D.C. Code § 13-423

Section 13-423(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction over a seller that sells to an intermediary outside the District and takes no action connecting itself to the District.

Mosley v. Nationwide Purchasing, Inc. · filed 1973-10-09(a)(1)

Kuni has not “transacted any business” in the District, however broadly the phrase be interpreted. Kuni was not solicited by appellant, nor paid by him. Kuni maintains no office nor agent in the District. Kuni sold an automobile to Nationwide and thereafter exercised no control over nor had any knowledge of the price at which the automobile would finally be sold to appellant. Clearly, Kuni has taken no action to connect it with the District.

Section 13-423(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction over a defendant that has not transacted business in the District of Columbia.

Cornwell v. CIT Corp. of New York · filed 1974-03-25(a)(1)

On the facts presented, it is readily apparent that Capitol has simply not “transacted any business” in the District of Columbia.

A corporation's execution, delivery, and partial performance of a substantial loan contract in the District qualifies as transacting business under § 13-423(a)(1) for a suit on that contract.

First American Bank, N. A. v. United Equity Corp. · filed 1981-01-21(a)(1)

Alternatively, the finding that United transacted business pursuant to D.C. Code 29-933i(c) is also sufficient in this instance to support a finding that it was “transacting any business” pursuant to D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(1), the local “long arm” statute.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident that ships goods to an intermediary expecting distribution in the District of Columbia.

Stabilisierungsfonds Fur Wein v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine Distributors Pty. Ltd. · filed 1981-03-23(a)(1)

We are convinced that when the “transacting any business” language is read to extend to the limits of due process, it encompasses a case like the present one where a nonresident defendant ships goods to an intermediary with the expectation that the intermediary will distribute the goods in a region that includes the District of Columbia.

Section 13-423’s transacting business clause does not confer jurisdiction when a defendant’s only meeting in the District was insignificant to a contract solicited and performed elsewhere.

Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Mary Helen Coal Co., Inc. · filed 1981-10-13(a)(1)

The Court finds that defendant’s contacts with the District of Columbia are not sufficient to support jurisdiction under D.C. Code § 13-423 or under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Section 13-423 requires a plaintiff relying on District business contacts to show that the defendants transacted business there and that the claims arose from that business.

Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt · filed 1982-07-16(b)

For this basis to apply, plaintiff must demonstrate not only that the defendants have transacted business in the District, but also that claims pursued by plaintiff arose out of the business transacted here.

Section 13-423 permits personal jurisdiction over defendants who transact business in the District of Columbia when the claim arises from that business, to the limits allowed by due process.

Eaton v. D'AMATO · filed 1980-05-01(a)(1), (b)

The applicable statutory provision is the District of Columbia long-arm statute, D.C.Code § 13-423(a)(l), (b), which permits a jurisdictional reach co-extensive with that sanctioned by the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a person transacts business in the District and the claim arises from that activity.

Hummel v. Koehler · filed 1983-03-03(a)(1)

This course of conduct provided an ample basis for the trial court’s finding that appellant transacted business in the District of Columbia for purposes of invoking jurisdiction over him under D.C.Code § 13-423(a)(l) (1981).

Section 13-423(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on a payment from a District of Columbia bank account when that connection is too remote and trivial to be a consequence of the defendant’s contractual activity.

Cockrell v. Cumberland Corp. · filed 1983-04-18(a)(1)

We hold that appellant’s writing of a check on a District of Columbia bank is both too remote and too trivial to be regarded as a consequence of any contractual activity by appellee. Thus there is no basis for invoking section 13-423(a)(l), and the trial court was correct in dismissing appellant’s action for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant purposefully conducts business in the District through employees or agents and the claim arises from that business.

Chrysler Corp. v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1984-08-29(a)(1)

The Court has found that Toyota is transacting business in this forum under Section 12; it additionally finds that Toyota has availed itself of the benefits of this forum through its contacts on the joint venture and that those contacts satisfy the requirements of 13 D.C.Code § 423(a)(1).

Section 13-423(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on a District lawyer’s limited communications about an agreement negotiated, executed, and performed elsewhere.

Mizlou Television Network, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co. · filed 1984-11-30(a)(1)

The agreement was neither negotiated nor executed and will not be performed in the District of Columbia, and the few communications from the District lawyer on behalf of FCSA to NBC or Mizlou will not draw the nonresident defendants within the sphere of this Court’s jurisdiction.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a successor corporation when claims arise from business its predecessor transacted in the District of Columbia.

Goffe v. Blake · filed 1985-03-27(a)(1)

Therefore, I find that Avanti clearly is subject to the jurisdiction of the District of Columbia courts with respect to Goffe’s claims pursuant to the “transacting any business” provision of the District of Columbia long-arm statute.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over nonresidents who purposefully obtain legal counsel in the District when the claim arises from their District contacts.

Law Offices of Jerris Leonard, P.C. v. Mideast Systems, Ltd. · filed 1986-04-07(a)(1)

Given that the Cosentinos purposefully availed themselves of legal counsel with expertise in government contracts law, they reasonably could have expected (and probably intended) that much of the legal work would have been performed in the District of Columbia. Thus it would not constitute unfair surprise to subject them to jurisdiction in this forum.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a claim arising from business transacted in the District even if that business ended before the suit was filed.

McDaniel v. Armstrong World Industries · filed 1985-03-14(a)(1)

First, the plain language of section (a)(1) does not require that the transaction of business occur at the time the suit is filed.

Section 13-423(a)(1) authorizes personal jurisdiction to the limits permitted by due process.

Chase v. Pan-Pacific Broadcasting, Inc. · filed 1985-09-12(a)(1)

As a result, our only inquiry with respect to section 13-423(a)(l) is whether exercising jurisdiction over the defendants would violate the principles of due process.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state client who seeks services from a District law firm when the firm’s fee claim arises from those contacts.

Fisher v. Bander · filed 1986-12-31(a)(1)

The District of Columbia long-arm statute provides in pertinent part that “[a] District of Columbia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim for relief arising from the person’s— ... transacting any business in the District of Columbia.” D.C.Code § 13-423(a)(l) (1981). ... Bander purposefully directed his activities at plaintiffs within the forum. He has presented no countervailing considerations to defeat jurisdiction. Therefore, the trial court’s order dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction must be reversed.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who transacts business in the District when the claim arises from District transactions; contacts may be imputed through a constructive agency relationship.

Brown v. Artery Organization, Inc. · filed 1987-02-24(a)(1)

In order to establish jurisdiction over the Artery defendants, none of whom is a resident of the District of Columbia, plaintiffs must demonstrate that these defendants have “transacted business” in the District within the meaning of D.C.Code § 13-423(a)(1) and that plaintiffs’ claims for relief arose from specific District of Columbia transactions. ... The Court concludes that Artery’s direct contacts with the District, and its indirect contacts, imputed as a result of its relationship with Cafritz, are sufficient to bring Artery within the purview of the D.C. long-arm statute, and that personal jurisdiction over Artery in this Court is thus fully established.

Section 13-423(a)(1) does not treat membership in a District of Columbia trade association as transacting business there for personal jurisdiction.

American Ass'n of Cruise Passengers v. Cunard Line, Ltd. · filed 1987-11-25(a)(1)

The first is § 13-423(a)(l), which confers jurisdiction over one who transacts business in the District of Columbia. Membership in a trade association, however, is not the equivalent of “transacting business” within the meaning of the long-arm statute.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over FBI employees working in the District of Columbia when their employment is tied to the alleged acts.

Rochon v. Federal Bureau of Investigation · filed 1988-08-11(a)(1)

Moreover, the business these defendants transact in the District of Columbia — their employment with the FBI — is directly tied to the acts charged in the Complaint. Thus, they satisfy both the “general” and “specific” tests for personal jurisdiction.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant negotiates, performs, or solicits business contracts in the District and the claim arises from that business.

Abramson v. Wallace · filed 1989-01-30(a)(1)

However, the conduct of negotiating, performing, or soliciting business contracts within the District has been held to qualify as “transacting business” for the purposes of the District’s long-arm statute. ... This standard, in conjunction with the requirement that on a motion to dismiss a court must view the jurisdictional allegations in the light most favorable to the non-movant, ... permits us to conclude that the court may properly exercise jurisdiction over defendant under the District of Columbia long-arm statute 13-423(a)(1).

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a claim arises from business the defendant deliberately transacted in the District.

QueTel Corp. v. Columbia Communications International, Inc. · filed 1991-12-17(a)(1)

Under the Mouzavires analysis, the plaintiff’s claims against the Cohen, Todd defendants arise from business that Cohen, Todd transacted in the district, sufficient to warrant personal jurisdiction over these defendants in this forum.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a person transacting business in the District of Columbia to the extent due process allows; incidental effects in the District of conduct directed elsewhere do not establish the required contacts.

United States v. Ferrara · filed 1993-05-28(a)(1)

Under the long-arm statute of the District of Columbia, an individual becomes subject to the jurisdiction of a District of Columbia court by “transacting any business in the District of Columbia.” D.C.Code § 13-423(a)(1). The “transacting business” provision has been interpreted to be as far-reaching as the due process clause allows. ... However, any effect that defendant’s enforcement of the rules of ethical conduct for the New Mexico bar has on the District of Columbia is, in this case, incidental, not deliberate.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a person for claims arising from business transacted in the District, but the plaintiff must allege factual contacts between the person’s activities and the District.

Dickson v. United States · filed 1993-09-08(a)(1)

The relevant portion of the statute provides personal jurisdiction over a person for claims arising from the person’s “transacting any business in the District of Columbia.” D.C.Code § 13-423(a)(l). ... Even under this “minimum contacts” doctrine, the Plaintiffs Complaint is inadequate. Here, the Complaint presents no factual connection between the individuals’ activities and the District.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a person for a claim arising from that person’s transaction of business in the District of Columbia, subject to due process limits.

Sunlite, Inc. v. BfG Bank AG · filed 1994-04-15(a)(1)

In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, the Court must accept Plaintiffs claims as true. However, in applying the jurisdictional requirements of this Circuit to the allegations in the Complaint in this litigation, the Court holds that Plaintiffs assertions do not satisfy the required standard for an exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendant.

Section 13-423(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction over out-of-state attorneys who send documents into the District at the plaintiff’s request without intending to transact business there.

Bank of Cape Verde v. Bronson · filed 1994-11-29(a)(1)

Defendants did not intend to transact business here when they complied with plaintiff’s request to have certain documents mailed to the Cape Verde Embassy and to the Bank’s counsel in the District of Columbia.

Section 13-423(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction when a defendant’s negotiations with a plaintiff’s D.C. lawyer and payment to that lawyer’s D.C. bank account do not show a deliberate association with the District.

Cellutech, Inc. v. Centennial Cellular Corp. · filed 1994-12-23(a)(1)

Defendants’ minimal contacts with the forum do not manifest a deliberate and voluntary association with the District of Columbia and simply do not rise to the level of transacting business within the District that is necessary to invoke the jurisdiction of our courts.

Section 13-423 does not treat retaining local counsel to defend a suit as doing business in the District for purposes of personal jurisdiction.

Staton v. Looney · filed 1989-02-02(a)(4)

The fact that the defendants have retained local counsel for the purpose of defending this case does not constitute doing business in the District of Columbia.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a corporate officer whose ownership and supervisory contacts show a deliberate and voluntary association with the District.

Katradis v. Dav-El of Washington, D.C. · filed 1987-01-13(a)(1)

Although the record on this issue is slim, the Court is constrained by the liberal reading of § 13-423 set forth in Mouzavires v. Baxter, 434 A.2d 988 (D.C.App.1981), to find that on the basis of the facts before it, exercise of jurisdiction would be appropriate under § 13-423(a)(l). From the record it appears that Klein’s contacts with the District of Columbia evidence a “deliberate and voluntary association with the forum.” Mouzavires, 434 A.2d at 995. Klein could reasonably anticipate being haled into court in the District of Columbia from his ownership and supervisory role in Dav-El D.C., making exercise of long-arm jurisdiction well within the bounds of due process and the D.C.Code.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a defendant when the claim arises from a contract signed and negotiated in the District with payments arranged through a District bank.

Clements Distributing Co. of Virginia v. Celebrity Products, Inc. · filed 1988-03-29(a)(1)

Where, as here, a contract was signed in the District of Columbia, attendant meetings were held in D.C. to negotiate and facilitate that contract, and one of the terms provided for deposits into a “lock box” provided by a D.C. bank, there can be no serious doubt that both the statute and due process considerations are satisfied by the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over the parties.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction based on business transacted in the District when the claim arises from that business and the defendant purposefully establishes sufficient District contacts.

Richter v. Analex Corp. · filed 1996-10-04(a)(1)

In order to establish personal jurisdiction under the “transacting business” provision of the District of Columbia long-arm statute, plaintiff must prove that (1) defendant transacted business in the District, (2) the claim arose from the business transacted in the District, and (3) the defendant purposely established minimum contacts with the District such that the Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction would not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction for claims arising from transacting business in the District to the fullest extent allowed by due process.

Shapiro, Lifschitz & Schram, P.C. v. Hazard · filed 1998-09-30(a)(1)

D.C.Code § 13-423(a)(1) provides that the Court “may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim for relief arising from the person’s ... transacting any business in the District of Columbia.” This provision provides for jurisdiction to the fullest extent permissible under the due process clause of the United States Constitution.

A single payment of an attorney’s travel expenses does not establish jurisdiction under § 13-423(a)(1) when it creates no substantial connection to the District of Columbia.

Shapiro, Lifschitz & Schram, P.C. v. R.E. Hazard · filed 2000-03-03(a)(1)

D.C.Code § 13-423(a)(1) provides that the Court “may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim for relief arising from the person’s ... transacting any business in the District of Columbia.” ... The Court finds that Colleen’s single act of providing a credit card to one of plaintiffs attorneys to cover some travel expenses does not create a substantial connection to the District of Columbia.

The transacting-business provision extends as far as the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause permits.

Flocco v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 2000-05-25(a)(1)

We have held, and Rust and Trosino concede, that the “transacting any business” provision of our long-arm statute extends as far as the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause permits.

Section 13-423(a)(1) requires purposeful business activity directed at District residents; a product reaching the District through third parties does not establish personal jurisdiction.

Holder v. Haarmann & Reimer Corp. · filed 2001-08-16(a)(1)

For the foregoing reasons, these contacts were insufficient under section 13-423(a)(1) to confer on the Superior Court personal jurisdiction over H & R.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits specific personal jurisdiction when a defendant transacts business in the District of Columbia and the claim arises from those business contacts.

Ulico Casualty Co. v. Fleet National Bank · filed 2003-03-31(a)(1)

Fleet’s contacts with ULLICO and its subsidiaries in this district directly relate to the subject of this suit: Fleet’s management of the plaintiffs checking account pursuant to its contract with ULLICO. Accordingly, as in Koteen, these contacts satisfy the requirements of the “transacting business” clause of the District of Columbia long-arm statute.

Section 13-423(a)(1) does not treat out-of-state federal officials as transacting business in the District of Columbia merely because their agency does business there.

Zakiya v. United States · filed 2003-06-10(a)(1)

Furthermore, the mere fact that the BOP conducts business in this district “and does so through its agents[,]” PL’s Opp’n at 8, does not amount to the out-of-state defendants having transacted business in the District of Columbia.

Section 13-423(a)(1)'s transacting business standard extends as far as the minimum contacts required by due process.

Digital Broadcast Corp. v. Rosenman & Colin, LLP · filed 2004-04-15(a)(1)

The “transacting business” standard is coextensive with the minimum contacts necessary to establish personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction when a claim arises from business transacted in the District; a District resident’s free music download can constitute such a transaction.

Arista Records, Inc. v. Sakfield Holding Co. SL · filed 2004-04-22(a)(1)

First, D.C.Code § 13-423 provides for specific jurisdiction because plaintiffs’ claim arises from defendant’s “transacting any business in the District of Columbia.” ... Thus even without considering the evidence offered in the declaration of Bruce Ward the Court can find that the download of music files by Henriksen constitutes transacting business in the District.

Section 13-423(a)(1) requires a federal employee’s own contacts with the District of Columbia; employment by an agency headquartered there does not establish personal jurisdiction.

Islamic American Relief Agency v. Unidentified FBI Agents · filed 2005-09-15(a)(1)

The plaintiffs claim that employment by a federal agency provides a basis for this Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a plaintiff who works and resides in Missouri under D.C.Code § 13-423(a)(1) is clearly contrary to existing precedent.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction only when the defendant transacted business in the District and the claim arose from that business.

Brunson v. Kalil & Co., Inc. · filed 2005-11-18(a)(1)

Based- on the fact that Plaintiffs claim did not arise from business transacted in the District of Columbia, this Court cannot have specific personal jurisdiction over Defendant Kalil, pursuant to D.C.Code §§ 13-423(a)(l) and 13-423(b).

Section 13-423(a)(1) does not permit personal jurisdiction based on unsubstantiated assumptions that a defendant’s products may have been used in the District.

Gonzalez v. Internacional De Elevadores, S.A. · filed 2006-01-31(a)(1)

Unsubstantiated assumptions about where a product may or may not have been used cannot be the basis for exercising personal jurisdiction over a non-resident corporation. ... Thus we cannot conclude that IDESA transacted business in the District within the meaning of the long-arm statute.

Subsection (a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when deliberate phone and fax communications directed into the District give rise to the claims.

FC INVESTMENT GROUP LC v. Lichtenstein · filed 2006-07-21(a)(1)

But giving due regard to all the alleged facts and circumstances of this case, the parties’ interactions and course of dealing, and the quality and nature of Mr. Lichtenstein’s contacts with the District of Columbia, the Court concludes that its exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendants comports with due process and with subsection (a)(1) of the D.C. long-arm statute.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident company when its contract negotiations and related activities establish substantial contacts with the District.

Overseas Partners, Inc. v. Progen Musavirlik Ve Yonetim Hizmetleri, Ltd. Sikerti · filed 1998-07-28(a)(1)

Negotiating or performing business contracts has been held to qualify as “transacting business” for the purposes of the District’s long-arm statute. ... Thus, the Court concludes that PROGEN’s connections with the District related to the MetroCity project are substantial enough to support the Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over it in this ease.

Section 13-423(a)(1) does not permit jurisdiction based solely on a manufacturer's sale to a national distributor when the manufacturer takes no additional steps to serve the District market.

Formica v. Cascade Candle Co. · filed 2001-01-08(a)(1)

Because defendant has not engaged in any additional conduct to “indicate an intent or purpose to serve the market in the foreign State,” defendant lacks the “ ‘substantial connection’ ... necessary for a finding of minimum contacts.”

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction for claims arising from a person's business activity in the District; allegations connecting that activity to the claim can justify jurisdictional discovery.

Wilson v. Wilson · filed 2001-11-01(a)(1)

Viewing the allegations in the complaint and the opposition together, we hold that they were sufficient to permit Mr. Wilson to conduct discovery in an attempt to confirm jurisdiction over Mrs. Wilson. D.C.Code § 13-423(a)(l) (1995) allows jurisdiction in the District over a person “as to a claim for relief arising from the person’s .'.. transacting any business in the District of Columbia.” ... The allegations concerning Mrs. Wilson meet this test.

Section 13-423(a)(1) requires a discernible relationship between the defendant’s business in the District and the plaintiff’s claim; conclusory allegations do not establish that relationship.

AGS International Services S.A. v. Newmont USA Ltd. · filed 2004-11-16(a)(1)

Thus, even if New-mont USA’s contacts could be appropriately considered in assessing whether they satisfy the transacting business requirement of D.C.Code § 13-423(a)(l), the plaintiffs have failed to meet this burden because they have made only conclusory statements to support the alleged existence of a “discernible relationship” between the defendants and the District of Columbia.

Section 13-423 permits personal jurisdiction over a person whose conduct gives rise to a claim through transacting business or contracting to supply services in the District of Columbia.

Jungquist v. Sheikh Sultan Bin Khalifa Al Nahyan · filed 1996-09-20(a)(1), (a)(2)

These alleged contacts with the District provide a sufficient basis for the Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the individual defendants under either the “transacting any business” arm or the “contracting to supply services” prongs of the District of Columbia’s Long Arm statute.

Section 13-423(a)(1) does not support personal jurisdiction based on contracts negotiated outside the District of Columbia.

Savage v. Bioport, Inc. · filed 2006-10-27(a)(1)

First, BioPort’s contract negotiations occurred outside the District of Columbia with DoD contracting agents in Fort Detrick, Maryland and Falls Church, Virginia. (Def.’s Br. ¶ 14.) This is not sufficient to support jurisdiction under the transacting business finger of the District’s long-arm statute.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction over a nonresident when the claim arises from the defendant’s business transactions in the District of Columbia; conclusory allegations and contacts with the federal government alone do not establish jurisdiction.

CITY OF MOUNDRIDGE, KS. v. Exxon Mobil Corp. · filed 2007-01-09(a)(1)

Under the District of Columbia’s long-arm statute, a court in the District of Columbia may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person outside the District if the plaintiffs claim arises from the defendant’s “transacting any business in the District of Columbia.” D.C.Code § 13-423(a)(1). ... Plaintiffs therefore have failed to meet their burden of establishing that Chevron-Texaco is subject to the court’s jurisdiction under the District of Columbia’s specific jurisdiction statute.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over nonresidents whose business activities in the District give them reason to anticipate suit there.

Fletcher v. District of Columbia · filed 2007-03-26(a)(1)

Given these circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude that the individual defendants engage in “business” activities in the District and certainly could have anticipated being haled into court here.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident whose business contacts with the District give rise to the claim and satisfy due process.

Heller v. Nicholas Applegate Capital Management, LLC · filed 2007-07-26(a)(1)

The District’s long-arm statute permits a court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant that transacts any business in the District of Columbia. D.C.Code § 13-423(a)(1). ... In sum, the Plaintiffs have not made a sufficient, showing that Allianz has minimum contacts with the District of Columbia adequate to permit the Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over it under the District’s long-arm statute and consistent with the strictures of the Due Process Clause.

Section 13-423(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on a single board meeting in the District that is unrelated to the claim.

NAWA USA, INC. v. Bottler · filed 2008-02-04(a)(1)

The D.C. long arm statute, D.C.Code § 13-423, authorizes the exercise of personal jurisdiction based on a defendant’s conduct in or directed toward the District of Columbia. ... The allegation of a single board meeting in the District is simply insufficient to establish jurisdiction.

Section 13-423(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction over a corporation based on its parent’s advertising when the corporation did not transact business in the District and no agency or alter ego relationship links it to the parent.

Jackson v. Loews Washington Cinemas, Inc. · filed 2008-03-27(a)(1)

On this record, appellant cannot establish that LWC “transacted business” in the District of Columbia within the meaning of the long-arm statute, D.C.Code § 13 — 423(a)(1).

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a defendant whose business contacts with the District satisfy due process, including sales through regional distributors expected to serve the District.

Quality Air Services, L.L.C. v. Milwaukee Valve Co. · filed 2008-07-21(a)(1)

The “transacting any business” prong of the District of Columbia long-arm statute permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the full extent authorized by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.

Signing a contract for services in the District on behalf of a nonexistent entity can count as transacting business under § 13-423(a)(1).

Gillespie v. Capitol Reprographics, LLC · filed 2008-08-29(a)(1)

Therefore, by signing the contract on behalf of a nonexistent entity, Mageno can be viewed as having transacted business in the District.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction based on business transacted in the District; a company’s District contacts may be attributed to a corporate officer who is more than an employee.

National Community Reinvestment Coalition v. Novastar Financial, Inc. · filed 2009-03-27(a)(1)

Because the “more than an employee” exception to the fiduciary shield doctrine applies to Anderson, NovaStar Mortgage’s contacts and transactions within the forum can be considered for purposes of personal jurisdiction. As described above, those contacts are sufficient to satisfy both subsection (a)(1) of the longarm statute and the requirements of constitutional due process.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when an attorney’s work involving District of Columbia property has a discernible relationship to a breach of fiduciary duty claim concerning that property.

Armenian Genocide Museum and Memorial Inc v. Cafesjian Family Foundation Inc · filed 2009-04-15(a)(1)

Because Section 13-423(a)(1) confers specific jurisdiction against a defendant, there must ... be a “nexus between the plaintiff’s claim and the defendant’s business activities in the forum jurisdiction.” ... The Court has little difficulty concluding that an attorney who represents a client in connection with the acquisition of real property in the District of Columbia can reasonably be expected to face a breach of fiduciary duty claim in the District of Columbia where the claim involves the same properties that were the focus of the representation.

Section 13-423(a)(1) requires more than an attorney-client relationship and contacts incidental to that relationship to establish personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state law firm.

Exponential Biotherapies, Inc. v. Houthoff Buruma N.V. · filed 2009-07-30(a)(1)

Plaintiff must establish more than the attorney-client relationship and contacts incidental to the attorney-client relationship in order to meet § 13-423(a)(l) and constitutional due process requirements.

Section 13-423 reaches the limits of due process, so personal jurisdiction under it depends on whether the defendant has sufficient contacts with the District of Columbia.

In Re Papst Licensing Gmbh & Co. Kg Litigation · filed 2008-12-11

The D.C. long arm statute is coextensive with the limits of due process, Helmer v. Doletskaya, 393 F.3d 201, 205 (D.C.Cir.2004), and so "the statutory and constitutional jurisdictional questions, which are usually distinct, merge into a single inquiry." United States v. Ferrara, 54 F.3d 825, 828 (D.C.Cir.1995).

Section 13-423(a)(1) does not confer jurisdiction based on participation in a District trade show when the defendant neither targets District residents nor sells services to them.

Citadel Investment Group, L.L.C. v. Citadel Capital Co. · filed 2010-03-31(a)(1)

In short, plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the Global Private Equity Conference, or Citadel Capital through its participation in the Conference, specifically targeted District of Columbia residents. Nor have they shown that Citadel Capital sold its investment services to District residents at, or as a result of, the Conference. Accordingly, the Court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction pursuant to section 13-423(a)(l).

Section 13-423(a)(1) does not support specific jurisdiction based on a defendant’s own conduct when the plaintiff alleges no actions by that defendant in the District.

Orellana v. CropLife International · filed 2010-09-23(a)(1)

... because no direct actions by CropLife E in the District are alleged, the Court finds that the plaintiffs have not met their burden of proving that specific jurisdiction can be exercised over CropLife E based on its own conduct.

Section 13-423(a)(1) does not establish personal jurisdiction over federal employees sued individually merely because their agencies maintain offices in the District of Columbia.

Akers v. Watts · filed 2010-09-24(a)(1)

The mere fact that they are federal government employees, affiliated with agencies headquartered or maintaining offices in this district, does not render them subject to suit in their individual capacities in the District of Columbia.

Section 13-423(a)(1) requires specific facts connecting the defendant’s business activity to the District; speculation about possible contacts is insufficient.

NBC-USA HOUSING, INC., TWENTY-SIX v. Donovan · filed 2011-03-31(a)(1)

In light of Lilley’s uneontroverted declaration and NBC’s unsubstantiated speculation, the Court concludes that NBC has failed to establish specific facts connecting Lilley with the District. ... Accordingly, the Court may not exercise personal jurisdiction over Lilley pursuant to subsection (a)(1) of the long-arm statute.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a defendant for a claim arising from business the defendant transacts in the District of Columbia.

Di Feng v. Lim · filed 2011-05-12(a)(1)

The factual allegations contained in Plaintiffs Opposition to Lim’s Motion to Dismiss do not carry the same weight as would an affidavit from Plaintiff; nevertheless, the Court finds them, at this stage of the proceedings, sufficient to support the conclusion that Lim transacted business in the District of Columbia and is thereby subject to the District’s long-arm statute.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant’s business meetings and locally performed contract amount to transacting business in the District and the claims arise from that business.

Lans v. Adduci Mastriani & Schaumberg L.L.P. · filed 2011-05-23(a)(1)

The Court is persuaded that the plaintiffs have a statutory basis for jurisdiction being exercised by this Court under section 13-423(a)(l). ... However, when these communications are combined with the business meetings that were conducted in the District of Columbia, along with Delphi contracting with a District of Columbia law firm to assist with the representation of Dr. Lans and Uniboard, and that contract ultimately being performed in the District by filing the patent infringement lawsuit in this Court, Delphi clearly conducted business in the District of Columbia.

Section 13-423(a)(1) requires a defendant to transact business in the District of Columbia for its business activity there to support specific personal jurisdiction.

Rundquist v. SE · filed 2011-07-20(a)(1)

In the present case, the Court need not address the second and third requirements, namely, whether plaintiffs claims arise from Vapiano SE’s contacts with the District and whether this defendant has sufficient contacts with the forum, because the current record does not establish that Vapiano SE transacts business in the District of Columbia.

Section 13-423(a)(4) does not support jurisdiction based on another entity’s conduct in the District without evidence that the defendant acts through that entity.

Tall v. COMCAST OF POTOMAC, LLC · filed 2010-08-09(a)(4)

Because the undisputed evidence demonstrates that Comcast of Potomac does not act in the District through another entity for purposes of section 13-423(a)(4), further jurisdictional discovery is unnecessary.

A third party's conduct in the District does not establish jurisdiction under § 13-423(a)(4) when the defendant does not control that party's activities there.

Tall v. Credit Protection Association · filed 2010-08-09(a)(4)

Tall also suggests that Equifax and the Credit Protection Association act in the District of Columbia as Comcast of Potomac's agents, and therefore provide the persistent course of conduct necessary for the Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Comcast of Potomac pursuant to ... section 13-423(a)(4). This is incorrect. ... In other words, there is no evidence that Comcast of Potomac controls Equifax's or the Credit Protection Association's activities in the District. ... Hence, Equifax's and the Credit Protection Association's activities in the District of Columbia provide no basis for this Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Comcast of Potomac.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction based on business transacted in the District by a defendant’s agent.

Plesha v. Ferguson · filed 2011-01-20(a)(1)

Because the long-arm statute explicitly authorizes jurisdiction based on the actions of an agent, the Court may exercise jurisdiction over Ferguson Inc. if Plesha can establish that Ferguson LLC was acting as its agent.

Subsection (a)(1) requires a defendant to transact business in the District to support specific personal jurisdiction.

Day v. Cornér Bank (Overseas) Ltd. · filed 2011-08-01(a)(1)

Accordingly, the Court finds that none of the defendants are “transacting any business” in the District as required by § 13-423(a)(1).

Section 13-423(a) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident whose deliberate activities in the District give rise to the claim and make it reasonable to anticipate defending the claim there.

Daley v. Alpha Kappa Alpha Sorority, Inc. · filed 2011-08-18(a)

Jurisdiction over them depends upon the application of the District’s Long Arm Statute and, more particularly, the provision that the District’s courts “may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim for relief arising from the person’s [ ] transacting any business in the District of Columbia.” D.C.Code § 13-423(a) (2001). ... In these circumstances, the participants could reasonably anticipate being required to defend their actions in the courts of the District without offending traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a claim arising from a defendant’s business in the District when that business establishes sufficient minimum contacts with the District.

Thompson Hine LLP v. Smoking Everywhere, Inc. · filed 2012-01-06(a)(1)

Thus, to establish personal jurisdiction under the “transacting any business” clause, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant transacted business in the District, the claim arose from that business, and the business constituted minimum contacts with the District such that the Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction would not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” ... After considering all of these materials in light of the key factors identified in the applicable precedents, the Court finds that plaintiff has not met its burden to demonstrate that defendants’ transactions here satisfy the minimum contacts analysis.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident for claims arising from business transacted in the District; a loan made and documented elsewhere did not establish that basis.

Atwal v. Myer · filed 2012-01-31(a)(1)

The District’s long arm statute permits a court in the District of Columbia to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant who does not reside in the District with regard to claims arising from the defendant’s “transacting any business in the district of Columbia[.]” D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(1). ... Here, Atwal presents no facts that establish personal jurisdiction over Myer in the District of Columbia. ... Neither Atwal nor Myer was a resident of the District of Columbia at the time that the original loan was made or when any of the promissary notes were executed.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction when a defendant’s business dealings in the District give rise to the suit; physical presence is unnecessary.

Johns v. Newsmax Media, Inc. · filed 2012-08-24(a)(1)

These facts establish that Newsmax “transact[ed] . . . business in the District of Columbia” sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction over Newsmax with respect to this suit.

Section 13-423 does not confer personal jurisdiction based on dealings with a federal agency in the District or an advertisement in a national newspaper that merely circulates there.

Ralls Corporation v. Terna Energy USA Holding Corporation · filed 2013-01-31(a)(1)

The Court holds Terna’s communications with CFIUS and its advertisement in national newspapers to sell Ralls’ collateral does not establish the required minimum contacts with the District to give this Court personal jurisdiction over Terna.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident whose contractual activities have consequences in the District and establish sufficient contacts there.

Federal Deposit Insurance v. US Titles, Inc. · filed 2013-04-17(a)(1)

The “transacting any business” subsection thus reaches US Titles if the D.C. consequences of the company’s contractual activities make the exercise of personal jurisdiction here constitutional. ... US Titles, in acting as closing agent, formed sufficient contacts with D.C. that it should have anticipated being haled into court here.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction based on transacting business in the District only when the defendant has sufficient contacts with the District and the claim arises from that business.

Hardy v. Northern Leasing Systems, Inc. · filed 2013-07-12(a)(1)

In the face of NLS’s arguments that it neither engages in persistent conduct aimed at deriving revenue from goods or services from the District of Columbia or transacts any business here, see Def.’s Mem. at 3, the plaintiff gives no indication that NLS has the requisite contacts, ties, or relation to the District of Columbia.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction based on transacting business in the District to the full extent allowed by due process.

Thompson Hine, LLP v. Taieb · filed 2013-11-12(a)(1)

Under the District of Columbia’s long-arm statute, courts located in the District may exercise personal jurisdiction over any individual who “transact[s] any business in the District of Columbia.” D.C. Code § 13-423. Because we have interpreted these words “to provide jurisdiction to the full extent allowed by the Due Process Clause[,] the statutory and constitutional jurisdictional questions, which are usually distinct, merge into a single inquiry”: would exercising personal jurisdiction accord with the demands of due process? United States v. Ferrara, 54 F.3d 825, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant for a claim arising from business transacted in the District, so long as jurisdiction complies with due process.

World Wide Travel Inc. v. Travelmate US, Inc. · filed 2013-11-15(a)(1)

This means that if a defendant transacts business here and a dispute arises from that transaction, he may be sued in the District so long as doing so would not violate the Due Process Clause.

Section 13-423(a)(1) requires a claim to arise from the defendant’s business activity in the District; a copyright registration there does not establish jurisdiction over a claim arising from an Idaho business arrangement.

Starkey v. Minor Miracle Productions, LLC · filed 2014-05-22(a)(1)

The key question, then, is whether Starkey’s claim arises out of this registration so as to satisfy D.C. Code § l3-423(a)(1). lt does not.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction based on business transacted in the District only when the claim arises from that business.

Turner v. Abbott · filed 2014-07-01(a)(1)

Although Defendant’s participation in litigation in the District of Columbia District Court arguably constitutes “transacting business” in the District of Columbia, this Court does not have specific jurisdiction over Defendant because Plaintiff’s claim did not arise from the business Defendant transacted in the District.

Section 13-423(a)(1) generally requires commercial activity to establish personal jurisdiction through transacting business in the District.

West v. Holder · filed 2014-08-05(a)(1)

The only provision of the statute that could potentially be relevant to Inslee’s contacts with the District is the “transacting any business” provision, subsection (a)(1). But contacts falling under the “transacting any business provision” usually must be commercial. ... Because he has not pointed to any contacts between Inslee and the District that fall under the provisions of the long-arm statute, this Court lacks specific jurisdiction over Inslee to the extent he is being sued in his individual capacity.

Section 13-423(a)(1) authorizes specific personal jurisdiction when the defendant transacts business in the District of Columbia and the plaintiff’s claims arise from that business.

Toumazou v. Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus · filed 2014-10-09(a)(1)

Determining whether D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(1) authorizes specific personal jurisdiction requires a two-part inquiry: (1) whether the defendant has “transacted business” in the District of Columbia; and (2) whether the plaintiffs’ claims “arise from” the business transacted.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant transacts business in the District of Columbia and the plaintiff’s claim arises from that business.

Associated Producers, Ltd. v. Vanderbilt University · filed 2014-12-23(a)(1)

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have presented sufficient facts to establish that Defendant Jensen transacted business in the District of Columbia within the meaning of D.C. Code § 13–423(a)(1) and that Plaintiffs’ claims arose out of this business.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over nonresident directors of a District nonprofit when their alleged conduct relates to the corporation, includes an act in the District, and jurisdiction comports with due process.

FAMILY FEDERATION FOR WORLD PEACE AND UNIFICATION INTERNATIONAL v. HYUN JIN MOON · filed 2015-12-24(a)(1)

“We have repeatedly reaffirmed” that the “transacting business provision [of the District’s Long Arm Statute] is coextensive with the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.” ... On the alleged facts of this case, we have little difficulty in concluding these directors clearly could anticipate being hauled into [a District of Columbia] court to account for their activities and that doing so does not violate notions of fair play and substantial justice.

Section 13-423 does not confer personal jurisdiction over a nonresident federal employee in an individual-capacity suit merely because the agency is headquartered in the District.

Hampton v. Comey · filed 2016-02-08(a)(1)

But “the mere fact that [a non-resident defendant] is an employee of the BOP, the headquarters office of which is in the District, does not render [the defendant] subject to suit in [his or her] individual capacity in the District of Columbia.”

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a claim arises from a nonresident’s transaction of business in D.C., including a contract for services expected to be performed there.

Xenophon Strategies, Inc. v. Jernigan Copeland & Anderson, Pllc · filed 2016-04-06(a)(1)

The plaintiff has, therefore, sufficiently demonstrated the basis for this Court to exercise personal jurisdiction pursuant to D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(1).

Possessing and using a social security number does not establish that a person transacts business in the District of Columbia under § 13-423(a)(1).

Barcroft v. Gibbs · filed 2016-07-06(a)(1)

First, the mere possession and use of a social security number is not enough to demonstrate that a defendant has transacted business in D.C.

Section 13-423(a)(1) allows personal jurisdiction over a person transacting business in the District when the claim has a discernible relationship to that business.

JACKSON v. GEORGE · filed 2016-09-22(a)(1)

Under the District of Columbia‟s long-arm statute (as in effect at the times relevant to this dispute, as well as now), a court in the District of Columbia “may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim for relief arising from the person‟s . . . transacting any business in the District[,]” D.C. Code § 13-423 (a)(1) (2001), if the claim raised has a “discernible relationship to the „business‟ transacted in the District.”

Section 13-423(a)(1) requires a plaintiff relying on another person’s business activity in the District to sufficiently allege an agency relationship with the defendant.

Gregorio v. Gordon · filed 2015-06-29(a)(1)

Second, even if the Court assumes that defendant Atherton’s co-defendants are responsible for the alleged harm — and further assumes that the Court has personal jurisdiction over the co-defendants, see infra n.5 — the plaintiff has not pleaded sufficiently an agency relationship between defendant Atherton and his co-defendants.

Section 13-423 permits jurisdiction over an out-of-District principal through an agent’s conduct in the District, but does not permit jurisdiction over an out-of-District agent merely because the principal is in the District.

Hourani v. Psybersolutions LLC · filed 2016-02-18(a)(3), (a)(4)

The long-arm statute does not provide for the reverse, that is, it does not permit personal jurisdiction over an agent who is outside the District of Columbia just because his actions are controlled by a principal located inside the District of Columbia.

Section 13-423(a)(1) does not permit specific jurisdiction based solely on filing a document with a federal agency in the District.

Beach Tv Properties Inc. v. Soloman · filed 2016-10-14(a)(1)

Because Haley Bader did not transact business in the District of Columbia in connection with filing the Statement of Eligibility, the Court cannot assert jurisdiction based on D.C. Code 13-423(a)(1).

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant transacts business in the District of Columbia and the plaintiff’s injury arises from that business.

Covey Run, LLC v. Washington Capital, LLC · filed 2017-03-28(a)(1)

Based on these facts, the Court concludes that Blackwell has transacted business in the District of Columbia, that Plaintiff’s injuries arise from that business, and that personal jurisdiction over Defendant Blackwell accordingly comports with the District’s long arm statute.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits specific personal jurisdiction when a defendant’s work under a contract substantially connected to D.C. purposefully targets people or entities there, even without physical presence in the District.

Xie v. Sklover & Donath, LLC · filed 2017-05-23(a)(1)

These various mailings, telephone calls, emails, filings, and negotiation sessions directly and purposefully targeted D.C.-based individuals and entities. In connection with the retainer contract, they therefore constitute “transacting . . . business in the District of Columbia” under § 13-423(a)(1), particularly under the expansive reading D.C. courts have applied to that provision.

Section 13-423(a)(1) does not treat entering into a family-law separation agreement as transacting business for purposes of personal jurisdiction.

Capel v. Capel · filed 2017-09-27(a)(1)

First,' Ms. Capel’s entering into the Agreement does not constitute “transacting business” within the meaning of the statute.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident for a claim arising from the person’s business transactions in the District, subject to due process limits.

McLaughlin v. Hartford Life & Annuity Insurance Company · filed 2017-10-25(a)(1)

District of Columbia law allows for specific personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants “as to a claim for relief arising from the person’s . . . transacting any business in the District of Columbia,” D.C. Code § 13-423, and this standard is “coextensive with the Constitution’s due process limit,” First Chi. Int’l v. United Exch. Co., 836 F.2d 1375, 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1988). ... These myriad connections tie Ms. Vidal, through the annuity contracts, to the District of Columbia, and thus the Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over her.

Section 13-423(a)(1) allows jurisdiction over a nonresident who transacts business in the District to the extent permitted by due process.

Ehf v. Bricklayers and Trowel Trades International Pension Fund Liquidation Portfolio · filed 2017-12-01(a)(1)

The transacting-business provision “has been given an ‘expansive interpretation’ rendering it ‘coextensive with the due process clause.’” World Wide Travel Incorporated v. Travelmate US, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Helmer v. Doletskaya, 393 F.3d 201, 205 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). This means that it “reaches out to non-resident defendants with as long an arm as the Constitution will allow.” Id. at 7.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction based on transacting business and reaches as far as due process allows.

Kaupthing Ehf. v. Bricklayers & Trowel Trades Int'l Pension Fund Liquidation Portfolio · filed 2017-12-01(a)(1)

D.C.'s long-arm statute, D.C. Code § 13-423, enumerates the kinds of contacts with the District that are sufficient to bring a non-resident defendant into a D.C. court, one of which is applicable here: "transacting any business in the District of Columbia." § 13-423(a)(1).

Section 13-423 permits specific jurisdiction based on transacting business in the District only when the claim arises from that business and the defendant has sufficient District contacts.

Trudel v. Suntrust Bank · filed 2018-03-22(a)(1)

Whether a non-resident defendant is subject to specific personal jurisdiction in this Court depends on whether its conduct satisfies the District of Columbia's long-arm statute, D.C. Code § 13-423, which in relation to transacting business here is coextensive with the due-process clause. ... Because Plaintiffs have not alleged that Gwynfe conducted any business in or had any contacts with the District of Columbia, they cannot clear the first three hurdles.

Section 13-423(a)(1) can treat business research conducted in the District as transacting business there.

Imapizza, LLC v. at Pizza Limited · filed 2018-09-24(a)(1)

Nonetheless, the Court concludes that, when all factual disputes are resolved and inferences are drawn in IMAPizza’s favor, some of Dhir’s contacts with the District qualify as business transactions under § 13-423(a)(1).

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a nonresident assignee only when the assignee’s own contacts with the District satisfy due process.

Brit Uw, Limited v. Manhattan Beachwear, LLC · filed 2017-01-26(a)(1)

From McGee, Johnson, and Farouki, this Court concludes that the applicable test for exercising personal jurisdiction over a non-resident assignee, when the assignee’s purported connection to the forum state stems from the assignment, is whether the assignee’s contacts with the forum state are sufficient to satisfy the minimum contacts requirement of the due process clause.

Section 13-423(a) permits specific jurisdiction when a defendant’s conduct has one of the listed connections to the District of Columbia.

Canuto v. Carter · filed 2017-08-10(a)

D.C. Code § 13-423 authorizes the exercise of specific jurisdiction under certain enumerated circumstances, including when an entity transacts any business in the District; contracts to supply services in the District; causes tortious injury in the District; or has an interest in, uses, or possesses real property in the District. ... As explained above, Ms. Canuto has not alleged that Cirrus has had any contacts with the District of Columbia, see generally Am. Compl., ECF No. 10; Pl.’s Opp. to Cirrus’ Mot., ECF No. 18; Pl.’s Surreply to Cirrus’ Reply, ECF No. 26, and Cirrus’ President’s affidavit confirms that Cirrus has absolutely no connection of any sort to the District of Columbia, let alone any connection that constitutes the conduct listed in § 13-423(a).

Section 13-423(a) permits specific personal jurisdiction only when the defendant’s conduct falls within a listed category and the claim arises from that conduct.

Nabaya v. Aber · filed 2018-03-31(a)

In addition, specific jurisdiction is proper only if the plaintiff’s claim “arise[s]” from the defendant’s alleged actions. ... Moreover, he has not pointed to any fact that suggests that any Defendant’s alleged conduct occurred in or had any effect in the District of Columbia.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction over claims arising from business transacted in the District; limited website interactivity may be insufficient to establish the required contacts.

12 Percent Logistics, Inc. v. Unified Carrier Registration Plan Board · filed 2017-10-18(a)(1)

Such limited “interactivity” arguably does not give INDOR sufficient contacts with the District of Columbia to constitute “transacting business” here. See Triple Up Ltd., 235 F. Supp. 3d at 28. Thus, having failed to show at this stage that Plaintiffs are substantially likely to establish personal jurisdiction over INDOR, the court cannot grant the injunctive relief that Plaintiffs seek against INDOR for that reason alone.

Section 13-423(a)(1) requires a plaintiff relying on a website to show that the defendant transacts business in the District; limited interactivity and uncertain use by District residents did not show a substantial likelihood of personal jurisdiction.

12 Percent Logistics, Inc. v. Unified Carrier Registration Plan Bd. · filed 2017-10-18(a)(1)

As relevant here, the long-arm statute permits District of Columbia courts to exercise specific jurisdiction over a person who is "transacting any business in the District of Columbia" and whose contacts with the District of Columbia give rise to the claim at hand. ... Such limited "interactivity" arguably does not give INDOR sufficient contacts with the District of Columbia to constitute "transacting business" here. ... Thus, having failed to show at this stage that Plaintiffs are substantially likely to establish personal jurisdiction over INDOR, the court cannot grant the injunctive relief that Plaintiffs seek against INDOR for that reason alone.

Section 13-423(a)(1) requires sufficient contacts with the District to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant for transacting business there.

United Therapeutics Corporation v. Vanderbilt University · filed 2017-08-15(a)(1)

Therefore, the Court concludes that United Therapeutics has failed to carry its burden of establishing that this Court can exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendants under section 13-423(a)(1) of the District of Columbia Code.

Section 13-423(a)(1) reaches nonresidents engaged in business activity in the District as far as due process permits.

Pinkett v. Dr. Leonard's Healthcare Corp. · filed 2018-10-29(a)(1)

Put another way, § 13-423(a)(1) reaches out to non-resident defendants engaged in business activity in the District with as long an arm as the Constitution will allow.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction over a defendant transacting business in the District through continuing ties with a District organization when the suit arises from or relates to those ties.

National Women's Political Caucus, Inc. v. Metropolitan Louisville Women's Political Caucus, Inc. · filed 2019-01-14(a)(1)

The D.C. long-arm statute, as most relevant here, authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction over any defendant “transacting any business in the District of Columbia,” D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(1), and this prong of the statute has been held to be “coextensive with the due process clause,” Xie, 260 F. Supp. 3d at 39 (quoting Helmer v. Doletskaya, 393 F.3d 201, 205 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). ... The subject matter of the litigation and MLWPC’s contacts with the District of Columbia are therefore sufficiently connected to support specific jurisdiction.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction based on transacting business in the District when the defendant's activities there establish purposeful availment.

Nat'l Women's Political Caucus, Inc. v. Metropolitan Louisville Women's Political Caucus, Inc. · filed 2019-01-14(a)(1)

It is evident that MLWPC's activities within the District of Columbia are ample enough to constitute purposeful availment.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a person for a claim arising from transacting business in the District, including representing clients there.

United States v. Lefande (In Re Deposition Lefande) · filed 2019-03-26(a)(1)

The District of Columbia’s long-arm statute gives the courts here jurisdiction “over a person” such as LeFande “as to a claim for relief arising from the person’s . . . transacting any business in the District of Columbia,” including the business of representing clients.

Section 13-423(a)(1) extends as far as due process permits when the relevant contacts arise from commercial or business-related activity.

Pinkett v. Dr. Leonard's Healthcare Corp. · filed 2019-05-06(a)(1)

The D.C. Court of Appeals has interpreted this prong to be “coextensive with the due process clause” when the relevant contacts derive from some type of commercial or business-related activity, as is the case here.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over claims arising from a contract for work in the District when the defendant purposefully connects itself to the District.

Maryland Digital Copier v. Litigation Logistics, Inc. · filed 2019-08-22(a)(1)

At bottom, the Court finds—based on Defendant’s contracting with Plaintiff to provide equipment and services in the District of Columbia to Defendant’s client, the fact that Plaintiff now seeks recovery for that performance, Defendant’s presence in the District of Columbia over the course of the contract, and Plaintiff’s communications with Defendant in the District of Columbia—that exercising jurisdiction over Defendant for Plaintiff’s claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment stemming from performance of the District of Columbia contract comports with the limitations of D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(1) and the Due Process Clause.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits specific personal jurisdiction over claims arising from a person’s business transactions in the District when the person’s contacts satisfy due process.

Targetsmart Holdings, LLC v. Ghp Advisors, LLC · filed 2019-09-19(a)(1)

District of Columbia law provides, in relevant part, that D.C. courts may exercise “so-called ‘specific jurisdiction’ over a person for claims that arise from the person’s ‘transacting any business’ in the District.” Gorman, 293 F.3d at 509 (citing D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(1)). ... GHP has sufficient “minimum contacts” with the District of Columbia to permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction here.

Section 13-423(a)(1) does not treat correspondence with a congressional committee and transmission of tax returns as transacting business in the District.

Trump v. Committee on Ways and Means, United States House of Representatives · filed 2019-11-11(a)(1)

But more importantly, the acts of corresponding with the Committee and transmitting Mr. Trump’s state tax returns would not constitute transacting business under section (a)(1).

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction when a claim is tied to a defendant’s business contacts with the District, including a settlement negotiated and signed there.

Parks v. Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco · filed 2020-01-27(a)(1)

To establish personal jurisdiction over the Bank itself, Plaintiffs once again look to D.C.’s transacting-business provision. See D.C. Code § 13–423(a)(1); Pl. Opp. to Bank & Officers’ MTD at 20. This time, Plaintiffs are on firmer ground, as they plainly assert factual allegations tying their claims to FHLBSF’s contacts with the District. They allege, to wit, that the Bank negotiated and signed the settlement agreement here. ... The Court thus concludes that specific jurisdiction is proper.

Section 13-423(a)(1) does not permit personal jurisdiction based solely on a client’s family members living in D.C. when the legal services were arranged and performed elsewhere.

Offray v. Harkavy,goldman,goldman,& gerstein,p.A. · filed 2020-06-23(a)(1)

Nothing in the record suggests that defendants deliberately set out to do business in D.C., avail themselves of the protection of its laws, or transact any business here. The Court therefore lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendants.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a person for a claim arising from business the person transacts in the District of Columbia.

Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes Division/IBT v. Union Pacific Railroad · filed 2020-07-01(a)(1)

Thus, Union Pacific transacted business in the District of Columbia within the meaning of D.C. Code section 13-423(a)(1).

Section 13-423(a)(1) does not treat personal visits, transportation, and incidental purchases in the District as transacting business when they cause no contractual repercussions there.

Agbara v. At&t Mobility LLC · filed 2020-09-10(a)(1)

His travel to the District of Columbia to drive Okoji and her baby home to Maryland, as well as his travel to Okoji’s office in the District of Columbia and his purchase of provisions there do not constitute “transacting business” for purposes of the long arm statute, which “permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction when a non-resident defendant’s contractual activities cause repercussions in the District.” Helmer v. Doletskaya, 290 F. Supp. 2d 61, 67 (D.D.C. 2003), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 393 F.3d 201 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). No such repercussions exist here.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits jurisdiction based on business transacted in the District only when the claim arises from that business.

Gather Workspaces LLC v. Gathering Spot, LLC · filed 2020-10-16(a)(1)

However, Section 13-423(a)(1) confers only specific jurisdiction and is limited to this purpose by Section 13-423(b), which prohibits the bringing of claims that do not relate to the acts that form the basis for personal jurisdiction.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant that transacts business in the District through a binding agreement tied to the District.

Peacetech Lab, Inc. v. C5 Accelerate LLC · filed 2021-01-12(a)(1)

This Court has specific personal jurisdiction over Pinard under D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(1) because Pinard is a signatory to the Gift Agreement. Through its representative, Pienaar, Pinard reached out to the District to do business with PeaceTech by contracting to provide funding to PeaceTech in exchange for naming rights over a space located in the District and other benefits.

Section 13-423(a)(1) requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant purposefully directed commercial or business activity at District residents.

Fay v. Humane Society of the United States · filed 2021-01-19(a)(1)

To establish that the Town transacted business in the District, plaintiff must show that the Town “purposefully engaged in some type of commercial or business-related activity directed at District residents.”

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant conducts business in the District and the claim arises from that business.

Safex Foundation, Inc. v. Safeth, Ltd. · filed 2021-05-12(a)(1)

Thus, two requirements must be satisfied for a claim against a defendant to fall within subsection (a)(1) of the District of Columbia’s long-arm statute: (1) the defendant must have conducted business in the District of ... Columbia, and (2) plaintiff’s claim against the defendant must arise from that business.

Section 13-423(a)(1) allows in-District conduct to count as transacting business even when that conduct is also tortious.

US Dominion, Inc. v. Powell · filed 2021-08-11(a)(1)

But Lindell misconstrues the law: while tortious conduct by a nonresident outside the District does not constitute “transacting . . . business in the District,” IMAPizza, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 112, a person’s in-District conduct can qualify as both tortious and “transacting business.”

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when the defendant conducts business in the District of Columbia and the plaintiff’s claim arises from that business.

Metropolis Special Police Department v. D.A.T.A. Management Consulting, LLC · filed 2022-01-06(a)(1)

Thus, two requirements must be satisfied for a claim against a defendant to fall within subsection (a)(1) of the District of Columbia’s long-arm statute: (1) the defendant must have conducted business in the District of Columbia, and (2) plaintiff’s claim against the defendant must arise from that business.

The transacting business provision reaches as far as constitutional due process permits.

Staggs v. Smith & Wesson · filed 2022-02-14(a)(1)

In fact, for cases that fall within the “transacting business” prong, the issue is one of due process alone. See Crane v. Carr, 814 F.2d 758, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that the “transacting business” clause is “coextensive . . . with the Constitution’s due process limit”).

Section 13-423(a)(1) can support personal jurisdiction over an out-of-forum defendant who joins a conspiracy with D.C. residents when a conspirator commits an overt act in D.C.

Pinson v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2022-03-09(a)(1)

A plaintiff can meet both the “transacting business” prong of the D.C. long-arm statute and the constitutional minimum contacts test by showing that an out-of-forum defendant participated in a conspiracy with residents of D.C. who took an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy in D.C.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant’s business transactions in the District give rise to the plaintiff’s claims.

US Dominion, Inc. v. Herring Networks, Inc. · filed 2022-11-07(a)(1)

These facts suffice to establish personal jurisdiction under § 13-423(a)(1) of the District’s long-arm statute, which covers, among other things, “‘business transactions’ in the everyday sense of commercial deal-making activities like advertising, operating office space, and performing contracts.” Smartmatic USA, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2022 WL 2208913, at *3.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over an entity that transacts business in the District of Columbia to the extent allowed by due process.

Aristotle International, Inc. v. Acuant, Inc. · filed 2023-02-02(a)(1)

Because the D.C. long-arm statute’s provision of jurisdiction over any entity that “transact[s] any business in the District of Columbia,” D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(1), extends as far as the Due Process Clause allows, the “statutory and constitutional jurisdictional questions . . . merge into a single inquiry: would exercising personal jurisdiction accord with the demands of due process?” Thompson Hine, LLP v. Taieb, 734 F.3d 1187, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted).

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over claims arising from business transacted in the District of Columbia, including through an agent; unspecified embassy coordination does not establish the required District contacts.

Rusesabagina v. Republic of Rwanda · filed 2023-03-16(a)(1)

The Washington, D.C., long-arm statute grants personal Jurisdiction over claims arising from a defendant’s “transacting any business in the District of Columbia,” whether in person or by an agent. D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(1). ... However, plaintiffs did not plead specific acts within the District of Columbia that would give a court of general jurisdiction in the District of Columbia jurisdiction over the Officials.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a contract claim when the contract has a substantial connection to the District, including its formation, subject matter, and contemplated performance there.

North American Company for Life and Health Insurance v. Hall · filed 2024-01-04(a)(1)

Under D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(1), a “District of Columbia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim for relief arising from the person’s . . . transacting any business in the District of Columbia[.]” ... A substantial connection exists if the contract was formed in the jurisdiction, the subject matter of the contract was tied to the jurisdiction, and the parties contemplated ongoing contract performance in the jurisdiction, including through monthly bills sent to an address in the jurisdiction. ... Those factors are present here and are sufficient to establish that Hall purposefully availed himself of the benefits and protections of D.C. laws and reasonably should have anticipated being haled into court here.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over claims arising from business transacted in the District when the defendant purposefully establishes minimum contacts there.

Verizon Trademark Services LLC v. Verizon Trademark Services LLC · filed 2024-01-12(a)(1)

The District of Columbia’s long-arm statute extends to claims arising from a defendant “transacting any business in the District,” D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(1), reaching “to the full extent allowed by the Due Process Clause” and thus personal jurisdiction is proper where a defendant had “minimum contacts” with the forum, i.e., “purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the [District], thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Thompson Hine, LLP v. Taieb, 734 F.3d 1187, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 2013). McMan did just that.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a defendant transacting business in the District to the full extent allowed by due process when the claim relates to its District contacts.

Tanya Mills v. Anadolu Agency NA, Inc. · filed 2024-06-21(a)(1)

Mills invokes the District of Columbia’s long-arm statute authorizing suit based on “transacting any business in the District of Columbia.” D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(1). Because the statute’s transacting-business provision authorizes “jurisdiction to the full extent allowed by the Due Process Clause,” Thompson Hine, LLP v. Taieb, 734 F.3d 1187, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Ferrara, 54 F.3d 825, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1995)), the statutory and constitutional grounds for specific jurisdiction here merge.

Section 13-423(a) requires factual support for a claim that a defendant transacted business in the District; a conclusory allegation does not establish personal jurisdiction.

Farah v. Government of the Republic of Somaliland · filed 2024-08-29(a)

Instead, he summarily asserts that the Organization and the U.S.-based individuals “regularly and actively conduct business activities in the District,” Opp. at 3, apparently attempting to invoke a provision of the D.C. long-arm statute that authorizes jurisdiction over claims “arising from the [defendant’s] . . . transacting any business in the District,” D.C. Code § 13-423(a). Plaintiff’s allegation is too broad and “conclusory” to satisfy Plaintiff’s burden to “make a prima facie showing of the pertinent jurisdictional facts.”

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a corporation only when the claim arises from its particular transaction of business in the District.

Li v. Li · filed 2024-10-29(a)(1)

As for specific jurisdiction, the District’s long-arm statute permits the exercise of jurisdiction over a corporation “as to a claim for relief arising from” its “transacting any business in the District.” D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(1). But any such claims must arise “from the particular transaction of business” in the District. See World Wide Minerals, Ltd. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, 296 F.3d 1154, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Here, the claims against the ICBC arise from actions that it allegedly took in China to sell property in China.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction based on business transacted in the District when the defendant’s conduct shows a purposeful connection to the District.

Central American Bank for Economic Integration v. Mossi · filed 2025-09-25(a)(1)

Though “a small amount of in-jurisdiction business activity”—even “a single act”—may “be sufficient” to confer jurisdiction under D.C.’s specific jurisdiction statute, the Court does not view Mossi’s involvement in the EV conference as “purposeful” enough to justify the exercise of specific jurisdiction.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over claims arising from a defendant’s business activity in the District, including an employment relationship centered there.

Alpine Consulting Partners, LLC v. Jacokes · filed 2025-10-17(a)(1)

This Court has jurisdiction under Section (a)(1) of D.C.’s long-arm statute, which permits the exercise of jurisdiction over a claim for relief arising from the defendant’s “transacting [of] any business in the District of Columbia.” D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(1).

Section 13-423(a)(1) requires a connection between the defendant’s business in the District and the claim.

Kung v. Democratic National Committee · filed 2025-10-20(a)(1)

Section 13-423(a)(1) is expansive, but it still “contemplates a connection that is related to the claim in suit.”

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant whose business in the District is sufficiently connected to the suit.

I.A.M. National Pension Fund v. Km Entertainment Consultants · filed 2025-11-14(a)(1)

Section 13-423(a)(1) of D.C.’s long-arm statute allows courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over out of state individuals based on their “transacting any business in the District of Columbia,” and the D.C. Circuit has said that this requirement is “coextensive with the Constitution’s due process limit.” ... The Court is also satisfied that I.A.M. has stated a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction.

Section 13-423 requires a claim based on transacting business in the District to arise from that business.

Olive Group Fz-Llc v. Afghanistan Civil Aviation Authority · filed 2026-05-05(a)(1)

The D.C. Code’s general long-arm statute, like the constitutional standard, requires a claim to “aris[e] from” a party’s “transacting any business in the District of Columbia.” D.C. Code § 13-423.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when the claim arises from conduct purposefully directed at the District of Columbia and exercising jurisdiction comports with due process.

Global Reach, Inc. v. Hawkwood Group LLC · filed 2026-05-13(a)(1)

In short, the April 13 tweetstorm tagging government officials in the District, other communications defendants had with plaintiff on March 16, 2016, and claimed to have with government officials in the District of Columbia, present an appropriate basis upon which the exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendants comports with the District’s long-arm statute, D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(1), and the binding precedent in Calder and Paxton.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a business whose District activities are connected to the plaintiff’s claim.

Atzili v. Islamic Republic of Iran · filed 2026-05-29(a)(1)

Because the Court concludes that the D.C. long-arm statute appears to provide personal jurisdiction over BAM and BHL, it does not address whether Rule 4(k)(2) applies.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over claims arising from a defendant’s transaction of business in the District, within constitutional due process limits.

Doe I v. Starbucks Corporation · filed 2026-02-17(a)(1)

Relevant here, the District’s long-arm statute, codified at D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(1)—which permits the exercise of jurisdiction over a corporation “as to a claim for relief arising from” its “transacting any business in the District”—“has been held ‘to be coextensive . . . with the Constitution’s due process limit.’” Forras v. Rauf, 812 F.3d 1102, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting Crane v. Carr, 814 F.2d 758, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). ... Plaintiffs also fail to allege facts showing that their forced-labor claims arise from Starbucks’s “particular transaction of business” in the District.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction to the fullest extent allowed by due process.

Reiman v. First Union Real Estate Equity & Mortgage Investments · filed 1985-07-17(a)(1)

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals having held that the D.C. long-arm statute permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a District of Columbia court to the fullest extent permitted to it under the Due Process Clause, the first question has been eliminated.

Section 13-423 permits jurisdiction over a business that extensively advertises to District residents when a customer's injury claim has a discernible relationship to that advertising.

Shoppers Food Warehouse v. Moreno · filed 2000-02-17(a)(1), (b)

Consistent with the trial court’s conclusion, we hold that the trial court properly exercised jurisdiction in this matter because appellant, through its extensive advertising activity in a major District of Columbia newspaper purposefully and deliberately solicited District residents as customers for its nearby Maryland and Virginia stores and thus transacted business in the District; and further, because Ms. Moreno’s claim was related to or had a discernible relationship to its advertising, Shoppers could have reasonably anticipated being haled into court to defend against a personal injury suit brought by a District resident. In short, Ms. Moreno met the requirements of § 13—423(b).

Section 13-423 permits personal jurisdiction based on substantial contract negotiations in the District when the claim arises from those negotiations.

U.S. Ship Management, Inc. v. Maersk Line, Ltd. · filed 2005-02-11(a)(1), (b)

As such, MLL’s contacts with the District of Columbia clearly amount to “transacting business” there. And because USSM’s claim in this case arises from those contacts, the District Court for the District of Columbia could properly exercise jurisdiction over MLL to hear this claim.

Section 13-423(a)(1) does not permit specific jurisdiction based solely on a nonresident defendant’s regular phone calls into the District of Columbia.

FC Investment Group LC v. IFX Markets, Ltd. · filed 2007-02-06(a)(1)

The Court concludes that defendant’s “regular” phone calls into the District of Columbia from elsewhere do not constitute “transacting business” in the District of Columbia. The Court may not assert specific jurisdiction over defendant based on such contacts alone.

Section 13-423 permits personal jurisdiction at the pleading stage when a plaintiff specifically alleges that a defendant advertised in the District to attract customers and that the claim arose from that advertising, if those allegations are uncontested.

Stocks v. Cordish Companies, Inc. · filed 2015-07-24(a)(1), (b)

Thus, at this stage of the case, the court concludes that Plaintiff’s specific, uncontested factual averment about Cordish’s advertising in the District of Columbia, and his allegation that his claim arose from that advertising, is sufficient under Shoppers Food to avoid dismissal of its complaint under Rule 12(b)(2).

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a lawyer for a client’s claim arising from the lawyer’s work before a federal agency in the District; the government contacts principle does not shield the lawyer from that claim.

Lex Tex Ltd., Inc. v. Skillman · filed 1990-08-22(a)(1)

In sum, one can hardly demand the right to come to the District of Columbia to pursue activities exclusively on behalf of an out-of-state principal and expect to be absolutely immune from suit here by that principal for causes of action arising directly out of the performance of such activities. The “government contacts” principle does not extend so far.