Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.030

A restitution victim under former RCW 9.94A.030(32) must suffer financial injury or property loss directly from the charged crime.

State v. Awawdeh · filed 1994-01-04(32)

Here, neither the sheriff's office nor RIAA has shown a financial injury or loss of property as a direct result of the crime charged. Former RCW 9.94A.030(32). RIAA is a nonprofit trade association. Record companies and musicians may have lost profits as a result of Mr. Awawdeh's activities, but RIAA has not. Therefore, RIAA and the sheriff's office Eire not victims as contemplated by former RCW 9.94A.030 (32).

A restitution recipient who has no compensable injury from the crime is not a victim under § 9.94A.030(37).

State v. Kisor · filed 1996-05-31(37)

A restitution recipient must be a "victim”. The statute defines victim as a "person who has sustained emotional, psychological, physical, or financial injury to person or property as a direct result of the crime charged.” RCW 9.94A.030(37). As Officer Mitchum did not claim a compensable injury, i.e. emotional or psychological harm for which he incurred counseling costs, or physical harm for which he incurred treatment expenses or lost wages, he is not a statutory victim.

The definition of victim includes limited partners whose financial losses were proximately caused by the crime charged.

State v. Branch · filed 1996-08-01(37)

The SRA defines a victim as "any person who has sustained emotional, psychological, physical, or financial injury to person or property as a direct result of the crime charged." RCW 9.94A.030(37). ... In this case, the limited partners' monetary losses were proximately caused by Branch's criminal conduct. As a matter of law, the sentencing court did not err in finding the 180 limited partners constitute multiple victims.

A person whose injuries are proximately caused by conduct forming the basis of a charged crime may be a victim under subsection (37), including an injured person denied assistance after a hit and run.

State v. Bourne · filed 1998-05-01(37)

A “victim” is “any person who has sustained emotional, physiological, physical, or financial injury to person or property as a direct result of the crime charged.” RCW 9.94A.030(37). ... The three passengers may be considered “victims” for purposes of determining whether there were “multiple victims” of the felony hit and run.

Section 9.94A.030(37) includes DSHS as a restitution victim when it pays the crime victims' expenses.

State v. Hahn · filed 2000-04-14(37)

Here, there is no question that DSHS qualifies as a victim for purposes of restitution under RCW 9.94A.142. See Davison, 116 Wash.2d at 920-21, 809 P.2d 1374 (city is "victim" for purposes of restitution because it paid wages to victim while victim could not work); State v. Jeffries, 42 Wash. App. 142, 144-45, 709 P.2d 819 (1985) (reimbursement to L & I for disability and medial expenses of assault victim); former RCW 9.94A.030(37) (1996).

Section 9.94A.030(40) defines a victim by injury directly resulting from the charged crime. Unlawful possession of a firearm victimizes the general public; possession of stolen property or firearms victimizes the property owner.

State v. Haddock · filed 2000-07-13(40)

A holding that the victim of all eight counts of unlawful possession of firearms is the general public is consistent with the definition of "victim" in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA): "any person who has sustained emotional, psychological, physical, or financial injury to person or property as a direct result of the crime charged." RCW 9.94A.030(40). Any injury Haddock's former girlfriend and her friends may have suffered was a direct result of Haddock's brandishing the guns, not his unlawful possession of them. On the other hand, we are satisfied that the victims of the six counts of possession of stolen firearms and the one count of possession of stolen property were the owners of the firearms and property, the Chrismans.

An insurer that pays for damage caused by a crime suffers financial injury as a direct result of the crime and qualifies as a victim.

State v. Ewing · filed 2000-09-05(40)

The statute impliedly limits restitution to victims; [6] a "victim" is defined as "any person who has sustained emotional, psychological, physical, or financial injury to person or property as a direct result of the crime charged." [7] ... Safeco incurred a financial loss as a direct result of Ewing's arson.

A spouse is a victim under this definition when arson directly causes her emotional or property injury, even if the burned home was jointly owned.

State v. Goodman · filed 2001-09-07(43)

Under these circumstances, we hold that Goodman's wife "sustained emotional, psychological, physical, or financial injury to person or property as a direct result of the crime charged." RCW 9.94A.030(43). As such, she was a victim of the arson.

Section 9.94A.030(44) defines “victim” for the Sentencing Reform Act, and that definition has no bearing outside the Act.

State v. McReynolds · filed 2003-06-10(44)

This extrapolation of the term "victim" to the unit-of-prosecution analysis is unfounded. The term has a specific meaning under the SRA, see RCW 9.94A.030(44), and its meaning extends beyond the immediate victim of a crime. State v. Davison, 116 Wash.2d 917, 920-21, 809 P.2d 1374 (1991). The definition has no bearing outside the confines of the SRA.

Section 9.94A.030(44) defines a victim as a person directly injured by the crime; an unpaid prior lienholder that had not covered another party's loss did not qualify.

State v. Kinneman · filed 2004-08-16(44)

RCW 9.94A.030(44) defines "victim" as "any person who has sustained emotional, psychological, physical, or financial injury to person or property as a direct result of the crime charged." ... Since Union Planters Bank had not provided Option One or Brown with money to cover their losses, however, subrogation principles are inapplicable. The trial court was limited to awarding restitution to Kinneman's victims. It did not err in denying an award to Union Planters Bank because Union Planters Bank was not a "victim" within the meaning of the statute.

Section 9.94A.030(53) defines a victim to include a witness targeted by tampering, even if the witness ultimately testifies.

State v. Victoria · filed 2009-05-11(53)

Pursuant to the SRA, a victim is "any person who has sustained emotional, psychological, physical, or financial injury to person or property as a direct result of the crime charged." RCW 9.94A.030(53). ... That Victoria was unable to dissuade Edwards and Moore from testifying is of no moment in determining their status as victims. ... Because Victoria tampered with two different witnesses, each of whom was a victim of his unlawful machinations, the trial court correctly ruled that his two convictions for tampering with a witness did not encompass the same criminal conduct.

Section 9.94A.030’s definition of “victim” yields when context clearly requires otherwise, allowing the domestic violence pattern aggravator to account for abuse of victims other than the victim of the charged offense.

State v. Sweat · filed 2013-03-18(53)

While Sweat contends that the definition of “victim” contemplates only those who suffered injury from the charged crime, the statute read as a whole indicates otherwise. RCW 9.94A.030 provides that the definitions in this section apply throughout the chapter, “[ujnless the context clearly requires otherwise.” Here, the context does otherwise require: the statute contemplates abuse that was not the direct result of the charged crime by referring to abuse “manifested by multiple incidents over a prolonged period of time” and stating that the current offense was “part of an ongoing pattern” of abuse.

The definition of “victim” in § 9.94A.030(53) does not limit the domestic violence pattern aggravator to people harmed by the charged crime.

State Of Washington v. Thaves · filed 2013-06-10(53)

We recently rejected such an argument in State v. Sweat. Wn. App. , 297 P.3d 73 (2013) (to present sufficient evidence to support RCW 9.94A.535(3)(h)(i) aggravating factor, State is not limited by RCW 9.94A.030(53)'s definition of "victim" to only those who suffered injury from the charged crime).

A victim under the Sentencing Reform Act can be society as a whole when a crime directly injures it, even if specific people also suffer secondary harm.

State v. Davis · filed 2013-09-20(53)

This view is also consistent with RCW 9.94A-.030(53)’s definition of “victim,” since society qua society may be directly injured by certain crimes that have an indirect or secondary, but nonetheless “destructive and foreseeable,” effect on specific individuals.

A restitution recipient must have suffered emotional, psychological, physical, or financial injury to person or property as a direct result of the charged crime; being a judgment creditor alone is insufficient.

State v. Cosgaya-Alvarez · filed 2013-01-14(53)

We disagree. ... Unlike enforcement of a judgment by a creditor, restitution under the SRA is limited to compensation to the victim for injury, damage, or loss of property. RCW 9.94A-.753(5). The SRA defines a “victim” as “any person who has sustained emotional, psychological, physical, or financial injury to person or property as a direct result of the crime charged.” RCW 9.94A.030(53).

Section 9.94A.030's definition of “victim” does not apply when the context of the domestic violence aggravator clearly requires a broader definition.

State v. Sweat · filed 2014-04-03(53)

And the context ofRCW 9.94A.535(3)(h)(i) clearly requires us to use a broader definition of"victim" than the one provided in RCW 9.94A.030(53).

Section 9.94A.030(53) defines a victim for restitution purposes; the State does not qualify as a victim when it incurs extradition expenses to prosecute an offense that did not directly victimize it.

State v. Cawyer · filed 2014-07-29(53)

A “victim” is “any person who has sustained emotional, psychological, physical, or financial injury to person or property as a direct result of the crime charged.” RCW 9.94A.030(53). ... Thus, we hold that the State does not qualify as a victim of Cawyer’s custodial interference because Cawyer’s offense neither directly victimized the State nor caused the State to incur expenses to assist those who were directly victimized by Cawyer’s offense.

A victim is a person who suffers emotional, psychological, physical, or financial injury to person or property as a direct result of the charged crime.

State Of Washington, Resp. v. Reinhard Wysgoll, App. · filed 2014-11-17(53)

RCW 9.94A.030(53) defines "victim" as "any person who has sustained emotional, psychological, physical, or financial injury to person or property as a direct result of the crime charged." ... Both offenses involved the same victims and produced the same harm to them.

Section 9.94A.030(53) defines a victim as a person directly injured by the charged crime; that definition applies to the destructive impact sentencing aggravator.

State v. Davis · filed 2014-12-24(53)

In the context of RCW 9.94A.535(3)(r), the standard definition makes clear sense-the victim of the offense is injured as a direct result of the crime, while persons other than the victim suffer a destructive impact caused by the crime in an indirect but foreseeable way.

A company billed for unauthorized purchases made with its fuel card is a victim when the charges create a financial liability directly resulting from the crime.

State Of Washington v. Vinod Chandra Ram · filed 2016-07-25(54)

Here, the trucking companies were the direct victims of Ram's crimes.

Section 9.94A.030(54) defines a theft victim broadly enough to include someone directly injured by the theft who did not own the stolen property.

State Of Washington v. Creamer · filed 2019-01-15(54)

First, regarding Creamer’s ownership argument, a theft “victim” for purposes of a same criminal conduct analysis may extend beyond persons with an ownership interest in the stolen property.

Former subsection (54) defines a victim as a person directly injured by the charged crime; victim status is determined separately for each offense.

State Of Washington v. Smith · filed 2020-02-11(54)

Former RCW 9.94A.030(54) (2015) defined “victim” as “any person who has sustained emotional, psychological, physical, or financial injury to person or property as a direct result of the crime charged.” ... Here, as the purchaser of stolen property, only Askay was a victim of Smith’s trafficking in stolen property offense. ... Because Smith’s forgery offenses had victims that were not victims of his trafficking in stolen property offense, the trial court properly found that the crimes did not encompass the same criminal conduct.

Ordinary investigation costs do not make the State a victim unless the crime directly harms it or the costs assist someone directly victimized.

State Of Washington v. Reeves · filed 2020-11-02(54)

A victim is defined as “any person who has sustained emotional, psychological, physical, or financial injury to person or property as a direct result of the crime charged.” RCW 9.94A.030(54). ... Reeves’s case is more analogous to Cawyer because her crime did not directly victimize the State, or cause the State to incur expenses to assist others directly victimized by the offense. Any costs incurred by the task force constituted ordinary investigation costs.

Section 9.94A.030(54) defines a victim as a person who sustains emotional, psychological, physical, or financial injury directly from the charged crime.

State Of Washington v. Abdi-issa · filed 2021-02-16(54)

The legislature defines “victim” as “any person who has sustained emotional, psychological, physical, or financial injury to person or property as a direct result of the crime charged.” RCW 9.94A.030(54). So, under the plain language of RCW 9.94A.535(3)(r) and .030(54), the aggravator applies only if the victim of the charged crime is a person.

Section 9.94A.030(54) defines a victim as a person who suffers injury to person or property as a direct result of the crime charged.

State Of Washington v. Johnson · filed 2021-03-15(54)

Here, because Johnson’s crime did not directly victimize the Task Force or cause it to incur expenses to assist persons directly victimized by the offense, we ... conclude the Task Force was not a “victim” entitled to restitution in this case.

A victim under RCW 9.94A.030(54) must have sustained injury as a direct result of the charged crime, which requires proximate cause.

State Of Washington, V. Carroll Jr. · filed 2021-11-08(54)

Like the crime victims’ compensation act, RCW 9.94A.030(54) defines “victim” with a proximate cause requirement: “‘Victim’ means any person who has sustained emotional, psychological, physical, or financial injury to person or property as a direct result of the crime charged.”

Section 9.94A.030(54) includes a person who suffers injury as a direct result of animal cruelty within the definition of “victim.”

State v. Abdi-Issa · filed 2022-02-17(54)

The definition of “victim” under the SRA includes Fairbanks because she sustained an injury as a direct result of the crime charged.

A victim must suffer injury directly from the charged crime; a domestic violence victim must suffer the abuse described in the statute as part of a pattern of controlling behavior.

State of Washington v. McVay · filed 2025-08-05(54), (55)

Contrary to the State’s argument, and even under a broad interpretation, a victim still must have “sustained emotional, psychological, physical, or financial injury to person or property as a direct result of the crime charged.” RCW 9.94A.030(54). Furthermore, an intimate partner domestic violence victim must have “been subjected to the infliction of physical harm or sexual and psychological abuse by an intimate partner or household member as part of a pattern of assaultive, coercive, and controlling behaviors directed at achieving compliance from or control over that intimate partner or household member.” RCW 9.94A.030(55). ... Here, there was no evidence of Ms. Vargas sustaining an injury under either definition.

Section 9.94A.030(29)(a) classifies second-degree assault as a violent offense for offender-score purposes.

State v. Pittman · filed 1989-05-08(29)(a)

Because Pittman's convictions are for violent offenses as defined in RCW 9.94A.030(29)(a), formerly codified at RCW 9.94A.030(26)(a), each has an offender score of 2.

First degree kidnapping is a serious violent offense under RCW 9.94A.030.

State v. Godwin · filed 1990-05-04

Kidnapping in the first degree is clearly a "serious violent offense." RCW 9.94A.030.

Section 9.94A.030(27) includes first degree rape among serious violent offenses.

State v. Hicks · filed 1991-07-18(27)

Serious violent offenses include rape in the first degree, the offenses involved here. RCW 9.94A.030(27).

Section 9.94A.030(33)(a) defines any class A felony as a violent offense.

State v. Collicott · filed 1992-06-04(33)(a)

Each of the three offenses meets the definition of "violent offense" under RCW 9.94A.030(33)(a), "Any felony defined under any law as a class A felony. . .".

Former § 9.94A.030(29) does not classify attempted second-degree robbery as a violent offense.

State v. Becker · filed 1990-12-17(29)

In doing so, attempted robbery in the second degree is not a violent offense under former RCW 9.94A.030(29) as Becker contends.

First degree robbery is a violent offense under former RCW 9.94A.030(26)(a) for offender-score purposes.

Matter of Personal Restraint of Holmes · filed 1993-04-06(26)(a)

The offender score for the Kittitas County first degree robbery conviction, defined as a violent offense in former RCW 9.94A.030(26)(a), is calculated under former RCW 9.94A-.360(8): ... the two Pacific County kidnapping convictions and ... the attempted rape count 2 points each, and the burglary conviction counts 1 point, for a total score of 7.

Section 9.94A.030(36)(a) defines vehicular assault as a violent offense.

State v. Freitag · filed 1995-06-22(36)(a)

While 30 days of jail time may be converted to community service for nonviolent offenses under the sentencing guidelines, vehicular assault is defined as a violent offense. RCW 9.94A.380; RCW 9.94A.030(36)(a).

Section 9.94A.030(27) excludes first degree burglary, second degree theft, and harming a police dog from its definition of serious violent offense.

State v. Kisor · filed 1993-02-04(27)

A "serious violent offense" is defined in RCW 9.94A.030(27) as follows: ... It is readily apparent that none of the crimes that Kisor was convicted of fall within the definition of "serious violent offense". Therefore, there was no legal basis for the community placement order and we must set it aside.

Section 9.94A.030(36) excludes a possessory drug offense that is neither defined as a class A felony nor expressly listed as a violent offense.

State v. Kelley · filed 1995-02-24(36)

Kelley’s offense, however, is not defined as a class A felony. Nor does the above statute explicitly list Kelley’s possessory offense. It thus appears from the face of this statute that Kelley’s offense remains nonviolent.

First degree kidnapping is a serious violent offense under § 9.94A.030(31)(a), but first degree robbery is not.

In Re Boot · filed 1996-11-07(31)(a)

The kidnapping counts are "serious violent offenses" under RCW 9.94A.030(31)(a); the robbery counts are not.

First degree kidnapping is a serious violent offense under the section; first degree robbery is not.

State v. Cornejo · filed 1996-11-07(31)(a)

The kidnapping counts are "serious violent offenses” under RCW 9.94A.030(31)(a); the robbery counts are not.

First and second degree murder are serious violent offenses under this section.

State v. Wooten · filed 1997-09-08(31)(a)

First and second degree murder are serious violent offenses. RCW 9.94A.030(31)(a).

First-degree murder is a serious violent offense under this section.

State v. Stackhouse · filed 1997-12-04(31)(a)

Murder in the first degree is a serious violent offense. RCW 9.94A.030(31)(a).

Mere possession of a firearm in a public place does not qualify as a violent offense under the section’s definition.

State v. Calvert · filed 1995-10-24(36)

Mere possession of a firearm in a public place is not a crime in Washington and therefore does not constitute a violent offense pursuant to RCW 9.41.040 (unlawful possession of a firearm by someone previously convicted of a violent offense) and RCW 9.94A.030(36) (definition of violent offense).

The definition of a serious violent offense includes solicitation to commit second degree murder.

In re the Personal Restraint of Mahrle · filed 1997-07-31(27)(a)

Mr. Mahrle’s crime of solicitation to commit second degree murder is a "serious violent offense” under RCW 9.94A.030.

Section 9.94A.030 defines criminal solicitation to commit second degree murder as a serious violent offense.

Matter of Maharle · filed 1997-10-16(27)(a)

Mr. Mahrle's crime of solicitation to commit second degree murder is a "serious violent offense" under RCW 9.94A.030.

First-degree assault is a serious violent offense under subsection (31).

In re the Personal Restraint of Rangel · filed 2000-02-17(31)

The definition of “serious violent offense” includes first-degree assault. RCW 9.94A.030(31).

First degree rape and first degree assault qualify as serious violent offenses under section 9.94A.030.

State v. Brown · filed 2000-03-27(34)(a)

The crimes against Lewis Brown plainly qualify as "serious violent offenses."

Attempted second degree murder is a serious violent offense, while first degree robbery is a violent offense.

State v. Johnston · filed 2000-03-30(31)(a) and (38)(a)

Moreover, attempted second degree murder is a "serious violent offense" while first degree robbery is a "violent offense." RCW 9.94A.030(31)(a) and (38)(a).

Section 9.94A.030(31)(a) classifies first degree manslaughter as a serious violent offense.

State v. Nelson · filed 2000-04-10(31)(a)

This ambiguity can be resolved only by going outside the sentencing documents and consulting RCW 9.94A.030(31)(a), which classifies first degree manslaughter as a "serious violent offense."

Former subsection (13) determines which offenses qualify as serious violent offenses for consecutive sentencing.

State v. Price · filed 2000-11-03(13)

First, the State agrees with Price that the trial court erred in ordering the firearm enhancements for Counts VIII, IX, and Count XI to be served consecutively because these were not “seriously violent offenses” as classified under former RCW 9.94A.030(13) (1996). ... We agree that these firearm enhancements should be served concurrently.

An Oregon third-degree robbery conviction comparable to Washington second-degree robbery is treated as a violent offense under former subsection (41).

State v. McIntyre · filed 2002-06-14(41)

They are that McIntyre’s third degree robbery is treated as both a class B offense, RCW 9A.56.210, and a violent offense, former RCW 9.94A.030(41) (1999).

An Oregon third-degree robbery conviction comparable to Washington second-degree robbery is treated as a violent offense under former subsection (41).

State v. McIntyre · filed 2002-06-28(41)

They are that Mclntyre's third degree robbery is treated as both a class B offense, RCW 9A.56.210, and a violent offense, former RCW 9.94A.030(41) (1999).

First degree kidnapping is a serious violent offense under section 9.94A.030.

State v. Israel · filed 2002-09-09

First degree kidnapping is a serious violent offense. RCW 9.94A.030. Thus, the trial court was required to run the kidnapping counts consecutively.

Section 9.94A.030 defines first degree kidnapping as a serious violent offense.

State v. King · filed 2002-09-09(36)(a)(vi)

First degree kidnapping is a serious violent offense. RCW 9.94A.030(36)(a)(vi). Thus, the trial court was required to run the kidnapping counts consecutively.

First degree assault is a serious violent offense under the section's definition.

State v. Posey · filed 2005-11-08(37)(v)

This is a "serious violent offense." Former RCW 9.94A.030(37)(v). It is an enumerated crime under the automatic decline statute.

First degree burglary is a violent offense under former RCW 9.94A.030(44)(a)(i).

In re the Personal Restraint of Fonseca · filed 2006-04-11(44)(a)(i)

Although defense counsel perceived deportation foreclosed a DOSA, all involved were apparently unaware of Mr. Fonseca’s DOSA ineligibility under RCW 9.94A.660(1)(b) due to his two prior convictions for first degree burglary — a class A felony and violent offense. RCW 9A.52.020(2); former RCW 9.94A.030(44)(a)(i) (2001) (now RCW 9.94A.030(45)(a)(i)).

Section 9.94A.030(45) does not classify conspiracy to commit second degree robbery as a violent offense.

State v. Knight · filed 2006-07-18(45)

Accordingly, conspiracy to commit second degree robbery is not a violent offense under the definitional provision of the SRA.

Second degree kidnapping is not a serious violent offense under subsection (41).

In Re Personal Restraint of VanDelft · filed 2006-11-30(41)

Second degree kidnapping, the offense at issue here, is not a serious violent offense, and therefore (1)(a) governs sentencing for that crime.

Rape of a child in the first degree is a violent offense, but not a serious violent offense, under § 9.94A.030.

State v. Woodruff · filed 2007-02-06(37)

The legislature classified rape of a child in the first degree as a "violent offense" under RCW 9.94A.030(45)(a)(i) (2002), and not a "serious violent offense" under RCW 9.94A.030(37) (2002).

The 2005 definition classifies attempted first degree burglary as a violent crime.

State v. Powell · filed 2007-07-24(48)(a)(i)

Former RCW 9.94A.030(48)(a)(i) (2005) defines attempted first degree burglary as a violent crime.

Section 9.94A.030(41) excludes first-degree child molestation from the definition of a serious violent offense.

State v. Vance · filed 2008-01-07(41)

However, child molestation in the first degree is not established by statute as a serious violent offense. See RCW 9.94A.030(41).

First degree child rape is not a serious violent offense under subsection (41).

State v. Grenning · filed 2008-01-08(41)

The Washington Legislature has not categorized first degree child rape as a serious violent offense. See RCW 9.94A.030(41).

First degree assault is a serious violent offense under RCW 9.94A.030(41)(a)(v).

State v. Kolesnik · filed 2008-09-16(41)(a)(v)

Here, the jury convicted Kolesnik of first degree assault, which is a serious violent offense under RCW 9.94A.030(41)(a)(v).

Under former RCW 9.94A.030(50), vehicular homicide by disregard is not a violent offense because the specific vehicular homicide provision controls over the general class A felony provision.

State v. STATELY · filed 2009-09-29(50)(a)(xiv)

The later subsection, relating specifically to vehicular homicide, is more specific than subsection (i), which relates generally to all class A offenses. Applying the specific-general doctrine, the specific terms of subsection (xiv) prevail and Stately's vehicular homicide by disregard conviction is not a violent offense.

Child molestation and communication with a minor for immoral purposes are not serious violent offenses under subsection (41).

State v. Vance · filed 2010-05-06(41)

Child molestation and communication with a minor for immoral purposes do not qualify as serious violent offenses. See RCW 9.94A.030(41).

First degree assault is a serious violent offense under RCW 9.94A.030(45).

State v. Statler · filed 2011-03-15(45)

Mr. Statler's first degree assault convictions are considered serious violent offenses under RCW 9.94A.030(45).

First degree robbery and second degree kidnapping are violent offenses under RCW 9.94A.030.

State v. Mutch · filed 2011-06-09(36)(a); (53)(a)(i), (vi)

In Washington, first degree robbery and second degree kidnapping are "violent" offenses. Former RCW 9.94A.030(36)(a) (1994); RCW 9.94A.030(53)(a)(i), (vi). Whether Mutch's previous offenses were comparable or "violent" are facts that follow necessarily and are intimately related, as a matter of law, to the actual convictions; he is therefore not entitled to a jury determination of these facts.

First degree rape and attempted first degree rape are serious violent offenses; second degree rape is not.

State v. Breaux · filed 2012-03-12(44)

Unlike second degree rape, first degree rape and attempted first degree rape are defined as "serious violent offenses." RCW 9.94A.030(44).

Section 9.94A.030(44) excludes second degree burglary and second degree assault from the definition of serious violent offense.

State of Washington v. Barclay · filed 2013-04-18(44)

Neither second degree burglary nor second degree assault is a serious violent offense. RCW 9.94A.030(44).

Attempted first degree arson is classified as a violent offense.

State of Washington v. Anderton · filed 2013-07-09(54)(a)(i)

Attempted first degree arson is, however, classified as a I violent offense. RCW 9.94A.030(54)(a)(i).

Section 9.94A.030 classifies first degree robbery as a violent offense, but not a serious violent offense.

State Of Washington v. Ogden · filed 2013-09-23(45), (54)

First degree robbery is a violent offense," but not a "serious violent offense."

Section 9.94A.030 classifies second degree robbery as a violent offense but not a serious violent offense.

State Of Washington v. Berg · filed 2014-01-21(45), (54)

Robbery in the second degree is a violent offense that is not considered a serious violent offense. RCW 9.94A.030(45), (54).

First degree assault and first degree rape are serious violent offenses under subsection (45).

State of Washington v. Kloepper · filed 2014-02-04(45)

Mr. Kloepper's convictions for first degree assault and first degree rape are classified as serious violent offenses. RCW 9.94A.030(45).

Second degree assault is a violent offense, but not a serious violent offense, under the section’s definitions.

State Of Washington, Resp. v. Andre L. Perez, App. · filed 2014-07-14(45), (54)(viii)

But, under RCW 9.94A.030(45), assault in the second degree is not a "serious violent offense." Rather, according to RCW 9.94A.030(54)(viii), assault in the second degree is a "violent offense."

Second degree assault is a violent offense under the section's definition.

State of Washington v. Clayton Mathieu Cotter · filed 2014-10-16(54)(a)(viii)

Under RCW 9.94A.030(54)(a)(viii), second degree assault, Clayton Cotter's current conviction, is a "violent offense."

Section 9.94A.030(45)(a)(viii) includes first degree assault of a child in its definition of serious violent crime.

State of Washington v. Jamison · filed 2014-05-20(45)(a)(viii)

RCW 9.94A.030(45)(a)(viii) expressly includes first degree assault of a child within its definition of "serious violent crime." So subsection (b) ofRCW 9.94A.589(1) applies.

Assault of a child in the second degree is a violent offense under RCW 9.94A.030(54)(ix).

State of Washington v. Caldwell · filed 2015-02-19(54)(ix)

Admittedly, assault of a child in the second degree is both a "violent offense" under RCW 9.94A.030(54)(ix) and an offense against a person under RCW 9.94A.411(2).

First degree murder and first degree assault are serious violent offenses under former subsection (34)(a).

State of Washington v. Nava · filed 2015-06-25(34)(a)

Both first degree murder and first degree assault, class A felonies, are serious violent offenses.

Section 9.94A.030(54) includes second degree assault as a violent offense but does not include attempted second degree assault; the offender score statute nevertheless scores the attempt like the completed offense.

State v. Ashley · filed 2015-05-27(54)

RCW 9.94A.030(54) defines a “violent offense” as including, among other offenses, “[a]ny felony defined under any law as a class A felony or an attempt to commit a class A felony” and second degree assault. RCW 9.94A.030(54)(a)(i), (viii). It does not include attempted second degree assault in this definition.

Second degree murder and first degree assault are serious violent offenses under the section's definition.

State of Washington v. Henkleman · filed 2015-08-11(46)(a)(iii) and (v)

The charges arose from separate and distinct criminal conduct-the murder of Mr. Heath and the assault of Mr. Cooper-and they are both "serious violent offenses" as defined by RCW 9.94A.030(46)(a)(iii) and (v).

Second degree assault is a violent offense but not a serious violent offense.

Personal Restraint Petition Of Larry Louis Anthony Davis · filed 2015-09-29(53)(a)(viii)

Under former RCW 9.94A.030(53)(a)( viii), second degree assault is a “ violent offense that is not considered a serious violent offense” and, thus, the sentencing court “ in fact exceeded its statutory authority” by imposing a 36-month community custody term for that conviction.

First degree arson is a violent offense but not a serious violent offense under § 9.94A.030.

State Of Washington v. Rohn · filed 2016-02-09(46), (55)

These subsections apply because Rohn was convicted of first degree arson, which is a violent offense but not a “serious violent offense” under our criminal code, RCW 9.94A.030(46), (55); RCW 9A.48.020(2); and is also a crime against persons under RCW 9.94A.411(2).

Section 9.94A.030(37)’s definition of “serious violent offense” excludes Shaw’s unlawful-possession and domestic-violence offenses.

Frost v. Van Boening · filed 2016-03-21(37)

Neither of Shaw’s crimes were “serious violent offenses.” Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.030(37) (2002) (defining “serious violent offense”); id. § 9.94A.589(1)(b) (requiring consecutive sentences for defendants who’ve committed two or more serious violent offenses).

Section 9.94A.030 classifies second degree assault as a violent offense for community custody purposes.

State Of Washington v. Romero · filed 2016-02-29(55)(a)(viii)

A sentencing court must impose community custody for violent offenses as defined by RCW 9.94A.030(55) and for crimes against persons as defined by RCW 9.94A.411(2).

Subsection (37)’s definition of “serious violent offense” excludes unlawful possession of drugs and a firearm and second-degree assault with a deadly weapon.

Frost v. Van Boening · filed 2016-08-29(37)

Neither of Shaw’s crimes were “serious violent offenses.” Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.030(37) (2002) (defining “serious violent offense”); id. § 9.94A.589(1)(b) (requiring consecutive sentences for defendants who’ve committed two or more serious violent offenses).

RCW 9.94A.030(55)(viii) classifies assault in the second degree as a violent offense.

State Of Washington v. Martinez · filed 2016-10-10(55)(viii)

Assault in the second degree is a "violent offense" under RCW 9.94A.030(55)(viii).

Assault in the first degree is a serious violent offense.

State Of Washington v. Ibrahim · filed 2017-01-30(46)(a)(v)

Assault in the first degree is a "serious violent offense." RCW 9.94A.030(46)(a)(v).

A felony violation of a no contact order with domestic violence is a nonviolent felony for offender score purposes.

State of Washington v. Douglas · filed 2016-08-16(34), (55)

Because violation of a no contact order with domestic violence is a "nonviolent felony," four of Mr. Douglas's five prior felony convictions count as one point each and the 2013 felony violation of a no contact order with domestic violence counts as two points. RCW 9.94A.030(34), (55); RCW 9.94A.525(7), (2l)(a).

First degree burglary is a violent offense under subsection (55)(i) because it is a class A felony.

State Of Washington, Resp. v. Christopher Hood, App. · filed 2016-09-26(55)(i)

Burglary in the first degree is a "violent offense." See RCW 9.94A.030(55)(i) ("violent offense" means "any felony defined under any law as a class A felony"); RCW 9A.52.020(2) ("Burglary in the first degree is a class A felony").

Former RCW 9.94A.030(27) did not include aggravated first degree murder among serious violent offenses.

Personal Restraint Petition Of Jeremiah Bourgeois · filed 2017-04-03(27)

But aggravated first degree murder was not included among the list of serious violent offenses. See former RCW 9.94A.030(27)(1992).

Section 9.94A.030(55)(a)(vii) defines assault in the second degree as a violent offense.

State Of Washington, V Moriarty · filed 2017-04-11(55)(a)(vii)

Assault in the second degree is a violent offense. RCW 9.94A.030(55)(a)(vii).

Second degree assault is a violent offense for offender-score purposes.

State of Washington v. Jones · filed 2017-04-27(55)(viii)

Second degree assault is a violent offense.

Second degree assault and drive-by shooting are violent offenses that are not considered serious violent offenses.

State Of Washington, V Chith · filed 2017-09-26(55)(a)(viii), (xii)

Second degree assault and drive-by shooting are violent offenses that are not considered serious violent offenses.

Section 9.94A.030 includes conspiracy, attempt, and solicitation to commit a serious violent offense in its definition of serious violent offenses.

State v. Weatherwax · filed 2017-04-06(46)(a)(ix)

The legislature clearly intended to include certain anticipatory offenses-conspiracy, attempt, and solicitation to commit a serious violent offense-in the definition of "serious violent offenses" to which RCW 9.94A.589(1 )(b)'s special consecutive sentencing rules apply. RCW 9.94A.030( 46)(ix).

Section 9.94A.030 defines assault in the first degree as a serious violent offense.

State Of Washington v. Ibrahim · filed 2017-08-21(46)(a)(v)

Assault in the first degree is a "serious violent offense." RCW 9.94A.030(46)(a)(v). ... Because the State charged Ibrahim with three counts of assault in the first degree of three different victims and the jury returned a separate verdict for each count of assault in the first degree for each victim, the court did, not err by imposing a consecutive sentence for the three convictions.

First degree murder is a serious violent offense under the section's definition.

State Of Washington v. Pierce · filed 2018-06-11(46)(a)(i)

First degree murder is a serious violent offense. RCW 9.94A.030(46)(a)(i).

Section 9.94A.030(46) does not classify first or second degree identity theft as a serious violent offense.

State Of Washington, V Fambro · filed 2018-06-26(46)

Neither first nor second degree identity theft is a serious violent offense. RCW 9.94A.030(46).

Former RCW 9.94A.030(41)(a)(v) (2006) classified first degree assault as a serious violent offense.

State Of Washington, V Contreras-rebollar · filed 2018-07-03(41)(a)(v)

In addition, former RCW 9.94A.030(41)(a)(v) (2006) classified first degree assault as a serious violent offense, and former WAC 437-20-010 (2000) established a 24 to 48 month community custody range for serious violent offenses.

Former subsection (38)(a) defines violent offenses to include class A felonies and second degree assault for offender score calculations.

Personal Restraint Petition Of Phillip Lamont Alexander · filed 2018-07-23(38)(a)

The trial court properly counted the assault in the first degree offender score as nine: three points for his prior assault in the first degree conviction,4 two points for his prior robbery in the first degree conviction,5 and two points each for his current offenses of assault in the second degree and burglary in the first degree.

Rendering criminal assistance is a nonviolent felony under the section’s definitions.

State of Washington v. Burnam · filed 2018-07-17(34), (55)

Rendering criminal assistance is a nonviolent felony. RCW 9.94A.030(34), (55); RCW 9A.76.070.

Section 9.94A.030 classifies first degree murder as a serious violent offense for calculating an offender score.

State Of Washington v. Pierce · filed 2018-08-27(46)(a)(i)

First degree murder is a serious violent offense. RCW 9.94A.030(46)(a)(i).

First degree burglary is a violent offense under subsection (55)(a)(i), while third degree assault is not.

State Of Washington v. Compton · filed 2019-04-30(55)(a)(i)

Contrary to Compton’s repeated assertions, first degree burglary, a class A felony, is a violent offense. ... Third degree assault, a class C felony, is not a violent offense. RCW 9A.36.031(2); RCW 9.94A.030(55)(a)(i).

Section 9.94A.030(34) classifies hit and run resulting in death as a nonviolent offense.

State of Washington v. Storms · filed 2018-08-14(34)

Hit and run, death resulting, is a nonviolent offense. RCW 9.94A.030(34).

Former subsection (41)(a) defines class A felonies as violent offenses.

State of Washington v. Bartz · filed 2019-06-06(41)(a)

The statutory rape convictions were class A felonies and were therefore “violent offenses.” Former RCW 9.94A.030(41)(a) (2000).

First degree assault is a serious violent offense.

State of Washington v. Berrian · filed 2019-07-11(45)(a)(v)

Assault in the first degree is a serious violent offense; thus, RCW 9.94A.525(9) applies. Former RCW 9.94A.030(45)(a)(v).

Section 9.94A.030 does not classify attempted residential burglary as a sex crime or serious violent offense.

Post Sentence Petition Of: Keenen Charles Pearson · filed 2019-09-03

But attempted residential burglary, a violation of RCW 9A.28.020 and RCW 9A.52.025, is not a sex crime or a serious violent offense. See RCW 9.94A.030.

Former RCW 9.94A.030 classifies second degree assault domestic violence as a violent offense for offender score purposes.

State Of Washington, V Crawford · filed 2019-09-16(46), (55)

But Crawford’s prior juvenile conviction — second degree assault domestic violence — is classified as a violent offense and his current offenses are classified as violent and serious violent offenses. Former RCW 9.94A.030 (46), (55).

Second degree murder and first degree assault are serious violent offenses under the section’s definition.

State Of Washington v. Wilson · filed 2019-11-25(47)(a)

As an initial matter, second degree murder and first degree assault are serious violent offenses governed by RCW 9.94A.589(1)(b). RCW 9.94A.030(47)(a).

A class A felony is a violent offense under section 9.94A.030(56)(a)(i).

State of Washington v. Waltari · filed 2019-12-12(56)(a)(i)

A class A felony is a violent offense. See RCW 9.94A.030(56)(a)(i). Therefore, if the present convictions include a class A felony, Mr. Waltari is ineligible for a DOSA sentence.

First degree assault is a serious violent offense under section 9.94A.030(47)(a)(v).

Personal Restraint Petition Of Vichai Saly · filed 2019-12-17(47)(a)(v)

The charges against Saly automatically subjected him to the jurisdiction of the adult division2 of the Pierce County Superior Court (“adult court”) because first degree assault is a serious violent offense under RCW 9.94A.030(47)(a)(v).

A class A felony, including first degree arson, is a violent offense under this section.

In Re The Detention Of G.r. · filed 2020-02-04(56)(a)(i)

Under RCW 9.94A.030(56)(a)(i), “[a]ny felony defined under any law as a class A felony or an attempt to commit a class A felony” is a violent offense. As a matter of law, the first degree arson was a violent offense.

Second degree assault is classified as a violent offense.

In Re The Detention Of C.j. · filed 2020-05-05(56)(a)(viii)

And second degree assault is a violent offense under RCW 9.94A.030(56)(a)(viii).

Second degree assault is a violent offense when calculating a juvenile prior felony score.

State of Washington v. Cantu · filed 2020-12-03(55)(a)(viii)

Cantu’s juvenile prior felony score is 2, calculated as follows: 1 point for second degree assault, a violent offense (see RCW 9.94A.030(55)(a)(viii)), plus one-half point for second degree burglary, and one-half point for residential burglary.

Section 9.94A.030(56)’s definition of “violent offense” does not determine whether a prior conviction is a serious offense for first degree unlawful possession of a firearm.

State Of Washington v. Ricky R. Sexton · filed 2020-08-04(56)

But the applicable definition here is not the one defining “violent offense” in RCW 9.94A.030(56), but the one defining “crime of violence” under RCW 9.41.010(4)(a).

Section 9.94A.030(55)(a)(i) defines violent offenses to include class A felonies and attempts to commit them.

State Of Washington v. Alverto · filed 2020-12-29(55)(a)(i)

A violent offense includes “[a]ny felony defined under any law as a class A felony or an attempt to commit a class A felony.” RCW 9.94A.030(55)(a)(i). ... Therefore, these crimes, as well as any attempts to commit these crimes, are violent offenses.

Former § 9.94A.030(54)(a)(vii) classifies second degree arson as a violent offense even when the property was uninhabited.

State Of Washington, V. Backman · filed 2022-10-25(54)(a)(vii)

Former RCW 9.94A.030(54)(a)(vii) (2012) classifies second degree arson as a violent offense. And former RCW 9.94A.030(54)(a)(viii) classifies second degree assault, Backman’s present conviction, as a violent offense. Therefore, the trial court correctly counted Backman’s prior second degree arson conviction as two points.

Conspiracy to commit second degree robbery is not a violent offense under the section’s definition.

In re the Post Sentence Review of: Jorge Luis Monge · filed 2022-10-25(58)(a)

But Mr. Monge’s crime of conviction, conspiracy to commit second degree robbery, is not a violent offense as defined in RCW 9.94A.030(58)(a).

Second degree assault is a violent offense under the section’s definition.

Post Sentence Review Of: Dfirstson Fiti · filed 2023-03-21(58)(a)(viii)

Second degree assault is a violent offense. RCW 9.94A.030(58)(a)(viii).

Second degree assault is a violent offense under this section.

State Of Washington, V. Leonard · filed 2023-03-28(58)(a)(viii)

Second degree assault is a violent offense. RCW 9.94A.030(58)(a)(viii). Therefore, home detention or electronic home monitoring is not a form of partial confinement generally available to a defendant convicted of second degree assault.

Section 9.94A.030 classifies second degree assault as a violent offense.

Detention Of C.R. · filed 2023-11-14(58)(a)(viii)

Here, CR committed acts constituting second degree assault, a violent offense.

The definition of “violent offense” includes any felony classified as a class A felony under any law.

In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of: Steven L. Smith · filed 2023-11-30(54)(a)(i)

“Violent offense” was defined to include “[a]ny felony defined under any law as a class A felony.” Former RCW 9.94A.030(54)(a)(i) (2011). First degree burglary was a class A felony. Former RCW 9A.52.020(2) (1975). Accordingly, the trial court correctly scored this prior offense.

Section 9.94A.030 defines second degree manslaughter as a violent offense but does not include attempted second degree manslaughter.

In the Matter of the Postsentence Review of: Hunter D. Rogers · filed 2024-02-01(58)(a)

While manslaughter in the second degree is a violent offense, attempted manslaughter in the second degree is not.

Vehicular homicide committed by reckless driving is a violent offense.

State Of Washington, V. Petersen · filed 2024-10-28(58)(a)(xiv)

Vehicular homicide in a reckless manner is a violent offense. RCW 46.61.520(1); 9.94A.030(58)(a)(xiv).

Section 9.94A.030 classifies second-degree malicious placement of an explosive as a nonviolent offense and possession of an explosive device as a violent offense.

State Of Washington, V. Tiley · filed 2024-02-20(33), (58)(i)

Malicious placement of an explosive device in the second degree is a class B felony and a seriousness level “IX” offense. RCW 70.74.270(2); RCW 9.94A.515. This offense is a “nonviolent offense.” RCW 9.94A.030(33). Possessing an explosive device is a class A felony and a seriousness level “IX” offense. RCW 70.74.180; RCW 9.94A.515. This offense is a “violent offense.” RCW 9.94A.030(58)(i). We vacate Tiley’s conviction of malicious placement of an explosive in the second degree.

Second degree robbery and second degree assault are violent offenses under this section.

State Of Washington, V. Jacques · filed 2025-04-22(58)(viii), (58)(xi)

Second degree robbery and second degree assault are both violent offenses. RCW 9.94A.030(58)(viii), (xi).

Possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and unlawful possession of a firearm are nonviolent offenses under section 9.94A.030(33).

State Of Washington, V. Kerr · filed 2025-09-23(33)

Possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and unlawful possession of a firearm are both nonviolent offenses. RCW 9.94A.030(33).

Section 9.94A.030(12) defines a determinate sentence whose terms are set at sentencing and generally cannot be changed later.

State v. Shove · filed 1989-07-13(12)

RCW 9.94A.030(12). This "determinate sentence" is ascertained at the time of sentencing, and generally is not subject to later change.

Section 9.94A.030(25) defines “sentence range” as the court’s discretionary range for a nonappealable sentence, which excludes appealable consecutive sentences.

State v. Goss · filed 1990-01-08(25)

'"Sentence range' means the sentencing court's discretionary range in imposing a nonappealable sentence." RCW 9.94A.030(25). ... Sentences ordered to be run consecutively under this provision are appealable. RCW 9.94A.120(14). Therefore, such sentences are not within the sentence range as that term is defined by statute.

Section 9.94A.030(14) limits a determinate sentence to the sentencing elements it lists, whether the sentence is standard or exceptional.

State v. Skillman · filed 1991-04-11(14)

A sentence within either category must be determinate, RCW 9.94A-.120(1) (standard), RCW 9.94A.370(1) (standard), RCW 9.94A.120(3) (exceptional), and a determinate sentence can contain no more than the elements set forth in RCW 9.94A.030(14).

A determinate sentence includes a term of community supervision.

State v. Roberts · filed 1994-12-01(14)

Determinate sentences under the SRA include terms of community supervision as well as terms of total or partial confinement. RCW 9.94A.030(14).

A determinate sentence must state the length of confinement and community supervision with exactitude; the sentencing court cannot leave the DOC to ensure that the sentence stays within the statutory maximum.

State v. Linerud · filed 2008-12-29(18)

Rather, the SRA mandates that courts impose a determinate sentence-a sentence that states, with exactitude, the total time of confinement and community supervision. ... Because a court may not impose a sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum and must impose a determinate sentence, it may not sentence a defendant to a term that, on its face, exceeds the statutory maximum and leave to the DOC responsibility for assuring that the sentence is lawful.

The definition of “standard sentence range” includes a range increased by a sentencing enhancement, not just an unenhanced base range.

Gutierrez v. Department of Corrections · filed 2008-07-24(44)

First of all, the statutory definition does not suggest the phrase is meant to apply only to unenhanced "base" ranges. "`Standard sentence range' means the sentencing court's discretionary range in imposing a nonappealable sentence." RCW 9.94A.030(44). This definition does not suggest that it is a term of art for the unenhanced "base" range.

The standard sentence range includes enhancements added to the base range.

In re the Postsentencing Review of Gutierrez · filed 2008-07-24(44)

First of all, the statutory definition does not suggest the phrase is meant to apply only to unenhanced “base” ranges. “ ‘Standard sentence range’ means the sentencing court’s discretionary range in imposing a nonappealable sentence.” RCW 9.94A.030(44). This definition does not suggest that it is a term of art for the unenhanced “base” range.

A sentence remains determinate even if earned release credits may reduce the time actually served.

In Re Brooks · filed 2009-07-23(21)

The SRA specifically states that a sentence is not rendered indeterminate by the fact that a defendant may earn early release credits. RCW 9.94A.030(21). ... We hold that Brooks's sentence is not indeterminate.

A sentence remains determinate even if the offender may reduce confinement through earned early release.

State v. Winkle · filed 2011-01-10(21)

The SRA specifically states that a sentence is not rendered indeterminate by the fact that a defendant may earn early release credits. RCW 9.94A.030(21).

A determinate sentence states the length of community custody with exactitude; a term equal to any period of earned early release is indeterminate.

State of Washington v. Bonser · filed 2014-04-22(18)

The trial court exceeded its statutory authority by imposing an indeterminate term of community custody. Mr. Bonser's term of community custody equal to "any period of earned early release" is an indeterminate sentence.

Section 9.94A.030(18) provides that the possibility of earned early release does not make a sentence indeterminate.

State v. Bruch · filed 2015-03-19(18)

A sentence is not indeterminate just because an offender may earn early release credits. RCW 9.94A.030(18).

A sentence includes total or partial confinement and any term of community custody imposed by the court.

State of Washington v. Oster · filed 2015-01-20(8)

A sentence includes periods of total or partial confinement, as well as any term of community custody imposed by the court.

A determinate sentence must state the exact length of confinement or the other sentence components specified in the definition; an exceptional life sentence for first degree assault does not satisfy that requirement.

State Of Washington v. Esquivel · filed 2017-03-06(18)

We accept the State's concession that the trial court erred in imposing an exceptional sentence of life for Esquivel's first degree assault conviction. Under the Sentencing Reform Act, the court must generally impose a determinate sentence that "states with exactitude the number of actual years, months, or days of total confinement, ... of partial confinement, of community custody, the number of actual hours or days of community restitution work, or dollars or terms of a legal financial obligation."

Section 9.94A.030’s definitions apply unless context clearly requires otherwise; when determining the sentencing grid range, “standard sentence range” means the range at the applicable grid intersection before adjustment for the statutory maximum.

State of Washington v. Cannata · filed 2018-04-24

But then, as now, the definition provision of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), chapter 9.94A RCW, states that its definitions apply “[u]nless the context clearly requires otherwise.” RCW 9.94A.030; and see LAWS OF 2000, ch. 28, § 2. Provisions of the SRA that explain how to arrive at the sentencing court’s discretionary range use the term “standard sentence range” in a different sense that is not adjusted for the statutory maximum sentence. In those provisions, it means the sentence range appearing at the applicable intersection in the sentencing grid.

Section 9.94A.030’s definitions apply unless context clearly requires otherwise; in provisions calculating a sentence, “standard sentence range” can mean the grid range before adjustment for the statutory maximum.

State of Washington v. Cannata · filed 2018-07-12

But then, as now, the definition provision of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), chapter 9.94A RCW, states that its definitions apply “[u]nless the context clearly requires otherwise.” RCW 9.94A.030; and see LAWS OF 2000, ch. 28, § 2. Provisions of the SRA that explain how to arrive at the sentencing court’s discretionary range use the term “standard sentence range” in a different sense that is not adjusted for the statutory maximum sentence. In those provisions, it means the sentence range appearing at the applicable intersection in the sentencing grid.

Section 9.94A.030(18) defines a determinate sentence as one that states the exact duration of confinement in years, months, or days.

State Of Washington v. Amos · filed 2020-04-28(18)

A determinate sentence is a sentence that “states with exactitude the number of actual years, months, or days of total confinement.” RCW 9.94A.030(18). Amos’s sentence was indeed a determinate sentence of 116 months.

A determinate sentence states the exact number of years, months, or days of total confinement.

State Of Washington, V. Lacharite · filed 2021-11-08(18)

A “determinate sentence” is “a sentence that states with exactitude the number of actual years, months, or days of total confinement.” RCW 9.94A.030(18). Here, the record shows that the trial court ordered an exact term of confinement.

Section 9.94A.030(49) defines a standard sentence range as the sentencing court’s discretionary range for imposing a nonappealable sentence.

State Of Washington, V. David Carpenter Anderson · filed 2023-08-21(49)

The Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) defines “standard sentence range” as “the sentencing court’s discretionary range in imposing a nonappealable sentence.” RCW 9.94A.030(49). Based on this definition in the SRA, it is clear that RCW 10.95.030(3)(a)(ii) provides a standard range discretionary sentence for any person who is convicted of the crime of aggravated murder when the person is at least 16 but less than 18 years old, such that they “shall be sentenced to a maximum term of life imprisonment and a minimum term of total confinement of no less than twenty-five years.” The statute thus creates a standard range from a minimum term of 25 years to a maximum term of life imprisonment.

Section 9.94A.030(35) bars home detention as part of a sex offender’s sentence.

State v. Speaks · filed 1991-09-18(35)

Home detention cannot be part of the sentence of a sex offender, RCW 9.94A.030(35), and it was not part of the sentence in this case. When the defendant was on home detention prior to sentencing, he was not serving any part of his sentence, and he was not accumulating time for which he would later be entitled to credit.

Section 9.94A.030 defines confinement to include partial confinement and electronically monitored home detention, allowing time spent in presentence home detention to count toward a sentence.

State v. Speaks · filed 1992-05-21(7), (20), (31)

Since the legislatively enacted SRA provides for credit for "all" confinement, and since confinement includes partial confinement, and partial confinement includes home detention, it is evident that the Legislature intended to afford a defendant credit for time served on home detention prior to sentencing.

Former RCW 9.94A.030(36) requires electronic surveillance for home release to qualify as home detention.

State v. Vasquez · filed 1994-10-11(36)

Mr. Vasquez was not electronically monitored during his home release; he therefore was not under home detention as defined by former RCW 9.94A.030(36).

Confinement includes partial confinement, and home detention is a form of partial confinement that can qualify as a detention facility for first degree escape.

State v. Parker · filed 1995-01-26(8), (40)

Since "home detention” comes within the definition of "detention facility”, it is clear the stipulated facts support Mr. Parker’s conviction for first degree escape.

Former subsection (36) generally excludes drug offenders from home detention, and that classification satisfies equal protection under rational basis review.

State v. Wallace · filed 1997-05-27(36)

Former RCW 9.94A.030(36), which was recodified in 1995 as RCW 9.94A.185, provides for a program of partial confinement that is available to certain offenders who are confined in a private residence. ... We hold that the home detention statute does not violate equal protection.

Section 9.94A.030 defines total confinement as confinement to an institution for 24 hours a day and treats home detention as partial confinement.

State v. Fuller · filed 1997-12-16(26), (35)

Total confinement is confinement to an institution for 24 hours a day. RCW 9.94A.030(35). Home detention is deemed partial confinement. RCW 9.94A.030(26).

Release conditions that confine an offender to home and work under electronic monitoring can satisfy the definitions of partial confinement and home detention.

State v. Swiger · filed 2005-11-10(26), (42)

Mr. Swiger’s release conditions then confined him to work and his home and satisfy the requirements of “partial confinement” necessary for “home detention.” Former RCW 9-.94A.030(26). And these conditions satisfy the requirements of home detention. Former RCW 9.94A.030(42).