D.C. Code § 23-110

Section 23-110 bars federal habeas review of a Superior Court conviction unless the motion remedy is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of detention.

Miles v. Rollins · filed 1990-03-02(g)

First, where Petitioner is still in the process of collaterally challenging his Superior Court convictions pursuant to D.C.Code § 23-110, this Court is precluded from entertaining a petition for writ of habeas corpus “unless it also appears that the remedy by [a § 23-110] motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.”

Section 23-110(g) permits federal habeas relief when the local motion remedy is inadequate or ineffective; four months of near-inactivity, without more, does not meet that standard.

Jackson v. Jackson · filed 1980-06-05(g)

Here, although four months of near-inactivity certainly gives pause and warrants closely reviewing the situation, this court is not persuaded that such delay, without more, necessarily renders the remedy inadequate or ineffective within the meaning of section 23-110(g).

Section 23-110(g) does not bar a federal court claim challenging prison transfer procedures when the prisoner does not challenge the sentence.

Neal v. Director, District of Columbia Department of Corrections · filed 1982-07-13(g)

Section 23-110, however, by its terms applies only to prisoners “claiming the right to be released” on the ground that “the sentence” is subject to legal attack.

Section 23-110 generally bars a prisoner who can seek relief by motion under the section from pursuing another post-conviction remedy unless the motion remedy is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of detention.

Streater v. Jackson · filed 1982-10-29(g)

A prisoner authorized to move for relief pursuant to D.C.Code § 23-110 may not pursue another avenue of post-conviction relief in local or federal courts unless the “remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.”

Section 23-110 is the proper vehicle for an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim instead of a writ of error coram nobis.

United States v. Higdon · filed 1985-08-12

We find appellee’s contentions without merit, because first, evidence of the mitigating factors, highlighted in the Memorandum of Points and Authorities accompanying appellee’s petition for the writ of error coram nobis, were before the court at the time of the sentencing hearing; and second, in any event, appellee’s contentions amounted to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, which must properly be pursued under D.C.Code § 23-110 (1981), and not under a writ of error eoram nobis.

Section 23-110 does not permit the Superior Court to review claims that counsel was ineffective on appeal.

Watson v. United States · filed 1986-04-08

In Streater v. United States, supra, 429 A.2d at 174, we stated that D.C.Code § 23-110, a popular means of collaterally attacking a conviction, “provides no basis upon which the trial court may review appellate proceedings.” This construction is supported by decisions on the analogous federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1982) (cited in Streater, supra, 429 A.2d at 174), as well as by reason: the Superior Court should not have authority to rule on the constitutionality of an appellate proceeding.

Section 23-110 does not permit the Superior Court to review a claim that counsel was ineffective on appeal.

Watson v. United States · filed 1987-12-10

In Streater v. United States, 429 A.2d 173 (D.C.1980) (per curiam), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 451 U.S. 902, 101 S.Ct. 1966, 68 L.Ed.2d 289 (1981), we stated that D.C.Code § 23-110 (1981), a popular means of collaterally attacking a conviction, “provides no basis upon which the trial court may review appellate proceedings.” Id. at 174. This construction is supported by decisions on the analogous federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1982) (cited in Streater, supra, 429 A.2d at 174), as well as by reason: the Superior Court should not have authority to rule.on the constitutionality of an appellate proceeding.

Section 23-110 permits relief from a trial court judgment of conviction but cannot revive an appeal to address appellate counsel’s failure to seek certiorari.

Head v. United States · filed 1993-06-10

By its very terms, § 23-110 does not authorize the relief that appellant seeks even if the court were to conclude that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because appellate counsel failed to file a petition for certiorari review. Under § 23-110, only the judgment of conviction in the trial court is vacated.

Section 23-110 does not apply to a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity because the defendant is not under sentence.

Morrison v. United States · filed 1990-08-16

In addition, D.C.Code § 23-110 is inapplicable since an NGI defendant is not considered to be under “sentence”.

Section 23-110(a) does not authorize a motion filed before sentencing because there is no sentence to vacate, set aside, or correct.

Johnson v. United States · filed 1991-01-17(a)

Section 23-110, however, only authorizes a motion "to vacate, set aside, or correct [a] sentence." D.C.Code § 23-110(a). Since appellant’s motion was filed before sentencing, it could not have been a motion “to vacate sentence.” The trial judge therefore properly treated it as a Rule 33 motion.

Section 23-110 applies only to motions to vacate a sentence and cannot be used before sentencing.

Joseph v. United States · filed 1991-09-13

That statute, however, applies only to motions to vacate sentence. Since Joseph had not yet been sentenced when he filed his motion, there was no sentence to vacate; consequently, we treat it (as the trial court did) as a motion for new trial under Super.Ct.Crim.R. 33.

Section 23-110 does not cover challenges to the computation or execution of a sentence; those claims must be raised by habeas corpus petition.

Alston v. United States · filed 1991-04-30

Whatever their legal merit, these contentions, like claims by other prisoners challenging the computation of a sentence, may not be raised under § 23-110.

Section 23-110 lets a defendant move at any time to correct a sentence that exceeds the legal maximum.

McAllister v. District of Columbia · filed 1995-01-26(a), (b)

The trial court observed, and we agree, that McAllister had a remedy under D.C.Code § 23-110. Under that provision, a criminal defendant has a right "at any time” to move the trial court "to vacate, set aside, or correct” a sentence if "the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law.” D.C.Code § 23-110(a), (b) (1989).

Section 23-110 applies the manifest injustice standard to a post-sentence request to withdraw a guilty plea.

Williams v. United States · filed 1995-03-27

The standard is the same — “manifest injustice” — if the issue is instead analyzed under the post-conviction statute, D.C.Code § 23-110.

Section 23-110 places collateral attacks on Superior Court sentences in the Superior Court.

Perkins v. Henderson · filed 1995-04-03(a)

D.C.Code § 23-110 vests subject matter jurisdiction to entertain collateral attacks upon Superior Court sentences in that court.

Section 23-110 does not permit trial courts to consider ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, even as cause for a procedural default.

Mayfield v. United States · filed 1995-06-12

Therefore, we see no reason to alter our long-standing rule that trial courts may not consider ineffective assistance of appellate counsel when ruling on § 23-110 claims.

Section 23-110(g) does not itself grant a court jurisdiction to hear a habeas petition when the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective.

Wilson v. Office of the Chairperson, District of Columbia Board of Parole · filed 1995-06-29(g)

D.C.Code § 23-110(g) accordingly does not constitute a grant of jurisdiction to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or any other court.

Section 23-110(g) bars a habeas petition after denial of a § 23-110 motion unless the motion remedy is inadequate or ineffective; a prisoner’s inability to use it again does not make it so.

Peoples v. Roach · filed 1995-12-28(g)

We also note that appellant’s inability to bring his latest application for relief as a § 23-110 motion does not render the remedy under § 23-110 “inadequate or ineffective” within the meaning of § 23-110(g), and therefore does not permit the Superior Court or any other court to entertain his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 23-110(g)'s motion remedy is not inadequate or ineffective merely because the Superior Court cannot review the Court of Appeals’s decision on a nonconstitutional claim.

Byrd v. John S. Henderson and United States of America · filed 1997-07-25(g)

Byrd cannot raise his claim of non-constitutional error in Superior Court by motion for collateral relief because the Superior Court lacks the power to review the Court of Appeals’s decision. ... That does not, however, render Byrd’s remedy by motion inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.

A motion filed under § 23-110 after sentencing must be treated as a presentence request to withdraw a guilty plea when the defendant made that request before sentencing and the plea judge denied it without a hearing.

Pettiford v. United States · filed 1997-08-28

Appellant, through newly appointed counsel, later filed a § 23-110 motion to vacate his pleas and sentence. The motions judge then proceeded to treat the motion as a typical post-sentence § 23-110 motion. We find that it should have been treated as a presentenee motion to withdraw appellant’s guilty pleas because of the procedure followed by the plea judge.

Section 23-110(g) bars federal habeas review only of claims that could have been raised through a section 23-110 motion.

Blair-Bey v. Quick · filed 1998-07-24(g)

Because section 23-110(g) only bars us from hearing those claims that could have been raised through section 23-110, that section does not prevent us from entertaining Blair-Bey’s habeas petition.

Section 23-110(a) requires a prisoner to be serving or detained under a Superior Court sentence to seek relief.

Thomas v. United States · filed 2001-01-25(a)

To meet the in-custody requirement of § 23-110, a prisoner must currently be serving or detained upon a sentence imposed by the Superior Court.

A § 23-110 motion to vacate a sentence is premature before the sentence is imposed.

Walls v. United States · filed 2001-05-31(a)

When the case came on for sentencing, the court — quite correctly — agreed with the government that the motion was pre*433mature and therefore could not be considered under section 23-110.

Section 23-110 does not provide relief for a challenge to the execution of a sentence.

United States v. Crockett · filed 2004-11-18

We are satisfied, therefore, that because Crockett failed to assert any of the four grounds for relief under § 23-110 and because we have determined that his case is in essence a habeas petition, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider his case under § 23-110.

Section 23-110 does not permit a court to vacate a valid sentence because a later prison placement policy changes how it is served.

Knight v. United States · filed 2006-01-12

Insofar as appellant’s motion in the trial court can be regarded as a motion to vacate sentence under D.C.Code § 23-110 (the local equivalent of 28 U.S.C. § 2255; see note 2, supra), it was properly denied by that court. ... In this case, the sentence imposed by the court was valid, and it remains valid, regardless of the subjective intent of the sentencing judge, and regardless of any change in BOP policy affecting the duration of appellant’s actual stay in prison.4 For this reason, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion to vacate his sentence.

Section 23-110 applies to prisoners sentenced by the D.C. Superior Court, but not to a prisoner sentenced by a judge sitting by designation of the D.C. Court of Appeals.

Banks v. Smith · filed 2005-07-08

Since Banks was sentenced by a judge sitting by designation of the DCCA, it would appear that Banks is held under sentence of the DCCA, and not under sentence of the Superior Court. After giving § 23-110 a plain reading, it appears that § 23-110 does not apply to Banks.

Section 23-110(g) permits a prisoner to challenge a D.C. Superior Court conviction or sentence under § 2241 when the § 23-110 remedy is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of detention.

Ford v. Warden R. Wiley · filed 2006-01-26(g)

Ford failed to show that § 23-110 was inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention, thus relief was not available pursuant to § 2241 regarding Ford’s convictions and sentence.

Section 23-110 provides D.C. Code offenders a remedy for challenges to the trial court’s imposition of sentence; challenges to the execution of a sentence proceed under § 2241.

Easton-El v. U.S. Parole Commission · filed 2007-11-06

Although the petition is captioned as brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, this habeas provision is unavailable to District of Columbia code offenders because they have an analogous available remedy under D.C.Code § 23-110. ... Because the pending application concerns the execution of the petitioner’s sentence, it is properly before the court under the general habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

Section 23-110 requires a challenge to a D.C. Superior Court sentence to be brought by motion in that court.

Whalen v. Superior Court for the District of Columbia · filed 2009-06-15

As this Court noted in its prior opinion, challenges of this nature must be brought by motion in the Superior Court under § 23-110.

Section 23-110 requires a challenge to a D.C. Superior Court conviction to be brought by motion in that court.

Worthy v. United States · filed 2010-02-26(g)

A challenge to the Superior Court conviction must be brought by motion in that court under D.C. Code § 23-110.

Section 23-110 requires challenges to D.C. Superior Court convictions to be pursued in Superior Court and bars federal district court jurisdiction over the same habeas challenge.

Hill v. Middlebrooks · filed 2010-03-02

Petitioner has brought this same action multiple times and each case has been dismissed on the ground that challenges to a Superior Court judgment of conviction must be pursued in that court under D.C. Code § 23-110. ... For the reasons stated in those cases, the Court finds again that it lacks jurisdiction and will dismiss this case with prejudice.

Section 23-110(a) provides a Superior Court motion to challenge or correct a sentence, including one alleged to exceed the lawful term.

Greely-Bey v. Anderson · filed 2010-07-22(a)

A challenge of this nature must be brought by motion in the Superior Court under D.C. Code § 23-110, which permits the filing of a motion in the Superior Court "to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence" if "(1) the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the laws of the District of Columbia, (2) the court was without jurisdiction to impose the sentence, (3) the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, (4) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack[.]" D.C. Code § 23-110(a).

Section 23-110(g) bars federal review only of claims that could have been raised under subsection (a), so it does not bar review of BOP sentence-calculation claims.

Watson v. United States · filed 2010-08-13(g)

Section 23-110(g) bars federal review of only those claims that could have been raised through § 23-110(a).

Section 23-110 does not provide a way to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

Baisey v. Stansberry · filed 2011-03-04

In fact, the petitioner is correct that D.C. Code § 23-110 is not an available vehicle to bring claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

Section 23-110 is not an available vehicle for claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

BAISEY v. Stansberry · filed 2011-07-13

In fact, the petitioner is correct that D.C.Code § 23-110 is not an available vehicle to bring claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

Section 23-110 requires a collateral attack on a Superior Court conviction to be brought in Superior Court.

Applewhaite v. Shinton · filed 2012-05-15

Since being upheld on direct appeal by the relevant court, Plaintiff’s current attempt to overturn his conviction is a “collateral attack,” which can only be brought in Superior Court under D.C. Code § 23-110.

Section 23-110 provides a motion in Superior Court as the remedy for a District of Columbia prisoner seeking to vacate a sentence.

Smith v. Leibovitz · filed 2012-06-22

Plaintiff’s claim to effectively vacate the challenged sentence fails because his remedy lies in the Superior Court by motion under D.C. Code § 23-110.

Section 23-110 is the exclusive remedy for D.C. Code offenders challenging their convictions or sentences unless that remedy is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of detention.

Pleasant v. Wilson · filed 2012-10-05

D.C. Code § 23-110 is the only available remedy for D.C. Code offenders to challenge their convictions and sentences absent a showing that the local remedy is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of the detention.

Section 23-110 requires challenges to Superior Court convictions to be filed in Superior Court.

Applewhaite v. Shinton · filed 2012-10-10

Any challenge to Plaintiff’s conviction must be filed in Superior Court as provided by D.C. Code § 23-110.

Section 23-110(g) does not bar a federal habeas claim alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

Lane v. United States · filed 2015-10-21(g)

Accordingly, § 23-110(g) does not apply to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

Section 23-110 does not cover claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

McNair v. Smoot · filed 2019-03-07

A claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel falls outside the scope of D.C. Code § 23-110.

Section 23-110(a) does not provide a remedy for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

Evans v. United States · filed 2020-06-15(a)

There is no dispute that this Court has jurisdiction over Evans’s habeas petition, because his petition is predicated on a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and, therefore, habeas relief is not available to him under D.C. Code § 23- 110(a).

Section 23-110(a) is the ordinary procedure for a D.C. Superior Court offender to challenge a conviction or sentence in Superior Court.

Dews v. Williams · filed 2021-03-19(a)

A District of Columbia offender who has been convicted in and sentenced by the Superior Court ordinarily must present challenges to his conviction and sentence by motion under D.C. Code § 23-110(a) in the Superior Court.

Section 23-110 provides the procedure for bringing a collateral challenge to a Superior Court conviction.

Parker, McCray, and Fortson v. United States · filed 2021-07-22

Accordingly, appellants first must bring their Fleming claims in Superior Court via a collateral challenge to their convictions pursuant to D.C. Code § 23-110.

Section 23-110 does not authorize the D.C. Superior Court to review appellate proceedings, so it does not bar a federal action challenging those proceedings.

Logan v. Secretary, Warden, FCC Coleman II · filed 2022-06-24

§ 23-110 does not give the D.C. Superior Court authority to review appellate proceedings.

Section 23-110(g) bars other courts from considering a D.C. Superior Court prisoner’s collateral challenge unless the remedy under that section is inadequate or ineffective.

Moore v. United States · filed 2022-08-03(g)

Thus, unless Moore can demonstrate that the remedy accorded under § 23-110 is inadequate or ineffective as to his particular challenge, this Court cannot reach any related issues.

Section 23-110 does not cover claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

Little v. United States · filed 2022-09-06

An ineffective assistance of appellate counsel (“IAAC”) claim is beyond the scope of § 23-110.

Section 23-110(g) bars a request for release from prison unless the prisoner shows that the statutory remedy is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of detention.

Prince Jones v. DC · filed 2022-10-31(g)

Insofar as appellant’s complaint requested release from prison, appellant’s claims are barred by D.C. Code § 23-110(g). Appellant has not demonstrated that his remedy under that statute is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.

Section 23-110 post-conviction relief is unavailable to a person who is not in custody.

FATUMABAHIRTU v. UNITED STATES · filed 2016-11-03

... are most often raised in a D.C. Code § 23-110 motion for post-conviction relief, but such an avenue is unavailable to Ms. Surur here because she is not in custody.

Section 23-110(g) does not restrict habeas petitions challenging civil commitment because it applies only to prisoners in custody under a Superior Court sentence.

Bension v. Meredith · filed 1978-07-14(g)

Section 23-110(g), patterned after 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970), relates only to an application for a writ on behalf of a “prisoner in custody under sentence of the Superior Court,” and thus has no application in the civil commitment context.

Section 23-110(g) does not remove federal habeas jurisdiction when a Superior Court prosecution ends in a mistrial without a conviction.

Sedgwick v. Superior Court for the District of Columbia · filed 1978-09-29(g)

That section pertains to “[a] prisoner in custody under sentence of the Superior Court.” D.C.Code § 23-110(a) (1973). Thus in the present case the plain language reading prescribed by the Supreme Court preserves the District Court’s habeas corpus jurisdiction.

A probationer is in legal custody and may seek relief under § 23-110 while on probation.

Snell v. United States · filed 2000-05-18

Appellant contends that this appeal, and not a collateral attack by way of motion under D.C.Code § 23-110 (1996 Repl.), is the appropriate redress for these injuries because appellant, as a probationer, was not “in custody” — a prerequisite for invoking § 23-110. ... Plainly, however, those words connote “legal custody,” for there is no indication elsewhere in the statute, or in its legislative history, that “custody” — for purposes of challenging a sentence — was limited to persons sentenced to incarceration.

Section 23-110(a) requires a person to be in custody under a Superior Court sentence when filing a motion to vacate that sentence.

Jeffrey v. United States · filed 2005-06-30(a)

Because Jeffrey had already served his sentence, and therefore was not detained or in custody at the time he filed his § 23-110 motion, the motion was not properly before the trial court.

Section 23-110(a) requires a person to be in custody under a Superior Court sentence when filing a motion to vacate that sentence.

Jeffrey v. United States · filed 2006-02-16(a)

Because Jeffrey had already served his sentence, and therefore was not detained or in custody at the time he filed his § 23-110 motion, the motion was not properly before the trial court.

Section 23-110(a) requires custody under the Superior Court sentence; collateral consequences after that sentence expires do not satisfy the custody requirement.

Norris v. United States · filed 2007-06-07(a)

Once a prisoner’s sentence has completely expired, the collateral consequences of a conviction are not sufficient to render the former prisoner “in custody” for purposes of either § 23-110 or habeas corpus.

Section 23-110(a)’s custody requirement is not satisfied by an outstanding obligation to register as a sex offender after the prison sentence has expired.

Mitchell v. United States · filed 2009-08-13(a)

We hold that an outstanding obligation to register under SORA does not sufficiently restrain a putative registrant’s liberty so as to render him “in custody” within the meaning of § 23-110.

Section 23-110 relief is available only to a person in custody under a Superior Court sentence when the petition is filed.

Magnus v. United States · filed 2011-01-06(a)

The trial court correctly ruled that Magnus could not proceed under D.C.Code § 23-110 because he was no longer “in custody under sentence of the Superior Court” when he filed his petition.

Section 23-110 permits a person on probation to seek to vacate a conviction because probation counts as custody.

MOLINA-AVILES v. District of Columbia · filed 2011-06-23

First, § 23-110 affords each of the Plaintiffs the ability to vacate their convictions while “in custody.” Individuals on probation are “in custody” both for purposes of § 23-110 and the federal habeas statute.

Section 23-110 relief is available only to a movant in custody under a Superior Court sentence.

IN RE D.R. · filed 2014-07-31(a)

D.R. raised this claim on direct appeal because relief is not available under D.C. Code § 23-110 unless the movant is “in custody under sentence of the Superior Court.”

Section 23-110(a) requires a D.C. Superior Court prisoner to bring a challenge to a conviction or sentence in Superior Court first.

Johnson v. Attorney General for D.C. · filed 2025-04-10(a)

Because Plaintiff is a District of Columbia Code offender, he must first bring a challenge to his conviction and sentence (here, an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim) in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.

Section 23-110(c) permits denial without a hearing when the motion and record conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief; vague or conclusory ineffective assistance allegations do not require a hearing.

McClurkin v. United States · filed 1984-01-31(c)

Although the trial court was to apply the manifest injustice standard of Rule 32(e), its disposition of these collateral attacks remained subject to the hearing requirement of D.C.Code § 23-110(c). ... Based upon our review of the record and the analysis of appellant’s contentions which we set forth in the remaining parts of this opinion, we are satisfied that the trial court did not err in declining to hold evidentiary hearings on appellant’s motion. We agree with the trial court that appellant’s contentions were either refuted by the record, or vague and conclusory.

Section 23-110(c) requires a hearing unless the motion and case record conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.

Miller v. United States · filed 1984-06-29(c)

We hold that the trial court erred in determining that the files and records conclusively showed that defendant was not entitled to any relief.

Section 23-110 permits denial of a motion without an evidentiary hearing when the motion, files, and records conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.

Jenkins v. United States · filed 1986-03-27(c)

The trial court was entitled to dispense with an evidentiary hearing on the D.C.Code § 23-110 (1981) motions because “the motion[s] and files and records of the case conclusively show[ed] that the prisoner [was] entitled to no relief.”

Section 23-110 requires a hearing when an ineffective-assistance motion raises material factual issues that the existing record cannot resolve.

Hockman v. United States · filed 1986-11-04(c)

A hearing is not required under D.C.Code § 23-110 if “the motion and files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” ... Since neither the motion nor its effect on Hock-man’s decision to testify were part of the trial record, a hearing was required.

Section 23-110 does not require a hearing when a movant’s claims are vague and conclusory, palpably incredible, or would not merit relief even if true.

Sanders v. United States · filed 1988-11-17

Finally, appellant contends the trial court improperly dismissed without a hearing his pro se motion under D.C.Code § 23-110 (1981). We agree with the trial court that a hearing was not required because appellant’s claims are vague and conclusory, or “palpably incredible,” or do not merit relief even if true.

Section 23-110 does not require an evidentiary hearing when the movant’s allegations, even if true, would not entitle him to relief.

White v. United States · filed 1984-11-26

Thus, no hearing was here required because even if the facts as stated by appellant were true, appellant would not be entitled to relief under section 23-110(a).

Section 23-110(c) allows a court to deny a hearing on a witness’s recantation when the trial judge observed the witness and the record permits an assessment of the claim.

Derrington v. United States · filed 1985-02-21(c)

The need for a hearing on a § 23-110 motion is diminished where a witness seeks to recant earlier testimony and the trial court has had the opportunity to observe the witness’ demeanor and weigh the credibility of the witness at trial.

Section 23-110(c) generally requires a hearing on a motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel unless the record conclusively shows that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.

Gaston v. United States · filed 1988-04-07(c)

There is a presumption that a trial court presented with a § 23-110 motion should conduct a hearing.

Section 23-110(c) does not require a hearing when the motion and case record conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.

Luckey v. United States · filed 1989-07-25(c)

Since the record makes clear that counsel could reasonably anticipate that appellant would be sentenced to a substantial period of incarceration and made a tactical decision to argue for commitment to a facility with services that could meet appellant’s needs, no hearing on appellant’s § 23-110 motion was required.

Section 23-110(c) generally requires a hearing on an ineffective assistance motion, but a judge may deny a hearing when the motion and record conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.

Sykes v. United States · filed 1991-01-28(c)

In case of doubt, a trial judge should ordinarily hold a hearing with respect to allegations of ineffective assistance. It might well have been wise to do so in this case. Nevertheless, we conclude that on these particular facts, where Sykes failed to produce an affidavit from Ms. Smith, where Ms. Smith would have had to risk incriminating herself to assist Sykes, and where the defense case depends on a jury’s crediting that Ms. Smith sold drugs to Officer Awkard after being warned by Sykes that Awkard was a policeman,12 the trial judge acted within her discretion in concluding that a hearing could serve no useful purpose.

Section 23-110 allows a trial court discretion to grant a hearing on a motion even when a hearing is not required.

Johnson v. United States · filed 1991-10-08

While case law has set forth standards to determine when a hearing must be held on a § 23-110 motion, see, e.g., Shepard v. United States, 533 A.2d 1278, 1283 (D.C.1987), the application of those standards has a certain discretionary element and in any event there is no bar to a trial court, if so disposed, granting a hearing with respect to any such motion. Here, the trial court’s order denying appellant’s motion was clearly mistaken in two significant factual assertions.7 We therefore set aside the order and remand the case for further consideration by the trial court.

Section 23-110(c) requires a hearing on a sufficiently specific ineffective assistance claim unless the motion and case record conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.

Gray v. United States · filed 1992-12-08(c)

We hold that the claim of ineffective assistance was sufficient to require a hearing on the § 23-110 motion; hence we remand this case to the trial court with directions to conduct one.

Section 23-110(c) requires a hearing unless the motion, files, and records conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.

Bruce v. United States · filed 1992-12-18(c)

The question is whether, despite the absence of a hearing, the record “conclusively” shows that Bruce is entitled to no relief. We hold that it does not.

Section 23-110 permits a court to deny a motion without an evidentiary hearing when the existing record provides an adequate basis for deciding it.

Ready v. United States · filed 1993-02-05

Where the existing record provides an adequate basis for disposing of the motion, the trial court may rule on the motion without holding an evidentiary hearing.

A § 23-110 motion may be resolved without a hearing when the available record establishes that a hearing is unnecessary.

Tibbs v. United States · filed 1993-07-19

In addition, there are some § 23-110 motions “which can be resolved on the basis of the available record,” so that a hearing is not required. ... This is such a case.

Section 23-110(c) requires a hearing unless the motion and case record conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.

Rice v. United States · filed 1990-09-21(c)

Since on the basis of the trial court’s order rendered without a hearing, we are unable to “say with certainty that appellant would not be entitled to relief even if his allegations were true,” ... we must remand the record for further proceedings on appellant’s § 23-110 motion.

Section 23-110 does not require a hearing when the available record resolves the issue raised by the motion.

Alpizar v. United States · filed 1991-08-21

Appellant’s motion presented an issue which could be resolved on the basis of the available record; thus, the trial court was not required to hold a hearing.

Section 23-110 requires a hearing unless the motion and case record conclusively show that the movant cannot obtain relief.

Smith v. United States · filed 1992-05-01

To uphold the denial of a § 23-110 motion without a hearing, this court must conclude that under no circumstances could the mov-ant establish facts warranting relief.

Section 23-110(c) requires a prompt hearing unless the motion, files, and records conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.

Webster v. United States · filed 1993-04-30(c)

D.C.Code § 23-110(c) (1989) provides that “[u]nless the motion and files and records conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief,” the judge must grant a “prompt hearing thereon.” ... Given the uncanny similarity between the suspect described by Quander and the man seized by the arrest team, we are satisfied that despite the absence of a hearing, the record conclusively shows that Webster is entitled to no relief. ... Accordingly, no hearing was required.

Section 23-110(c) permits denial without a hearing when the motion and record conclusively show no entitlement to relief, including when claims are vague or conclusory.

Poole v. United States · filed 1993-08-26(c)

A hearing is not required where the petitioner’s claims (1) are “vague and conclusory,” (2) are “palpably incredible,” or (3) “would not merit relief even if true.” ... In the absence of more specificity, we conclude that most of Poole’s claims are vague, conclusory, and palpably incredible. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in dismissing them without a hearing.

A hearing is presumed appropriate on a § 23-110 motion, and doubts about whether to hold one should be resolved in favor of a hearing.

Gillis v. United States · filed 1991-02-20

As the trial judge correctly noted, there is a presumption in favor of holding a hearing on § 23-110 motions, and any question regarding the appropriateness of a hearing should be resolved in favor of holding a hearing.

Section 23-110(c) requires a hearing unless the motion and case records conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.

Wright v. United States · filed 1992-05-15(c)

To uphold the denial of a § 23-110 motion without a hearing, this court must conclude that under no circumstances could the mov-ant establish facts warranting relief.

Section 23-110 does not require a hearing when the movant’s allegations, even if true, fail to establish ineffective assistance of counsel.

Johnson v. United States · filed 1992-07-14

We hold, as did the trial judge, that none of Johnson’s claims, considered separately or together, were sufficient to require a hearing because, even if true, they did not meet the test for ineffective assistance established by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

Section 23-110(c) requires a hearing unless the motion and case record conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.

Hollis v. United States · filed 1993-05-04(c)

We hold only that, because the motion and the files and records do not conclusively show that appellant is unable to prove his claim of ineffective assistance, a hearing must be conducted.

Section 23-110(c) requires a prompt hearing unless the files and records establish beyond doubt that the movant would receive no relief even if the allegations were proven.

Matthews v. United States · filed 1993-07-26(c)

The statute provides that the trial court shall hold a prompt hearing unless the files and records establish beyond doubt that the movant would be entitled to no relief if the allegations were proven.

A court considering a § 23-110 ineffective assistance claim should obtain an explanation from trial counsel when the record alone does not establish that counsel’s challenged decision was a reasonable tactical choice.

Reaves v. United States · filed 1997-05-08

Under the particular facts of this case, however, we hold that the trial court erred in denying Huffs § 23-110 motion on the pleadings and trial record alone.

A § 23-110 motion alleging ineffective assistance based on uncalled witnesses may be denied without a hearing when the movant provides no affidavits from those witnesses.

Fields v. United States · filed 1997-08-14

Fields also contends that the trial court erred in denying two motions brought under D.C.Code § 23-110 (1996) alleging ineffective assistance of counsel without holding a hearing. ... The fact that Fields has not provided an affidavit from any of these witnesses is itself a sufficient ground to reject without a hearing allegations of ineffectiveness premised on the failure to call them.

Section 23-110 permits denial of a motion without a hearing when the movant could prove no facts entitling him to relief.

Carle v. United States · filed 1998-01-15

And, since appellant could prove no facts entitling him to relief, the trial court did not err in denying without a hearing his motion for a new trial based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Section 23-110 generally favors a hearing on an ineffective assistance claim, but no hearing is required for vague or conclusory allegations, palpably incredible claims, or allegations that would warrant no relief even if true.

Courtney v. United States · filed 1998-03-19

Furthermore, although we have recognized a presumption in favor of a hearing on a § 23-110 claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we have stated consistently that no hearing is required where defendant’s motion “consists of (1) vague and conclusory allegations, (2) palpably incredible claims, or (3) allegations that would merit no relief even if true.”

Section 23-110(c) permits denial without a hearing when the motion raises no new factual issue and the record conclusively shows that the defendant is entitled to no relief.

Johnson v. United States · filed 1993-11-24(c)

We further hold that the motion to withdraw the plea under D.C.Code § 23-110 did not raise any new factual issues requiring a hearing, and that the court therefore committed no error in denying the motion without a hearing.

Section 23-110(c) permits a court to deny a motion without a hearing when the record conclusively shows that the movant is not entitled to relief.

Young v. United States · filed 1994-03-15(c)

Third, the trial judge could properly deny appellant’s motion for a new trial without a hearing because “the record conclusively shows that he is not entitled to the relief he seeks because his claims are ‘palpa...bly incredible.’”

Section 23-110 motions normally require a hearing to examine whether challenged conduct by trial counsel had a tactical basis, but a hearing is unnecessary when that basis is apparent to the trial judge.

McKinnon v. United States · filed 1994-07-07

Here, the rationale for the tactical choice was entirely apparent and readily perceived by the trial judge. We emphasize that by so stating, we do not signal any retreat from this court’s longstanding position that hearings are normally required in order to explore whether there was a tactical basis for challenged conduct of trial defense counsel.

A hearing on a § 23-110 motion is unnecessary when the claims can be resolved as a matter of law or only on the trial record.

Smith v. United States · filed 1996-11-27

Smith challenged the failure of the trial court to grant a hearing on his § 23-110 motions. Since all of the claims which he raises can be resolved as a matter of law or are subject to review only on the trial record, we reject his claim that the trial court erred in failing to grant him a hearing.

Section 23-110 generally requires a hearing on an ineffective assistance claim unless the claim is palpably incredible, vague and conclusory, or would not warrant relief even if true.

Newman v. United States · filed 1997-09-09

We therefore will affirm the trial court’s denial of a § 23-110 motion without a hearing only if the claims (1) are “palpably incredible”; (2) are “vague and eonclusory”; or (3) even if true, do not entitle the movant to relief.

Section 23-110(c) permits a court to deny a motion without a hearing when the motion and case record conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.

Minor v. United States · filed 1994-09-15(c)

Specifically, when “the motion and files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief,” a hearing is not necessary.

A § 23-110 motion that makes only vague and conclusory allegations may be denied without a hearing.

Spencer v. United States · filed 1997-01-23

We agree with the trial court that Spencer’s motion was “vague and eonclusory” and therefore was properly denied without a hearing.

Section 23-110 carries a presumption in favor of a hearing on an ineffective assistance motion when resolving the claim requires facts outside the record.

Thomas v. United States · filed 1996-11-14

“There is a presumption in favor of holding a hearing on a § 23-110 motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel that requires an inquiry into matters outside the record.”

Section 23-110(c) requires a hearing on a post-conviction motion unless the motion and case record conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.

Dantzler v. United States · filed 1997-06-19(c)

Where a defendant seeks post-conviction relief pursuant to Section 23-110, the judge must conduct a hearing “[u]nless the motion and files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief....”

Section 23-110 permits a court to deny a motion to vacate without a hearing when doing so is within its discretion.

Page v. United States · filed 1998-08-06

Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Page’s motion under D.C.Code § 23-110 without having held a hearing.

Section 23-110(c) requires a hearing on an ineffective assistance claim when the record does not conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.

Woodard v. United States · filed 1998-11-05(c)

Recognizing the extensive case law in this jurisdiction establishing the presumption in favor of granting a hearing in a § 23-110 ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and the lack of factual support in the record for some of the trial court’s determinations, specifically, that alleged deficiencies were permissible “tactical decisions” of counsel and that Woodard waived his objection to admission of his grand jury statements, we need only hold, at this juncture, that the trial court erred in denying, without a hearing, Woodard’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

A § 23-110 motion alleging ineffective assistance may be denied without a hearing when the movant fails to identify proposed witnesses or provide supporting affidavits and the claim is vague and conclusory.

Harris v. United States · filed 1999-09-16(c)

We find no merit to appellant’s related claim that the trial court erred in denying him a hearing on his § 23-110 motion alleging that his counsel was ineffective because he did not make an on-site inspection of Harris' apartment building or interview prospective witnesses in order to rebut the detectives’ testimony that they entered the building with consent. ... However, as Harris did not identify any of these witnesses or provide any affidavits to support either of his contentions, and still has not - done so before this court, his claim is vague and con-clusory, and the trial court acted properly in denying his motion without a hearing.

Section 23-110 presumes that an ineffective-assistance claim warrants a hearing when resolving it requires facts outside the record.

Upshur v. United States · filed 1999-12-30

Where claims are made alleging ineffective assistance of counsel under D.C.Code § 23-110, there is a presumption in favor of a hearing when matters outside the record must be considered.

Section 23-110 presumes a hearing for an ineffective assistance claim requiring inquiry outside the record, but permits a ruling without a hearing when the available record resolves the motion.

Spencer v. United States · filed 2000-04-13

There is a presumption in favor of holding a hearing on a § 23-110 motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel that requires an inquiry into matters outside the record. ... However, where the motion may be “resolved on the basis of the available record,” the trial court may rule on the motion without holding an evidentiary hearing.

Section 23-110(c) generally requires a hearing on an ineffective assistance motion unless the motion and record conclusively show that the prisoner cannot obtain relief.

Dobson v. United States · filed 1998-04-16(c)

In order to uphold the denial of a § 23-110 motion without a hearing, we must be satisfied that “under no circumstances could the petitioner establish facts warranting relief.”

Section 23-110(c) requires a hearing when a motion presents evidence that could establish ineffective assistance of counsel and prejudice.

Lanton v. United States · filed 2001-08-16(c)

We conclude that Lanton has proffered sufficient evidence, both as to deficient performance and as to prejudice, to entitle him to a hearing on his § 23-110 motion.

Section 23-110(c) requires a hearing unless the files and records conclusively show that the movant can establish no facts warranting relief; vague and conclusory allegations do not require one.

Southall v. United States · filed 1998-07-30(c)

A hearing is required on the motion unless the files and records show conclusively that the movant can establish no facts warranting relief. ... Southall’s claims of ineffectiveness in his motion in the trial court, as the trial court determined, were vague and conelusory, and failed to assert how trial counsel was ineffective and otherwise warranted no relief.

A § 23-110 ineffective-assistance motion presumptively warrants a hearing, but the court may deny a hearing when the record resolves the claims or the remaining allegations are vague and conclusory.

Lane v. United States · filed 1999-09-09

When a defendant in a § 23-110 motion raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, there is a presumption that the trial court should conduct a hearing. ... Despite the presumption, a hearing is not required in every case, and we review a trial court’s decision not to hold one only for abuse of discretion. ... Applying this standard to the present case, we conclude that the trial court properly denied the motion without a hearing.

A § 23-110 motion alleging ineffective assistance may be denied without a hearing when the claim fails the Strickland test.

Sothern v. United States · filed 2000-08-03

We agree with the trial court that Sothern’s motion failed to meet the Strickland test, and that he was therefore not entitled to relief or even to a hearing.

Section 23-110 does not require an evidentiary hearing when a motion’s allegations are conclusory and unsubstantiated.

Malede v. United States · filed 2001-02-22

Malede alleged no such divergency of interests in his § 23-110 motion; his only contention was that Farquhar’s pursuit of the insanity defense was “intolerably deficient.” The trial judge found this assertion to be conclusory and unsubstantiated, so as to obviate the need for an evidentiary hearing. We agree.

A § 23-110 motion alleging ineffective assistance ordinarily warrants a hearing, but a vague and conclusory claim unsupported by a proffer does not.

Robinson v. United States · filed 2002-05-02

In the absence of any proffer of expert testimony about the difficulty of identifying the shooters by the light of the gunfire, the trial judge could properly conclude that the claim that counsel was ineffective for not calling such an expert was “vague and conclusory” and, therefore, that Bailey was not entitled to a hearing.

Section 23-110 requires a hearing when a motion presents affidavits asserting facts that could warrant relief.

Lopez v. United States · filed 2002-06-06

In short, in light of our case law, the trial court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Lopez’s request for a hearing on his § 23-110 motion.

Section 23-110(c) presumptively requires a hearing unless the motion and case record conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.

Williams v. United States · filed 1999-01-28(c)

This statute provides that the court must hold a hearing on such a motion unless “the motion and files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” D.C.Code § 23-110(c). The use of the adverb “conclusively” reflects a stringent standard, and a hearing is presumptively required.

Section 23-110 motions generally require a hearing when material factual questions cannot be resolved from the existing record.

Jones v. United States · filed 2000-01-20

In motions of this kind there is a presumption in favor of conducting a hearing unless there are no material questions of fact to be resolved, and the contentions can be resolved on the basis of existing files and records in the case.

Section 23-110 does not require a hearing when the court can resolve the motion on the record.

Thomas v. United States · filed 2000-04-13

No hearing is required to resolve motions filed pursuant to D.C.Code § 23-110 if the matter can be resolved on the record as was the case here.

Section 23-110 permits a court to deny a motion without a hearing when its allegations would not warrant relief even if true.

Diamen v. United States · filed 1999-02-25(c)

Although a defendant is presumptively entitled to a hearing on a motion brought pursuant to D.C.Code § 23-110, no hearing is required where his allegations would merit no relief even if trae.

A § 23-110 motion alleging ineffective assistance requires a hearing when specific allegations raise questions about counsel’s performance and prejudice.

Little v. United States · filed 2000-03-23

Thus, because Little has alleged sufficient facts that counsel may have unreasonably failed to move to suppress an involuntary statement and there is a question of whether the introduction of the statement prejudiced his case, a hearing on the § 23-110 motion is necessary.

Section 23-110 generally calls for a hearing on a motion, but vague and conclusory allegations do not require one.

Blair v. United States · filed 2002-02-14

While there is a "presumption that a trial court presented with a § 23-110 motion ... should conduct a hearing” "we have recognized three categories of claims that do not merit hearings: (1) vague and conclusory allegations, (2) palpably incredible claims, and (3) assertions that would not merit relief even if true.” Ramsey v. United States, 569 A.2d 142, 147 (D.C.1990) (citations and quotations omitted). As these particular allegations lack any factual support, they are vague and con-clusory and the trial court did not err in denying Mr. Blair a hearing.

Section 23-110 generally favors an evidentiary hearing on an ineffective-assistance claim when the existing record cannot resolve it.

Haley v. United States · filed 2002-06-13

Particularly, in light of the presumption in favor of a hearing on a § 23-110 motion, the decision not to conduct an evidentiary hearing under the circumstances presented in this case constituted an abuse of discretion.

Section 23-110(c) presumes a hearing on a motion, but no hearing is required when the allegations would merit no relief even if true.

Joyner v. United States · filed 2002-08-08(c)

We have recognized that there is a statutory presumption in favor *351of a hearing on a § 23-110 motion, see § 23 — 110(c); Dobson v. United States, 711 A.2d 78, 83 (D.C.1998), but we also have “stated consistently that no hearing is required where defendant’s motion ‘consists of (1) vague and conclusory allegations, (2) palpably incredible claims, or (3) allegations that would merit no relief even if true.’ ” Courtney v. United States, 708 A.2d 1008, 1011 (D.C.1998) (quoting Ready v. United States, 620 A.2d 233, 234 (D.C. 1993)).

A § 23-110 motion alleging ineffective assistance for failure to investigate witnesses may be denied without a hearing when the movant offers no credible proffer of their exculpatory testimony.

Forte v. United States · filed 2004-07-22

While demonstration of the failure to investigate and call witnesses can establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Gray v. United States, 617 A.2d 521, 524 n. 8 (D.C. 1992), we have “required ‘an affidavit or other credible proffer as to the allegedly exculpatory nature of [the prospective witnesses’] testimony.’” Lopez, supra, 801 A.2d at 42 (citation omitted). Without such a proffer, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to investigate unnamed witnesses with unspecified testimony.

Section 23-110 does not require an evidentiary hearing on vague, conclusory, incredible, or meritless allegations merely because prospective witnesses refuse to provide supporting affidavits.

Metts v. United States · filed 2005-06-16(c)

In any case, we reject the proposition that even if a motion for a § 23-110 hearing consists of vague, conclusory, incredible, or otherwise meritless allegations, such a hearing is nevertheless warranted where prospective witnesses have refused to provide supporting affidavits. The determination of whether to hold a § 23-110 hearing hinges on the weight and credibility of the defendant’s allegations, not the reluctance of potential witnesses or elusiveness of possible evidence.

Section 23-110 requires an evidentiary hearing when the outcome of a motion turns on the credibility of opposing witnesses.

Artis v. United States · filed 2002-07-18

The trial court erred in basing its rejection of Artis's claim on the ground that a court hearing his suppression motion might have believed the police officers rather than Mr. and Mrs. Artis. Where the outcome of a § 23-110 motion turns on the credibility of the opposing witnesses, an evidentiary hearing is required to decide it.

Section 23-110(c) allows a court to decide a motion without an evidentiary hearing when no genuine dispute exists about facts material to the motion.

Ginyard v. United States · filed 2003-02-06(c)

Thus, if no genuine doubt exists about the facts that are material to the motion, the court may conclude that no evidentiary hearing is necessary.

Section 23-110(c) does not require an evidentiary hearing when allegations about counsel’s condition identify no deficient representation that prejudiced the trial.

Joyner v. United States · filed 2003-03-13(c)

We agree that no hearing was necessary where the basis of appellant’s argument rested solely on allegations of Pullings’ drug use and psychiatric treatment in 1999, and where appellant failed to point to any particular examples of alleged deficient representation by his counsel which prejudiced the outcome of his trial.

A court may deny a § 23-110 motion without an evidentiary hearing when the record supports its findings; that denial is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Alston v. United States · filed 2003-12-24

Additionally, we review the trial judge’s denial, without a hearing, of appellant’s motion pursuant to D.C.Code § 23-110, for abuse of discretion. ... Having found such support in the record, we conclude that the trial judge’s denial of appellant’s motion for a new trial, without a hearing, was without error.

A § 23-110 motion may be denied without an evidentiary hearing when the existing trial record conclusively establishes that the movant is not entitled to relief.

Al-Mahdi v. United States · filed 2005-02-10

Thus, we find no infirmity in the trial judge’s decision to deny appellant’s § 23-110 motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. Even where, as here, such a motion is based on counsel’s failure to pursue a certain course of action, a-hearing may be unnecessary if the existing trial record establishes conclusively that the movant is not entitled to relief.

A court should generally hold an evidentiary hearing on a § 23-110 motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.

Joseph v. United States · filed 2005-07-14

There is a presumption that a trial judge should hold an evidentiary hearing on a defendant’s § 23-110 motion to vacate his sentence on the ground that trial counsel was ineffective.

Section 23-110(c) requires an evidentiary hearing when disputed factual allegations could entitle the prisoner to relief.

Hilliard v. United States · filed 2005-07-21(c)

We find that the judge erred in deciding the factual issues raised by Hilliard’s motion without an evidentiary hearing.

Section 23-110(c) permits a court to decide a motion without a hearing when the existing record adequately resolves it.

Harkins v. United States · filed 2002-11-21(c)

We agree with the trial court that a hearing would not have elicited any additional information; thus a hearing was not necessary.

Section 23-110(c) permits a trial court to deny a motion without a hearing when its assertions are vague or conclusory or the case record conclusively shows the prisoner is entitled to no relief.

West v. United States · filed 2005-01-19(c)

If West’s assertions are vague or conclusory, or if the records of the case “conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief,” the trial court need not conduct a hearing on the motion.

Section 23-110 permits a court to deny an ineffective assistance motion without a hearing when the allegations are conclusory and lack supporting facts.

Pearsall v. United States · filed 2002-12-19

The trial court denied the motion without a hearing, concluding that appellant’s allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel were merely conclusory and provided no factual basis for the claim that counsel’s performance was deficient. We agree.

A hearing on a § 23-110 motion is not required when the claims are vague and conclusory or can be resolved on the available record.

Mercer v. United States · filed 2004-09-02

We have also held that a hearing may not be required when the § 23-110 motion can be resolved on the basis of the available record. ... Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not commit error in deciding the motion without a hearing.

A § 23-110 claim may be denied without a hearing when the movant fails to present a factual dispute.

Pérez v. United States · filed 2009-03-26

We agree that without a factual dispute, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting this basis for Villatoro’s ineffectiveness claim without a hearing.

Section 23-110(c) permits denial of a post-conviction motion without a hearing when the motion and case record conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.

Cade v. United States · filed 2006-02-27(c)

While there is a presumption that the trial court should hold a hearing prior to deciding a § 23-110 motion, ... no hearing is required where “the motion and files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief,” D.C.Code § 23-110(c) (2001), or “where defendant’s motion consists of (1) vague and conclusory allegations, (2) palpably incredible claims, or (3) allegations that would merit no relief even if true.”

Section 23-110(c) requires a hearing unless the motion and case records conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.

Jackson v. United States · filed 2008-01-17(c)

Indeed, the statute itself expressly provides that a hearing “shall” be held “[u]nless the motion and files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” D.C.Code § 23-110(c).

A hearing is presumed for a § 23-110 motion alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel, but the trial court may deny one when the existing record adequately resolves the claim.

Hairston v. United States · filed 2006-08-17

Although there is a presumption in favor of holding a hearing on a § 23-110 motion which asserts ineffectiveness of trial counsel, the right to a hearing is not automatic. ... Here, we conclude that, under Ready and Ramsey, the trial court did not err in refusing to hold a hearing on Mr. Hair-ston’s § 23-110 motion.

Section 23-110(c) requires a hearing unless the motion and case record conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.

Jones v. United States · filed 2007-03-15(c)

The statute itself requires a hearing “[u]nless the motion and files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” ... None of these factors can be said, however, to render appellant’s claims so facially invalid that they conclusively established in themselves that appellant was entitled to no relief.

Section 23-110(c) requires a hearing on a colorable claim unless the motion and case record conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.

Steward v. United States · filed 2007-06-21(c)

We agree with appellant, however, that the court erred in summarily dismissing his section 23-110 motion without affording him a hearing (or, at least, an opportunity to supplement his motion before the court determined whether to hold a hearing).

Section 23-110(c) requires a hearing unless the motion and case record conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.

Aiken v. United States · filed 2008-09-11(c)

The statute requires a hearing “[u]nless the motion and files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.”

A court may decide a § 23-110 motion without an evidentiary hearing when it need not resolve a factual dispute or make credibility findings.

Howerton v. United States · filed 2009-02-19

Finally, because the trial judge was not required to resolve any factual dispute or make credibility findings to resolve the section 23-110 motion, the judge was not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing before ruling on the motion.

Section 23-110(c) allows a court to deny a motion without a hearing when the motion and case records conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.

Freeman v. United States · filed 2009-05-14(c)

When “the motion and files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief,” a hearing is not necessary.

Section 23-110(c) requires a hearing unless the motion and case record conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.

Long v. United States · filed 2006-11-09(c)

We conclude, however, that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Long’s § 23-110 motion without a hearing.

Section 23-110(c) requires a hearing unless the motion and case record conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.

Watley v. United States · filed 2007-03-22(c)

As the record currently stands, it does not “conclusively show” that appellant is “entitled to no relief’ on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. D.C.Code § 23-110(c). Accordingly, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s § 23-110 motion without a hearing.

A § 23-110 ineffective-assistance claim may be denied without a hearing when the movant raises no factual dispute requiring one.

Perez v. United States · filed 2009-03-26

We agree that without a factual dispute, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting this basis for Villatoro's ineffectiveness claim without a hearing.

A court may deny a § 23-110 motion alleging ineffective assistance without a hearing if its claims are vague and conclusory, palpably incredible, or would not merit relief even if true.

Ransom v. United States · filed 2008-05-01

Although there is a presumption that the trial court should conduct a hearing on a motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, the denial of such motion without a hearing can be sustained if the motion has (1) “vague and eonclusory allegations,” or (2) “palpably incredible claims,” or (3) “assertions that would not merit relief even if true.”

A hearing is generally presumed for a § 23-110 motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, but a judge may deny one when the allegations would merit no relief even if true.

Mozee v. United States · filed 2009-01-08

Finally, although there is a presumption in favor of holding a hearing on a § 23-110 motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, a judge need not hold a hearing “if the motion consists of (1) vague and conclusory allegations, (2) palpably incredible claims, or (3) allegations that would merit no relief even if true.”

Section 23-110(c) creates a presumption in favor of a hearing on an ineffective-assistance claim, but a hearing is not automatic.

Strozier v. United States · filed 2010-03-25(c)

Although D.C.Code § 23-110(c) creates a statutory presumption in favor of holding a hearing when there is an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, the right to a hearing is not automatic.

Section 23-110(c) permits denial of a motion without a hearing when the record conclusively shows that the movant is entitled to no relief.

Wheeler v. United States · filed 2009-08-13(c)

Because the record “conclusively show[s]” that Wheeler “is entitled to no relief,” D.C.Code § 23-110(c), the trial court did not abuse its ... discretion in denying Wheeler’s motions without a hearing.

Section 23-110 does not require a hearing when the existing record adequately supports deciding the motion.

Wright v. United States · filed 2009-08-27

While a hearing is presumptively favored, it is not required if the “existing record provides an adequate basis for disposing of the motion.”

Section 23-110(e) presumes a hearing on an ineffective assistance claim, especially when the allegations concern facts outside the trial record.

Paige v. United States · filed 2011-07-28(e)

We have said more than once that, where the court is faced with a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, [D.C.Code § 23-110(e) ] creates a presumption that a hearing should be held, ... especially where the allegations of ineffectiveness relate to facts outside the trial record.