions are to be construed not isolation, but together with other related provisions.” Thus, “[a] court interpreting a statute should, whenever possible, read the provision in harmony with other provisions to which it naturally relates.” ... The Court therefore concludes that defendant’s valves are not “consumer goods” as they are not furniture, furnishings, or personal effects used in the home.

The CPPA covers consumer transactions involving property primarily for personal, household, or family use, rather than commercial investment transactions.

Poblete v. Indymac Bank · filed 2009-09-28(a)(2)

The CPPA, by its terms, applies only to consumer transactions, e.g., purchasing property for use as a primary residence, and not to commercial transactions, e.g., purchasing property as a financial investment.

Section 28-3901(a)(2) defines a consumer as someone who receives or seeks goods or services primarily for personal, household, or family use.

Cannon v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2013-03-01(a)(2)

The CPPA defines “consumer” both as a noun and an adjective. In relevant part, the noun “consumer” means “a person who does or would ... receive consumer goods or services,” D.C. Code § 28-3901(a)(2), or “a person who does or would provide the economic demand for” “any act which does or would create, alter, repair, furnish, make available, provide information about, or, directly or indirectly, solicit or offer for or effectuate, a sale, lease or transfer, of consumer goods or services,” id. § 28-3901(a)(2), (6). When used as an adjective, as in the phrase “consumer goods,” the word means “primarily for personal, household, or family use.” Id. § 28-3901(a)(2). We read these provisions together to define “consumer” as a person who receives or demands goods or services that are primarily for personal, household, or family use.

Section 28-3901(a)(2) limits “consumer” status to goods, services, or trade practices primarily for personal, household, or family use, so the Consumer Protection Procedures Act does not cover commercial or investment-property transactions.

Bakeir v. Capital City Mortgage Corporation · filed 2013-03-04(a)(2)

The Consumer Protections Act defines a “consumer” as “a person who does or would purchase, lease (from), or receive consumer goods or services . . . or a person who does or would provide the economic demand for a trade practice” and further specifies that “as an adjective, ‘consumer’ describes anything, without exception, which is primarily for personal, household, or family use.” D.C. Code § 28-3901(a)(2) (2012). The Consumer Protections Act, accordingly, does not apply to transactions of a commercial nature. ... Based on the evidence presented during the trial, it is clear that the plaintiff’s transaction with the defendants does not fall within the purview of the Consumer Protections Act in light of the Court’s finding that she purchased the property for investment purposes. ... Accordingly, the Court finds in favor of the defendants on the plaintiff’s claim under the Consumer Protections Act.

Section 28-3901(a)(2)(A), (B)(i) defines consumers by reference to purchasing, leasing, or receiving goods or services normally used for personal, household, or family purposes.

APA Assessment Fee Litigation v. American Psychological Assoc. · filed 2014-09-05(a)(2)(A), (B)(i)

Both sides agree that the CPPA does not provide plaintiffs with a cause of action. Plaintiffs do not appear to have been acting as “consumer[s]” within the meaning of the statute when they paid the special assessment: they did not “purchase, lease . . . , or receive consumer goods or services,” that is, goods or services “normally use[d] for personal, household, or family purposes.” D.C. Code § 28-3901(a)(2)(A), (B)(i).

Section 28-3901(a)(2)(A) defines a CPPA consumer as someone who does or would purchase or receive consumer goods or services.

Wilding v. DNC Services Corporation · filed 2019-10-28(a)(2)(A)

A “consumer,” in turn, is a person who “does or would purchase . . . or receive consumer goods or services.” D.C. Code § 28-3901(a)(2)(A). See also Price v. Indep. Fed. Sav. Bank, 110 A.3d 567, 574 (D.C. 2015) (“[I]n order to obtain redress under the CPPA, [the plaintiffs] must be ‘consumers,’ defined as ‘a person who . . . does or would purchase . . . or receive consumer goods or services.’”) (quoting § 28-3901(a)(2)(A)). As a result, “the CPPA does not cover all consumer transactions, and instead only covers trade practices arising out of consumer-merchant relationships.” Sundberg v. TTR Realty, LLC, 109 A.3d 1123, 1129 (D.C. 2015).

The Act regulates trade practices arising from consumer-merchant relationships involving consumer goods or services, not attorney settlement negotiations between a former employee and employer.

Cuneo Law Group, P.C · filed 2009-11-19(2), (3), and (6)

The Act defines “trade practice” as “any act which does or would create, alter, repair, furnish, make available, provide information about, or, directly or indirectly, solicit or offer for or effectuate, a sale, lease or transfer, of consumer goods or services.” D.C. Code § 28-3901(6). ... The Act defines a “consumer” as “a person who does or would purchase . . . or receive consumer goods or services . . . or a person who does or would provide the economic demand for a trade practice[,]” and “as an adjective, ‘consumer’ describes anything, without exception, which is primarily for personal, household or family use[.]” Id. § 28-3901(2). ... Finally, the Act defines “merchant” as “a person who in the ordinary course of business does or would supply the goods or services which are or would be the subject matter of a trade practice.” Id. § 28-3901(3). ... Here, the defendant’s actions, in regards to the settlement agreement, cannot by any stretch of the imagination be construed as purchasing activity, but instead involved negotiations between attorneys and their subsequent execution of an agreement settling their dispute. As such, the plaintiffs’ participation in the process that brought about the settlement agreement did not involve them in providing the defendant with any consumer services, and thus the defendant’s claim falls outside the scope of a consumer-merchant relationship, which the D.C. Consumer Act regulates.

Section 28-3901(a)(6) defines a trade practice broadly enough that conduct occurring after a mortgage is signed may still be covered when it can alter, effectuate, or provide information about the mortgage sale.

Ihebereme v. Capital One, N.a · filed 2010-08-09(a)(6)

For the Court to be persuaded by this argument, it must find that none of the challenged behavior “create[d], alter[ed], repair[ed], furnish[ed], ma[d]e available, provide[d] information about, or, directly or indirectly, solicit[ed] or offer[ed] for or effectuate[d]” the sale of the mortgage. See D.C. Code § 28-3901(a)(6). Such a finding is not appropriate at this stage, in light of the facts alleged by plaintiff. ... Accordingly, the Court will not disqualify behavior falling outside of – or after – the act of signing the contract from the DCCPPA’s purview.

The CPPA bars recovery for personal-injury damages arising from tortious medical malpractice claims and does not permit such claims to proceed under the statute.

McGaughey v. District of Columbia · filed 2010-09-24

Because McGaughey's CPPA claims against the Howard defendants similarly "constitute 'attacks on the actual performance of [a physician's] medical service, which would be more appropriately addressed in the context of a [] medical malpractice claim,'" and because the CPPA bars recovery for such damages, the Howard defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

The statute defines “merchant” broadly to include persons who indirectly sell or transfer consumer goods or services, and defines goods or services to include consumer credit.

Chen v. Bell-Smith · filed 2011-03-08(a)(3), (a)(7)

Significantly, the DCCPPA does not require that a party hold himself out as a supplier of consumer goods or services, or that he advertise or solicit business, in order to be considered a "merchant"; rather, the term "merchant" includes all persons who "sell" or "transfer, either directly or indirectly, consumer goods or services." See D.C. Code § 28-3901(a)(3) (2005).

Section 28-3901(a)(3) defines a merchant to include a person who ordinarily sells or supplies consumer goods or services, and the person need not be the actual seller if connected with the supply side of the transaction.

Hall v. South River Restoration, Inc. · filed 2017-09-11(a)(3)

Under the CPPA, “‘merchant’ means a person, whether organized or operating for profit or for a nonprofit purpose, who in the ordinary course of business does or would sell, lease (to), or transfer, either directly or indirectly, consumer goods or services, or a person who in the ordinary course of business does or would supply the goods or services which are or would be the subject matter of a trade practice.” D.C. Code § 28-3901(a)(3). Both parties agree that “[a] merchant need not be the ‘actual seller of the goods or services’ complained of, but must be ‘connected with the supply side of the consumer transaction.’” Adler v. Vision Lab Telecommunications, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 35, 39 (D.D.C. 2005) (quoting Save Immaculata/Dunblane, Inc. v. Immaculata Prep. Sch., 514 A.2d 1152, 1159 (D.C. 1986)). On the particular facts of this case, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Defendant was sufficiently “connected with the supply side of the consumer transaction” to allow their CPPA claim to move forward.

Section 28-3901 does not make a nonprofit blood bank a merchant merely because it charges fees for providing blood.

Kozup v. Georgetown University · filed 1987-07-07(a)(3), (a)(6)

That the ARC assesses charges for the provision of blood is not determinative of its identity as a “merchant” under the Act.

Section 28-3901 covers entities that sell consumer credit or take assignment of a credit account and continue extending credit, and defines trade practice to include furnishing or transferring consumer credit.

Osinubepi-Alao v. Plainview Financial Services Ltd. · filed 2014-05-29(a)(3), (a)(6)

The Consumer Protection Procedure Act applies to merchants “who sell[] consumer credit as well as those entities which take an assignment of the credit account and continue the extension of credit to the consumer.”

Section 28-3901(a) defines a CPPA “merchant” to include a person who, in the ordinary course of business, sells, leases, or transfers consumer goods or services; repeated property purchases, renovations, and resales plausibly satisfy that definition at the pleading stage.

Levick v. Kiser · filed 2016-09-08(a)

Under the CPPA, a merchant is defined as “a person, whether organized or operating for profit or for a nonprofit purpose, who in the ordinary course of business does or would sell, lease (to), or transfer, either directly or indirectly, consumer goods or services . . . .” D.C. Code § 28-3901. ... Accepting all the allegations in the Complaint as true, and “constru[ing] reasonable inferences from those allegations in the plaintiff’s favor,” Sissel, 760 F.3d at 4, it is plausible that the defendant falls within the CPPA’s definition of “merchant.”

Under the CPPA, a merchant includes a person who sells or supplies consumer goods or services that are or would be the subject matter of a trade practice; a consumer is a person who purchases, leases, or receives consumer goods or services or provides the economic demand for a trade practice.

Cronin v. Adam A. Weschler & Son, Inc. · filed 2012-11-15(a)(3)

While its protections apply to a wide range of transactions, “a valid claim for relief under the CPPA must originate out of a consumer transaction.” Ford v. ChartOne, Inc., 908 A.2d 72, 81 (D.C. 2006). Under the CPPA, the term “merchant” “means a person . . . who . . . does or would sell, lease (to), or transfer, either directly or indirectly, consumer goods or services, or a person who does or would supply the goods or services which are or would be the subject matter of a trade practice.” D.C. Code § 28-3901(a)(3). It is thus clear that Weschler’s, by selling the goods, qualifies as a merchant. “Consumer,” on the other hand, means “a person who does or would purchase, lease (from), or receive consumer goods or services, including a co-obligor or surety, or a person who does or would provide the economic demand for a trade practice.” Id. § 28-3901(a)(2). As Plaintiff here never obtained or sought to obtain any goods or services from Wechsler’s, she was not a “consumer” for purposes of the CPPA; as such, she cannot allege a claim under the statute.

Section 28-3901 et seq. provides consumers a cause of action against merchants for unfair or deceptive practices involving goods or services, but does not cover claims arising exclusively from an employee-employer relationship.

Plummer v. Safeway, Inc. · filed 2013-03-30

Count II of Plummer’s complaint alleges a cause of action for unfair and deceptive trade practices, and Count VII alleges an unspecified claim under the DCCPPA. ... Both require the presence of a consumer-merchant relationship. ... Plummer does not assert a consumer-merchant relationship with Safeway, nor can one be inferred since Plummer is a Safeway employee and the only factual information in the record relates to his employee-employer relationship with Safeway. Because Plummer cannot bring a cause of action under the DCCPPA for claims arising exclusively out of his employment relationship, he fails to state a claim under the DCCPPA.

The CPPA covers consumer-merchant relationships involving goods or services, but a borrower’s loan-servicing inquiries did not state a covered consumer claim.

Edmond v. American Educational Services National Collegiate Trust · filed 2010-10-28

If, as plaintiff alleges, AES services a loan extended by Bank of America, plaintiff is not a consumer seeking relief as against a merchant with whom he contracted for services.

The CPPA's protections apply to conduct involving a consumer-merchant relationship, and a merchant is one who supplies or sells the consumer goods or services at issue.

Baylor v. Mitchell Rubenstein & Associat · filed 2017-05-30(c), (a)(3)

The CPPA applies only to consumer-merchant relationships. ... However, decisions from the D.C. Court of Appeals indicate that a merchant need only be connected with the “supply side” of a consumer transaction for liability to attach. ... In this situation, it seems implausible to characterize Appellee as someone who sold or transferred consumer goods or services or who supplied the goods or services which are or would be the subject matter of a trade practice. ... In light of the terms of the statute, we are constrained to hold that Appellee’s conduct falls outside the scope of the CPPA. ... Because we find that Appellee’s actions did not take place within the context of a consumer-merchant relationship, as required by the CPPA, we need not address Appellant’s claim that debt collection is a “trade practice” as defined by this statute.

Section 28-3901 limits CPPA coverage to trade practices arising from consumer-merchant relationships and does not impose aiding-and-abetting or civil-conspiracy liability on non-merchants.

Sundberg v. TTR Realty LLC · filed 2015-02-12(a)(3)

the CPPA does not cover all consumer transactions, and instead only covers “trade practices arising out of consumer-merchant relationships.”

The DCCPPA generally governs trade practices arising from consumer-merchant relationships.

Owens v. Bank of America NA · filed 2018-09-14

Generally, the DCCPPA “police[s] trade practices arising only out of consumer-merchant relationships.”

The CPPA requires a consumer-merchant relationship for conduct to qualify as an actionable trade practice.

Kopff v. Battaglia · filed 2006-03-29

For the reasons articulated by Judge Huvelle in a similar case, the Court concludes that plaintiffs fail to state a claim under the CPPA because there is no consumer-merchant relationship within the meaning of the statute, and therefore Battaglia’s actions cannot qualify as actionable trade practices.

The CPPA reaches consumer transactions between merchants and ultimate retail consumers, not transactions elsewhere in the distribution chain.

In Re G-Fees Antitrust Litigation · filed 2008-10-29

The CPPA was enacted “to police trade practices arising only out of consumer-merchant relationships.” ... “Transactions along the distribution chain that do not involve the ultimate retail customer are not ‘consumer transactions’ that the Act seeks to reach. Rather, it is the ultimate retail transaction between the final distributor and the individual member of the consuming public that the Act covers.” ... Because plaintiffs are unable to allege that they are consumers of anything Fannie Mae provides, they cannot state a claim under the CPPA, and defendants’ motion to dismiss the claim under the D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act, Count V, will be granted.

Section 28-3901(c) requires the D.C. Consumer Protection Act to be construed and applied liberally to promote its remedial purposes, including eliminating improper trade practices.

Jefferson v. Collins · filed 2012-11-28(c)

While the Court appreciates that the D.C. Consumer Protection Act must be “construed and applied liberally to promote its” remedial purposes, such as the elimination of “all improper trade practices,” D.C. Code § 28-3901(c), (b)(1), federal pleading standards nonetheless require the plaintiffs to allege sufficient factual content to support a plausible claim to relief, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

The DCCPPA must be construed and applied liberally to promote its purpose, but liberal construction does not relieve a plaintiff of pleading facts supporting a claim.

['HANCOCK v. URBAN OUTFITTERS, INC.'] · filed 2014-03-14(c)

Although the DCCPPA “shall be construed and applied liberally to promote its purpose,” D.C. Code § 28-3901(c), even under the most liberal interpretation of the plaintiffs’ complaint, the plaintiffs have not pleaded that the transactions at issue would not have been completed had the plaintiffs not provided their ZIP codes.

Section 28-3901(c) requires the CPPA to be construed and applied liberally because it is broadly remedial and protects consumers’ right to truthful information.

Mann v. Capital Health Care Associates, Inc. · filed 2017-04-27(c)

Where, as here, the statute is designed to be broadly remedial, the test is “not especially demanding.” Id. at 1389 (internal quotation marks omitted); see D.C. Code § 28-3901(c) (the CPPA “shall be construed and applied liberally to promote its purpose”); id. § 28-3901(b)(1) (the CPPA’s purpose is to “assure that a just mechanism exists to remedy all improper trade practices”).

Section 28-3901(a)(6) defines a trade practice broadly as an act involving the sale, lease, or transfer of consumer goods or services; crediting mortgage payments is not such a trade practice.

Ihebereme v. Capital One, N.A. · filed 2013-03-28(a)(6)

Plaintiffs have not identified a catetory in section 3904 that would embrace this allegation, and defendants are correct that crediting payments to the mortgage does not constitute a trade act under the statute. The DCCPPA defines a trade practice to mean “any act which does or would create, alter, repair, furnish, make available, provide information about, or, directly or indirectly, solicit or offer for or effectuate, a sale, lease or transfer, of consumer goods or services.” D.C. Code § 28-3901(a)(6).

Section 28-3901(a)(6)–(7) does not treat debt collection alone as a trade practice when the collector is not offering consumer goods, services, or credit.

Baylor v. Mitchell Rubenstein & Associates PC · filed 2014-07-08(a)(6), (a)(7)

Therefore, their attempts to collect debts are not trade practices under the DCCPPA.

A merchant includes an entity that sells consumer credit or is connected with the supply side of a consumer transaction, even if it is not the actual seller of the goods or services.

McMullen v. Synchrony Bank · filed 2016-02-19(a)(3)

The statute defines “merchant” as one “who in the ordinary course of business does or would sell, lease (to), or transfer, either directly or indirectly, consumer goods or services . . . or would supply the goods or services which are or would be the subject matter of a trade.” D.C. Code § 28-3901(a)(3). This “includes one who sells consumer credit as well as those entities which take an assignment of the credit account and continue the extension of credit to the consumer.” Jackson, 788 F. Supp. at 1253. A “merchant need not be the ‘actual seller of the goods or services’ complained of, but must be ‘connected with the “supply” side of the consumer transaction.’” Adler v. Vision Lab Telecomm., Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 35, 39 (D.D.C. 2005) (quoting Save Immaculata/Dunblane, Inc. v. Immaculata Prep Sch., Inc., 514 A.2d 1152, 1159 (D.C. 1986)). This definition plainly covers the Bank Defendants here.

Section 28-3901(a)(1) treats corporations as “persons” rather than “individuals,” and § 28-3901(k)(1)(B) limits the individual cause of action to consumer-goods transactions purchased or received for personal, household, or family use.

Glycobiosciences, Inc. v. Innocutis Holdings, LLC · filed 2016-05-24(a)(1), (k)(1)(B)

First, although the CPPA does not expressly define “individual,” it is clear from the CPPA’s definition of “person” that organizational entities like corporations constitute “person[s],” but are not “individual[s].” See D.C. Code § 28-3901(a)(1) (defining “person” to mean “an individual, firm, corporation, partnership, cooperative, association, or any other organization, legal entity, or group of individuals however organized”); see also id. § 28-3901(b)(14) (defining “nonprofit organization” to mean “a person” who “[i]s not an individual”). Second, the cause of action for an “individual” applies to challenges brought by “an individual” “on behalf of that individual, or on behalf of both the individual and the general public” regarding a “trade practice [that] involves consumer goods or services that the individual purchased or received in order to test or evaluate qualities pertaining to use for personal, household, or family purposes.” Id. § 28-3901(k)(1)(B) (emphases added). Glyco does not allege that, even if it were an “individual” within the meaning of the CPPA, it is suing in its capacity as a purchaser or recipient of the goods at issue. To the contrary, Glyco’s allegations focus on the injury that it has allegedly suffered in its capacity as a competitor of Fidia. Claims of that type fall beyond the scope of the CPPA.

The CPPA covers consumer-merchant trade practices involving goods or services normally used for personal, household, or family purposes; commercial property dealings remain outside the statute, and a personal economic benefit from business activity does not make the owner or business a consumer.

Derrick Price and IHip Hop, LLC v. Independence Federal Savings Bank · filed 2015-02-19(a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B)(i), (a)(3)

The Act ―‗was designed to police trade practices arising only out of consumer-merchant relationships,‘ and does not apply to commercial dealings outside the consumer sphere.‖ Ford v. Chartone, Inc., 908 A.2d 72, 81 (D.C. 2006) (citation omitted) (quoting Howard v. Riggs Nat’l Bank, 432 A.2d 701, 709 (D.C. 1981)). Thus, in order to obtain redress under the CPPA, Price and the LLC must be ―consumers,‖ defined as ―a person who, other than for purposes of resale, does or would purchase, lease (as lessee), or receive consumer goods or services, including as a co-obligor or surety, or does or would otherwise provide the economic demand for a trade practice.‖ D.C. Code § 28-3901 (a)(2)(A). ―Consumer goods or services‖ are those that ―[a] person does or would purchase, lease (as lessee), or receive and normally use for personal, household, or family purposes.‖ Id. § 28-3901 (a)(2)(B)(i). ... This is precisely what Price did as owner and landlord of the subject property when he leased it to other individuals and businesses for their use, instead of using the property himself. Utilizing the proceeds of Independence‘s 2007 loan for the ―personal economic benefit to himself and his family‖ does not make Price a consumer in this context, nor is the LLC a consumer because its members received a personal economic benefit from the company‘s business activity. ... We agree with the trial court—Price and the LLC are not ―consumers‖ within the meaning of the CPPA and, as such, there was no genuine issue of material fact and Independence was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Section 28-3901 does not treat an employment relationship as consumer goods, services, or a consumer transaction for personal, household, or family purposes.

Stone v. Landis Construction Company Inc. · filed 2015-07-23(a)(2)

Employment, properly understood, is not used “for personal, household, or family purposes.”

Section 28-3901(b)(1) makes the CPPA's listed unlawful trade practices nonexclusive and supports using the Act to remedy improper trade practices that violate other laws.

In re Packaged Seafood Products Antitrust Litigation · filed 2017-03-14(b)(1)

[w]hile the CPPA enumerates a number of specific unlawful trade practices ... the enumeration is not exclusive.A main purpose of the CPPA is to “assure that a just mechanism exists to remedy all improper trade practices.” D.C. Code § 28-3901(b)(1) (emphasis added). Trade practices that violate other laws, including the common law, also fall within the purview of the CPPA. ... Given this clear statement from D.C.’s highest court, and that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged a violation of federal antitrust law (among other laws), the Court therefore DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss on this ground.

Section 28-3901(c) directs that the CPPA be construed and applied liberally and recognizes consumers’ right to truthful information about consumer goods and services purchased or received in the District.

Frankeny v. District Hospital Partners, LP · filed 2020-02-27(c)

The Act is “construed and applied liberally” and establishes a consumer’s “right to truthful information about consumer goods and services” that are purchased or received in the District of Columbia. D.C. Code § 28-3901(c); see also D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(1)(A) (providing private right of action).

Section 28-3901(c) establishes an enforceable right to truthful information from merchants about consumer goods or services purchased, leased, or received in the District of Columbia.

McMullen v. Synchrony Bank · filed 2018-01-11(c)

The CPPA establishes an enforceable right to truthful information from merchants about consumer goods and services that are or would be purchased, leased, or received in the District of Columbia.

Section 28-3901(a)(2)(B)(i) covers a sale involving the ultimate retail customer when the goods are used for personal, household, or family purposes.

In re Remicade Antitrust Litigation · filed 2018-12-04(a)(2)(B)(i)

the sale of Remicade falls within the protection of the CPPA because it involves the “ultimate retail customer, ... the individual member of the consuming public.”

Section 28-3901(a)(1) and (a)(2) allow an LLC or other legal entity to qualify as a consumer when its goods or services are acquired for personal, household, or family purposes, and 8th Street adequately alleged that purpose at the pleading stage.

333 8th Street Ne, LLC v. Turnkey Title, LLC · filed 2023-08-28(a)(1), (a)(2)

The statute, on its face, would thus appear to count LLCs and other business entities as potential consumers, provided that the goods and services they acquired were for a personal, household, or family purpose. ... At this stage, however, 8th Street’s allegations are enough, and Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss its CPPA and CPA claims will be denied.

Section 28-3901(a)(2) excludes a purchaser who buys goods for resale or primarily to promote business or professional interests from the CPPA’s definition of consumer.

Mines v. Metagenics, Inc. · filed 2023-10-13(a)(2)

“If the purchaser is regularly engaged in the business of buying the goods or service in question for later resale to another in the distribution chain, or at retail to the general public, then a transaction in the course of that business is not within the Act.”

Section 28-3901(a)(3)'s broad definition of “merchant,” read with subsection (a)(7), covers mortgage lenders and mortgage-servicing activities involving consumer services and real-estate mortgage transactions.

McFadden v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC · filed 2022-04-04(a)(3)

Under the DCCPPA, “merchants” are defined as persons who “sell, lease . . . , or transfer, either directly or indirectly, consumer goods or services.” D.C. Code § 28-3901(a)(3). “Goods and services,” are “any and all parts of the economic output of society, at any stage or related or necessary point in the economic process, and includes consumer credit . . . real estate transactions, and consumer services of all types.” D.C. Code § 28-3901(a)(7). ... Here, however, Ms. Wilson has alleged in the Complaint that Mr. Cooper was both the mortgage servicer and her mortgage lender. ... And the DCCPPA applies to mortgage lenders. ... Moreover, in Logan v. LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 80 A.3d 1014, 1027 (D.C. 2013), the D.C. Court of Appeals held that the DCCPPA applied to “real estate mortgage transactions,” “mortgage refinancing,” and “deceptive billing practices related to a contract for consumer goods and services.” 80 A.3d at 1027. ... Therefore, because the DCCPPA applies to “any action normally considered only incidental to the supply of goods and services to consumers,” the services Ms. Wilson alleged fall into its scope.

Section 28-3901 directs liberal construction of the CPPA, defines “consumer” and “merchant,” and limits the statute to trade practices arising out of consumer-merchant relationships.

Wollner v. Columbia Property Trust, Inc. · filed 2022-09-12(c), (a)(2), (a)(1)

Although the statute is intended to “be construed and applied liberally,” see D.C. Code § 28-3901(c), it applies only to “trade practices arising out of consumer-merchant relationships,” ... Under the CPPA, a “consumer” is one “who ... does or would purchase, lease (as lessee), or receive consumer goods or services” or a person who “does or would provide the economic demand for a trade practice.” D.C. Code § 28-3901(a)(2). And a “merchant” is an “individual, firm, corporation, partnership, cooperative, association, or any other organization, legal entity, or group of individuals however organized” who “in the ordinary course of business does or would sell, lease (to), or transfer, either directly or indirectly, consumer goods or services” or who “does or would supply the goods or services which are or would be the subject matter of a trade practice.” D.C. Code § 28-3901(a)(1), (3). ... Although plaintiffs allege that the condominium units are “consumer goods” within the statutory definition, they allege no facts from which this Court can infer a consumer-merchant relationship between plaintiffs and CRT. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ CPPA claim must be dismissed.

Section 28-3901(a)(15) includes a nonprofit organization whose subsidiary purpose, even if its broader mission is different, is promoting consumers’ interests through accurate product information and protection from misleading marketing.

Center for Inquiry, Inc. v. Walmart, Inc. & Center for Inquiry, Inc. v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc. · filed 2022-09-29(a)(15)

CFI’s mission-driven opposition to homeopathy as a pseudoscience and CFI’s efforts to remove homeopathic drugs from the market show that, at least in part, CFI both is organized and operates to promote the interests of those who would be consumers of “ineffective” homeopathic products.

Section 28-3901(c) establishes an enforceable consumer right to truthful information from merchants about goods and services purchased, leased, or received in the District of Columbia.

Meta Platforms, Inc. v. District of Columbia · filed 2023-09-14(c)

The CPPA “establishes an enforceable right to truthful information from merchants about consumer goods and services that are or would be purchased, leased, or received in the District of Columbia.” D.C. Code § 28-3901(c).

Section 28-3901 requires liberal construction of the CPPA and can cover a consumer who receives consumer services and unfair practices involving information about a consumer good.

Jones v. Vintage Equity Group, LLC · filed 2025-07-28(c), (a)(2)(A), and (a)(6)

The CPPA “is a comprehensive statute designed to provide procedures and remedies for a broad-spectrum of practices which injure consumers,” Dist. Cablevision Ltd. P’ship v. Bassin, 828 A.2d 714, 722–23 (D.C. 2003) (quoting Atwater v. D.C. Dep’t of Consumer & Regul. Affs., 566 A.2d 462, 465 (D.C. 1989)), and should be “construed and applied liberally to promote its purpose,” D.C. Code § 28-3901(c). ... Under the CPPA, a consumer is “a person who . . . receive[s] consumer goods or services.” D.C. Code § 28-3901(a)(2)(A). ... Even though Jones herself did not personally transfer the $720 dollars to Vintage, given the broad purpose of the CPPA, this is sufficient to state a claim. ... Withholding information that a consumer is entitled to clearly fits within the parameters of the CPPA, which prohibits unfair trade practices including those which “provide information about” a consumer good. D.C. Code § 28-3901(a)(6).

Section 28-3901 makes the CPPA a broad consumer-protection statute that assures a mechanism to remedy improper trade practices, establishes an enforceable right to truthful information from merchants, and must be construed and applied liberally.

Galvin v. Ruppert Nurseries, Inc. · filed 2025-08-28(b)(1), (c)

It is a broad consumer protection statute, meant to “assure that a just mechanism exists to remedy all improper trade practices.” D.C. Code § 28-3901(b)(1). It “establishes an enforceable right to truthful information from merchants about consumer goods and services,” and is to be “construed and applied liberally” to effectuate that purpose. D.C. Code § 28-3901(c).

Section 28-3901(a) permits entities, including third-party payors, to qualify as consumers when they purchase consumer goods or services for non-resale purposes.

MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE v. MERCK SHARP & DOHME CORP. · filed 2023-11-20(a)

District of Columbia: The D.C. consumer protection act defines a “consumer” as any “person,” defined to include entities who purchase “consumer goods or services,” so long as the purchase is not “for purposes of resale.” D.C. Code § 28-3901(a); see also Adam A. Weschler & Son, Inc. v. Klank, 561 A.2d 1003, 1005 (D.C. 1989) (stating that a transaction is covered by the statute so long as “the purchaser is not engaged in the regular business of purchasing . . . and reselling it”).

Section 28-3901(a)(7) broadly defines “goods and services” to include economic outputs and their production and disposal, while § 28-3901(c) requires the CPPA to be construed and applied liberally to protect consumers’ right to truthful information.

Earth Island Institute v. The Coca-Cola Company · filed 2024-08-29(a)(7), (c)

Section 28-3901(a)(7) of the CPPA defines “goods and services” as “any and all parts of the economic output of society, at any stage or related or necessary point in the economic process.” ... Its statements about producing materials in a more sustainable manner are statements about its economic outputs at the production stage; its statements about recycling discarded packaging are statements about the disposal of its economic outputs. ... If Coca-Cola makes misleading statements about whether its products are produced in a sustainable way and can be effectively recycled, then those statements are about “goods and services” as the term is broadly defined in the CPPA.

The statute defines a consumer as one who purchases or receives consumer goods or services primarily for personal, household, or family use, excluding transactions made for business or investment purposes.

Kim v. Dp Capital LLC · filed 2024-09-20(a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B)

In turn, a “consumer” is “a person who, other than for purposes of resale, does or would purchase, lease (as lessee), or receive consumer goods or services.” 6 D.C. Code § 28-3901(a)(2)(A). And “[consumer] goods and services” covers “any and all parts of the economic output of society” so long as the purchaser obtains the good or service “for personal, household, or family purposes.” Id. § 28-3901(a)(2)(B), (a)(7). Together, these provisions establish that a “consumer” is “a person who receives or demands goods or services that are primarily for personal, household, or family use”—not one who transacts “primarily to promote business or professional interests.” Shaw v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 605 F.3d 1039, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 2010).

Section 28-3901(d) directs courts to give due consideration and weight to FTC and federal-court interpretations of unfair or deceptive acts under § 5(a) of the FTC Act, but those interpretations do not impose mandatory elements of a CPPA unfair-trade-practices claim.

Scott v. Apple Inc. · filed 2024-11-06(d)

Those are not, however, required elements of the claim; rather, courts are simply directed to give “due consideration and weight” to the Federal Trade Commission’s interpretation of an “unfair or deceptive act or practice” and to the ways in which courts have interpreted Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act. D.C. Code § 28-3901(d). Applying this guidance, the Court is persuaded that Plaintiff has stated an unfair and deceptive trade practices claim.

Section 28-3901 defines the DCCPPA terms “consumer,” “merchant,” “goods and services,” and “unfair or deceptive trade practice.”

Ternes v. C.R. Home Improvement, Inc. · filed 2025-03-24

The DCCPPA includes a provision that defines the terms “consumer,” “merchant,” “goods and services,” and “unfair or deceptive trade practice.” See D.C. Code § 28-3901. The Court is satisfied that the Plaintiffs’ Complaint pleads sufficient facts to meet these definitions.

Section 28-3901(a)(7) broadly defines goods and services to include all parts of society's economic output, including consumer services, and section 28-3901(b)(1) confirms the CPPA's broad remedial purpose; together, these provisions support treating a mortgage servicer that provides services to borrowers as a CPPA merchant.

Hardnett v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. · filed 2025-09-10(a)(7), (b)(1)

It defines “goods and services” to include “any and all parts of the economic output of society, at any stage or related or necessary point in the economic process, and includes consumer credit, franchises, business opportunities, real estate transactions, and consumer services of all types.” Id. § 28-3901(a)(7). ... The amended complaint plausibly alleges that Select Portfolio provides services to borrowers and thus is a merchant within the meaning of the CPPA. That is especially true given the “broad remedial purposes” of the Act, which “defines its terms comprehensively in keeping with the purpose to ‘assure that a just mechanism exists to remedy all improper trade practices.’”

Section 28-3901(a)(2) limits consumer status to a person who purchases, leases, or receives consumer goods or services, or provides the economic demand for a trade practice, so submitting research proposals or manuscripts alone does not create a consumer-merchant relationship.

Slaby v. Fairbridge · filed 1998-04-01(a)(2)

Subsection § 28-3901(a)(2) of the CPPA defines “consumer” as [A] person who does or would purchase, lease (from), or receive consumer goods or services, including a co-obligor or surety, or a person who does or would provide the economic demand for a trade practice; as an adjective, ‘consumer’ describes anything, without exception, which is primarily for personal, household, or family use. ... In this case, the plaintiff is not a consumer within the meaning of the § 28-3904 because her claims do not arise from the purchase, lease or receipt of consumer goods or services. ... Under these facts, the court concludes that the plaintiff fails to state a claim under D.C.Code § 28-3901 because she fails to allege a consumer-merchant relationship between the plaintiff and the various defendants.

The CPPA's merchant definition covers businesses that ordinarily sell, lease, transfer, or supply consumer goods or services, while its trade-practice definition covers acts concerning a sale, lease, or transfer of such goods or services.

Medley v. District of Columbia · filed 2026-01-22(a)(3)(A) (a)(6)

The statute defines a merchant as someone “who in the ordinary course of business does or would sell, lease, or transfer, either directly or indirectly, consumer goods or services” or “who in the ordinary course of business does or would supply the goods or services which are or would be the subject matter of a trade practice.” D.C. Code § 28-3901(a)(3)(A). ... See D.C. Code § 28-3901(a)(6) (defining “trade practice” as “any act which does or would create, alter, repair, furnish, make available, [or] provide information about . . . a sale, lease or transfer, of consumer goods or services”). Medley argues that LEDC is a merchant because it assisted with the District’s Homeowner Assistance Fund and the provision of mortgage assistance payments would have “altered” his mortgages, analogizing to cases about companies that serviced loans. ... While there is no dispute that a mortgage is a good or service, LEDC helping the District administer its Homeowner Assistance Fund is far removed from serving as the direct provider or servicer of a mortgage. There is no allegation LEDC itself engaged in any activity related to “a sale, lease, or transfer” of any mortgage to Medley. D.C. Code § 28-3901(a)(6).

Section 28-3901(a)(6) defines a trade practice to include acts that make available or provide information about consumer services, and § 28-3901(a)(7) defines goods and services broadly to include all parts of society's economic output; legal services therefore fall within the Act's trade-practice coverage.

Banks v. District of Columbia Department of Consumer & Regulatory Affairs · filed 1993-12-06(a)(6), (a)(7)

The Act defines “trade practice” as “any act which does or would create, alter, repair, furnish, make available, provide information about, or, directly or indirectly, solicit or offer for or effectuate, a sale, lease or transfer, of consumer goods or services.” D.C.Code § 28-3901(a)(6) (1991). “Goods and services” are defined as “any and all parts of the economic output of society, at any stage or related or necessary point in the economic process, and includes consumer credit, franchises, business opportunities, real estate transactions, and consumer services of all types.” D.C.Code § 28-3901(a)(7) (1991). We agree with DCRA that the performance of legal services is an act that “make[s] available,” or “provide[s] information about,” a “service[ ]” that is “part[ ] of the economic output of society.” The performance of legal services, therefore, is a “trade practice” under the Act.

Section 28-3901(a)(6) defines a trade practice broadly to include acts relating to the sale, lease, or transfer of consumer goods or services, and § 28-3901(a)(7) defines goods and services to include consumer credit, real estate transactions, and consumer services.

Lillie May Deberry v. First Government Mortgage and Investors Corporation · filed 1999-03-26(a)(6), (a)(7)

A “trade practice” is defined as “any act which does or would create, alter, repair, furnish, make available, provide information about, or, directly or indirectly, solicit or offer for or effectuate a sale, lease or transfer, of consumer goods or services.” D.C.Code § 28-3901(a)(6). “Goods and services” is defined as “any and all parts of the economic output of society, at any stage or related or necessary point in the economic process, and includes consumer credit, franchises, business opportunities, real estate transactions, and consumer services of all types.” D.C.Code § 28-3901(a)(7).

Section 28-3901(c) establishes an enforceable right to truthful information from merchants about consumer goods and services purchased, leased, or received in the District of Columbia, and an alleged violation of that right can constitute an injury in fact sufficient for standing.

Campbell v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pa · filed 2015-09-16(c)

Defendants do not appear to challenge the adequacy of either of these alleged injuries for standing purposes, and the Court agrees with Ms. Campbell that unauthorized charges and allegedly material misrepresentations about the program constitute injuries in fact for standing purposes. See In re APA Assessment Fee Litig., 766 F.3d 39, 47 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that plaintiffs may recover mistaken overpayments via an unjust enrichment claim); D.C. Code § 28-3901(c) (“This chapter establishes an enforceable right to truthful information from merchants about consumer goods and services that are or would be purchased, leased, or received in the District of Columbia.” ); see also Grayson v. AT & T Corp., 15 A.3d 219, 249–50 (D.C. 2011) (“[T]he deprivation of a statutory right to be free from improper trade practices may constitute an injury-in-fact sufficient to establish standing, even though the plaintiff would have suffered no judicially cognizable injury in the absence of the statute.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Accordingly, because Ms. Campbell’s theories of injury premised on unauthorized premium charges and violations of the CPPA are sufficient to establish standing as to each of her claims, the Court will deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).

Section 28-3901(c) gives consumers an enforceable right to truthful information from merchants about consumer goods and services purchased, leased, or received in the District of Columbia, and the CPPA is construed broadly through a reasonable-consumer lens.

McMullen v. Synchrony Bank · filed 2020-04-24(c)

The CPPA “establishes an enforceable right to truthful information from merchants about consumer goods and services that are or would be purchased, leased, or received in the District of Columbia.” D.C. Code § 28-3901(c). It is a remedial statute to be construed broadly but through the lens of a “reasonable consumer.”

Section 28-3901(a)(7) covers using real estate as collateral for a personal debt-consolidation loan as a consumer-credit transaction.

Lawson v. Nationwide Mortgage Corp. · filed 1986-02-18(a)(7)

Transaction # 2 patently did not involve a sale of real estate; rather, it involved use of real estate as collateral for a personal debt consolidation loan. The Act specifically encompasses such “consumer credit” transactions. See D.C.Code § 28-3901(a)(7).

Section 28-3901's definition of merchant includes sellers of consumer credit and entities that take assignments of credit accounts and continue extending credit to consumers.

Jackson v. Culinary School of Washington · filed 1992-03-26(3), (7)

A merchant includes one who sells consumer credit as well as those entities which take an assignment of the credit account and continue the extension of credit to the consumer. ... In this case, the Plaintiffs assert that the Secretary and the Guaranty Agencies were involved in the continuing extension of credit to the students. ... Plaintiffs also allege that the Guaranty Agencies are either “original lenders or assignees” of the notes. ... Accordingly, by its terms, the CPPA applies to these parties.

The D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act does not apply to commercial transactions conducted in Virginia merely because the consumer resides in the District of Columbia.

Nelson v. Nationwide Mortgage Corp. · filed 1987-04-16

Although both the District of Columbia and Virginia have enacted consumer protection statutes, see D.C.Code §§ 28-3901 to 3908 (Supp.1986); Va.Code Ann. §§ 59.1-196 to 207 (1982), the Court need not engage in a conflicts analysis here because it finds that even if Nelson’s factual allegations are taken as true, the District of Columbia statute does not reach the conduct involved in this case. It is undisputed that both Nationwide and Family Federal are Virginia corporations, and that the relevant transactions occurred in Virginia. Consequently, the District of Columbia statute would have to be given broad extraterritorial effect if it were to apply here. Nothing in the statute or interpretative case law indicates such a legislative intent, and absent such affirmative evidence the Court will not presume that the statute was intended to apply to every commercial transaction involving a District of Columbia resident, wherever and with whomever that transaction occurs.

Section 28-3901's broad purpose and definitions support using the Consumer Protection Procedures Act's procedures and remedies to enforce trade practices made unlawful by other District statutes.

Atwater v. District of Columbia Department of Consumer & Regulatory Affairs · filed 1989-10-24(b)(1), (a)(6), (a)(7)

Among its purposes is to “assure that a just mechanism exists to remedy all improper trade practices.” § 28-3901(b)(l). ... The Act contemplates that its procedures will be invoked, not simply to enforce its own substantive provisions, but also those of other consumer protection laws. ... The Act defines the term “trade practice” broadly, to embrace “any act which does or would create, alter, repair, furnish, make available, provide information about, or, directly or indirectly, solicit or offer for or effectuate, a sale, lease or transfer, of consumer goods or services.” § 28-3901(a)(6). ... “Goods and services” are defined to include “any and all parts of the economic output of society.” § 28-3901(a)(7).

Section 28-3901(b) states that the CPPA is intended to remedy improper trade practices and promote fair business practices throughout the community.

Williams v. Central Money Co. · filed 1997-07-17(b)

The purposes of the CPPA are to “assure that a just mechanism exists to remedy all improper trade practices [and to] promote, through effective enforcement, fair business practices throughout the community....” D.C.Code § 28-3901(b). If the CPPA did not apply to cases like this one, loan and mortgage companies could defeat those statutory purposes and evade D.C. consumer protection laws by locating themselves just across the District line from the D.C. citizens they seek as customers.

Section 28-3901(b)(1) states that a main purpose of the CPPA is to provide a just mechanism for remedying all improper trade practices, including practices that violate common law.

District Cablevision Limited Partnership v. Bassin · filed 2003-07-17(b)(1)

A main purpose of the CPPA is to “assure that a just mechanism exists to remedy all improper trade practices.” D.C.Code § 28 — 3901(b)(1) (emphasis added). Trade practices that violate other laws, including the common law, also fall within the purview of the CPPA.

Section 28-3901(a)(6) broadly defines a trade practice, and section 28-3901(a)(7) includes consumer credit and real estate transactions within goods and services.

DeBerry v. First Government Mortgage & Investors Corp. · filed 1999-12-30(a)(6), (a)(7)

The first relevant statutory term, a “trade practice,” is defined as “any act which does or would create, alter, repair, furnish, make available, provide information about, or, directly or indirectly, solicit or offer for or effectuate, a sale, lease or transfer, of consumer goods or services.” ... D.C.Code § 28-3901(a)(7) defines “goods and services” broadly to mean: any and all parts of the economic output of society, at any stage or related or necessary point in the economic process, and includes consumer credit, franchises, business opportunities, real estate transactions, and consumer services of all types.

Section 28-3901 treats providers of services that are the subject matter of a trade practice as merchants and their customers, who create demand for those services, as consumers.

Dorn v. McTigue · filed 2001-07-23(a)(2), (a)(3), and (a)(6)

The CPPA defines a “merchant,” in pertinent part, as a person who supplies services that are the “subject matter of a trade practice.” ... “Trade practice” is defined, in pertinent part, as any act that makes available, provides information about, solicits, or offers a sale of consumer services. ... Therefore, this court holds that the defendant is a “merchant,” as required under the CPPA, because he supplied services that are the “subject matter of a trade practice,” namely, services that are the subject of medical practice. ... The CPPA defines “consumer,” in pertinent part, as a person who provides “the economic demand for a trade practice.” ... Having established that the defendant supplies services that are part of a trade practice, it then follows that the defendant’s customers, such as the plaintiff, provide “the economic demand for a trade practice,” i.e., the demand for the defendant’s medical practice. ... In sum, the court has jurisdiction over the plaintiffs CPPA claim and the CPPA does apply to this case.

Section 28-3901's definition of “person” includes individuals, allowing an individual to be held liable under the CPPA for creating an unconscionable loan.

Cooper v. First Government Mortgage & Investors Corp. · filed 2002-07-09(a)(1)

The CPPA, in contrast, very clearly states that an “individual” may be held liable for creating an unconscionable loan. D.C.Code § 28-3901(a)(l).

Section 28-3901(a)(3) treats as a merchant a person who sells or supplies consumer goods or services, directly or indirectly, that are the subject of a trade practice.

Williams v. Purdue Pharma Co. · filed 2003-12-31(a)(3)

The Court concludes that the activities alleged in the complaint may have created a consumer-merchant relationship between Purdue and Abbott and the plaintiffs sufficient for CPPA coverage and that the complaint is not subject to a motion to dismiss on this basis.

The Consumer Protection Procedures Act applies to the performance of medical services as a “trade practice.”

Caulfield v. Stark · filed 2006-03-09

Having ruled as we did in Banks with respect to legal services, we can discern no reason why the performance of medical services should not be a “trade practice” as well under the CPPA.

The CPPA covers merchants or goods suppliers, but does not impose guarantor liability on a private individual who recommends another merchant’s goods or services.

Carleton v. Winter · filed 2006-06-15(a)(3)

This court concluded that the CPPA was intended to regulate the conduct of merchants or goods suppliers, and the bank did not fall into either category. ... We specifically held that the CPPA does not “impose liability as a guarantor upon any private individual (or his employer) who recommends the goods or services of a particular merchant to another.” ... Thus, Winter’s recommendation of Phillips because he had done good work for her in the past places neither her nor her employer within the ambit of the CPPA, and therefore the trial court’s conclusion that the CPPA did not apply to the facts and circumstances of this case was correct. ... We note that even if Winter did qualify as a "merchant,” as the term is defined under CPPA's § 28-3901(a)(3) and interpreted in Howard, 432 A.2d at 709, she would not necessarily be liable under § 28-3904.

Under the D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act, “goods and services” includes real estate mortgage finance transactions.

Johnson v. LONG BEACH MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2001-4 · filed 2006-08-04(a)(7)

Because (1) Long Beach Mortgage Company is the alleged lender for Loan II, (2) Plaintiff asserts her rights against Long Beach Mortgage Company “affirmatively in an action to cancel and void the sale from its inception,” and (3) the terms “goods and services” are interpreted broadly under the DCCPPA to include real estate mortgage finance transactions, see DeBerry v. First Gov’t Mortg. & Investors Corp., 743 A.2d 699, 703 (D.C.1999); D.C.Code § 28-3901(a)(7) (defining “goods and services”), Plaintiffs claims of Long Beach Mortgage Company’s derivative liability for the acts of Mortgage USA pursuant to D.C.Code § 28-3901 shall not be dismissed.

Section 28-3901(a)(2) covers a consumer transaction when goods or services are obtained for personal use, even if an authorized attorney makes the purchase and the consumer has a pecuniary motive.

Ford v. ChartOne, Inc. · filed 2006-09-28(a)(2)

We disagree as well with the contention that because Ford acquired his medical records to seek a financial recovery in his personal injury lawsuit, he did not obtain them “for personal, household, or family use.” D.C.Code § 28 — 3901(a)(2). Using medical records to secure compensation for injuries in a lawsuit is no less “personal” than is using them to secure insurance coverage or, for that matter, a second medical opinion, employment, medical leave, and other personal benefits. A motive may be pecuniary and still be personal.

Section 28-3901(c) requires the CPPA to be construed and applied liberally to promote its purpose.

Shaw v. Marriott International, Inc. · filed 2007-02-22(c)

As the statute itself states, it “shall be construed and applied liberally to promote its purpose.” D.C. CODE § 28-3901(c).

Section 28-3901(3) defines a “merchant” as a person who sells, transfers, or supplies consumer goods or services, including indirectly, in connection with a trade practice.

Snowder v. District of Columbia · filed 2008-06-05(3)

The CPPA defines “merchant” as a “person who does or would sell, lease (to), or transfer, either directly or indirectly, consumer goods or services, or a person who does or would supply the goods or services which are or would be the subject matter of a trade practice.” D.C.Code § 28-3901(3) (2001). ... While appellants’ argument is not without some force given the relationship between MPD and the private towing companies it utilizes in the District of Columbia, we agree with the District and hold that it is not a merchant for purposes of the CPPA. ... Similarly, the District is not a commercial enterprise. Although MPD is involved in the towing of automobiles in the District, in that it contacts towing companies to retrieve vehicles on its streets, it did not supply the towing and storage services in this case. Nor did it receive any remuneration from those companies for the towing and storage services provided, or enter into a consumer-merchant relationship with any of the vehicle owners. Accordingly, appellants’ CPPA claims against the District of Columbia must fail.

Section 28-3901 covers prospective consumer-service transactions and does not require a written agreement or payment for a merchant-consumer relationship.

Byrd v. Jackson · filed 2006-07-06(a)(2), (a)(3), and (a)(6)

But the Act imposes no such requirements. As footnoted at the outset, it defines a “merchant” to include one who “would sell ... consumer ... services”; a “consumer” as one who “would purchase” such services; and a “trade practice” as any act which “would ... make available ... or offer for ... sale ... consumer ... services” (emphases added). If, for example, Byrd falsely “advertise[d] or offer[ed]” his services to Smith as a foreclosure-avoidance specialist “without the intent to sell them ... as advertised or offered,” D.C.Code § 28-3904(h), he violated the Act whether or not he entered a formal contractual relationship with her or received money for the services.

The CPPA broadly defines a consumer to include a person who purchases, leases, or receives goods or services, and permits a financial motive where the transaction is primarily for personal, household, or family use; goods and services include real-estate transactions.

MODERN MANAGEMENT CO. v. Wilson · filed 2010-06-03(a)(2), (a)(7)

“Consumer” is defined in the CPPA, D.C.Code § 28-3901(a)(2), to “mean[ ] a person who does or would purchase, lease (from), or receive consumer goods or services including a co-obligor or surety, or a person who does or would provide the economic demand for a trade practice; as an adjective, ‘consumer’ describes anything, without exception, which is primarily for personal, household, or family use[.]” (emphasis added). ... Therefore, the purpose of the transaction was personal to Wilson; she contracted with the appellants not as a landlord in order to gain profit, but as a consumer seeking to “receive” their services as self-proclaimed “foreclosure specialists” and “money lenders,” to help her maintain ownership of her house. ... Therefore, we conclude that given the disputed facts presented at trial, the issue of whether Wilson qualified as a “consumer” under the CPPA was a question of fact properly submitted to the jury and the verdict is supported by the evidence.

Section 28-3901(a)(3) defines a merchant without a geographical limitation, so the challenged sale or service need not occur in the District of Columbia.

Sloan Ex Rel. Juergens v. Urban Title Services, Inc. · filed 2010-02-12(a)(3)

As indicated above, the statutory definition of “merchant” does not itself contain any geographical limitation nor has Duncan directed the Court to any other legal authority in support of his claim that the term is so limited. Accordingly, Duncan’s argument, as framed, is without merit.

Section 28-3901(c) requires the CPPA to be construed and applied liberally to promote its remedial purpose, but that mandate does not eliminate the constitutional injury-in-fact requirement.

Grayson v. AT & T CORP. · filed 2011-01-20(c)

Second, the Council expressed its intent that the CPPA be considered a remedial statute by explicitly stating that “[t]his chapter shall be construed and applied liberally to promote its purpose,” D.C.Code *245§ 28—3901(c); that is, the purpose of “assuring] that a just mechanism exists to remedy all improper trade practices and deter the continuing use of such practices.” D.C.Code § 28-3901(b)(1). In interpreting the mandate to liberally construe and apply the CPPA’s provisions, we do not speculate and infer that the Council sought to eliminate our injury-in-fact requirement. Rather, our reading of the legislative and drafting history indicates that the Council expressly sought to augment the remedies available to enforce the CPPA under a revised § 28-3905(k)(1) by providing for injunctive relief and merchant disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, see, e.g., D.C.Code § 28-3905(k)(1)(D)-(E) (2001), and by expanding OAG’s CPPA authority.

Section 28-3901(c) requires the CPPA to be construed and applied liberally to promote its remedial purpose.

Saucier v. Countrywide Home Loans · filed 2013-04-18(c)

Moreover, because it is a remedial statute, the CPPA must “be construed and applied liberally to promote its purpose.” D.C.Code § 28-3901(c).

Section 28-3901(a)(6) broadly defines a trade practice as an act directly or indirectly connected to a sale, lease, or transfer of consumer goods or services, allowing the DCCPPA to reach alleged antitrust conduct.

In re Processed Egg Products Antitrust Litigation · filed 2012-03-20(a)(6)

The Act defines “trade practice” to be “any act which does or would create, alter, repair, furnish, make available, provide information about, or, directly or indirectly, solicit or offer for or effectuate, a sale, lease or transfer, of consumer *898goods or services.”

Section 28-3901(7) defines “goods and services” as any and all parts of society’s economic output, at any stage or related or necessary point in the economic process.

Floyd v. Bank of America Corp. · filed 2013-07-11(7)

However, the CPPA’s definitional section, § 28-3901, does define the term “goods and services” to mean “any and all parts of the economic output of society, at any stage or related or necessary point in the economic proeess[.]” § 28-3901(7). In light of that definition, we conclude that when we consider whether the Complaint states a claim under the CPPA provisions pertaining to representations about the “characteristics” and “standard” of the Bank’s “services,” we must focus on whether it alleges misrepresentations about the Bank’s “economic output.” We conclude that the Complaint does not allege misrepresentations about the Bank’s “economic output,” but instead alleges a misrepresentation about other matters (i.e., the legal environment and the climate of surveillance), and therefore does not state a claim under § 28-*2553904(a) and (d).

Section 28-3901(a)(2)(B)(i) covers a consumer who purchases, leases, or receives and normally uses consumer goods or services for personal, household, or family purposes; the statute reaches the ultimate retail transaction, not wholesale transactions along the distribution chain.

In re Lidoderm Antitrust Litigation · filed 2015-05-05(a)(2)(B)(i)

The District of Columbia’s consumer protection statute allows causes of action on behalf of a “consumer” who “does or would purchase, lease (as lessee), or receive and normally use” consumer goods or services “for personal, household, or family purposes.” ... Following the guidance of courts in the jurisdiction, I conclude that GEHA is not a consumer under the District of Columbia’s statute and GEHA’s claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.