Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.030

Section 9.94A.030(27) defines home detention to include GPS monitoring that restricts an offender to home and work.

State v. Swiger · filed 2006-12-21(27)

As a threshold matter, we hold that Swiger's release on GPS home monitoring pending appeal meets the definition of home detention under RCW 9.94A.030(27) (defining home detention as confinement "in a private residence subject to electronic surveillance").

Home detention requires confinement in a private residence under electronic surveillance; a curfew and daily reporting do not qualify.

State v. DOCKENS · filed 2010-07-09(31)

Because he was not on home detention, Dockens was not confined as defined under former RCW 9.94A.030(31), and RCW 9.94A.505(6), which requires credit for all time served in confinement, does not apply.

Section 9.94A.030 treats home detention with electronic surveillance as partial confinement, allowing felony defendants credit for presentence electronic home monitoring under the SRA.

Harris v. Charles · filed 2011-05-12(8), (28), (34)

The SRA requires a sentencing court to credit a felony defendant's sentence for presentence time spent in "confinement." RCW 9.94A.505(6). "`Confinement'" includes "partial confinement," which in turn includes "work release" and "home detention." RCW 9.94A.030(8), (34). "`Home detention' means a program of partial confinement available to offenders wherein the offender is confined in a private residence subject to electronic surveillance." RCW 9.94A.030(28). Thus, the SRA requires courts to credit felony defendants' sentences for time served on EHM.

Section 9.94A.030(10) treats fines and contributions to interlocal drug funds as distinct court-ordered legal financial obligations.

State v. Jackson · filed 1992-05-26(10)

We must therefore presume that the Legislature intended "fines" and "interlocal drug funds" to have different meanings under the SRA.

Section 9.94A.030(10) defines legal financial obligations to include restitution, court costs, and fines.

State v. Angulo · filed 1995-05-01(10)

Financial obligations include restitution, court costs, and fines. RCW 9.94A.030(10).

Section 9.94A.030(10) authorizes drug fund contributions for drug-related crimes; the contribution must be based on investigation costs and cannot exceed $20,000.

State v. Hunter · filed 2000-09-18(10)

We cannot ignore the language of the statute that includes county or interlocal drug funds in the definition of the court-ordered legal financial obligations that the court is authorized to impose. ... Second, although the statute does not expressly limit the imposition of a drug fund contribution to drug-related crimes, we find this a reasonable and rather obvious interpretation. Finally, although the drug fund contribution is not a fine, we find it analogous and hold that the trial court is limited by the $20,000 maximum fine set for any felony for which a maximum fine is not statutorily fixed. See RCW 9.92.010. [5] We further interpret the statute as requiring the amount of the contribution to be based on the costs of the investigation.

Under former RCW 9.94A.030(27), costs of incarceration ordered as part of a sentence are legal financial obligations.

In Re Pierce · filed 2011-12-29(27)

Costs of incarceration constitute "any ... financial obligation," and, when imposed as part of a sentence, they are "assessed to the offender as a result of a felony conviction." Former RCW 9.94A.030(27). Thus, when a trial court orders payment of costs of incarceration in the judgment and sentence, such costs are included in the inmate's LFOs along with any other court-ordered costs, assessments, or restitution.

Section 9.94A.030(30) defines legal financial obligations to include fines and court costs as distinct categories.

State of Washington v. Clark · filed 2015-11-19(30)

RCW 9.94A.030(30). This definition distinguishes among different types of costs, other financial obligations, and fines.

Section 9.94A.030(30) includes the cost of a defense investigator in legal financial obligations that may be assessed after a felony conviction.

State of Washington v. Juan Manual Reyes · filed 2016-03-15(30)

Among costs that fall within the statutory definition of "legal financial obligation" are "court-appointed attorneys' fees, and costs of defense ... assessed to the offender as a result of a felony conviction." RCW 9.94A.030(30). ... Because defense investigation costs imposed by the court fall within the statutory definition of "legal financial obligations," are not excluded from recovery by RCW 10.01.160(2), and Washington has adopted a constitutional cost recovery regime, the trial court did not err in imposing the cost.

Section 9.94A.030(31) permits an obligation for a county or interlocal drug fund only for a drug-related crime and in an amount commensurate with investigation costs.

State Of Washington v. Williams · filed 2016-08-01(31)

And RCW 9.94A.030(31) permits the trial court to impose LFOs for county or interlocal drug funds. But this fee can be imposed only for a drug- related crime and commensurate with the costs of investigation.

Section 9.94A.030(31) includes a financial obligation assessed as a result of a felony conviction in the definition of a legal financial obligation.

State Of Washington v. Howland · filed 2016-10-17(31)

RCW 9.94A.030(31) defines an LFO as including any "financial obligation that is assessed to the offender as a result of a felony conviction."

Section 9.94A.030(31) includes court costs and county or interlocal drug funds in its definition of legal financial obligations; drug court costs must reflect expenses actually incurred.

State Of Washington, V Allen · filed 2016-07-12(31)

RCW 9.94A.030(31) includes court costs and county or interlocal drug funds in the definition of LFOs and, arguably, drug court costs could be construed as either court costs or one of the entities entitled to benefit from a county or interlocal drug fund. Although Hunter suggests that this is sufficient to authorize the trial court to impose such LFOs,11 it also holds that any such costs must be related to expenses or costs actually incurred. 102 Wn. App. at 639. Again, because there is nothing in the record showing that Allen incurred any drug court costs, the trial court abused its discretion in imposing these costs.

Section 9.94A.030(31) includes waivable supervision fees within legal financial obligations.

State Of Washington, / Cross--app. v. Michael Craig Okler, / Cross-res. · filed 2020-03-09(31)

Because supervision fees can be waived by the court, they constitute discretionary LFOs.

Section 9.94A.030(31)’s definition of a legal financial obligation includes DOC supervision fees, which are discretionary because a court may waive them.

State Of Washington v. Kailen Hall · filed 2020-03-23(31)

Because supervision fees can be waived by the court, they constitute discretionary LFOs. See RCW 9.94A.030(31) (“‘Legal financial obligation’ means a sum of money that is ordered by a superior court of the state of Washington for legal financial obligations which may include . . . any . . . financial obligation that is assessed to the offender as a result of a felony conviction.”); State v. Lundstrom, 6 Wn. App. 2d 388, 396 n.3, 429 P.3d 1116 (2018) (costs of community custody are discretionary LFOs).

Section 9.94A.030(31) defines a legal financial obligation as an amount imposed as a result of a felony conviction; a drug court participation fee paid without a conviction does not qualify.

State Of Washington, V. Peterson · filed 2025-08-04(31)

Because an LFO may only be imposed pursuant to a criminal conviction and Peterson was not convicted, Civil Survival Project does not control on this issue.

The definition of drug offense includes federal drug convictions even when no comparable Washington offense exists.

State v. Villegas · filed 1993-12-13(16)

These provisions can be reconciled if "drug offense", as defined, is viewed as an exception to the general rule that only convictions that have comparable Washington offense definitions are to be factored into the offender score.

Section 9.94A.030(16) excludes possession of a controlled substance from the definition of “drug offense” for offender score purposes.

State v. Garza-Villarreal · filed 1993-12-30(16)

Garza-Villarreal’s previous possession conviction counts for only 1 point, however, because possession is not a “drug offense” as defined in RCW 9.94A.030(16).

Section 9.94A.030(47) defines a qualifying felony failure to register as a sex offense when the person has a prior failure-to-register conviction from before June 10, 2010.

State Of Washington, V. Pond · filed 2026-04-06(47)

Under this statutory definition of “sex offense,” when he was convicted in 2007, Pond was an adult convicted of a sex offense because he had been convicted as an adult for violating RCW 9A.44.132(1) (failure to register as a sex offender) on at least one prior occasion prior to June 10, 2010, in 2005.

For prosecutions before July 1, 1990, the definition of “sex offense” did not limit when a court could consider future dangerousness for a sexually motivated crime.

Matter of Personal Restraint of Rama · filed 1994-03-28(29)

Rama argues that because none of his crimes were sex offenses as defined in RCW 9.94A.030(29), future dangerousness does not support imposition of an exceptional sentence. ... Clearly, from a commonsense perspective, Rama's offenses were committed entirely for the purpose of sexual gratification and hence are properly characterized as sexual offenses. Thus, despite Barnes, the trial court did not err in considering Rama's future dangerousness, and we reject this aspect of Rama's challenge.

Section 9.94A.030(29)(a) includes first degree child molestation in its definition of a sex offense, including when committed by a juvenile.

State v. Acheson · filed 1994-07-25(29)(a)

The Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 defines sex offense as "an offense defined as a sex offense in RCW 9.94A.030”, RCW 13.40.020(24), and RCW 9.94A.030 includes the offense committed by Acheson.

A juvenile felony with a finding of sexual motivation under RCW 13.40.135 is not a sex offense under this definition.

State v. SMH · filed 1995-01-17(31)(b)

Although S.M.H. was found to have committed a felony with sexual motivation, he did not commit a sex offense under the current definition in RCW 9.94A.030(31). He therefore is not required to register as a sex offender under RCW 9A.44.130.

Section 9.94A.030(33) defines a sex offense to include any violation of chapter 9A.44 RCW.

State v. Heiskell · filed 1996-05-09(33)

Under RCW 9.94A.030(33), a sex offense is any violation of chap. 9A.44 RCW, and thus encompasses the crime for which Heiskell pleaded guilty.

As charged, felony luring under RCW 9A.40.090 and misdemeanor communicating with a minor under RCW 9.68A.090 do not meet the definition of a sex offense.

State v. Kissee · filed 1997-11-21(33)

The three luring counts did not charge "sex offenses” within the meaning of this definition, because luring is a felony described in RCW 9A.40.090. The communicating count did not fall within this definition, because it charged a gross misdemeanor rather than a felony. Accordingly, the trial court lacked statutory authority to impose a SSOSA sentence.

A crime outside the listed sex offenses qualifies as a sex offense only when the State alleges and proves sexual motivation beyond a reasonable doubt and the factfinder finds it.

State v. Halgren · filed 1999-02-11(33)(b)

We agree with Halgren that there is no longer room for the argument that a judicial determination may be made that factually a crime is a sex offense even if not defined as such in the SRA. As the SRA directs, where a crime is not specifically identified as a sex offense, like rape or incest, the determination that a crime is a sex offense may be made only after the prosecution alleges and proves sexual motivation beyond a reasonable doubt, and the court or the jury makes a finding of sexual motivation.

Section 9.94A.030(33)’s definition of “sex offense” does not include first degree murder with premeditated intent.

State v. Burkins · filed 1999-03-15(33)

Although the State’s theory at trial was that Burkins sought out Anderson to sexually assault with a plan to kill her if she resisted, first degree murder with premeditated intent is not a “sex offense” under the SRA.

Felony murder predicated on rape is not a sex offense under subsection (33)(a).

State v. Thomas · filed 1999-07-29(33)(a)

We hold felony murder predicated on rape is not a "sex offense" as defined under RCW 9.94A.030(33)(a).

Section 9.94A.030’s definition of sex offense must be read with the corrected cross-reference so failure to register as a sex offender is included and failure to register as a kidnapping offender is excluded.

State v. King · filed 2002-04-29

The inadvertent numbering error undermines the express intent of both statutes and renders them irrational because the failure to register as a kidnapping offender is deemed a sex offense while the failure to register as a sex offender is not. ... In this case where the legislative intent is clear and there is no ambiguity, it is imperative to supply the correct numbering in order to correct the obvious error and make the statutes rational.

An offense committed with sexual motivation is categorized as a sex offense.

State v. Hudnall · filed 2003-03-11(36)(c)

Because Hudnall also pleaded guilty to having sexual motivation, this offense is categorized as a sex offense. See former RCW 9.94A.030(36)(c)(1999).

Section 9.94A.030(38) defines sex offenses as felonies, so a gross misdemeanor with sexual motivation does not qualify.

State v. A.S. · filed 2003-03-31(38)

RCW 9.94A.030(38) limits its definition of sex offenses to felonies. ... Fourth degree assault is a gross misdemeanor, even when committed with sexual motivation as defined in RCW 13.40.135. ... Thus, even though A.S. acted with sexual motivation and was found to be amenable to community-based treatment, his misdemeanor offense made him ineligible for a SSODA.

Section 9.94A.030 defines sex offenses as felonies, so a gross misdemeanor does not qualify.

State v. JP · filed 2003-05-22

All crimes defined as sex offenses in RCW 9.94A.030 are felonies.

An out-of-state conviction falls within the definition of “sex offense” only if it is comparable to a Washington felony sex offense.

State v. McInally · filed 2005-01-24(38)(d)

The statutory definition of “sex offense” in RCW 9.94A.030(38)(d) is used for scoring purposes and includes only offenses that are comparable to felony sex offenses in Washington.

The definition of “sex offense” includes an out-of-state offense only if it is comparable to a Washington felony sex offense.

State v. McInally · filed 2005-02-07(38)(d)

The statutory definition of "sex offense" in RCW 9.94A.030(38)(d) is used for scoring purposes and only includes offenses that are comparable to felony sex offenses in Washington.

Former RCW 9.94A.030(32)(b) lists first degree child molestation as an offense that can serve as a predicate for indeterminate sentencing.

In re the Personal Restraint of McCarthy · filed 2006-07-05(32)(b)(i)

Thus, McCarthy’s Oregon offense was equivalent to Washington’s offense of first degree child molestation. Because it is an offense enumerated in former RCW 9.94A.030(32)(b), one consequence of this offense is that it serves as a predicate offense under RCW 9.94A.712(l)(b).

Former RCW 9.94A.030(32)(b) lists first degree child molestation as an offense that can serve as a predicate for an indeterminate sentence, including a comparable out-of-state conviction.

In Re Petition of McCarthy · filed 2006-09-12(32)(b)

Thus, McCarthy's Oregon offense was equivalent to Washington's offense of first degree child molestation. Because it is an offense enumerated in former RCW 9.94A.030(32)(b), one consequence of this offense is that it serve as a predicate offense under RCW 9.94A.712(1)(b).

The definition of “sex offense” in chapter 9.94A does not determine the meaning of the distinct term “sexual offense” in the presentence report statute.

State v. Nelson · filed 2005-11-22(38)

Although the legislature defined the term “sex offense” in chapter 9.94A RCW, it chose to use the term “sexual offense” rather than “sex offense” in RCW 9-.94A.500(1).

The numbering error in § 9.94A.030(42)(a)(i) is corrected by reading its registration exception as RCW 9A.44.130(12).

State v. Albright · filed 2008-05-13(42)(a)(i)

To do this we must correct the numbering error in RCW 9.94A.030(42)(a)(i) as follows: "A felony that is a violation of chapter 9A.44 RCW other than RCW 9A.44.130( 12 )."

Section 9.94A.030(42)(a)(i) uses the renumbered exception in RCW 9A.44.130(12), so felony failure to register as a sex offender remains a sex offense.

State v. Castillo · filed 2008-05-15(42)(a)(i)

And the sentencing reform act definition of sex offense should read: "`Sex offense' means [a] felony that is a violation of chapter 9A.44 RCW other than RCW 9A.44.130[(12)]." RCW 9.94A.030(42)(a)(i).

Under former RCW 9.94A.030(41), fourth degree assault is not a sex offense even when committed with sexual motivation because it is a gross misdemeanor.

State v. C.D.C. · filed 2008-07-02(41)

Here, C.D.C. pleaded guilty to fourth degree assault with sexual motivation, a gross misdemeanor, under RCW 9A.36.041(1) and RCW 9.94A.835. A defendant convicted of fourth degree assault, even with sexual motivation, is not a “sex offender” as defined by statute and, thus, the greatest period of community supervision the trial court has authority to impose is 12 months.

Sexual motivation means that sexual gratification was one purpose of the offense; prior misconduct can help prove that purpose when the current conduct follows a persistent pattern.

State v. Vars · filed 2010-08-16(43)

"`Sexual motivation' means that one of the purposes for which the defendant committed the crime was for the purpose of his or her sexual gratification." [22] ... We reject Vars's claim and conclude that evidence of his prior misconduct is admissible to prove sexual motivation where, as here, his current actions conform to a persistent pattern of prior behavior.

Section 9.94A.030(46)(a)(i) covers felonies currently listed in chapter 9A.44 RCW, excluding convictions under statutes repealed after 1976.

State v. Taylor · filed 2011-07-25(46)(a)(i)

The plain language of former RCW 9.94A.030(46)(a)(i) applied only to sex offenses currently listed in chapter 9A.44 RCW.

A felony with a finding of sexual motivation is a sex offense under Washington law.

State v. DaSilva · filed 2011-08-02(33)(b)

The Judgment references Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.030, wherein “sex offense” is defined to include “[a] felony with a finding of sexual motivation under RCW 9.94A.127 or 13.40.135,” and “sexual motivation” to mean “that one of the purposes for which the defendant committed the crime was for the purpose of his or her sexual gratification.” Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.030(33)(b), (34) (1997). ... The District Court correctly reasoned DaSilva “was required to register” because his conviction fit within the definition of “sex offense” under Washington law.

A felony under chapter 9A.44 RCW is a sex offense unless it falls within the exception for former RCW 9A.44.130(12); failure to register under former RCW 9A.44.130(11)(a) qualifies.

State v. Caton · filed 2011-09-13(46)(a)(i)

But the applicable version of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, chapter 9.94 RCW, defined a “sex offense” as “[a] felony that is a violation of chapter 9A.44 RCW other than [former] RCW 9A.44.130(12).” Former RCW 9.94A.030(46)(a)(i) (2008). Here, Caton was convicted under former RCW 9A.44-.130(11)(a), not an excluded offense. His claim fails.

Former RCW 9.94A.030(42)(a)(i) includes failure to register as a sex offender within the definition of “sex offense” despite an erroneous cross-reference.

State Of Washington v. Durrett · filed 2014-06-02(42)(a)(i)

While Durrett is technically correct, his argument fails under State v. Castillo, 144 Wn. App. 584, 183 P.3d 355 (2008) and State v. Albright, 144 Wn. App. 566, 183 P.3d 1094 (2008). ... However, the legislature failed to amend RCW 9.94A.030, to accurately cross-reference those provisions. The Castillo and Albright courts treated the new definition as an oversight and interpreted the statute as preserving its original meaning.

Section 9.94A.030 treats felony failure to register as a sex offender as a sex offense when the person has a prior failure-to-register conviction.

State Of Washington v. Thrasher · filed 2014-08-04(46)(a)(v)

However, a "sex offense" also includes felony failure to register as a sex offender ifthe person has been convicted of failure to register on at least one prior occasion.

Former RCW 9.94A.030(33)(a) included only offenses contemporaneously listed in chapter 9A.44 RCW as predicate sex offenses for failure to register.

In re the Personal Restraint of Wheeler · filed 2015-06-30(33)(a)

Consequently, we agree with Taylor that the sex offense definition in effect when Wheeler failed to register supports a reading of “is” that permits only sex offenses contemporaneously included in chapter 9A.44 RCW to serve as the predicate for a failure to register conviction.

A second conviction for felony failure to register as a sex offender qualifies as a “sex offense.”

Personal Restraint Petition Of Matthew Quinn Shoop · filed 2015-12-29(46)(a)(v)

But because it is his second conviction for felony failure to register, it is for a “sex offense” under RCW 9.94A.030(46)(a)(v), such that a term of community custody of up to 36 months is appropriate under RCW 9.94A.701(1)(a).

Section 9.94A.030’s definition of a sex offense does not include indecent exposure under RCW 9A.88.010(2)(b).

State Of Washington, V Hodgson · filed 2016-05-03

Here, the jury convicted Hodgson of indecent exposure in violation of RCW 9A.88.010(2)(b). Because Hodgson was not convicted of any offense listed in the statutes that authorize the issuance of a sexual assault protection order under RCW 7.90.150(6)(a), the trial court lacked the statutory authority to impose the order.

Section 9.94A.030(46)(c) includes felonies with a finding of sexual motivation in the definition of “sex offense,” but that definition does not eliminate sexual motivation enhancements for felonies.

State of Washington v. Kuhlman · filed 2016-01-21(46)(c)

We recognize with Jonathan Kuhlman the inherent inconsistency resulting from a juxtaposition ofRCW 9.94A.835 with RCW 9.94A.030(46)(c). We find this inconsistency more of a circular or nonsensical anomaly or a legislative drafting error than an ambiguity. ... Kuhlman's construction would render sexual motivation enhancements nugatory and would void the provisions ofRCW 9.94A.533 and RCW 9.94A.535.

Section 9.94A.030 defines “predatory” by reference to whether the perpetrator was a stranger to the victim, meaning the victim did not know the perpetrator twenty-four hours before the offense.

State Of Washington v. Reginald Juntunen Aka Reggie Juntunen · filed 2016-03-29(39), (51)

This is likely because Juntunen’s admission to Baum was consistent with the statutory definitions of the crime of child molestation and predatory aggravator. ... To be ... “predatory” means that the “perpetrator of the crime was a stranger to the victim,” where being a “stranger” means “that the victim did not know the offender twenty-four hours before the offense.” RCW 9.94A.030(39), (51).

A felony under chapter 9A.44 RCW, including first degree rape of a child, is a sex offense.

State of Washington v. Ellison · filed 2016-06-14(46)(a)(i)

As a felony in violation of chapter 9A.44 RCW, a rape of a child conviction is a "sex offense" mandating an offender's registration under RCW 9A.44.130. RCW 9.94A.030(46)(a)(i); RCW 9A.44.128(10)(a); RCW 9A.44.132.

The definition of “sex offense” includes indecent liberties because it is a felony under chapter 9A.44 RCW, including when committed by a juvenile.

State of Washington v. Rhynard · filed 2016-07-19(46)(a)(i)

In tum, the SRA defines a "sex offense" as including "[a] felony that is a violation of chapter 9A.44 RCW other than RCW 9A.44.132." Former RCW 9.94A.030(46)(a)(i) (2012). Indecent liberties is a felony under chapter 9A.44 RCW. See RCW 9A.44.100(2). Therefore, ajuvenile who has been found to have committed indecent liberties must register as a sex offender pursuant to RCW 9A.44.130(l)(a).

Former § 9.94A.030(46)(a)(v) counts felony failure to register as a sex offense only when the person has a prior conviction under RCW 9A.44.132(1); a prior conviction under former RCW 9A.44.130 does not qualify.

State Of Washington, V Wilcox · filed 2016-09-27(46)(a)(v)

The statute specifies that the violation must be a violation of RCW 9A.44.132, not a violation of RCW 9A.44.130 or any former version of the failure to register statute.

Section 9.94A.030(47) does not list indecent exposure as a sex offense.

State Of Washington v. Murray · filed 2017-03-06(47)

Indecent exposure is not a named sex offense under RCW 9.94A.030(47).

Third degree rape of a child is a sex offense under the definition in this section.

State Of Washington v. Cover · filed 2017-09-19(47)(a)(i)

With respect to count 1, his two other current offenses are the other two third degree rape of a child convictions, which are both sex offenses, and other current offenses are counted as prior convictions for purposes of calculating offender scores.

Section 9.94A.030 defines possession of depictions of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct as a sex offense.

State Of Washington, V Pittman · filed 2017-10-31(47)(a)(iii)

Possession of depictions of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct is a sex offense.

Former section 9.94A.030(46)(b) includes a prior felony conviction as a sex offense when the offense was in effect before July 1, 1976, and is comparable to a currently listed sex offense.

In re Pers. Restraint of Arnold · filed 2018-02-15(46)(b)

To fall within subsection (b)'s coverage, the conviction triggering the duty to register has to be based on a statute that(1) was "in effect. . . prior to 1976" and (2)is "comparable" to a current offense listed in former RCW 9.94A.030(46)(a). As discussed below, Arnold's conviction meets both prerequisites.

Section 9.94A.030(47) defines sex offenses and does not include indecent exposure, so indecent exposure is not excluded from the sexual motivation aggravator.

State v. Murray · filed 2018-05-17(47)

Indecent exposure is nof one of the crimes defined as a sex offense. Accordingly, indecent exposure is potentially one of the crimes for which the sexual motivation aggravator can apply.

Attempted failure to register as a sex offender is not a sex offense under the definition in subsection (47)(a)(v).

Post Sentence Review Of: Michael P. Thompson & Ricky L. Carroll · filed 2018-11-06(47)(a)(v)

We hold that attempted failure to register as a sex offender is not a sex offense under RCW 9.94A.030(47)(a)(v).

Section 9.94A.030(29)(b) classifies attempted kidnapping as a sex offense when accompanied by a special finding of sexual motivation.

In re Pers. Restraint of Gronquist · filed 2018-11-08(29)(b)

The special findings of sexual motivation make each attempted kidnapping a sex offense. Former 9.94A.030(29)(b).

Indecent exposure is not itself listed as a sex offense, but a felony with a finding of sexual motivation is a sex offense.

State Of Washington v. Williamson · filed 2019-04-29(47)(c)

Indecent exposure is not listed as a sex offense in RCW 9.94A.030(47). ... But "[a] felony with a finding of sexual motivation under RCW 9.94A.835" is a sex offense.

A conviction for failure to register as a sex offender is a sex offense when the person has been convicted of that crime more than once.

Personal Restraint Petition Of: Larry Lloyd · filed 2019-07-02(47)(a)(v)

Because he has been convicted of failure to register as a sex offender more than once, this conviction is considered a “sex offense” under RCW 9.94A.030(47)(a)(v).

The definition of “sex offense” includes a felony violating chapter 9A.44 RCW, including Washington third degree rape.

In Re The Personal Restraint Petition Of Bradley Lewis Reynolds · filed 2019-12-17(38)(a)(i) (2003); (42)(a)(i) (2006)

Former RCW 9.94A.030(38)(a)(i) (2003) and former RCW 9.94A.030(42)(a)(i) (2006) defined “sex offense” to include “[a] felony that is a violation of chapter 9A.44 RCW.” Third degree rape, which was defined in former RCW 9A.44.060 (1999), constituted a violation of chapter 9A.44 RCW.

A prior felony qualifies as a sex offense when a statute with the same elements was in effect before July 1, 1976, and the offense is comparable to a sex offense listed in subsection (a).

In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of Roger Michael Hawley · filed 2019-12-17(38)(b)

We find Hawley’s crime of conviction under former RCW 9A.44.070(1) was in effect prior to July 1, 1976. ... We, therefore, find the second inquiry satisfied—Hawley’s crime of conviction is comparable to an offense under subsection (a).

For a current offense committed after the 2015 amendment, felony failure to register qualifies as a sex offense when the defendant has a qualifying prior failure-to-register conviction under RCW 9A.44.132(1) or RCW 9A.44.130.

State Of Washington v. Mower · filed 2020-04-20(48)(a)(v)

At that time, under RCW 9.94A.030(48)(a)(v), a “sex offense” included, in part, “[a] felony violation of RCW 9A.44.132(1) (failure to register as a sex offender) if the person has been convicted of violating RCW 9A.44.132(1) (failure to register as a sex offender) or 9A.44.130 prior to June 10, 2010, on at least one prior occasion.” ... Here, Mower committed his current offense long after the 2015 amendment. Wilcox does not apply.

A felony under chapter 9A.44 RCW, including third degree rape, is a sex offense unless it violates RCW 9A.44.132.

State of Washington v. Alan Ray Reukauf aka Allen Reukauf · filed 2020-09-22(48)(a)(i)

RCW 9.94A.030(48)(a)(i) defines “sex offense” to include “[a] felony that is a violation of chapter 9A.44 RCW other than RCW 9A.44.132.”

A second or subsequent failure to register charge qualifies as a sex offense.

State Of Washington, V. Hehn · filed 2021-08-02(47)(a)(v)

Failure to register constitutes a “sex offense” on a defendant’s second or subsequent charge of failure to register. RCW 9.94A.030(47)(a)(v).

Attempted second degree child molestation qualifies as a sex offense under the definition.

State Of Washington v. Wolfenberger · filed 2023-11-07(47)(a)(i)

And the term “sex offense” includes second degree child molestation. RCW 9.94A.030(47)(a)(i); RCW 9A.44.086(1). ... Here, Wolfenberger was convicted the sex offense of attempted second degree child molestation. Therefore, RCW 9.94A.729(5) applies, and the trial court was required to convert Wolfenberger’s earned early release time to community custody.

A felony violation of chapter 9A.44 RCW, including second degree rape, is a sex offense.

State Of Washington, V. Vernon · filed 2024-02-05(47)(a)(i)

A “sex offense” is “[a] felony that is a violation of chapter 9A.44 RCW,” ... which includes rape in the second degree. RCW 9.94A.030(47)(a)(i); RCW 9A.44.050(2). So, a person of ordinary intelligence would understand that “sex offender status” means being a convicted felony sex offender.

A felony outside chapter 9A.44 RCW is a sex offense under this definition only if it was committed with sexual motivation.

State Of Washington, V. Jonathan Michael Anthony Ricardo · filed 2024-05-21(47)(c)

Despite the second degree assault charge being based on “intent to commit” a sex offense, it was not charged as an assault committed with “sexual motivation.” The second degree assault was therefore not a sex offense as charged.

Felony failure to register under RCW 9A.44.132(1)(b) is a sex offense.

State v. Buck · filed 2024-03-14(47)(a)(v)

Felony Failure to Register, RCW 9A.44.132(1)(b), is considered a “sex offense” under RCW 9.94A.030(47)(a)(v).

The list of most serious offenses in subsection (21) rationally identifies recidivists who threaten public safety for equal protection purposes.

State v. Manussier · filed 1996-08-08(21)

And while the offenses included in the enumerated list of crimes in RCW 9.94A.030(21) may be at least debatable, they nevertheless comprise an arguably rational, and not arbitrary, attempt to define a particular group of recidivists who pose a significant threat to the legitimate state goal of public safety.

Subsection (37)(b) defines a persistent offender to include someone convicted of two listed felony sex offenses; the court upheld the resulting mandatory sentence against a challenge based on racial disparity.

State Of Washington, V. Jermaine Rodregus Freeman · filed 2025-05-27(37)(b)

Under the POAA, a “persistent offender” is an offender convicted of two of the felony sex offenses listed in RCW 9.94A.030(37)(b), or three of the felonies considered a most serious offense listed in RCW 9.94A.030(37)(a). ... Because the POAA mandates the trial court to impose an LWOP sentence for all persistent offenders, Freeman fails to show the act is unconstitutional.

A persistent offender must have prior convictions for most serious offenses on at least two separate occasions; the sentencing judge may determine the conviction dates from the judgments.

State Of Washington, V. Dugan · filed 2026-04-20(37)(a)

As discussed, a persistent offender under the POAA must have prior convictions of “most serious offenses” on “at least two separate occasions.” RCW 9.94A.030(37)(a). But unlike the ACCA’s “ ‘committed on occasions different from one another’ ” inquiry in Erlinger, determining prior dates of conviction under the POAA is not a “fact-laden” task.

A juvenile conviction in another state’s adult court does not count as a prior conviction for persistent offender status unless the case was transferred under RCW 13.40.110.

State v. Ollens · filed 1998-01-09(25), (27)(a)(ii)

RCW 9.94A.030(27) is not ambiguous; its language is specific and is not susceptible of two meanings or interpretations. It expressly includes within the definition of “offender” only those juveniles for whom a decline hearing was conducted pursuant to RCW 13.40.110. It makes no mention of out-of-state juvenile decline proceedings; rather it refers solely to the Washington statutory procedure.

The definitions of “most serious offense” and “persistent offender” make the third qualifying conviction the trigger for persistent offender punishment.

State v. Angehrn · filed 1998-03-02(23), (27)

POAA’s mandatory sentence of life without parole is triggered only upon the conviction of the third “most serious offense.” See RCW 9.94A.030(23), (27), .120(4).

A prior conviction qualifies for persistent offender status only if it is included in the offender score.

State v. Cruz · filed 1999-10-07(27)(a)(ii)

Such is necessarily the case because a conviction for purposes of implementing the POAA must also be a conviction that forms part of a defendant's offender score. RCW 9.94A.030(27)(a)(ii); State v. Morley, 134 Wash.2d 588, 604, 952 P.2d 167 (1998).

The persistent offender definition incorporates the washout rules for prior convictions, but prior convictions served concurrently can still count as separate offenses.

State v. Keller · filed 1999-12-13(25)

To summarize, the phrase “included in the offender score under [former] RCW 9.94A.360” as used in former RCW 9.94A.030(25) refers specifically to the washout provisions set forth in former RCW 9.94A.360(2). The phrase is not interchangeable with the provisions of former RCW 9.94A.360(6)(c).

A persistent offender must have a current most serious offense and two qualifying prior convictions; the State must prove that an out-of-state conviction qualifies as a strike.

State v. Russell · filed 2001-01-19(27)(a)

Under former RCW 9.94A.030(27)(a), [33] a "persistent offender" is one who: ... The trial court shall resentence Russell as a non-persistent offender unless the State bears its burden of proving a second strike.

Section 9.94A.030(27)(b)'s two strikes definition of a persistent offender can constitutionally apply to a person convicted of first degree rape and then indecent liberties by forcible compulsion.

State v. Morin · filed 2000-03-20(27)(b)

In 1996, the legislature amended the law to classify certain sex offenders as persistent offenders after two convictions. [3] Morin was sentenced under this amendment. ... Applying the four part test to this case, we conclude that Morin's sentence to life imprisonment without parole for the crime of indecent liberties by forcible compulsion does not violate Washington's constitutional prohibition against cruel punishment.

Former § 9.94A.030(25)(b) permits two qualifying prior convictions to count as separate strikes even when they count as one conviction in the offender score.

State v. Keller · filed 2001-03-22(25)(b)

The phrase "included in the offender score under RCW 9.94A.360" stated in the Persistent Offender Act refers to the entire statute and cannot reasonably be interpreted to mean two different things. The statute is not ambiguous, and thus is not subject to the rule of strict construction. We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals, Division One, which affirmed the judgment of the King County Superior Court holding that Petitioner Lawrence John Keller's two prior felony convictions counted as two "strikes" under the Persistent Offender Accountability Act, although they counted only as one conviction in calculating his offender score, and sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

The persistent offender definition treats attempts at specified serious sex offenses as qualifying strikes even when the attempts are class B crimes.

State v. Gimarelli · filed 2001-03-23(29)(b)(i)(C)

Other most serious violent sex offenses, such as first or second degree rape and first or second degree rape of a child also would qualify an offender for life in prison if they had a prior rape conviction. See RCW 9.94A.030(29)(b)(i)(A). Likewise, an attempt at any of those crimes, even though the attempts would only be class B crimes, would have the same result. See RCW 9.94A.030(29)(b)(i)(C).

Former RCW 9.94A.030(27)(a)(ii) allows a qualifying out-of-state felony conviction to count as a prior conviction for persistent-offender sentencing.

State v. Jennings · filed 2002-04-05(27)(a)(ii)

The prior offenses may be convictions from other states, if they are for felonies that, if committed in this state, would be most serious offenses and included in the offender score as set out in RCW 9.94A.360. Former RCW 9.94.030(27)(a)(ii). ... We hold that the trial court may use the Dade County, Florida, conviction as a prior conviction when resentencing Jennings on remand.

An out-of-state conviction counts as a sex offense if the comparable Washington offense is a felony sex offense, even if the other state classifies the conviction as a misdemeanor.

State v. DeVincentis · filed 2002-06-10(36)(d)

DeVincentis argues that the reference in (d) to subsection (a) shows that an out-of-state conviction must be a felony in order to count as a "sex offense". But out-of-state convictions are to be classified "according to the comparable offense definitions and sentences provided by Washington law." Former RCW 9.94A.360(3)(1999). ... The New York nomenclature classifying the conviction as a misdemeanor is not dispositive. We conclude the court did not err in treating the 1984 New York conviction as a felony and counting it as a sex offense in the offender score.

The persistent offender definition permits prior attempted rape convictions to count as strikes when sentencing for a qualifying offense committed after the POAA took effect.

State v. Nordlund · filed 2002-08-30(29)(b)

As with the use of his other prior convictions to calculate his offender score under the SRA, the use of these convictions to determine the POAA's application does not increase the punishment for his prior strikes; rather, the prior strikes are used only to calculate his current sentence for his post-POAA convictions. See In re Williams, 111 Wash.2d at 363, 759 P.2d 436. Consequently, there is no ex post facto violation.

Second degree assault counts as a strike for a mandatory persistent offender life sentence, but delivery of a controlled substance does not.

State v. Lopez · filed 2002-10-10(27), (31)(a)

While second degree assault counts as a "strike" for the purposes of a mandatory life sentence under the POAA, delivery of a controlled substance does not.

Subsection (32)(b) classifies an offender convicted of a second listed sex offense, including first degree child molestation, as a persistent offender.

State v. Flores · filed 2002-11-01(32)(b)

The legislature has defined Flores as a member of a class of persistent offenders who have committed serious and violent sex offenses, often against children. RCW 9.94A.030(32)(b).

Section 9.94A.030’s definition of conviction does not make a juvenile’s adult-court conviction a prior strike before the required juvenile-court declination hearing occurs.

State v. Carpenter · filed 2003-07-15(11)

The SRA definition of "conviction" neither limits nor qualifies the term. ... Had the Legislature chosen to similarly qualify "conviction" under the POAA or SRA, Carpenter's conviction would stand as of June 5, 1996. But the Legislature did not. ... Hence, we hold that Carpenter's conviction of second degree assault operates as a strike from January 28, 2000.

A foreign robbery conviction is not a strike under the persistent offender statute when it is neither factually nor legally comparable to Washington second degree robbery.

In Re Personal Restraint of Lavery · filed 2005-05-05(23)(u)

Foreign eign convictions count as strikes if they are comparable to a Washington strike offense. Former RCW 9.94A.030(23)(u)(1998). ... We conclude that Lavery's 1991 foreign robbery conviction is neither factually nor legally comparable to Washington's second degree robbery and therefore not a strike under the POAA.

Prior Washington statutory rape convictions may count under the persistent offender definition when they are comparable to a listed offense.

State v. Ball · filed 2005-06-07(32)(b)(ii)

(ii) Has, before the commission of the offense under (b)(i) of this subsection, been convicted as an offender on at least one occasion, whether in this state or elsewhere, of an offense listed in (b)(i) of this subsection or any federal or out-of-state offense or offense under prior Washington law that is comparable to the offenses listed in (b)(i) of this subsection. ... Although the crime of statutory rape no longer exists, the victim age elements are similar to the current offense of child rape.

A prior first degree statutory rape conviction is comparable to first degree child rape for persistent offender sentencing because nonmarriage was an implied element of the former offense.

State v. Stockwell · filed 2005-08-23(32)(b)(ii)

We hold, therefore, that the trial court did not err in finding that Stockwell’s 1986 first degree statutory rape conviction was legally comparable to first degree child rape for POAA purposes.

Section 9.94A.030(33)(b) counts a prior first degree statutory rape conviction as a strike because that offense is legally comparable to first degree rape of a child.

State v. Stockwell · filed 2007-01-04(33)(b)

Given the apparent impetus for adding a comparability clause to the POAA, given Bailey, and given the legislative history of these statutes, we hold as a matter of law that first degree statutory rape under former RCW 9A.44.070(1) and first degree rape of a child under RCW 9A.44.073(1) are comparable. See RCW 9.94A.030(33)(b), .570.

A persistent offender’s prior convictions qualify for a life sentence when at least one occurred before the commission of another qualifying offense; the sentencing court may rely on the offender’s acknowledgment of the relevant dates.

State v. O'CONNELL · filed 2007-02-06(29)(a)(ii)

Of these two or more previous convictions, "at least one conviction must have occurred before the commission of any of the other most serious offenses for which the offender was previously convicted." Former RCW 9.94A.030(29)(a)(ii). ... Second degree robbery is a most serious offense, former RCW 9.94A.030(25)( o ), and the August 6, 1993 conviction occurred before the August 21, 1994 commission of the second offense. Consequently, the trial court properly found with a preponderance of the evidence that a POAA life sentence was mandated.

A prior conviction can count toward persistent offender status when facts stipulated by the defendant establish that it is comparable to a Washington most serious offense.

State v. Moncrief · filed 2007-03-27(32)(a)(ii)

The superior court properly considered Mr. Moncrief's stipulation in his prior military conviction that the child victim there was six years old. This fact supports the superior court's determination that the prior conviction was comparable to first degree rape of a child. That determination, in turn, supports the finding that Mr. Moncrief is a persistent offender.

A Washington robbery conviction classified as a class A felony qualifies as a strike offense for persistent offender sentencing.

State v. Failey · filed 2008-04-22(33)

Again, applying RCW 9.94A.035, Failey's 1974 robbery conviction is a class A felony, which is a strike offense for persistent offender sentencing purposes. RCW 9.94A.030(33).

A juvenile conviction counts as a prior strike under the persistent offender definition only if the State establishes that the juvenile was convicted as an offender, including that the superior court had jurisdiction.

State v. Knippling · filed 2009-04-30(37)(a)(ii)

Here, the State did not meet its burden of showing that Knippling was convicted as an "offender" in 1999 because there was no evidence in the record that the superior court had jurisdiction over Knippling. This is critical because, as we noted above, to classify Knippling as an "offender," the State had to show that Knippling was convicted of an automatic decline charge or that the juvenile court declined jurisdiction. The State has shown neither.

A defendant’s affirmative agreement that an out-of-state conviction counts in the offender score allows it to count as a persistent-offender strike without further proof of classification.

State v. Birch · filed 2009-08-11(33)

Although Ross and Ford did not involve the POAA, we extend the rule regarding affirmative agreements regarding the inclusion of prior offenses in the offender score to cases involving the POAA. ... The trial court did not err in counting Mr. Birch's California robbery conviction as a strike under the POAA.

Under former subsection (25)(b), convictions occurring at the same time count as only one most serious offense.

In Re Carter · filed 2010-03-09(25)(b)

Because the Oregon convictions occurred at the same time, they constituted only one most serious offense. See former RCW 9.94A.030(25)(b) (1994).

Former subsection (33)(a) defines a persistent offender as a defendant convicted of a most serious offense who has two prior convictions for most serious offenses.

State v. Williams · filed 2010-06-15(33)(a)

A defendant convicted of a most serious offense who has been previously convicted of two most serious offenses is subject to a life sentence without the possibility of parole (a "three strikes" offender). Former RCW 9.94A.030(33)(a) (2006); RCW 9.94A.570. ... So, even without the conviction for second degree assault, Mr. Williams is subject to life without the possibility of parole.

A juvenile whose case is transferred to adult criminal court is an offender under this section, and a qualifying conviction following a knowing waiver of the declination hearing can count toward persistent offender status.

State v. Saenz · filed 2010-07-13(30)

An "offender" is a person who has committed a felony established by state law and is eighteen years of age or older or is less than eighteen years of age but whose case is under superior court jurisdiction under RCW 13.04.030 or has been transferred by the appropriate juvenile court to a criminal court pursuant to RCW 13.40.110. Former RCW 9.94A.030(30). ... The record supports that the waiver was knowing and intelligent. ... We reverse the trial court's conclusion that the POAA did not apply and remand for resentencing consistent with our opinion.

A persistent offender has two prior convictions for most serious offenses on separate occasions; the State may prove those convictions by a preponderance of the evidence.

State v. Powell · filed 2012-12-18(36)(a)

A “persistent offender” is someone who, at sentencing for a most serious offense conviction, has previously been convicted on two separate occasions of most serious offenses under RCW 9.94A.525. ... Simply put, the State presented sufficient evidence of Mr. Powell’s two prior convictions and the trial court did not err by sentencing Mr. Powell to life in prison without the possibility of parole.

Under former subsection (31), a juvenile’s adult court conviction can count as a strike only if the juvenile was under adult court jurisdiction or was properly transferred there.

State v. Saenz · filed 2012-08-23(31)

A juvenile can be an offender only if he or she “committed a felony” and the “case is under [adult] jurisdiction under RCW 13.04.030 or has been transferred by the appropriate juvenile court to a criminal court pursuant to RCW 13.40-.110.” Former RCW 9.94A.030(31) (2006).

A juvenile adjudication qualifies as a conviction, and first degree child molestation qualifies as a sex offense under the section’s definitions.

State v. Benitez · filed 2013-06-11(9), (45)(a)(i)

Therefore, Benitez’s juvenile adjudication is a “conviction” under RCW 9.94A.030(9) and first degree child molestation is a “sex offense” under former RCW 9.94A.030(45)(a)(i).

A prior out-of-state conviction counts toward persistent offender status only if it is legally or factually comparable to a Washington most serious offense.

State v. Latham · filed 2014-09-03(37)(a)

A defendant is a persistent offender if he or she has been convicted in Washington of a most serious offense and has on at least two other prior occasions been convicted of a most serious offense in this or any other state. RCW 9.94A.030(37)(a). ... Because neither of the two Nevada offenses is legally or factually comparable to any of Washington’s most serious offenses put forward by the State or relied on by the trial court, we reverse Latham’s sentence and remand for resentencing.

Persistent offender status depends on the validity of prior convictions, not the sentences imposed for them.

State Of Washington v. Mcgowen · filed 2014-10-13(37)(a)(ii)

But, in defining a persistent offender, it is the validity of the prior conviction that is determinative of that status—not the validity of the sentence. See RCW 9.94A.030(37)(a)(ii).

A defendant whose sexual motivation special verdicts are reversed lacks the second strike needed for persistent offender classification.

State Of Washington, Resp. v. Robert D. Hitt, App. · filed 2014-12-22(37)

Moreover, because we reverse Hitt's sexual motivation special verdicts, which served as Hitt's second strike, Hitt will not be subject to being classified as a persistent offender at resentencing.

A conviction for a former offense counts toward persistent offender status only if it is legally or factually comparable to a current most serious offense.

State Of Washington v. Irby · filed 2015-04-20(37)

A "persistent offender" is someone who, at sentencing for a most serious offense conviction, has previously been convicted on two separate occasions of most serious offenses under RCW 9.94A.525. RCW 9.94A.030(37). ... Because the State presented insufficient evidence to prove that the 1976 conviction is factually comparable to a strike offense, it was error to conclude that Irby could be sentenced to life without parole as a persistent offender.

A prior conviction counts toward persistent offender status only if it would be included in the offender score under RCW 9.94A.525.

State Of Washington v. Garrison · filed 2015-04-06(37)(a)(ii)

Garrison’s final contention is that he was improperly sentenced as a persistent offender pursuant to the Persistent Offender Accountability Act, RCW 9.94A.570. This is so, he asserts, because the trial court incorrectly concluded that one of his prior convictions was comparable to a Washington class B felony, rather than a class C felony, which would have washed out and would not have counted as a strike. Garrison is correct.

Section 9.94A.030(38)(a)(ii) requires a sequence of prior convictions and offenses for persistent offender status; the sentencing judge may determine that sequence from dates in the prior judgments.

State Of Washington v. Brinkley · filed 2016-02-01(38)(a)(ii)

The court is entitled to consider "facts intimately related to the prior convictions" such as the dates of conviction, offense dates and the underlying offense.

The persistent offender definition requires prior qualifying convictions on at least two separate occasions; two convictions entered in the same guilty plea count as one.

State Of Washington v. Bluford · filed 2016-08-29(38)(a)(ii)

That is because the plain words of RCW 9.94A.030(38)(ii) require prior qualifying convictions to occur "on at least two separate occasions."

A persistent offender has a current most serious offense and two prior convictions for most serious offenses on separate occasions.

State Of Washington v. Jacob Ivan Schmitt, & Prp Of Schmitt · filed 2016-11-23(38)(a)(ii)

Under the POAA, a “[p]ersistent offender” is defined as someone who at the time of sentencing for a current most serious offense, has been convicted twice before of most serious offenses under RCW 9.94A.525. RCW 9.94A.030(38)(a)(ii). ... Schmitt was properly apprised of his two prior strikes and that the first degree robbery charge would be a third strike.

A legally equivalent out-of-state conviction for a most serious offense counts toward persistent offender status.

State of Washington v. JD Miller · filed 2016-12-20(38)(a)

Agreeing with the trial court, we hold that an Idaho aggravated assault is the legal equivalent of Washington's second degree assault. The trial court properly characterized the prior Idaho conviction as a "strike" when it sentenced Mr. Miller as a persistent offender.

A prior out-of-state conviction counts toward persistent-offender status only if the offense would be considered a most serious offense under Washington law.

State v. Bluford · filed 2017-05-04(38)(a)

A persistent offender is an individual who ( 1) has been convicted in Washington "of any felony considered a most serious offense" and (2) has "been convicted as an offender on at least two separate occasions" in any state for offenses that, in accordance with Washington law, "would be considered most serious offenses." RCW 9.94A.030(38)(a). ... We do not know which one, and ifit was N.J. Stat.§ 2C:15-l(a)(3), Bluford's conviction was not legally comparable to a most serious offense in Washington. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals on this issue.

Section 9.94A.030 allows a comparable out-of-state conviction for a most serious offense to count toward persistent offender status.

State Of Washington v. Watson · filed 2017-05-16(38)(a)(ii)

An out-of-state conviction may count as a strike if it is comparable to a most serious offense in Washington. ... Because the two offenses are factually comparable, the trial court correctly found that the Utah attempted robbery conviction was a most serious offense and did not err in imposing a persistent offender sentence.

An out-of-state conviction may count as a persistent offender strike if it is comparable to a Washington most serious offense.

State Of Washington, V Charles v. Farnsworth, Jr. · filed 2017-05-31(38)(a)(ii)

An out-of-state conviction may count as a strike if it is comparable to a most serious offense in Washington. RCW 9.94A.030(38)(a)(ii); RCW 9.94A.030(33)(u). ... Because Farnsworth’s California conviction is legally comparable to a most serious offense in Washington, we need not analyze factual comparability. Farnsworth’s argument fails.

In the 2012 version of § 9.94A.030, subsection (37)(b) lists offenses under the persistent offender definition.

State Of Washington v. Martell · filed 2017-08-29(37)(b)

As discussed above, tracking the subsequent amendments to former RCW 9.94A.030(31)(b) (2008), as required by RCW 1.12.028, the citation at the time of Martell’s offense should have been to former RCW 9.94A.030(37) (2012).

A second degree assault with sexual motivation qualifies as a second strike under the persistent offender definition when the offender has qualifying prior convictions.

State Of Washington v. Raethke · filed 2017-12-26(38)(a)(i), (b)(i)

Thus, his present conviction for assault in the second degree with sexual motivation qualified as a second strike requiring a sentence of life without the possibility of parole under the POAA. RCW 9.94A.030(38)(a)(i),(b)(i); see also RCW 9A.36.021(1)(e).

A prior conviction can count toward the persistent offender definition despite a wrong statute citation in the judgment when the charging documents establish conviction under the correct statute.

State Of Washington v. Jackson Jr. · filed 2018-05-07(38)(a)(ii)

Even without considering the jury instructions, the charging documents were sufficient to show Jackson's 1998 prior conviction was under RCVV 9A.36.021. ... The court properly sentenced Jackson as a persistent offender.

Former RCW 9.94A.030(38)(b)(i) lists first degree child molestation as a prior conviction that qualifies a person for sentencing under RCW 9.94A.507.

State Of Washington, V Denatale · filed 2018-06-05(38)(b)(i)

DeNatale’s second degree molestation and third degree child rape convictions are sex offenses, and he has previously been convicted of first degree child molestation, a crime listed under former RCW 9.94A.030(38)(b)(i).

An out-of-state conviction counts toward persistent offender status when it is comparable to an offense listed in subsection (37).

State Of Washington v. Williams · filed 2019-02-06(37)

For an out-of-state offense to be classified as a prior conviction for purposes of the POAA, that offense must be comparable to a Washington offense that is listed in former RCW 9.94A.030(37).

Former RCW 9.94A.030(37)(b)(i) includes comparable out-of-state convictions in the persistent offender definition; it does not require the sentencing court to choose the most comparable Washington offense.

State Of Washington v. Mccasland · filed 2019-02-26(37)(b)(i)

Contrary to this argument, the POAA simply provides that the definition of persistent offender includes defendants convicted of first degree child molestation who have prior out-of-state convictions for offenses that are comparable to the offenses listed in former RCW 9.94A.030(37)(b)(i). Former RCW 9.94A.030(37)(b)(i)(A), (ii). Thus, it is immaterial whether Washington’s incest offense may be more factually comparable to Oregon’s first degree sodomy convictions than second degree child rape.

Former RCW 9.94A.030(37)(b)(i) includes attempted first and second degree rape of a child among the offenses that can qualify a person as a persistent offender after two convictions.

State Of Washington v. Persell · filed 2020-04-14(37)(b)(i)

Those listed offenses include second degree rape of a child, attempted second degree rape of a child, and attempted first degree rape of a child. Former RCW 9.94A.030(37)(b)(i). ... Thus, his present convictions in Thurston County qualified as a second strike requiring a sentence of life without the possibility of release under the POAA.

A prior conviction counts as a strike under the persistent offender law only if it qualified as a most serious offense when the defendant committed the current offense.

Personal Restraint Petition Of Lonnie Tennant · filed 2020-05-19(33)

But to properly include the assault conviction as a strike offense for POAA sentencing, the prior conviction must also have been a most serious offense under RCW 9.94A.030(33). In this context, the relevant comparison is to offenses that constituted most serious offenses when the defendant committed the offense for which he is currently being sentenced.

A defendant remains a persistent offender under former subsection (32)(a) when, despite a vacated conviction, two qualifying prior convictions remain.

State of Washington v. Weber · filed 2021-02-01(32)(a)

[R]egardless of the vacation of Mr. Weber’s attempted second degree murder conviction, he still has two prior convictions for strike offenses— one for first degree assault and one for second degree assault—making him a persistent offender in relation to his current conviction. Former RCW 9.94A.030(32)(a) (2002). ... We agree with and adopt the reasoning of both decisions, however.

Section 9.94A.030 treats a first degree murder conviction as the first of three strikes, rather than a strike under the two strikes rule.

State Of Washington, V. Baker · filed 2021-08-02(29)(a), (33)(a)-(b)

In actuality, Baker’s conviction was the first of three strikes because his crime did ... not trigger the two strikes provision. Former RCW 9.94A.030(29)(a), (33)(a)-(b) (2006); RCW 9.94A.570.

Section 9.94A.030 defines a persistent offender and classifies any class A felony as a most serious offense.

State Of Washington, Resp-cross App V. Darryl W. Kennon, App-cross Resp · filed 2021-08-16(37), (32)(a)

And a persistent offender is a defendant who has been convicted of a most serious offense and (1) has two prior felonies that also are most serious offenses or (2) has been convicted of rape of a child in the first degree, or child molestation in the first degree. RCW 9.94A.030(37). A “most serious offense” means any class A felony. RCW 9.94A.030(32)(a). ... Because Kennon’s prior convictions and his current conviction constitute serious offenses, under the plain meaning of the POAA, Kennon is a persistent offender subject to mandatory life imprisonment.

A conviction for an offense committed as a juvenile may count toward persistent offender status when the juvenile court properly transferred the case to adult court.

State Of Washington, V. Michael Reynolds, Jr. · filed 2022-02-28(34)

Although there is no transcript of the decline hearing, there is sufficient documentation to establish the decline hearing took place and that Reynolds was represented by counsel. The trial court did not err by concluding that the State met its burden to prove that the 2002 conviction was properly under adult court jurisdiction.

Section 9.94A.030 excludes juvenile court adjudications from persistent offender strikes but counts qualifying adult convictions for crimes committed as a juvenile.

State v. Reynolds · filed 2023-09-21(37), (34)

It explicitly bars sentencing courts from counting juvenile adjudications as strikes. RCW 9.94A.030(37), (34). But it does not bar sentencing courts from counting adult “most serious offense[s]”—even if the adult conviction resulted from a crime committed as a juvenile.

Section 9.94A.030(37)(a)(ii) requires a prior conviction to precede the commission of another most serious offense, and a judge may determine whether it did.

State Of Washington, V. Rivers · filed 2025-03-10(37)(a)(ii)

We conclude that the POAA determination remains one within the Almendarez-Torres exception allowing the court to determine the fact of prior conviction, including “the jurisdiction in which the defendant’s crime occurred and its date.” Erlinger, 602 U.S. at 839 (emphasis added). This allows a court to conclude a conviction for one crime occurred before the commission of another.

A judge may determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether the prior convictions required for persistent-offender sentencing exist.

State Of Washington, V. Monroe · filed 2025-08-25(37)(a)(ii)

Contrary to Monroe’s argument, it is well-established precedent in Washington that “[a]ll that is required by the constitution and the [POAA] statute is a sentencing hearing where the trial judge decides by a preponderance of the evidence whether the prior convictions exist.”

Section 9.94A.030(37)(a) defines persistent offender status using two prior most serious convictions on separate occasions; a judge may determine the relevant dates without a jury.

State of Washington v. Henry Hauser, Jr. · filed 2026-01-27(37)(a)(i)-(ii)

A persistent offender is an offender who before commission of the current offense, has on two separate occasions been convicted of felonies that are most serious offenses. RCW 9.94A.030(37)(a)(i)-(ii). ... Hauser argues that under Erlinger, 602 U.S. 821, the fact that his previous convictions occurred on separate occasions could only be found by a jury and not by the trial court. We disagree. ... We agree with these cases, and we conclude that Erlinger does not overrule existing Washington case law. Accordingly, we find no constitutional error.

Section 9.94A.030 classifies first degree child molestation and second degree rape of a child as violent offenses and includes them among the most serious offenses.

Personal Restraint Petition Of Thomas T. Nissen · filed 2026-01-21(33)(a), (d); (55)(a)(i)

All three of ... his convictions are classified by statute as “most serious offenses” and first degree child molestation and second degree rape of a child are classified as “violent offenses.” See Former RCW 9A.44.083(2); Former RCW 9A.44.076(2); Former RCW 9.94A.030(33)(a), (d) (2019); Former RCW 9.94A.030(55)(a)(i) (2019).

The definition of “most serious offenses” may include attempted violent crimes, including attempted first degree burglary, without violating equal protection.

State v. Cruz · filed 1998-06-22(23)

The Legislature, or in this instance, the people, may rationally conclude that an attempt to commit a violent crime is serious enough to be included in the category of “most serious offenses.”

An out-of-state conviction is a most serious offense if its Washington equivalent is a felony classified as a most serious offense.

State v. Aronhalt · filed 2000-02-22(23)(u)

A “most serious offense” includes “any out-of-state conviction for an offense that under the laws of this state would be a felony classified as a most serious offense under this subsection.” Former RCW 9.94A.030(23)(u) (1998).

A federal conviction counts as a prior most serious offense only if it is comparable to a Washington most serious offense; federal bank robbery without an established intent to steal is not comparable to second degree robbery.

State v. Freeburg · filed 2004-02-17(23)(u)

Convictions from other jurisdictions, including federal convictions, which are comparable to Washington's most serious offenses, are counted as prior convictions. [9] ... The trial court erred in concluding that Freeburg's federal conviction was comparable to a second degree robbery conviction in Washington.

An out-of-state conviction qualifies as a prior strike if it is comparable to a listed offense, but a sentencing court cannot use underlying facts that the prior trier of fact did not find beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Ortega · filed 2004-02-17(31)(b)(ii)

Because some of his criminal acts occurred in the period from July 22 to around July 31, the July 22 amendment adding the comparability language authorizes the trial court to determine whether the 1991 Texas conviction is comparable to any of the qualifying crimes in former RCW 9.94A.030(31)(b)(i) (2001). ... We conclude that Apprendi prohibits a sentencing court's consideration of the underlying facts of a prior conviction if those facts were not found by the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 9.94A.030(32)(u) determines whether a felony committed before December 2, 1993, is a most serious offense by comparing it to current most serious offenses.

State v. Failey · filed 2009-02-12(32)(u)

But we agree with Failey that the 1974 robbery should be classified pursuant to RCW 9.94A.030(32)(u). That statute defines a "most serious offense" in part as any felony offense in effect prior to December 2, 1993, that is comparable to a current most serious offense.

Second degree assault is a most serious offense that counts as a strike under the persistent offender accountability act.

State v. Breitung · filed 2010-04-20(29)(b), (33)

Second degree assault is both a felony and a "most serious offense," and counts as a strike under the persistent offender accountability act; whereas fourth degree assault is only a gross misdemeanor. See former RCW 9.94A.030(29)(b), (33) (2006) (persistent offender); RCW 9.94A.570.

Under former RCW 9.94A.030(23)(t), a felony with a special verdict finding that the defendant was armed with a firearm is a most serious offense because the verdict qualifies as a deadly weapon verdict.

In Re Cruze · filed 2010-08-12(23)(t)

This special verdict was a deadly weapon verdict, and Cruze was convicted of a "felony with a deadly weapon verdict under RCW 9.94A.125," former RCW 9.94A.030(23)(t), which is a most serious offense.