Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.401

Section 69.50.401(f) is violated by a defendant’s affirmative act of compensating, threatening, soliciting, surrounding, enclosing, drawing in, or otherwise associating a minor with an unlawful drug transaction; the minor need not actually participate.

State v. Hollis · filed 1999-02-01(f)

The involving a minor in a drug transaction statute does not require that the minor actually participate in the drug transaction. In fact, the minor’s culpability and actions— which are proscribed under other statutes—are inapposite for the purposes of the involving a minor in a drug transaction statute. Instead, the focus is on the defendant’s affirmative acts. A defendant violates RCW 69.50.401(f) if he or she compensates, threatens, solicits or in any other manner involves—i.e., surrounds, encloses, or draws in—a minor in an unlawful drug transaction, or obliges a minor to become associated with the drug transaction, e.g., by inviting or bringing a minor to a drug transaction, or allowing the minor to remain during a drug transaction.

Section 69.50.401(a) does not penalize a pharmacy for repackaging and relabeling drugs in the course of its professional practice because that activity is not manufacturing under the controlled substances act.

In Re Farina · filed 1999-04-13(a)

The Board imposed penalties on C.A.P.S. under RCW 69.50.401(a) for manufacturing drugs without a license or registration. ... RCW 69.50 explicitly excludes packaging or labeling of drugs by a practitioner. Former RCW 69.50.101( o )(1). ... By definition, then, a pharmacy is expressly excluded from the ranks of manufacturers. A pharmacy that repackages and relabels drugs in the course of its professional practice, as C.A.P.S. does, is not manufacturing. Therefore, the controlled substance registration and penalty provisions of RCW 69.50 clearly do not apply.

Section 69.50.401(a) treats preparation or processing of methamphetamine or its immediate precursor as manufacture, even when the final crystals have not yet been precipitated.

State v. Hepton · filed 2002-09-26(a)

The wealth of evidence here that Mr. Hepton had produced liquid methamphetamine indicates far more than a substantial step toward the manufacture of methamphetamine. The plain language of RCW 69.50.101 provides that preparation or processing of a controlled substance or its immediate precursor constitutes manufacture of a controlled substance. RCW 69.50.101(d), (p). Here, the evidence indicates that almost all components and equipment needed to manufacture methamphetamine by the red phosphorus method were found in the basement area or in the garbage. Mr. Hepton admitted in statements to the police that he had completed the process up to the point that he only needed to precipitate out the methamphetamine crystals. The State's expert testified that during the process of drying the final product, Epsom salts (also found in the basement) added to the ether increases its volatility. From this evidence, a reasonable juror could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Hepton was guilty of processing methamphetamine or its immediate precursor.

Section 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii) covers possession of a controlled substance with intent either to deliver it or to manufacture it.

State v. McPherson · filed 2002-05-16(a)(1)(ii)

Significantly, the possession with intent statute encompasses intent to deliver or manufacture.

Under § 69.50.401, unlawful sale and possession are separate offenses with different elements and penalties, and a purchaser is chargeable as a possessor rather than as a seller.

State v. Warnock · filed 1972-09-26(a), (c)

Furthermore, a purchaser of illegally sold drugs is not chargeable as a seller, but only as a possessor. Different elements are contained in the two offenses and different penalties are prescribed. RCW 69.50.401(a) and RCW 69.50.401(c).

Section 69.50.401(c) makes possession of any amount of a controlled substance unlawful unless it was obtained under a valid practitioner prescription or order, or is otherwise authorized by the chapter.

State v. King · filed 1973-07-23(c)

There is no merit to the argument that the quantity of the amphetamine possessed was not enough to constitute a violation of the act. The legislature has provided that the possession of any amount of a controlled substance is unlawful unless otherwise authorized by statute.

Section 69.50.401(d) does not make willful or felonious possession elements of the controlled-substance possession offense.

State v. Sheldon · filed 1984-07-23(d)

Although included in the information, willful and felonious possession are not elements of the crime charged.

Section 69.50.401(c) requires proof that the defendant offered a controlled substance and delivered a noncontrolled substance, but the State need not specifically identify the substance delivered.

State v. Anderson · filed 1990-05-29(c)

In order to convict under this statute, the State must prove that Anderson offered a controlled substance and that he delivered a noncontrolled substance.

Section 69.50.401(c) makes it an offense to offer to deliver a controlled substance and then deliver a noncontrolled substance in its place.

State v. Roberts · filed 1994-11-14(c)

The elements of the offense are (1) an offer to deliver a controlled substance and (2) delivery of a noncontrolled substance.

Section 69.50.401(a) defines the general drug offense, which must be charged and proved together with the additional location element for the special drug offense.

State v. Graham · filed 1993-03-04(a)

RCW 69.50.401(a) describes a general drug offense, possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. RCW 69.50.435 describes a special drug offense, possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver in a particular place or area. The special drug offense requires proof of an additional element. Both the general and special drug offenses must be charged and proved.

Section 69.50.401(a) defines the underlying drug offense of manufacturing, delivering, or possessing a controlled substance with intent to manufacture or deliver; the drug-free-zone provision enhances the penalty for violating it.

State v. Silva-Baltazar · filed 1994-12-15(a)

RCW 69.50.401(a) provides that "it is unlawful for any person to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance". When these drug activities take place in certain locations, then RCW 69.50.435 is applied.

Section 69.50.401(a) does not treat a purchaser of a controlled substance as having delivered it merely by purchasing it.

State v. Morris · filed 1995-05-23(a)

Under these definitions, a person who buys drugs does not "transfer”, and hence does not "deliver”.

Section 69.50.401(a)(1)(i)(A) criminalizes cocaine delivery without requiring a minimum amount, so the precise amount within the statutory range is not an element of the offense.

State v. Alexander · filed 1995-01-26(a)(1)(i)(A)

Accepting as a verity for the purposes of this case that .00003 kilogram is an "extraordinarily small amount” of cocaine, we conclude the amount involved in Alexander’s crime is not an element of the crime defined by RCW 69.50.401(a)(l)(i)(A).

Section 69.50.401(f) makes involving a person under 18 in an unlawful controlled-substance transaction an offense, and the person's age is an element the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Duran-Davila · filed 1995-05-01(f)

This disputed fact was an element of the criminal offense at issue. ... Thus, the State failed to prove an element of the charge of involving a person under the age of 18 in a controlled substance transaction.

Subsection (1) prohibits knowingly delivering a controlled substance.

State of Washington v. Kendall · filed 2017-02-14(1)

The elements of the delivery offense are that the defendant knowingly delivered a controlled substance. RCW 69.50.401(1); State v. Boyer, 91 Wn.2d 342, 344, 588 P.2d 1151 ( 1979).

Section 69.50.401 makes possession of a controlled substance with intent to possess it an offense.

State v. Scriver · filed 1978-10-10

The elements of the offense under RCW 69.50.401 are (1) possession of a controlled substance (2) with the intent to possess it.

Section 69.50.401 requires proof that a person delivered a controlled substance; it does not require proof of a sale for profit.

State v. Peterson · filed 2021-11-18(1)

By comparison, RCW 69.50.401 requires a prosecutor to prove that a person delivered a controlled substance, and the State need not show that a controlled substance was sold for profit.

Section 69.50.401(a) prohibits possessing a controlled substance with intent to manufacture or deliver, and constructive possession requires dominion and control over the drug or premises; mere proximity is insufficient.

State v. Amezola · filed 1987-08-17(a)

Ramirez was charged with possession with intent to manufacture or deliver a controlled substance in violation of RCW 69.50.401(a). The State proceeded at trial to prove possession with intent to deliver heroin upon two theories: constructive possession and accomplice liability. ... Possession of property may be either actual or constructive. Actual possession means that the goods are in the personal custody of the person charged with possession, while constructive possession is established when the person charged with possession has dominion and control over either the drug, State v. Callahan, 77 Wn.2d 27, 29, 459 P.2d 400 (1969), or the premises, State v. Davis, 16 Wn. App. 657, 659, 558 P.2d 263 (1977). Exclusive control is not necessary to establish constructive possession, State v. Wheatley, 10 Wn. App. 777, 779, 519 P.2d 1001 (1974), but mere proximity to the drugs without more is insufficient to show the dominion and control necessary to establish constructive possession, State v. Hystad, 36 Wn. App. 42, 49, 671 P.2d 793 (1983).

For a charge under § 69.50.401(a), constructive possession requires dominion and control over the drug or the premises where it is found; exclusive control is unnecessary, but mere proximity to the drugs is insufficient.

State v. Hagen · filed 1989-04-17(a)

In Washington, constructive possession is established when the person charged has dominion and control over either the drug, State v. Callahan, 77 Wn.2d 27, 29, 459 P.2d 400 (1969), or the premises where the drug is found, State v. Davis, 16 Wn. App. 657, 659, 558 P.2d 263 (1977). ... Exclusive control is not necessary to establish constructive possession, State v. Wheatley, 10 Wn. App. 777, 779, 519 P.2d 1001 (1974), but mere proximity to the drugs is not enough to establish constructive possession.

Section 69.50.401(a) makes possession of a controlled substance a crime; control over premises where drugs are found is only evidence from which possession may be inferred, not the statutory offense itself.

State v. Olivarez · filed 1991-12-05(a)

Under RCW 69.50.401(a) it is a crime to possess a controlled substance. It is not a crime to have dominion and control over the premises where the substance is found. That fact is one of the circumstances from which constructive possession may be inferred.

Section 69.50.401(d) makes it unlawful to possess a controlled substance, and possession may be actual or constructive.

State v. Lozano · filed 1994-11-03(d)

RCW 69.50.401(d) provides that it is unlawful to possess a controlled substance. Possession may be either actual (in personal custody) or constructive (under the dominion or control of the person charged).

Section 69.50.401 does not permit separate convictions for possession of more than 40 grams of marijuana and possession of marijuana with intent to manufacture or deliver because the Legislature treated those marijuana offenses as the same for double-jeopardy purposes.

State v. Portrey · filed 2000-10-12(a), (d)-(e)

Similarly here, the Legislature has concluded that possession of less than 40 grams of marijuana is less culpable than possession of more than that amount. See RCW 69.50.401(e) ("[A]ny person found guilty of possession of forty grams or less of marihuana shall be guilty of a misdemeanor"). The Legislature clearly intended to place possession of marijuana in amounts over 40 grams in the same class as possession of other controlled substances. It is inconceivable that the Legislature intended to require more severe punishment for those who possess more than 40 grams of marijuana with intent to manufacture or distribute than for those who possess other controlled substances with intent to manufacture or distribute. The Legislature thus could not have intended that a person could be convicted of both possession of more than 40 grams of marijuana and possession of marijuana with intent to manufacture or deliver, when it would not permit double convictions for possession of other controlled substances. We therefore hold that the marijuana offenses, like those for other controlled substances, are the same, and Mr. Portrey's conviction on both counts violated his right against double jeopardy.

Section 69.50.401(a)(1) makes the unlawful manufacture of marijuana a class C felony.

State v. Cowin · filed 2003-03-11(a)(1)

There is no question that Kelli Cowin was convicted of a felony violation of RCW 69.50.401. The unlawful manufacture of marijuana is a Class C felony. RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)-(iii); RCW 9A.20.021(l)(c).

Section 69.50.401(a)(1)(iii) classifies the unlawful manufacture of marijuana as a Class C felony.

State v. Cowin · filed 2003-04-29(a)(1)(iii)

The unlawful manufacture of marijuana is a Class C felony. RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(iii); RCW 9A.20.021(1)(c).

Section 69.50.401(1)(2)(b) requires proof that the defendant possessed methamphetamine in Washington with intent to deliver it; constructive possession may be shown by dominion and control under the totality of the circumstances, not mere proximity alone.

State Of Washington, V Gilbert · filed 2018-10-02(1)(2)(b)

Here, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that Gilbert possessed methamphetamine (2) with the intent to deliver it (3) in the State of Washington. RCW 69.50.401. ... In reviewing claims of constructive possession, this court examines whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant exercised dominion and control over the contraband in question. ... In some circumstances the ability to immediately take actual possession of an item can establish dominion and control, however, mere proximity to the item by itself cannot. ... Here, considering the totality of the circumstances, Gilbert exercised dominion and control over the methamphetamine contained in the metal box. ... Consequently, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Gilbert had constructive possession of the methamphetamine in the metal box.

Constructive possession of marijuana under RCW 69.50.401 requires dominion and control of the premises; mere presence in the house is insufficient.

State v. Davis · filed 1977-01-04

As a matter of law, one cannot have constructive possession of marijuana found in a house predicated upon his mere presence therein. There must be a showing of dominion and control by him of the premises themselves.

Constructive possession requires dominion and control over the controlled substance; control over the premises where it is found is only one circumstance to consider.

State v. Shumaker · filed 2007-12-27(1)

In other words, the State must show dominion and control over the substance for a proper conviction under constructive possession.

Constructive possession of a controlled substance may be shown by dominion and control over the substance or the premises where it was found.

State v. Ponce · filed 1995-11-02(d)

Recent cases have established that the State may show that the person charged had dominion and control over the contraband or over the premises in which the contraband was found.

For possession with intent to deliver under subsection (a), control over premises raises a rebuttable presumption of control over drugs found there.

State v. Tadeo-Mares · filed 1997-07-01(a)

When, as here, a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, proof of dominion and control over the premises raises a rebuttable presumption there is dominion and control over the contraband in the premises.

Section 69.50.401(1) requires proof of possession for possession with intent to deliver; dominion and control over the drugs can establish constructive possession.

State of Washington v. Cook · filed 2024-05-14(1)

To prove unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, the State had to prove, among other elements, that Cook possessed the drugs in question. ... Considering this evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to establish that although the drugs were in the trunk, Cook had dominion and control over the drugs.

Section 69.50.401 prohibits marijuana possession and distribution even when undertaken for religious purposes.

State v. Balzer · filed 1998-04-17

Given Balzer’s beliefs as sincere and central to his religious practices, it is clear that restriction of his marijuana use burdens exercise of his religious practices; RCW 69.50.401 ... criminalizes possession and distribution of the drug even if for religious purposes.

Under § 69.50.401(a), delivery of a controlled substance requires proof of guilty knowledge or intent, and possession with intent to deliver is a lesser included offense of delivery.

State v. Rapp · filed 1979-12-31(a)

RCW 69.50.401(a) on its face does not expressly require proof of an intent to deliver when the charge is delivery of a controlled substance. However, it has recently been held that guilty knowledge (i.e., intent) is an element of the crime of delivery. ... Therefore, because the State must prove intent in order to convict of delivery as well as to convict of possession with intent to deliver under the statute, we conclude that the latter is a lesser included offense of the former because it is impossible to commit the offense of delivery without having committed the offense of possession with intent to deliver.

Section 69.50.401(c) allows a possession conviction to rest on constructive possession, which may be established by circumstantial evidence showing the drugs were on the defendants’ property in relatively inaccessible locations and unlikely to have been placed there by a third party.

State v. Laursen · filed 1975-12-31(c)

Because there was no allegation that the drugs were ever in the actual possession of the defendants, their conviction can be sustained only upon a showing of constructive possession. ... Although the contraband was not found within or immediately adjacent to defendants’ house, it was found on their property in locations which are relatively inaccessible to other persons. No one else resided with the Laursens, and their nearest neighbor lived 300 yards away. This circumstantial evidence in addition to the unlikelihood that a third party would place such valuable material on defendants’ property is sufficient for a jury to find that the Laursens constructively possessed the contraband found on their premises.

For a conviction under § 69.50.401(a), constructive possession may be proved by circumstantial evidence showing the defendant's dominion and control over the drugs and their containers.

State v. Hauser · filed 1978-03-16(a)

Constructive possession, dominion and control over the two suitcases and the contents by defendant may be shown by circumstantial evidence. ... The evidence is clear that the defendant requested Mr. Hrvatin to travel to Tucson to pick up the suitcases and transport them to Yakima, paying all of the expenses. Defendant took Hrvatin to the airport and met him on the return flight. Mr. Hrvatin had no interest in the suitcases other than to bring them back to Yakima and deliver them to defendant. While defendant claims that all he knew was that the suitcases contained leather and jewelry, the jury was entitled to judge the credibility of that testimony. Therefore, the issue of constructive possession was supported by the evidence and properly submitted to the jury.

Section 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii) prohibits manufacturing a qualifying controlled substance without requiring proof of an amount, while subsection (e)'s misdemeanor provision applies only to possession of forty grams or less of marijuana.

State v. Moore · filed 1989-05-22(a)(1)(ii), (e)

Similarly, in this case appellant was convicted of two felonies: possession of more than 40 grams of marijuana and manufacturing a controlled substance. Manufacturing marijuana does not have an amount requirement as an element of the crime. RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii). Consequently, the reasoning of Jones applies with equal force to appellant's circumstance. Accordingly, the prohibition against double jeopardy was not violated in this case. ... This argument is without merit. Subsection (e) has no application to appellant's case since he was convicted of possessing more than 40 grams of marijuana. Moreover, there is no apparent ambiguity between the provisions.

Section 69.50.401(a) makes delivery of a controlled substance an offense based on a knowing physical transfer; the defendant’s motive to obtain drugs for personal use is not relevant to the offense.

State v. Evans · filed 1996-03-11(a)

The fact that he facilitated the delivery only because he was hoping to get drugs for himself did not diminish the degree of his involvement or make him less culpable for the crime. His motive is irrelevant. The crime of delivery simply requires the knowing, physical transfer of a controlled substance.

Section 69.50.401 makes delivery of a controlled substance unlawful unless the delivery is authorized by statute.

State v. McReynolds · filed 1996-03-19

RCW 69.50.401 makes delivery of a controlled ubstance unlawful, except as authorized by statute.

Section 69.50.401(a)(ii)'s delivery offense requires an actual transfer of a controlled substance from one person to another; when delivery and conspiracy are both charged, the conspiracy must involve a third person beyond the two participants in the delivery.

State v. Miller · filed 1997-01-16(a)(ii)

The crime of delivery of a controlled substance necessarily requires participation of two persons. If only those two persons have participated in an illicit agreement, the charge of conspiracy cannot be maintained. ... Where both delivery and conspiracy are alleged, the conspiracy must allege the involvement of a third person other than those involved in the delivery.

Section 69.50.401(a) offenses involving marihuana are not excluded from RCW 69.50.435(a)’s sentence enhancements.

State v. Pierce · filed 1995-05-26(a)

Upon reading RCW 69.50.401, .410, and .435 together, it is clear that the Legislature did not intend to exclude marihuana offenses that violated RCW 69.50.401 from the enhancement provisions of RCW 69.50.435(a).

For purposes of the 40-gram possession thresholds, marijuana is weighed with water from recently cut plant material; it need not be dried.

State v. Kazeck · filed 1998-04-17(d), (e)

Had the Legislature intended to exclude water from the definition of marijuana, it would have listed water as an exception. The Legislature did not; ergo, we will not.

Section 69.50.401(e) treats possessing 40 grams of marijuana or less as one unit of prosecution, even when the marijuana is kept in multiple locations within the defendant's dominion and control.

State v. Adel · filed 1998-10-15(e)

The relevant portion of the possession statute states, "any person found guilty of possession of forty grams or less of marihuana shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." RCW 69.50.401(e). ... The possession statute does not authorize multiple convictions based upon a drug being stashed in multiple places within a defendant's actual or constructive possession. ... We find the unit of prosecution in RCW 69.50.401(e) is possessing 40 grams of marijuana or less, regardless of where or in how many locations the drug is kept.

Subsection (a)(l)(i) applies to a completed delivery of a controlled substance, not solicitation.

State v. Moten · filed 1999-06-01(a)(l)(i)

But RCW 69.50.401(a)(l)(i) governs a completed VUCSA delivery and not solicitation.

A charge of conspiracy to deliver methamphetamine under § 69.50.401(a)(1)(i) must allege that a person outside the delivery transaction participated in the conspiracy, because delivery itself necessarily involves two people.

State v. McCarty · filed 2000-04-27(a)(1)(i)

Conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance, unlike conspiracy in general, necessarily requires the involvement of at least three people because the crime of delivery itself necessarily involves two people. Thus a document charging conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance must allege that persons involved outside the act of delivery took part in the conspiracy agreement.

Section 69.50.401(a)(1) prohibits delivery of cocaine; solicitation to deliver cocaine is an offense under chapter 9A.28 RCW, not chapter 69.50 RCW.

In re the Personal Restraint of Bowman · filed 2001-12-24(a)(1)

We disagree and hold that solicitation to deliver is an offense under chapter 9A.28 RCW, not chapter 69.50 RCW. ... Bowman was charged under RCW 9A.28-.030, prohibiting solicitation, and RCW 69.50.401(a)(1), prohibiting delivery of cocaine.

Section 69.50.401(a) covers a person who intentionally helps bring about a drug transfer, even when acting for the buyer.

State v. Ramirez · filed 1991-08-05(a)

Thus, when the Legislature defined a delivery as a "transfer", it necessarily included as "deliverers" any persons who intentionally participated in bringing about the drug transaction.

Section 69.50.401(a) prohibits delivery of a controlled substance, including when a purchaser's agent or intermediary actually transfers the substance.

State v. Sherman · filed 1976-03-24(a)

The issue presented is whether the “purchaser-agent exemption” as noted in State v. Catterall, 5 Wn. App. 373, 376-78, 486 P.2d 1167 (1971), interpreting RCW 69.40.060 (now repealed), continues to exist within the provisions of RCW 69.50.401(a), the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. We hold that the purchaser-agent exemption is not applicable under the provisions of RCW 69.50.401 (a).

Section 69.50.401(a) does not expressly require specific intent for delivery of a controlled substance, but general intent is required because the offense involves moral turpitude and is malum in se.

State v. Tuss · filed 1978-08-10(a)

We disagreed with that interpretation in State v. Boyer, supra, and we adhere to our opinion that the statute on its face expressly does not require intent as a specific element of the crime of delivery-of a controlled substance. However, we recognized in State v. Boyer, supra, that general intent expressed in terms of willfulness, guilty knowledge, or scienter is a required element where the crime involves moral turpitude and is malum in se, rather than malum prohibitum. We further recognized that delivery of a controlled substance does involve moral turpitude and is malum in se, rather than malum prohibitum.

Section 69.50.401(a) requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a person delivering a controlled substance knew the identity of the product being delivered.

State v. Boyer · filed 1979-01-04(a)

Accordingly, absent express legislative language to the contrary, we find in the context of this statute, its history and language, that guilty knowledge is intrinsic to the definition of the crime itself. Guilty knowledge must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in conviction of this defendant under the statute.

The offense requires an intent to offer, arrange, or negotiate for the sale of a controlled substance, followed by delivery of a noncontrolled substance; the seller's knowledge of the substance's noncontrolled character is immaterial.

State v. Lauterbach · filed 1982-10-20(c)

The mens rea of the crime lies in the accused's offering, arranging, or negotiating for the sale of a controlled substance. That is an essential element of the crime. It might be more appropriate to state that that is the essential prerequisite to the commission of the crime. The crime has not been committed, however, until the accused, subsequent to the previous arrangement, does actually "sell, give, deliver, dispense, distribute, or administer" the noncontrolled substance to another person. At that point in time it is immaterial whether the accused knew or did not know whether the substance delivered was not a controlled substance.

Section 69.50.401(a) makes it unlawful to deliver a controlled substance and does not expressly state an intent requirement.

State v. Armstrong · filed 1993-04-19(a)

RCW 69.50.401(a) defines the crime charged against Armstrong: "[I]t is unlawful for any person to . . . deliver ... a controlled substance." The statute does not expressly include an intent requirement.

Section 69.50.401(a) requires proof that a defendant possessed a controlled substance with intent to deliver, and that intent must be supported by evidence beyond possession itself.

State v. Davis · filed 1995-10-26(a)

The State, however, must prove that the defendant intended to deliver the controlled substance — presently or at some time in the future. ... As applied here, the intent to deliver must logically follow as a matter of probability from the evidence presented — evidence in addition to possession. ... There is not enough evidence before us to infer the specific criminal intent to deliver required by the statute. Intent to deliver does not follow as a matter of logical probability.

Section 69.50.401 proscribes marijuana use and represents a valid exercise of the State’s police power.

State on Behalf of Hendrix v. Waters · filed 1998-02-17

RCW 69.50.401 proscribes marijuana use. This statute has withstood constitutional scrutiny, and represents a valid exercise of the State’s police power.

RCW 69.50.401 is constitutional as applied to possession of marijuana in the home for personal use.

State v. Seagull · filed 1980-04-30

In their final assignment of error defendants allege that RCW 69.50.401 is unconstitutional as applied to possession of marijuana in the home for personal use. The Supreme Court has just ruled on this issue. State v. Smith, 93 Wn.2d 329, 610 P.2d 869 (1980). RCW 69.50.401 is constitutional.

Section 69.50.401(a) requires proof that the defendant intended to deliver or manufacture the controlled substance.

State v. Smith · filed 1977-03-28(a)

From the plain language of the statute we conclude that the intent to deliver or manufacture a controlled substance is a required element of RCW 69.50.401(a).

Section 69.50.401 requires a delivery to involve both a deliverer and an intended recipient.

State v. Langworthy · filed 1979-05-10

RCW 69.50.401 of the act prohibits delivery of a controlled substance. A delivery is an "actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from one person to another of a controlled substance". (Italics ours.) RCW 69.50.101(f). The substantive offense of delivery thus necessarily requires the participation of two persons — the deliverer and the intended recipient. If there is no intended recipient, there can be no delivery under this statute.

Section 69.50.401 makes delivery of a controlled substance unlawful without regard to whether the person acts as a buyer or seller, or as a principal or agent, when an illegal transfer occurs.

State v. Matson · filed 1978-12-06

The Uniform Controlled Substances Act, however, provides that "it is unlawful for any person to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance." RCW 69.50.401. The definition of "deliver," herein at issue, is found in RCW 69.50.101(f): "Deliver" or "delivery" means the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from one person to another of a controlled substance, whether or not there is an agency relationship. Thus the new statute makes no distinction between the selling and the purchasing of drugs and eliminates the distinction between whether a buyer or seller acts as a principal or agent so long as an illegal transfer of a controlled substance occurs.

Section 69.50.401 treats the prohibited conduct as specific and individual acts of delivery or possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, rather than as one continuing course of activity.

State v. Walker · filed 1979-08-30(a)

The acts prohibited by the statutes are the conspiracy to deliver, or possess with intent to deliver, a controlled substance. RCW 69.50.407; 69.50.401. These statutes prohibit specific and individual acts and not simply a course of activity.

Section 69.50.401(c) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had guilty knowledge that the possessed drug was a controlled substance.

State v. Weaver · filed 1979-09-04(c)

The rationale of the Boyer and Hennings opinions applies with equal force to a charge of possession under RCW 69.50.401(c). Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause for entry of a finding of fact on the question of whether or not the defendant had guilty knowledge that the drug was a controlled substance.

Section 69.50.401(a) makes delivery of a controlled substance unlawful and requires the State to prove guilty knowledge—an understanding of the identity of the product delivered.

State v. Russell · filed 1987-05-28(a)

RCW 69.50.401(a) provides that "[e]xcept as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to . . . deliver ... a controlled substance." Although the statute does not specify a mens rea, the State must also prove "guilty knowledge," that is, an understanding of the identity of the product being delivered. ... In the present case, the defense of duress does not negate the mens rea of the crime in question. The mental state necessary for delivery of a controlled substance requires only that the defendant understand the identity of the product being delivered. This mens rea is not inconsistent with the definition of duress. Russell could have delivered the cocaine with full knowledge of what it was and still prevailed on his defense of duress, assuming there was sufficient evidence of duress to persuade the jury. The trial court acted correctly in refusing to place the burden of proof of duress on the State.

Subsection (a) does not expressly specify guilty knowledge for unlawful manufacture, but an allegation that the accused manufactured marijuana can sufficiently allege knowledge of the substance under liberal postverdict review.

State v. Wallway · filed 1994-01-07(a)

The portion of the statute making it unlawful to manufacture a controlled substance does not specify that guilty knowledge is an element of that offense. ... For purposes of this case, we assume that guilty knowledge is an element of the crime of unlawful manufacture of a controlled substance. ... Thus, under Kjorsvik's liberal standard, an allegation that the accused manufactured marijuana is at the same time an allegation that the accused had knowledge of the identity of the substance being manufactured.

Section 69.50.401(a) treats a separate and distinct intent to manufacture drugs as the unit of prosecution, allowing multiple convictions when manufacturing operations are sufficiently differentiated by time, location, or intended purpose.

In Re the Personal Restraint of Davis · filed 1999-05-28(a)

Possession with intent to deliver and possession with intent to manufacture are both prohibited under the same statute, RCW 69.50.401(a). Therefore, the "unit of prosecution" in possession with intent to manufacture cases is a separate and distinct intent to manufacture drugs.

Section 69.50.401(a)(1)(iii) treats a separate and distinct intent to manufacture drugs as a separate unit of prosecution, so separately located, self-contained marijuana grow operations may support separate convictions.

In Re Davis · filed 2000-11-02(a)(1)(iii)

We hold that each of Davis' separately located and self-contained marijuana grow operations properly served as the basis for a separate unit of prosecution under RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(iii). Accordingly, Davis' petition is denied.

Section 69.50.401(a)(1)(iii) treats a separate and distinct intent to manufacture drugs as a separate unit of prosecution, and each separately located, self-contained grow operation may support a separate charge.

In re the Personal Restraint of Davis · filed 2000-11-02(a)(1)(iii)

We hold that each of Davis’ separately located and self-contained marijuana grow operations properly served as the basis for a separate unit of prosecution under RCW 69.50.401(a)(l)(iii). Accordingly, Davis’ petition is denied.

For double-jeopardy purposes, possessing cocaine at the same time and place as part of one course of conduct is one unit of prosecution under RCW 69.50.401(d), even if charged in separate counts.

State v. Jones · filed 2003-07-21(d)

Following Adel, we look to determine what act or course of conduct our Legislature defined as the punishable act (unit of prosecution) for violating the statutory prohibition against possession of a controlled substance. ... We conclude, as the court did in Adel, that a single unit of prosecution was involved in the charged course of conduct. The conduct occurred at the same time and place, and was charged, albeit in two separate counts, as a violation of the same criminal statute, RCW 69.50.401(d).

Section 69.50.401(a) requires guilty knowledge as an element of delivering a controlled substance, and that knowledge must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. McKeown · filed 1979-06-19(a)

Holding that intent is essential to the crime, the court formulated the mens rea element in terms of "guilty knowledge": ... guilty knowledge is intrinsic to the definition of the crime itself. Guilty knowledge must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in conviction of this defendant under the statute.

Section 69.50.401(d) allows a possession conviction for any amount of a controlled substance, including residue.

State v. Malone · filed 1994-01-10(d)

Thus, we hold that RCW 69.50.401(d) does not require that a minimum amount of drug be possessed, but that possession of any amount can support a conviction.

Section 69.50.401(a) requires unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to manufacture or deliver; guilty knowledge is not an additional element of that offense.

State v. Sims · filed 1992-05-21(a)

The statutory elements of the crime are (1) unlawful possession (2) with intent to manufacture or deliver (3) a controlled substance, to wit: marijuana. RCW 69.50.401(a).

Section 69.50.401 treats a defendant’s continuous, uninterrupted possession of cocaine from multiple sources as a single possession offense for double-jeopardy purposes.

State v. Lopez · filed 1995-11-14

Here, there is no question that Mr. Lopez’ convictions are the same offense at law; they are based on violation of the same statute, RCW 69.50.401.

The former statute's ten-year maximum sentence for heroin possession was treated as equivalent to a class B felony for offender-score purposes.

State Of Washington, V Whiteash · filed 2013-12-31(a)(1)(i)

Additionally, the legislature clearly intended heroin possession to be equivalent to a class B felony. The possession statute has always stated that the maximum term of imprisonment is 10 years. Compare former RCW 69. 50. 401( 1971) with RCW 69. 50. 401. This was true both before and after the legislature amended it to specify that possession is a class B felony. LAWS OF 2003 ch. 53 § 331.

Section 69.50.401(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly delivered a controlled substance or possessed one with intent to deliver or manufacture it.

State of Washington v. Grant · filed 2017-08-10(1)

To convict a defendant of delivery of a controlled substance, the State must prove that she knowingly delivered a controlled substance. RCW 69.50.401(1). ... To convict a defendant of possession with intent to deliver or manufacture, the State must prove that she possessed a controlled substance with the intent to deliver the controlled substance. RCW 69.50.401(1).

Subsection (d) does not require the State to prove that the defendant knew the substance was illegal.

State v. Porter · filed 1999-12-23(d)

... The Porter application erroneously states that proof of knowledge is required for a successful drug possession prosecution. Knowledge is not an element of possession under RCW 69.50.401(d).

Section 69.50.401(d) prohibits unauthorized possession of a controlled substance without requiring the State to prove knowledge or intent to possess.

City of Kennewick v. Day · filed 2000-10-12(d)

Under the State provision, we have held that "[t]he State is not required to prove either knowledge or intent to possess, nor knowledge as to the nature of the substance[.]" ... Simply put, possession is a strict liability crime.

Section 69.50.401(d) requires the State to prove possession of a controlled substance; the defendant must produce some evidence of unwitting possession or a valid prescription.

State v. Brown · filed 1983-02-01(d)

RCW 69.50.401(d) makes the possession of a controlled substance a crime and the State has the burden of proving the defendant possessed the controlled substance. However, under the exception therein, the defendant has the burden *848of coming forward with some evidence that the substance was possessed unwittingly or by means of a valid prescription.

Under RCW 69.50.401(a) and (d), unlawful possession requires proof of the controlled substance’s identity and the defendant’s possession, and charging and instructing on a specific substance requires the State to prove that specific substance.

State v. Potts · filed 1998-11-17(a) and (d)

The State must establish two elements in a prosecution for unlawful possession under RCW 69.50.401(a) and (d): the nature of the substance and the fact of the defendant’s possession. ... If, however, the State charges possession of a specific substance and the court instructs that a specific substance was possessed (either at the insistence of the State or without exception from the State), then the instruction becomes the law of the case. ... Here, the State assumed the additional burden in the “to convict” instruction of proving the unnecessary element that the specific controlled substance possessed was methamphetamine. The evidence, however, does not substantially support a finding that the substance in the baggie was methamphetamine.

Section 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii) requires proof of delivery of a controlled substance and knowledge that the substance delivered was a controlled substance.

State v. DeVries · filed 2003-07-17(a)(1)(ii)

The necessary elements of the crime are (1) delivery of a controlled substance, and (2) knowledge that the substance delivered was a controlled substance. RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii); State v. Hernandez, 85 Wash.App. 672, 675, 935 P.2d 623 (1997). The State was required to plead and prove that DeVries knew that she was delivering a controlled substance. [4] State v. Nunez-Martinez, 90 Wash.App. 250, 255, 951 P.2d 823 (1998).

Section 69.50.401(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly delivered a controlled substance, including methamphetamine.

State Of Washington, V Mickens · filed 2017-06-06(1)

To convict Mickens of unlawful delivery of methamphetamine, the State must prove that knowingly delivered a controlled substance, methamphetamine. RCW 69.50.401(1). Taken in the light most favorable to the State, on July 14, A.C. entered Mickens’s house, and he purchased forty dollars’ worth of methamphetamine. Mickens gave A.C. the methamphetamine inside a straw. On July 21, A.C. purchased a bag of methamphetamine from Mickens. A rational jury could find that Mickens unlawfully delivered methamphetamine in the straw and in the bag to A.C., and thus, sufficient evidence supports his conviction on both counts.

Knowledge is not an element of unlawful possession of a controlled substance under subsection (d).

State v. Bailey · filed 1985-09-09(d)

However, the Legislature did not modify the statute after Cleppe, and it would be inappropriate to judicially require knowledge as an element of possession.

Section 69.50.401(a) does not require a separate element of guilty knowledge for possession with intent to deliver.

State v. Thompson · filed 1993-04-19(a)

The statutory elements of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver are (1) unlawful possession (2) with intent to manufacture or deliver (3) a controlled substance, to wit: cocaine. ... However, the common law element of guilty knowledge is not an element of the offense: ... Under the reasoning of Sims, Thompson's argument is without merit.

Section 69.50.401(c) does not require the State to prove that the defendant knew the nature of the substance delivered when he contracted to deliver a controlled substance and then delivered a substitute.

State v. Wilson · filed 1981-07-23(c)

That reasoning is inapplicable here. It is impossible for one to contract for the delivery of a controlled substance without knowing what he is doing, since to contract involves an intentional act. When a party has entered into such a contract and then makes a delivery in compliance with the agreement, he is guilty of delivery of a controlled substance under RCW 69.50.401(a). The element of guilty knowledge required under Boyer would be established by proof of the contract to deliver. If, on the other hand, he delivers some other substance, he has nevertheless committed a crime under RCW 69.50.401(c).

Section 69.50.401(a)(1)(i) requires proof that the defendant delivered a controlled substance and knew that it was a controlled substance; the substance's identity may be established beyond a reasonable doubt through circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences.

State v. Hernandez · filed 1997-04-18(a)(1)(i)

To find a person guilty of the unlawful delivery of a controlled substance, the trier of fact must find that the defendant (1) delivered a controlled substance and (2) knew that the substance delivered was a controlled substance. RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(i). ... This evidence and the reasonable inferences from this evidence are sufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the substance delivered by Hernandez was cocaine.

Section 69.50.401(a)(l)(i) requires proof that the defendant delivered a controlled substance and knew that the substance delivered was a controlled substance; circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences may establish the identity of the delivered substance.

State v. Hernandez · filed 1997-03-07(a)(l)(i)

To find a person guilty of the unlawful delivery of a controlled substance, the trier of fact must find that the defendant (1) delivered a controlled substance and (2) knew that the substance delivered was a controlled substance. RCW 69.50.401(a)(l)(i). ... Hernandez claims the evidence was insufficient to prove that he delivered cocaine. We disagree. This evidence and the reasonable inferences from this evidence are sufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the substance delivered by Hernandez was cocaine.

Section 69.50.401(a) makes it unlawful to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver a controlled substance, and a manufacture conviction includes nonstatutory guilty knowledge of the identity of the substance being manufactured.

State v. Warnick · filed 2004-05-25(a)

RCW 69.50.401(a) provides “it is unlawful for any person to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance.” Under RCW 69.50.401(a), offenses involving moral turpitude are considered mala in se offenses for which guilty knowledge is deemed a nonstatutory element. ... Instruction 7 correctly states the law because it required the jury to find that Ms. Warnick knew the identity of the substance being manufactured in the garage. ... As the State contends, any further element instruction would be redundant and unnecessary. Ms. Wamick’s contention fails.

Section 69.50.401(1) requires proof that the defendant knew the delivered substance was a controlled substance, even though the statute does not expressly state an intent element.

State of Washington v. Hansen · filed 2024-01-18(1)

RCW 69.50.401(1) defines unlawful delivery of a controlled substance as “[e]xcept as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance.” Though the statute does not expressly include an intent element, State v. Boyer held that guilty knowledge is intrinsic to the definition of the crime of delivery. 91 Wn.2d 342, 344, 588 P.2d 1151 (1979). Thus, the elements of the crime are: “(1) delivery of a controlled substance, and (2) knowledge that the substance delivered was a controlled substance.” State v. DeVries, 149 Wn.2d 842, 849-50, 72 P.3d 748 (2003). ... The amended information adequately implied that Mr. Hansen knew the substance he delivered was a controlled substance.

Section 69.50.401(c) does not require knowledge of the nature of the substance delivered or intent to deliver a controlled substance, and it criminalizes contracting to deliver a controlled substance followed by delivery of a substitute.

State v. Prather · filed 1981-12-14(c)

Some of these concerns were recently addressed in State v. Wilson, 95 Wn.2d 828, 631 P.2d 362 (1981), where the court held that a defendant's knowledge of the nature of the substance delivered is not an element of the offense defined by RCW 69.50.401(c). If the defendant does not have to know whether she is delivering a controlled or noncontrolled substance, then her intent to deliver one or the other is equally irrelevant in this particular context. ... In the cited statute, the legislature was obviously concerned with conduct of contracting to deliver a controlled substance and thereafter making a delivery, ostensibly pursuant to that contract, even though the transaction was a "burn" where something other than a controlled substance was delivered. ... The statute does not make the sale of a nonnarcotic substance a crime; rather it makes the contracting for delivery of a controlled substance, which is completed as a criminal offense by delivery of some substitute, a crime.

At the time of the defendant's arrest, subsection (d), rather than subsection (c), defined unlawful possession; citing subsection (c) was harmless and waived when the defendant did not raise the discrepancy and suffered no apparent unfair-trial prejudice.

State v. Southard · filed 1982-07-21(c) (d)

The information charged defendant with violating RCW 69.50.401(c). The judgment incorporates this statute in its own statement of the crime. At the time of defendant's arrest, however, RCW 69.50.401(d), which had been in effect since March 21, 1979, defined the crime of unlawful possession. Laws of 1979, ch. 67, § 1. Because defendant did not raise this discrepancy, and because it did not appear to deprive him of a fair trial in any way whatsoever, we consider any error to be harmless and waived.

Section 69.50.401(a) requires proof that a defendant delivering a controlled substance had guilty knowledge—that the defendant knew the substance was a controlled substance.

State v. Riggins · filed 1983-04-04(a)

Riggins correctly contends that guilty knowledge is a required element of the offense of delivery of a controlled substance. State v. Boyer, 91 Wn.2d 342, 588 P.2d 1151 (1979). Cf. State v. Cleppe, 96 Wn.2d 373, 635 P.2d 435 (1981) (guilty knowledge not an element of illegal possession). WPIC 50.06(2), in its suggested instruction on this offense, includes as an element, "[t]hat the defendant knew it was a controlled substance". Instruction 3 makes no reference to the State's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had guilty knowledge, which in this case would amount to knowledge that the baggie contained a controlled substance. The instruction was, therefore, clearly erroneous.

For delivery under § 69.50.401(a), the State must prove that the defendant knowingly understood the identity of the controlled substance being delivered.

State v. Nieblas-Duarte · filed 1989-08-21(a)

The statute under which Nieblas-Duarte was charged, RCW 69.50.401(a), makes it unlawful to "manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance." When the crime charged under this provision is delivery of a controlled substance, the State must also prove an additional, court imposed element: that the defendant acted with guilty knowledge, i.e., that he or she understood the identity of the product being delivered. ... We therefore hold that because the Nieblas-Duarte information contains the phrase "unlawfully and feloniously," it conveys the knowledge element and meets constitutional criteria.

To convict for delivery of a controlled substance, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly actually or constructively transferred, or attempted to transfer, a controlled substance; entrapment does not negate those elements.

State v. Casbeer · filed 1987-07-20(a)

In order to convict a defendant of delivery of a controlled substance, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, with guilty knowledge, actually or constructively transferred or attempted to transfer to another person a controlled substance. ... Casbeer admits that he knew he was giving Lowry marijuana. Thus, he does not dispute the elements necessary for conviction of delivery of a controlled substance. ... Proof of the elements of entrapment does not negate any of the elements of the crime of delivery of a controlled substance. Thus, McCullum, Acosta, and Hicks are inapplicable to the situation here.

Section 69.50.401(a)'s simple-delivery offense includes guilty knowledge that the delivered substance is a controlled substance, and alleging that the delivery was "unlawful" necessarily implies that knowledge.

State v. Johnson · filed 1993-05-17(a)

Use of the word "unlawfully" necessarily implies guilty knowledge that the delivered substance is a controlled substance under the statute.

A charge of unlawful delivery under § 69.50.401(a) must allege that the defendant knew the identity of the substance delivered; citing the statute alone does not supply that element.

State v. Kitchen · filed 1991-07-16(a)

Here, the statutory references in the informations are not helpful because the statute itself does not set forth the element of guilty knowledge. Nor do the allegations that defendants delivered cocaine to undercover agents remedy the complaints' shortcomings. Nothing contained in that statement implies the defendants knew the identity of the substance delivered. The informations neither expressly nor impliedly include the court-imposed element of guilty knowledge.

Section 69.50.401(a) requires knowledge that the substance being delivered is controlled, but not knowledge of its exact chemical or street name.

State v. Nunez-Martinez · filed 1998-02-27(a)

In our view, the guilty knowledge required by Boyer is knowledge that the substance being delivered is a controlled substance. It is not knowledge of the substance’s exact chemical or street name.

Section 69.50.401(c) is violated when a person offers a controlled substance and then delivers a noncontrolled substance in its place; the State must prove both acts.

State v. Simmons · filed 1983-12-20(c)

Under RCW 69.50.401(c), the State must prove (1) offer of a controlled substance and (2) delivery of a noncontrolled substance. ... Mr. Simmons' conduct fell directly within the prohibition of RCW 69.50.401(c). The State correctly charged him; the court correctly denied his motion.

Section 69.50.401(a) makes possession of a controlled substance unlawful, including naturally occurring psilocybin mushrooms.

State v. Patterson · filed 1984-04-09(a)

The Uniform Controlled Substances Act, RCW 69.50, makes it unlawful to "possess ... a controlled substance." RCW 69.50.401(a). "Controlled substance" is defined to include a "substance ... in Schedules I through V . . ." RCW 69.50.101(d). Schedule I includes "any material . . . which contains any quantity of . . . Psilocybin." RCW 69.50.204(d)(18). The key word "material" means "consisting of matter." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1392 (1976). This meaning is sufficiently explicit to include substances in their natural state as well as chemical derivatives or compounds. We conclude that it was the clear legislative intent to include the psilocybin mushroom as a controlled substance.

Section 69.50.401(c) requires proof that the accused arranged to deliver a controlled substance and then delivered a noncontrolled substance, including proof of the nature of the substance delivered, although expert chemical analysis is not essential.

State v. EDDIE A. · filed 1985-05-21(c)

Under the plain language of RCW 69.50.401(c), the State must establish the accused arranged to deliver a controlled substance and then, ostensibly pursuant to that agreement, delivered a noncontrolled substance. ... When RCW 69.50.401(c) is read in conjunction with RCW 69.50.401(a), delivery of a controlled substance, it is clear the two sections describe separate and distinct offenses. Both offenses require proof of the nature of the substance delivered. If the State fails to prove what substance was delivered, it has not established which crime was committed, and thus has not proved the elements for either offense.

Under § 69.50.401(a), misdemeanor possession of marijuana is a lesser included offense of delivery because proving delivery necessarily requires actual or constructive possession.

State v. Wilson · filed 1985-08-06(a)

Mr. Wilson contends the trial court erred in refusing to give his requested instruction on the lesser included offense of possession. We agree. A misdemeanor charge of possession of marijuana is a lesser included offense of the crime of delivery of marijuana. ... In order to establish "delivery", the State was required to prove the "actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from one person to another of a controlled substance, ..." RCW 69.50.101(f). In this case, this necessarily required actual or constructive possession by the accused. The evidence presented at trial by the State itself included actual possession, i.e., physical custody of the controlled substance.

Under § 69.50.401, possession of a controlled substance is a lesser included offense of delivery of a controlled substance.

State v. Netling · filed 1987-01-07(c) (d)

The possession of cocaine charge was not a separate offense but rather a lesser included offense of the delivery charge.

Under § 69.50.401, possession of 40 grams or less of marijuana is a lesser included offense of delivery, but a possession instruction is required only when the evidence supports finding possession without delivery.

State v. Rodriguez · filed 1987-08-10(a), (e)

The appellant was charged with a violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, i.e., the delivery of marijuana to a Seattle police officer. RCW 69.50.401(a). ... At the end of the trial, defendant's counsel objected to the trial court's failure to give his proposed instructions on the lesser included offense of possession of 40 grams or less of marijuana. RCW 69.50.401(e). The trial court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support the instruction. We agree. ... In summary, there was no dispute regarding delivery, the key element distinguishing delivery from possession. Absent any disputed evidence on this issue, the trier of fact could not rationally find the defendant innocent of delivery and guilty of possession. ... Consequently, the defendant was guilty either of delivery or not at all, the factual prong of Workman was not satisfied, and the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's requested instructions.

Section 69.50.401(a)(1)(iii) authorizes a fine of up to $10,000, so the trial court's $2,000 fine was within the statutory limit.

State v. Phelps · filed 2002-09-13(a)(1)(iii)

The trial court imposed a $2,000 fine, which is well below the maximum authorized fine of $10,000, and directed it to be paid out of the separate $86,000 civil forfeiture settlement agreement. See RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(iii) (authorizing not more than a $10,000 fine).

Section 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii) makes the drug-site cleanup contribution discretionary with the trial court, and if a fine is imposed, the first $3,000 collected goes to the cleanup fund.

State v. Wood · filed 2003-06-05(a)(1)(ii)

We interpret this to mean that a person such as Mr. Wood, who has been convicted of a crime involving methamphetamine, may be punished by imprisonment, or a fine, or both. If a fine is imposed, the first $3,000 collected must go to the drug site cleanup fund. We do not interpret the statute as requiring a mandatory $3,000 fine as suggested by the State. As written, the statute authorizing a contribution to the drug cleanup fund is discretionary with the trial court.

For an offense under § 69.50.401(a)(l)(ii), the five-year imprisonment/$10,000 fine maximum marks the upper end of an undefined sentencing range in which the judge retains discretion to tailor an exceptional sentence.

State v. Stalker · filed 1985-10-10(a)(l)(ii)

The maximum sentence which could have been imposed is 5 years' imprisonment and/or a $10,000 fine. RCW 69.50.401(a)(l)(ii). ... The concept of an undefined range between the maximum sentence available under RCW 69.50.401(a)(l)(ii) and the presumptive sentencing range of 1 to 3 months was intended to allow the judge some degree of discretion in tailoring the sentence to the person and the crime before him. ... The adoption of any fixed restriction on the discretion of the sentencing judge is better left to the Legislature.

Section 69.50.401(a) prohibits delivery of a controlled substance, and delivery may be accomplished through an actual, constructive, or attempted transfer, including a transfer through an intermediary.

State v. Campbell · filed 1990-08-27(a)

A delivery within the meaning of RCW 69.50.401(a) can be accomplished by "the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer" of a controlled substance "from one person to another".

Section 69.50.401(a) makes an illegal transfer of a controlled substance punishable as delivery regardless of whether the participant acts as a buyer's or seller's agent, so the procuring-agent defense is unavailable.

State v. Grace · filed 1991-07-08(a)

The Uniform Controlled Substances Act, however, prohibits "any person to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance." RCW 69.50.401. Deliver is defined in RCW 69.50.101(f): "'Deliver' or 'delivery' means the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from one person to another of a controlled substance, whether or not there is an agency relationship. " ... [T]he new statute makes no distinction between the selling and the purchasing of drugs and eliminates the distinction between whether a buyer or seller acts as a principal or agent so long as an illegal transfer of a controlled substance occurs.

Section 69.50.401(d) prohibits unauthorized possession of a controlled substance, and the possession offense is not concurrent with RCW 69.50.412(1) because a person may violate the paraphernalia-use statute without possessing a controlled substance.

State v. Williams · filed 1991-09-09(d)

As was demonstrated previously, a defendant may violate the paraphernalia statute, RCW 69.50.412(1), although his conduct does not violate the statute prohibiting possession of controlled substances, RCW 69.50-.401(d). We therefore conclude that the two statutes are not concurrent.

Possession of a large quantity of drugs together with cash, scales, gloves, and repackaging materials supports a rational inference that the possessor intended to deliver the controlled substance.

State v. Zamora · filed 1991-10-15(a)(1)(i)

Mr. Zamora first contends that while the evidence is sufficient to establish his constructive possession of the cocaine found in his office, it is insufficient to establish an intent to deliver. He is mistaken. ... An inference of intent must flow rationally from the evidence produced. ... A large quantity of drugs, along with large amounts of cash, scales, gloves and repackaging materials leads to a rational and logical inference of intent to deliver. ... Here, any rational trier of fact could have found Mr. Zamora possessed the cocaine with intent to deliver.

Section 69.50.401(a) includes knowledge as a required mental element of the underlying controlled-substance offense.

State v. Carter · filed 1992-01-28(a)

The sentence enhancement statutes do not offend constitutional guaranties by denying a defense based on lack of knowledge; the underlying crime, RCW 69.50.401(a), includes a mental element, knowledge.

Section 69.50.401(a)'s unlawful-delivery offense includes a guilty-knowledge element: the defendant must know the identity or nature of the controlled substance delivered, and a pretrial information charging only that the defendant acted unlawfully is insufficient.

State v. Johnson · filed 1992-05-21(a)

Because knowledge is an essential element, it is subject to the Kjorsvik mandate of inclusion in the charging document. ... Rather, due to the context of a pretrial challenge, we construe the charging language strictly; because each petitioner was simply charged with "unlawfully deliver[ing] a controlled substance", the informations failed to contain language clearly suggesting the requisite criminal intent. ... We decline to find "unlawfully" has the same meaning and import as "knowingly"; "unlawfully"; standing alone, is insufficient.

Section 69.50.401(a)(1)(i) requires delivery of a Schedule I or II narcotic drug, but naming cocaine sufficiently alleges that classification because cocaine is a Schedule II narcotic.

State v. Marquez · filed 1992-06-09(a)(1)(i)

Here, cocaine is a schedule II narcotic drug. RCW 69.50.206(b)(5). The words "a narcotic from schedule I or II" would add nothing to the amended information. The essential statutory elements are properly set out in the amended information and Mr. Marquez was fully informed of the elements of the offense charged.

Section 69.50.401(a)(1)(i) requires sufficient evidence of intent to deliver, and possession of 1.3 grams of cocaine, together with the circumstances presented here, was insufficient to establish that intent.

State v. Wade · filed 1999-12-10(a)(1)(i)

We hold that the admissible evidence is insufficient to support a conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, but it is sufficient to support a conviction for simple possession.

Section 69.50.401(a)(l)(i) prohibits possessing cocaine with intent to deliver, and the court held that the evidence was sufficient to prove that intent.

State v. Campos · filed 2000-04-06(a)(l)(i)

Mr. Campos was charged with possessing cocaine with intent to deliver under RCW 69.50.401(a)(l)(i). ... In sum, although Mr. Campos attempted to offset the State’s evidence with innocent explanations, the jury resolved the factual issues in favor of the State. ... We hold the evidence was sufficient to support a jury finding that Mr. Campos possessed cocaine with the intent to sell it.

Section 69.50.401(a) requires proof that the defendant intended to deliver the controlled substance presently or at some future time; possession alone generally does not establish that intent.

State v. Darden · filed 2002-03-07(a)

To convict for possession of controlled substance with intent to deliver, the State must show the defendant intended to deliver the substance presently or at some future time. RCW 69.50.401(a); State v. Davis, 79 Wash.App. 591, 904 P.2d 306 (1995). Naked possession of a controlled substance is generally insufficient to establish an inference of an intent to deliver. State v. Brown, 68 Wash.App. 480, 485, 843 P.2d 1098 (1993) ("[c]onvictions for possession with intent to deliver are highly fact specific and require substantial corroborating evidence in addition to the mere fact of possession"). Rather, reported Washington cases in which intent to deliver was inferred from possession of narcotics all seem to involve at least one additional factor.

Section 69.50.401(a) requires substantial corroborating evidence beyond mere possession to prove intent to deliver; an officer's opinion about the amount normally carried for personal use is insufficient by itself.

State v. Brown · filed 1993-01-19(a)

Convictions for possession with intent to deliver are highly fact specific and require substantial corroborating evidence in addition to the mere fact of possession. Based on the facts before us, we hold that the officer's opinion as to what a person would carry for normal use is insufficient to justify a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Brown possessed the cocaine in question with intent to deliver.

Section 69.50.401(a) requires the controlled substance possessed to be the same controlled substance the defendant intends to deliver.

State v. Robbins · filed 1993-03-04(a)

Evidence is not sufficient to support a conviction for possession with intent to deliver unless a rational trier could find that the defendant possessed the same cocaine he intended to deliver. RCW 69.50.401(a) states that "it is unlawful for any person to . . . possess with intent to . . . deliver, a controlled substance", and the plain meaning of this language is that possession and intent to deliver refer to the same quantity of controlled substance.

Section 69.50.401(a) requires an intent to deliver a controlled substance but does not require an intent to deliver it within any particular area.

State v. McGee · filed 1993-12-09(a)

RCW 69.50.401(a) does not require an intent to deliver within a particular area, only an intent to deliver.

Section 69.50.401(a) prohibits unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, and intent to deliver requires substantial corroborating evidence beyond mere possession, such as drugs possessed with a large amount of cash.

State v. Hagler · filed 1994-05-16(a)

The statutory elements of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver are: (1) unlawful possession (2) with intent to deliver (3) a controlled substance; in this case, cocaine. RCW 69.50.401(a); ... Here, the only issue is whether a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the element of intent to deliver. ... At least one additional factor is required for an inference of intent to deliver. ... The additional factor must be suggestive of sale as opposed to mere possession in order to provide substantial corroborating evidence of intent to deliver. ... Here, accompanying the possession of 24 rocks of cocaine, the additional element suggestive of sale is the sum of $342 in the hands of a juvenile. The inference from that much cash provided circumstantial evidence for the trial court to weigh in deciding that the State had met its burden of proof. ... Viewing the amount of drugs and cash possessed by a juvenile in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Hagler possessed the cocaine with intent to deliver. Accordingly, we affirm.

Section 69.50.401(a) makes possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver a distinct offense requiring proof of possession and intent to deliver.

State v. Gocken · filed 1995-06-22(a)

A person is guilty of possessing a controlled substance with intent to deliver when: with an intent to deliver, a person possesses a controlled substance. RCW 69.50.401(a). Double jeopardy is avoided under a Blockburger analysis because possession of drug paraphernalia and possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver have separate elements. Possession of drug paraphernalia requires use of drug paraphernalia, while possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver does not. Likewise, possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver requires proof of an intent to deliver a controlled substance while possession of drug paraphernalia does not.

Section 69.50.401(a) makes possession with intent to deliver a greater offense than simple possession under subsection (d), and a defendant may not receive convictions for both offenses when they arise from one continuous possession because they are the same offense for double-jeopardy purposes.

State v. O'CONNOR · filed 1997-07-25(a), (d)

Possession with intent to deliver contains an element not found in possession: intent to deliver. RCW 69.50.401(a), (d). But possession does not contain an element not found in possession with intent to deliver. ... Accordingly, we hold that under a double jeopardy analysis, O’Connor cannot be convicted of both possession and possession with intent to deliver.

Possession of a large quantity of a controlled substance, together with an additional corroborating factor such as substantial cash or other evidence of drug sales, can support a finding of intent to deliver.

State v. Campos · filed 2000-04-06(a)(1)(i)

Possession of a controlled substance, without more, is insufficient to establish an inference of intent to deliver. ... Where intent to deliver is inferred from possession of a large quantity of a controlled substance, some additional factor must be present. ... This qualifies as an additional factor showing intent under Hagler and Lopez.

Section 69.50.401(a) makes it unlawful to possess a controlled substance with intent to deliver, and conviction requires proof of that intent.

State v. Miller · filed 1998-05-22(a)

Under RCW 69.50.401(a), it is unlawful for any person to possess a controlled substance with intent to deliver. ... Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom, there is sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Miller had intent to deliver the drugs. McCroskey found drugs packaged in amounts appropriate for individual use, approximately 25 empty plastic bindles, a list with names, numbers and “monetary marks” on it, $96, and a knife. When considered along with McCroskey’s testimony on the significance of such items, this evidence is sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, Miller’s intent to deliver drugs.

Section 69.50.401(a)(l)(i) requires proof of unlawful possession of a controlled substance and an intent to deliver it.

State v. Atsbeha · filed 1999-07-19(a)(l)(i)

The elements of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver under RCW 69.50.401(a)(l)(i) are “(1) unlawful possession (2) with intent to deliver (3) a controlled substance[.]”

Section 69.50.401(a) requires proof that the defendant manufactured a controlled substance or possessed a controlled substance with intent to deliver; fingerprints on manufacturing equipment supported manufacture, but an incomplete process and no finished drugs could not support possession with intent to deliver.

State v. Todd · filed 2000-08-17(a)

The State had to prove that Mr. Todd manufactured methamphetamine. ... We agree. It was reasonable for the trier of fact to infer that, more likely than not, Mr. Todd manufactured methamphetamine based on his fingerprints. ... The State also had to prove that Mr. Todd possessed methamphetamine with the intent to deliver. ... Possession with intent to deliver requires that the defendant have something—that is that he possess drugs to deliver. Intent to deliver must logically follow as a matter of probability from the evidence presented in addition to possession. ... Even accepting the State's argument that the "box lab" supported a large-scale operation, there still must have been something to deliver. That is, the manufacturing process must have been completed and the methamphetamine must have been on hand to deliver to someone. Here, the methamphetamine manufacturing process was incomplete. Mr. Todd had no drugs to deliver. He could not therefore possess with the intent to deliver. We affirm Mr. Todd's conviction for manufacture of methamphetamine and reverse his conviction for possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver.

Section 69.50.401(a) makes it unlawful to possess a controlled substance with intent to manufacture or deliver, and that intent requires more than bare possession or quantity alone.

State v. Huynh · filed 2001-06-29(a)(1)(i)

At issue here is whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support the "intent to manufacture or deliver" element of this offense. RCW 69.50.401(a). ... An inference of intent to deliver may not be based on "`bare possession of a controlled substance, absent other facts and circumstances[.]'" ... Proof of mere possession of a large quantity of a controlled substance, without an additional factor, may not support a finding of intent to deliver. ... "The additional factor must be suggestive of sale as opposed to mere possession in order to provide substantial corroborating evidence of intent to deliver." ... But a police officer's opinion that a defendant possessed more drugs than normal for personal use is insufficient as corroborating evidence to establish intent to deliver. ... We conclude that no rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Huynh possessed the cocaine with intent to deliver based on the arguments presented by the State.