D.C. Code § 28-3905

Section 28-3905(k)(1)(F) permits a court to award any relief it deems proper under the CPPA, which may include rescission.

Hughes v. Abell · filed 2009-07-20(k)(1)(F)

Civil remedies available under the CPPA include "any [] relief which the court deems proper," which may include rescission. D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(1)(F).

Section 28-3905(k)(1) permits a person who brings an action seeking relief from an unlawful trade practice to recover reasonable attorney’s fees even when the action is voluntarily settled, and § 28-3905(k)(1)(F) permits recovery of costs as other relief the court deems proper.

In Re: Inphonic, Inc., Wireless Phone Rebate Litigation - Mdl-1792 · filed 2009-12-18(k)(1), (k)(1)(F)

The DCCPPA is not a federal statute, nor does it use the phrase “prevailing party.” Rather, the D.C. Council chose to permit recovery of “reasonable attorney’s fees” by those who “bring an action . . . seeking relief from” an unlawful trade practice. D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(1). Thus, the availability of fees under § 28-3905(k)(1) is not governed by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of a legal term of art that is not found in the statute. ... The Court concludes that § 28-3905(k)(1) does not bar the recovery of attorney’s fees and costs where, as here, the parties voluntarily settle the litigation. ... By obtaining monetary compensation in “satisfaction of all claims” (Settlement at 2 ¶ 1), plaintiffs have obtained “relief” for their alleged harms within the meaning of the DCCPPA. Thus, they may seek attorney’s fees and costs under § 28-3905(k)(1).

Section 28-3905(k)(2) permits prevailing plaintiffs to recover reasonable attorney’s fees for claims brought under the DCCPPA, but not for an unrelated common-law claim.

Kim v. Dp Capital LLC · filed 2024-09-20(k)(2)

Put differently, “the [DCCPPA] allows prevailing plaintiffs to recover” attorneys’ fees for any claim under the DCCPPA. Sloan v. Soul Circus, Inc., No. 15-cv-1389 (RC), 2015 WL 9272838, at *7 (D.D.C. Dec. 18, 2015) (emphasis added). But because Plaintiffs cannot prevail on a “claim under this chapter,” see D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(2) (emphasis added), they may not “recover . . . [r]easonable attorney’s fees” for an unrelated common-law claim, id. § 28-3905(k)(2)(B).

Section 28-3905(k)(2)(B) authorizes recovery of reasonable attorney’s fees, which may be included in the amount in controversy but are subject to non-aggregation when a public-interest organization seeks relief for consumers.

International Rights Advocates, Inc. v. Nestle USA, Inc. · filed 2026-02-05(k)(2)(B)

After all, the Supreme Court has long held that attorneys’ fees permitted by a statute “became part of the matter in controversy by the complaint, and not mere ‘costs’ excluded from the reckoning by the jurisdictional and removal statutes,” Mo. State Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 290 U.S. 199, 202 (1933), and CPPA permits recovery of “[r]easonable attorney’s fees,” D.C. Code § 28–3905(k)(2)(B). ... The fees generated to bring this claim are necessary to provide relief for the District of Columbia consumers, so the non-aggregation principle applies to plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees.

Section 28-3905(k)(1)(B) permits an award of reasonable attorney fees and costs without requiring the claimant to submit an accounting before the award.

Djourabchi v. Self · filed 2008-07-23(k)(1)(B)

First, plaintiffs request the Court to consider their claim for attorneys’ fees under D.C.Code § 28-3905(k)(1)(B). ... However, it is not necessary for a party seeking attorney fees and costs to submit an accounting to the court before such fees are awarded. ... Therefore, the Court will Grant the Plaintiffs’ request for attorney fees and costs in an amount yet to be determined.

Section 28-3905(k)(1) permits a plaintiff who obtains relief through a voluntary settlement to recover reasonable attorney’s fees, with costs available as other relief the court deems proper.

In Re InPhonic, Inc. · filed 2009-12-18(k)(1)(B), (k)(1)(F)

However, nothing in the text of § 28-3905(k)(l) requires that this success must be achieved by trial or court order. In addition, to interpret § 28-3905(k)(l) so as to make settlement a bar to recovering fees would discourage private counsel from bringing consumer protection actions and thus contravene the D.C. Council’s stated purpose. Therefore, the Court concludes that § 28-3905(k)(l) does not bar the recovery of attorney’s fees and costs where, as here, the parties voluntarily settle the litigation.

Section 28-3905(k)(1) authorizes treble damages and any relief the court deems proper, including potentially rescission, and its remedial purpose precludes an unclean-hands defense to a CPPA claim.

Hughes v. Abell · filed 2012-06-07(k)(1)(A), (k)(1)(F)

Accordingly, the CPPA expressly indicates that conduct may constitute a violation "whether or not any consumer is in fact misled, deceived or damaged thereby," D.C. Code § 28-3904, and provides for the recovery of treble damages, D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(1)(A). ... Hence, the doctrine of unclean hands should not bar Hughes' claims under the CPPA. ... Civil remedies available under the CPPA include "any [] relief which the court deems proper," which may include rescission. D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(1)(F).

Section 28-3905(k)(1)(A) provides damages of $1,500 per violation or treble damages, whichever is greater.

Cannon v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2012-12-10(k)(1)(A)

The Plaintiff’s argument misconstrues the limitations provided in the CPPA. The statute provides that damages shall be $1,500 per violation or treble damages, whichever is greater. D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(1)(A) (emphasis added).

Section 28-3905 provides treble damages or $1,500 per violation, whichever is greater, and permits a consumer who proves causation but cannot establish pecuniary damages to elect the $1,500 statutory amount.

Wells v. Allstate Insurance · filed 2002-08-12

Plaintiff also points out that the damages issue is simplified by the Consumer Protection Act, which provides for either “treble damages, or $1,500 per violation, whichever is greater, payable to the consumer.” D:C.Code § 28-3905. This statutory provision permits class members who are able to show causation, but cannot prove the amount of pecuniary damage suffered as a result, to opt for the default payment of $1,500.

The CPPA authorizes an injunction against an unlawful trade practice and permits recovery of $1,500 per violation, whichever is greater, as statutory damages payable to the consumer; the court applied both remedies to the plaintiffs’ proven violations.

Beck v. Test Masters Educational Services, Inc. · filed 2014-06-20(k)(2)(D) and (k)(2)(A)

The CPPA provides that, as a remedy for proven violations, plaintiffs may obtain “[a]n injunction against the use of the unlawful trade practice.” D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(2)(D). ... Applying the aforementioned factors to the present case, and finding that there are no genuine issues of material fact, the Court denies the plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive relief because they have failed to demonstrate that irreparable injury will ensue in the absence of an injunction. ... As an alternative to treble damages—which are unavailable to the plaintiffs because they have no compensatory damages—the CPPA permits recovery of “$1,500 per violation, whichever is greater, payable to the consumer.” D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(2)(A). ... The Court has granted summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ discrete CPPA claims and the default statutory damages are therefore appropriate.

Section 28-3905(k)(2) authorizes treble damages and reasonable attorney fees as remedies for a Consumer Protection Procedures Act violation; treble damages are measured by actual damages, and once any consumer damage is established no further findings are required.

Khalil v. El Rafaei · filed 2022-07-22(k)(2)

Of the possible remedies available under the statute, Khalil has requested treble damages, reasonable attorney fees and punitive damages. D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(2). ... Treble damages in lack of home improvement license cases in the District are measured by the Plaintiff’s actual damages, and not the disgorged amount. ... “‘[O]nce it is established that a consumer [has] suffered any damage, the CPPA authorizes [the] court to treble damages without further findings.’” ... Accordingly, as previously stated, the Court will treble the $17,600 actual damage award for a total actual damage award of $52,800. ... Accordingly, the Court will award attorney fees in an amount yet to be determined.

Section 28-3905(k)(2) contemplates equitable relief, repayment, and attorney’s fees, which do not necessarily require notice under the District’s rule for unliquidated damages.

May v. River East at Grandview · filed 2024-09-12(k)(2)

The equitable relief, repayment, and attorney’s fees sought by appellants, all contemplated by the CPPA, D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(2), are either liquidated damages or “fall outside the ambit of unliquidated damages.” Lindsey v. District of Columbia, 810 F. Supp. 2d 189, 202-03 (D.D.C. 2011).

Section 28-3905(k) allows individuals to seek treble damages, attorney fees, punitive damages, limited restitution, or injunctive relief for a business’s unlawful trade practice.

Search v. Uber Technologies, Inc. · filed 2015-09-10(k)

But Search does not seek relief for personal injuries under the CPPA; rather, in Count VI he seeks relief only under the Act’s private-enforcement mechanism, whereby individuals may be awarded enumerated treble damages, attorney fees, punitive damages, limited restitution, or injunctive relief, if a business is found to have engaged in a trade practice that violates the Act.

Section 28-3905(k)(1)(A) makes damages in a private attorney general action payable to the consumer, not the person bringing the action.

National Consumers League v. General Mills, Inc. · filed 2010-01-15(k)(1)(A)

To the contrary, CPPA provides that damages in a private attorney general action are “payable to the consumer.” D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(1)(A). Accordingly, aggregation is not proper.

Section 28-3905(k)(1), including subsection (D), permits a private-attorney-general action that is not automatically a class action under CAFA when the plaintiff has not brought a Rule 23 class action.

National Consumers League v. Flowers Bakeries, LLC · filed 2014-04-08(k)(1)(D)

The same is true of D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(1)(D). The Court therefore sees no reason to depart from the well-reasoned conclusion of Judge Bates in Breakman and Zuckman that removal is not permitted under CAFA’s class action provision for actions brought by a private attorney general under D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(1) where plaintiff has not brought a “class action” under D.C. Superior Court Rule 23.

Section 28-3905(k)(1)(D) permits a private-attorney-general action on behalf of a consumer or class of consumers, and that wording difference from subsection (k)(1)(C) does not prevent applying the non-aggregation principle when calculating the jurisdictional amount.

Earth Island Institute v. Bluetriton Brands · filed 2022-01-27(k)(1)(D)

Relatedly, while Defendant makes much of the fact that this suit was brought under D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(1)(D) — which permits an action “on behalf of the interests of a consumer or a class of consumers,” as opposed to “on behalf of the general public,” D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(1)(C) — it offers no compelling reason to think that this semantic difference is material to the applicability of the non-aggregation principle.

Section 28-3905(k)(1)(F) authorizes any relief the court deems proper under the CPPA, which may include rescission.

Hughes v. Abell · filed 2010-11-17(k)(1)(F)

Civil remedies available under the CPPA include "any [] relief which the court deems proper," which may include rescission. D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(1)(F). In addition, the Court's equitable powers allow it to quiet title in Hughes if Wells Fargo's actions warrant that remedy. Hence, it would be premature to dismiss Hughes's quiet title count while his unconscionability claim remains pending.

Section 28-3905(k)(1) requires a CPPA plaintiff seeking relief to have suffered damage from the use or employment of an unlawful trade practice, consistent with a concrete injury-in-fact requirement.

Silvious v. Snapple Beverage Corporation · filed 2011-06-27(k)(1)

In his amended complaint, plaintiff suggests that he has suffered no actual injury, see Am. Compl. ¶ 6, but, contrary to his apparent belief, “a lawsuit under the CPPA does not relieve a plaintiff of the requirement to show a concrete injury-in-fact to himself.” Grayson v. AT&T Corp., 15 A.3d 219, 244 (D.C. 2011); see Muldrow v. EMC Mortgage Corp. --- F. Supp. 2d ---, ---, 2011 WL 713681, at *3 (D.D.C., Mar. 2, 2011) (quoting Osbourne v. Capital City Mortgage Corp., 667 A.2d 1321, 1330 (D.C. 1995)) (“To obtain standing to sue for a violation of the DCCPPA, a plaintiff ‘must have suffered damage as a result of the use or employment of an unlawful trade practice.’ ”) (quoting D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(1)) (citing cases); Grayson, 15 A.3d at 238 (confirming “that the 2000 amendments [to the CPPA], viewed in the context of the legislative and drafting history of those amendments, do not reveal an explicit intent of the Council to erase the constitutional standing requirement to which [the D.C. Court of Appeals] has adhered during the past several decades”).

Section 28-3905(k)(1) requires a plaintiff seeking standing for a CPPA violation to have suffered damage caused by an unlawful trade practice.

Silvious v. Snapple Beverage Corp. · filed 2011-06-27(k)(1)

In his amended complaint, plaintiff suggests that he has suffered no actual injury, see Am. Compl. ¶ 6, but, contrary to his apparent belief, “a lawsuit under the CPPA does not relieve a plaintiff of the requirement to show a concrete injury-in-fact to himself.” ... (“To obtain standing to sue for a violation of the DCCPPA, a plaintiff ‘must have suffered damage as a result of the use or employment of an unlawful trade practice.’ ”) (quoting D.C.Code § 28-3905(k)(1)) (citing cases); ... (confirming “that the 2000 amendments [to the CPPA], viewed in the context of the legislative and drafting history of those amendments, do not reveal an explicit intent of the Council to erase the constitutional standing requirement to which [the D.C. Court of Appeals] has adhered during the past several decades”).

A consumer's CPPA claim seeking statutory or treble damages or an injunction for an alleged violation of the Act is sufficient to establish standing.

Jessica Velcoff, Ph.D. v. MedStar Health · filed 2018-06-21(k)(2)(A), (D)

With respect to the CPPA claim, Dr. Velcoff claims that MedStar violated its promise to protect her confidential mental-health information, and she seeks, among other things: (a) statutory damages of $1,500 per violation or treble damages, whichever is greater; and (b) an injunction to stop future unauthorized disclosures of confidential information. D.C. Code § 28-3905 (k)(2)(A), (D). Such claims under the CPPA suffice to establish standing.

Section 28-3905(k)(1)(C) authorizes a public-interest organization to sue on behalf of a consumer or class, but that authorization alone does not satisfy Article III’s concrete-injury requirement.

Clean Label Project Foundation v. Garden of Life, LLC · filed 2021-09-23(k)(1)(C)

The CPPA permits nonprofit organizations to bring actions “on behalf of itself or any of its members, or on any such behalf and on behalf of the general public,” and also allows “public interest organization[s]” to bring actions “on behalf of the interests of a consumer or a class of consumers.” D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(1)(C), (D). ... As the Court understands CLP’s rather muddled argument, CLP claims that fulfilling the CPPA’s statutory requirements is sufficient to create the concrete injury needed to establish constitutional standing. Pl.’s Opp’n at 5, 9–12. Not so. ... This means that a plaintiff bringing a claim alleging an infringement of a statutorily conferred right—like CLP here— must still show evidence of an injury that “affect[ed] the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” ... The same is true here. Absent a concrete injury, CLP lacks the required “irreducible constitutional minimum” to sue in federal court. ... To meet this constitutional minimum, CLP must do more than allege that Garden of Life has generally violated the CPPA by presenting misleading information—it must identify a concrete harm that accrued as a result.

Section 28-3905(k)(1)(A) allows a consumer to sue under the CPPA and does not bar that consumer from seeking class certification, but it does not give the consumer standing to seek damages for the general public apart from a class action.

Scott v. Apple Inc. · filed 2024-11-06(k)(1)(A)

According to Apple, this means that Plaintiff “lacks statutory standing to sue on the public’s behalf.” ... But a class action differs from suing “on behalf of . . . the general public,” and Apple cites no authority suggesting that an individual bringing suit under the CPPA as a “consumer” is foreclosed from seeking to certify a class. ... But to the extent Plaintiff purports to bring suit for damages on behalf of “the general public” separate and apart from his effort to bring a class action—and it is far from clear that he does—the Court agrees that he has failed to allege facts sufficient to bring such a suit.

Section 28-3905(k)(5) exempts nonprofit organizations from CPPA suits based on membership or membership services, unless the dispute arises from the purchase or sale of consumer goods or services in the ordinary course of business.

In Re Apa Assessment Fee Litigation · filed 2012-05-30(k)(5)

And in this case, that rule works no unfairness to plaintiffs, because they chose to pursue their claim in the District of Columbia – a jurisdiction that enacted a law providing that suits under the CPPA against a nonprofit organization "shall not be based on membership in such organization, membership services, . . . or any other transaction, interaction, or dispute not arising from the purchase or sale of consumer goods or services in the ordinary course of business." D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(5). As noted above, the parties agree that the APA and APAPO are both exempt from the coverage of the CPPA. Defs.' MTD at 25-26; Plfs.' Opp. at 25. The Court concurs in that view. Plaintiffs' claims are clearly based on "membership in such organization [and] membership services," not "the purchase or sale of consumers goods or services in the ordinary course of business." Hence, because the CPPA applies to plaintiffs' claims, those claims must be dismissed.

Section 28-3905(a) tolls the DCCPA limitations period when a complaint is filed with the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs, until the complaint is resolved administratively; a complaint to the Department of Health does not invoke that tolling provision.

Reese v. Loew's Madison Hotel Corporation · filed 2014-08-28(a)

The statute specifically provides for a tolling of the statute of limitations upon the “filing of a complaint with the Department [of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs] . . . until the complaint has been resolved through an administrative order, consent decree, or dismissal . . . .” Id. § 28-3905(a). Although the plaintiff alleges that she made a complaint to the District of Columbia’s Department of Health Community Hygiene, Compl. ¶¶ 26, 28, the plaintiff does not allege that she made a complaint to the District of Columbia’s Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs, which resides in a separate District of Columbia agency from the Department of Health, and the plaintiff does not assert any tolling is applicable under D.C. Code § 28-3905(a).

Private DCCPPA actions based on repeated allegedly misleading sales are timely for sales made within three years of filing, even if the same conduct began earlier.

Beyond Pesticides v. Monsanto Co. · filed 2018-04-30

"[T]he [DCCPPA] is subject to a three-year statute of limitations." ... Thus, Plaintiffs' claims cannot be dismissed as time-barred because, at the very least, claims regarding sales of Roundup in the last three years are timely.

Private citizens must bring claims under § 28-3905 within three years.

District of Columbia v. Exxon Mobil Corp. · filed 2022-11-12(d)(1)

Nor does the Act impose a statute of limitations on claims that the District may bring, but it does require a private citizen to bring similar claims within three years.

Section 28-3905(k)(5) excludes CPPA actions against nonprofit organizations based on organizational membership, membership services, or disputes unrelated to ordinary-course consumer-goods or services sales.

APA Assessment Fee Litigation v. American Psychological Assoc. · filed 2014-09-05(k)(5)

Moreover, the CPPA expressly provides that any “action . . . against a nonprofit organization shall not be based on membership in such organization, membership services, . . . or any other transaction, interaction, or dispute not arising from the purchase or sale of consumer goods or services in the ordinary course of business.” D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(5) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs’ claims fall directly within the nonprofit-membership exclusion.

Section 28-3905(k)(5) exempts nonprofit organizations from CPPA suits based on membership, membership services, or transactions other than ordinary-course purchases or sales of consumer goods or services.

Levine v. American Psychological Ass'n · filed 2012-05-30(k)(5)

In this case, the District has chosen to exempt nonprofit organizations from its consumer protection laws, except in circumstances not applicable here. See D.C.Code § 28-3905(k)(5). ... And in this case, that rule works no unfairness to plaintiffs, because they chose to pursue their claim in the District of Columbia — a jurisdiction that enacted a law providing that suits under the CPPA against a nonprofit organization “shall not be based on membership in such organization, membership services, ... or any other transaction, interaction, or dispute not arising from the purchase or sale of consumer goods or services in the ordinary course of business.” D.C.Code § 28-3905(k)(5). ... As noted above, the parties agree that the APA and APAPO are both exempt from the coverage of the CPPA. Defs.’ MTD at 25-26; Plfs.’ Opp. at 25. The Court concurs in that view. Plaintiffs’ claims are clearly based on “membership in such organization [and] membership services,” not “the purchase or sale of consumers goods or services in the ordinary course of business.” Hence, because the CPPA applies to plaintiffs’ claims, those claims must be dismissed.

Section 28-3905(k)(1) permits representative CPPA suits for damages, but those suits remain subject to Superior Court Rule 23 because the 2000 amendments did not clearly or explicitly displace the rule.

DONALD ROTUNDA v. MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC. · filed 2015-09-02(k)(1)

Like this court’s standing requirement, Rule 23 has been a mainstay of Superior Court civil practice for decades,11 the time-tested framework within which suits for damages by class-members “as representative parties,” Rule 23 (a), have been maintained. The detailed procedures it contains and the authority it invests in the court to administer them address the concerns of constitutional fairness and case management that arise in suits brought on behalf of potentially large numbers of absent class-members. As in Grayson, we believe that before the Council is understood to have abrogated or repealed the rule’s application to representative suits under the CPPA, it must be seen to have done so unambiguously — “clear[ly] or explicit[ly].”

Section 28-3905 ties CPPA statutory damages to consumer goods or services purchased or received, rather than to merely viewing an unlawful communication.

Sloan v. Soul Circus, Inc. · filed 2015-12-18(k)(2)(A); (k)(1)(A), (k)(1)(B)

It is true that a person can violate the CPPA “whether or not any consumer is in fact misled, deceived or damaged thereby.” D.C. Code § 28-3904. But the CPPA specifies that, for claims brought by testers and nonprofit organizations, damages claims may seek “relief from the use of a trade practice . . . when that trade practice involves consumer goods or services that [the consumer tester or nonprofit organization] purchased or received.” D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(1)(B) (emphasis added); see also id. § 28-3905(k)(1)(C) (using nearly identical language). The statute implies therefore that CPPA statutory damages awards flow from a purchase or receipt of consumer goods or services—not the mere observation of a merchant’s unlawful communication.

Section 28-3905(k)(1)(C) allows a nonprofit organization to sue on behalf of itself, its members, or the general public for relief from a trade practice violating District law, without proceeding as a class action.

Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Hormel Foods Corporation · filed 2017-04-05(k)(1)(C)

Plaintiff did not bring this case under District of Columbia Superior Court Rule of Civil Procedure 23, but instead under D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(1)(C), which states that “[a] nonprofit organization may, on behalf of itself or any of its members, or on any such behalf and on behalf of the general public, bring an action seeking relief from the use of a trade practice in violation of a law of the District . . . ” This D.C. Code section does not require class proceedings and is a “separate and distinct procedural vehicle from a class action,” to which CAFA does not apply.

Section 28-3905(k)(1)(C) allows a nonprofit organization to sue on behalf of the general public only when it also sues on behalf of itself or one of its members and alleges an injury to itself or its members.

Beyond Pesticides v. Dr Pepper Snapple Group, Inc. · filed 2019-07-01(k)(1)(C)

Indeed, Beyond Pesticides apparently misreads § 28-3905: it only allows an organization to sue on the public’s behalf if it also alleges an injury to itself or to its members. See § 28-3905(k)(1)(C) (“A nonprofit organization may, on behalf of itself or any of its members, or on any such behalf and on behalf of the general public, bring an action seeking relief from the use of a trade practice in violation of a law of the District . . . .” (emphasis added)).

Section 28-3905(k)(1)(A)(C) authorizes a nonprofit organization to sue on behalf of itself or its members for relief from a trade practice violating District law, including one involving consumer goods or services it purchased.

UNIFORMED FIRE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION FAMILY PROTECTION PLAN LOCAL 854 v. AMARIN PHARMA, INC. · filed 2023-02-23(k)(1)(A)(C)

D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(1)(A)(C) indeed authorizes suits by “[a] nonprofit organization [], on behalf of itself or any of its members . . . [to] bring an action seeking relief from the use of a trade practice in violation of a law of the District, including a violation involving consumer goods or services that the organization purchased . . . .” The Consolidated Complaint clearly asserts IPPs’ status as non-profits. (CC ¶¶ 11–16, 251. Accordingly, the Court concludes that IPPs have standing to bring their consumer protection suits in the District of Columbia. See Remicade, 345 F. Supp. 3d at 588.

Section 28-3905(k)(1)(D) lets a public interest organization sue on behalf of a consumer or class without showing its own traditional Article III standing, if the consumer or class could sue and the organization has a sufficient nexus to adequately represent those interests.

Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Hormel Corp. · filed 2021-09-02(k)(1)(D)

We agree with ALDF on its first point. The CPPA confers standing upon “public interest organization[s]” bringing suit “on behalf of the interests of a consumer or a class of consumers,” so long as they have a “sufficient nexus” to “adequately represent those interests.” D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(1)(D). That recent addition to the CPPA conveys a clear legislative intent to modify Article III’s strictures with a statutory test governing public interest organizations’ standing to bring a CPPA claim. Because ALDF meets that statutory test, it has standing to sue without regard to whether it also satisfies traditional Article III standing requirements.

Section 28-3905(k)(1)(D) permits a public-interest organization to sue on behalf of a consumer or class when it identifies the consumers and has a sufficient nexus to their interests to adequately represent them; a nexus to particular consumers is not required.

Center for Inquiry, Inc. v. Walmart, Inc. & Center for Inquiry, Inc. v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc. · filed 2022-09-29(k)(1)(D)(i)-(ii)

Further, CFI’s complaints adequately identify the class of consumers it seeks to represent as District of Columbia customers to whom Walmart or CVS markets homeopathic products. ... Finally, whether appellees’ challenge to CFI’s standing is viewed as facial or factual, we are satisfied that CFI both has, and has alleged, a sufficient stake in this CPPA action to pursue it zealously. ... And while CFI has not shown a nexus to or relationship with any particular consumers, the statute makes it enough that CFI has a “nexus to the interests involved of the consumer” so as “to adequately represent those interests.” 6 § 28-3905(k)(1)(D)(ii). For all the foregoing reasons, we conclude that CFI has standing.

Section 28-3905(k)(1)(D) allows a qualifying public-interest organization to sue on behalf of consumers in D.C. courts without alleging its own injury, but the D.C. Council provision does not eliminate federal Article III member-participation requirements for associational standing.

Travelers United, Inc. v. Hyatt Hotels Corporation · filed 2025-01-03(k)(1)(D)

First, the CPPA provision creating Travelers United’s cause of action and giving it the right to sue for damages on behalf of individual consumers does not abrogate the member-participation requirement for associational standing because it is an act of the D.C. Council, not of Congress.

Section 28-3905(k)(1)(D)(i) allows a public interest organization to sue on behalf of a consumer or class of consumers without alleging an Article III injury.

Breathe Dc v. Swedish Match North America LLC · filed 2025-09-29(k)(1)(D)(i)

But it did not have to do so to file in Superior Court—rather, it relied on the statutory standing provided for in the CPPA that does not require such an injury. D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(1)(D)(i) (“[A] public interest organization may, on behalf of the interests of a consumer or a class of consumers, bring an action seeking relief.”); see Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Hormel, 258 A.3d 174, (D.C. 2021) (finding that provision (k)(1)(D) of D.C. Code § 28-3905 “modif[ies] Article III’s doctrinal requirements with a more expansive statutory test”).

Section 28-3905(k)(1)(D)(ii) permits a public interest organization to sue on consumers’ behalf when it has a sufficient nexus to their interests, without satisfying Article III standing requirements.

Mighty Earth v. Jbs USA Food Company · filed 2026-03-16(k)(1)(D)(ii)

And of course, Hormel holds that Article III standing is unnecessary in the specific context of claims brought under § 28-3905(k)(1)(D) in Superior Court. This Court is thus bound by those rulings, which collectively foreclose JBS’s argument that the Reorganization Act mandates the Article III “cases” or “controversies” requirement.

Section 28-3905(k)(1)(A) permits a consumer, including one who receives rather than purchases services, to bring a private action for relief from a trade practice violating District of Columbia law.

Mann v. Capital Health Care Associates, Inc. · filed 2017-04-27(k)(1)(A)

Section 28-3905(k)(1)(A), which authorizes private plaintiffs to bring suits, states that “[a] consumer may bring an action seeking relief from the use of a trade practice in violation of a law of the district.” D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(1)(A). The “definitions” section states that “‘consumer’ means . . . a person who . . . does or would purchase, lease (as lessee) or receive consumer goods or services . . . .” Id. § 28-3901(a)(2)(A). The Act’s inclusion of both those who “purchase” and those who “receive” products and services within the definition of “consumer” makes it plain that a plaintiff need not actually pay for the services herself to claim the protections of the Act.

Section 28-3905(k)'s private right of action is subject to the limitations in § 28-3903(c)(2), so a public interest organization may not sue a person subject to Public Service Commission regulation under the CPPA.

Client Earth v. Washington Gas Light Company · filed 2025-09-04(k)(1)(D)(i)

For the reasons stated above, we conclude that we continue to be bound by the holding of Gomez that the limitations in Section 28-3903(c)(2) apply not only to the Department’s adjudicative authority, as the plain language of the statute suggests, but also to the private right of action under Section 28-3905(k).

Section 28-3905(k)(1) allows an aggrieved person to sue under the CPPA whether or not the person was damaged and provides statutory, actual, punitive, and other relief as specified by the statute.

Murray v. Motorola, Inc. · filed 2009-12-10(k)(1)

The unlawful trade practices described in the CPPA, see D.C.Code § 28-3904, entitle an aggrieved person to sue for relief (under D.C.Code § 28-3905(k)(1)) “whether or not [plaintiffs were] ... damaged thereby.” D.C.Code § 28-3904. Under section 28-3905(k)(1)(A)(F), a successful CPPA plaintiff may recover statutory damages of $1,500 per violation (or, if greater, trebled actual damages) as well as punitive damages and other relief.

Section 28-3905(k)(1)(B) permits an individual to bring a DCCPPA claim for injunctive relief on behalf of the general public without thereby making the action a Rule 23 class action for CAFA purposes.

Hackman v. One Brands LLC · filed 2019-04-01(k)(1)(B)

As has already been explained, Plaintiff filed suit under the DCCPPA, not under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor under Rule 23 of the D.C. Superior Court Rules. And, “the DCCPPA [does not] qualify as a statute similar to Rule 23 that itself carries the requisite procedural safeguards.” Zuckman, 958 F. Supp. 2d at 305. If, at the motion-to-dismiss stage, a court concludes that Plaintiff’s claim must be treated as a class action, then that court can dismiss Plaintiff’s DCCPPA claim. See Rotunda, 123 A.3d at 981 (affirming dismissal because the plaintiff sought money damages for the general public under the DCCPPA without complying with the procedures of Rule 23). But, this Court cannot simply convert Plaintiff’s claim into a class action, capable of attaining jurisdiction under CAFA, when Plaintiff has specifically disclaimed any intention for class certification. Zuckman, 958 F. Supp. 2d at 305.

Section 28-3905(k)(1)(B) permits an individual to bring a private-attorney-general action without making it a Rule 23 class action for CAFA purposes.

Zuckman v. Monster Beverage Corporation · filed 2013-08-06(k)(1)(B)

As this Court has previously recognized, “[t]he DCCPPA specifically authorizes a private attorney general suit without any reference to class action requirements.” Breakman, 545 F. Supp. 2d at 101. ... Hence, his case does not qualify as a class action under the Class Action Fairness Act, and the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction pursuant to that statute.

Section 28-3905(k)(1)(C) permits a nonprofit organization to sue for itself, its members, or the general public, while § 28-3905(k)(1)(D)(i) permits a public interest organization to sue on behalf of a consumer or class of consumers for relief from an unlawful trade practice.

Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc. · filed 2020-03-05(k)(1)(C), (k)(1)(D)(i)

This argument is meritless. Plaintiffs plainly seek relief for more than just themselves. Plaintiffs invoke D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(1)(C), which states that “[a] nonprofit organization may, on behalf of itself or any of its members, or on any such behalf and on behalf of the general public, bring an action,” and D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(1)(D)(i), which entitles a public interest organization to, “on behalf of the interests of a consumer or a class of consumers, bring an action seeking relief from the use by any person of a trade practice in violation of a law of the District.” Compl. ¶¶ 11–12. ... These allegations plausibly establish that consumers in the District of Columbia in general, not just Plaintiffs and their members, have been misled by Defendant’s marketing and would benefit from the requested injunction.

Section 28-3905(k)(l) authorizes actions under the CPPA only by or on behalf of aggrieved consumers.

Ford v. ChartOne, Inc. · filed 2006-09-28(k)(l)

Thus, civil actions under D.C.Code § 28-3905(k)(l), the provision of the CPPA pursuant to which Ford sued ChartOne, may be brought only by (or on behalf of) aggrieved consumers.

Section 28-3905(k)(1) allows a person to bring an action under the DCCPPA seeking relief from any person's use of a trade practice that violates District law.

Ali v. MID-ATLANTIC SETTLEMENT SERVICES, INC. · filed 2009-07-17(k)(1)

Under D.C.Code § 28-3905(k)(1), “a person, whether acting for the interests of itself, its members or the general public, may bring an action under this chapter ... seeking relief from the use by any person of a trade practice in violation of a law of the District of Columbia” (emphasis added). Courts have held that the DCCPPA “was designed to police trade practices arising only out of consumer-merchant relationships.”

Section 28-3905(k)(l) allows any person, including someone acting for their own interests, to bring a CPPA action in Superior Court seeking relief from an unlawful trade practice.

Wetzel v. Capital City Real Estate, LLC · filed 2013-08-15(k)(l)

“Any person,” “whether acting for the interests of itself ... or the general public, may bring an action under [the CPPA] in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia seeking relief from the use by any person of a trade practice in violation of a law of the District of Columbia.” D.C.Code § 28-3905(k)(l) (2009) (emphasis added). Thus, both appellant Wetzel and appellant Rushbrook are able to make claims against appellee under the CPPA.

Section 28-3905(k)(1)(D) authorizes a public interest organization to bring an action on behalf of a consumer or class of consumers, but it does not require the action to proceed as a Rule 23 class action; the DCCPPA lacks equivalent procedural safeguards for CAFA purposes.

Toxin Free USA v. the J.M. Smucker Company · filed 2020-11-30(k)(1)(D)

To be sure, § 28-3905(k)(1)(D) of the DCCPPA authorizes class actions, but it does not require them. See Nat’l Consumers League v. Bimbo Bakeries USA, 46 F. Supp. 3d 64, 76 n.5 (D.D.C. 2014). The DCCPPA lacks the “requisite procedural safeguards” to qualify as a state statute sufficiently equivalent to Rule 23 as required by CAFA, Zuckman, 958 F. Supp. 2d at 305, and as a result, “removal is not permitted under CAFA’s class action provision for actions brought by a private attorney general under D.C. Code § 28–3905(k)(1)” when the action is “not brought [as] a class action under D.C. Superior Court Rule 23,” Flowers Bakeries, LLC, 36 F. Supp. 3d at 36.

Section 28-3905(k)(1) permits consumer-protection suits as private attorney-general actions; an injunctive suit under it is not a CAFA class action, and injunction-compliance costs must be divided among the beneficiaries when calculating the amount in controversy.

Beyond Pesticides v. Exxon Mobil Corporation · filed 2021-03-22(k)(1)

And in suits brought under D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(1), like this one, courts in this District have consistently applied the non-aggregation principle to hold that, if a purported amount in controversy is calculated by reference to a defendant’s cost of compliance with an injunction, the total cost of compliance must be divided by the number of the injunction’s beneficiaries. ... And as it argues, courts in this District have consistently—and persuasively—concluded that suits on behalf of consumers brought under the DCCPPA, including under § 28-3905(k)(1)(D), are “private attorney general suits” and not class actions as defined by CAFA, in cases “where [a] plaintiff has not brought a ‘class action’ under D.C. Superior Court Rule 23.”

The 2019 amendments' private right of action and enhanced remedies cannot be applied retroactively to pre-amendment conduct because they increase landlords' liability.

Sizer v. Velasquez · filed 2022-02-24(k)(6), (k)(2)(A)(I)

In this case, the amendment to the CPPA allowing a private right of action also changed the financial consequences for landlords. Whereas landlords faced with a lawsuit by the Attorney General may be required to pay “economic damages” and limited financial penalties (not more than $5,000 for each initial violation of enumerated sections; not more than $10,000 for subsequent violations, D.C. Code § 28-3909(b)(1)–(2) (2021 Supp.)), a landlord sued by private action may be required to pay each tenant $1,500 per violation or treble damages, whichever is greater; punitive damages; and “[a]ny other relief which the court determines proper.” D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(2)(A)(I)–(II) (2021 Supp.). ... In the absence of any argument by Ms. Sizer and Mr. Michelman addressing how the increased liabilities under the 2019 Amendment to the CPPA would survive a retroactivity analysis under Landgraf, we conclude that application of the statute as amended to the landlords’ 2017 conduct would be impermissibly retroactive.

Section 28-3905(k)(1)(C) allows a nonprofit public-interest organization to sue as a private attorney general for the general public, and a representative action seeking only injunctive relief need not comply with Rule 23; a citation to (k)(2)(B)–(F) does not itself make the action one seeking consumer money damages.

Clean Label Project Foundation v. Abbott Laboratories · filed 2022-05-25(k)(1)(C), (k)(2)(B)–(F)

Plaintiff brings this case under D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(1)(C)–(D) as a nonprofit public interest organization on behalf of itself and, acting in the capacity of a private attorney general, “the general public of the District of Columbia.” Compl. ¶¶ 46, 55–56, 123. ... The analysis that follows, confirmed by persuasive authority, leads to the conclusions that Rule 23’s requirements need not apply to such actions, CAFA does not provide a basis for federal jurisdiction over such actions, and this case is not converted into a federal class action simply by seeking injunctive relief for consumers. Accordingly, this case is not a “class action” for CAFA purposes.

Section 28-3905(k)(1) allows a person to bring a CPPA claim on behalf of the general public even if that person did not own the vehicle when the alleged injury occurred.

Snowder v. District of Columbia · filed 2008-06-05(k)(1)

Ms. Garrick’s CPPA claim against the towing companies remains. Though she did not own the vehicle at the time of the alleged injury, she can bring a CPPA claim on behalf of the general public. See D.C.Code § 28-3905(k)(1).

Section 28-3905(k)(5) does not exempt a nonprofit university’s undergraduate educational services from CPPA coverage as “training or credentialing activities” or “membership services”; those terms generally refer to professional or organizational activities.

Qureshi v. American University · filed 2023-03-07(k)(5)

In light of that context, it makes sense to read “training or credentialing activities” to encompass conduct like professional licensing, career training, apprenticeships, or accreditation activities, but not necessarily undergraduate education. ... The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiffs’ claims do not fall within the limited nonprofit carve-out in § 28-3905(k)(5).

Section 28-3905(k)(1) requires the cost of requested injunctive relief in a private-attorney-general action brought for D.C. consumers to be divided among those consumers when measuring the amount in controversy.

Breathe Dc v. Juul Labs, Inc. · filed 2023-07-13(k)(1)

Standing by its prior holding, and persuaded by the thoughtful opinions penned by its numerous colleagues who have tackled this issue, the Court again “concludes that the appropriate measure of the requested injunctive relief is not the amount that [Defendant] must spend to comply with the injunction, but that amount divided by the number of members of the public on whose behalf Plaintiff brings the action.” Inst. for Truth in Mktg., 321 F. Supp. 3d at 91; Earth Island Inst., 583 F. Supp. 3d at 110.

Section 28-3905(k)(1) authorizes a public-interest organization to sue on its own behalf and for the District’s general public, and in such a representative action the defendant’s compliance costs are apportioned among the represented population when calculating diversity jurisdiction.

International Rights Advocates v. Mars, Incorporated · filed 2025-03-13(k)(1)

D.C.’s legislature made the conscious decision to include a private attorney general provision in the DCCPPA. A plaintiff’s choice to invoke that provision, and thus bring about its attendant jurisdictional consequences, is not some random accident of fate or act of nature; it is the exercise of a right conferred by representative democratic processes, of the sort that courts must ordinarily respect. ... In sum, the defendants have not convinced the Court to depart from this District’s conventional wisdom regarding the calculation of the amount in controversy in representative DCCPPA actions: the cost of complying with a hypothetical injunction must be divided among the beneficiary population, which in this case is the population of D.C. Only if this prorated cost of compliance exceeds $75,000 may the case be removed to federal court pursuant to the diversity jurisdiction statute.

Sections 28-3905(k)(1)(A) and (k)(6) give consumers a private action for trade practices violating District law, including trade practices arising from landlord-tenant relations.

Hettinger v. Bozzuto Management Company · filed 2025-07-21(k)(1)(A), (k)(6)

That is because the CPPA itself provides a private right of action to any “consumer . . . seeking relief from the use of a trade practice in violation of a law of the District,” and it specifies that this right of action “shall apply to trade practices arising from landlord-tenant relations.” D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(1)(A), (6) (first emphasis added). The weight of relevant authority, moreover, holds that (1) the violation of another D.C. statute (2) in a consumer context constitutes a per se violation of the CPPA.

Section 28-3905(k)(l) does not authorize a private Superior Court action under the CPPA for claims arising in the context of landlord-tenant relations.

Feemster v. BSA Limited Partnership · filed 2007-01-12(k)(l)

However, the Court cannot embrace the interpretation the plaintiffs would have it give to the CCPA. ... The plain language of the current version of the CPPA clearly provides that “[t]he department may not ... apply the provisions of section 28-3905 ... to landlord tenant relations.” This language leads the Court to the conclusion that it cannot adhere to the plaintiffs’ interpretation of the statute. ... Therefore, BSA is entitled to summary judgment on count IV of the second amended complaint.

Section 28-3905(k)(1) does not extend the CPPA's private right of action to landlord-tenant relations.

Gomez v. Independence Management of Delaware, Inc. · filed 2009-03-26(k)(1)

We now hold that the Council did not intend by that amendment to extend the private right of action created by the CPPA into the realm of landlord-tenant relations.

Section 28-3905(k)(2) requires private CPPA claims to be brought initially in Superior Court as the ordinary forum, but it does not bar parties from contractually selecting another forum.

Roberts v. Advanced Building Design · filed 2025-07-24(k)(2)

Rather than evincing any type of jurisdictional requirement, the CPPA simply tells consumers who wish to bring a private suit under the CPPA, as § 3905(k) explicitly authorizes, where they must bring their claims in the ordinary course, absent any contrary agreement: Their claims must initially be brought in the Superior Court rather than, say, having an option to bring it before one of the District’s agencies. This statutory language serves an important purpose because in the provisions immediately preceding § 3905(k)’s recognition of a private right of action, the Act sets forth a separate procedure by which individuals may file a complaint with the Department of Licensing and Consumer Protection. D.C. Code § 28-3905(a)-(j). Given these two distinct tracks for relief, § 3905(k)(2) serves to make clear that the track selected by Roberts—private actions under the CPPA—should be pursued in the Superior Court, rather than the Department. What it does not do is expressly, unambiguously, or even implicitly divest parties of their rights to contract for a different forum if they so choose.

Section 28-3905(k)(1)(A) permits a CPPA action for a trade practice violating D.C. law, not federal law, and subsection (k)(2) makes CPPA relief cumulative of other available remedies.

Jones v. Vintage Equity Group, LLC · filed 2025-07-28(k)(1)(A), (k)(2)

The CPPA allows actions challenging “a trade practice in violation of a law of the District.” D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(1)(A). By its plain text, the CPPA limits the cause of action to violations of D.C. law. ... But that broad language does not include violations of federal law. ... That she also may be able to acquire additional documentation through a motion to compel is irrelevant, as relief under the CPPA is “cumulative” of any other available remedy. D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(2).

Section 28-3905(k)(1) authorizes a plaintiff to sue on behalf of the D.C. public, and § 28-3905(k)(2)(B) provides for attorneys’ fees.

Organic Consumers Association v. Foster Farms, LLC · filed 2025-03-26(k)(1) (k)(2)(B)

The DCPPA provides for attorneys’ fees. ... But Plaintiff has a right to sue on behalf of the D.C. public. ... The public includes individuals who would have separate and distinct claims against Defendants because their alleged behavior has a material effect on consumers.

Section 28-3905(k)(1) authorizes a person to bring a private attorney general action on behalf of itself, its members, or the general public for relief from a trade practice that violates D.C. law, without requiring a Rule 23 class action.

Breakman v. AOL LLC · filed 2008-04-17(k)(1)

The one-count complaint alleges an action based upon the DCCPPA, which authorizes “[a] person, whether acting for the interests of itself, its members, or the general public” to bring an action “seeking relief from the use by any person of a trade practice in violation of a law of the District of Columbia.” D.C.Code § 28-3905(k)(l). Because this District of Columbia statute expressly authorizes a private attorney general suit such as this one, this is not a class action to which the Class Action Fairness Act applies.

Section 28-3905(k)(1) permits a person to bring a CPPA action on behalf of the general public without complying with Rule 23, and subsection (k)(1)(A) makes monetary relief payable to the consumer.

National Consumers League v. General Mills, Inc. · filed 2010-01-15(k)(1), (k)(1)(A)

Moreover, the plain language of the CPPA expressly authorizes suits like NCL’s that are brought on behalf of the general public without imposing any requirement that the suit meet the strictures of Rule 23. ... Consequently, the Court finds that, at least for CPPA claims brought on behalf of the general public as here, plaintiffs need not comply with Rule 23.

Section 28-3905(k)(1)(B) requires a tester-standing complaint to plausibly allege that the plaintiff purchased the product or service in order to test or evaluate it, with an actual intent to test or evaluate the product.

Nides v. DVC Industries, Inc. · filed 2025-05-08(k)(1)(B)

But at a minimum, the statutory language is clear that for a complaint to pass muster under Subsection (k)(1)(B), it must contain sufficient facts to plausibly allege that the plaintiff purchased the product or service “in order to test or evaluate” it—by which we understand the statute to require, consistent with the legislative history discussed above, a showing that the plaintiff actually intended to test or evaluate the product.

Section 28-3905(i)(3)(B) permits the Superior Court to enforce settlement agreements and agency orders, but allows rescission of an underlying consumer contract as consumer redress only when enforcing a final order of the Section of Hearings.

Baker v. District of Columbia · filed 1985-06-28(i)(3)(B)

The award of rescission of an underlying consumer contract as “consumer redress” may be part of the trial court’s order, however, only in an action to enforce a final order of the Section of Hearings.

Section 28-3905(k)(2) does not extend a private CPPA cause of action to merchants suing other merchants; it refers to consumer-plaintiffs.

Independent Communications Network, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp. · filed 1987-02-25(k)(2)

In short, the CPPA supplies consumers with a private cause of action against merchants. It is not intended to supply merchants with a private cause of action against other merchants.

Section 28-3905 allows the CPPA’s procedures and sanctions to enforce consumer trade practices made unlawful by other District laws, even when those laws provide different enforcement procedures or sanctions.

Atwater v. District of Columbia Department of Consumer & Regulatory Affairs · filed 1989-10-24(2)

Although § 28-3904 makes a host of consumer trade practices unlawful, its list of such practices was not designed to be exclusive. The remainder of the statute obviously contemplates that procedures and sanctions provided by the Act will be used to enforce trade practices made unlawful by other statutes. If the § 28-3904 listing were exclusive, the references in § 28-3905 to to other laws and to the common law would serve no purpose.

Section 28-3905(k)(1)(C) permits punitive damages based on the actual damages, frequency, persistency, and intentionality of the merchant’s unlawful trade practice and the number of consumers affected; a continuing failure to admit and rectify the merchant’s mistakes can support such an award.

Rowan Heating-Air Conditioning-Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Williams · filed 1990-10-16(k)(1)(C)

There is no case law interpreting § 28-3905(k), but when the section was enacted by the District of Columbia Council, the Committee Report offered the following guidelines for its application: ... Here, the trial court’s finding that appellant was guilty of a “continuing” failure to admit to its mistakes, and of an unwillingness to rectify the situation, is sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages under the standards set forth in the Committee Report.

Section 28-3905(g)(5) authorizes an administrative law judge to award punitive damages and reasonable attorney’s fees against a merchant for unlawful conduct, while § 28-3905(Z) bars an administrative award to a victorious respondent-merchant unless the statute expressly authorizes it.

Ramos v. District of Columbia Department of Consumer & Regulatory Affairs · filed 1992-01-09(g)(5), (Z)

Of relevance here, the Office of Adjudication may order remedies against the merchant, “including punitive damages, treble damages, or reasonable attorney’s fees, as are reasonable and necessary to identify, correct, or prevent the conduct which violated District law.” Id. at § 28-3905(g)(5). ... But the CPPA does not expressly authorize an AU to grant attorney’s fees or punitive damages in favor of a respondent-merchant. ... We accordingly conclude that the Council left no room for awards of attorney’s fees and punitive damages to merchants in unprescribed circumstances. The enabling statute is clear and unambiguous: there is no statutory authority granting ALJs the power to award a victorious merchant any relief beyond dismissal of the consumer’s complaint.

Section 28-3905(k)(1) requires a consumer-merchant relationship involving the sale of goods or services and actual damages caused by the alleged misrepresentation or omission for a damages action.

Athridge v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. · filed 2001-09-17(k)(1)

The facial breadth of the statute has caused three judges of this Court to conclude that, under District of Columbia law, to wit, the decision in Howard v. Riggs Nat’l Bank, 432 A.2d 701 (D.C.1981), the Act only supplies consumers with a cause of action against merchants selling them goods or services. There must therefore be a consumer-merchant relationship in a consumer transaction involving the sale of goods or services. ... At no point, however, was there ever a consumer merchant relationship between the Athridges’ assignor, Jorge, and Aetna; ... The Consumer Protection Procedures Act, which deals only with the merchant-consumer relationship under District of Columbia law, cannot possibly be stretched beyond recognition to reach statements made or not made by an insurance company engaged in litigation against its insured to establish that it is not obliged to represent or indemnify him. ... Additionally, it is also the law of the District of Columbia that a damage action under this Act requires a showing that the consumer suffered actual damages because of the misrepresentation or omission claimed to violate the Act. ... The Athridg-es’s complaint, based on its assignment from him, therefore fails as a matter of law even if the Act was applicable to the relationship between Aetna and Jorge.

Section 28-3905(k)(l) permits treble damages once a consumer proves damage from a trade practice violating District law, without the egregious conduct or malice required for punitive damages.

District Cablevision Limited Partnership v. Bassin · filed 2003-07-17(k)(l)

In D.C.Code § 28-3905(k)(l), treble damages evidently serve a remedial rather than a punitive purpose because the statute expressly states that both treble damages and punitive damages are available. ... Since the purpose of treble damages under the CPPA is remedial rather than punitive, the plaintiffs in this case were entitled to an award of treble damages without the showing of egregious conduct and malice required for punitive damages. We agree with the Williams court that “[o]nce it is established that a consumer [has] suffered any damage, the CPPA authorizes courts to treble damages without further findings.”

Before October 19, 2000, § 28-3905(k)(1) allowed a private CPPA action only by a consumer who suffered damages; generalized language that a trade practice could violate the CPPA whether or not a consumer was damaged did not eliminate that injury requirement.

Williams v. Purdue Pharma Co. · filed 2003-12-31(k)(l)

The Court is not persuaded that it should rely on this generalized introductory language to the exclusion of the more specific language in Section 28-3905(k)(l) that only a “consumer who suffers any damages” could bring suit under the CPPA before October 2000.

In a representative action, the statute permits relief restoring consumers' money or property and other appropriate relief, but the requested relief remains individualized damages rather than disgorgement into a common fund.

Reigner v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. · filed 2004-11-23(k)(1)(E), (k)(1)(F)

The complaint in this case demands “actual damages equal to the amount District of Columbia consumers paid for Affected Locks and related warranty upgrades,” but that demand must be considered in light of the language of D.C.Code § 28-3905(k)(1)(E), which provides for such additional relief in representative actions “as may be necessary to restore to the consumer money or property, real or personal, which may have been acquired by means of the unlawful trade practice.” ... Thus, unlike Williams or Aetna, this suit seeks damages for individual consumers, not disgorgement. It does not seek to establish a joint or common right in a common fund.

Former § 28-3905(k)(l) does not authorize a private Superior Court action seeking damages for personal injury of a tortious nature or arising from a landlord-tenant relationship.

Childs v. Purll · filed 2005-09-08(k)(l)

The Act limits the jurisdiction of the Department in a number of substantive ways; of pertinence to the present case, the Act specifically states that the Department may not (1) “order damages for personal injury of a tortious nature,” or (2) “apply the [complaint adjudication] provisions of section 28-3905 to ... landlord-tenant relations; ...” D.C.Code § 28-3903(c). It follows from Diamond that former § 28-3905(k)(l) is subject to the same substantive limitations, i.e., it does not authorize a private action in Superior Court where the claim (1) seeks damages for personal injury of a tortious nature, or (2) arose in the context of landlord-tenant relations.

For CPPA claims arising before the October 2000 amendment, § 28-3905(k)(l) limited private actions in the same way as DCRA jurisdiction and therefore did not permit recovery for personal injury of a tortious nature; the amendment was not retroactive.

Caulfield v. Stark · filed 2006-03-09(k)(l)

The amendment was not retroactive. Childs, 882 A.2d at 238. Since 2000, therefore, there has been no CPPA provision barring actions under that statute for "damages for personal injury of a tortious nature." On the other hand, we cannot say, because this issue is not before us, whether removal of the DCRA reference from the statute in 2000 is enough, in itself, to allow actions for personal injury of a tortious nature under the statute as amended.

Section 28-3905(k)(1) authorizes a person to bring an action for a trade practice violating District of Columbia law and seek money damages and other remedies, including treble damages, attorney’s fees, punitive damages, an injunction, and other proper relief.

Johnson v. LONG BEACH MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2001-4 · filed 2006-08-04(k)(1)

Second, D.C.Code § 28-3905(k)(1) authorizes “a person” to “bring an action under this chapter in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, seeking relief from the use by any person of a trade practice in violation of a law of the District of Columbia and may recover or obtain the following remedies ...” D.C.Code § 28-3905(k)(1) (2001). Remedies include treble damages, reasonable attorney’s fees, punitive damages, an injunction, and “any other relief which the court deems proper.” Id. The express terms of 28-3905(k)(1) therefore authorize Plaintiff to bring an action for a violation of § 28-3904(r), and to seek money damages and other relief as remedies.

Before the October 2000 amendment, § 28-3905(k)(l) did not authorize a CPPA damages action for tortious personal injuries arising from a landlord-tenant transaction.

Parker v. Martin · filed 2006-08-17(k)(l)

As a result, the trial court did not err in denying the Parkers’ claim for damages under the CPPA because the transaction arose in a landlord-tenant relationship and because they seek damages for personal injuries of a tortious nature.

Section 28-3905(k) allows any person to bring a DCCPPA claim for the interests of themselves, their members, or the general public, but standing still requires an actual or threatened injury-in-fact.

Hoyte v. Yum! Brands, Inc. · filed 2007-05-02(k)

A claim under the DCCPPA may be brought by any person, “whether acting for the interests of itself, its members, or the general public.” D.C.Code § 28-3905(k). While the preceding language and the statute’s introduction — “[i]t shall be a violation of this chapter, whether or not any consumer is in fact misled, deceived, or damaged thereby,” D.C.Code § 28-3904 — might suggest that a plaintiff could pursue a claim under DCCPPA without an actual or threatened injury, the cases hold otherwise. ... Since plaintiff must present an actual or threatened injury-in-fact to have standing to raise his DCCPPA claims, the analysis of Count II will resemble that of Count I.

Section 28-3905 permits a consumer to sue for relief only if the consumer suffered damage.

Beard v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. · filed 1991-02-26(k)(l)

Obviously, suffering damage is a condition precedent to suit, and one who has not been injured cannot sue under this statute for any relief whatever.

Section 28-3905(k)(1) permits a consumer to bring a D.C. Consumer Protection Act action in Superior Court, but does not make a judicial forum exclusive or bar arbitration.

Olle v. 5401 Western Avenue Residential, LLC · filed 2008-08-06(k)(1)

Therefore, compelling the plaintiffs to arbitrate their dispute will “not [cause them to] forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute[s]; it only submits ... their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”

Section 28-3905(k)(l)(A) permits treble damages or $1,500 per violation, whichever is greater; when treble damages are unsupported by the evidence, the authorized award is $1,500.

Brandywine Apartments, LLC v. McCASTER · filed 2009-01-29(k)(l)(A)

Appellant argues that the jury improperly awarded Mr. MeCaster $2,500 in statutory damages under the CPPA although there is a cap of $1,500. D.C.Code § 28-3905(k)(l)(A) (plaintiff suing a merchant for an unfair trade practices violation may recover “treble damages, or $1,500 per violation, whichever is greater”). ... We agree that the award of $2,500 is not authorized by the statute. There was no evidence allowing us to treat it as an award of treble damages. Because the only remaining option is the statutory minimum award, the amount of damages must be reduced to $1,500.

Section 28-3905(k)(l) permits an action for a violation of § 28-3904 to be brought in Superior Court but does not require that the action be brought there.

Hume v. Watson · filed 2010-01-14(k)(l)

However, the language of § 28-3905(k)(l) states merely that an action for a violation of § 28-3904 may be brought in Superior Court, not that such an action must be brought in Superior Court.

Section 28-3905(k)(1) authorizes treble damages once a consumer establishes a CPPA violation and any resulting damage, without additional findings.

MODERN MANAGEMENT CO. v. Wilson · filed 2010-06-03(k)(1)

The remedial purpose of treble damages, as distinguished from punitive damages, is particularly apparent given the fact that the treble damages provision of the CPPA, D.C.Code § 28-3905(k)(l), authorizes the court to treble damages without the plaintiff having to establish anything beyond the CPPA violation itself: “[0]nce it is established that a consumer [has] suffered any damage, the CPPA authorizes [the] court[] to award treble damages without further findings.” Byrd, supra, 902 A.2d at 782 (emphasis added) (quoting Dist. Cablevision, supra, 828 A.2d at 729).

Section 28-3905(k)(1)(F) permits a court to grant any other relief it deems proper for a CPPA violation, potentially including rescission.

Hughes v. Abell · filed 2010-11-16(k)(1)(F)

The quiet title count depends -upon the outcome of the CPPA count. Civil remedies available under the CPPA include “any [] relief which the court deems proper,” which may include rescission. D.C.Code § 28-3905(k)(l)(F). In addition, the Court’s equitable powers allow it to quiet title in Hughes if Wells Fargo’s actions warrant that remedy. Hence, it would be premature to dismiss Hughes’s quiet title count while his unconscionability claim remains pending.

Section 28-3905(k)(1)(C) permits CPPA punitive damages when the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence a state of mind evincing malice or its equivalent, and § 28-3905(k)(1) makes statutory damages available for actionable misrepresentations and failures to disclose material information.

Griffith v. Barnes · filed 2008-06-11(k)(1)(C) and (k)(1)

D.C.Code § 28-3905(k)(1)(C) provides for the availability of punitive damages under the CPPA. To recover punitive damages, it is not enough to show that defendants acted with intent. ... Accepting the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, Griffith has shown that defendants made misrepresentations and failed to disclose material information. These wrongful acts render Griffith eligible for the statutory damages available under the CPPA, enumerated at D.C.Code § 28-3905(k)(1). ... Accordingly, Griffith is eligible for punitive damages under the CPPA so long as there is “clear and convincing evidence that [defendant acted with] a state of mind evincing malice or its equivalent.”

A plaintiff bringing a CPPA action must show a concrete injury-in-fact; the 2000 amendments broadened authorized plaintiffs and made remedies cumulative without eliminating that standing requirement.

Grayson v. AT & T CORP. · filed 2011-01-20(k)(1) and (2)

Thus, without a clear expression of an intent by the Council to eliminate our constitutional standing requirement, we conclude that a lawsuit under the CPPA does not relieve a plaintiff of the requirement to show a concrete injury-in-fact to himself.

An auctioneer is a merchant subject to dismissal of its debt collection suit when the buyer has filed a complaint arising from the same trade practice.

Adam A. Weschler & Son, Inc. v. Klank · filed 1989-08-07(k)(4)

Weschler, as an auctioneer, is an actor clearly “connected with the ‘supply’ side” of the transaction.