D.C. Code § 12-301

Section 12-301(8) provides a three-year limitations period for a negligence-based informed-consent claim.

Tavakoli-Nouri v. Gunther · filed 2000-02-10(8)

However, Tavakoli-Nouri’s second claim of lack of informed consent against Dr. Gunther for negligently failing to disclose the possible adverse consequences of the surgery was timely filed within the requisite three-year statute of limitations. D.C.Code § 12-301(8).

Section 12-301(7)’s three-year limitations period cannot support summary judgment when admissible evidence creates a genuine factual dispute over the contract’s maturity date and resulting breach.

Puma v. Sullivan · filed 2000-02-24(7)

Therefore, Ewoldt’s out-of-court statements are admissible and they raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding when the note became due, and thus when it was breached. ... Thus, because there is admissible evidence on both sides of this materially factual dispute, summary judgment is improper.

Section 12-301(7) requires express or implied contract claims to be filed within three years after accrual, generally running from the date of breach.

Allison v. Howard University · filed 2002-04-24(7)

To maintain a cause of action on an express or implied contract in the District of Columbia, a plaintiff must bring a lawsuit within three years following the accrual of the claim. ... The statute of limitations begins to run “from the date a contract is breached.” ... Therefore, the D.C.Code’s three-year statute of limitations bars the plaintiffs first breach-of-contract claim. ... Assuming ... that the parties entered into a contract, the court nevertheless determines that the D.C.Code’s three-year statute of limitations bars the plaintiffs’ second breach-of-contract claim.

Section 12-301(8) supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1981 claims.

Brown v. District of Columbia · filed 2003-03-11(8)

With respect to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,1983, the parties agree that the relevant statute of limitations in this jurisdiction is three years. ... The undersigned finds that defendant is entitled to summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981(a), 1983, as such claims are time-barred.

Section 12-301(8) requires a wrongful-discharge action to be brought within three years after the claim accrues.

Walker v. Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers · filed 2006-07-17(8)

In the District of Columbia, a litigant complaining of wrongful discharge must bring an action within three years after the claim accrues. D.C.Code § 12-301(8); see also Stephenson v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 789 A.2d 1248, 1248 (D.C.2002).

For a § 1983 due-process claim, § 12-301(8) supplies the applicable three-year limitations period rather than the one-year period in § 12-301(4).

Does I through III v. District of Columbia · filed 2005-11-21(8)

Accordingly, the court finds that D.C.Code § 12-301(8), which imposes a three-year statute of limitations on actions where “a limitation is not otherwise prescribed,” is the relevant District of Columbia limitations period.

Section 12-301(8)'s three-year limitations period applies to breach-of-implied-covenant claims, with accrual governed by actual or inquiry notice under the discovery rule.

C & E SERVICES, INC. v. Ashland, Inc. · filed 2007-08-02(8)

The three year statute of limitations for fraud and negligent misrepresentation also applies to plaintiffs’ breach of implied covenant claim. ... See ... D.C.Code § 12-301(8). As discussed above, because there are genuine disputes of material fact as to when plaintiffs had actual or inquiry notice, the Court finds that plaintiffs’ breach of implied covenant claim survives defendant’s motion with regard to the statute of limitations.

Section 12-301(7) requires contract claims to be brought within three years, with an implied-contract claim accruing when the breach occurs or the defendant receives unjust enrichment from the plaintiff.

McQueen v. Woodstream Corp. · filed 2007-08-10(7)

In the District of Columbia, a plaintiff must bring an action on contract claims within three years. D.C.Code § 12-301(7). This statute of limitations period begins to run when a claim accrues, which occurs “when its elements are present.” News World Commc’ns, Inc. v. Thompsen, 878 A.2d 1218, 1222 (D.C.2005) (internal citations omitted). For an implied contract the statute of limitations period runs from “the time of the breach ... the time services are performed, rendered, and received,” in other words, when the defendant has received “unjust enrichment” from the plaintiff.

Section 12-301(8) imposes a three-year limitations period on legal-malpractice and breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims, running from accrual.

Mawalla v. Hoffman · filed 2008-08-08(8)

The statute of limitations applicable to the breach of fiduciary action is also three years. D.C.Code § 12-301(8).

Section 12-301 imposes a three-year limitations period on contract claims under subsection (7) and on personal-injury claims, including intentional infliction of emotional distress, under subsection (8).

Moore v. District of Columbia · filed 2010-02-26(8), (7)

Moore’s claims under § 1981 and § 1983 must also fail, as they fall outside of the relevant statute of limitations. ... In our Circuit, the statute of limitations for both § 1981 and § 1983 claims is three years. ... See Carney v. American Univ., 151 F.3d 1090, 1096 (D.C.Cir.1998) (citing D.C.Code § 12-301(8)). ... Moore’s common law claims are also time-barred. ... The statute of limitations for these claims is three years. ... See D.C.Code § 12-301(7) (contract claims); Saunders v. Nemati, 580 A.2d 660, 665 (D.C.1990) (intentional infliction of emotion distress falls under D.C.Code § 12-301(8)). ... Therefore, her common law claims must also be dismissed.

Section 12-301(8) gives CPPA claims a three-year limitations period, measured from accrual.

Silvious v. Snapple Beverage Corp. · filed 2011-06-27(8)

Claims under the CPPA must be brought within three years of accrual. ... Because plaintiff had inquiry, even if not actual, notice of a claim at the time that he purchased each beverage, he cannot rely on the discovery rule to save those long-expired claims.

Under D.C. Code § 12-301(8), the three-year limitations period for an IDEA fee claim begins when the hearing officer issues the determination underlying the fee request.

Annette v. District of Columbia · filed 2014-08-26(8)

The undersigned concurs in the more recent decisions from this court calculating the three-year period from the date the hearing officer issued a determination, where the plaintiff’s request is for an award of fees that were incurred while pursuing claims adjudicated by the hearing officer at the administrative level.

D.C. Code § 12-301(8) provides a catch-all three-year limitations period for the claims at issue.

Gray v. Staley · filed 2015-08-10(8)

All of his claims are subject to the catch-all three-year limitations period under D.C. Code § 12-301(8).

D.C. Code § 12-301(8) sets a default three-year limitations period running from when a claim accrues.

Tran v. Citibank, N.A. · filed 2016-09-23(8)

While the default statute of limitations in D.C. is three years from when the claim accrued, see D.C. Code § 12-301(8), this limitations period may be shortened by contract, see Peters, 942 A.2d at 1167–68.

D.C. Code § 12-301(7) imposes a three-year statute of limitations on contract claims.

Sodexo Operations, LLC v. Not-For-Profit Hospital Corporation · filed 2016-09-28(7)

Pursuant to District of Columbia law, the statute of limitations on a contract claim is three years. D.C. Code § 12-301(7).

The three-year limitations period under D.C. Code § 12-301(8) barred Plaintiff’s claims because more than three years elapsed after the period began to run and before he filed suit.

Gray v. Staley · filed 2016-12-15(8)

Consequently, because more than three years have elapsed between the early 1990s, when Plaintiff was released from prison and the limitations period began to run, and May 2011, when Plaintiff filed suit, his claims are time barred. See D.C. Code § 12-301(8).

D.C. Code § 12-301(8) provides a three-year limitations period for tort claims.

Machala v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc. · filed 2017-06-29(8)

Delaware’s limitations period for tort claims is two years.23 D.C’s is three years.24 As such, the Borrowing Statute dictates that Delaware’s two-year limitations period applies.

Claims not among the intentional torts enumerated in § 12-301 are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Crockett v. Mayor · filed 2017-09-25(8)

Finally, the claim for harassment asserted in Count VIII is not among the enumerated intentional torts in D.C. Code § 12-301, and must therefore be presumed to have a three-year statute of limitations. See D.C. Code § 12-301(8).

D.C. Code § 12-301(8) supplies a three-year limitations period for most Bivens actions.

Berman v. Crook · filed 2018-02-02(8)

A three-year limitations period applies to Bivens claims ... (three-year limitations period in D.C. Code § 12-301(8) applies to most Bivens actions)

D.C. Code § 12-301(8)'s residual three-year limitations period applies to DCCPPA claims, and claims based on sales within the last three years are timely.

Beyond Pesticides v. Monsanto Co. · filed 2018-04-3012-301(8)

Thus, Plaintiffs' claims cannot be dismissed as time-barred because, at the very least, claims regarding sales of Roundup in the last three years are timely.

D.C. Code § 12-301(7) provides a three-year statute of limitations for fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims.

Said v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation · filed 2018-07-10(7)

The defendant is correct that these claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations under District of Columbia law.

D.C. Code § 12-301(8) imposes a three-year limitations period on CPPA and fraud claims, running from when the right to sue accrues.

Pleznac v. Equity Residential Management, L.L.C. · filed 2018-08-08(8)

Under D.C. law, a plaintiff must bring a claim under the CPPA or for fraud within three years from the time when her right to maintain the action accrues.

For Bivens claims against federal agents based on conduct in the District of Columbia, D.C. Code § 12-301(8) supplies a three-year limitations period when no more specific limitation applies.

Carr v. Sessions · filed 2019-02-25(8)

Because the government defendants are based in the District of Columbia, District of Columbia law governs. And “[i]n the context of a Bivens action claiming the deprivation of constitutional rights, the D.C. Circuit has instructed that D.C. Code § 12–301 provides the relevant limitations period”: Three years at most. Richardson v. Sauls, 319 F. Supp. 3d 52, 67 (D.D.C. 2018) (citing Zhao v. Unknown Agent of CIA, 411 F. App’x 336, 336–37 (D.C. Cir. 2010)); see also D.C. Code § 12-301(8) (providing a three-year limitations period for actions “for which a limitation is not otherwise specially prescribed”).

D.C. Code § 12-301(8) imposes a three-year limitations period on CPPA and fraud claims, measured from when the right to maintain the action accrues.

Pleznac v. Equity Residential Mgmt., L.L.C. · filed 2018-08-08(8)

Under D.C. law, a plaintiff must bring a claim under the CPPA or for fraud within three years from the time when her right to maintain the action accrues.

D.C. Code § 12-301(8)'s three-year limitations period barred the negligence claims because the period expired in late 2011.

Doe v. Kipp DC Supporting Corp. · filed 2019-01-03(8)

the three-year limitations period on her negligence claims expired in late 2011.

Section 12-301(8) supplies a three-year statute of limitations for Bivens claims because no federal limitations period otherwise applies.

Jacksonville Urban League, Inc. v. Azar, II · filed 2019-07-16(8)

The D.C. Code does not specify a statute of limitations for Bivens claims, but it provides that claims “for which a limitation is not otherwise specifically prescribed” are subject to a three-year limitations period. D.C. Code § 12-301(8).

Section 12-301(8) provides a three-year residual statute of limitations for personal-injury-type claims in the District of Columbia, including the § 1983 action at issue.

Dorsey v. District of Columbia · filed 2019-08-08(8)

The residual statute of limitations in the District of Columbia is three years, see D.C. Code § 12-301(8), which this Court adopts for purposes of the present action.

Section 12-301(8) provides a three-year limitations period for these Bivens and § 1983 claims, so claims based on the April 2014 standoff were untimely when filed in 2019.

Lovelien v. United States of America · filed 2019-11-18(8)

The standoff took place in April 2014, but Plaintiffs filed their Complaint this year, so any claims based on conduct during the standoff fall outside the three-year limitations period.

D.C. Code § 12-301(8) imposes a three-year statute of limitations on § 1983 and negligence claims, making Savage’s claims untimely.

Savage v. District of Columbia · filed 2019-12-09(8)

Third, Savage’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations. See Earle v. District of Columbia, 707 F.3d 299, 305 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citing D.C. Code § 12-301(8)). ... Fourth, for similar reasons that his Section 1983 claim is untimely, Savage’s negligence claim fails to meet the three-year statute of limitations. See D.C. Code § 12-301(8).

Section 12-301(8) provides the District’s general three-year personal-injury limitations period, which applies to claims that lack their own limitations period.

Willis v. District of Columbia Public Schools · filed 2020-02-18(8)

Since Section 1983 does not have a built-in statute of limitations, the general three-year statute of limitations imposed by District of Columbia law on claims for personal injury, see D.C. Code § 12-301(8), applies.

Section 12-301(8) supplies the District of Columbia's three-year residual statute of limitations for a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Jefferson-11th Street, LLC v. District of Columbia · filed 2020-06-05(8)

In the District of Columbia, the Court “appl[ies] the three-year residual statute of limitations to a section 1983 claim.” Id. (citing D.C. Code § 12-301(8)).

D.C. Code § 12-301(8) sets a three-year limitations period for negligence claims.

JACOBS v. HILTON WORLDWIDE CAPITAL HOLDINGS, INC. · filed 2020-09-17(8)

Under D.C. law, the limitations period for a claim of negligence is three years. D.C. Code § 12-301(8)

D.C. Code § 12-301(7)-(8) imposes a three-year limitations period on the plaintiff’s contract and negligence claims.

Lucas v. District of Columbia · filed 2023-02-17(7)-(8)

“the plaintiff’s contract and negligence claims are governed by the District of Columbia’s three-year statute of limitations.”

Section 12-301(8) supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims because § 1983 lacks a specially prescribed limitation period.

Morrison v. Bowser · filed 2024-07-03(8)

Section 1983 does not specify a limitation period, so D.C. Code § 12-301(8) supplies one. See Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1984). And § 12-301(8) sets a statutory limitation of three years on any action which otherwise lacks a “specially prescribed” limitation period.

Section 12-301(8) provides a three-year limitations period for tortious-interference and intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims, making these claims untimely here.

McNeil v. Duncan · filed 2024-10-08(8)

Plaintiff’s claims for tortious interference and intentional infliction of emotional distress are governed by a three-year statute of limitations period pursuant to D.C. Code § 12-301(8). ... Plaintiff’s claims—including any respondeat superior claims based on those individuals’ actions—accordingly, accrued on September 6, 2017, at the latest, and they became untimely on September 6, 2020, see D.C. Code § 12-301(8).

Contract claims and claims without another prescribed limitation period generally have a three-year limitations period, but discovery and lulling doctrines may delay or prevent application of the bar when factual issues remain.

Gupta v. 2ndwave LLC · filed 2026-01-20(a)(7), (a)(8)

Actions for breach of contract in the District of Columbia must be brought within three years “from the time the right to maintain the action accrues.” D.C. Code § 12-301(a)(7). ... Finally, the Defendants assert that this claim, too, is barred by a three-year statute of limitations. Defs.’ Mot. 20-21; see also D.C. Code § 12-301(a)(8) (providing that actions “for which a limitation is not otherwise prescribed” must be brought within “3 years” of the “the time the right to maintain the action accrues”). Their argument is compelling. But like the breach of contract claim, there are factual questions bound up in whether the lulling doctrine applies. ... Particularly “where a plaintiff has been injured by fraud and remains in ignorance of it without any fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered.”

Section 12-301(8) supplies the generally applicable three-year limitations period for support actions that would otherwise have been barred by the unconstitutional two-year paternity limitation.

District of Columbia Ex Rel. W.J.D. v. E.M. · filed 1983-09-23(8)

Until or unless the 2-year limitation provision of § 16-2342 is replaced by other legislation, actions for support which until now would have been barred by that provision will be governed by generally applicable 3-year statute of limitations, see D.C.Code § 12-301(8) (1981), and by D.C. Code § 12-302 (1981), which provides for the tolling of limitations during minority.

Section 12-301(7) gives contract actions a three-year limitations period running from breach, while § 12-301(8) gives negligence actions a three-year limitations period running when the plaintiff suffers injury.

Prouty v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. · filed 1983-10-06(7) (8)

Finally, the Court finds that even if other impediments to maintaining this breach of contract claim did not exist, plaintiff’s contract action would be barred by the statute of limitations. The statute of limitations for contract actions in the District of Columbia is three years. D.C.Code § 12-301(7) (1981). The statute begins to run from the time of breach. ... Moreover, even if plaintiff could maintain a negligence action under these circumstances, this claim would be barred by the statute of limitations. The statute of limitations period for negligence claims is three years. D.C.Code § 12-301(8) (1981). The limitations period begins to run when the plaintiff suffers injury.

For negligence, strict-liability, and misrepresentation claims, the statute imposes a three-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knows or should know through due diligence of the right to recover, or is on inquiry notice of actionable harm.

Baker v. AH Robins Co., Inc. · filed 1985-07-17(8)

Under District of Columbia law, an action for negligence, strict liability or misrepresentation must be brought within three years after a cause of action accrues. D.C.Code § 12-301(8). ... However, in cases such as this in which the relationship between tortious conduct and subsequent injury may be obscure, a “discovery rule” is applied to begin the statute of limitations’ running at the time when a prospective plaintiff knows or should know through the exercise of due diligence of her right to recover, or, in other words, when she is put on “inquiry notice” of the existence of actionable harm. ... But she must get to court within the statutory period.

Section 12-301(2) and (3) impose three-year limitations periods for recovering personal property or damages for unlawful detention and for injury to real or personal property.

Dayton v. Czechoslovak Socialist Republic · filed 1986-12-19(2), (3)

Finally, Centrotex argues that these suits are barred by the statute of limitations. The parties agree that the relevant statute of limitations in this case is three years. ... D.C.Code § 12-301 prescribes the following limitations periods: (2) for the recovery of personal property or damages for its unlawful detention — 3 years; (3) for the recovery of damages for an injury to real or personal property — 3 years.

Section 12-301(7) imposes a three-year limitations period on contract claims.

National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Notter · filed 1987-10-08(7)

Accordingly, the Court holds that the relevant District of Columbia statute of limitations — D.C.Code § 12-301 — applies to this case. ... Under D.C.Code § 12-301(7), the contract claim is subject to a three-year limitation period.

Section 12-301(8) provides a three-year limitations period for the plaintiffs' standby-duty-pay claim, allowing recovery of deficient standby pay for the full three years before suit.

Ball v. District of Columbia · filed 1992-05-22(8)

They will receive the deficient standby duty pay for the full three-year period allowed under the applicable statute of limitations. ... D.C.Code § 12-301(8).

Subsection (8) provides a three-year limitations period for common-law fraud and tortious-interference claims, and fraudulent concealment may toll that period.

Jones v. Meridian Towers Apartments, Inc. · filed 1993-03-23(8)

The statute of limitations for the common law fraud and tortious interference claims is three years. See D.C.Code § 12-301(8). ... Under both local and federal law, fraudulent concealment by defendants tolls the statute of limitations. ... Therefore, the Court finds that there is sufficient evidence that a reasonable jury could find, depending on its resolution of disputed facts or the inferences to be drawn from the facts, that defendants fraudulently concealed information essential to plaintiffs’ claims, either because the acts were self-concealing or by affirmative acts of concealment.

Section 12-301(8) imposes a three-year limitations period on actions for intentional interference with prospective contractual relations.

Hall v. Burger King Corp. · filed 1995-11-13(8)

Pursuant to D.C.Code § 12-301, this three (3) year limitations period applies to actions for intentional interference with prospective contractual relations (see D.C.Code § 12-301(8); Carr v. Brown, 395 A.2d 79, 83 (D.C.1978)) and for claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (see Banks v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 802 F.2d 1416, 1421-23 (D.C.Cir.1986); Alder v. Columbia Historical Soc'y, 690 F.Supp. 9, 12-13 (D.D.C.1988)).

Subsection (8) supplies a three-year limitations period that can bar an unlawful-conversion claim based on events predating the three-year period.

Amariglio v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. · filed 1996-09-20(8)

The embezzlement and obstruction claims are not recognized as civil actions. Even construing the embezzlement allegation generously as the tort of unlawful conversion, it would be time barred because it stemmed from alleged actions that occurred prior to 1990. See D.C.Code § 12-301(8) (three year statute of limitations).

Section 12-301(7) gives claims of this kind a three-year limitations period.

Partnership Placements, Inc. v. Landmark Insurance · filed 1998-12-30(7)

It is undisputed that appellants did not file their complaint within the three-year limitation period prescribed by statute for claims of. this kind.

D.C. Code § 12-301(7) imposes a three-year limitations period on contract claims, and § 12-301(8) imposes a three-year limitations period on fraud and conspiracy-to-commit-fraud claims.

Federal Deposit Insurance v. Wabick · filed 2002-08-02(7), (8)

D.C.Code § 12-301(8) specifies a three-year limitations period for such claims, so FIRREA’s express three-year period in Section 1821 (d)(14)(A)(ii)(I) is not enlarged. ... Because FDIC’s breach of contract claims are also subject to a three-year limitations period under D.C.Code §. 12-301(7), FIRREA’s express six-year statute of limitations for contract claims in Section 1821(d)(14)(A)(i)(I) applies to Count I.

Section 12-301(8) provides a three-year limitations period for claims for which no other limitation period is specifically prescribed.

Bradley v. National Ass'n of Securities Dealers Dispute Resolution, Inc. · filed 2003-01-28(8)

The parties do not dispute that each of the plaintiffs claims is governed by a three-year District of Columbia statute of limitations. This is because her claims are not one of the enumerated causes of action specified in D.C.Code § 12-301 (2001). Section 12-301(8) of the District of Columbia Code provides for a three-year statute of limitations period for those claims “which a limitation is not otherwise specifically prescribed ...” D.C.Code § 12-301(8).

Section 12-301(7) gives negligence claims a three-year limitations period, which begins when the negligent act causes injury.

Byrd v. Admiral Moving and Storage, Inc. · filed 2005-01-12(7)

Second, both her negligence and her breach of contract claims are timely because the statute of limitations for each did not begin to run until the negligent act caused plaintiff to suffer an injury, ... or until the breach of contract occurred. ... The contract was breached in the spring of 2003, when defendant’s delegatee moving companies ceased paying the storage facility, and plaintiffs negligence claim matured at least by September 2003, when she suffered injury through the auctioning of her goods as a result of defendant’s negligent failure to ensure payment to the delegatee storage facility. (Compl. at 4) Both these claims plainly fall within the District of Columbia’s applicable three-year statutes of limitations.

Section 12-301(7) requires a breach-of-contract action to be filed within three years, and the limitations period barred LaPrade’s claim on these facts.

LaPrade v. Rosinsky · filed 2005-09-01(7)

It ruled, inter alia, that LaPrade’s action for damages for breach of contract was barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations, D.C.Code § 12-301(7) (1981), and that LaPrade was not entitled to partition as the deed that would have vested a one-half interest in the property in LaPrade was void because Mr. Rosinsky did not sign it or authorize Mrs. Rosinsky to do so in his behalf. ... LaPrade did not commence her action to recover for the alleged breach until November 29, 2000. As the trial court observed in its order granting defendants’ motion, even if it is assumed that LaPrade was not aware that the May 1976 deed was not in fact executed by Charles Rosinsky until the ruling of the Office of the Secretary of the District of Columbia to that effect on November 2, 1987, LaPrade was required by the applicable three-year statute of limitations to file her action for breach of contract by November 2, 1990 rather than ten years later as she did. The court’s assumption represents a generous view of the facts, one most favorable to LaPrade, as she was necessarily well aware of the Rosinskys’ position by the time she executed her affidavit on April 28, 1986. We perceive no error in this court’s grant of summary judgment on this count.

Section 12-301(8) supplies a three-year limitations period for IDEA due process hearing requests.

Anthony v. District of Columbia · filed 2006-11-30(8)

Because the Court holds that the three-year statute of limitations of D.C.Code § 12-301(8) applies, the Court will remand the case so that the hearing officer can formulate an appropriate compensatory education award in light of any additional FAPE denials within the limitations period.

Section 12-301(7) imposes a three-year limitations period on breach-of-contract claims, including express and implied contracts, running from the breach or completion of the contract.

Braude & Margulies, P.C. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance · filed 2007-01-07(7)

Moreover, the statute of limitations bars B & M’s breach of contract claim against Fireman’s related to the Venetian Project dispute. The applicable statute of limitations for breach of contract claims, whether the contract is express or implied, is three years. D.C.Code § 12-301(7). The statute of limitations runs from the time of the breach or completion of the contract.

Section 12-301 sets a three-year limitations period for the claims at issue, including conversion, trespass, nuisance, contract, fraud, malpractice, negligence, and emotional-distress claims.

Tolbert v. National Harmony Memorial Park · filed 2007-11-09

Thus, contrary to the defendants’ assertions, D.C.’s statute of limitations determines the limitations periods in this case. There is a three-year limitation on every claim Tolbert asserts in her complaint. See D.C.Code § 12-301 (providing a 3-year limitation period for claims of conversion, see § 12-310(2), trespass and nuisance, see § 12-310(3), breach of contract and breach of implied covenant of good faith, see § 12-310(7), and fraud, professional malpractice, negligence, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, see § 12-310(8)).

Section 12-301(8) sets a three-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, which supplies the limitations period for Rehabilitation Act disability-discrimination claims when the federal statute specifies none.

Kersey v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority · filed 2008-02-12(8)

Because the Rehabilitation Act does not specify a limitation period, it is determined by reference to the applicable state statute of limitations. ... D.C.Code § 12-301(8) provides a three year limitation period for personal injury claims.

Section 12-301(7) supplies a three-year limitations period for breach-of-contract claims, and that period may be equitably tolled while an ERISA claimant exhausts required administrative remedies.

Pettaway v. Teachers Insurance & Annuity of America · filed 2008-04-18(7)

In pension benefit situations such as this one, courts in the this Circuit analogize an alleged denial of benefits to a breach of contract claim, which has a statute of limitations of three years under District of Columbia law. See id. (“[T]he applicable statute is § 12-301(7) of the District of Columbia Code, establishing a three-year limitations period for breach of contract actions.”); ... Here, there is good cause to equitably toll the District of Columbia’s three-year statute of limitations. ... The Court therefore concludes that the period of time during which the plaintiff pursued her administrative appeal is equitably tolled in calculating whether the plaintiffs ERISA claim is time-barred.

Section 12-301(8) supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims in the District of Columbia.

Lewis v. Government of the District of Columbia · filed 2009-08-15(8)

“In the District of Columbia, D.C.Code § 12-301(8) governs [§ 1983] claims and provides a [catch-all] three-year statute of limitations.”

Section 12-301(8) provides a three-year statute of limitations for tort claims accruing to the legal representative of a deceased person.

Melara v. CHINA NORTH INDUSTRIES, CORP. · filed 2009-09-30(8)

The statute of limitations on other tort claims that have accrued to the “legal representative of the deceased,” D.C.Code § 12-101, is three years. D.C.Code § 12-301(8). ... Thus, plaintiffs wrongful death claim was filed almost four years too late and his remaining claims, all of which are brought in his capacity as legal representative of the deceased, were filed nearly two years after the statute of limitations expired.

Section 12-301(7) imposes a three-year limitations period on fraud claims, running when the plaintiff has actual or inquiry notice of the injury, its cause, and evidence of wrongdoing.

Drake v. McNair · filed 2010-04-29(7)

The statutory limitation period governing Mrs. Drake’s fraud and misrepresentation claims is three years. See D.C.Code § 12-301(7), (8) (2001). A statute of limitations begins to run when a plaintiff has either actual or inquiry notice of (1) the existence of the alleged injury, (2) its cause in fact, and (3) some evidence of 'wrongdoing.

Section 12-301(8) supplies a three-year limitations period for IDEA attorney-fee claims.

Davidson v. District of Columbia · filed 2010-09-08(8)

Accordingly, the court concludes that Kaseman and Jester do not expressly or impliedly overrule those district court rulings applying the three-year statute of limitations set forth in D.C.Code § 12-301(8) to claims for attorney’s fees under the IDEA. The court will therefore apply a three-year statute of limitations to the remaining claim in this case.

Subsection (8) imposes a three-year limitations period on medical malpractice and informed consent claims.

Hartley v. Dombrowski · filed 2010-10-18(8)

Under District law, the statute of limitations for medical malpractice and informed consent claims is three years. D.C.Code § 12-301(8). As more than three years have lapsed since the surgery took place, plaintiffs proposed informed consent claim is time barred.

A three-year limitations period applies to a contract-based commission claim, and it begins to run when the claimant is told the commission will not be paid.

Medhin v. Hailu · filed 2011-08-11(7)

The statute of limitations for a contract-based action is three years. See D.C.Code § 12-301(7) (2001). ... Thus, any claim by Medh-in to recover that commission brought more than three years after that notice would be untimely. Accordingly, when Hailu sought declaratory judgment over four years later, the trial court did not err in concluding that any claim by Medhin to the commission would have been time-barred.

Section 12-301 gives contract claims and claims without another prescribed limitations period three years to be filed.

Leitner-Wise v. Koniag, Inc. · filed 2018-12-13(7), (8)

Under D.C. law, a three-year statute of limitations applies to all four of Plaintiff’s claims.

Section 12-301 supplies a three-year limitations period for Rehabilitation Act claims under § 794.

Adams v. District of Columbia · filed 2010-09-28

Courts in this district have applied the District of Columbia’s three-year limitations period, which is applicable to personal injury claims, to claims under § 794. ... Because the plaintiff commenced this lawsuit on November 9, 2009, outside the three-year statute of limitations, the plaintiffs claims of disparate treatment under the Rehabilitation Act are time-barred.

Section 12-301(8) provides a three-year limitations period when no other period is specified; claims based on the mortgage transaction itself are barred after three years.

Logan v. LaSalle Bank National Association · filed 2013-12-12(8)

Judge Iscoe noted a potential statute of limitations problem with this count of the complaint, and any claims based on the mortgage transaction itself certainly are barred by the three-year statute. See D.C. Code § 12-301(8) (2001) (three-year residual statute of limitations applies where no other limitation period specified).

Subsection (4) imposes a one-year statute of limitations on false-arrest and false-imprisonment claims.

Stoddard v. Wynn · filed 2014-09-19(4)

The claim is barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations. See D.C. Code § 12-301(4) (one-year statute of limitations applies to claims for false arrest and false imprisonment).

D.C. Code § 12-301(4) imposes a one-year statute of limitations on claims for false arrest and false imprisonment.

Hampton v. Comey · filed 2016-02-08(4)

Section 12-301 imposes a one-year statute of limitations for claims of false arrest and false imprisonment, D.C. Code § 12-301(4)

D.C. Code § 12-301(4) requires false-imprisonment and malicious-prosecution actions to be filed within one year after accrual, subject to any applicable tolling rule.

Patrick v. District of Columbia · filed 2016-04-12(4)

A plaintiff must bring an action for false imprisonment or malicious prosecution within one year of when the cause of action first accrues. D.C. Code § 12-301(4).

Subsection (4) gives false-imprisonment claims a one-year limitations period, starting when the allegedly unlawful imprisonment occurs.

Perrow v. District of Columbia · filed 2020-01-21(4)

The statute of limitations for a false-imprisonment claim under D.C. law is one year. D.C. Code § 12-301(4). Claims for false imprisonment thus accrue at the time the allegedly unlawful imprisonment occurs.

Section 12-301(4) requires battery and false-arrest or false-imprisonment actions to be filed within one year.

Singleton v. District of Columbia · filed 2022-09-14(4)

Under D.C. law, actions for “battery” and “false arrest or false imprisonment” must be brought within one year. See D.C. Code § 12-301(4).

D.C. Code § 12-301(4) imposes a one-year limitations period on false-arrest and false-imprisonment claims, subject to applicable tolling.

Marsh v. District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department · filed 2025-03-28(4)

one-year statute of limitations for claims of false arrest and false imprisonment.

Section 12-301(4) imposes a one-year limitations period on assault and false-imprisonment claims.

Jones v. District of Columbia · filed 2004-11-08(4)

The defendants argue and the plaintiff concedes that the claims in Count V of the amended complaint — namely the common-law tort claims of assault and false imprisonment against Ellison and the Department of Corrections vicariously, see Pl.’s Compl. at ¶¶ 44-47 (Count V) — are barred by the one-year statute of limitations set out in D.C.Code § 12-301(4). See Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 19-20; Pl.’s Opp. at 20. The Court agrees. The gym incident, which gives rise to these tort claims, occurred in December 1997. Jones’ complaint, however, was not filed until September 2000, well outside the statutory limitations period. There being no argument that the limitations period should be tolled in this case, the defendants are entitled to judgment in their favor as a matter of law on Count V.

Section 12-301(4) imposes a one-year statute of limitations on assault, battery, false arrest, and false imprisonment claims in the District of Columbia.

CHEN v. Monk · filed 2010-03-29(4)

The statute of limitations for assault, battery, false arrest, and false imprisonment in the District of Columbia is one year. See D.C.Code § 12-301(4). ... The statute of limitations began to run on the date that the alleged events occurred, April 21, 2007, and expired one year later on April 21, 2008. ... The Court concludes that plaintiffs claims for assault, battery, false arrest and false imprisonment are all barred by the statute of limitations.

Under § 12-301(1), a quiet-title action may qualify as an action for recovery of lands subject to the fifteen-year limitations period, making dismissal on a shorter-period ground premature when the action could recover rights to the property.

Lancaster v. Fox, Jr. · filed 2014-11-05(1)

Lancaster sues to quiet title, an action that, at least in part, seeks “the recovery of lands.” Were he successful in voiding the deeds of trust, he would thereby recover rights to the underlying property. ... Because the statute of limitations could run as long as fifteen years, the Court believes it premature to dismiss Lancaster’s suit on this ground.

Section 12-301(1)'s fifteen-year limitations period does not apply to a money-damages claim for excess building size because that claim is not for recovery of lands, tenements, or hereditaments.

Burra v. Aetna Life Insurance · filed 1996-11-15(1)

Regardless, it has no merit, as the Burkas’ claim for money damages based on the GFA excess is not a claim “for the recovery of lands, tenements, or hereditaments”; thus, it is not entitled to a-fifteen-year statute of limitations under the D.C.Code § 12-301(1).

Section 12-301’s limitation periods are tolled for misrepresentation until the plaintiff should have discovered it, even when the misrepresentation does not conceal the cause of action.

Richards v. Milton Stanley Mileski (Two Cases) · filed 1981-08-21

In addition, the local statutes of limitation are tolled in cases involving misrepresentation, even if that misrepresentation does not hide the cause of action itself, until such time as the misrepresentation should have been discovered.

Under subsection (4), the discovery rule applies to defamation-related claims based on communications sent to a limited, specialized readership, and the claims are timely when filed after plaintiffs discovered the communications.

Associated Producers, Ltd. v. Vanderbilt University · filed 2014-12-23(4)

Accordingly, the Court applies the discovery rule to Plaintiffs’ claims. As Plaintiffs allege that they discovered Defendant Jensen’s allegedly defamatory communications in July 2013, and Plaintiffs thereafter filed suit against Defendants in March 2014, Plaintiffs claims are not barred by the statute of limitations.

Under § 12-301(8)'s three-year limitations period, a lack-of-informed-consent medical-malpractice claim is time-barred when the complaint shows that the plaintiff knew or should have known of her injury, its cause, and some evidence of wrongdoing more than three years before filing suit.

Marzorati v. Medstar-Georgetown Medical Center, Inc. · filed 2017-07-14(8)

Because Marzorati did not bring her lack-of-informed-consent claim for another eight-and-a-half years, and because she has failed to identify any reason to believe that this information was insufficient to put her on notice of (1) her corresponding injury (her worsened pain), (2) its cause (her decision to undergo the surgery), and (3) “some evidence of wrongdoing” by the defendants (defendants’ failure to warn her about the risk of worsened pain), her lack-of-informed-consent claim is time-barred as a matter of law.

Section 12-301(8) provides a three-year limitations period for fraud-related claims not otherwise specifically prescribed, running from when the fraud or misrepresentation is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered.

Clouser v. Temporaries, Inc. · filed 1989-11-03(8)

It is undisputed that Counts II-VI of TI’s counterclaim, with respect to the claims of fraud, fraudulent concealment, constructive fraud, punitive damages, negligent misrepresentation, are governed by the three-year limitations period provided in D.C.Code § 12-301(8) for claims “for which a limitation is not otherwise specifically prescribed.” In the District of Columbia, there is a three-year statute of limitations for fraud claims, and that period begins to run from the time the fraud of misrepresentation “either is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered.” ... However, the question as to when TI sustained its lost is not dispositive as to when the statute of limitation begins to run; the inquiry is when “the fraud or misrepresentation either is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered.” Clearly, the fraud, if any, was discovered on March 16, 1984 when TI agents made their findings of the audit report to TI.

For fraud claims, the three-year limitations period begins when the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should discover, the facts giving rise to the claim.

Professional Answering Service, Inc. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. · filed 1989-10-11(8)

Consequently there was no basis for the motions judge to find that PASI should have known on the date that the contract was formed and the equipment was furnished that C & P had fraudulently misrepresented that it would adequately service the equipment. See Interdonato v. Interdonato, 521 A.2d 1124, 1126 (D.C.1987) (statute of limitations for fraud begins to run upon discovery of facts from which claim arises, or at the time such facts should reasonably be ascertained); Bailey v. Greenberg, 516 A.2d 934, 941 (D.C.1986); Doolin v. Environmental Power Ltd., 360 A.2d 493, 497 (D.C.1976).

Under § 12-301(8), a medical-malpractice action accrues for limitations purposes when the plaintiff knows or should reasonably know of the injury, its cause in fact, and some evidence of wrongdoing, and metastatic cancer may be the relevant injury whose discovery starts the limitations period.

Colbert v. Georgetown University · filed 1993-05-04(8)

We hold that the relevant injury in this case, for the purpose of the discovery rule, is the metastasis of Mrs. Colbert’s cancer, not the diagnosis of the original cancer. The Colberts have presented sufficient evidence to establish that they did not reasonably believe Mrs. Colbert had suffered such an injury until September 1986. We hold that whether this belief was reasonable is a genuine issue of material fact, and that summary judgment based on the statute of limitations was therefore erroneously granted.

Section 12-301(4) applies the discovery rule to determine when a tort cause of action accrues, including a defamation claim.

Gibson v. Boy Scouts of America · filed 2005-01-10(4)

This alleged incident of defamation is not time barred because of the District of Columbia’s “discovery rule.” Although D.C.’s statute of limitations jurisprudence for defamation claims usually runs for one year from the time of publication, the District of Columbia applies the “discovery rule” to determine when a tort action accrues. See D.C.Code § 12-301(4); see also Goldman v. Bequai, 19 F.3d 666, 671-2 (D.C.Cir.1994). This rule states that “a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff has knowledge of (or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have knowledge of) (1) the existence of the injury, (2) its cause in fact, and (3) some evidence of wrongdoing.” Goldman, 19 F.3d at 672 (citing Knight v. Furlow, 553 A.2d 1232, 1234 (D.C.1989)) (internal quotations omitted). Since Plaintiff did not know about the statements made to the Pastor and other members of his community until March 26, 2003, and had no knowledge of, nor should he have had knowledge of, the existence of the allegedly defamatory statements, their cause in fact, or evidence of wrongdoing, and he filed his claim within one year of this date, his defamation claim is timely filed.

Section 12-301(8) gives product-liability claims a three-year limitations period measured from accrual, and under the D.C. discovery rule accrual does not begin until the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the injury, its cause in fact, and evidence of wrongdoing.

Gassmann v. Eli Lilly and Co. · filed 2005-12-29(8)

Applying District of Columbia law, product liability claims must be filed within three years “from the time the right to maintain the action accrues.” D.C.Code § 12-301; ... However, in cases “where the relationship between the fact of injury and the alleged tortious conduct is obscure” when the injury occurs, a three-pronged “discovery rule” is applied to determine when the action accrues. ... Under the discovery rule, a plaintiffs claim does not accrue, and the statute of limitations does not begin to run, until the plaintiff know[s] (or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should know) (1) of the injury, (2) its cause in fact and (3) of some evidence of wrongdoing.

D.C. Code § 12-301(8) supplies the three-year personal-injury limitations period for § 1983 claims.

Proctor v. District of Columbia · filed 2014-11-25(8)

Since Section 1983 does not have a built-in statute of limitations, the general three-year statute of limitations imposed by District of ... Columbia law on claims for personal injury, see D.C. Code § 12-301(8), applies.

Section 12-301(7) sets a usual three-year statutory limitations period for breach-of-contract actions.

Dawn J. Bennett Holding, LLC v. Fedex Techconnect, Inc. · filed 2016-11-08(7)

In the District of Columbia, the usual statutory period to bring an action for breach of contract is three years. D.C. Code § 12-301(7).

A legal malpractice claim may not be brought more than three years after the time the right to maintain the action accrues.

Beach Tv Properties Inc. v. Soloman · filed 2018-03-29(8)

Legal malpractice claims in the District of Columbia “may not be brought” more than three years “from the time the right to maintain the action accrues.”

D.C. Code § 12-301(8) provides that a legal malpractice claim may not be brought more than three years after the right to maintain the action accrues.

Beach TV Props., Inc. v. Solomon · filed 2018-03-29(8)

Legal malpractice claims in the District of Columbia "may not be brought" more than three years "from the time the right to maintain the action accrues."

D.C. Code § 12-301(7) supplies the District of Columbia's three-year limitations period for breach-of-contract claims that courts borrow for analogous nonfiduciary federal claims lacking their own limitations period.

Bricklayers & Trowel Trades Int'l Pension Fund v. Kel-Tech Constr., Inc. · filed 2018-08-03(7)

Accordingly, courts must "borrow the most closely analogous statute of limitations from the state in which the court sits," here the District of Columbia's three-year statute of limitations for breach of contract claims. Id. (citing D.C. Code § 12-301(7) ).

Section 12-301(7) gives breach-of-contract claims a three-year limitations period running from accrual, while § 12-301(8) gives wrongful-discharge-in-violation-of-public-policy claims a three-year period that accrues when the plaintiff has unequivocal notice of the wrongful termination.

Prosper v. Attorney General of Antigua and Barbuda · filed 2022-09-12(7), (8)

In the District of Columbia, a three-year statute of limitations governs breach-of-contract claims like Prosper’s. See D.C. Code § 12-301(7); Prouty v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 572 F. Supp. 200, 205 (D.D.C. 1983). ... A three-year statute of limitations governs it. See Stephenson v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 789 A.2d 1248, 1249 (D.C. 2002) (citing D.C. Code § 12-301(8)). Unlike for breach-of-contract claims, this tort claim accrues “the moment” the plaintiff has unequivocal notice—whether actual or constructive—of the wrongful termination, even if the termination happens later.

The court held that §§ 12-301(7) and (8) impose three-year limitations periods for breach-of-contract and tortious-interference claims, respectively, and that Nwaneri’s claims were untimely.

Nwaneri v. George Washington University Hospital · filed 2023-03-20(7) (8)

“D.C. Code § 12-301(7) imposes a three-year statute of limitations for breach of contract actions.” ... “The statute of limitations on a tortious interference claim is also three years. See D.C. Code § 12-301(8);”

Section 12-301(7) supplies a three-year limitations period for breach-of-contract claims, and § 12-301(8) supplies a three-year limitations period for negligence claims; the court applies those periods to assess timeliness.

St. Peter v. Georgetown University · filed 2023-12-15(7), (8)

Yet this time, the dispute does not turn on which statute of limitations applies, since D.C. law specifies a three-year period for breach-of-contract actions. See D.C. Code § 12-301(7). ... As it does for contract actions, D.C. law specifies a limitations period of three years for negligence claims. See D.C. Code § 12-301(8).

D.C. Code § 12-301(7) gives breach-of-contract actions a three-year limitations period running from the time of breach, but the court declined to resolve timeliness at the pleading stage.

Quinn v. Kreindler & Kreindler LLP · filed 2023-03-03(7)

(7) on a simple contract, express or implied – 3 years. D.C. Code § 12-301(7). ... and the statute of limitations begins to run, at the time of the breach.

Section 12-301(8) supplies a three-year limitation period for an IDEA attorney’s-fees claim.

Brown v. Barbara Jordan P.C.S. · filed 2007-06-13(8)

The IDEA, does not specifically include a statute of limitations provision for attorneys’ fees claims. As a result, Courts have had to resort to importing limitations periods from analogous state law causes of action. ... In the absence of clear precedent from our Circuit Court to the contrary, this Court joins in the conclusion of its colleagues and adopts the D.C.Code’s three year limitation period.

Section 12-301(8) gives negligence, strict liability, and failure-to-warn product liability claims a three-year limitations period measured from accrual.

Kubicki v. Medtronic, Inc. · filed 2018-02-05(8)

Turning to another major argument that Medtronic and Unomedical raise in the context of their motions for summary judgment—timeliness—the Court notes that the parties do not dispute that Plaintiffs’ product-liability claims for negligence, strict liability, and failure to warn are subject to the three-year statute of limitations laid out in D.C. Code § 12-301. ... For the reasons explained below, this Court finds that the infusion set-related tort claims that the Kubickis have brought against Unomedical are not timely, because such claims could have (and should have) been discovered shortly after Caroline’s injury in 2007, and Unomedical had no notice of the infusion set claims against it until the Kubickis filed an amended complaint, six years after the injury occurred.

D.C. Code § 12-301(7) and (8) require actions arising in contract, fraud, and negligence to be brought within three years from when the right to maintain the action accrues.

U.S. Bank National Association v. Poblete · filed 2016-03-18(7) & (8)

The D.C. statute of limitation, D.C. Code § 12-301, requires actions arising in contract, fraud and negligence to be brought within three years “from the time the right to maintain the action accrues.”

Section 12-301(7) requires contract actions to be filed within three years after the right to maintain the action accrues, which occurs when the alleged breach happens.

Billups v. Laboratory Corp. of America · filed 2017-01-30(7)

The District’s statute provides that actions on a contract “may not be brought” more than three years “from the time the right to maintain the action accrues.” D.C. Code § 12-301(7). It is settled that “[a] cause of action for breach of contract accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, at the time of the breach,”

D.C. Code § 12-301(8) requires negligence actions to be brought within three years after the cause of action accrues.

Swanson v. Howard University · filed 2017-04-13(8)

“Under District of Columbia law, an action for negligence must be brought within three years after a cause of action accrues.”

Section 12-301(8)'s limitations period does not control the timeliness of an equitable contribution claim, which may fail on equitable grounds even when filed within the statutory period.

George Washington University v. Bier · filed 2008-04-18(8)

We do not doubt that this independent action was filed within the appropriate statute of limitations. D.C.Code § 12-301(8) (2001). However, as we have said, contribution is an equitable remedy, ... and "[tjraditionally and for good reasons” the statute of limitations does not control the timeliness of equitable claims.

Section 12-301(8)'s three-year limitations period for breach-of-fiduciary-duty actions is subject to tolling under the adverse-domination doctrine when a plaintiff corporation is controlled by wrongdoers.

Alberts v. Tuft (In Re Greater Southeast Community Hospital Corp. I) · filed 2006-09-26(8)

it is unknown whether D.C. courts would recognize the doctrine as an exception to the running of the statute of limitations. The court concludes that they would for two reasons.

The limitations periods in D.C. Code § 12-301(4) and (8) may be equitably tolled when the complaint plausibly alleges circumstances justifying tolling, so dismissal of the Colombian-law claims as time-barred was denied.

In re Chiquita Brands International, Inc. · filed 2016-06-01(4), (8)

The Court agrees, for the reasons previously discussed, that the factual allegations of the complaint plausibly suggest the existence of circumstances- which might justify an equitable tolling of applicable statutes of limitations, including the limitation period which apply to the Colombian law claims of the D.C. Plaintiffs. On this basis, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Colombian law claims as time-barred shall.be denied.

Section 12-301(3) provides a three-year limitations period for the action, and filing the same suit in another jurisdiction does not toll that period when the earlier suit was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Curtis v. Aluminum Ass'n · filed 1992-04-24(3)

The Superior Court of the District of Columbia dismissed appellant’s suit against Aluminum Association and other defendants on the ground that the three-year statute of limitations governing such actions had expired pursuant to D.C.Code § 12-301(3). ... We have held, however, that “[tjhere is no basis for finding that filing suit in another jurisdiction tolls the statute of limitations here_” Namerdy v. Generalcar, 217 A.2d 109, 113 (D.C.1966); see also Bond v. Serano, 566 A.2d 47 (D.C.1989). ... Thus, our holding in Bond binds this division.

Section 12-301(8)’s three-year period for negligence claims is not tolled by filing the same claim in another court that lacks jurisdiction.

Bond v. Serano · filed 1989-11-13(8)

Appellant concedes that the statute of limitations had run, but urges this court to apply principles of equitable tolling and to hold that his earlier suit against the District of Columbia filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging the same cause of action, but which had been dismissed by that court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, tolled the statute of limitations for purposes of his Superior Court suit. Concluding that we are bound by a previous decision of this court rejecting a functionally identical argument, Namerdy v. Generalcar, 217 A.2d 109, 113 (D.C.1966), we uphold the order of the trial court dismissing appellant’s complaint.

Section 12-301(8)’s three-year limitations period is not subject to equitable tolling under District of Columbia law when that rule does not conflict with federal law.

Loumiet v. United States of America · filed 2013-09-12(8)

Here, District of Columbia case law precludes equitable tolling of the applicable statute of limitations. See Sayyad v. Fawzi, 674 A.2d 905, 906 (D.C. 1996) (per curiam) (rejecting equitable tolling of D.C. Code §12-301(8) under principle of “strict adherence to statutes of limitations.”); ... Plaintiff points to no reason why this policy against tolling conflicts with federal law, and thus, pursuant to District of Columbia law, the Court will not apply equitable tolling here.

D.C. Code § 12-301(4) imposes a one-year limitations period on assault-and-battery claims, including those pursued through a Survival Act claim, measured from the decedent’s injury.

Frasier v. Hp Enterprise Services, LLC · filed 2016-09-15(4)

The statute of limitations for a claim brought pursuant to the Survival Act is the statute of limitations applicable to the underlying claim, and the claim generally accrues on the date of the decedent’s injury, and not on the date of the decedent’s death.

D.C. Code § 12-301(4)'s one-year period governs assault-and-battery claims pursued through a Survival Act claim, with accrual at the decedent's injury rather than death.

Delorenzo v. HP Enterprise Services LLC · filed 2016-09-15(4)

The statute of limitations for a claim brought pursuant to the Survival Act is the statute of limitations applicable to the underlying claim, and the claim generally accrues on the date of the decedent’s injury, and not on the date of the decedent’s death.

D.C. Code § 12-301(4)'s one-year period governs assault-and-battery claims pursued through a Survival Act claim, with accrual at the decedent's injury rather than death.

Ridgell v. HP Enterprise Services LLC · filed 2016-09-15(4)

The statute of limitations for a claim brought pursuant to the Survival Act is the statute of limitations applicable to the underlying claim, and the claim generally accrues on the date of the decedent’s injury, and not on the date of the decedent’s death.

Subsection (4) provides a one-year statute of limitations for assault-and-battery claims.

Stultz v. Hp Enterprise Services, LLC · filed 2017-09-01(4)

To the extent Plaintiffs intend to claim vicarious liability for assault and battery, such claims are time barred under D.C. law, which provides a one-year statute of limitation on assault and battery claims.

Section 12-301(a)(4) requires assault and battery claims to be filed within one year from accrual; claims filed more than one year after accrual are time-barred.

Yazzie v. National Organization for Women · filed 2021-03-30(a)(4)

D.C. law requires that claims for assault or battery be filed within one year “from the time the right to maintain the action accrues.” D.C. Code § 12-301(a)(4).

The court applies § 12-301(4)'s one-year limitations period to assault and battery claims and to IIED claims intertwined with and completely based on those claims.

Parker v. Bowser · filed 2026-03-10(4)

Claims of assault and battery are subject to a one-year statute of limitations in the District of Columbia, and while IIED claims normally have a three-year statute of limitations, when they are ‘intertwined’ with and completely based on claims which have a shorter statute of limitations, they are subject to that period.

Section 12-301(4) gives defamation claims a one-year statute of limitations.

Turner v. Federal Express Corp. · filed 2008-03-28(4)

A one-year statute of limitations applies to claims of defamation. See D.C.Code § 12-301(4) (2003); see also Jin v. Ministry of State Sec., 254 F.Supp.2d 61, 68 (D.D.C.2003). Turner filed this action on February 22, 2007. Hence, any allegedly defamatory statement made prior to February 22, 2006 could not be the basis for a claim, as it would be time-barred.

Section 12-301(4) sets a one-year limitations period for assault and battery claims, including survival claims based on those torts.

Zagami v. Hp Enterprise Services, LLC · filed 2016-09-15(4)

HPES and The Experts move to dismiss Count II of the McCullough Complaint and Count VIII of the Proctor Complaint because they are barred by D.C.’s one-year statute of limitations for assault and battery claims. See D.C. Code § 12-301(4). ... Both claims will be dismissed as time barred or, in the alternative, as conceded.

Section 12-301 applies a one-year limitations period to assault, battery, and other intentional-tort claims, while claims of a different nature, including qualifying malpractice claims, receive the three-year period; the applicable period depends on the substantive elements and underlying act of the claim.

McCracken v. Walls-Kaufman · filed 1998-09-10(4), (8)

In order to decide whether the trial court properly granted appellee's motion to dismiss, we must first determine whether appellants' complaint set out a claim only for assault or battery or other intentional tort, to which the one-year period of limitations of D.C.Code § 12-301(4) applies, or whether in addition to or instead of such a claim appellants' complaint stated a claim of a different nature that is governed by the three-year period of limitations prescribed by D.C.Code § 12-301(8) (1995). To do so, we must look beyond the conclusory terms of the pleadings to the substantive elements of any alleged causes of action. ... When an action is alleged under the broad rubric of medical malpractice, it is the underlying act that is the basis for the alleged malpractice that determines the applicable period of limitations.

Section 12-301(10) does not abrogate the continuing-tort doctrine by implication; clearer legislative language is required.

National Telephone Cooperative Ass'n v. Exxon Corp. · filed 1998-11-19(10)

Here, although section 12-301(10) affirmatively adopts a portion of the common-law’s discovery rule, it is entirely silent with respect to the continuing-tort doctrine. Section 12-301(10) must evince language of greater clarity before the Court will interpret it to abrogate the continuing-tort doctrine by implication. Accordingly, NTCA’s claims are timely presented.

Section 12-301(8) supplies a three-year limitations period for abuse-of-process actions because the statute does not specifically prescribe another period; subsection (4)'s one-year period does not apply merely because abuse of process resembles malicious prosecution.

Rothenberg v. Ralph D. Kaiser Co. (In Re Rothenberg) · filed 1994-08-24(4), (8)

D.C.Code § 12-301(4) provides that the statute of limitations for "libel, slander, assault, battery, mayhem, wounding, malicious prosecution, false arrest or false imprisonment” is one year; whereas D.C.Code § 12-301(8) provides that an action "for which a limitation is not otherwise specially prescribed” is governed by a three-year limitation. ... Likewise, an action for abuse of process is governed by the residuary three-year limitation of section 12-301(8) because the statute does not specifically provide otherwise.

D.C. Code § 12-301(8) imposes a three-year statute of limitations on common-law tort claims.

Lin v. United States · filed 2017-03-30(8)

The statute of limitations for a common-law tort is three years, D.C. Code § 12-301(8).

Section 12-301(8)'s three-year limitations period begins when the right to sue accrues, and a continuing tort requires a new wrongful injurious act within that period; ongoing injury, concealment, or a continuing conspiracy alone does not extend it.

Fitzgerald v. Seamans · filed 1974-10-09(8)

The three-year statute of limitations embodied in D.C.Code § 12-301(8) (1973) runs “from the time the right to maintain the action accrues,” and in tort actions this has been interpreted to mean the time injury results from the wrongful acts. ... The mere allegation that the conspiracy continued as a conspiracy of silence, or even active concealment, within the limitations period will not suffice to make actionable those acts of the conspirators on which the statute of limitations has run. ... What is required to come within the continuing tort exception, and what is lacking here, is another wrongful injurious act within the statutory period repetitious of prelimitation period acts, not simply a passive refusal to remedy wrongful pre-limitation period acts.

Section 12-301(8) gives most common-law tort claims a three-year limitations period, while § 12-301(4) gives assault-and-battery claims one year; for a continuing tort, the period begins when the tortious conduct ends.

Rochon v. Federal Bureau of Investigation · filed 1988-08-11(8), (4)

In this ease, the District of Columbia’s three-year statute of limitations applies to almost all of plaintiffs’ common law claims, D.C.Code § 12-301(8); ... the sole exception is Mr. Rochon’s claim against defendant Veach for assault and battery, which has a one-year time bar. D.C.Code § 12-301(4); ... As a general rule, the statute of limitations begins to run “when the plaintiff[s] know[ ] both the existence and the cause of his [or her] injury.” ... Under this “continuing tort” doctrine, the statute of limitations does not start to run when a plaintiff knows or should have known about the defendants’ actions. ... Rather, the cause of action accrues, and the limitations period begins to run, at the time the tortious conduct ceases.

Section 12-301(4) gives assault and battery claims a one-year limitations period, while § 12-301(8) provides a three-year period for the other common-law claims discussed.

Williams v. District of Columbia · filed 1996-02-05(4), (8)

In the District of Columbia, assault and battery claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations period. D.C.Code Ann. § 12-301(4). ... In this ease, Williams failed to file timely her assault claim (Count V) and her battery claim (Count VI). She has presented no justification for her failure to file timely nor has she offered any legal authority to support her theory of equitable tolling. The motion to dismiss Counts V and VI will be granted, because both are barred by the statute of limitations, D.C.Code § 12-301(4). ... Even though Counts II and IV were filed within the three-year statute of limitations period applicable under D.C.Code § 12-301(8), to maintain her claims against the District of Columbia government, Williams must have provided, within six months of the injury, “notice in writing to the Mayor of the District of Columbia of the approximate time, place, cause, and circumstances of the injury or damage.” D.C.Code § 12-309 (1995).

The one-year period in § 12-301(4) for false arrest and false imprisonment does not govern First and Fourth Amendment Bivens claims; the three-year residual period in § 12-301(8) applies.

Lederman v. United States · filed 2001-03-05(4)

Defendants contend that the constitutional torts alleged in this case are analogous to the common law torts of false arrest and false imprisonment, and, therefore, § 12-301(4)’s one year statute of limitations applies. ... Consistent with the Supreme Court’s rationale in Owens, and this Court’s rationale in Hobson, the District of Columbia’s three-year general limitations provision should apply to plaintiffs Bivens actions for First and Fourth Amendment violations. ... Defendants have not shown how their preferred one-year intentional tort limitations period is appropriate for the Bivens actions in this case.

Section 12-301(7) gives actions with no otherwise specified limitations period three years, measured here from accrual when the work stopped and the bill was sent.

Dawson v. Drazin · filed 1966-10-31(7)

The latter is not applicable under the facts of the instant case. Appellee’s uncontroverted testimony shows that he stopped work on the project in July 1960 and sent a bill to appellant and his wife at that time. It was then that his cause of action arose. Zellan v. Cole, 87 U.S.App.D.C. 9, 183 F.2d 139 (1950); Lalley v. Escoett, 79 U.S.App.D.C. 306, 146 F.2d 667 (1945); Boogher v. Roach, 25 App.D. C. 324, 333 (1905). Since the complaint was filed in February 1963, the statute of limitations had not run its full three years. D.C.Code § 12-301(7), (8) (Supp. V, 1966). The trial judge was correct in not barring the action on this ground since appellant had not met his burden of proof. Pekofsky v. Blalock, D.C.Mun.App., 175 A.2d 604 (1961).

Section 12-301(8) supplies a three-year limitations period for actions not otherwise enumerated.

Fitzgerald v. Robert C. Seamans, Jr. · filed 1977-04-29(8)

The parties agree that the statute of limitations applicable to this case is that of D.C.Code § 12-301(8) (1973), which establishes a three year limitations period for actions not otherwise enumerated. The District Court agreed, citing ... We affirm that ruling.

D.C. Code § 12-301(8) imposes a three-year limitations period on any cause of action not expressly defined in the section.

McDonald's USA, LLC v. Craft · filed 2017-06-22(8)

In the District of Columbia, a three year limitations period attaches to any cause of action not expressly defined in Section 12-301 of the D.C. Code. See D.C. Code § 12-301(8).

D.C. Code § 12-301(8) imposes a three-year limitations period on causes of action not specifically prescribed elsewhere, measured from accrual.

Ford v. State of Maryland Attorney General · filed 2018-10-22(8)

State law claims for “personal injury must be brought within three years of the time the action accrues.” See Bailey v. Greenberg, 516 A.2d 934, 936 (D.C. 1986), citing D.C. Code § 12-301(8) (setting a statute of limitations of three years for all causes of action not “specifically prescribed” in other subsections).

D.C. Code § 12-301 establishes time limits for bringing actions in the District of Columbia and does not create a private right of action.

Slovinec v. Georgetown University · filed 2017-07-31

D.C. Code § 12-301 establishes the time limits for bringing actions in the District of Columbia; it does not create a private right of action, let alone one for employment discrimination.

The D.C. Code § 12-301 limitations periods do not apply to a WMATA tort suit seeking to recover repair costs for publicly important transit facilities when the suit advances WMATA’s public purpose.

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. Union Station Venture Limited · filed 2017-08-03

But here, where WMATA has spent money to repair allegedly wrongfully damaged facilities that are critical to a portion of a transit system whose operation is of great interest to a wide segment of the public, WMATA is not subject to the statute of limitations in a tort suit that seeks to recover the cost of those repairs.

For a common-law wrongful-discharge claim, the three-year limitations period begins when the employee receives unequivocal notice of termination, not on the later final day of employment.

Stephenson v. American Dental Ass'n · filed 2002-01-17(8)

There is no dispute that his claim, based on public policy, is governed by the three-year statute of limitations set forth in D.C.Code § 12-301(8) (2001). ... The operative fact is not the formal termination date but, rather, is the moment Stephenson learned of definite injury. Here, the alleged wrongful discharge occurred when Stephenson was notified unequivocally of his termination. ... There is no genuine dispute that Stephenson received notice of termination, at the latest, on March 29, 1996. Under the reasoning of Ricks and Chardon,' which we adopt, his claim filed on May 28, 1999, was too late to survive the three-year statute of limitations.

Section 12-301 supplies one- or three-year limitation periods, running from accrual, for the specified claims, including conversion, contract, fiduciary-duty, and wrongful-transfer claims.

Riddell v. Riddell Washington Corp. · filed 1987-11-18(5), (8), (2), (7)

The general statute of limitations period for the District of Columbia governs the remaining claims. D.C.Code § 12-301. ... The general limitations statute provides a limitations period of either one year, D.C.Code § 12-301(5), or three years, D.C.Code § 12-301(8), from the date of accrual. ... Count IV alleges conversion. The statute of limitations for conversion is three years. D.C.Code § 12-301(2). ... Count V alleges breach of contract. Specifically, plaintiff maintains Jean Riddell breached her duty of good faith and fair dealing when she foreclosed on the note. Under local law, a three year statute of limitations applies. D.C.Code § 12-301(7), which runs from the date of the breach. ... Count VI alleges that Jean Riddell breached her fiduciary duty to plaintiff. The applicable statute of limitations is three years. D.C.Code § 12-301(8). ... Finally, Count VII alleges that Jean Riddell wrongfully transferred plaintiff’s stock to the corporations. This claim is subject to a three year statute of limitations. D.C.Code §§ 12-301(2) or (8).

Section 12-301(8) requires negligence claims seeking personal-injury damages to be brought within three years of accrual, but a defendant may be estopped from asserting the period when misleading representations induced the plaintiff to delay filing.

Bailey v. Greenberg · filed 1986-10-29(8)

An action alleging negligence and seeking damages for personal injury must be brought within three years of the time the action accrued. ... “In the more commonplace negligence actions, where the fact of injury is readily discernible, the cause of action accrues when the injury occurs.” ... We hold Bailey raised a material issue of fact whether Greenberg or his agent, INA, or both, lulled her into not filing suit. ... Were she able to show the delay in filing suit was induced as a result of such representations, Greenberg would be estopped from pleading the statute of limitations as a bar.

Section 12-301 imposes a three-year limitation for fraud and negligence claims; fraud accrues when discovered or reasonably discoverable, while ordinary negligence accrues when the plaintiff is injured, and the limitation period also controls concurrent equitable relief.

Carmichael v. Egan · filed 1977-05-26

In this action, our concurrent jurisdiction has been invoked and we are governed by the District of Columbia statute of limitations, D.C.Code 1973, as amended, § 12-301. We will consider its application to each of the alleged causes of action seriatim. ... In the District of Columbia, the statute of limitations for fraud is three (3) years. D.C.Code § 12-301. The statute does not begin to run until the fraud has been discovered or until the plaintiff by exercise of ordinary care might reasonably have discovered it. ... We therefore hold that plaintiff’s claim for fraud is barred by the statute of limitations. D.C.Code, 1973, § 12-301. ... Section 12-301 provides a three-year limitation upon the commencement of negligence actions. In ordinary negligence actions, such as this case, the D.C. statute begins to run at the time the plaintiff suffers injury. ... plaintiff’s claim for negligence is again barred by the statute. D.C.Code, 1973, § 12-301. ... Since concurrent jurisdiction does exist, and the statute of limitations has barred plaintiffs requests for legal relief, equity will follow the law and be controlled by the applicable statute of limitations.

The court held that D.C. Code § 12-301 imposes a one-year limitations period for the listed torts, a three-year period for other torts without a specially prescribed period, and starts the period when the right to sue accrues.

Saleh v. Bin Zayed Al Nahyan · filed 2021-09-22(a)(4), (a)(8), (a)

The statute of limitations for any of these torts under D.C. law is one year. See D.C. Code § 12-301(a)(4) (stating that “for libel, slander, assault, battery, mayhem, wounding, malicious prosecution, false arrest or false imprisonment,” the applicable statute of limitations is “1 year.”). If plaintiffs allege an underlying tort not included in this list, the maximum statute of limitations is three years. See D.C. Code § 12-301(a)(8) (stating that for a tort “for which a limitation is not otherwise specially prescribed,” the applicable statute of limitations is “3 years”).

For professional-negligence claims under § 12-301(3), the three-year limitations period runs when the right to sue accrues, generally when the injury occurs; the limited discovery rule delays accrual only in appropriate cases.

Washington Tennis & Education Foundation, Inc. v. Clark Nexsen, Inc. · filed 2018-08-20(3)

The parties agree that a three-year statute of limitations applies to this action. See D.C. Code § 12-301(3). ... The statute of limitations begins to run “from the time the right to maintain the action accrues.” D.C. Code § 12-301. ... Typically, “[w]here the fact of an injury can be readily determined, a claim accrues for purposes of the statute of limitations at the time the injury actually occurs.” ... Pursuant to the discovery rule, “the claim does not accrue until the plaintiff, exercising due diligence, has ‘discovered or reasonably should have discovered all of the essential elements of her possible cause of action, i.e., duty, breach, causation, and damages.’” ... “Application of the discovery rule . . . is not universal,” and is to be applied on a limited “‘case by case basis.’” ... Having considered the foregoing factors and concluded that Plaintiff is a sophisticated party who benefitted from the hired expertise of others and was on notice of any design deficiencies in Clark Nexsen’s construction documents well within the statute of limitations period, the court holds that the discovery rule is inapplicable to WTEF’s claim.

For a claim subject to § 12-301(8), the three-year limitations period begins when the plaintiff knows or reasonably could have known the facts constituting the cause of action.

Zervas v. District of Columbia · filed 1993-03-17(8)

Plaintiffs claim as to the March 1988 selection process was filed within the three-year statute of limitations. Plaintiffs claim is also timely to the extent that he relies on the alleged preselection in October 1987. Plaintiff was not aware of the facts constituting that cause of action until April 1989, when his counsel obtained a document referring to the alleged preselection through discovery. Until that time, plaintiff could not reasonably have known the facts surrounding the alleged preselection. It appeared that no permanent selection had been made for the position because Mott was “acting” Deputy Director and the DCFD solicited applications for the post. The statute of limitations did not begin to run until April of 1989. Thus, plaintiffs claim is not time-barred.

Section 12-301(8) requires a survival action to be filed within three years after accrual; under the discovery rule, accrual occurs when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the injury, its cause in fact, and some evidence of wrongdoing.

James D. Nelson, Jr. v. American National Red Cross, James D. Nelson, Jr., Cross-Appellee v. American National Red Cross · filed 1994-06-28(8)

Under District of Columbia law, a survival action must be filed within three years of the date the right to maintain the action accrues. D.C.Code § 12-301(8). Ordinarily, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues at the time he suffers the injury alleged. ... Under the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff “must know or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should know (1) of the injury, (2) its cause in fact, and (3) some evidence of wrongdoing.” ... We conclude that summary judgment was appropriately granted here. Nelson Sr. should have known he had suffered a legally cognizable injury when he was told he was HIV positive.

Section 12-301(8) imposes a three-year limitations period, and a claim accrues when the plaintiff has actual or inquiry notice; inquiry notice requires knowledge of an injury, its factual cause, and some evidence of defendant wrongdoing.

Smith v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. · filed 2000-07-19(8)

Mrs. Smith’s fraud and deceptive trade practices claims are governed by a three-year statute of limitations. See D.C.Code § 12-301(8). ... For purposes of the statute of limitations, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff has either actual or inquiry notice of her cause of action. ... A plaintiff is charged with inquiry notice of a claim when she knew of (1) an injury, (2) its cause in fact, and (3) some evidence of wrongdoing by defendants. ... Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on the ground of statute of limitations because Mrs. Smith’s awareness of defendants’ nondisclosure of information, coupled with her purported knowledge of her own addiction and of the generally addictive and harmful qualities of cigarettes, was not sufficient evidence of wrongdoing to satisfy the third requirement for inquiry notice of her fraud claim. ... In the absence of any indication as to how Mrs. Smith reasonably could have investigated the facts underlying her fraud claim in 1992, or greater evidence of defendants’ alleged wrongdoing, the Court cannot state, as a matter of law, that Mrs. Smith was on inquiry notice of her fraud claim in 1992. Summary judgment on the ground that plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred is therefore inappropriate.

Section 12-301(8) gives tortious interference claims a three-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knows or should know of appreciable injury and the defendant's role; continuing conduct does not postpone accrual after that notice.

Beard v. Edmondson and Gallagher · filed 2002-01-24(8)

The cause of action for tortious interference with contract is subject to a three-year statute of limitations. See D.C.Code § 12-301(8) (2001).7 The question we must decide is whether that statute had run by the time E&G sued Gross and Foley Hoag for tortious interference in December 1992. ... We cannot accept E&G’s argument. Our cases specifically have rejected the expansive application of the continuing tort doctrine exemplified in Page and employed by Judge Levie in ruling that the statute of limitations was tolled until the quiet title litigation finally was concluded. E&G knew or should have known that it was appreciably injured by the lis pendens from the outset, when Gross filed a notice of ATTA’s claimed right of first refusal with the Recorder of Deeds in January 1987. Under our case law, the continuation of the litigation therefore did not delay the accrual of E&G’s cause of action, and the statute of limitations ran on any tortious conduct by Gross or Foley Hoag that occurred prior to December 1, 1989, i.e., more than three years before E&G filed suit.

The three-year catch-all limitations period begins when the claimant knows that the insurance policy does not cover the alleged loss.

Saylab v. Harford Mutual Insurance · filed 2003-05-15(8)

The statute of limitations argument is not persuasive. Assuming for these purposes that Associated and Ms. Meyers are correct and the three-year “catch-all” statute of limitations under D.C.Code § 12-301(8) applies to the complaint allegations, the time did not start running until the Saylab family knew that the insurance policy from Harford did not cover their loss, contrary (it is alleged) to the legal requirements for insurance to cover dram shop liability and the specific requests of Don Juan. Thus, the actual controversy that gave rise to the filing of the declaratory judgment action arose when Harford denied coverage in the fall of 2001. The lawsuit filed in January 2002 was timely.

Section 12-301 sets a three-year limitations period for contract claims, a one-year period for various tort claims, and a three-year residual period.

Emrit v. Holland · filed 2017-06-13

Appellant has not shown any error in the dismissal of his case as time-barred. See D.C. Code § 12-301 (establishing three-year limitations period for contract claims, one-year limitations period for various tort claims, and three-year residual limitations period).

Section 12-301 starts the limitations period when the right to sue accrues; the state-law claims addressed here had limitations periods of no more than three years.

Canuto v. Carter · filed 2017-08-10

Under District of Columbia law, none of the state law claims asserted against Bank of America has a statute of limitations longer than three years. ... The statutory period begins to run “from the time the right to maintain the action accrues.” D.C. Code § 12-301. ... Thus her state law claims against Bank of America accrued in 2009. In waiting to file suit until November 16, 2016, approximately seven years after Bank of America’s actions that allegedly caused her injury, Ms. Canuto brought her state law claims against Bank of America too late. Those claims are time barred.

Under D.C. Code § 12-301(8), the trial court must determine the accrual date of an unjust-enrichment claim from the facts and then decide whether the complaint was timely.

Boyd Jr. v. Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton · filed 2017-07-20(8)

The trial court can then determine whether appellant filed his complaint within the applicable limitations period for unjust enrichment claims.

Under D.C. Code § 12-301(8), a negligence claim has a three-year limitations period that begins when the cause of action accrues, meaning when the plaintiff knows or should have known of the injury.

Johnson v. Paragon Sys., Inc. · filed 2018-03-29(8)

Likewise, Mr. Johnson's negligence claim is subject to the District of Columbia's three-year residual statute of limitations. ... The cause of action accrues "when the plaintiff knows or through the exercise of due diligence should have known of the injury."

Section 12-301(8)'s three-year limitations period for an action not otherwise specifically prescribed begins when the enforcement claim accrues, after the underlying administrative liability is finally adjudicated.

Strand v. Frenkel · filed 1985-11-13(8)

As a consequence, the tenants’ enforcement claim, in contrast with their initial claim for rental overcharges, did not accrue — and the three-year statute of limitations did not begin to run — until early to mid-August, 1983, seven months after they filed suit.

Section 12-301(8) requires actions for which no other limitation is prescribed to be filed within three years of accrual; for these refund claims, the period runs separately from each payment.

Woodruff v. McConkey · filed 1987-04-21(8)

We hold that appellants’ causes of action based on the licensing statute arose when payments were made, and are subject to the general three-year statute of limitations, § 12-301(8), for each payment made.

For legal-malpractice claims, the three-year limitations period begins when the client knows or should know of an injury, its cause, and evidence of wrongdoing; attorney’s fees and costs caused by the malpractice are legally cognizable injury.

Knight v. Furlow · filed 1989-02-06

We agree with Knight’s contention that a claim for legal malpractice does not accrue until the plaintiff-client has sustained some injury from the malpractice. ... We conclude that attorney’s fees and costs expended as a result of an attorney’s alleged malpractice constitute legally cognizable damages for purposes of stating a claim for such malpractice. ... Because the evidence indicates that Knight knew of, and sustained injury from, Furlow’s alleged malpractice more than three years before filing the complaint, the statute of limitations bars Knight’s prosecution of his legal malpractice claim.

Section 12-301(8) imposes a three-year limitations period, measured from when the right to maintain the action accrues, for actions without another specifically prescribed limitation.

Stackhouse v. Schneider · filed 1989-05-26(8)

Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, actions for the following purposes may not be brought after the expiration of the period specified below from the time the right to maintain the action accrues: ... (8) for which a limitation is not otherwise specially prescribed — 3 years. ... However, it does not follow that in every case it is the date of injury that triggers the running of the statute of limitations. ... We hold that the three year statute of limitations for maintaining an action under the 1982 No-Fault Act does not begin to run until the injured party qualifies under one of the six exceptions of § 35-2105.

Section 12-301 imposes a three-year limitations period for negligence and contract claims, running from accrual; in legal-malpractice cases, accrual generally occurs at actual injury, while the discovery rule applies when the relationship between injury and tortious conduct is obscure and the plaintiff knows or should know of the injury, its cause, and evidence of wrongdoing.

Williams v. Mordkofsky · filed 1990-04-17

In the District of Columbia, the limitations period for count 1, which sounds in negligence, and counts 3-5, which sound in contract, is three years “from the time the right to maintain the action accrues.” D.C.Code § 12-301 (1981). ... For many years, therefore, the District of Columbia courts have applied an “injury” rule. Under the injury rule, “a claim for legal malpractice accrues when the plaintiff-client suffers actual injury, not when the act causing the injury occurs.” ... Since there are occasions, however, when even the injury rule works an undue hardship on potential plaintiffs, the District of Columbia recently has adopted a “discovery” rule. In Knight v. Furlow, 553 A.2d 1232 (D.C.1989), the court stated that the discovery rule should apply “in cases where the relationship between the fact of injury and some tortious conduct is obscure at the time of injury.”

Section 12-301(8) gives fraud claims a three-year limitations period measured from when the right to sue accrues, with accrual when the fraud was or should have been discovered through due diligence; § 12-301(7) gives express and implied contract claims a three-year limitations period.

Hawkins v. Greenfield · filed 1992-08-18(8), (7)

Under District of Columbia law, an action for fraud must be brought within three years of “the time the right to maintain the action accrues.” D.C.Code § 12-301(8). The statute of limitations for an action for fraud begins to run when the fraud is or should have been discovered through plaintiff's due diligence. ... The statute of limitations for an express or implied contract is three years. D.C.Code § 12-301(7). Therefore, plaintiff’s claims for breach of the implied warranty of habitability, breach of the duty to make repairs, and breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment are properly limited to the events that occurred within the three years of the commencement of this action.

Section 12-301(3) provides a three-year limitations period for trespass claims, accruing according to whether the encroachment is continuing or permanent; for a permanent encroachment, the period begins when the invasion begins or becomes known to the injured party.

Kayfirst Corp. v. Washington Terminal Co. · filed 1993-02-08(3)

Although the distinction between a permanent and continuing invasion is usually crucial in determining when a cause of action accrues for trespass or nuisance, see Beatty v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 860 F.2d 1117, 1122 (D.C.Cir.1988), in this case the result is the same. If the encroachment is a continuing trespass, then “[t]he cause of action accrued on the date of the trespass and continued until three years after the encroachment [is] re-moved.” L’Enfant Plaza, 359 A.2d at 7. “If the invasion is deemed to be ‘permanent,’ there is but one cause of action, and the statute of limitations commences to run from the time the invasion began, or when it became known to the aggrieved party,” which in this case is KayFirst. Beatty, 860 F.2d at 1122 (citing Dobbs, Remedies § 5.4, at 343) (emphasis added). KayFirst acquired title to Parcel 4 in October 1988, discovered the step footing in January 1989, and filed its first amended complaint in this case in January 1991, well within the three-year limitations period if the encroachment be considered permanent. WMATA’s Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied, therefore, on the statute of limitations issue.

Section 12-301's three-year limitations period for a claim seeking return of a retainer begins when the bailee refuses a demand for return, rather than when earlier billing statements are sent.

Kerns v. Ameriprint, Inc. · filed 1993-03-05

The refusal by the bailee, Kerns, to return the bailed property, was the event that triggered the running of the statute.

Section 12-301(8) imposes a three-year limitations period for fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and interference-with-judgments claims; accrual follows discovery of injury, causation, and wrongdoing, and fraudulent concealment tolls the period.

Firestone v. Firestone · filed 1996-02-16(8)

Under District of Columbia law, a tort action accrues “when the plaintiff has knowledge of (or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have knowledge of) (1) the existence of the injury, (2) its cause in fact, and (3) some evidence of wrongdoing.” ... Fraudulent concealment, however, tolls the running of the statute of limitations. ... The Amended Complaint thus contains the three allegations required to plead fraudulent concealment: that Leonard Firestone engaged in an on-going scheme to conceal the alleged fraud; that Russell III and Myrna did not have actual or constructive notice of the concealment; and that Russell III and Myrna exercised due diligence, but could not discover the continuing fraud until November 1993. If these allegations are true, then the statute of limitations would not have expired until after Russell III and Myrna filed their original complaint.

For a breach-of-contract claim, an anticipatory repudiation alone does not start the three-year limitations period; the injured party may sue immediately or wait until an actual breach.

EastBanc, Inc. v. Georgetown Park Associates II, L.P. · filed 2008-01-17(7)

Even if the repudiation is clear, forceful, and unequivocal, the time for filing suit does not begin to run on the strength of the anticipatory repudiation alone.