D.C. Code § 12-301

D.C. Code § 12-301(8) imposes a three-year limitations period on the claims addressed by the court.

Abate v. District of Columbia · filed 2009-10-05(8)

The District argues that Plaintiffs’ complaint is barred by the applicable statutes of limitations,3 which are three years for counts 1 and 2 pursuant to D.C. Code § 12-301(8) ... Consequently, if Plaintiffs’ claims accrued on or before June 27, 2004, those claims are time barred by D.C. Code § 12-301(8).

Subsection (4) sets a one-year limitations period for defamation claims.

Bond v. U.S. Department of Justice · filed 2011-12-06(4)

Under District of Columbia of law, which applies to this diversity action, the statute of limitations for defamation claims is one year.

D.C. Code § 12-301 imposes a three-year limitations period on claims for a simple contract under subsection (7) and on claims for which no limitation is otherwise specially prescribed under subsection (8).

Youkelsone v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation · filed 2012-12-20(7), (8)

That provision provides for a limitations period of three years for cases arising from: “a simple contract, express or implied,” id. § 12-301(7), and for cases “for which a limitation is not otherwise specially prescribed,” id. § 12-301(8).

A defamation claim must be filed within one year after the cause of action accrues.

McFadden v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority · filed 2013-06-12(4)

Under District of Columbia law, “[a] claim for defamation must be filed within one year of accrual of the cause of action.” Maupin v. Haylock, 931 A.2d 1039, 1041-42 (D.C. 2007); D.C. Code § 12-301(4) (2012).

Subsection (4) imposes a one-year statute of limitations on defamation claims.

Stovell v. James · filed 2013-09-01(4)

District of Columbia law provides a one-year statute of limitations for claims of defamation. D.C. Code § 12-301(4).

D.C. Code § 12-301(4) imposes a one-year limitations period on defamation and assault claims, and that same period applies to false-light and intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims when they are intertwined with defamation.

Forras v. Rauf · filed 2014-04-18(4)

Under D.C. Code § 12-301(4), the statute of limitations for defamation and assault are expressly set at one year, and under the “single publication” rule, defamation-based claims accrue on the date the allegedly defamatory statements were first published. ... Although false light and intentional infliction of emotional distress are not expressly mentioned in D.C. Code § 12-301(4), the D.C. courts hold that when such claims are “intertwined” with defamation claims, they share the one year statute of limitations.

Subsection (4) establishes a one-year statute of limitations for common-law defamation claims.

Amobi v. District of Columbia Department of Corrections · filed 2014-06-27(4)

D.C. Code § 12-301(4) establishes a one-year statute of limitations for common law defamation claims.

D.C. Code § 12-301(4) imposes a one-year statute of limitations on defamation claims, measured from publication.

Hourani v. Mirtchev · filed 2015-07-31(4)

The statute of limitations for defamation claims in the District is one year after publication.

D.C. Code § 12-301(4) imposes a one-year limitations period on assault-and-battery claims, so survival claims based on those claims are time-barred when filed after that period has expired.

Halmon-Daniels v. Experts, Inc. · filed 2016-09-15(4)

Both claims will be dismissed as time barred or, in the alternative, as conceded.

D.C. Code § 12-301(4) provides a one-year statute of limitations for assault and battery claims.

McCullough v. HP Enterprise Services, LLC · filed 2016-09-15(4)

they are barred by D.C.’s one-year statute of limitations for assault and battery claims. See D.C. Code § 12-301(4).

Section 12-301(4)'s one-year limitations period applies to constitutional torts specifically listed in the statute, such as libel and slander, and does not extend to reputational actions lacking defamation.

Liff v. Office of Inspector General for the U.S. Department of Labor · filed 2016-11-07(4)

Courts borrow state intentional-tort limitations periods only “for constitutional torts specifically listed in the statute.” Banks, 802 F.2d at 1428 (emphasis added). Although D.C. Code § 12-301(4) includes “slander” and “libel” as intentional torts, it lists no reputational actions where defamation is absent.

D.C. Code § 12-301(4) provides a one-year limitations period for libel and slander claims.

Coulibaly v. Kerry · filed 2016-09-30(4)

For defamation claims, a one-year limitations period applies in the District of Columbia.

D.C. Code § 12-301(4) gives civil assault and battery claims a one-year limitations period, so claims filed more than a year after accrual are barred.

White v. Washington Intern Student Housing · filed 2019-04-25(4)

Based on the one-year statute of limitations, the last act giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims for battery and assault must have occurred on or after August 29, 2017. ... But, Plaintiff did not file this lawsuit until August 29, 2018, more than one year after his claims accrued. Accordingly, those claims are barred by the statute of limitations.

D.C. Code § 12-301(4) gives defamation claims a one-year statute of limitations, running from publication.

Byd Company Ltd v. Alliance for American Manufacturing · filed 2021-08-06(4)

The statute of limitations for defamation claims in the District is one year. D.C. Code § 12-301(4) (2019). “Defamation occurs on publication, and the statute of limitations runs from the date of publication.”

D.C. Code § 12-301(a)(4) imposes a one-year limitations period on assault, false arrest, and defamation claims, so claims filed more than one year after those events are barred.

Offutt v. United States · filed 2022-09-30(a)(4)

D.C. Code § 12-301(a)(4) prescribes a one-year statute of limitation for “libel, slander, assault, battery, mayhem, wounding, malicious prosecution, false arrest or false imprisonment.” The District’s alleged false arrest, assault, and defamation of Plaintiff took place on March 27, 2020, but Plaintiff did not file suit until September 10, 2021—more than five months after the one-year statute of limitations had run. Consequently, Plaintiff’s assault, false arrest, and defamation claims are barred by the one-year statute of limitations and the court will dismiss them.

D.C. Code § 12-301(4) gives defamation claims a one-year limitations period, measured from publication or transmission of the defamatory statement to a third party.

Freeman v. Herring Networks, Inc. · filed 2022-10-31(4)

The statute of limitations for defamation claims is one year under D.C. law. D.C. Code § 12-301(4). The critical date for statute-of-limitation purposes is when the defaming document or statement was published or transmitted to a third party.

Section 12-301(a)(4) gives defamation claims a one-year statute of limitations, so only statements made after January 16, 2022 were timely here.

Newman v. Howard University School of Law · filed 2024-02-06(a)(4)

The statute of limitations for defamation claims is one year. D.C. Code § 12-301(a)(4). So Newman can only bring his defamation claim for statements made after January 16, 2022.

Section 12-301(a)(4) gives defamation claims a one-year statute of limitations, which barred this action because the complaint was filed more than one year after the alleged statements.

Arrington v. Tm Associates Management Inc. · filed 2025-07-24§ 12-301(a)(4)

Defendant is correct that the District of Columbia (whose law we apply in this diversity action) has a one-year statute of limitations for defamation. See D.C. Code § 12-301[(a)](4).

The court treats defamation claims as subject to § 12-301(4)'s one-year statute of limitations.

Johnson v. Georgetown University · filed 2026-03-31(4)

In her FAC, Johnson brought a defamation claim against all defendants, see ECF No. 1 at 120–21, which has a one-year statute of limitations, see Jovanovic, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 111 (citing D.C. Code § 12-301(4)).

Section 12-301(4) imposes a one-year limitations period on defamation actions, running from publication.

Doe v. United States Department of Justice · filed 1983-10-31(4)

Viewing the complaint as a whole *873and applying the rationale of McClam and Church of Scientology of California v. Foley, 640 F.2d 1335 (D.C.Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961, 101 S.Ct. 3110, 69 L.Ed.2d 972 (1981), the Court holds that the proper statute of limitations to apply is the District of Columbia one-year statute of limitations which governs defamation actions. D.C.Code § 12-301(4) (1981). ... Publication of the allegedly defamatory remarks “upon her removal” thus took place well over a year before suit was filed, and the claim is therefore barred by § 12-301(4).

Section 12-301(4) bars defamation claims based on events occurring more than one year before the complaint was filed.

Provisional Government of Republic of New Afrika v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. · filed 1985-04-12(4)

The Court dismisses any defamation allegations based on events which occurred prior to April 19, 1983, one year before the complaint was filed. These allegations are barred by the relevant statute of limitations. D.C.Code § 12-301(4).

Section 12-301(4) imposes a one-year limitations period for libel and related claims, running from publication, including the first distribution of a republication under the single-publication rule.

Foretich v. Glamour · filed 1990-12-19(4)

Plaintiffs’ claims for defamation and for intentional infliction of emotional distress are, as previously indicated, governed by the one-year limitations period for libel set by D.C.Code § 12-301. ... Defamation occurs on publication, and the statute of limitations runs from the date of publication. ... Under the single publication rule, the date of publication for the FOEM reprints was the date they were “published,” i.e. the date the first copies were distributed. ... The single publication rule applies to the FOEM distribution as it would to any other publication or republication, and the statute runs from the start; not the end, of the republication.

Section 12-301(4) gives defamation claims a one-year limitations period.

Wiggins v. District Cablevision, Inc. · filed 1994-05-13(4)

Most of the claim in paragraph 25 can be dismissed for another reason. Plaintiffs defamation claim is barred by the District of Columbia’s one-year statute of limitations. D.C.Code § 12-301(4). Plaintiff alleges that between January 19, 1990 and February 25, 1990, defendants published the allegedly defamatory remarks. But this civil action was not filed until January 9, 1992, almost two years later. These claims are clearly outside the one-year bar.

Section 12-301(4) imposes a one-year limitations period on slander claims.

Caudle v. Thomason · filed 1996-04-25(4)

Thus, it is barred by the one-year statute of limitations found in D.C.Code § 12-301(4) unless it fits into one of the exceptions to the limitations period.

Section 12-301(4) gives a malicious-prosecution claim a one-year limitations period that begins when the underlying action terminates, rather than when it is initiated.

Wiggins v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. · filed 2001-07-23(4)

Under District of Columbia law, the statute of limitations for a malicious prosecution claim is one year. D.C.Code § 12-301(4); ... The statute of limitations “begins to run when the underlying action against a plaintiff terminates, not when the underlying action is initiated.”

Section 12-301(4) requires a libel claim to be filed within one year after accrual, generally measured from publication of the defamatory statement.

Oparaugo v. Watts · filed 2005-10-06(4)

A complaint for libel must be filed within one year of the accrual of the cause of action. -D.C.Code § 12-301(4) (2001). In such cases, the claim arises on the date the defamatory statement was published, and the statute of limitations runs from that date.

Section 12-301(4) requires a defamation claim to be filed within one year after the cause of action accrues.

Maupin v. Haylock · filed 2007-09-06(4)

A claim for defamation must be filed within one year of accrual of the cause of action. See Sturdivant v. Seaboard Serv. Sys., Ltd., 459 A.2d 1058, 1058 n. 1 (D.C.1983) (“A suit for libel must be filed 'within one year of the alleged defamation”) (citing D.C.Code § 12-301(4)).

Section 12-301(4) imposes a one-year statute of limitations on libel and defamation claims, running generally from publication of the defamatory statements.

Ray v. Olender · filed 2014-03-07(4)

As the district court correctly concluded, appellant’s claims are time-barred under the District of Columbia’s one-year statute of limitations for libel and defamation claims. See D.C.Code § 12-301(4); Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 553 F.2d 220, 227 (D.C.Cir.1977) (stating that “the statute of limitations generally starts running with the publication” of the defamatory statements).

Section 12-301(4) sets a one-year limitations period for defamation claims.

Wiggins v. Philip Morris, Inc. · filed 1994-05-13(4)

Even if plaintiffs allegations were not wholly inadequate on their face, plaintiffs defamation claim would be barred for another reason, the District of Columbia’s one-year statute of limitations.

Section 12-301(4) sets a one-year limitations period for assault, battery, and false imprisonment claims.

Battle v. District of Columbia · filed 2014-02-28(4)

Likewise, because the latest allegedly tortious and discriminatory acts in plaintiff’s complaint occurred in June of 2010, the statute of limitations will also have run on each of her state-law claims. See D.C. Code § 12-301(4) (defining one-year statute of limitations for actions alleging assault, battery, and false imprisonment); D.C. Code § 2-1403.16(a) (defining a one-year statute of limitations for D.C. Human Rights Act claims); Rynn, 457 F. Supp. 2d at 24 (concluding that an intentional infliction of emotion distress claim premised on the same conduct as claims covered by D.C. Code § 12-301(4) is subject to a one-year limitations period).

Section 12-301(4) limits actions for libel and slander to one year from accrual.

Ray v. Olender · filed 2013-11-21(4)

First, the instant complaint lodged with the Clerk on October l7, 2013, is barred by the District of Columbia’s one-year statute of limitations applicable to defamation actions, and plaintiff has not stated a basis for tolling the limitations period.

The one-year period applies to assault and battery and to an intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim intertwined with those torts; the residual three-year period governs an independent emotional-distress claim and, presumably, negligent supervision or training.

Renay Hunter v. The District of Columbia · filed 1991-08-30(4), (8)

Hunter’s claim for assault and battery is thus clearly barred by the one-year statute of limitations in § 12-301(4). ... Hunter’s complaint did not allege any facts suggesting that the defendants intentionally caused him emotional distress by conduct “independent” of the alleged assault and battery. Therefore, the one-year statute of limitations bars this claim, as the district court held. ... The district court dismissed this claim, too, pursuant to the one-year statute of limitations in § 12-301(4). There is no case directly on point, but as we read § 12-301, the three-year residual statute of limitations presumably governs this cause of action, even if the negligent conduct of the District is alleged to have resulted in an intentional tort by the police.

Section 12-301 imposes a one-year statute of limitations on claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Deskins v. Barry · filed 1989-12-04

Claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. D.C.Code § 12-301. Defendants have moved to dismiss based' on the fact that none of the acts complained of occurred within one year of the filing of this case. Plaintiff has not contested this aspect of the motion. Accordingly, plaintiffs emotional distress claim is dismissed.

Section 12-301(8) imposes a three-year limitation on an independent intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress action that is not intertwined with a cause of action covered by another subsection, rather than the one-year period in § 12-301(4).

Saunders v. Nemati · filed 1990-09-21(4), (8)

In sum, we see no basis for deviating from the well established principle that the plain language of a statute normally controls. We therefore hold that an independent action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, not intertwined with any of the causes of action for which a period of limitation is specifically provided in the other provisions of section 12-301, is governed by the general residuary three-year limitation of section 12-301(8).

Section 12-301 gives assault and battery claims a one-year limitations period, gives claims without a specifically prescribed period three years, and—when intentional infliction of emotional distress rests on the same acts as assault and battery—uses the one-year period for both, subject to continuing-tort accrual.

Rendall-Speranza v. Nassim · filed 1996-03-18(4), (8)

Under the D.C.Code, an action for assault or battery may not be brought after the expiration of a one-year period from the time the right to maintain the action accrues. D.C.Code § 12-301(4); ... Under the D.C.Code, absent a specifically prescribed statute of limitations for a claim, the time period by which that claim must be brought is three years. D.C.Code § 12-301(8). ... when the plaintiff has alleged the same acts to .support both a claim for assault and battery and a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, as the plaintiff does in the case at bar, the statute of limitations for both claims is the one-year time period applicable to her assault and battery claim.

Section 12-301(8) provides a three-year residual limitation period for an independent intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim, but an emotional-distress claim intertwined with assault and battery is governed by the limitation period for the underlying claim.

Rendall-Speranza v. Nassim · filed 1997-03-14(8)

Because there is no specific statute limiting the time for filing a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in the District of Columbia, the D.C. Court of Appeals has held that an independent action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is subject to the District’s three-year residual limitation period, D.C.Code § 12-301(8). ... However, a claim for emotional distress that is “intertwined with any of the causes of action for which a period of limitation is specifically provided,” including assault and battery, is subject to the limitation period for the intertwined claim. ... Accordingly, the district court did not err in holding that the one-year period of limitation for assault and battery applies to Rendall-Speranza’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Section 12-301(8) supplies a three-year residual limitations period for an independent intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim, but not when the claim is intertwined with a cause of action with a specific limitations period.

Thompson v. Jasas Corp. · filed 2002-07-15(8)

“Because there is no specific statute limiting the time for filing a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in the District of Columbia, the D.C. Court of Appeals has held that .an independent action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is subject to the District’s three-year residual limitation period, D.C.Code § 12-301(8).” ... “The residuary three-year limitation applies, however, only if the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is not “intertwined with any of the causes of action for which a period of limitation is specifically provided ....” ... To the extent that plaintiffs emotional distress claim is based on conduct occurring in connection with her employment by Jasas, it is “intertwined with” her hostile work environment claim and thus it assumes the hostile work environment claim’s one-year limitation period. ... Plaintiffs emotional distress claim, therefore, is restricted to incidents that occurred within the year preceding the filing of her original complaint on December 17, 1997.

Section 12-301(8) gives negligent infliction of emotional distress claims a three-year limitations period.

Gil v. Neighbors' Consejo · filed 2023-07-07(8)

Plaintiff’s Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress claim against Moran-Gaitan suffers from the same defect, as it is also subject to a three-year limitations period.

Section 12-301(8)’s three-year limitation applies to an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim intertwined with claims subject to that period.

Burda v. National Ass'n of Postal Supervisors · filed 1984-07-27(8)

Here, in contrast, the claim of emotional distress is intertwined with claims which fall within the three-year limitation. Thus, even the reasoning of the district court in Tel-Oren would result in the application of a three-year limitation to the emotional distress claim on the facts presented here.

Section 12-301(8) gives an independent claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress a three-year filing period.

Dahlman v. American Ass'n of Retired Persons (AARP) · filed 2011-06-13(8)

An independent claim for IIED — one that is not intertwined with another tort claim — is subject to a three-year limitations period.

Under D.C. Code § 12-301(8), filing a timely action in the D.C. courts does not toll the three-year limitations period for a later federal action asserting the same claim when the plaintiff still has a remedy in the local courts.

Carter v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority · filed 1985-06-14(8)

“We therefore hold' that the statute of limitations bars Ms. Carter's claim in this court.”

Section 12-301(8) imposes a three-year limitations period, and filing a complaint later dismissed involuntarily without prejudice does not toll that period for a subsequent suit arising from the same event.

Sayyad v. Fawzi · filed 1996-04-18(8)

This case presents the question whether the filing of a complaint, which is subsequently dismissed involuntarily without prejudice, tolls the statute of limitations and prevents the assertion of such a defense to a subsequent lawsuit arising from the same event. We hold that it does not, and affirm the dismissal of the appellant’s complaint. ... The applicable three-year statute of limitations ran on July 25, 1993. See D.C.Code § 12-301(8) (1989).

The discovery rule under D.C. Code § 12-301 delays accrual of a medical-malpractice claim until the claimant knows or, through due diligence, should know of the injury.

Stager v. Schneider · filed 1985-06-28§ 12-301(3), (7), and (8)

Under District of Columbia law, Mrs. Stager’s cause of action for medical malpractice did not accrue until, at the earliest, December 1980 for it was only then that she knew or by the exercise of due diligence should have known of the injury.

D.C. Code § 12-301(4) applies to intentional personal-injury actions, while § 12-301(8) applies to negligent personal-injury actions.

Gladys Banks v. Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company · filed 1986-10-20(4) (8)

the basic distinction between the two provisions is that section 12-301(4) governs actions for intentional personal injury, while section 12-301(8) governs actions for negligent personal injury.

D.C. Code § 12-301(8) provides a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions and contains no tolling provision.

Congress v. District of Columbia · filed 2017-10-03(8)

There are two possible statutes of limitations to borrow here: the three-year statute for personal injury actions under D.C. law or the one-year statute in the DCHRA. See id. If the one-year statute applies, so too does the DCHRA’s tolling provision. Id. The three-year statute contains no tolling provision. See D.C. Code. § 12-301(8).

Section 12-301(1)'s fifteen-year limitations period for recovering lands, tenements, or hereditaments does not strictly apply to constructive trust actions, which are governed by laches.

Granville v. Hunt · filed 1989-11-17(1)

This characteristic of a constructive trust action is reflected in the fact that neither D.C.Code § 12-301(1), providing a fifteen year statute of limitations “for the recovery of lands, tenements, or hereditaments,” nor the three year “catchall” statute of limitations of § 12-301(8) is strictly applicable to constructive trust actions. Rather, the guiding principle is one of laches.

Section 12-301(8) requires a personal-injury action to be filed within three years after the claim accrues, and the claim accrues when the injury occurs.

Johnson v. Marcheta Investors Ltd. Partnership · filed 1998-05-07(8)

The applicable statute of limitations, D.C.Code § 12-301(8) (1995), requires that an action be filed within three years from the date on which the claim accrued. In this case the claim accrued on July 31, 1991, when Ms. Johnson suffered her injury.

Section 12-301(8) supplies a three-year statute of limitations for the taxpayer’s tax-refund action.

Askin v. District of Columbia · filed 1999-05-06(8)

In Carter-Lanhardt, we discussed in some detail the language, structure, and legislative history of an earlier but almost identical version of the statute, and we concluded that, as in the parallel federal tax scheme, a three-year statute of limitations applies. Id. at 917-19; see D.C.Code § 12-301(8) (1995). The present suit was brought within the three-year period.

Section 12-301(8) provides a three-year personal-injury statute of limitations, which the court applies as the borrowed limitations period for Bivens claims filed in the District of Columbia.

Nattah v. Bush · filed 2008-03-31(8)

The personal injury statute of limitations is three years in the District of Columbia. See D.C.Code § 12-301(8).

Under D.C. Code § 12-301, limitations periods begin when the right to sue accrues; subsection (7) provides three years for implied-contract claims, and subsection (8) provides three years for limitations not otherwise specially prescribed.

Peart v. Latham and Watkins LLP · filed 2013-10-23(7), (8)

The D.C. Code states that statutes of limitations for local causes of action begin to run “from the time the right to maintain the action accrues.” D.C. Code § 12–301. ... D.C. Code § 12-301(8), the catch-all provision providing three-years for “a limitation . . . not otherwise specially prescribed”); D.C. Code § 12-301(7) (three-year limitations period for implied contracts)

D.C. Code § 12-301(3)’s three-year period barred the unfiled claim in this interspousal tort dispute.

Turner v. Taylor · filed 1984-02-02(3)

Since no such action was ever filed, her claim is now barred by the three-year statute of limitations. D.C. Code § 12-301(3) (1981).

Subsection (3) supplies a three-year limitations period for claims seeking damages for injury to real or personal property, including civil RICO claims.

Bender v. Rocky Mountain Drilling Associates · filed 1986-11-12(3)

Nonetheless, the statute of limitations governing RICO causes of action is the three-year statute of limitations which applies to “the recovery of damages for an injury to real or personal property.” D.C. Code § 12-301(3).

Section 12-301(4) gives personal injury claims a three-year limitations period running from the alleged injury.

Brown v. American Postal Workers Union · filed 2009-10-19(4)

Under the District of Columbia’s statute of limitations on personal injury claims, plaintiff had three years from the time of the alleged injury -- until December 21, 2003 -- to bring her negligence claim against the Union. D.C. Code § 12-301(4)

D.C. Code § 12-301(3) imposes a three-year statute of limitations on actions seeking damages for injury to real property, and accrual begins when the alleged taking occurs after all required conditions for the closure are satisfied.

Wharf, Inc. v. District of Columbia · filed 2015-09-28(3)

Pursuant to D.C. Code § 12-301(3), there is a three-year statute of limitations applicable to a cause of action seeking to recover damages for an injury to real property. ... As such, Plaintiffs’ takings claim began to accrue on May 5, 2014, the date that the Plat was recorded with the Surveyor’s Office and the ground lease was recorded with the Recorder of Deeds.

D.C. Code § 12-301(8) sets a three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Jones v. Kirchner · filed 2016-08-26(8)

Like Maryland, D.C. has a three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions such as this. See Earle, 707 F.3d at 305 (citing D.C. Code § 12-301(8)).

Section 12-301(4) imposes a three-year limitations period on actions to recover personal property or damages for its unlawful detention, measured from when the right to maintain the action accrues.

Howard University v. Borders · filed 2022-03-01§ 12-301(4)

Washington, D.C. too has a three-year statute of limitations for recovery of a chattel. D.C. Code § 12-301 (“[A]ctions for the following purposes may not be brought after the expiration of the period specified below from the time the right to maintain the action accrues: . . . for the recovery of personal property or damages for its unlawful detention—3 years.”).

Section 12-301(a)(8) imposes a three-year statute of limitations on negligence actions seeking personal-injury damages.

Kubichek v. Unlimited Biking Washington, DC, LLC · filed 2025-02-06(a)(8)

The statute of limitations for negligence actions for personal injury damages is three years. D.C. Code § 12-301(a)(8); Bussineau v. President & Dirs. of Georgetown Coll., 518 A.2d 423, 425 (D.C. 1986).

Section 12-301(8) gives a three-year limitations period to a claim that a hotel negligently failed to prevent assaults, but equitable estoppel requires reliance on the defendant’s conduct that caused delay beyond the period.

Mr. Carl H. Alley v. Dodge Hotel · filed 1977-02-02(8)

Given that, on any theory that the hotel was liable for the assaults, the statute of limitations had run. Any vicarious responsibility for the conduct of a person participating in either assault would have become barred after expiration of a maximum of three years from the time it occurred. And for any negligent failure by^ the hotel to take precautionary measures, it was likewise incumbent upon Alley to commence litigation within a three-year period. ... To be sure, an estoppel can arise from conduct rendering reliance on the statute inequitable. ... Moreover, conformably with general requirements of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, it was necessary that Alley, as the party invoking it, have relied upon the acts or representations of his adversaries and because of such reliance, have refrained from instituting legal action within the limitation period. ... Measured by these considerations, Alley’s version was insufficient as a matter of law to command an audience at a trial.

Section 12-301 imposes a three-year limitations period for actions to recover on promissory notes and a twelve-year period for a claim under a sealed Covenant Not to Sue.

Spellman v. American Security Bank · filed 1986-01-31(8), (6)

In this jurisdiction the time within which a party may commence an action to recover on a promissory note is three years. ... Accordingly, we hold that the Covenant Not to Sue is subject to a twelve-year statute of limitations, and that the bank timely filed its claim under it.

For § 1983 claims not among the torts listed in subsection (4), subsection (8)’s three-year limitations period governs.

Hobson v. Brennan · filed 1985-12-16(8)

the three-year D.C. statute (rather than the one-year statute) governs the class of cases described using the “simple, broad” ... for § 1983 claims.

Under the discovery rule, a negligence claim under § 12-301(8) accrues when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the injury, its factual cause, and some evidence of wrongdoing.

Bussineau v. President of Georgetown College · filed 1986-11-26(8)

We hold that for a cause of action to accrue where the discovery rule is applicable, one must know (or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should know (1) of the injury, (2) its cause in fact and (3) of some evidence of wrongdoing.

An action on a contract not under seal must be filed within three years, and the limitation period for a single breach begins when the breach occurs.

Press v. Howard University · filed 1988-04-28(7)

Because this action was not filed until December 1983, more than three years later, the trial court ruled that it was barred by the statute of limitations. We agree.

D.C. Code § 12-301 requires legal-malpractice claims to be filed within three years after the client suffers actual injury.

Brown v. Jonz · filed 1990-04-05

Claims for legal malpractice must be brought within three years of the date the client suffers actual injury.

Subsection (8) applies a three-year limitations period to a survival action when no authority makes the foreign limitations period substantive.

Jaffe v. Teamworks · filed 2003-08-08(8)

As such, the Court will apply the three-year statute of limitations of the forum to this cause of action.

D.C. Code § 12-301 generally gives contract and tort claims a three-year limitations period, measured from accrual and subject to the discovery exception.

Capitol Place I Associates L.P. v. George Hyman Construction Co. · filed 1996-03-21(3), (7)

Generally, for statute of limitations purposes, a cause of action must be brought within a certain period “from the time the right to maintain the action accrues.”

The catch-all rule bars an attack on a rate after three years when no more specific limitations period applies.

Democratic Central Committee of the District of Columbia v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission, D.C. Transi · filed 1988-06-06(8)

In the absence of a more specific statute of limitations, the catch-all provision of the D.C.Code requires that any attack on a rate must be brought within three years.

Section 12-301(8) imposes a three-year catch-all limitations period on causes of action without a specified limitations period.

Potts v. Howard University Hospital · filed 2009-02-20(8)

The defendants correctly assert that § 12-301(8) provides a “catch-all” statute of limitations of three years for causes of action without a specified statute of limitations.

Subsection (8) supplies a three-year catch-all limitations period for § 1983 claims in the District.

Lewis v. Government of the District of Columbia · filed 2009-08-17(8)

In the District of Columbia, D.C. Code § 12-301(8) governs [§ 1983] claims and provides a [catch-all] three-year statute of limitations.

Section 12-301(4) provides a one-year limitations period for battery claims.

Weiss v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers · filed 1990-01-24(4)

The statute of limitations for a battery claim is one year. D.C. Code § 12-301(4).

The one-year limitation period in § 12-301(4) applies to invasion-of-privacy actions as a similar intentional tort.

Doe v. Southeastern University · filed 1990-02-21(4)

Section 12-301 of the D.C.Code establishes a one-year statute of limitations for libel, slander, assault, and other similar intentional torts. The Court finds this one-year statute of limitations is also applicable to invasion of privacy actions.

Section 12-301 gives actions on notes a three-year limitations period unless the obligation is an instrument under seal; an unsealed note remains subject to the three-year period.

Huntley v. Bortolussi · filed 1995-12-07(6)

Under D.C.Code § 12-301 (1981), an action on a note is governed by a three year statute of limitations, unless it constitutes “an instrument under seal” within the purview of § 12-301(6). ... Accordingly, we conclude that the action on the unsealed note in this case is governed by a three year statute of limitations. Appellee’s action is barred by the statute of limitations and should have been dismissed.

The District is immune from the running of the statute of limitations when it sues to vindicate public rights and perform public functions.

District of Columbia v. OWENS-CORNING FIBERGLAS CORPORATION · filed 1990-03-08

We therefore conclude that the District of Columbia is immune from the running of the statutes of limitations and repose when it brings suit seeking to vindicate public rights and involving the performance of public functions.

The § 12-301 exemption for actions brought by the District of Columbia government is limited to suits enforcing public rights and does not extend beyond the common-law nullum tempus principle.

In the Matter of the FORT TOTTEN METRORAIL CASES ARISING OUT OF the EVENTS OF JUNE 22, 2009 · filed 2012-09-05

This analysis indicates that the D.C. Court of Appeals construes §§ 12-301 and 12-310 as merely coextensive with, but no broader than, the principle of nullum tempus.

Under § 12-301(8), a tort claim accrues when reasonable diligence would have revealed the injury, its cause, and some evidence of wrongdoing, even absent actual knowledge.

Albers, Katherine M. v. Eli Lilly & Company · filed 2004-01-06(8)

On the undisputed facts, a reasonable person would have commenced an inquiry in 1991 and swiftly would have found some evidence of wrongdoing. Thus the claim accrued in 1991, and this suit is untimely.

Under § 12-301(8), the three-year limitations period begins when a plaintiff knows or should know of an injury, its cause, and some evidence of wrongdoing, and not knowing the precise basis of the injury does not toll the period.

Bradley v. National Ass'n of Securities Dealers Dispute Resolution · filed 2005-12-30(8)

Under the discovery rule, a claim does not accrue until a plaintiff knows, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should know, of (1) an injury, (2) its cause, and (3) some evidence of wrongdoing.

Claims cannot avoid the one-year limitations period for libel, slander, and malicious prosecution by giving those claims new names, rather than using the three-year catchall period.

Hobley v. Wachovia Corp. · filed 2008-04-22(4) (8)

There are, however, no causes of action in the District of Columbia for “false accusation, false information, false prosecution, and frame-up.” Moreover, appellant cannot circumvent the applicable statute of limitations by creating new names for existing causes of action. Thus, the district court properly treated appellant’s allegations as analogous to claims for libel, slander, and malicious prosecution, which are subject to a one-year statute of limitations, and dismissed them as time barred.

Section 12-301(4) gives false-imprisonment, false-arrest, and libel claims a one-year limitations period running from accrual.

Wormley v. United States of America · filed 2009-02-24(4)

In the District of Columbia, false imprisonment, false arrest, and libel are all subject to a one-year statute of limitations from the time the right to maintain the action accrues. D.C. Code § 12-301(4).

Section 12-301(7) gives contract claims a three-year limitations period, while § 12-301(8) requires fraud actions within three years after discovery or when they reasonably should have been discovered.

Interdonato v. Interdonato · filed 1987-02-24(7), (8)

The claims based on Paul’s alleged promises (count IV) all sound in contract and thus are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. D.C. Code § 12-301 (7) (1981).

For an action under the 1982 Act, the three-year limitations period runs when the injured party qualifies to sue under the Act, rather than automatically from the injury.

Dupree v. Jefferson · filed 1989-09-15(8)

We reject [the] contention that the action in this case [brought under the 1982 Act] accrued at the time of injury. We hold that the statute of limitations began to run when the injured party qualified under one of the six exceptions of § 35-2105 to maintain an action under the No-Fault Act.

Under the discovery rule, the three-year limitations period begins when the injured party knows or reasonably should know of an injury, its cause, and some evidence of wrongdoing.

Hancock v. HomEq Servicing Corp. · filed 2008-05-23(3), (8)

from the time the injured party “knows, or with the exercise of reasonable diligence would have known, of some injury, its cause-in-fact, and some evidence of wrongdoing.”

Section 12-301(2) provides a three-year limitations period for recovering personal property or seeking damages for its unlawful detention.

Hunt v. Depuy Orthopaedics, Inc. · filed 2009-07-20(2)

According to D.C. Code § 12-301, the statute of limitations is three years for claims involving “the recovery of personal property or damages for its unlawful detention.”

D.C. Code § 12-301(8) gives a three-year limitations period for tort claims that accrue to a deceased person's legal representative.

Melara v. China North Industires Corporation · filed 2009-09-30(8)

The statute of limitations on other tort claims that have accrued to the “legal representative of the deceased,” D.C. Code § 12-101, is three years. D.C. Code § 12-301(8).

Subsection (8) supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1981 and § 1983 claims, while subsection (7) supplies a three-year period for contract claims.

Moore v. District of Columbia · filed 2010-03-01(8), (7)

the statute of limitations for both § 1981 and § 1983 claims is three years. ... The statute of limitations for these claims is three years.

Section 12-301(8) provides a three-year limitations period, making claims based entirely on acts before February 15, 2005 time-barred.

Armenian Assembly of America, Inc. v. Cafesjian · filed 2010-03-09(8)

See D.C. Code § 12-301(8) (providing that statute of limitations is three years). ... Therefore, to the extent that Plaintiffs rely on any acts that occurred entirely before February 15, 2005, their claims are time-barred.

Under § 12-301(8), the limitations period is three years, so claims based entirely on acts before February 15, 2005 are time-barred.

Armenian Assembly of America, Inc. v. Cafesjian · filed 2010-03-22(8)

D.C. Code § 12-301(8) (providing that statute of limitations is three years). ... Therefore, to the extent that Plaintiffs rely on any acts that occurred entirely before February 15, 2005, their claims are time-barred.

D.C. Code § 12-301(8) supplies a three-year limitations period for an IDEA prevailing party’s action to recover attorneys’ fees.

Wilson v. Government of the District of Columbia · filed 2010-07-30(8)

In sum, although part of this Court’s reasoning in Akinseye has been superseded by the District of Columbia Circuit Court’s holdings in Kaseman and Jester, that does not compel the conclusion that the statute of limitations applicable to a prevailing party’s claim for attorneys’ fees under the IDEA is not the three-year “catch-all” provision of D.C. Code § 12-301(8) as the defendant argues.

Section 12-301(8) gives claims without another specified limitations period a three-year deadline, running from accrual.

Dubois v. Washington Mutual Bank · filed 2010-09-03(8)

all of plaintiff s common law claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations and thus are DISMISSED. See D.C. Code § 12-301(8).

D.C. Code § 12-301(8) imposes a three-year statute of limitations on medical malpractice and informed consent claims.

Hartley v. John Dombrowski, M.D., Pc · filed 2010-10-18(8)

Under District law, the statute of limitations for medical malpractice and informed consent claims is three years.3 D.C. Code § 12-301(8).

Under § 12-301(8), a wrongful-discharge claim in the District of Columbia must be filed within three years after accrual.

Jones v. GLAXOSMITHKLINE, LLC · filed 2010-12-20(8)

In the District of Columbia, the statute of limitations for a wrongful discharge claim is three years.

A three-year limitations period applies to breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims, limiting them to conduct and omissions occurring within that period.

Waters v. Armenian Genocide Museum & Memorial, Inc. · filed 2011-01-26(8)

The Court also notes that because of the three-year statute of limitations for breach of fiduciary actions in the District of Columbia, see D.C. Code § 12-301(8), AGM&M’s claims for breach of fiduciary duty against Waters and Cafesjian are premised upon conduct and omissions taking place in or after February 2005.

D.C. Code § 12-301(7) imposes a three-year time limit on breach-of-contract claims.

Nattah v. L-3 Communications Titan Group · filed 2011-03-18(7)

The District applies a three-year time limitation on claims for breach of contract, D.C. Code § 12-301(7), which is applicable to the alleged employment agreement here.

Subsection (8) applies a three-year statute of limitations to fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and negligent supervision claims, subject to the discovery rule.

Haralson v. Eagle Group International LLC · filed 2010-07-20(8)

The Court agrees with defendant that a three-year statute of limitations applies to plaintiff’s claims of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and negligent supervision.

A negligence claim must be brought within three years of the date the wrongful acts occurred.

Aguado v. Suntrust Bank · filed 2010-09-29(8)

a claim for negligence must be brought within three years of the date the wrongful acts occurred, D.C. Code § 12-301(8) (2010); see Tolbert v. Nat’l Harmony Mem’l Park, 520 F. Supp. 2d 209, 211-12 (D.D.C. 2007) (listing negligence among claims with three-year limitation under § 12-301).

A wrongful discharge claim in the District of Columbia must be filed within three years after the claim accrues.

Jones v. Glaxosmithkline LLC · filed 2010-12-20(8)

an action within three years after the claim accrues.

Under D.C. Code § 12-301, the limitations period runs from accrual, and under the discovery rule accrual occurs when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the injury, its cause, and some evidence of wrongdoing.

Perry v. Scholar · filed 2010-03-19

“Generally, under D.C. Code § 12-301, a cause of action can be brought within the given time period from when ‘the time the right to maintain the action accrues.’” ... “Under this rule, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff has knowledge of (or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have knowledge of) (1) the existence of the injury, (2) its cause in fact, and (3) some evidence of wrongdoing.”

Section 12-301 gives three years for recovery of personal property or damages for injury to personal property, but one year for assault, battery, mayhem, wounding, malicious prosecution, false arrest, or false imprisonment, with the period running from accrual.

Roum v. Fenty · filed 2010-03-22(2)-(4)

While Roum may have three years to file suit for the recovery of his personal property or the recovery of damages for an injury to his personal property under D.C. Code §12-301(2)-(3), Roum’s false arrest, assault, and false imprisonment claims are governed by D.C. Code § 12-301(4), which provides a one year statute of limitations for “assault, battery, mayhem, wounding, malicious prosecution, false arrest or false imprisonment.” ... The District of Columbia Code provides that the statutory period begins to run “from the time the right to maintain the action accrues.”

D.C. Code § 12-301(4) imposes a one-year statute of limitations on assault, battery, false arrest, and false imprisonment claims.

Chen v. District of Columbia · filed 2010-03-29(4)

The statute of limitations for assault, battery, false arrest, and false imprisonment in the District of Columbia is one year. See D.C. Code § 12-301(4).

Section 12-301 imposes a one-year limitations period, and concealing a defendant’s identity does not toll that period.

Hall v. Lanier · filed 2010-04-22§ 12-301

District of Columbia law does not permit a party’s concealment of his identity to serve as a basis for equitable estoppel.

D.C. Code § 12-301(8) provides a three-year limitations period for IDEA attorney-fee claims when no other limitations period is specially prescribed.

Davidson v. District of Columbia · filed 2010-09-08(8)

D.C. Code § 12-301(8) provides that a limitations period of three years shall apply to all actions for which a limitations period is not otherwise specially prescribed.

Section 12-301(8) imposes a three-year limitations period on claims without another specifically prescribed limitation.

Hu v. George Washington University · filed 2011-03-02(8)

A claim of common law spoliation of evidence,“for which a limitation is not otherwise specially prescribed” under D.C. Code § 12-301, also falls within the three-year statute of limitations “catch-all” provision.

Section 12-301 provides a three-year catch-all limitations period for claims without a specifically prescribed period and a one-year period for false imprisonment and defamation.

Sykes v. United States Attorney for the District of Columbia · filed 2011-03-16(8), (4)

D.C. Code § 12-301 (2011) outlines the statutory time limitations for bringing all types of actions within the District of Columbia.

Section 12-301(8) supplies a three-year catch-all limitations period for claims not specially governed by another limitations statute.

Saunders v. District of Columbia · filed 2011-06-06(8)

Due to this statutory silence, retaliation claims under the DC-FCA are subject to the three-year “catch-all” statute of limitations under D.C. Code § 12-301(8).

Subsection (8) provides a three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims against the District.

Jones v. District of Columbia · filed 2012-07-25(8)

The applicable statute of limitation for § 1983 claims against the District is three years. D.C. Code § 12-301(8)

Claims under the CPPA must be filed within three years after they accrue.

Silvious v. Snapple Beverage Corporation · filed 2011-06-27(8)

Claims under the CPPA must be brought within three years of accrual.

A breach-of-contract claim is subject to a three-year limitations period, and dismissal at the pleading stage requires the accrual date to be conclusively established from the complaint.

Performance Contracting, Inc. v. Rapid Response Construction, Inc. · filed 2011-06-27(7)

See D.C. Code § 12-301(7)-(8). ... Thus, any claims that accrue prior to April 6, 2006—three years before the filing of the complaint—are time-barred. ... Because Rapid has failed to satisfy its burden to demonstrate that Performance’s claims are “conclusively time-barred” on the face of the complaint, the Court declines to dismiss Performance’s claims on statute of limitations grounds at this time.

D.C. Code § 12-301(2) imposes a three-year limitations period for recovering personal property or damages for its unlawful detention, and a conversion claim accrues upon an unconditional demand and refusal or an inconsistent act; factual allegations may support equitable tolling, so timeliness was not resolved on dismissal.

De Csepel v. Republic of Hungary · filed 2011-09-01(2)

The statute of limitations at issue here is the District of Columbia's three-year statute for claims relating to “the recovery of personal property or damages for its unlawful detention.” ... Here, plaintiffs’ claims are based on the repudiation of bailments created at the end of World War II. Accordingly, “a claim for conversion accrues when the plaintiff demands the return of the property and the defendant refuses, or when the defendant takes some action that a reasonable person would understand to be either an act of conversion or inconsistent with a bailment.” ... The Court therefore concludes that the Complaint states fact which, if true, could support a finding that this action is timely. Accordingly, the Court declines to resolve this issue on a motion to dismiss.

Subsection (8) sets a three-year limitations period for claims for which no other limitation period is specially prescribed.

George v. Bank of America N.A. · filed 2011-10-31(8)

Plaintiff’s remaining tort claims of fraud, contract breach, negligence, and IIED must suffer the same fate as the federal claims because the District of Columbia limitations period for bringing such claims is, at the longest, three years from the time the action accrued on January 30, 2007. See D.C. Code § 12-301(8) (applicable to claims “for which a limitation is not otherwise specially prescribed”).

Under § 12-301(8), unjust-enrichment claims must generally be brought within three years after accrual, and the limitations period may be equitably tolled when defendants’ misconduct lulls a plaintiff into inaction.

Kiwanuka v. Bakilana · filed 2012-02-24(8)

Under District of Columbia law, a plaintiff must bring a claim for unjust enrichment within three years from the time of accrual of the action. D.C. Code § 12-301(8). ... District of Columbia courts recognize a restricted equitable tolling doctrine, which “allows a plaintiff to initiate an action beyond the statute of limitations . . . [if the] defendant’s fraudulent concealment or misconduct lulled the plaintiff into allowing the filing deadline to pass (often called the ‘lulling doctrine’).”

Subsection (8) imposes a three-year limitations period on common-law claims.

Phelps v. Stomber · filed 2012-08-13(8)

Under D.C. law, the common law claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations period. D.C. Code § 12-301(8).

Section 12-301(4) gives false arrest, libel and slander, and malicious prosecution claims a one-year statute of limitations; an intertwined emotional-distress claim is also subject to that one-year period.

Chandler v. Jones · filed 2011-08-09(4)

The statute of limitations for false arrest (Count 1), libel and slander (Count 2), and malicious prosecution (Count 7) is one year. D.C. Code § 12-301(4).

D.C. Code § 12-301(7) gives breach-of-contract claims a three-year limitations period running from breach, while § 12-301(2) gives conversion claims a three-year period that accrues immediately when property is unlawfully acquired.

Sea Search Armada v. Republic of Colombia · filed 2011-10-24(7), (2)

In the District of Columbia, the statute of limitations for breach of contract is three years, and it begins to run at the time of the breach. ... Plaintiff’s conversion claim also carries a three-year statute of limitations. ... When a defendant acquires the property unlawfully in the first instance, as Plaintiff alleges here, a conversion claim accrues immediately.

D.C. Code § 12-301 provides a three-year limitations period for breach-of-contract claims and for claims without another specifically prescribed period.

Lopiccolo v. American University · filed 2012-01-05§ 12-301(7) and (8)

The statute of limitations in the District of Columbia for bringing a breach of contract claim is three years. ... D.C. law provides that when a statute of limitations period is not expressly enumerated for a particular claim, the applicable statute of limitations is three years.

Section 12-301(8) imposes a three-year residual limitations period on causes of action without another prescribed limitations period.

Hamilton v. City of Washington, District of Columbia · filed 2012-04-05(8)

Under D.C. Code § 12-301(8), causes of action for which a statute of limitations is not otherwise prescribed are governed by the three-year residual provision.

Intentional torts have a one-year limitations period, while torts without a prescribed period have a three-year residual period; a claim intertwined with an intentional tort receives the one-year period.

Singh v. District of Columbia · filed 2012-08-07(4) and (8)

Under D.C. Code § 12-301(4), intentional torts such as malicious prosecution have a statute of limitations of one year. ... common-law torts that do not have a prescribed statute of limitations have a three-year residual statute of limitations under D.C. Code § 12-301(8). ... Yet if such claims are intertwined with an intentional tort that is delineated in D.C. Code § 12-301(4), they are subject to the same one-year statute of limitations as that intentional tort.

Section 12-301 exempts the District government from the statute of limitations only for actions enforcing public rights, consistent with the common-law principle of nullum tempus.

In Re: In the Matter of the Fort Totten Metrorail Cases Arising Out of the Events of June 22, 2009 · filed 2012-08-16§ 12-301

This analysis indicates that the D.C. Court of Appeals construes §§ 12-301 and § 12-310 as merely coextensive with, but no broader than, the principle of nullum tempus.

D.C. Code § 12-301(7) provides a three-year limitations period for breach-of-contract claims running from the breach, and § 12-301(8) provides the same three-year period for breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims.

Lu v. Lezell · filed 2013-01-25(7), (8)

In the District of Columbia, the statute of limitations for breach of contract is three years, and it begins to run at the time of the breach. ... In any event, just like Plaintiffs’ contract claim, this one would also be barred by the same three-year statute of limitations.

D.C. Code § 12-301 imposes a three-year statute of limitations on breach-of-contract claims.

Bakeir v. Capital City Mortgage Corporation · filed 2013-03-04

Claims for breach of contract are also subject to a three-year statute of limitations. D.C. Code § 12-301.

D.C. Code § 12-301 provides a three-year statute of limitations for causes of action for which no limitation is otherwise specifically prescribed.

Halldorson v. Sandi Group · filed 2013-03-29

Under District of Columbia law, claims for fraud/fraudulent inducement, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and tortious interference with business expectancies are governed by a three-year statute of limitations. See D.C. Code § 12-301 (providing for a three-year statute of limitations for any cause of action “for which a limitation is not otherwise specifically prescribed”)

D.C. Code § 12-301(8) provides a three-year catch-all limitations period for causes of action not otherwise specifically listed.

Paul v. Didizian · filed 2013-07-31(8)

Relevant here, the District of Columbia’s catch-all statute of limitations for causes of action not explicitly listed – such as those which the Court understands Plaintiff to have brought against Didizian – is three years. See D.C. Code § 12-301(8).

D.C. Code § 12-301(7) supplies a three-year limitations period for the guaranty claim because the guaranty was not a sealed instrument; the 12-year period in § 12-301(6) does not apply.

Farouki v. Petra International Banking Corporation · filed 2013-09-17(7), (6)

Even accepting this fact as true, however, PIBC’s claim remains time barred given this Court’s prior ruling that a three-year statute of limitations—and not the 12-year limitations period for sealed instruments—applies to this case.

Subsection (7) supplies a three-year statute of limitations for breach-of-contract actions, and that period governs ERISA benefits claims.

Virtue v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Retirement and Family Protection Plan · filed 2013-11-04(7)

Consistent with this thinking, courts in this district have applied the District of Columbia’s three-year statute of limitations for breach-of-contract actions to ERISA benefits suits. See D.C. Code § 12-301(7); ... As the Court agrees this is the proper course – and as Plaintiff does not argue to the contrary – the three-year period will govern.

D.C. Code § 12-301(8) provides a three-year limitations period for claims for which no other specific limitation is provided.

Morris v. Carter Global Lee, Inc. · filed 2013-11-05(8)

Plaintiff’s claim is subject to the three-year statute of limitations reserved for claims for “which a limitation is not otherwise specifically provided.” D.C. Code § 12-301(8).

Section 12-301(7) imposes a three-year limitations period on breach-of-contract claims, while subsection (8) supplies a three-year period when no specific limitations period is prescribed, including for the D.C. consumer-protection and slander-of-title claims here.

Travelers Indemnity Company of Connecticut v. University Hall Condominium Owners Association · filed 2020-03-02(7), (8)

D.C. Code § 12-301(7) (three-year statute of limitations for breach of contract); D.C. Code § 12-301(8) (providing that, in D.C., where a limitation period is not specifically prescribed, as for Thomas’s D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act violation and slander of title claims, the applicable period is three years).

Under D.C. Code § 12-301(8), a legal-malpractice action is subject to a three-year limitations period measured from when the right to maintain the action accrues, with accrual tolled during continuous representation in the matter.

Jones v. Lattimer · filed 2014-03-06(8)

The applicable statute of limitations under District of Columbia law for legal malpractice is three years “from the time the right to maintain the action accrues.” D.C. Code § 12-301(8); ... In legal malpractice cases, however, the D.C. Court of Appeals has adopted the “continuous representation” rule, under which “the cause of action is tolled until the attorney ceases to represent the client in the specific matter at hand.”

Section 12-301(8) requires a medical-malpractice action to be brought within three years of the injury or within three years after the injured party knew or should have known of the injury.

Allen v. Hill · filed 1993-06-03(8)

An action of this nature must be brought within three (3) years of the time of the injury, see D.C.Code § 12-301(8), or within three years from the time the injured party knew or should have known of the injury. ... Based on the facts presented, we conclude that appellant’s first cause of action accrued no later than August 1987, when she was informed by Dr. Patterson, the fourth dentist that examined her during that period, that she needed surgery to remove the Sargentine paste allegedly used by appellee.

Section 12-301(8) gives medical-malpractice claims a three-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff has actual or inquiry notice of the injury, its cause, and some evidence of wrongdoing.

Berkow v. Lucy Webb Hayes National Training School for Deaconesses & Missionaries Conducting Sibley Memorial Hospital · filed 2004-02-05(8)

D.C.Code § 12-301(8) (2001) establishes a three-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions. ... Whatever the merits of these arguments, they cannot obscure the fact that on this record Berkow, after learning on August 28, 1996, about Dr. Fleury’s misdiagnosis, was on inquiry notice of any wrongdoing by the other defendants here who may have contributed to his injury. ... Contrary to Berkow’s contention, therefore, the “discovery rule” — which tolls the statute of limitations until a plaintiff has sufficient knowledge of the injury, its cause, and some evidence of wrongdoing — does not help him here.

Section 12-301(8) imposes a three-year limitations period that applies to legal malpractice claims.

Jackson v. J.E. Wingfield & Associates, P.C. · filed 2006-02-06(8)

The district court correctly determined appellant’s legal malpractice claim is barred by the District of Columbia’s three-year statute of limitations. See D.C.Code § 12-301(8); Wagner v. Sellinger, 847 A.2d 1151, 1154 (D.C. 2004).

Section 12-301(8) gives legal-malpractice claims a three-year limitations period, and under the discovery rule the claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the injury, its cause, and some evidence of wrongdoing.

Gallucci v. Schaffer · filed 2007-08-28(8)

In the District of Columbia, the statute of limitations governing a legal malpractice claim is three years. Wagner v. Sellinger, 847 A.2d 1151, 1154 (D.C.2004); see D.C.Code § 12-301(8). “The statute of limitations for a legal malpractice claim is governed by the discovery rule in cases where the relationship between the fact of injury and some tortious conduct is obscure at the time of injury.” R.D.H. Commc’ns v. Winston, 700 A.2d 766, 768 (D.C.1997). Under the discovery rule, “a claim does not accrue until a plaintiff knows, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should know, of (1) an injury, (2) its cause, and (3) some evidence of wrongdoing.” Wagner, 847 A.2d at 1154 (internal citation omitted). Because Plaintiffs lawsuit is deemed to have been filed on April 27, 2005, his claims are barred unless they accrued on or after April 27, 2002.

Section 12-301(8) gives legal-malpractice claims a three-year limitations period.

Burtoff v. Faris · filed 2007-11-15(8)

the principal issue we decide here is whether, as Faris contends (and as he argued below), Burtoffs suit is barred by the relevant three-year statute of limitations. ... We hold that it is. ... The relevant statute of limitations for each of Burtoffs claims against Faris is three years. See D.C.Code § 12-301(8) (2001); Wagner v. Sellinger, 847 A.2d 1151, 1154 (D.C.2004); Beard v. Edmondson & Gallagher, 790 A.2d 541, 546 (D.C.2002).

Section 12-301(8) imposes a three-year limitations period on legal-malpractice claims, which begins when the injured party discovers the basis of the claim.

Bolton v. Bernabei & Katz, PLLC · filed 2008-07-31(8)

The statute of limitations for legal malpractice is three years, Wagner v. Sellinger, 847 A.2d 1151, 1154 (D.C.2004) (citing D.C.Code § 12-301(8) (2001)), and we have held that it starts running once the party alleging injury discovers the basis of the claim.

Section 12-301(8) gives legal-malpractice claims a three-year limitations period, but under the continuous-representation rule accrual waits until representation on the matter ends.

De May v. Moore & Bruce, LLP · filed 2008-11-06(8)

In the District of Columbia, the statute of limitations for a legal malpractice claim is three years. D.C.Code § 12-301(8) (2001). ... The continuous representation rule states: when the injury to the client may have occurred during the period the attorney was retained, the malpractice cause of action does not accrue until the attorney’s representation concerning the particular matter in issue is terminated. ... Contrary to defendants’ narrow view of the facts, these roles overlapped. At the core, they all related to the trusts and defendants’ attempt to structure these trusts to minimize plaintiffs’ tax burden. Because of their multiple roles, defendants were involved in the tax work for De May and the trusts, whether it be tax planning or IRS work relating to the trusts, continuously from 1996 until at least 2005 or later.

The three-year statute of limitations for simple contracts applies to a guaranty that is neither a sealed instrument nor a negotiable instrument.

Farouki v. Petra International Banking Corporation · filed 2014-08-11(7)

The guaranty is neither a sealed instrument nor a negotiable instrument and is therefore subject to the three-year statute of limitations for simple contracts.

D.C. Code § 12-301(8) provides a three-year residual statute of limitations for causes of action whose limitations period is not otherwise specifically prescribed, including IIED and NIED claims.

Williams-Jefferies v. Aarp · filed 2016-06-06(8)

Although the Code does not provide a specific limitations period for IIED and NIED claims, it includes a “residual” statute of limitations of three years for causes of action “not otherwise specifically prescribed.”

Subsection (8) supplies the District of Columbia’s general three-year statute of limitations for Bivens claims.

Loumiet v. United States · filed 2016-07-12(8)

In this case, there is no dispute that the District of Columbia’s general three-year statute of limitations applies to Loumiet’s Bivens claims. See D.C. Code § 12-301(8).

Under D.C. Code § 12-301(7), a claim is not time-barred when the complaint appears to have been filed within three years of the plaintiff’s alleged discovery of the wrongdoing.

Pierre v. Winn Managed Properties, LLC · filed 2016-12-14(7)

Accepting plaintiff’s allegations as true, as the Court must at this stage of litigation, the complaint appears to have been filed within three years of plaintiff’s alleged discovery of wrongdoing; therefore, the Court cannot grant defendant’s motion on statute of limitations grounds.

D.C. Code § 12-301(7) imposes a three-year statute of limitations on breach-of-contract claims.

Emrit v. Holland & Knight, LLP · filed 2017-01-27(7)

Based on the plaintiff s factual allegations, and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, the Court finds that the alleged breach occurred in 2006 at the latest. Therefore, the plaintiff had until 2009 to file his claims.

D.C. Code § 12-301(8) provides a three-year catch-all statute of limitations period for the plaintiff’s § 1981 claims.

Latson v. Sessions · filed 2017-06-23(8)

the District’s three-year statute of limitations period applies to the plaintiff’s § 1981 claims.

D.C. Code § 12-301(7) provides a three-year limitations period for contract actions, while § 12-301(8) provides a three-year limitations period for quantum meruit or unjust-enrichment claims, which accrues when the plaintiff’s last service is rendered and compensation is wrongfully withheld.

Glenn v. Fay · filed 2017-12-18(7) (8)

In Washington, D.C., the statute of limitations for contract actions is three years (D.C. Code § 12-301(7)). ... The Court concludes that Mr. Glenn’s quantum meruit claim accrued and the statute of limitations on that claim began to run in 2010. ... And because the statute of limitations for a quantum meruit action in D.C. is three years ... (D.C. Code § 12-301(8)).

Under § 12-301(7), a simple-contract claim must be filed within three years after accrual, and no applicable tolling rule extended the period here.

Yerrell v. EMJ Realty Co., AKA CCP, LLC · filed 2022-09-01(7)

“Except as otherwise specifically provided by law,” an action may not be brought with respect to a simple contract after the expiration of three years from the time the right to maintain the action accrues. D.C. Code § 12-301(7).

Section 12-301(8) imposes a three-year residual limitations period on § 1983 claims.

Smith v. Government of the District of Columbia · filed 2019-05-16(8)

Section 12-301(8) imposes a “three-year residual statute of limitations” on “section 1983 claims.”

Section 12-301 provides a three-year statute of limitations period when applied here as the analogous local limitations period.

White v. Fosco · filed 1984-12-07

The applicable statute of limitations period under D.C.Code § 12-301 is three years.

Section 12-301 supplies a three-year limitations period for the UCC foreclosure claim and for the contract and wrongful-transfer claims, with the latter claims treated as accruing no later than the plaintiff’s 1983 notice of the foreclosure and stock sale.

Riddell v. Riddell Washington Corporation · filed 1989-02-03(8), (2), and (7)

Tolling aside, the vitality of a claim under § 28:9-504 is at the most three years. D.C.Code § 12-301(8). ... Even assuming that the statute of limitations on plaintiffs UCC claim did not begin to run until he had notice of that claim, as he argues, his notice of the foreclosure triggered a duty to inquire as to any claims arising from the manner in which the foreclosure was effected. ... Each of these claims is subject to a *1498three-year statute of limitations. D.C.Code §§ 12-301(2), (7), (8). ... The district court was correct in dismissing both claims, which accrued in 1981 when Jean Riddell foreclosed on the stock. We need not reach the question whether the statute of limitations began to run then or only when plaintiff learned of the underlying transactions, since he was on notice of the foreclosure and of the sale of his stock to the corporations at the latest by 1983. He had a duty to inquire into the propriety of those transactions as of that time.

Section 12-301(8) imposes a three-year limitations period on this action under District of Columbia law.

Resolution Trust Corp. v. Gardner · filed 1992-03-25(8)

Under District of Columbia law, the statute of limitations for this action is three years. See D.C.Code § 12-301(8). Under D.C. law then, the claims as to the 1985 payments would have expired in 1988 unless under the provisions of FIRREA cited above, the appointment of the FSLIC as conservator or RTC as receiver revived the claims, or unless the plaintiff has alleged a continuing tort or grounds for equitable tolling.

Section 12-301(8) supplies a three-year statute of limitations for the claims at issue.

Resolution Trust Corp. v. Gardner · filed 1992-07-30(8)

Under District of Columbia law, the statute of limitations for this action is three years, which is the same period provided in the FIRREA statute. See D.C.Code § 12-301(8); 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14)(A).

Subsection (8) imposes a three-year limitations period on the plaintiff’s § 1981 and § 1983 claims, but a continuing violation may bring related discriminatory acts within that period.

Holland v. BD. OF TRUSTEES OF UNIV. OF D. OF COL. · filed 1992-06-18(8)

Plaintiff’s Fifth and Thirteenth Amendment claims lie against the District of Columbia under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and, like his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, are subject to the three-year limitation imposed by D.C.Code § 12-301(8). ... To avoid the statute of limitations bar, plaintiff argues that, because he was subjected to a “continuing violation” of discrimination culminating with his demotion in 1987, all of the incidents he alleges accrue within the statute of limitations. ... On a motion to dismiss, the Court must agree with this continuing violation theory since plaintiff can reasonably be said to have alleged “a series of related [discriminatory] acts, one or more of which falls within the limitations period.”

The three-year limitations period in § 12-301(3) does not bar a coverage-dispute action arising from a later agreement to resolve the dispute by declaratory judgment.

Northbrook Insurance Co. v. United Services Automobile Ass'n · filed 1993-06-24(3)

Northbrook also claims, somewhat perfunctorily, that the trial judge should have granted summary judgment in its favor because USAA’s action was brought more than three years after the accident. See D.C.Code § 12-301(3) (1989). USAA’s suit, however, was not based on tort, but rather on its agreement with Northbrook, in 1991, that any applicable coverage dispute was to be resolved in an action for a declaratory judgment. If Northbrook's contention were accepted at face value, then USAA’s right to bring the action would have expired in 1988, three years before the parties entered the agreement on which the suit was based! For this and other reasons, we reject Northbrook’s contention that the complaint is time-barred.

Section 12-301(8) supplies a three-year limitations period, so claims filed after that period are time-barred.

Zandford v. National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, Inc. · filed 1998-05-20(8)

Zandford concedes that the applicable statute of limitations period for count II is three years pursuant to D.C.Code § 12-301(8) [pi’s supp. opp. at 9], thus the claims arising out of the hearing expired in 1991. This claim, filed in 1993, is time barred. ... In sum, Zandford’s own words taken directly from the pro se Fourth Amended Complaint unquestionably demonstrate that Zandford knew of all six causes of action on the date they accrued. Accordingly, defendants Hobbs, Sherman and NASD are entitled to judgement as a matter of law on Counts I, II, III, IV, V and VI, as all claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.