Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.030

The definition of a repetitive domestic violence offense does not include cyberstalking, so a gross misdemeanor cyberstalking conviction does not add a point to the offender score under that definition.

State of Washington v. Roque · filed 2019-03-21(42)

Furthermore, the definition of “[r]epetitive domestic violence offense” does not include cyberstalking.

Child molestation can qualify as a domestic violence offense under RCW 9.94A.030(20).

State of Washington v. Smith · filed 2019-06-06(20)

Any failure by counsel to lodge an objection did not constitute deficient performance since child molestation is properly characterized as a domestic violence offense.

Former § 9.94A.030(42) defines repetitive domestic violence to include a nonfelony domestic violence violation of a no-contact order.

State Of Washington v. Mcclain · filed 2020-04-07(42)

Although McClain’s judgment and sentence did not specifically mention the relevant statutes, based on the above, we conclude that the State nonetheless carried its burden to prove by a preponderance of evidence that McClain’s 2014 misdemeanor convictions were repetitive domestic violence offenses as defined in chapter 9.94A RCW.

Section 9.94A.030(42) includes nonfelony domestic violence assault and nonfelony domestic violence violations of protection or no-contact orders as repetitive domestic violence offenses.

State Of Washington, V. Santiago · filed 2021-08-02(42)(a)(i), (ii), (iii)

Relevant to our review is that any domestic violence assault that is not a felony or any domestic violence violation of a protection order or no-contact order that is not a felony offense qualifies as a “repetitive domestic violence offense.”

Section 9.94A.030(20) incorporates the domestic violence definitions in both RCW 10.99.020 and RCW 26.50.010.

State of Washington v. Soderberg · filed 2022-06-28(20)

We disagree with Martie Soderberg’s contention that RCW 10.99.020’s and RCW 26.50.010’s definitions for “domestic violence” are not interchangeable. In 2013, RCW 9.94A.030 read, in relevant part: ... (20) “Domestic violence” has the same meaning as defined in RCW 10.99.020 and 26.50.010. ... Based on the foregoing, both statutory definitions of “domestic violence” correspond. Contrary to Soderberg’s wish, RCW 10.99.020’s language cannot be ignored.

A third degree assault against a biological child qualifies as a domestic violence offense for offender score purposes when it was pleaded and proven.

State Of Washington, V. Davis · filed 2023-06-20(20)(a)

We hold that the State met its burden of proving by a preponderance that Davis’ prior assault in the third degree was a pleaded and proven “domestic violence offense” under RCW 9.94A.030.

Section 9.94A.030(42) includes fourth degree assault and gross misdemeanor restraining order convictions among repetitive domestic violence offenses.

State of Washington v. Daniel S. Burnett, Jr. · filed 2023-10-24(42)

Further, Mr. Burnett has three prior convictions for “[r]epetitive domestic violence offenses,” which count as 1 point each, for a total of 3 points. RCW 9.94A.525(21)(d); RCW 9.94A.030(42) (two fourth degree assault convictions sentenced in 2018 and a gross misdemeanor restraining order conviction sentenced in 2018).

Section 9.94A.030(55) includes psychological abuse within its definition of a victim of domestic violence when the abuse is part of a pattern of coercive and controlling behavior.

State of Washington v. Sanchez · filed 2024-06-06(55)

Whether a defendant attempts to keep a domestic violence victim from initially reporting the crime or attempts to convince the victim to retract their allegations after the fact, the conduct could constitute psychological abuse as part of a pattern of coercive and controlling behavior of the victim of domestic violence.

Section 9.94A.030(42)(a)(ii) and (iv) include domestic violence no contact order violations and harassment as repetitive domestic violence offenses even when they are misdemeanors.

State of Washington v. Kieffer · filed 2024-05-14(42)(a)(ii), (iv)

Because violation of a no contact order-DV and harassment-DV qualify as repetitive domestic violence ... offenses even where they are misdemeanors, Mr. Kieffer’s convictions on those eight charges count as points on his offender score. RCW 9.94A.030(42)(a)(ii), (iv).

Sexual motivation exists when one purpose of a crime is the defendant's sexual gratification, which may be inferred from conduct intended to continue a coercive sexual relationship.

State of Washington v. Bush · filed 2015-03-17(46)

"Sexual motivation" means that one of the purposes for the crime was the defendant's sexual gratification. Former RCW 9.94A.030(46) (2010). ... Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the jury could reasonably infer that the assault and intimidation Bush inflicted on Fawn were for the purpose of continuing the sexual gratification.

Sexual motivation exists when sexual gratification is one purpose for committing the crime.

State Of Washington, V McCracken · filed 2016-07-06(47)

Thus, the stipulated facts support the trial court’s finding that one purpose McCracken remained unlawfully in the house was for his sexual gratification.

Sexual motivation means acting for purposes of sexual gratification; evidence of masturbation can support that finding when it is unnecessary to prove the underlying offense.

State Of Washington v. Eckhart · filed 2016-10-03(47)

A court may impose an exceptional sentence if a crime was committed with sexual motivation, i.e., for purposes of sexual gratification. RCW 9.94A.835(2); RCW 9.94A.030(47). ... Thus, the evidence of masturbation was not necessary to prove the underlying offense and supported the jury's finding of sexual motivation.

A crime is sexually motivated when one purpose for committing it is the defendant’s sexual gratification.

State Of Washington v. Peterson · filed 2017-01-31(47)

The fact that sexual intercourse occurred supports the trial court’s conclusion that the assault was committed for Peterson’s sexual gratification, making the crime sexually motivated under former RCW 9.94A.030(47).

A sexual motivation finding requires proof that the defendant acted for the purpose of sexual gratification.

State of Washington v. Hubbard · filed 2018-03-22(48)

S.L.’s testimony provided a sufficient basis for the jury to find Mr. Hubbard provided drugs to her for the purpose of sexual gratification, as required by RCW 9.94A.030(48).

Section 9.94A.030(48) defines sexual motivation as committing a crime for the purpose of sexual gratification; an offense with that motivation involves sexual conduct.

Quintero-Cisneros v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2018-06-11(48)

Quintero’s offense of conviction requires proof that one of the purposes for which the defendant committed the underlying assault was “for the purpose of his . . . sexual gratification.” Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.030(48). We have held that an offense committed for the purpose of sexual gratification necessarily involves “sexual conduct.” United States v. Rocha-Alvarado, 843 F.3d 802, 808 (9th Cir. 2016). Quintero’s offense is thus a categorical match for the first element of the federal generic offense.

Section 9.94A.030(48) defines sexual motivation as having sexual gratification as one purpose for committing a crime.

State of Washington v. Luis Alberto Luna Landeros · filed 2018-08-30(48)

“Sexual motivation” means that one of the defendant’s purposes in committing the crime was sexual gratification. ... In turn, the findings of fact support beyond a reasonable doubt the trial court’s conclusion that at least one purpose of Mr. Landeros’s burglary was his sexual gratification.

Sexual motivation means that sexual gratification was one purpose for committing the crime.

State Of Washington v. Conaway · filed 2018-12-03(48)

Sexual motivation "means that one of the purposes for which the defendant committed the crime was for the purpose of his or her sexual gratification." RCW 9.94A.030(48) and .835. This requires the jury to consider the defendant's motive.

Sexual motivation requires proof that sexual gratification was one purpose for committing the crime.

State Of Washington, V Guillermo · filed 2021-03-30(48)

While the indecent exposure charge does not require proof of sexual motivation, the sexual motivation aggravating factor required the State to prove Guillermo committed the indecent exposure for his sexual gratification.

Sexual motivation requires proof that the defendant committed the offense for his own sexual gratification.

State Of Washington, V Dunlap · filed 2023-01-10(48)

The touching of O.A.s thigh was the same conduct upon which the fourth degree assault with sexual motivation rested and was sufficient for proving fourth degree assault with sexual motivation. See RCW 9.94A.030(48); Jarvis, 160 Wn. App. at 119.

Sexual motivation requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that sexual gratification was one purpose for committing the crime.

State Of Washington, V. Harm · filed 2024-10-01(49)

An allegation of sexual motivation requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that sexual gratification was among the defendant’s purposes in committing the charged offense. ... Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the State, the reasonable inference is that Harm received sexual gratification from the assault and, accordingly, the assault was sexually motivated.

Section 9.94A.030(48) defines sexual motivation as committing a crime for the purpose of sexual gratification, and that definition is sufficiently clear to give notice of the sexual motivation enhancement.

State of Washington v. Ownbey · filed 2024-10-22(48)

RCW 9.94A.835, the definition of “sexual motivation” contained in RCW 9.94A.030(48), and our Supreme Court have made sufficiently clear that crimes committed for a defendant’s sexual gratification carry a higher penalty. Mr. Ownbey fails to demonstrate that the enhancement is unconstitutionally vague.

A community protection zone extends 880 feet from a public or private school, and the statutory definitions make a residency restriction using that term sufficiently clear.

State of Washington v. Peters · filed 2019-09-17(8)

“Community protection zone” is defined by the SRA to mean “the area within eight hundred eighty feet of the facilities and grounds of a public or private school.” Former RCW 9.94A.030(8). ... Particularly because this is a mandatory condition that uses the statutorily defined term “community protection zone,” whose definition relies, in turn, on the statutorily defined terms “private school” and “public school,” the condition is not vague.

Former § 9.94A.030(45)(v) and (vii) classify first degree rape and first degree assault as serious violent offenses.

State Of Washington v. Westwood · filed 2020-03-19(45)(v), (vii)

Westwood’s convictions for first degree rape and first degree assault are classified as serious violent offenses. Former RCW 9.94A.030(45)(v), (vii) (2012).

Under former RCW 9.94A.030, first degree assault qualifies as a serious violent offense and a violent offense when calculating offender scores.

Personal Restraint Petition Of Carlos Jermaine Hull · filed 2020-10-13(46)(a)(v), (55)(a)(i)

But for the first first degree assault conviction and the first degree unlawful possession of a firearm, the second first degree assault conviction is a serious violent “other current offense” that counts as 3 points. ... And for the second degree assault conviction, both first degree assault convictions are violent “other current offenses” that count as 2 points and his first degree unlawful possession of a firearm is an “other current offense” that counts as 1 point.

First degree kidnapping is a serious violent offense for offender score purposes.

In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of: Joseph Russell Pool · filed 2020-12-15(46)(vi)

Kidnapping in the first degree is a serious violent offense. RCW 9.94A.030(46)(vi).

First-degree assault is a serious violent offense under the statute's definitions.

Personal Restraint Petition Of: Daniel Galeana Ramirez · filed 2021-11-23(46)(v)

Under RCW 9.94A.030(46)(v), assault in the first degree is a “serious violent offense.”

First degree assault and first degree kidnapping are serious violent offenses.

State of Washington v. Tapia · filed 2022-02-08(46)(a)(v), (vi)

First degree assault and first degree kidnapping are serious violent offenses.

First degree kidnapping and first degree rape are serious violent offenses under this section.

State Of Washington, V. Glymph · filed 2022-06-07(46)(vi), (vii)

Here, Glymph was convicted of first degree kidnapping and first degree rape, both of which are serious violent offenses. RCW 9.94A.030(46)(vi), (vii).

Section 9.94A.030 defines first-degree assault as a serious violent offense.

State Of Washington, V. Ramos · filed 2022-11-07(46)(v)

Assault in the first degree is also defined as a “serious violent offense” under RCW 9.94A.030(46)(v).

Section 9.94A.030(46)(a) classifies attempted first degree murder and first degree assault as serious violent offenses.

State Of Washington, V Clara M. Rood · filed 2022-12-13(46)(a)

Under RCW 9.94A.589(1)(b), attempted first degree murder is a serious violent offense that carries a seriousness level of XV, the same seriousness level as completed first degree murder. State v. Weatherwax, 188 Wn.2d 139, 149-50, 392 P.3d 1054 (2017); RCW 9.94A.515; RCW 9.94A.030(46)(a)(i), (ix). First degree assault is a serious violent offence that has a seriousness level of XII. RCW 9.94A.515; RCW 9.94A.030(46)(a)(v).

First-degree robbery is not a serious violent offense under the section’s definition.

State of Washington v. Louis L. Hanson, aka Louis Montoya · filed 2023-03-21(46)

Robbery in the first degree is not classified as a serious violent offense.

First degree assault is a serious violent offense under section 9.94A.030(46)(v).

State Of Washington, V. Bale · filed 2023-07-05(46)(v)

Assault in the first degree is a serious violent offense.

Second degree assault is a violent offense under subsection (55)(a)(viii), but not a serious violent offense under subsection (46).

State of Washington v. Pearson · filed 2023-08-10(55)(a)(viii), (46)

Second degree assault is a violent offense under former RCW 9.94A.030(55)(a)(viii) (2020), not a serious violent offense under RCW 9.94A.030(46).

Second degree robbery and second degree malicious mischief are neither serious violent offenses nor sex offenses.

State of Washington v. Aaron · filed 2024-02-21(46), (47)

Neither second degree robbery nor second degree malicious mischief is a serious violent offense or a sex offense. Former RCW 9.94A.030(46), (47).

First degree assault and first degree kidnapping are serious violent offenses.

State of Washington v. Rodriguez · filed 2024-02-29(46)(a)(v), (vi)

First degree assault and first degree kidnapping are serious violent offenses. See RCW 9.94A.030(46)(a)(v), (vi).

First degree rape and attempted first degree rape are serious violent offenses.

Personal Restraint Petition Of Navin A Milko · filed 2025-05-19(46)(a)(vii), (ix)

The jury convicted Milko inter alia, in count 1, of rape in the first degree and, in count 2, attempted rape in the first degree. Both crimes are serious violent offenses under RCW 9.94A.030(46)(a)(vii), (ix).

First degree assault is a serious violent offense.

State of Washington v. Bostick · filed 2025-06-24(46)(a)(v)

First degree assault is a serious violent offense. RCW 9.94A.030(46)(a)(v).

Subsection (46)(a)(iii) defines murder in the second degree as a serious violent offense.

Personal Restraint Petition Of Miguel Angel Miranda · filed 2026-02-02(46)(a)(iii)

To the extent Smith advised Miranda that he was eligible for or entitled to a one-third reduction in his sentence, that was incorrect. ERT may not exceed 10 percent of a sentence for an offender who, like Miranda, is convicted of murder in the second degree. See RCW 9.94A.729(3)(c) (ERT may not exceed ten percent for an offender convicted of a serious violent offense committed after July 1, 2003); RCW 9.94A.030(46)(a)(iii) (murder in the second degree is a serious violent offense).

Section 9.94A.030(46) includes second degree attempted murder and first degree assault in the definition of “serious violent offense.”

State of Washington v. Knox · filed 2026-02-03(46)

“Serious violent offense” includes both second degree attempted murder and first degree assault. RCW 9.94A.030(46)(a)(iii), (a)(v), (a)(ix).

Section 9.94A.030(47) includes aggravated first degree murder within its definition of “serious violent offense” because it is a type of first degree murder.

Personal Restraint Petition Of: Ernest Dale Benson, Jr · filed 2026-04-28(47)

When Monschke invalidated LWOP sentences for young adults, the legislature did not need to add aggravated first degree murder to the definition of “serious violent offense” because that definition already included first degree murder.

Section 9.94A.030(9) treats a guilty plea followed by a deferred sentence and dismissal as a conviction that can establish a prior-conviction element.

State Of Washington v. Conaway · filed 2021-03-01(9)

Because under the plain language of RCW 9.94A.030(9) a deferred sentence is a conviction, the State’s proof of this deferred sentence was sufficient to establish the predicate offense element of indecent exposure.

Section 9.94A.030(9) defines a conviction to include a guilty verdict.

State of Washington v. Guajardo · filed 2021-06-17(9)

A charge is not a conviction. But RCW 9.94A.030(9) defines a “conviction” as including a verdict of guilty.

Section 9.94A.030(9) defines conviction to include a juvenile court’s finding of guilt during a deferred disposition.

State v. M.Y.G. · filed 2022-05-19(9)

Under the SRA definition, this finding of guilt constitutes a conviction triggering RCW 43.43.754’s DNA sample requirement.

Section 9.94A.030(9) includes a finding of guilt in its definition of conviction, so a deferred sentence is a conviction.

State of Washington v. Kevin Harrell, Jr. · filed 2022-06-16(9)

A deferred sentence is a conviction: it requires an initial finding of guilt. See RCW 9.94A.030(9) (defining “conviction” as, inter alia, “a finding of guilty”); State v. Harper, 50 Wn. App. 578, 580, 749 P.2d 722 (1988) (“[A] deferred sentence is a ‘conviction served’ for purposes of the [Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), chapter 9.94A RCW].”).

Section 9.94A.030(9) includes an accepted guilty plea in its definition of conviction, even if the case is later dismissed, and that definition may apply outside sentencing.

State v. Conaway · filed 2022-06-30(9)

The legislature’s inclusion of that title within the SRA shows the legislature’s intention to apply the SRA definition of “conviction” to adjudications of guilt, including guilty pleas, when it is relevant, not just to issues involving sentencing.

A conviction includes acceptance of a guilty plea, a guilty verdict, or a finding of guilt.

State Of Washington, V. Harry Lee Jones, Jr. · filed 2022-08-22(9)

This standard is appropriate whenever information is challenged after a conviction, regardless of its form. A conviction is an “adjudication of guilt” and includes “a verdict of guilty, a finding of guilty, and acceptance of a plea of guilty.” RCW 9.94A.030(9).

A conviction includes acceptance of a guilty plea, which counts the same as a jury verdict in determining whether a defendant has been convicted.

State Of Washington, V. Johnson · filed 2022-01-18(9)

Under RCW 9.94A.030(9), “conviction” means “an adjudication of guilt,” including “a verdict of guilty, a finding of guilty, and acceptance of a plea of guilty.” We treat a guilty plea the same as we would a jury verdict to determine whether a defendant has been convicted.

Section 9.94A.030(9) defines conviction to include a no-contest plea for offender score purposes.

State of Washington v. Zimmerman · filed 2025-03-28(9)

However, even a plea of no-contest under both the laws of Washington and Oregon satisfies the definition of “conviction.”

The definition of “offender” includes juveniles but does not expand a juvenile court’s authority to impose conditions in dispositional orders.

State of Washington v. D.K.V. · filed 2021-04-01(35)

We conclude that the SRA’s definition of “offender” is not a sufficiently express provision, as required by RCW 13.04.450, to expand a juvenile court’s limited authority to impose conditions in dispositional orders.